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Ernst Mach

extcnsion, number, density, and tcxturc closcly rescmblcd or rcprcscntcd similar characteristics in the cxternal causc of our sensory impressions. Secondary qualitics such as color, sound, smcll, taste, balance, and touch as well as tcrtiary or emotional qualitics bccame cntirely mental with no analogies in the physical world at all. Furthcrmorc, mass, weight, and potcntial or actual forcc were addcd as qualitics to all physical objccts, even though it was frcely admittcd that thcy had no rcliable rescmblance to thc fccling of prcssurc which probably first suggcstcd thcm, or to any other sensory characteristic.⁴⁶

Berkeley, Hume, and Kant during the eightccnth century destroyed the abovc synthesis of science, philosophy, and conimon sense by re-turning to presentationalism, that is, to thc prc-Galilcan view that notieed sensory impressions or objccts wcrc parts or aspects of thc cxtcrnal world itsclf and not merc mental symbols or representations of it. The ninctccnth and twentieth ccnturies have secn a continuation of prcscntationalist philosophy in positivism, logical positivism, prag-matism, idcalism, phcnomcnology, and in a return to the most con-sistent form of phenomenalism and most extrcmc ideological oppo-nent of forcc-oricntcd common sense—Buddhism.

The last two ccnturies have also secn a gradual decline in rcspect for the hcroic valucs, a natural conscqucncc of thc climination of thc aristocracy from power in most Western countrics.^4C This has Icft humane and practical valucs in a dominant position, one antiforcc and the other forcc oriented.

Science dcvelopcd in thc seventcenth century on a force-oricnted “knowlcdgc is power” foundation. Scicntific knowlcdge and under-standing would cnablc men to bccomc stronger and better able to influence or contro! their surroundings. Propcrly uscd, force could benefit man by hclping him to solvc problems and to bccomc happier. The ninctccnth-century attempt of Augustę Comte in thc social Sciences and Ernst Mach in thc natural scicnccs to shift thc basie assump-tions of science from a representationalist to a presentationalist epis-temology, and from a common sense to a Buddhist conccption of forcc, has rcintroduced thc qucstion of the desirability of science itsclf.

Almost all contcmporary philosophy is presentationalist, and its most consistent form sccms to be Buddhism, but if Buddhism is thc finał answer, then why havc science at all? Buddhism does not need science, and Buddhistic, that is, kinematic, science will ncver satisfy common sense.⁴⁷

Mach and Buddhism

Modern scientists, such as Mach and Einstein, who continucd to live, speeulate, and do rescarch bccause other people who had not lost all practical and heroic valucs carcd for and protectcd them could allow thcmseWes thc luxury of Buddhistic or pacifistic opinions, that is, reject two-thirds of thc traditional Western triad of value systems. But how could such an attitudc benefit science ovcr thc long run? How could a presentationalist, kinematie science serve thc best interests of the business and laboring community and of policcmcn and soldiers who by necessity have to be representationalist and in large mcasure forcc oriented^{5 48} The answer is that it could not. Presentationalist, kinematie science was just as much a hothousc product as Buddhism and pacifism. They could survivc only through thc good fortunę that at least a few humanc and practical and hcroic leaders have still rc-taincd political control in many intcllcctually significant countries. If “humanc” valucs wcrc cvcr to prcvail to tlić fuli cxclusion of practical and hcroic ways of thinking among political leaders, then hcavcn help the human race.

If Buddhism wcrc to prevail as a world religion, then science would have to go. If common sense with its triad of basically inconsistent valuc systems wcrc to prevail, then many scientists would havc to reform their purposes, beliefs, and methodologies. In particular, "under-stand-rcality” or dynamie science would oncc again havc to takc prcccdence ovcr “describe-and*relate-thc-appearancc" or kinematie science as it did almost four hundred ycars ago when Galileo during thc original scicntific revolution hclpcd ovcrthrow Ptolemy’s kinematie approach to astronomy and correctcd Ari$totle’s quasi-dynamic under-standing of forcc.⁴¹'

IX

The Buddhist theory of economy holds that desires causc problcms and problcms causc unhappiness and that if desires wcrc climinatcd problcms would ccasc and unhappiness would vanish. Machs theory of economy argued that problems should be eliminaied and that, as a result, at least scicntific unhappiness should vani$h. Both approaches agreed in an economy of thought. sincc prcsumably thinking was rc-sponsiblc for a good many “unncccssary" of "superłluous" problems.

Max Bom, perhaps unconsciously, pointed out thc compatibility of Mach’s Denkjjkpnoniie with Buddhist doctrinc in thc following critical

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