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Brass of William Wenemar, a captain and magistrate of Gent, first half of the 14th century. As a senior militia officer of one of the wealthiest cities in Europę he would have the best available military equipment; nevertheless, this still has much in common with that of the late 13th century. (Bijlokemuseum, Gent)

FRENCH ARMIES OF THE HUNDRED YEARS WAR

1337-1453

The period immediately leading up to the Hundred Years War saw France morę prosperous and powerful than it had been sińce the fali of the Roman Empire. The French kings, like the English, could draw upon morę effective ‘sinews of war’ than any medieval rulers before them. Our study of their armies is aided by the greater volume of documentary evidence concerning recruitment, organisation and payment which survives from this period.

In earlier days French monarchs relied upon the rich region around Paris to finance their wars, but recent nrban growth meant that towns throughout the realm became important sources of money and men. On the other hand some cities were flexing their political muscles as centres of semi-autonomous mini-states, most notably in Flanders.

The Hundred Years War played a major role in French history; the country tasted extremes of humiliation and triumph in what was really a sequence of related conflicts, which France finally won. By the time it was over France had changed from a traditional decentralised kingdom where the king was merely ‘first amongst equals’ into one of the most centralised monarchies in Europę. How much these wars contributed to a process of ‘nation-building’ is, however, less elear.

Tactically, the Hundred Years War saw the French initially clinging to their own military traditions - and losing — followed by a period in which the English clung to their military traditions - and also lost. Meanwhile the intervals of supposed peace between major Anglo-French clashes were characterised by civil wars, uprisings and widespread devastation by bands of unemployed soldiers. Another feature which has generally been ignored by British historians is a French naval superiority during most of the Hundred Years War. Finally it could be argued that, had it not been for King Charles Vl’s bouts of paranoid schizophrenia from 1392 onwards, French victories in the late 14th century would have ended the Hundred Years War some fifty years earlier than was eventually the case.

Military attitudes also changed considerably during this period. The knightly elite soon felt itself under threat, not least from an increasingly influential middle class. This resulted in an artificial revival of tournaments, chivalric literaturę and extravagant behaviour intended to reinforce the distinction between knights and others. At the same time there were those who stopped looking to the past and who tried to embrace new forms of warfare, including Geoffroy de Charny, Christine de Pisań and Jean de Bueil. The latter’s Le Jouvencal, written in the mid-15th century, showed considerable interest in cannon, and in effective strategy rather than the pursuit of personal glory. Other 15th century treatises focussed on specific weapons, such as the Art de l'artillerie et canonnage and the Art d’archerie. Ali these factors contributed

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