page_149 < previous page page_149 next page > Page 149 mechanisms can be local or nonlocal, private or public, or combined. Ecosystem managers are packaging diverse public ownership mandates with an array of inducementsincluding compensation, incentive, and benefits-sharing optionsintended to attract private owners to participate (see Michaels et al. 1992). In sum, the former revolution sought sweeping separations of ownership and control in land through macro-zoning of the landscape. Landowners were asked to relinquish certain rights of use in light of a newly defined public interest that emphasized a clean environment. Ecosystem management proposes a new geography of ownership and control that will potentially, but not necessarily, reach the backyard of all landowners. Caldwell clearly hoped that the first Quiet Revolution would go beyond broader land-use regulation: "An ecosystems approach to public land policy assumes a scope that embraces all land regardless of its ownership or custody under law" (1972, p. 412). This hope is more likely to be realized through ecosystem management than the Quiet Revolution, which held little to attract most landowners to its camp. Conclusion The rapid expansion of the ecosystem management and its bigger-is-better operating bias makes the property-ecosystem interface a pressing research target at many levels. As the ecosystem management paradigm expands in practice, it subsumes more ownership units and creates new ranks of inholders. It bears repeating Popper's (1979) injunction that ownership factors such as concentration, absenteeism, and owner background and values are an important, though often hidden, dimension in land-use planning. Anyone who doubts this influence need only recall the sovereign hand of railroad companies a century ago in locating, on a national scale, settlements, public infrastructure investments, thoroughfares and major national parks (NPCA 1988). On a regional and local scale, competing ownership claims can cloud title, obstruct land assembly, and stymie property transactions. Prior ownership patterns such as checkerboarding prefigure where settlement and subdivision occur and, of course, the degrees of management freedom retained by ecosystem managers. Monopoly ownership patterns, surprisingly recurrent in the United States (NRC 1993), raise the cost of land for housing, for local livelihoods, and for such basic tools as conservation easements. It also dictates which lands will be exempted from protection and where planning windfalls and wipeouts will occur. The personal values of inholders, turned political, can stampede public opinion for or against ecosystem management. Â < previous page page_149 next page >