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THE CZECHOSLOVAK REPUDLIC, 1918-1938

In thc abscncc of Kram tir, who was at thc Paris Pcacc Confcrencc, Dcp-uty Premier Antonin Svchla negotiated willi ihe Sccial Dcmocrals/¹ An ablc politician, hc managed to scttle thc conflict amicably, but only aEter the goyernment promiscd to speed up the inauguration of thc land reform and thc holding of local clcctions.

In May, popular discontcnt—mostly bccausc of thc scrious food shortage—fillcd thc streets of many eilies with dcmonstrators. In addi-tion, impaticnce with what was considcrcd to be lcnicncy on thc part of thc authoritics in rounding up black markctccrs and in laking adcąuatc steps against thc rising priccs was causing political rcpercussions in thc govcrnment coalition. The National Democrats advocated taking Stern mcasures against agitators and ignored thc undcrlying causes of thc radi-calization of the masses. On thc other hand, the socialist parties felt un-derrepresented in the government and thus unablc to carry out a policy of social and economic reforms. Fearing that they might lose control of the popular movement, thc moderate socialist leaders pressed for re-organization of the govcrnmcnt. The dissension within thc coalition resulted in the resignation of thc National Dcmocralic ministers from thc cabinet.⁵² Because of foreign policy considerations, Presidcnt Masaryk refused to accept their resignation. Howcver, thc governmcnt could not further dclay the holding of local clcctions—even tliough, becausc of Czechoslovakia’s military conflict with Sovict Hungary, they could bc held in the Czech provinces only.

The local elections were bascd on a new elcctoral law which intro-duced proportional representation and fixcd lists of candidates as pre-sented by the parties. The rcsults of the voting, which took place on June 15-16, confirmcd the popularity of the two socialist parties.⁵³ Among the Germans, who took part in thc clcctions only vcry rchictant-ly, the German Social Dcmocralic party sccurcd wcll over 40 pcrccnt of all voles.^M The elear swing of thc clccloralc to thc lcft which thc clcc-

⁸¹ Svehla regarded the ultimatum as a vote of nonconfidence and submitted a secret resignation to Masaryk, who, however, refused to accept it. Thanks to Svehla’s negotiating skill and also the conciliatory ntlitudc of thc Social Dcmo-crats, an agreement was rcachcd and thc crisis pnsscd away. Sec Pcroutka, Budovan\ statu, u, 781-99.

⁵² Kocman, Boj o smer, i, 220.

⁰³ Pcroulka, Budovdm sialu, ir, 1022-26. The Social Dcmocrals reccivcd 30.1, the agrarians 20.5, and thc Czech Socialisls 15.6 pcrccnt of all volcs. The National Democrats with 8.2 perccnt occupied thc fiEtto place aflcr the Catholic Populist party which received 9.7 percent of all votcs. Sec PJehlecl, m, 90.

⁸⁴ Pfehlcd, Dl, 90. The German parties at first hcsilatcd to takc part in the com-munal elections because they were afraid that (his might bc intcrprclcd as llicir recognition of the Czechoslovak state. In thc end, howcver, they dccidcd to par-ticipate. See Jaroslav Cesar and Bohumil Ćerny, Politika nemeckych buriodznich stran v Ceskoslovensku v letech 1918-1938 [The Polilics of the German Bourgeois Parties in Czechoslovakia in 1918-1938] (2 vols.; Prague, 1962), i, 154-56.

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DEMOCRACY AND 1TS PROULEMS, 1918-1920

tions rcvcalcd causcd the rcplacemcnt on July 8 of KramaFs cabinet by that of thc Social Dcmocralic leader, Vlaslimil Tusar (1880-1924). lt was bascd on thc coopcration of thc Czcchoslovak Social Democrats, thc Czech (National) Socialists, thc Czech agrarians, and thc Slovak Club. The National Democrats and the Czech populists were not represented in it. The ncw coalition, which because of ils composilion was referred to as thc “Red-Green coalition,” enjoycd the confidcncc of President Masaryk.⁰⁵ The Czechoslovak political system, which was marked by strong social consciousncss, callcd for rapid rcctification of any past in-justiccs against thc poor and Uic working inan. Stimulatcd by fcar of the conscqucnc.es of serious disorders because of misery and Bolshcvik agita-tion, thc coalition leaders strove fevcrishly to achievc a modicum of sta-bility and to carry out thc most essential intcrnal reforms.

President Masaryk s dccision to ask a socialist to head the govcrnment rellccted his determination to solve thc acute internal crisis in coopera-tion with the two main political forces in the country—the socialists and thc agrarians. Evcntually, the existcncc of the socialist-agrarian coalition depended largcly on the success of Svchla’s cllorts.

To understand Antonin Svchla (1873-1933) it is essential to recog-nize him as a Czech pcasant leader. Chairman of thc Czech agrarian party sińce 1909, 5vehla dcvclopcd a national constitucncy as a champion of thc counlryside. He had morę appcal to two constilucncies—the smali and middlc-sizc farmers—than any of thc other agrarians. A mod-erate, opting for change, not thc status quo, Svehla leaned ncithcr left nor right; he was simply rcaching out to enlist support for a politics of trust. His genius lay in his putting together thc self-interests of dillercnt groups. Accessiblc, shrewd, i1c.\iblc, willing to listen and accommodate, he was one of thc fcw major figures to havc survivcd thc ycars of turmoil with-out earning many cncmies. Soon after Masaryk’s return from abroad there dcvclopcd i steady, elose relationship of mutual confidcncc and friendship betwccn tlie two most inlluential men on tlie Czech political scenę. Masaryk admired Svehla’s ability to visualize quickly thc essen-lials of 1 problem, strip away the irrclcvancics, and produce by laborious negotialious thc workablc compromisc ncccssary to solvc it.

Svchla was not so much a reformer as a man shrewd cnough to know when to bend beforc the incvitablc. Through patient negotiations he ac-commodatcd sccmingly irrcconcilablc forccs. He shunned thc spotlight of publicity, living unobtrusivcly on his farm ncar Prague. Hc enierged from thc crisis of 1919 as the most important political figurę in Czccho-slovakia, ideally suited to pacify the widespread wav.es of unrest within the framework of party and coalition politics. The basie principle of the

⁵⁵ Peroutka, Diulovani staju, ii, 1140-61. For thc text of Tusar’s program, see Kocnian, Boj o smer, u, 70-72.

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