IMG01

CHAPTER 12

Philosophy of Science i

Ernst Mach has often bccn thought of as a halfway iigurc bctwcen the positivism of Augustę Comte and the logical positivism of the mid-twentieth ccntury. To understand and evaluate this impression in proper fashion we must first darify what we mean by ‘!^ositivism.^M Mach himsclf rcjcctcd the labcl, ncvcr identified his philosophy with that of Comte, except in mnior aspeets, and died hcforc logical positiv-i'sm camc into cxistcncc as a conspicuous movcmcnt. On the other hand, Mach’s vcrbal reticence should not obscurc factual similaritics.

Mach and Comte wcrc both presentationalists in identifying the physical world with what could be immediatcly sensed, and wcrc phc-nomcnalists in rcjccting causes as agents or forccs in favor of dcscrib-ing conscious referents in terms of mathematical functions or cqua-tions. They also wcrc both “scicntistic” in belicving in human progress and in the indispcnsablc role of science in hclping to rcalizc that progress. Epistcmologically, their types of phenomenalism were somc* what different. Mach was sensation-oriented, while Comte, the orig-inator of the term "sodology,” disdaincd introspective psychology in favor of holistic theorizing about vaguc, cross-causal conccptual conglomcratcs which morę rcccnt sociologists foliowi ng tmilc Durkhcim have labcled “social facts." Mach obviously was not a posi-rivist in this sociological or Durkheimian sense, but in at least one or morc of the other common uses of the term he clcarly was. Let us then examinc somc of thcsc other dcfinitions.

16 4

1.    Narrow definition: Positivi$m was the philosophy of Augustę ¹ Comte.

₂.    Broad definition: Positivism was the philosophy that combincd.ępis- , tcmological phenomenalism with “scicntism,” that is, with the bc-licf in the desirability of scientific and technological progress.

3.    Hostile "dcfmitions":

a.    Positivism was a matcrialistic and atheistic philosophy (religious objection).

b.    Positivism was a philosophy that exaggcratcd the importance of an empincal approach to science (rationalistic objection).

c.    Posilivism was a philosophy that concentratcd on merc dctails at the expen$e of a moro generał and profouml uiuIcrstanding^Hc-gclian or holistic objection).

d.    Positivism was a philosophy that attempted to imposc a mathe* matical, formaliStic, or idealized method on subject matter often unsuited to this kind of approach (humanistic objection).

4.    Most conrmon sclf-definition: Positivism was a scientific method-ology, which not only was not a philosophy, but which aimed to make all philosophy supcrfluous, at least as concerned science.

Ernst Mach was a self-dcfinition positivist, a religious objection posi-tivist (which included confusing presentationalist phenomenalism with representationalist materialism), shared enough of Augustę Comtc's basie vicws on the philosophy of science to be considercd at least partially a narrow definition positivist, and was also a complete broad definition positivist. In addition, he augmented both narrow and broad definition positWism with his theories of “economy" and “biological nccds” and by acccpting ontological as wcll as cpistemological phenomenalism.

Mach as a broad definition positivist was of course mcrely part of .1 \ hugc and in many respeets dominant nineteenthcentury movement. Many followers of Hume and Kant have as much right to bc callcd positivists in this sense as the e.\press disciplcs of Augustę Comte. John Stuart Mili, Herbert Spencer, Claude Bernard, Theodor Gompcrz, and many others contributed to the hopes and clTorts ot this influential ideology.

Like Comte, Mach denied that he was a philosopher. that he had .1 philosophy, or that science did or should rcly on philosophy or on anv particular typc or system of philosophy. Both men flattered the spectal-

165