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chapter. However, sińce technical problems are mostly partial, the subordination of social Sciences to technical interests causes their in-creasing fragmentation, which in turn renders even morę difficult a comprehensive view of society as well as a deeper inąuiry into and the understanding of specific relationships and phenomena. These argu-ments demonstrate the need to relate sociology morę closely to other social Sciences. »The autonomy of social Sciences is not something „in itself”, but is based on reification .. . For this reason the demarcation between these two Sciences (sociology and psychology - V. M.) is just as little absolute as the boundary between sociology and economy, or sociology and history. Insight into society as a whole also implies that all factors operating within this totality, and which can never be re-duced upon each other without a remainder, must come within know-ledge; this insight must not be allowed to be terrorized by the scien-tific division of work«.⁶⁰ Yet, cooperation of Sciences is not sufficient for the development of critical theory and creation of a theoretical base necessary for unification with practice, in which theory would not play a subordinated instrumental role. »Relationship with philo-sophy remains a constitutive one for sociology . . .«⁶¹ because »without a concern for the destiny of the totality, which must not be spoken of without an idea in the sense of a great philosophy, sociology as a science is sterile, for which it unjustly denounces philosophy«.⁶² Sociology cannot be confined to the description, classification and ex-planation of different phenomena and relationships in existing society, nor to its functioning as a system. Its duty is to show how men should live in common, in fact it must assume and continue the so much abo-minated and underestimated role of enlightenment.⁶³ Having thus conceived the role of sociology and of other theoretical social Sciences in unifying theory and practice, the protagonists of the critical theory have resolutely rejected the idea of the so-called value-free social Sciences (Wertfreilieit) as a philosophical justification for transform-ing these Sciences into un-autonomous tools of social practice. Their critique of the principle of ethical neutrality has convincingly shown, through an epistemological analysis and by using concrete historical materiał, that, if consistently implemented, it fully justifies irrational decisionism of social practice, and that this principle shows a tendency to make the functional rationality’s predominance in scientific thought all embracing and absolute.^{1 2 3 4 5} There is also agreement on a few basie points in elucidating the particular role of theoretical thought in

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1

⁰⁰    Th. W. Adorno, »Zur Logik der Sozialwissenschaften*, p. 261.

2

   M. Horkheimer, »Soziologie und Philosophie«, in the book by M. Horkhcimer, T. W. Adorno, Sociologica //, p. 14.

3

   Ibid., p. 11.

4

^M Ibid., p. 12, 16.

5

Sce J. Habermas, »Dogmatismus, Vernunft und Entscheidung«, in the book Theorie und Praxis, pp. 231-256; J. Habermas, »Analytische Wissenschaftstheorie und Dialektik«, pp. 299-310; W. Hofmann, »Vom Werturteil in der Gesellschafts-lchre«, in the book W. Hofmann, Unwersitat, Ideologie, Gesellschaft, Beitrage zur Wisscnschaftssoziologie, pp. 67-81. The most voluminous historical analysis of the problem of value-free social Sciences may be found in the study by W. Hofmann, Gesellschaftslehre ais Ordnungsmacht, Die Werturteilsfragc - heute, Muncker und Humbolt, Berlin, 1961.