SEESP

European Studies Centre, University of Oxford

Balancing Disappointment and Enthusiasm:

Developments in EU-Balkan Relations during 2003

SEESP OPINION PIECE

Dimitar Bechev

SEESP Research Associate

Enter the Greeks

When taking over the EU presidency, Greece made it clear that the Balkans would be top priority.

As early as January 2003, Foreign Minister George Papandreou's team issued an ambitious

strategy paper on the Western Balkans, confident that neighbouring Greece could make a

difference whilst at the EU's helm (Greek Presidency Priorities for the Western Balkans, 13

January 2003). It aimed to upgrade the Stabilisation and Association Process (SAP), the EU's

policy tool in the Western Balkans, into an enlargement-oriented framework. The paper spoke of

a 'Balkan European Integration Process' and a high-level Western-Balkans-EU forum to discuss

issues of common interest. In addition, the Greek Presidency pushed for the inclusion of

economic and social cohesion as goals on the EU agenda for the Western Balkans. The idea was

to channel funds into local-level initiatives targeting structural problems such as unemployment,

de-industrialisation and the lack of foreign investment. The Greek paper identified the EU-Balkan

summit scheduled to take place in Thessaloniki in June 2003 as the forum at which the region's

integration into the Union could be speeded up.

A year down the road, the question is whether the events lived up to initial expectations. It seems

appropriate to look at the bigger picture and put the question in context.

The bigger picture: integration or division?

Greece’s bold move was indeed timely in light of the developments occurring beyond the Western

Balkans. In the EU annals, 2003 is likely to be remembered for the conclusion of the accession

treaty with the ten new members in Athens on 16 June. The enlargement endgame was delivered

during the December 2002 Copenhagen Summit, which also backed the aim of the two "left-

outs", Bulgaria and Romania, joining the Union by 2007. The Council also made pledges to both

of these countries for substantially increased funds ahead of accession. The Western Balkan,

however, feared they were the losers in the game. Uncertainty over the future of the enlargement

project post-2004/2007 clouded their outlook.

These fears at least partly reflected important changes at the global level, with the Balkans

caught between the EU and US. With international attention shifting to the Middle East, the region

could not rely on special treatment from the West. What is more, the squabbles within the EU,

and between France, Germany and the US over the war in Iraq held South East Europe hostage.

Virtually all of the regional governments were faced with a tough choice over the International

Criminal Tribunal as the US insisted on signing bilateral treaties with them to exempt its own

citizens from the court's jurisdiction. What is more, to some EU members' profound dislike, most

Balkan states were quick to jump on the "New Europe" bandwagon and support the war in Iraq.

Nevertheless, the EU-US cooperation on a range of Western Balkan issues was preserved, and

even advanced, with the EU launching a police mission in Bosnia-Herzegovina in January 2003

and taking up peacekeeping duties in FYR Macedonia from NATO two months later. For its part,

the Greek Presidency did a good job in ensuring that the EU remained focused on the Western

Balkans despite Iraq. Luckily, the tectonic moves in world politics had little negative fallout on the

region and its progress towards the EU.

Western Balkans' progress towards the EU

The success of the SAP can be measured by what has been accomplished by the individual

Western Balkan states. In January 2003, Albania started formal negotiations for a Stabilisation

and Association Agreement (SAA), having been turned down three years earlier. Based on its

progress in implementing the SAA signed in 2001, Croatia submitted a membership application in

February and declared its readiness to open accession talks. In response, Zagreb was asked to

complete a 3,000-page questionnaire to assess its level of preparedness. The Commission

received the answers in October and is due to submit to the Council an avis on the Croatian

application in spring 2004. Serbia and Montenegro fared less well. The two republics could not

bridge their differences over external trade regimes, which is a key EU condition for the common

state to start SAA negotiations. Thus the tensions inherent in preserving the federal state, under

EU pressure, ultimately hindered progress on the SAP agenda. Scandals related to the

unauthorized re-export of sugar to the EU under the preferential terms extended to the Western

Balkans further marred Serbia's image, not to mention the political instability in Belgrade all

through the year culminating in yet another unsuccessful presidential election. Serbia and Croatia

faced comparable international pressure over the Hague-based International Criminal Tribunal for

former Yugoslavia (ICTY). In the case of Croatia this has important consequences for its EU bid.

The UK and Netherlands postponed the ratification of the SAA and made progress conditional on

Zagreb's cooperation in extraditing high-profile figures such as General Gotovina. Motivated by

Croatia's example, FYR Macedonia has been considering submitting a membership application

but no words of encouragement have come from Brussels or the Member States' capitals. On 18

November, the Commission adopted a feasibility study on Bosnia, paving the way for a SAA, but

made the start of negotiations conditional on further progress on issues like the reintegration of

Mostar and the fight against organised crime. Overall, the SAP moved forward but the progress

was thorny and uneven.

Thessaloniki and the enhanced SAP

The run-up to Thessaloniki saw increasing foreign policy activism in the Western Balkans. The

region's leaders used all possible diplomatic fora to flag up their ambitions. Gathered in Ohrid in

early June, they demanded that the EU should give the region a clear membership horizon.

Croatia insisted (and indeed is still insisting) on acceding alongside Bulgaria and Romania in

2007. President Svetozar Marovic was quick to announce that the same applied to Serbia and

Montenegro. Lofty rhetoric, often directed toward domestic audiences, was sometimes followed

by more down-to-earth suggestions. It was requested that, within the Commission, the

Enlargement Directorate should take over responsibility for the Western Balkans. The Western

Balkans also demanded that funds left from the 2004 enlargement be channeled into the CARDS

programme.

Given that the issues of candidacy and extra funding monopolised the headlines, it was no

surprise that the Thessaloniki Summit proved a disappointment for the Western Balkan politicians

and citizenry. Promotion to candidate status was not on the table, while CARDS was beefed up

with only 200 million euro for the period until 2006. The EU referred to the region's membership

perspective, but adhered to the 'potential candidates' formula introduced during the Feira

European Council in 2000, and was reluctant to transfer the SAP to Commissioner Verheugen.

Finally, social and economic cohesion for the region did not find a place on the agenda despite

Greece's support. As a result, many in the region interpreted Thessaloniki as a failed opportunity

(RFE/RL Newsline, 23 June; Patrick Moore, EU Membership for the Western Balkan States

Remains "Over There, Far Away", RFE/RL Balkan Report, 27 June 2003).

The post-Thessaloniki pessimism, however, was partly unjustified considering the outcome of the

summit. Although the level of political commitment remained unaltered, the SAP was clearly

enriched with a variety of instruments that brought it as close as possible to the enlargement

template. This was sanctioned by the Thessaloniki Agenda, a document put together by the

Commission and endorsed by the EU General Affairs Council (The Western Balkans and

European Integration Communication from the Commission to the Council and the European

Parliament COM (2003) 285 - 21/05/03; Thessaloniki Agenda for the Western Balkans: Moving

towards European Integration, Luxembourg, 16 June 2003). It introduced European Partnerships,

a mechanism for supporting each country's progress through identifying priorities across sectors.

Termed European Integration Partnerships in the Commission's original proposal, the mechanism

is clearly modeled on the Accession Partnerships in force for the candidates of Central and

Eastern Europe. To strengthen the SAP states' institutions, the EU also launched twinning

exchanges with administrative staff from the Member States, and made the region eligible for

technical assistance for harmonising national legislation with the acquis communautaire. Brussels

also opened its research and education programmes. In addition, the Thessaloniki Agenda

inaugurated a regular EU-Western Balkan forum for political dialogue at the ministerial level on a

number of common-interest issues, including Justice and Home Affairs. Its first meeting took

place on 9 December in Brussels.

It is fair to say that although the EU-Balkan Summit was not a breakthrough, it added much flesh

to the bone by transforming the SAP into a more coherent EU integration framework. What is

more, the Thessaloniki Agenda gives the Commission a greater role in the SAP, which is a long-

term guarantee that the Western Balkans will not slip from the agenda after the 2003 Greek and

Italian presidencies.

On the political side, the EU was economical in its promises, but this did not discourage

frontrunner Croatia from pursuing its membership bid. The Union has also been, nevertheless,

emphatic that the Western Balkans are not part of its Wider Europe agenda -- a way of stressing

that accession remains the strategic goal of its policy for the region. However, it is still not clear

how one graduates from the SAP to a more tangible membership perspective. The latter is not an

issue for Bulgaria and Romania. The Thessaloniki Council's conclusions backed 2004 as the date

for closing accession negotiations and decoupled progress on chapters like regional policy,

agriculture, and the budget from the adoption of a new financial framework for the period 2007-

2012. What remains to be seen is whether Sofia and Bucharest will manage to complete

membership talks by the end of 2004, and how Croatia's application will be received. In sum,

2004 promises to be far more important for South East Europe's integration into the EU than

2003.