IMG92

Notes

to. Josip Boncelj, Jozef Stefan (Lj u bijana, 1960), pp. 132—133.

11. Ludwig Boltzmann, Populare Schriften (Lcipzig, 1925). PP- 243-244.

12. Ludwig Flamm, "Die Pcrsónlichkcit Bolizmanns,” Óstcrrcichische Chemi\er. Zeilung, 47 (1944), 28.

13. Ibid., p. 29.

14. Friedrich Hcrneck, “Wiener Physik vor 100 Jahrcn," Physi{alische Hldtter, *7 (1961), 459-

15. PSL. pp. 245-248.

16. Stephen F. Mason, A History of the Sciences (New York, 1962), p. 499.

17. In pariicular, Picrre Duhcm and Georg Fcrdinand Heim.

18. Karl K. Lcistncr, Projcssor und Prolet: Kurzweiligc und Vollstdndige Widerlegung des Hassbuches Lcr.itis gegen dic Mac hi sten (Karlsbad, 1932), p. 62; Alois Hóflcr, "Ludwig Boltzmann ais Mcnsch und Philosoph,” Siiddeutsche Mor.atshejte. Vol. 3, Hcft 10 (Oct., 1906), unpaginatcd.

19. For a difTerent point of view on Ncwton’s philosophy sec Howard Stein, "Ncwtonian Spacc-Timc," Texas Quarterly, 10 (1967), 174, and other artides in the same issue.

20. E. A. Burtt, The Metaphysical Foundations of Modern Science, (New York, 1954), pp. 233-239.

21. Isaac Newton, "Absolutc and Rclativc Space, Time, and Motion,” Philosophy of Science. Arthur Danto and Sidncy Morgcnbcsser, eds. (Clcvcland, 1964), p. 325.

22. AOS, p. 12.

23. A. Wolf, A History of Science, Technology, and Philosophy in the l6th and iyth Centuries, Vol. II (New York, 1959), p. 672: "The introduction of 'mass' among the primary qualitics of matter appears to havc bccn suggested to Newton by Boylc's expcrimcnts on the density of air. The conccpt madę it pos-sible to work out the mcchanical theory of naturę morc satisfactorily than it was possiblc to do with the Cartcsian vorticcs."

24. SOM (La Salle, III., 1960), p. 298.

25. Ibid., p. 299.

26. Newton, op. cit.. pp. 322-329.

27. Ibid., pp. 322-323.

28. Ibid., p. 323.

29. Ibid.

30. Ibid.

31. Ibid., p. 322.

32 Ibid.

33. Ibid., p. 323.

34. Ibid.

35. Ibid., pp. 323, 326.

36. Ibid.

37. In order to grnsp what Newton meant by "rclative" and "absolutc" let mc use an cxamplc that probably camc to Newton’s mind many limes, namcly, the "retrograde" motion of Mars.

In terms of Ncwton's causal, represcntative rcalism and mind-matter dualism, the obscrvcd retrogression was a relatire apparent motion, and the unobscrvcd but scientiftcally mcasurablc retrogression was a rclatiue physical motion. The absolutc physical motion of Mars, howevcr, was an ellipse around the sun with no retrogression: first, because only that ellipse "in itsclf” could satisfy all

mcasurcmcnts from all perspcctivcs; sccond, bccausc only that ellipse was pre-NUinably incasurablc from the edge of Uic univcrse, and third, bccausc only that ellipse was ablc to cxplain the causal behavior and influence of Mars.

38. For Newton evcrything “absolutc" was also "rc!ativc" in that (1) mea-surement from the edge of the univcrsc involvcd a relation, (2) there wcrc nor-mally local pcrspectivcs that gave a "rclatise” picturc dosely in accord with what could be measured from the "fixed stars," (3) everything "absolutc" could be "related," that is, compared or contrasted, with any number of other things, (4) all "absolutcs" had numerous historical and causal relations, ar.d (5) all “absolutes" had various relations with Cod. In short, by “absolutc" Newton did not mcan frec from relations. Frcc from obsemable (i.e., sensuous, notice-ablc) constant relations, ycs, but then for Newton all physical rcality, both “ab-solutc" and "rdativc," was frcc from thosc kinds of relations, Lc., mcntal or cpistcmological relations.

39. Karl R. Popper, “A Notc on Berkeley as a Prccursor of Mach," Brińsh Journal jor Philosophy oj Science, 4 (1953), 26-36; John Myhill, Berkeley's ‘De Motu’: An Anticipation of Mach," Unitersity oj California Publicaticnt in Philosophy, 29 (1957), p. 141—157

40. SOM, pp. 272, 280.

41. Ibid., p. 237.

42. Frcdcrick Copplcston, A History of Philosophy (New York, 1964), Vol. 5,

part 1, p. 162.

43. Ibid.

44. COE, p. 82.

45. SOM, p. 237.

46. Bok/.mann, op. cit., pp. 256-257.

47. COE, pp. 84-85.

48. SOM. p. 341.

49. Bunge, op. cit.. p. 594. “In short, as Newton had discovered, kinemaues is dcduciblc from dynumics but not as D’Alcmbcrt, Kirchhoff, and Mach wanted, convcrsely. In other words, the invcrsc problem of experimcnial mechanics— dcriving masses, stresses and forces from a knowlcdgc of motions a!onc—is in generał as unsokablc as the problem of inferring postulatcs from theorems in a uniquc way."

50. Ibid., p. 588.

51. SOM. p. 272.

52. Ibid., p. 273.

53. Ibid.

54. Ibid., p. 280.

55. Ibid.

56. Ibid.

57. Ibid., p. 337.

58. S&G (La Sallc, 111., 1960), p. 139-

59. PW (Lcipzig, 1900), p. 56.

60. Newton, op. cit., p. 327.

61. Ibid., p. 325.