European Journal of International
Relations
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Relational Power for Foreign Policy Analysis: Issues in Japan s China
Policy
Linus Hagström
European Journal of International Relations 2005; 11; 395
DOI: 10.1177/1354066105055485
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Relational Power for Foreign Policy
Analysis: Issues in Japan s China Policy
LINUS HAGSTRÖM
Swedish Institute of International Affairs
The aim of this article is to demonstrate how a relational concept of
power can benefit Foreign Policy Analysis (FPA). It begins by drawing
attention to the fact that Japan s foreign policy has been portrayed
rather enigmatically in terms of power, and by arguing that such an
enigma stems from the fact that FPA has borrowed the concept of
power of much International Relations (IR) theory, i.e. one that puts
power on a par with capability. With a point of departure in Steven
Lukes relational concept of power, the article then conceptualizes an
alternative perspective. By applying the ensuing  relational power
analysis to two  significant issues in Japan s China policy, namely the
negotiations for bilateral investment protection and interaction over the
disputed Pinnacle (Senkaku or Diaoyu) Islands, the article demon-
strates that Japan s foreign policy can be portrayed more intelligibly in
terms of power, and thereby also how power could be treated in FPA in
the first place.
KEY WORDS f& bilateral investment treaty f& foreign policy analysis f&
Japan s China policy f& Japan s foreign policy f& Japanese power f&
Pinnacle (Senkaku/Diaoyu) Islands f& relational power analysis
1. Problem: Enigmatic Power?
Everybody knows just how illusive, complicated, messy and contested the
concept of power is. Yet, except in rare cases (Guzzini, 2000: 53), such
obstacles do not keep scholars from using the term. Instead, by and large
there is agreement in International Relations (IR) theory that power should
be analyzed in terms of capability, either because the latter operationalizes
the former as in Morgenthau s classical realism where power is understood as
 control (Morgenthau, 1993 [1948]: 29 36, 124 65), or because the two
European Journal of International Relations Copyright © 2005
SAGE Publications and ECPR-European Consortium for Political Research, Vol. 11(3): 395 430
[DOI: 10.1177/1354066105055485]
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European Journal of International Relations 11(3)
are fundamentally the same as in Waltz neorealism (Waltz, 1979: 60 61,
131, 191 2). Power as capability, moreover, functions as a, if not the, most
pertinent independent variable in such theories, and states that do not
conform to realist predictions are dubbed  anomalies . This understanding
of power has produced an enigma of Japanese power  in this context
consisting in the fact that Japan s great economic capability has not seemed
to translate into commensurate political and military power (Waltz, 1993:
64 9).
Yet, departing from realism and neorealism, one would have to disregard
Japan s  historical legacy , and bluntly conclude that the country already
possesses a broad range of capabilities, not least in the military field. Its
defence expenditure, for example, has been among the largest in the world
for many years, often second only to the USA.1 With the exception of
offensive ground warfare capability, its military capability is likewise world
class in both size and quality (Lind, 2004: 93 101). Realists should thus
have to conclude that Japan is already a  military power , and, since the
country ranks highly on most other  power components too, neorealists
should have to conclude that it has already reached the rank of  great power
(Waltz, 1979: 131; cf. Morgenthau, 1993: 124 65). However, the reason
why they do not is that the explicit (in realism) or implicit (in neorealism)2
connection between capability and outcome, in terms of  control or the
 exercise of power , is regarded as unclear in the case of Japan. In brief, the
country does not seem to use its vast policy base as anticipated by those
theories, i.e. by taking security considerations and waging wars (cf. Berger,
1996: 320, 322; Katzenstein, 1996c: 506). Again, this is what renders Japan
enigmatic to them.
Although it contradicts the view of power in realism and neorealism,
scholars of such convictions would thus seem to be in tacit agreement with
pluralist Dahl that,  a potential for control is not, except in a peculiarly
Hobbesian world, equivalent to actual control (Dahl, 1958: 37). However,
if Japan s military capability is invalidated as a shortcut to military power it
must be doubted whether  control in the economic field has been analyzed
any more carefully so as to justify the country s denomination as  economic
power . Apparently, it becomes theoretically difficult for realists and
neorealists to apply their concept of power to Japan because the connection
between capability and outcome cannot be consistently sustained. In any
case, the fact that those who adopt a concept of power in terms of capability,
or a  property concept , do not portray Japan s foreign policy coherently in
terms of power is key to the enigma of Japanese power as it is conceived in
this article.
Other theories manage to dissolve the enigma of Japanese power as it is
portrayed in much of the discourse, but by doing so they actually sustain the
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Hagström: Japan s China Policy
enigma as it is presented in the previous paragraph. In short, they argue that
Japan is just following a different logic and may actually be a model for other
states  to liberals for reasons of economic rationality (e.g. Rosecrance,
1986), and to constructivists as a consequence of identity, historical
experience, and domestic cultural-institutional context (e.g. Berger, 1996;
Katzenstein, 1996a). Although the significance of power as an independent
variable is generally downplayed in favour of preferences in liberalism
(Moravcsik, 1997), and ideas, identities and culture in constructivism
(Jepperson et al., 1996: 40; Wendt, 1999: 35), liberal and constructivist
analyses still mostly imply a property concept of power. Japan is thus referred
to as  economic power ,  civilian power ,  soft power , or the like, with such
ascriptions being substantiated with reference to  economic ,  civilian or
 soft capabilities.
Regardless of theory, Japan is thus ascribed economic or civilian power
just on behalf of capability, while it is believed to be politically and militarily
insignificant despite its large capability within such fields as well. The latter
judgement is rather derived from the fact that Japan does not seem to use its
political and military policy bases to produce desired outcomes. This
arguably unbalanced state of affairs may or may not find reasonable
explanations in liberalism and constructivism, and I re-emphasize that it is
not the purpose of this article to evaluate such accounts. For the time being
I would rather like to draw attention to the fact that Japan is ascribed power
rather incoherently by representatives of all those theories, and to point out
that such an understanding is key to the enigma of Japanese power as it is
conceived in this article. Yet, I am at a loss when it comes to suggesting what
should be done about this double standard in IR theory. Given the centrality
of power in both realism and neorealism, another definition of the term
would perhaps give rise to new and even graver theoretical problems.
Foreign policy analysts, on the other hand, may or may not subscribe to
the theoretical ideas discussed above, but they do tend to adopt concepts of
power that are derived from such theories. Let me give just a few
illustrations from the analysis of Japan s foreign policy, where it is very
ubiquitous3  power is first used interchangeably with capability, for
example in,  superior economic growth and corollary measures of economic
size . . . all point to an exceptionally rapid increase in [Japanese] power
(Katzenstein, 1996a: 99). It is also understood as the potential of future
capability, as in  Japanese are considering whether or not they should
increase their military power to be commensurate with their economic
might (Kennedy, 1994: 198). Third, the  units of greatest capability (Waltz,
1979: 72) are referred to as  powers , and Japan is called an  economic
superpower (Emmott, 1992: 56; Drifte, 1996; Hughes, 1999: 11), a
 global economic power (Johnson, 1995: 260),  a peaceful, commercial
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European Journal of International Relations 11(3)
power (Katzenstein, 1996a: 5),  a new category of power (Huldt, 1996: x),
 a  not the  twenty-first-century power (Kennedy, 1994: 197), and  a
medium-size, non-nuclear military power (Hunt, 1992: 29). In sum, the
analysis of Japan s foreign policy to a large extent depends on a concept of
power derived from IR theory. In a similar vein, Neack, Hey and Haney note
that Foreign Policy Analysis (FPA) is  largely informed and structured by the
theoretical orientation and conceptualizations of international politics
(Neack et al., 1995: 7 8).
Now, it could be argued that such usage has gone wrong because IR
concepts are inherently unsuited to FPA (Waltz, 1979: 122, 175). System-
atically considering that assertion, however, Elman finds that they are not
(Elman, 1996: 47). However, his conclusion is  distinct from the question of
how well they stack up against alternative explanations and the empirical
record (Elman, 1996: 11). In sum, Elman persuasively argues that IR
theory could indeed explain foreign policy, implying that it cannot be
inherently wrong to employ a property concept of power in the context of
Japan s foreign policy. The question is rather if such usage is beneficial to its
understanding in terms of power. I argue that it is not, and mainly because
the double standard of power in IR theory spills over to analyses of Japan s
foreign policy.
However, this time the problem could be solved rather more easily.
Because the two have different purposes, there is simply no reason why FPA
would have to inherit theoretical problems associated with IR theory. This
article argues that the enigma of Japanese power could be overcome in FPA
if Japan s foreign policy were analysed other than just measuring capability
or repeating supposedly commonsensical ideas about the country s power
status. Such analysis should be directed at instances of  control or the
 exercise of power , i.e. the outcome that realists, neorealists as well as
analysts of Japan s foreign policy really wish to pinpoint by their focus on
capability. This view of power is often associated with so-called  relational
concepts of power , and such are in fact already familiar to FPA.
Carlsnaes notes that two broad traditions have played and continue to play
major roles in FPA  Realpolitik and Innenpolitik. The former is
characterized by a focus on  material systemic-level factors (Carlsnaes, 2002:
334), while the latter  contains a host of different and disparate approaches
(Carlsnaes, 2002: 334), all of which share an emphasis on the role of
domestic factors. Whereas a relational concept of power could have been
part of the latter tradition, the enigma of Japanese power results from the
fact that a concept of power imbued with Realpolitik has been prevailing in
FPA. Nevertheless, the very essence of the discipline has been boiled down
to a definition much reminiscent of the relational concept of power itself, at
least one put forward by Dahl, i.e. one limiting instances of  affecting
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Hagström: Japan s China Policy
relevant to foreign policy to those preceded by an act of volition (Dahl,
1957, 1958):
. . . foreign policies consist of those actions which, expressed in the form of
explicitly stated goals, commitments and/or directives, and pursued by
governmental representatives acting on behalf of their sovereign communities,
are directed toward objectives, conditions and actors  both governmental
and non-governmental  which they want to affect and which lie beyond their
territorial legitimacy. (Carlsnaes, 2002: 335, emphasis added; cf. Knudsen,
1994: 52 3)
In sum, a relational concept of power should make an important contribu-
tion to FPA. Indeed, relational power analysis even looks tantamount to its
purpose, at least as defined by Carlsnaes and others. However, unlike the
comparative FPA conceived by Elman above, this conceptual framework is
not meant to explain the configuration of international structure, or
anything for that matter. If power is defined as certain outcomes in the
relationship between A and B, it would certainly be  a dubious analytical
exercise to use  power to explain those outcomes (Wohlforth, 1993: 4; cf.
Waltz, 1979: 175). Hence, a relational concept of power does not define
cause as effect because, unlike power as capability, power as outcome is not
meant as an independent variable. To sum up, power is relationally defined
in this article, and it is therefore natural to consider the exercise of power to
be the only relevant context of the power concept.
The article will now proceed to the next step, namely to argue that Lukes
so-called  three-dimensional view would make an intriguing point of
departure for FPA, and then to make it as operational as possible so as to
facilitate relational power analysis. Still, not even this relational approach is
completely dissociated from capability. Borrowing Baldwin s (1985: 22 4)
distinction between statecraft (as policy input/output  for example policy
instrument, regardless of B and of effects) and power (as policy outcome in
the relationship with B), it must also address the question of  Capabilities to
get whom to do what? (Baldwin, 1993: 16; cf. Baldwin, 1993: 8 9, 18).
In the following sections the article will demonstrate how to use the
ensuing analytical framework. It will do so with the help of two cases from
Japan s China policy  the negotiations for a bilateral investment treaty
(BIT), and the dispute over the Pinnacle Islands (in Japan, Senkaku Shotô; in
the People s Republic of China (PRC), Diaoyu Qiudao; on Taiwan,
Tiaoyutai) in the East China Sea.4 The empirical analysis addresses two
questions  (i) Did Japan exert power over China with regard to such issues
or did it not, and (ii) if so, by what means? By doing so, it aims to
demonstrate how Japanese foreign policy, and indeed foreign policy to begin
with, can be analysed more intelligibly in terms of power.
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European Journal of International Relations 11(3)
2. Solution: Relational Power Analysis
The previous section suggested that Japan s foreign policy could be
portrayed more coherently and intelligibly if FPA were focused on what
analysts of Japan s foreign policy really wish to pinpoint by their focus on
capability, namely instances of  control or  the exercise of power . Although
there is conceptual pluralism within the relational field, in this section I will
argue that there is good reason for taking Lukes three-dimensional view 
namely that  A exercises power over B when A affects B in a manner
contrary to B s interests (Lukes, 1974: 34)  as starting point for relational
power analysis.
Analyses of Japan s foreign policy, referred to above, are sometimes
supplemented with  structural ideas of power (e.g. Drifte, 1996; Hughes,
1999). One problem with such approaches is that they do not tend to end
up in results so different from their very points of departure (e.g. Drifte,
1996: 9, 162). Another obstacle is that they obscure and belittle the
responsibility of individual actors for the production, reproduction and
transformation of  structural patterns. Furthermore, even if one acknowl-
edges that there is  unconscious or  unintentional action (Okabe, 1995: 5),
and, still more, if one accommodates the existence of  real or  objective
interests, there is no need to resort to a  structural concept of power. One
reason for taking the three-dimensional view as starting point is that such
phenomena are considered empirically researchable to it.
This view, moreover, arguably encompasses and transcends the relational
ideas associated with both pluralist Dahl (1957, 1958) and reformists
Bachrach and Baratz (1962, 1963)  i.e. the two  dimensions of power
that it emerged in response to. Not only do the three dimensions or  faces
share the same underlying definition of power, namely Lukes own radical
one (Lukes, 1974: 27, 34), but they also have in common the position that
scope, domain, means, etc., matter and should be clarified in power analysis
(cf. Baldwin, 2002: 178). Still, what makes Lukes three-dimensional view
transcend its predecessors  indeed what makes it  radical  is that it
breaks with their behaviourist ontology and argues that seemingly consen-
sual relationships may embody latent conflicts of interest, i.e. inconsistency
between A s interests and the  real interests of B. This is to say that A can
exert power over B by means of control, manipulation and authority,
without B, or even A, being aware of this relationship. In short, the fact that
Lukes concept very comprehensively accommodates so many different ideas
of power is the reason for taking it as conceptual starting point (cf. Lukes,
1974: 26 7; Gaventa, 1987: 50; Isaac, 1992: 39).
Though originally conceptualized with domestic politics in mind, and
regardless of the opinion that they have had little impact (Hveem, 1997:
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Hagström: Japan s China Policy
26 7), the three dimensions of power are frequently referred to in the
literatures of IR and FPA. Still, in spite of the debates spurred by it, the
three-dimensional view has never before been used in this kind of an
analytical setting.5 This is another important reason for trying to make it
more operational in the subsection below, especially by engaging in
methodological development.
2.1 The Analytical Framework
Since the  three faces debate  has failed as a methodological agenda for
empirical research (Isaac, 1992: 53), the quest for methods is still new
territory. Moreover, since no established technique of textual analysis fits the
requirements of the relational concept used here (cf. Bergström and Boréus,
2000), a method must be constructed which is specifically adapted to it. This
is what I call  relational power analysis . Although its constituent parts are
not new, the compilation of them into one analytical framework certainly is.
This section s premise is that a reconstructive and interpretative method,
consisting in process-tracing, interest and intentional modes of analyses, sits
well with the relational concept of power (cf. Nye, 2003 [1993]: 58).
In line with Lukes definition above, first it is necessary to examine what
A did or failed to do towards B. Such an investigation could be undertaken
with the help of  process-tracing analysis (George, 1979; George and
McKeown, 1985; McKeown, 1999). In accordance with Baldwin s distinc-
tion between statecraft and power above, this mode of analysis should also
delve into the question by what means A acted, if at all. Baldwin delineates
four categories of statecraft  economic and military instruments, propa-
ganda and diplomacy. There is no reason to alter the material categories,
which means that  economic statecraft continues to signify  influence
attempts relying primarily on resources which have a reasonable semblance
of a market price in terms of money (Baldwin, 1985: 13 14), and  military
statecraft still  refers to influence attempts relying primarily on violence,
weapons, or force (Baldwin, 1985: 14). The immaterial ones, however, lack
analytical precision. Baldwin defines  propaganda as  influence attempts
relying primarily on the deliberate manipulation of verbal symbols
(Baldwin, 1985: 13)6 and  diplomacy as  influence attempts relying
primarily on negotiation (Baldwin, 1985: 13). However, since  negotiation
is also characterized by the  manipulation of verbal symbols , the distinction
between propaganda and diplomacy in Baldwin s terms is difficult to sustain.
Instead, the two categories had better been merged under the heading of
ideational statecraft, which not only includes but also supersedes them both.
Ideational statecraft is defined here as influence attempts relying primarily on
ideas, norms and symbols. Although such activity can also occur on the basis
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European Journal of International Relations 11(3)
of material instruments of statecraft, once a socialization process is in place,
it may start to function by its own logic. This notion makes relational power
analysis accommodate both  power , in more traditionally relational terms,
and  reason (Kivimäki, 2002). Finally, manoeuvres such as recalling or
expelling diplomats, and establishing or breaking off official relations do not
rely on negotiation, but are nonetheless policy instruments commonly
known as diplomacy. Diplomatic statecraft is thus reintroduced as influence
attempts relying primarily on representation and other symbolic resources of
foreign ministries.
The second task is to examine B s interests  did A affect B s interests?
One advantage of taking Lukes as conceptual point of departure is that his
definition accommodates the subtle mechanisms by which actors shape each
other s,
. . . perceptions, cognitions and preferences in such a way that they accept their
role in the existing order of things, either because they can see or imagine no
alternative to it, or because they see it as natural and unchangeable, or because
they value it as divinely ordained and beneficial. (Lukes, 1974: 24)
Analysis along such lines must therefore reckon not only with the causal
effects that A s action may have on B, but also with constitutive ones.7 Lukes
moreover makes a distinction between  revealed interests , which are the
analytical focus of Dahl, and Bachrach and Baratz, and  real ones (Lukes,
1974: 25, 33; cf. Connolly, 1983 [1974]: 64 5). However, the latter
approach, which is equivalent to an actor s wants and preferences under
privileged conditions of choice, i.e. in a hypothesized situation of  relative
autonomy or  independently of A s power  e.g. through democratic
participation (Lukes, 1974: 33; cf. Connolly, 1983: 65), has encountered
much criticism (Bradshaw, 1976: 270; Benton, 1981: 289; Isaac, 1992: 40).
Most importantly, it has been condemned for implying  false consciousness
and for measuring up to no more than an observer s assessment of  real
interests , implying a certain view of human nature and thereby resulting in
 paternalism or  vanguardism (Ball, 1988: 90).8 Moreover, when used to
analyze corporate actors it also does not translate into results so different
from the analysis of revealed interests. In short,  real interest analysis based
in the thinnest conceivable idea of human/state nature, here represented by
the notion of  objective interest in IR theory and that of  right in classical
liberal thought, is still analytically internal to theoretical and/or ideological
perspectives. The analysis of revealed interests should be able to accom-
modate such perspectives if only a sufficiently broad range of tensions and
grievances within each complex actor are taken into account (Hagström,
2005a: 169). In the end, interest analysis thus focuses on express wants,
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Hagström: Japan s China Policy
preferences and choices (as revealed through political participation), and on
signs of B s grievances, opposition or veto towards A.
The last step of relational power analysis is to assess if an established
connection between A s policy and B s interests can be interpreted in terms
of relational power. In the first two dimensions of power such an evaluation
is conditioned on intentionality, but a characteristic of Lukes approach 
indeed, one of its defining  radical features  is the insistence that both
actors may be unaware of the fact that A exerts power over B. Yet, since it is
notoriously difficult to pinpoint both intentions and lack thereof (Hollis and
Smith, 1991: 171 6), Lukes introduces responsibility as a method to locate
the  power mechanism (Lukes, 1974: 41 2, 55 6; cf. Connolly, 1983: 94,
131 n. 9). The main question is  could A have acted differently? State
actors have been attributed with responsibility along similar lines in IR
theory (e.g. Watson, 1997: 95). However, to affect someone without
accomplishing anything seems just like careless behaviour (Morriss, 1987:
29 30). Lukes significance criterion filters away some nuisances (Lukes,
1974: 26), implying that A s exertion of power over B is characterized by
A s harming or exploiting of B (Reeve, 1982: 83; Ball, 1988: 90). Other
instances where A did not effect anything, moreover, could be sorted out by
conditioning A s power over B on A s purposefulness. This is in line with
Lukes remark that  the outcomes of power must serve the interests of the
powerful (Lukes, 1986: 5; emphasis in original). A reinvigoration of
intentionality helps dissolve what is starting to look like a paradox 
regardless of real intentions or lack thereof, in the present article so-called
 intentional analysis guides the rational reconstruction of action. This mode
of analysis takes the meaning of behaviour to be  in the eyes of the beholder
(Scheja, 2000: 4). An active analyst ascribes meaning or intentionality to
behaviour in order to make sense of it as action (Scheja, 2000: 4).9 Since the
connection between intention and action is analytical, the aim is merely to
establish whether or not A s behaviour, which significantly contradicts B s
interests, can be ascribed the intentionality of responsibility (as expressed
choice or reconstructed carelessness) and purposefulness (as expressed
knowledge or reconstructed predictability of behavioural consequences),
and the outcome of their relationship thus interpreted as relational power.
In sum, the aim of process-tracing analysis is to pinpoint the mechanisms
whereby inputs transform into outputs and outputs develop into outcomes.
Depending on whether A s policy is found to affect B s interests, intentional
analysis finally helps to make sense of the relationship between A and B in
terms of power, or not so. However, in a more fundamental sense, process-
tracing is already an act of locating the  power mechanism (Lukes, 1974:
55; Lukes, 1986: 13). Both methods are fundamentally part of the same
reconstructive and interpretative endeavour, and they also rely on the
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European Journal of International Relations 11(3)
same kind of empirical materials  preferably  relics or  parts of the
phenomenon under study (Hadenius, 1983: 137), i.e. documents, partici-
pant interviews and newspaper articles (Dahl, 1958: 36 41; Lukes, 1974:
11 15). Analytical plausibility is strengthened by considering alternative
ways to assemble data, and by comparing the rationality of different
reconstructions (George, 1979: 57 8; McKeown, 1999: 170 1). Historical
analysis customarily rests on this kind of  analyst oriented methodology (cf.
Bergström and Boréus, 2000: 26 7), and so do detective work and legal
proceedings (George, 1979: 57; George and McKeown, 1985: 47;
McKeown, 1999: 167). Now the time has come to see how this  means of
exposition (Darstellungs mittel) (Weber, 1949: 78, emphasis in original),
and the  ideal types (Idealtypus) that it comes with, can inform the analysis
of two issues in Japan s China policy (cf. Weber, 1949: 92 3), and thereby
the analysis of Japan s foreign policy in terms of power.
3. Cases: On Their Selection
Having established a problem and advanced a possible solution, it is
necessary to delineate a material to which that solution can be applied so as
to see if the problem actually dissolves. This section briefly argues that a
suitable material consists of  significant issues in a relationship that is
 crucial to Japan. The crucial case consists of Japan s China policy, and
significant issues are provided by the negotiations for bilateral investment
protection, and the countries interaction over the disputed Pinnacle
(Senkaku or Diaoyu) Islands.
The case study approach, first, is justified by the fact that all aspects of
policy-making possibly fluctuate with situational factors. The relational
concept of power therefore demands careful specification of the context
within which A exercises power over B. Another characteristic of the
relational concept is that it is accommodating enough to justify the
assumption that Japan  as most actors  continuously attempts to
influence and from time to time exerts power over most other entities with
which it interacts. This is why the significance criterion was introduced
above, but it is not enough. In addition, the country s relationship with
international actors and in situations not automatically associated with such
outcomes need to be put in focus. To gain maximum leverage on other
significant instances of Japan s foreign policy, it is appropriate to adopt a
 crucial case study approach (Eckstein, 1975: 117 19). The idea that
Japan s China policy is indeed a  crucial case of its foreign policy stems from
a number of factors that seem to co-vary in conditioning the country s use
of statecraft  (i) geographical proximity of counterpart; (ii) size of
counterpart; and (iii) fundamentality of issue (cf. Wallensteen, 1971). Ceteris
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Hagström: Japan s China Policy
paribus, Japan is known for publicly having used policy instruments towards
small and distant states, and over issues of low fundamentality. Exceptions
have either been limited in scale or dependent on positive measures (Katada,
2001: 39, 41, 43 4). China s proximity to Japan thus gives credibility to the
present focus, and so does the country s immensity. Chinese self-conscious-
ness  the pride the country takes in being the  Middle Kingdom (Roy,
1998: 6; Solomon, 1999: 28)  also means that it would be no simple task
to try to affect it incompatibly with its interests (Rose, 1998: 124). Affecting
China would moreover be a particularly difficult task for Japan (and the
other way around), because both countries are acutely aware of their
bilateral relationship (cf. Naughton, 1994: 66 7). Finally, the broad
interfaces that have been maintained between the two countries for more
than 2000 years contribute relevance to the empirical focus, because contact
is a prerequisite for A s exercise of power over B (Dahl, 1957: 292).
To make it even more crucial, significant issues in Japan s China policy
should be selected as case studies, and the most central instances of such
issues should be chosen as concrete observations. In the end, there are thus
central cases of significant cases of a crucial case of Japan s foreign policy.
Apart from the overall delimitation with regard to time  confinement to
the period of alleged Japanese  foreign policy change from the mid-1980s
to the mid-1990s  significant issues are selected with point of departure in
two criteria  first, accounts of Japan s post-World War II foreign policy are
customarily placed in the context of US foreign policy and overall Japan US
relations. However, since it is the relationship between Japan and China that
is of immediate interest here, American and other external factors that might
shape Japan s foreign policy will be excluded to the largest possible extent.
Issues must thus be situated primarily in the bilateral Sino Japanese
relationship. Second, since the variables subject to exploration  i.e. the
study variables  are unsuitable as criteria for case selection, issues must be
instances of international interaction in which influence could have been
attempted, regardless of whether it was so or not (cf. Baldwin, 1999/2000:
98). As already mentioned, two issues fit these criteria  first, the politics of
bilateral investment protection; and second, the dispute over the Pinnacle
Islands.
Now, what are the most central instances of such issues? First, FDI-related
issues have been salient in Japan s China policy since Sino Japanese
rapprochement in 1972  especially after former paramount leader Deng
Xiaoping put an end to the Cultural Revolution and initiated the Open
Door Policy in 1978. However, since completely free competition has yet to
emerge on the Chinese market  in particular since there has been no real
separation between politics and economics  not just market mechanisms
determine the inflow of Japanese FDI into China. Political factors also call
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European Journal of International Relations 11(3)
for attention. This is the perspective from which the relevance of investment
laws and BITs stands out. Hence, the final stages of bilateral negotiations for
the Agreement between Japan and the People s Republic of China
concerning the Encouragement and Reciprocal Protection of Investment
(Japan China Bilateral Investment Treaty, JCBIT) in 1988 makes up one
appropriate observation. The significance of this case is underlined by several
facts  first, the uncompleted negotiations, which started in 1981, turned
into  a pending problem in bilateral relations (Kuniya, 1989: 69; Higure,
1989: 81). Second, once the JCBIT was concluded it was seen as  epoch-
making and central to the post-normalization development of Sino
Japanese relations (AS-E, 27 August 1988: 2; AS-M, 27 August 1988: 2).10
Third, the treaty was followed by a boom of Japanese FDI flowing into
China (AS-M, 18 September 1992: 36).
The Pinnacle Islands, second, consist of five islets and three barren rocks
situated about 300 km (180 miles) west of the main island of Okinawa and
200 km (120 miles) northeast of Taiwan, approximately between 25°44 and
25°57 north latitude and 123°30 and 124°35 east longitude (Ministry of
Foreign Affairs, 1972: 3). On a map the islands look so insignificant that one
may wonder if the dispute over the islands is really such a big issue. Yet, it is
crucial mainly for two reasons. First, if one country gives up its rights to the
islands, its bargaining position in other territorial disputes may deteriorate.
Second, the islands in question may hold tremendous value as base points
for generating claims to Exclusive Economic Zones (EEZ) rich in natural
resources  not only fisheries, but possibly also oil, gas and sea-based
minerals.11 Potential hydrocarbon reserves arguably hold more promise than
those in the South China Sea  indeed, a matter of great importance to
Japan and China, both of whom are dependent on foreign energy supplies
(Roy, 1998: 60; Whiting, 1998: 290, 293). The sudden end of the Cold War
brought new heat to the dispute. In February 1992, in particular, China
promulgated the Law on the Territorial Sea and Contiguous Zone
(Territorial Waters Law, TWL), incorporating the Pinnacle Islands as well as
the entire South China Sea, and announcing the right of the People s
Liberation Army (PLA) to remove by force any incursion on among others
the disputed islands and to continue to chase offending ships in the open
seas (Article 14) (Hiramatsu, 1992a: 21; 1993: 6).12 Since it challenged
Japan s claim to sovereignty and its  de facto control , the TWL constituted
China s most explicit move with regard to the Pinnacle Islands thus far.
True, some events in 1996 7 got larger media exposure, but the involved
actors then were mostly individuals acting in their private capacity. PRC
adoption of the TWL in 1992 therefore marks the beginning of the concrete
observation in the second case study.
However, the two case studies not only provide the study of statecraft in
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Hagström: Japan s China Policy
Japan foreign policy with crucial cases. Such cases also embody a crucial test
of the analytical framework. Although two cases are inadequate for the
formulation even of a preliminary theory of Japanese statecraft (cf. Guzzini,
2000: 54, 57, 59, 60; Baldwin, 2002: 180), they should be sufficient for an
evaluation of the relational approach to power per se.
4. First Case: Negotiations for a Bilateral Investment Treaty
In line with a Japanese proposal, the First Conference of Japanese Chinese
Government Officials in December 1980 in Beijing resulted in an agreement
to start negotiations for a JCBIT (Kajita, 1988: 59; Higure, 1989: 81).
Consultations began in May 1981 in Tokyo, and for a couple of years they
were held alternately in the two capitals.
During the first seven rounds of negotiations in 1981 7, Japan did not
use certain policy instruments to conclude the JCBIT as fast as possible. It
rather attempted to justify the presently low level of Japanese FDI in the
PRC by pointing to the lack of a JCBIT. In other words, the country
proposed a BIT to divert PRC expectations for instantly increasing Japanese
investment. This linkage is made clear from a statement by the chairman of
the Liberal Democratic Party s (LDP) Executive Council, former Foreign
Minister ItM
Masayoshi   Chinese people often tell Japan to further
magnify its investment in China . . . but [first] they will have to promote a
JCBIT (AS-M, 2 October 1986: 10; cf. Diet-HR 101, Gaimu 5, 4 April
1984: 2 3; Diet-HC 101, Gaimu 4, 6 April 1984: 19; Diet-HR 104, Gaimu
13, 14 May 1986: 14).13 Japan then made the conclusion of such a treaty
dependent on changes in China s investment environment (e.g. Katayama,
1988: 14), many of which were difficult for the PRC to accept. Most
significantly it demanded that Japanese investors be granted so-called
National Treatment (NT)  i.e. the principle of treating foreign investors
no less favourably than domestic ones under all legal and administrative
procedures (Wang, Y., 2002: 194, n. 5). Japan thus rebutted the Chinese
idea that FDI and other economic cooperation either substituted wartime
compensation (Rose, 1998: 5, 54), or was simply Japan s responsibility as a
developed country (SWB FE/0242, 29 August 1988: A3/2).14 In short,
Japanese rhetoric made a JCBIT seem all the more indispensable and in this
respect,  one of the problems was on the Japanese side. [The country]
suggested a treaty, and then it didn t make sufficient effort to conclude it
(interviewee 9/1).15
The Japanese government was clearly not very keen on concluding a
JCBIT (interviewee 8/2; cf. interviewee 9/2; interviewee 14). Although
such an approach made the negotiations drag on, it did not discourage
China. PRC adaptation to Japanese  reality was instead reflected in the
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European Journal of International Relations 11(3)
country s change in attitude. Its gradual acceptance of the Japanese
argument was revealed in an effort to strengthen the legal framework
governing FDI in China (Diet-HC 114, Gaimu 3, 11 April 1989: 2), a more
positive attitude towards BITs as an instrument to attracting FDI (e.g. BR
39, 1984: 18),16 and the active promotion of the PRC investment
environment (e.g. BR 40, 1983: 4; BR 31, 1984: 7; BR 3, 1985: 16 19; BR
17, 1985: 21). In sum, Japan established causality between  a bad
investment environment ,  no JCBIT and  scarce FDI , and this move was
contrary to China s revealed interest in attracting more FDI from Japan.
Still, insofar as China slowly started to adapt to the Western worldview, so
that its definition of interest itself changed, Japan s policy had constitutive
effects as well.
However, with wages rising in the newly industrializing countries, where
many Japanese firms had previously been investing to sustain low-cost
production, China became a more attractive site for investors worldwide
(AS-M, 12 March 1986: 9; FBIS-EAS-88 167, 29 August 1988: 3;17 Diet-
HC 114, Gaimu 3, 11 April 1989: 3; interviewee 8/1). Japanese FDI to
China thus started to increase quite naturally. Due to such a development
Japan s interest in concluding the JCBIT also grew larger, and so did the
effort that the country made to reach an agreement (interviewee 7/3;
interviewee 9/2; interviewee 14). After being interrupted for almost three
years, this new situation combined with the tenth anniversary of the Peace
and Friendship Treaty and Prime Minister Takeshita Noboru s visit to China
(interviewee 9/1; interviewee 14), as well as with some personnel changes in
Japan s Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MOFA) (interviewee 10; interviewee
11; interviewee 13), to promote a reopening of the negotiations.
4.1 Process-tracing Analysis
The negotiations were formally reopened in mid-June 1988, and successfully
concluded less than a month later in Beijing. China s agreement to include
NT into the treaty during the last day of negotiations finally enabled an
agreement (AS-M, 17 July 1988: 1). This was considered the  most
significant breakthrough of the JCBIT (Bates, 1988: 10; cf. AS-E 2
September 1988: 13). Yet, there are different ways to understand why the
PRC decided to give up its prolonged resistance to NT. Commentators have
explained its concession pointing out that NT was given conditional terms,
i.e. exceptions to the rule are permissible,  in the case it is really necessary for
the reason of public order, national security or sound development of
national economy and  in accordance with . . . applicable laws and
regulations (Protocol, 3ż). Participants on the Japanese side, in turn,
explain that conditional NT attests to China s recognition that it would have
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Hagström: Japan s China Policy
been difficult to provide foreign investors with exactly the same conditions
as domestic ones in 1988 (Diet-HC 114, Gaimu 3, 11 April 1989: 14;
interviewee 7/1; interviewee 7/3; interviewee 9/2). Although NT was an
important principle, the establishment of a Joint Committee was launched as
a more substantial way to protect Japanese investment in China (interviewee
7/1; interviewee 9/1). Participants and observers moreover hypothesize
that China s agreement to NT was brought about by last minute, top-level
intervention (interviewee 4; interviewee 7/2; interviewee 15; interviewee
16). It is perhaps a reasonable assumption since such a negotiating style has
been depicted as typically Chinese (Solomon, 1999 [1995]: 150).
However, neither participants nor observers seem to have contemplated
the possibility that PRC acquiescence to NT had any ulterior reasons. Yet,
Japan continued to rely on the causality established during the first seven
rounds of negotiations; namely, that it was quite natural that FDI did not
increase as long as there was no JCBIT  a treaty which in turn could not
be realized without guarantees for a better investment environment, NT in
particular. However, Japan started to formulate this message in increasingly
positive terms: An  improved investment environment  particularly
Chinese acquiescence to NT  would lead to an agreement on JCBIT, and
such an agreement would spur even more Japanese FDI to China. In the
words of Prime Minister Nakasone Yasuhiro   If [we] make [an agreement
on] JCBIT, it also becomes easier to do joint ventures. The advancement of
small and medium sized Japanese corporations will benefit China (AS-E, 24
October 1985: 1; cf. Diet-HC 114, Gaimu 3, 11 April 1989: 3).
Japan s ideational policy instrument depended on  market economic logic
and the widely accepted norms and practices of the international investment
regime  a context more amenable to Japan s interests than to China s (cf.
Ogura, 1979: 550). Indeed, those were the  rules of the game that China
was not originally part of, but nevertheless had to internalize or accept in
order to attract FDI (Pearson, 1991: 8). Such ideas successfully defined the
limits of  reality , so that China s previous stance was portrayed as
 unrealistic (Holloway, 1988: 117), whereas Japan was described as  unfairly
discriminated against (Bates, 1988: 9). Japan also relied on a policy base
consisting of other countries making similar claims towards China.
The ideational instrument was substantiated and reinforced by the
economic policy instrument of non-investment until the mid-1980s, and
then on promises of increasing FDI. Ministry of International Trade and
Industry (MITI) guidance may have provided the means through which
 market economic logic , as launched by Japan, was translated into  real
economics (cf. Lardy, 1994: 119; Deng and Mukai, 1996: 170 1; Zhang
D.D., 1998b: 53, 72 3). However, non-investment was soon rephrased in
more positive terms, so that the Chinese government had reason to believe
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European Journal of International Relations 11(3)
Table 1
The flow of Japan s Direct Investment to China, 1979 89
(cases/millions of USD)
Year 1979 1980 1981 1982 1983 1984 1985 1986 1987 1988 1989
Cases 1 6 9 4 5 66 118 85 101 170 126
Value 14 12 26 18 3 114 100 226 1226 296 438
Source: Compiled from Jian-An Chen (1992: 258).
Note: The statistics are reproduced in current figures. If a gigantic oil project is excluded in
1987, the value of Japanese FDI to China ends up more or less in-between the values noted for
1986 and 1988.
that if it agreed to conclude a JCBIT with a NT clause, Japanese FDI would
start to increase in the country. After the agreement had been reached,
moreover, MITI took steps to promote such investment more actively, inter
alia through the dispatch of an investment environment research delegation
and through the establishment of the Japan-China Investment Promotion
Organisation (AS-M, 3 March 1989: 9; AS-M, 11 April 1989: 2; AS-M, 6
June 1991: 11; Zhang D.D., 1998a: 159). In the end, a boom in Japanese
FDI, lasting until the bloodshed at Tiananmen Square in June 1989,
followed the conclusion of the treaty (see Table 1).
Finally, during his August 1988 visit Prime Minister Takeshita brought
Ä„810 billion to China  the largest ODA package Japan had ever extended
to a single country (Shida, 1988: 3). What about the possibility that this
third yen-loan to China functioned as yet another economic policy
instrument? True, observers agree that ODA has been Japan s most
important policy instrument (Yasutomo, 1995: 15; Deng and Mukai, 1996:
169 71; Zhao, Q., 1996: 160), and that the Japanese government has used
such assistance as a tool to guide FDI in China and to negotiating
improvements in the country s FDI environment (Deng and Mukai, 1996:
170; Zhang, D.D., 1998b: 53, 72 3). Arase, moreover, seems to make a
connection between the third yen-loan in 1988 and the JCBIT (Arase,
1993: 949). Still, there is no concrete evidence that this ODA package
served as yet another policy instrument. Some Japanese policy-makers
suggest that a connection between the JCBIT and Japanese ODA was made
rather on the Chinese side (interviewee 8/1). While new Japanese ODA
packages are generally presented to recipients as a kind of omiyage or
 souvenir by a visiting Japanese prime minister (Söderberg, 2002: 116), the
PRC concession on NT could be understood in terms of a Chinese omiyage
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Hagström: Japan s China Policy
and as such quite unrelated to any possible Japanese influence attempts
(interviewee 8/2).
4.2 Interest Analysis
An investigation of China s interests first demonstrates that parts of the final
treaty  in particular NT and ways of dealing with compensation in the case
of nationalization or confiscation  significantly contradicted what had thus
far been revealed as such. In short, China accepted the  international norms
that it had previously resisted (BR 29, 1984: 18 19; cf. BR 39, 1984: 19;
Zhang, D.D., 1998a: 154; interviewee 11). Two Japanese negotiators, a
Chinese official and an analyst of Sino Japanese economic relations,
independently of each other claim that China changed its stance because it
 realized that modernization in the last event depended on granting Japan
NT (Zhang, D.D., 1998a: 153; interviewee 7/3; interviewee 12; inter-
viewee 15). Needless to say, such  realization clearly implies the Japanese
ideational policy instrument of establishing causality between a JCBIT and
increased investment as discussed earlier. Adopting this idea, Chinese leaders
strayed from their previously nurtured position that it is a Japanese
obligation or responsibility to provide FDI anyway. The interest analysis
thus suggests that proponents of modernization and economic development
in the country were constitutively affected by Japan s policy, so that they
became more accommodating towards NT and other Japanese demands that
they had previously resisted. However, since there is reason to believe that
reformists around Deng Xiaoping prevailed in domestic policy-making
(interviewee 4; interviewee 5; cf. Zhao, Q., 1996: 156), conservatives
continuously emphasizing sovereignty were causally affected, meaning that
their revealed interests were contradicted by the terms of the JCBIT (cf.
Pearson, 1991: 3, 50; Zhao, Q., 1996: 155; Roy, 1998: 85; Wang, Y., 2002:
43). Their concerns were allegedly aggravated by the fact that the agreement
was made with a former colonizer (cf. Wang, Y., 2002: 36).
4.3 Intentional Analysis
Intentional analysis, finally, demonstrates that Japanese policy-makers strate-
gically depended on the idea of  a bad Chinese investment environment
(interviewee 10; cf. Katayama, 1988: 15), and that they knew about the
domestic contestation of the Open Door Policy (interviewee 7/3). They
moreover understood China s increasing need for FDI (interviewee 7/3;
interviewee 9/1; interviewee 9/2; cf. Kajita, 1988: 66; interviewee 1;
interviewee 7/2; interviewee 7/3; interviewee 12), and they were aware
that the country regarded investment as a substitute for Japanese wartime
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European Journal of International Relations 11(3)
compensation (interviewee 7/3; interviewee 8/2; interviewee 9/2). Since
market mechanisms do not function perfectly in Japan either, MITI should
have been in a position to use administrative guidance to fulfil China s
wishes if it had only wanted to. Hence, all in all it is possible to draw the
conclusion that Japan exerted power over China when the two countries
negotiated the JCBIT, it did so in particular so that NT was finally included
into the treaty. It did so, moreover, with ideational and economic
instruments, relying on a power base consisting of systemic ideational
resources and economic capability, the significance of which was in turn
reinforced by the way it was perceived by the PRC.
5. Second Case: The TWL and Interaction over the
Pinnacle Islands
The first 20-some years of parallel Japanese and Chinese claims to the
Pinnacle Islands, from the early 1970s until 1992, saw mainly non-military
influence attempts from both parties. The bottom line to Japan s policy was
the ideational instrument of reiterating that the country  controls the
islands  effectively , a stance based on the discovery-occupation mode of
acquisition under international law (Matsui, 1997: 23 30). China, on its
part, relied on similar policy instruments. It referred to  historical evidence
in support of its claim, and used the idea of one hundred years of sufferings
and humiliation to justify the fact that it had been oblivious of the islands for
seventy-some years. In short, Japanese imperialism had weakened China to
the extent that it failed to recognize that Japan had stolen them and even
that they were Chinese in the first place (interviewee 17).
On top of the above-mentioned pattern, in 1972 and 1978 Japan s policy
with regard to the islands took the shape of ideational and perhaps economic
statecraft. Both the PRC and the Republic of China (ROC, Taiwan) started
to claim the territory rather vigorously in the early 1970s. Still, when Japan
and the PRC normalized relations in September 1972, Chinese assertiveness
faded quickly and student demonstrations against Japan were also brought
to an end (Shaw, 1999: 15). This change in attitude could be interpreted as
a concession to Japan for its recognition of the mainland government.
In 1978, moreover, right-wing LDP Diet members tried to condition the
inclusion of an  anti-hegemony clause in the Peace and Friendship Treaty
on PRC acceptance that Japan has sovereignty over the islands. China
reacted against this instance of diplomatic statecraft by dispatching
100 armed fishing boats to the islands (Zhao, Q., 1996: 194). Deng
Xiaoping, however, did his best to calm down the situation. In the end, an
anti-hegemony clause was indeed adopted and China proposed that  the
question  be shelved (Suganuma, 2000: 138). This outcome resembles the
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Hagström: Japan s China Policy
one suggested by LDP s right wing, but the linkage seems to have been
made rather on the PRC side. In any case, PRC dependence on Japanese
diplomatic support made the country take a cautious stance towards the
territorial dispute. In addition, there was possibly also concern that a bolder
approach to the dispute might jeopardize Japanese ODA and FDI, both of
which China increasingly was taking an interest in.
Let s elaborate a bit further on the concept of  shelving , which Deng
launched on the latter occasion:
It does not matter if this question is shelved for some time, say, ten years. Our
generation is not wise enough to find common language on this question. Our
next generation will certainly be wiser. They will surely find a solution
acceptable to all. (Quoted in Suganuma, 2000: 138)
Leading Japanese politicians like Nakasone Yasuhiro interpreted this state-
ment as tacit PRC acceptance that the Pinnacle Islands belong to Japan
(Hiramatsu, 1992b: 48 9). In the longer term, however, it is clear that
Deng s expression has functioned as an ideational policy instrument on the
part of China. Japanese policy-makers occasional reference to the  shelving
policy implies that there is indeed  a question  to shelve in the first place,
thus bearing witness that they are constitutively affected by Deng s remark
on a continuous basis.
During the incident in 1990, Japan kept manifesting  effective control .
Still, the PRC seems to have muted its assertiveness mostly due to
diplomatic and economic statecraft. In short, although the linkage again
seems to have been made rather by the PRC, Japanese diplomatic support
and ODA in the wake of the Tiananmen Square bloodshed quite effectively
prevented China from openly challenging the status quo (Downs and
Saunders, 1998/99: 128).
5.1 Relational Power Analysis: An Integrated Account
The TWL was accepted by majority vote on 25 February and then signed by
PRC President Yang Shangkun (FBIS-CHI-92 038, 26 February 1992:
20).18 The law reconfirms China s claim to the Pinnacle Islands and other
islands arguably under Chinese sovereignty (Article 2). It also covers
adjacent bodies of water, including 12 nautical miles (nm) of territorial sea
and another 12 nm of contiguous zones (Articles 3 and 4). According to
Hiramatsu, however, the law s main characteristic is that it takes the trouble
of pointing out what should otherwise be obvious, namely the rights of the
PLA to remove by force any incursion on such territories and to continue to
chase offending ships in the open seas (Article 14) (Hiramatsu, 1992a: 21;
Hiramatsu, 1993: 6).
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European Journal of International Relations 11(3)
In the aftermath of the TWL Japan kept relying on many of the
mechanisms discussed thus far. The strategy of  effective control crystallized
as ideational statecraft (the large number of protests)19, diplomatic statecraft
(non-action such as no compromise and no joint development), and military
statecraft (the practical maintenance of the status quo through guarding).
The latter has continued at least since the early 1970s  according to
Japanese rhetoric since 1895 (Matsui, 1997: 23 30)  and there is
testimony that such activities have become increasingly aggressive in the late
1990s (Hyer, 1995: 45).
Both parts of the  effective control policy significantly contradicted
revealed PRC interests in reuniting the islands with the mainland. Still,
although Chinese policy-makers and scholars at times acknowledge that
Japan practically  controls or  occupies the islands for now, they seem
causally rather than constitutively affected by the policy (Zhang Y., 2 April
2001; Yang, 9 April 2001; interviewee 15; interviewee 17; cf. interviewee
16). Not least the TWL proves China s sustained ability to make its own
claim heard. Still, the more that the country is integrated into international
society, and the more that it starts to depend on the (Western) normative
structures on which such society is built, the more difficult it should become
for China to criticize the modes of acquisition under international law on
which Japan bases its claim to the islands. A number of the involved Japanese
policy-makers in 1992 moreover acknowledge that they are aware that the
Chinese government is not very satisfied with the present state of affairs
(interviewee 3; interviewee 13; interviewee 14). Yet, they add that China is
satisfied enough not  to rock the boat too severely . It is not willing to risk
Japanese economic cooperation only because of the islands. The Chinese
government is, in other words, practically incapable of challenging the status
quo;  they [Chinese policy-makers] accept that they cannot do anything
about it (interviewee 13; cf. interviewee 14). Hence,  effective control was
instrumental to Japanese exercise of power over China.
The strategy of  effective control was supplemented in 1992 with a policy
emphasizing the non-existence of  a dispute  a policy which has been
maintained by the Japanese government since the early 1970s (Shaw, 1999:
27). Since the country  exercises effective control there can be  no dispute
(Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 5 March 1992; cf. Defense Agency, 16 October
2000; interviewee 6). Taken together, the two instruments could be seen as
an attempt to rebut Deng s  shelving policy . The policy of  no dispute
legitimized sustained Japanese non-action with regard to the islands, and it
was therefore contrary to China s revealed interests (cf. interviewee 17;
interviewee 18). Yet, the effects of this ideational/diplomatic policy
instrument were again causal rather than constitutive. Chinese policy-makers
have even tried to counter it by insinuating that there is  tacit understanding
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Hagström: Japan s China Policy
of the existence of a dispute (Zhang Y., 2 April 2001; cf. Yang, 9 April 2001;
interviewee 15; interviewee 17). Actors on the Japanese side, on the other
hand, have expressed awareness that the PRC does not  feel good about the
present arrangement (interviewee 3), and one could hence draw the
conclusion that Japan exerted power over China by means of a strategy of
 no dispute (cf. interviewee 1).
Third, Japan relied on the positive diplomatic instrument of maintaining
a cautious attitude towards the PRC with regard to the islands. While
strongly protesting on the one hand, the government refrained from taking
more provocative action on the other (Diet-HR 123, Okinawa-Hoppô 4, 10
March 1992: 28; Diet-HR 123, Yosan, 2 Bunkakai 2, 12 March 1992: 34;
Diet-HR 123, Okinawa-Hoppô 5, 12 March 1992: 14; cf. interviewee 3).
The Japanese government s consistent attempts to downplay the issue seem
like a concession to the PRC, but since such measures have kept facilitating
the preservation of the status quo they are not. The longer that this situation
continues uninterrupted the more likely that Japan s  control becomes
internationally recognized, perhaps in terms of  acquisitive prescription
implying  the legitimization of a doubtful title by the passage of time and the
presumed acquiescence of the former sovereign (Shaw, 1991: 291, quoted
in Shaw, 1999: 35, n. 36). Since this policy thus favours Japan s position in
the long term, it at least constitutes a good Japanese attempt to exert power
over China.
Fourth, PRC promulgation of the TWL enhanced Japanese criticism of
the plans for having Emperor Akihito visit China. Forces within the LDP,
centred on members of the pro-Taiwan grouping, soon resisted the plans for
an imperial visit even more persistently than before (FBIS-EAS-92 066, 6
April 1992: 3, 6 7; AS-M, 8 April 1992: 2; AS-M, 22 April 1992: 11; AS-
M, 21 May 1992: 4; Kim, 2001: 232). The TWL became a policy window
for such forces (cf. interviewee 2; interviewee 6), and they seemed likely to
prevail in the heated intra-party policy-making process (interviewee 14). The
infighting brought about a rather ambiguous Japanese approach to China s
continuous invitations  another diplomatic policy instrument. Although
MOFA officials generally supported the idea of sending the emperor to
China (cf. Kim, 2001: 237; interviewee 3; interviewee 14), they were able to
use domestic resistance as a lever towards the country (Kim, 2001: 239 40).
To the extent that it jeopardized crucial international recognition and
economic cooperation in the wake of Tiananmen Square, this uncertainty
was contrary to the revealed PRC interest (Kim, 2001: 229 30). Statements
by Japanese policy-makers, moreover, show that they should have been able
to calculate the potentially negative effects for China of a postponed imperial
visit (interviewee 3; interviewee 13; interviewee 14). In sum, linkage
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European Journal of International Relations 11(3)
between the TWL and the imperial visit permitted Japan to exert power over
China.
5.2 More on Interests
While  effective control , the  no dispute strategy and the cautious attitude
were contrary to China s sovereignty interest, ambiguity with regard to the
imperial visit contradicted the country s interest in modernization and
economic development. Still, the reason why China chose not to challenge
the former instances of Japanese statecraft, as it has done regarding similarly
disputed territories in the South China Sea, is rather that any escalation of
the dispute would be detrimental to the country s interest in economic
development (Whiting, 1998: 294). In addition to the probable discontinu-
ation of ODA and FDI, Japan s supremacy in military capability would
further enhance the cost of trying to  recapture the islands by force (cf. Wu,
2000: 298). Although US policy in regard to the Pinnacle Islands has been
somewhat ambiguous (Blanchard, 2000: 96), in this context it is still
important to remind ourselves about the Japan US Security Treaty and the
security guarantees that most likely extend to the islands.
In response to Japan s protests in the wake of the TWL, PRC authorities
tried their best not to rock the boat any further. Chinese criticism of Japan
became muted (Wang, J., 5 April 2001; interviewee 6), and top leaders
repeated that the TWL did not manifest a change in Chinese policy and that
the  shelving policy remained unaltered (FBIS-CHI-92 052, 17 March
1992: 6; Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 18 March 1992; SWB FE/1332 [4],
18 March 1992: i; AS-M, 18 March 1992: 2; FBIS-CHI-92 063, 1 April
1992: 8; FBIS-CHI-92 064, 2 April 1992: 7 8; SWB FE/1345 [3], 2 April
1992: i; CG 402 4, 1992: 24).20 It was moreover suggested that China was
ready to accept a growing status and role of Japan  as a major political
power (Kim, 2001: 240).
In short, Chinese policy prioritized economic development and moderni-
zation over sovereignty (Wang, J., 5 April 2001; cf. Downs and Saunders,
1998/99: 117), and it was thus more in line with a reformist definition of
national interest than with a conservative one. By accepting infringements
on the sovereignty interest for the sake of economic development and
modernization, the PRC government also contradicted the revealed interest
of Chinese nationalists. The PRC must constantly take into consideration
Japan s ability to raise, maintain or cancel  economic cooperation with the
country, because a deterioration of economic relations with Japan is
something that leading Chinese policy-makers wish least of all.
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Hagström: Japan s China Policy
5.3 More Recent Developments
An overview of more recent interaction over the Pinnacle Islands reinforces
the image of a rather consistent pattern of interaction, where the only
possible change in later years has been in US policy, which has become more
supportive of Japan (e.g. Institute for National Strategic Studies, 2000: 4; cf.
Shaw, 1999: 126; Blanchard, 2000). Japan has thus carried on with the
multidimensional policy instrument of  effective control , and the positive
diplomatic instrument of caution not to provoke China. An arrangement in
2000, where the PRC agreed to notify Japan before entering into the
country s territorial sea including the waters around the disputed islands,
was moreover reached as a result of MOFA s ability to use the discontent of
LDP members (and their explicit linkage between PRC compliance and
ODA) as  a card towards PRC authorities (interviewee 1). The tension
between sovereignty and modernization in China, where proponents of the
latter have tended to prevail, remained in place throughout the 1990s.
6. Conclusion: Intelligible Power
This concluding section argues that relational power analysis indeed helps
dissolve the enigma of power in Japan s foreign policy as it was presented in
section one. In that sense, this article also provides an example of how power
could be treated more coherently in FPA.
6.1 Relational Power Analysis of Issues in Japan s China Policy
Both cases demonstrate that Japan exerted power over the PRC, which itself
is called a  great power , and in bilateral interaction concerning  significant
issues in the relationship. In two divergent settings the country interestingly
relied on rather similar instruments  mostly ideational and diplomatic
ones, which were used positively, defensively and through non-action. In
both cases such instruments rested on systemic resources of the policy base
 the international investment regime in section four and international law
in section five. Japan s policy instruments were also facilitated by economic
factors, both the country s actual capability and perceptual resources
consisting in PRC fear of jeopardizing Japanese  economic cooperation .
Japan s Pinnacle Islands policy, however, not only depended on civilian
instruments, but also on military ones in the form of guarding. Apart from
mere capability, in this context the Japan US alliance must also be construed
as one crucial policy base.21
Most of the instruments discussed above affected PRC interest either
causally or constitutively. However, the domain of such effects was again
found to have been facilitated by the fact that leading PRC policy-makers
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European Journal of International Relations 11(3)
prioritized economic development and modernization over sovereignty.
Indeed, PRC fear of jeopardizing Japanese  economic cooperation provided
Japan with a foundation to which most instances of its exertion of power
over China could be traced. Such instances thus took the shape of
infringements on interest defined as sovereignty either by the state itself
(although it prioritized Japanese economic cooperation as in section five), or
by subgroups (although Japanese economic cooperation was prioritized by
the state as in section four).
Intentional analysis in the first case study concluded that Japanese policy-
makers depended on the aforementioned instruments strategically, because
they were sufficiently aware that the country s policy was contrary to
Chinese interests. The second study likewise argued that most Japanese
policy instruments were better interpreted in terms of strategies, because
Japanese policy-makers were again quite aware of the fact that such measures
countered PRC interests, or such instruments were at least likely to bring
significant benefits to Japan at the expense of China in the long run, and
Japanese policy-makers should have been able to understand that.
6.2 Reflections on Relational Power Analysis and Implications for Future
Research
Overall, I believe that relational power analysis has fared well in this study. In
particular, it enabled sections four and five to draw conclusions about
Japan s case-specific China policies, which were coherent in terms of power.
It thereby helped dissolve the enigma of Japanese power as it was conceived
in section one. By doing so, it also demonstrated how to employ relational
power to foreign policy analysis in the first place.
Still, what are the advantages of relational power analysis vis-Ä…-vis the
normal usage of  power in the discipline, i.e. one inspired by realist and
neorealist concepts? In particular, it comprises an ideal type with an
elaborately developed methodology. Weber notes that,  If the historian . . .
rejects an attempt to construct such ideal types . . . the inevitable con-
sequence is either that he consciously or unconsciously uses other similar
concepts without formulating them verbally and elaborating them logically
or that he remains stuck in the realm of the vaguely  felt  (Weber, 1949:
94). In comparison with much power analysis in the discipline, relational
power analysis thus facilitated a transparent and coherent departure from
exactly such approaches to power. The article is in agreement with Hook et
al. that the image of Japan as  enigmatic, inexplicable or abnormal (Hook et
al., 2001: 24) is a  myth , and it has shown that this myth is conditioned on
defective analytical approaches. It also agrees that the country s foreign
policy can be understood if only  sufficient intellectual rigour is applied
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Hagström: Japan s China Policy
(Hook et al., 2001). Most importantly, with the help of relational power
analysis Japan s foreign policy could be portrayed more coherently and
intelligibly in terms of power, and Japan could thus be demystified as a state
actor.
Yet, a new analytical framework entails that new phenomena are perceived,
because they are largely construed internal to the ideal types of that
framework. Without a concept of ideational statecraft, for example, this
article would hardly have discerned empirical phenomena as such. In this
respect, power analysis inspired by realism and neorealism may seem
incommensurable rather than at odds with the framework of relational
power, because Japan is oddly still not using capability in a more muscular
way. Yet, since the latter was developed in response to fundamental problems
faced by the former, and by focusing directly on what such analysis tries to
approximate by measuring capability, this is not the case.
It could also be argued that the conclusions in the previous subsection
basically overlap with the  civilian power thesis , which has been put forward
so earnestly in the wake of the Cold War and before, and it does. So what is
new? Is relational power analysis not just a more cumbersome way of
reaching the same results? I touched on this subject in the first part of the
article, but for the sake of clarity I repeat myself. By invoking for instance
economic rationality and the cultures and institutions of antimilitarism,
Rosecrance, Berger, Katzenstein and others elegantly explain why Japan has
not assumed the position of traditional great power. They thus provide a
solution to the enigma of Japanese power as conceived by realists and
neorealists. However, drawing the conclusion that Japan is a civilian power,
they protract the enigma of Japanese power as it is conceived in this article.
The reason is that they basically stick to the definition of power as capability,
while just disagreeing on its underlying ontology (Wendt, 1999: 94), and
downplaying its importance as an independent variable in favour of interests,
and ideas, identity and culture. This means that the civilian power thesis
basically derives from Japan s large civilian capability. The contribution of
relational power analysis, on the contrary, is to provide a tool with the help
of which the image of civilian power can be more thoroughly investigated,
but also problematized. This article has shown that Japan not only exerted
civilian power over China. Although proponents of the civilian power thesis
might concur with my findings, while objecting that at root is still capability,
there is no guarantee that they would have reached the same conclusions.
After all, it is quite easy to know what capabilities matter most ex post facto,
or after relational power analysis has already been carried out.
With its focus on contingencies, relational power analysis is unsuited to
generalization. The summary above, however, highlighted some tendencies,
and there is reason to believe that if it were used to guide further research it
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European Journal of International Relations 11(3)
could give rise to more generalized theoretical statements about Japan s
China policy, Japan s foreign policy or foreign policy to begin with. Future
research will hopefully show if the image of subtle and discreet Japanese
power holds in other instances of its China policy and in the interaction with
other actors. Incoherent understanding of power is hardly unique to the
analysis of Japan s foreign policy, and a comparative approach would
demonstrate the prevalence of subtle and discreet power mechanisms in
other countries foreign policies, because they are certainly also not uniquely
Japanese. Indeed, relational power analysis could be seen as the given
method for any FPA with reconstructive and interpretative ambitions.
Unlike in this study, it should be used more comparatively, at least to
scrutinize the statecraft and interests of all parties to an interaction so as to
evaluate their relative power. Adler identifies a  particularizing positivist
strategy that reconstructs historical processes and narratives , somewhat in
line with the present, as the   weak programme of constructivism in the
social sciences (Adler, 2002: 97).
Notes
This article is developed from my 2003 Phd thesis in political science at Stockholm
University. I especially thank Jan Hallenberg and Marie Söderberg for their valuable
advice throughout the years, and Stefano Guzzini for lethally sharp comments during
the defence. I also thank participants in the panel on International Relations and
Regional Imbalances at the Second Annual SSAAPS Conference 2003, where an
earlier draft of this article was presented, as well as Olav F. Knudsen, Barry Buzan and
three anonymous reviewers, for fruitful comments and advice. I finally acknowledge
the funding of the special foreign and security programme at the Swedish Institute of
International Affairs, under the auspices of which this article was written.
1. See SIPRI, http: //projects.sipri.se/milex/mex_major_spenders.html. The link
between a country s military expenditure and its denomination, for example in
terms of  a power , may seem far-fetched but analysts regularly adhere to it (e.g.
Iriye, 1992: 112 13). In fact, defence expenditure is commonly used as a
 single-variable indicator of power (Merritt and Zinnes, 1989: 13).
2. For examples of this tendency in Waltz neorealism, see Waltz (1979: 185,
192).
3. This argument is more fully developed in Hagström (2005b).
4. The islands are better known by their Chinese and Japanese names, but since this
analysis is unbiased as to the different claims, and since words are instrumental
in the construction of reality (cf. Kivimäki, 2002), neutrality is retained by
applying the islands seldom-used and perhaps  antiquated English name (Shaw,
1999: 11).
5. A couple of years ago, Gaventa even noted that the three-dimensional view had
yet to be employed in empirical analysis in the first place (Gaventa, 1987: 36).
Still, his own book from 1980 must be recognized as one rare example
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Hagström: Japan s China Policy
(Gaventa, 1980). Unlike the empirical analysis in this study, however, Gaventa
tries to settle what power mechanisms are present in a seemingly unequal
situation. In their textbook on the global political economy, Gill and Law also
discuss Lukes concept of power, but they do not develop an analytical
framework around it (Gill and Law, 1988: 71 80). Neither does Krause in an
article that analyses the advantage of arms transfers beyond a  bargaining power
model . The connection to Lukes in the  hegemonic power model , moreover, is
only implicit (Krause, 1991).
6. In later works, Baldwin has replaced  propaganda with  symbolic means ,
defined in terms of  appeals to normative symbols as well as the provision of
information (Baldwin, 2002: 179).
7. The distinction between causal and constitutive effects corresponds to different
approaches to ideas in IR theory and FPA. Where rationalist analysis treats ideas
as an explanatory variable  a contender to interests and intentions in
explanations of human action (e.g. Goldstein and Keohane, 1993), constructiv-
ism takes the liberal and neoliberal emphasis on independent causal effects of
ideas and norms to be inadequate. Instead, it stresses the constitutive effect of
such social building materials (e.g. Katzenstein, 1996b; Fearon and Wendt,
2002: 58 60).
8. Lukes fits this kind of radicalism only to the extent that he accepts that A can
exert power over B to enlighten B on his, her or its  real interests (but he also
stresses that this power relation must end as soon as B acknowledges the
correctness of A s assessment) (Lukes, 1974: 33).
9. Hadenius has developed the closely related  motive analysis within political
science (Hadenius, 1983: 137).
10. AS-M stands for Asahi Shimbun, the morning edition. AS-E represents the
evening edition of the same major Japanese daily.
11. However, it is not certain that the Pinnacle Islands will generate as vast areas of
maritime space as disputants and scholars believe or hope (Charney, 1995;
Charney, 1999).
12. A complete Japanese translation of the law is published in Kazankai s collection
of materials relevant to the Sino Japanese relationship (Kazankai, 1998:
944 6).
13. Diet-HR represents a Diet protocol originating from the House of Representa-
tives, while Diet-HC stands for one from the House of Councillors. Gaimu
means that the protocol was taken in the Foreign Affairs Committee, Okura that
it was taken in the Finance Committee, Yosan stands for the Budget Committee
and Okinawa-Hoppô designates the Committee for Okinawa and the Northern
Territories.
14. SWB FE stands for BBC, Summary of World Broadcasts, Far East.
15. Information on interviews is further presented in the reference list.
16. BR stands for  Beijing Review , the official PRC weekly in English.
17. FBIS-EAS stands for Foreign Broadcast Information Service, East Asia.
18. FBIS-CHI stands for Foreign Broadcast Information Service, China.
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European Journal of International Relations 11(3)
19. The Japanese government formally protested to China on four occasions but
restated the same points at other times as well (Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 27
February 1992; AS-E, 27 February 1992: 2; SWB FE/1316, 28 February 1992:
A3/1; Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 5 March 1992; FBIS-CHI-92 052, 17
March 1992: 6; Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 18 March 1992; AS-M, 7 April
1992: 1; Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 8 April 1992).
20. CG stands for Chûgoku geppô. This monthly periodical, edited until 1994 by the
China section at the MOFA (sometimes together with the China-focused think
tank Kazankai), consists of translated excerpts from Chinese newspapers, many
of which could of course be considered government mouthpieces.
21. The obscure presence of the US in Japan s Pinnacle Islands policy, in particular
the bilateral Security Treaty, proves the problem of excluding  to the largest
extent possible American and other external factors that  might shape Japan s
foreign policy (see p. 405).
References
1. Interviewees (in alphabetical order)
Li Guojiang, Senior Research Fellow, Institute of Contemporary History, Chinese
Academy of Social Sciences (CASS), Beijing, 3 April 2001.
Wang Jisi, Director, Institute of American Studies, CASS, Beijing, 5 April 2001.
Yang Bojiang, Research Professor and Deputy Director Northeast Asian Studies
Division, Chinese Institute of Contemporary International Relations (CICIR),
Beijing, 9 April 2001.
Zhang Yunling, Director, Institute of Asia-Pacific studies and Institute of Japanese
Studies, CASS, Beijing, 2 April 2001.
2. Interviewees II (anonymous)
1. An official at the China Section of the Japanese Ministry of Foreign Affairs,
MOFA, Tokyo, 22 November 2000.
2. A former MOFA official with long experience from China and Taiwan, Tokyo, 7
November 2000.
3. A former ambassador and official at the Japanese embassy in Beijing, Tokyo, 22
May 2002.
4. A director at the Japan China Investment Promotion Organization, Tokyo, 16
November 2000.
5. The director general of the Japan China Economic Association, Tokyo, 20
November 2000.
6. A MOFA top-official central to Japan s China policy in 1992, Tokyo, 1 December
2000.
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8. A former Japanese Ministry of International Trade and Industry (MITI) official in
charge of Northeast Asian affairs, Tokyo, (1) 6 December 2000 and (2) 29 May
2002.
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Hagström: Japan s China Policy
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