Citizens’ Alliance for North Korean Human Rights (NKHR)
2
Vol. 53 / Fall / 2009
Life &
Human
Rights in
North Korea
Citizens’ Alliance for North Korean Human Rights (NKHR)
Life & Human Rights in North Korea
3
| C
O N T E N T S
|
E
SSAY
Experiences and Fundamental Strategies of
International Lobbying on North Korean Human Rights
in the UN system
Joanna Hosaniak · 4
F
ORUM
Right to Food and Discrimination based on
Social Classification and Ascription
Tae-Hoon Kim · 11
W
ITNESS
A
CCOUNT
Moving from Japan to North Korea, and to South Korea Again
Chul-Yoon Kim · 21
D
OCUMENT
Report of the Special Rapporteur on the Situation of Human
Rights in the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea
Vitit Muntarbhorn · 31
This quarterly is published in Korean and English.
All expenses were paid for with voluntary contributions
from Korean citizens.
Citizens’ Alliance for North Korean Human Rights (NKHR)
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ESSAY _ _ _ ____ __
Experiences and Fundamental Strategies of
International Lobbying on North Korean Human
Rights in the UN system
Joanna Hosaniak
Senior Officer
International Cooperation Team
Citizens’ Alliance for North Korean Human Rights
The Citizens’ Alliance for North Korean Human Rights (NKHR) has been
active in raising the profile of the human rights conditions in North Korea at
the UN system in the following areas:
1. Lobbying for the North Korea related Resolution and establishment of
the country-specific Rapporteur and cooperation with the Rapporteur since
then.
2. Cooperation with the relevant Committees that monitor North Korea’s
obligations under the four thematic human rights instruments it has
voluntarily acceded to.
3. Communicating cases to the Special Procedures regarding individuals of
concern.
1. Activities at the UN Commission on Human Rights (UN Human
Rights Council)
For about five decades, the UN scarcely addressed the human rights situation
in North Korea. Even after both the Republic of Korea and the Democratic
People’s Republic of Korea became full members of the UN community in
1991, and when the humanitarian and human rights situation in North Korea
worsened in the middle of the 90s as illustrated by the increased outflow of
refugees from the country, the first resolution at the UN Commission on
Human Rights appeared only in 2003. The resolution was introduced by the
European Union countries.
Life & Human Rights in North Korea
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Despite the slow few decades, the situation gained momentum after 2003. In
2004, the second resolution was passed; the language of it was stronger and
the scope of issues included extended. Most importantly, the 2004 resolution
established the mandate of the Special Rapporteur on the Situation of Human
Rights in North Korea.
The beginning of the process in 2003 would be impossible without active
participation of international NGO community and the proactive support of
the European Union and other governments. Importantly, at that time, the part
of the civil society in South Korea which was mobilized around the North
Korean issues under the umbrella of a few local and North Korean refugees-
based organizations was strong enough to add the voice or moral support for
raising the North Korean issue on the international arena. Needless to say, this
approach unfortunately repeatedly backfired in South Korea where the society
continues to be divided over the issue without leaving a room to freely discuss
the North Korean human rights problems from humanitarian perspective and
not be accused of certain political ideology.
Despite this metaphorical Sword of Damocles, the NKHR joined hands with
other organizations in South Korea, Japan, Europe and the USA to form a
chain of individuals that would lobby for raising high profile to the North
Korean human rights issue. Lobbying was conducted in Geneva and in the
respective governments at home. It would entail adding the changes to the text
of the resolution, which had to convey a strong message of concern on one
hand, but not that strong that would be viewed as hostile and would alienate
the countries that could possibly join in voting for it. Next step was to gain as
much support as possible in the voting for the resolution, so that it could pass
at the plenary vote. This was the most difficult process and needed quite
skilled logistical preparation among the organizations. Every participant
needed to cover 10-15 countries and even if the lobbyist could not influence
the position of the government (practically impossible with China, Russia,
most African and South-East Asian countries), the reasoning behind such
actions was to at least expose the members of the diplomatic corps to the issue
of human rights abuses in North Korea and the plight of North Korean
refugees in China.
The resolutions place the responsibility on North Korea to make progress in
the field of human rights, but the DPRK has been rejecting them since 2003
and has failed to recognize and cooperate with the Special Rapporteur
(appointed in July 2004) whose mandate belongs to the special procedures
system in the UN and comprises of the independent experts. The Special
Rapporteur acts pro-bono and is only covered with travel expenses when
Citizens’ Alliance for North Korean Human Rights (NKHR)
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preparing for reports or reporting to the UN Human Rights Council or General
Assembly. The Special Rapporteur on the Situation of Human Rights in North
Korea, Professor Vitit Muntarbhorn, has requested the DPRK to be allowed
into the country in 2004, 2005 and 2006 and has not been granted the access
by the North Korean authorities.
Some critiques point out that the fact that the resolution is country-specific,
aiming at proverbial “naming and shaming” is precisely the obstacle against
North Korea’s cooperation with the Special Rapporteur. Such criticism is not
accurate, however, since the independent experts of other special procedures
requested visits to the country even before the resolution was tabled and
adopted at the Commission. Requests were made in 1999 by the Special
Rapporteur on freedom of religion or belief, in 2002 by the Special
Rapporteur on right to freedom of opinion and expression, and in 2003 by the
Special Rapporteur on the Right to Food. All of them were denied.
In November of 2006, the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights met
with the DPRK authorities and made proposal for activities related with the
advisory services and technical cooperation program, but the DPRK stated
that it was unable to accept the offer. Faced with lack of cooperation from the
DPRK government and noting lack of substantial improvement of human
rights situation in the country, the Commission’s resolution in 2005 requested
that the issue will be discussed at the UN General Assembly’s Session. From
the 60th GA Session in 2006 until 2008, the resolutions on North Korea were
adopted by the General Assembly and requested reporting from the Special
Rapporteur and the UN Secretary General. Thus, the UN Secretary General
made a report to the General Assembly on the situation of human rights in
North Korea in 2007 and 2008 along with the reports of the Special
Rapporteur to the GA in 2007 and to the Human Rights Council in 2008
(followed by another resolution at the Council) and recent in March 2009.
Many domestic and international organizations, including NKHR, continue to
provide information to Professor Vitit Muntarbhorn for his preparation of the
annual reports. Since he is denied access to the country, he relies on the
information provided by the North Korean witnesses or organizations which
possess information about the situation in North Korea; thus the role of the
civil society in helping to expand the number of issues covered by the Special
Rapporteur’s reports cannot be underestimated.
Another important activity that NGOs can do is to influence governments to
make statements of concern during the plenary sessions of the Human Rights
Council and the General Assembly. Also, all the agencies which have
Life & Human Rights in North Korea
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ECOSOC accreditation are able to speak at the Council’s session and should
do so for the effectiveness of communication. Since NKHR has not obtained
the ECOSOC status yet; its role in this area is partly crippled, but it has not
prevented NKHR from cooperating with organizations which do possess an
ECOSOC status to request them to make communications in 2003, 2004 and
2005 on the issues of children, trafficking of women, prison system and
refugees situation related with North Korea.
Some critiques may ask whether these types of activities are really bringing
outcomes in relation to the means invested in them. It is true that North Korea
continues to reject the mandate of country Rapporteur and prevents other
thematic Rapporteurs from entering the country; it also rejects to apply for
advisory and technical services and will most probably continue to do so in
the future.
The role of such activities should be viewed as that of maintaining high
profile to the issue on the international arena. North Korea cannot expect that
its human rights record will remain its internal problem only. Especially after
it has started to produce large numbers of refugees, the problem became
regionalized or even internationalized, since North Koreans apply for asylum
in the European countries, as well as the US and Canada.
It is true that North Korea is not quite susceptible to the pressure from the
outside as illustrated by the nuclear stand-off. Even if the pressure produces
any slight changes in the course of its behaviour, it may not be satisfying to
the international community in terms of international security. However, we
have to remember that in terms of human rights, whatever small reforms are
conducted in the country may bring substantial relief to the suffering of the
people. From 2003 on for example, the international community focused on
the issue of prison camps, harsh treatment of refugees back at home and
violence against women, especially deported women. In 2004 North Korea
amended its Criminal Code and Criminal Procedures Code and eased
punishments for the border-crossers. The NKHR followed on these changes
with the report “North Korea: Republic of Torture” which showed a partially
positive trend of relief in punishment in the prison system for those who were
classified as simple border crossers. It still excludes the whole problem of
harsh punishment for political prisoners, believers and others and that is why
we should keep the UN system informed and ask governments to exert
pressure on North Korea in this area, as it is unrealistic to expect that such an
extensive surveillance machine of the authoritarian state which has been
operating for 60 years will improve within a day.
Citizens’ Alliance for North Korean Human Rights (NKHR)
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2. Cooperation with the Committees monitoring implementation of
UN human rights instruments.
North Korea has ratified four UN human rights treaties, namely the
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, the International
Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, the Convention on the
Elimination on All Forms of Discrimination against Women, and the
Convention on the Rights of the Child, and is obliged to present periodical
reports to the four Committees that monitor States’ fulfillment of the
obligations under those conventions.
This is an area that leaves much room for NGOs activities. As difficult as it is
to cooperate with North Korea based on the resolutions because the country
altogether rejects them and the mandate of the country Rapporteur,
nevertheless it dutifully fulfills the requirements of periodic reporting under
each of the Conventions and sends delegations from various Ministries in
Pyongyang for reviews by the Committee’s experts, which is always
positively reflected in each of the resolution and the country-Special
Rapporteur’s reports.
More importantly, NGOs do not need to have an ECOSOC status in order to
submit stakeholder’s information or to observe the interaction between
Committee’s experts and the government; the NGO needs only to register in
advance with the Secretariat of the relevant Committee.
North Korea was reviewed in 2001 by the Human Rights Committee which is
monitoring implementation of the International Covenant on Civil and
Political Rights in each member country; in 2003 the Committee on Social,
Economic and Cultural Rights reviewed the DPRK delegation based on the
International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights; in 2005 the
CEDAW Committee in New York reviewed the implementation of the
Convention on the Elimination on All Forms of Discrimination against
Women in North Korea and as recently as January 2009, the Committee on
the Rights of the Child questioned North Korea on the status of children’s
rights based upon the Convention on the Rights of the Child. Both in 2005 and
in 2009, the NKHR submitted shadow reports to the CEDAW Committee and
to the Committee on the Rights of the Child and followed upon it before the
relevant Session. In 2005, the NKHR delegation met separately with each of
the experts of the CEDAW Committee to brief them with the most pressing
issues affecting women in North Korea and in 2009, the NKHR had an
occasion to have a separate briefing meeting for all the experts of the
Committee on the Rights of the Child one day before the DPRK delegation
Life & Human Rights in North Korea
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was questioned by the experts. Needless to state, both of these interactions
brought extraordinary results. As the DPRK reporting is very general and poor
in technical terms (such as continuous lack of reliable statistics) and the
independent information from NGOs in North Korea is impossible to be
obtained, the experts rely on the third parties information that give the experts
idea of the scope and nature of the problematic issues in the country.
In 2009 for example, experts of the Committee raised all the issues signaled
by the Citizens’ Alliance such as Korean/Western age difference, child labor,
lack of free medical care, work on opium fields, high drop-out rates from
schools and early age military training and demanded that North Korean
delegation relates to those questions. Such interaction should not be
underestimated. Even if North Korean delegation was unable to answer some
of the questions, the Committee’s concerns would also be expressed in the
following Recommendations presented to the country after the Session. The
members of the delegation have surely reported back in Pyongyang about the
scope of knowledge that the international community has about the poor
situation of children’s rights in the country and hopefully it will be an impetus
for some improvements in North Korea.
This type of work is invaluable; however there is still a visible lack of NGOs
that provide information to relevant Committees on North Korean human
rights problems. In 2009, the NKHR was the only South Korean NGO that
came for the Session. There were also very few submissions in advance. To
put the issue in the perspective, if one of the European countries such as UK,
Sweden or France is reviewed by the relevant Committee, there are 10-20
submissions from domestic and international NGOs referring to the problems
in the country.
Despite the fact that such activities involve much planning in advance, each of
the Committees lists countries to be reviewed at least 1 year in advance and
since then the NGO should prepare to gather information for shadow report,
send it in advance and arrange the schedule to be present before the
government delegation is questioned; it is an area which should be more
extensively explored, in particular by South Korean NGOs.
3. Communicating cases to the Special Procedures.
Special Procedures can be used any time by NGOs representing individual
victims or by the victims’ relatives. This system allows for submitting
individual complaints in the area where the human rights violation has
Citizens’ Alliance for North Korean Human Rights (NKHR)
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occurred. The communications may be sent for example to the Special
Rapporteur on violence against women; Special Rapporteur on the human
rights aspects of the victim of trafficking in persons, especially women and
children; Special Rapporteur on the sale of children, children prostitution and
child pornography; Working Groups on Enforced or Involuntary
Disappearances; and others, including the Special Rapporteur on the situation
of human rights in the DPRK.
After the case is accepted and until it is resolved, it will remain in the file and
will be mentioned in the yearly report presented by the relevant Rapporteur or
Working Group. NKHR presented one abduction case to the Working Group
on Enforced or Involuntary Disappearances in 2004 and since then, the
Working Group continues to request the DPRK government to provide
information on the individual concerned. Since the Group has been receiving
negative replies from the DPRK government and the victim has not been
released yet, the Working Group renews its question to the government each
year.
Not only the individual cases, but the general information in the relevant area
of expertise of each Special Rapporteur’s can be provided. Unfortunately,
there is still visible lack of thematic reporting especially by South Korea-
based NGOs who have potential access to various victims of human rights
abuses in North Korea and can easily report on them.
It is sad to observe that despite being the 13th largest economy in the world
according to the 2007 World Bank report, and despite the country’s ambition
to be a more active player in the area of human rights in Asia and in the UN
system, particularly after elevating a South Korean to the position of UN
Secretary General, the South Korea’s civil society is still lagging behind other
developed countries in mobilization on North Korean human rights issues in
the international arena. It is difficult to explain such a state of affairs with lack
of democratic traditions in South Korea, especially after 20 years of
democratically elected governments and its civil society’s pro-active
participation in domestic issues.
FORUM _ _ _ ____ __
Right to Food and Discrimination based on
Social Classification and Ascription
Tae-Hoon Kim
Member, the Subcommittee on Human Rights in North Korea
Korean Bar Association
Ⅰ. Right to Food
1. Definition of "Right to Food"
"Right to food" is the right of all people to access food in the amount that is
sufficient to maintain a healthy, active, nutritious, and culturally enriching life.
Following the 1948 Universal Declaration of Human Rights and the 1966
International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (to which
North Korea is a party), delegations from 185 countries (including North
Korea) reconfirmed the right to access safe and nutritious food, the right to
secure sufficient food, and the right to be free from hunger at the 1996 World
Food Summit in Rome.
Today, famine caused by natural disaster such as flood or drought can be
alleviated by more effective relief work by governments and the international
community. For that reason, famine is now considered a man-made disaster,
rather than a natural disaster. Famine is explained not just by "food
availability decline" (FAD), but also by "food entitlement decline" (FED) or
distribution of food entitlement. Food availability is but one element in one's
right to food.
1
2. The Origin and the Current Situation of North Korea's Famine
1
Amartya Sen, Stephan Haggard․, Marcus Noland, quoted in North Korea's Choice
(Maeil Business Newspaper), pp. 3-4.
Citizens’ Alliance for North Korean Human Rights (NKHR)
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North Korea's famine in the 1990's was one of the worst in the twentieth
century, killing 600,000 to 1,000,000 people.
2
There is no end in sight for the
decade-long chronic food shortage since the famine. The famine in North
Korea is not a temporary phenomenon caused by natural disaster or
disruptions in food aid from Russia, China, and others. The chronic food
shortage in North Korea is caused by structural problems of the North Korean
government, which combines dictatorship with socialism. 70% of North
Korea's population lives in cities, as a result of its policy of building up heavy
industries, and the urban population relies on ration for food. However, North
Korea's arable land is limited, and its climate is not conducive to farming.
Moreover, the collective farming system disincentivizes working. In spite of
these problems, North Korea pursued a policy of self-sufficiency in food. As a
result, food shortage began to appear already in the late 1980's. Furthermore,
when its special trade relationships with Russia and China began to break
down, North Korea started to experience a shortage of fertilizers and other
farming resources. As a result, food production plummeted starting in 1994,
and rationing was suspended. A huge flood in 1995 exacerbated the situation,
and a large number of people died of starvation between 1995 and 1998.
Chronic food shortage continues since then.
According to the International Covenant on Economic, Social, and Cultural
Rights, when there is food shortage or even just a risk of food shortage,
governments have an obligation to ensure food availability, using food aid and
2
N
orth Korea's Choice, pp. 123-126. Estimates by other individuals and agencies are
as follows:
Estimating Individuals/Groups
Estimated Number of Famine-Caused
Deaths
Good Friends(South Korean NGO)
Over 3,500,000 (Aug. 1995 - July 1998)
Hwang Jang-yop(Fmr Secretary, Korea Labor
Party)
2,500,000 (1995 - 1997)
Hayes, Peter
200,000 - 2,000,000 (1995 - 1998)
US Congressional Research Service
900,000 - 2,400,000 (1995 - 1998)
Natsios, Andrew S.
2,500,000 (1995 - 1997)
Lee, Sam-sik (Korea Ins. for Health & Social
Affairs)
230,000 (1995 - 1997)
Choi Su-hyong(DPRK Vice Minister of Foreign
Affairs)
220,000 (1995 - 1998)
Goodkind and West
600,000 - 1,000,000(1995 - 2000)
Lee Suk
668,000 (Nov. 1994. 11. - Aug. 1999
※ Estimates of Number of Deaths from North Korea's Famine(Chung, Kwang-min,
Economics of North Korea's Famine, p. 177 (Seoul. Shidae Jungshin)
Life & Human Rights in North Korea
13
foreign sources if necessary. However, North Korea's policy priority during
the famine in the 1990's was on the military, rather than on economic reform.
North Korea's government spent an enormous amount of money on Yongbyon
nuclear facility, prompting the first nuclear crisis in 1994. Furthermore, it
spent the money it saved from food aid on military expenditures and luxury
goods for the ruling class. The North Korean government did not try to secure
food by using either its foreign reserves or foreign loan, and did not seek
timely help from the international community. Rather, it even blocked foreign
aid from reaching the country. For these reasons, North Korea is considered to
have caused the food crisis on its own. During the famine, Kim Jong-il
inspected the construction of Kumsusan Memorial Hall and spent 800 million
US dollars on preserving Kim Il-sung's body, but he never once visited the
areas hit by famine.
3
Since then, North Korea launched Taepodong-1, whose
production cost 300 million dollars, in 1998, performed its first nuclear test in
2006, launched a long-range rocket Unha-2 carrying the satellite
Kwangmyongsong-2 on April 5, 2009, and performed a second nuclear test in
2009. It is estimated that North Korea has spent 2.6 billion dollars on these
nuclear and missile tests.
4
The North Korean regime has thus spent an
enormous amount of money on military ventures and luxury goods while the
people are starving. Such a reckless and cruel behavior is likely to constitute a
crime against humanity.
As Jean Ziegler, the UN Special Rapporteur on the Right to Food, reported in
February 2001, most of the humanitarian aid to North Korea went to the
military and intelligence agencies,
5
and the ruling class amassed more wealth
as a result. North Korean people's right to food is completely controlled by
government authorities. While markets have sprung up after the collapse of
the Public Distribution System (PDC), as many as 6 million people who either
cannot participate in the market or lack independent means of survival face a
serious threat to their existence.
The North Korean government's failure to provide sufficient food to its people
is closely related to the infringement of their social and political rights and
constitutes a grave violation of their food entitlement.
3
Oh, Kyung-seop. 「A Study on North Korea's Crisis management Dynimics:
Focusing on Military-First Politics」(Dec. 2008 Ph.D. dissertation, Korea Univ.), pp.
111-112.
4
April 6, 2009 issue, Joongang Daily.
5
In 1997, a private NGO found food cans in a North Korean submarine that ran
aground on the eastern shore. A video that was filmed by a Japanese NGO called
RENK in July 2004 shows that rice supplied by South Korea, the WFP, and other aid
agencies is sold in Sunam Market, Chongjin, Hambuk.
Citizens’ Alliance for North Korean Human Rights (NKHR)
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3. Difference in Food Distribution Based on Class and Region
a. Difference in Food Distribution Based on Class
When asked, "Was there any difference in food distribution between people
with power and general residents?" in the interview with 100 North Korean
defectors conducted by the KBA in 2008, defectors said powerful agencies,
such as the Workers' Party of Korea (WPK), the prosecution, the Bowibu
(secret police), high ranking officials, managers, military supplies production
units and other agencies such as grain mill factories and the organizations
earning foreign currency normally receive food ration. In addition, the ratio of
grain that the people in authority receive was mostly rice, while general
residents receive corn. Furthermore, the amount and frequency of food
distributed to the ordinary people was not fixed. Sometimes there was no food
distribution at all. Even when there was the frequent food distribution, on
average people receive food ration from two to seven days per a month.
The right to access to food in the DPRK is determined by the hierarchy of
power. Although humanitarian assistance to the DPRK has continued for over
10 years, the aid program has not been up to international standards because
the food distribution system is based on the hierarchical class system.
Currently, the loyal hierarchical strata claim the right to decide the
distribution of food and receive the distributed food exclusively and steadily.
According to a person's political status, food distribution in the DPRK has
become a system which favors individuals with vested rights over ordinary
residents. The party, the military, and government high-ranking officials are
normally provided with food through a separate distribution channel. In
practice, the distribution system mainly for workers has been nearly paralyzed.
After the 'July 1st Economic Management Improvement Measure' in 2002,
key agencies of power, including the WPK, the Bowibu, the Ministry of
People's Armed Forces, the Public Security Agency, and high ranking
officials and strategically important military factories have their own food
distribution system and manage a stable life, which is incomparable to that of
ordinary people. They exercise control over the lives of ordinary workers and
farmers who constitute 80% or more of the population to maintain current
ruling system. Therefore, there has been criticism that aid from the
international society only benefits the key ruling strata of the DPRK such as
the WPK, the government, and the military.
The smallest number of people required to maintain the DPRK’s ruling
system, an estimated 6.5 million, belong to the first to third rank of the
Life & Human Rights in North Korea
15
country’s distribution system. Authorities of the DPRK require a minimum of
1.2 million tons if one needs 500g a day, or up to 1.7 million tons if one needs
700g a day. No matter how famine happens in the DPRK, the amount of food
required can be produced in the country, which indicates the amount of food
produced within the country is sufficient for the maintenance of its own
system without any external support.
From the facts above, authorities of the DPRK seem to ignore criticism on
their intentional negligence of the food supply to ordinary people, believing
that society of the DPRK would not be affected as long as they manage the
core loyal class in good faith.
b. Regional Imbalances in Food Distribution
In spite of the chronic food shortage over 10 years, Pyongyang, the “Capital
of the Revolution”, has been the preferential area in food distribution over the
other areas.
In the interviews conducted by the KBA regarding the difference in food
supply between Pyongyang and the other local regions, 20 out of 60 North
Korean defectors testified that there was food distribution in Pyongyang but
not in other local areas. The other 40 defectors testified that they heard from
relatives in Pyongyang that there might well be food distribution in
Pyongyang, the center of the country.
ID023 (for the North Korean defector's privacy and safety, ID with numbers
was given instead of his or her real name) testified that food is distributed first
to the People's Army all over the country. The next order of preference is
Pyongyang city and the neighboring militaries, with rural areas at the lowest
priority. Only after supplies are distributed to strategically important areas and
Pyongyang, the leftovers have been supplied to local regions.
Conditions in Pyongyang are relatively better than other areas since
Pyongyang is adjacent to Pyong-an Province and Hwanghae Province, which
together produce 80% of the total food output of the DPRK. About 43.5%
(Heungnam 13.5%, Cheongjin 9.5%, Wonsan 9.5%) of the total quantity of
rice aid was carried through Nampo Harbor from 2003 to 2006. Fertilizer aid
was transported mainly to Nampo Harbor (50%), and secondly to Haeju
Harbor. The other harbors, Heungnam, Cheongjin(Chŏngjin) and Wonsan, are
all about equal, with less than 10% respectively.
Citizens’ Alliance for North Korean Human Rights (NKHR)
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According to the data submitted to the National Assembly of the Republic of
Korea by the Ministry of Unification in 2005, 16.92% of ships laden with rice
for the DPRK docked in Nampo Harbor, adjacent to Pyongyang. On the other
hand, a little less was distributed through Ryanggang Province (4.57%) and
Gangwon Province (5.76%), where food is relatively insufficient.
Considering deaths due to the shortage of food in the eastern area, provinces
of South and North Hamkyeong(Hamgyŏng), Gangwon and Yanggang, it is
not just due to regional imbalance but a deeply rooted discrimination policy
based on background and class by the DPRK authorities.
II. Discrimination by the Personal Background Classification
1. Classification of North Koreans
Under the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (Article 1, 2, and 7) and the
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (Article 14 and 26) to
which North Korea is a party, all human beings have equal rights.
Furthermore, North Korea asserts that citizens of the DPRK are guaranteed
equal rights regardless of race, skin color, gender, language, faith, political
views, social or national status, property, and the time of birth and class in the
second report of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights.
Nevertheless, despite such claims, North Korea has conducted several
investigations on the personal bagrounds of its citizens sice independence in
1945, and classified them into three classes: 'core', 'wavering', and 'hostile' and
51 categories. North Korea has exercised the class discrimination policy (the
"modern caste system") for a long period of time.
The first category of core class constitutes 10-20% of the total North Korean
population
6
and is the ruling group. It includes Kim Il Sung, Kim Jong Il,
their family and relatives. They lead the North Korean system. According to
the interview with 100 North Korean defectors conducted by the Korean Bar
Association, the people in this group come from families with a good
background such as patriots [ID001], children of guerrilla fighters against
Japanese imperialism, war participants whose names are known for their valor
and their families, people and family related to Kim Il Sung and Kim Jong Il
[ID006, 37], the Korean War heroes and their families [ID024], and the
6
It was known that core class accounts for 28%, wavering class 45%, hostile class
27%. However, according to some documents, it seems that there have been some
changes in the composition ratio.
Life & Human Rights in North Korea
17
bereaved families of North Korean families [ID029, 72]. Most of them live in
metropolitan areas including Pyongyang and are preferred in terms of
appointment as executive members in the party, government and military. As
the enjoy prestige in all fields including education, promotion, distribution,
residence, and medical treatment, they form a certain social position that is
inherited to the next generation. However, there is an opinion that suggests
social position used to be the most desired, but now money counts more.
The second category of the wavering class (basic stratum) consists of laborers,
technical engineers, farmers, clerks, teachers and their families, but not party
members. They manage to live their daily lives with irregularly paid wages
and run small private business. Most of them live in small to medium sized
cities and in rural villages and lead a life in poverty with insufficient and
discriminating health benefits. Some of them can be upgraded to the core
crowd, depending on their loyalty and contribution. With the economic crisis,
bribery prevails, as does buying and selling of government official positions
in smaller administrative provinces. Thus class distinction as social control is
losing its effect.
The third group, hostile class (complex stratum), is comprised of class
antagonists and national offenders. They are called an impure faction, branded
as reactionaries, and are direct victims of the social classification policy in
North Korea. People in this category include former capitalist landowners and
their families and pro-Japanese or pro-American people and their families,
families of the persecuted, released convicts who committed political offences,
the family of a North Korean defector (the first group), people related to spies,
people of anti-party and counter-revolutionary faction, Christian believers and
their families, people whose position as party members has been forfeited,
people discharged from executive positions in the party, the families of
imprisoned people, and heavy violators of economic law. Of course, prisoners
of war and their families are also included in this category.
2. Discrimination based on Social Classification and Background (Songbun)
a. Discrimination in Distribution of Food
The stratification of food distribution by importance shows public servants of
the party, government, and organizations (one million, 4% of the total
population) in the first tier; the military authorities and the Bowibu, the Public
Security Agency, and law and prosecution authorities (1.5 million, 6% of the
total population) in the second tier; employees and families of munitions
factories and special enterprises (4 million, 20% of the total population) in the
Citizens’ Alliance for North Korean Human Rights (NKHR)
18
third; employees of general state enterprises, teachers, doctors and workers in
the service sector (6 million, 30% of the total population) in the fourth; and
farmers who are excluded in the distribution chain (8 million, 40% of the total
population) at the bottom. classes suffering from food shortages are below the
fourth rank. It is natural that the wavering class and hostile class belongs to
the underprivileged class, shunned by the distribution of food.
7
b. Discrimination in Admission to the Army, the Party and Higher Education
People in the hostile class (complex stratum) cannot join the army, which is
the foundation of advancement into society. People with underprivileged
social background can enter two-year colleges such as technical training
college [ID012, 13], specialty college [ID049, 52], and art and sports college
[ID051]. Primary and secondary education are mandatory in North Korea, so
everyone is educated, but even so some North Korean defectors reported they
were discriminated against during their compulsory education years. "No
matter how smart you are, if your background is bad, you can never be the
class president or head of subcommittes"[ID020]. "You don't get much
discrimination in the primary, middle, and high schools, but sometimes your
personal background information becomes known and you get bullied by
other students"[ID036]. "Other children start bullying you from primary
school"[ID056].
Some defectors reported that "Up until 1990s, the people in the complex strata
group were heavily discriminated against, but after 2003, you can do anything
if you had money, so nothing's more important to have money than the
background"[ID022]. "These days, you can go to a university with money,
even if it's not as good as one as ones in Pyongyang [ID045, 76]. With the
continuing economic system, bribery is common and the classification of
one's social background has weakened. Consequently, college admission
requirements have somewhat loosened.
c. Discrimination at Workplace
People with bad foundation (songbun) cannot work in the powerful jobs such
as political organization, Bowibu, Prosecutor's Office, and Public Security
Agency and grains and seed producing enterprises and armament factories.
They do manual labor in general factories except for coal mines, cooperation
farms, and munitions factories where people avoid working because the work
is too tough and harmful.
7
Goodfriends, 『Changes in North Korean Society and Human Rights』, pp. 18-20.
Life & Human Rights in North Korea
19
However, testimonies such as "Today money is much more important than
personal background [ID022]," and "If you are capable, you can go anywhere
[ID027]," "Except national organizations like the military party or an
important position like the throne you can work for any kind of organization.
If you have money, you don't need to worry about your background [ID038]."
suggest that a status system is showing signs of ease.
d. Restriction on Residence
The people from the complex strata group cannot live in Pyongyang, Nampo,
seaside, North-South border areas. They live in mountain areas, rural areas,
and mining towns such as Hamgyung-do and Yangang-do.
e. Discrimination in Due Process
North Korea has discriminatory legal policy against people with their
background. According to the 100 North Korean interviews by KBA, 79% of
them answered "When people with no background commit a crime, they face
harsher punishment because of their background." and this shows that the
degree of punishment can differ depending on their background.
f. Infringement on the Right to Marriage
Bad background can affect North Koreans' marriage. The result of the
multiple answer choice by North Korean defectors proves that if your spouse
has a bad background, you will be treated as a person with a bad background.
Bad backgrounds are passed on to their offspring, so a person with good
background does not want to get married a person with a bad background
[ID053, 60, 66, 78, and 91]. Parents with good backgrounds run a background
check on their son-in-law or daughter-in-law candidate and strongly refuse
their child getting married to a person with a bad background. That is why
many people commit suicide [ID001]. Also, the marriage maybe opposed by
the family, but it is not opposed by the state at the political level [ID008].
Usually parents don't allow them, but many people think a person with money
is good enough nowadays [ID012].
III. Concluding Recommendations
1. North Korean authorities must introduce a social policy abolishing the caste
system known as “Songbun (background),” whose existence has already been
confirmed.
Citizens’ Alliance for North Korean Human Rights (NKHR)
20
2. North Korean government should establish a food distribution policy
according to which the vulnerable groups including children, pregnant
mothers, and the elderly will have a priority.
3. North Korean should ensure that WFP and other humanitarian aid
organizations can transparently monitor that the aid goes to the people it is
intended to help, and to achieve that goal, the aid organizations must be
allowed to visit the sites unannounced and randomly, undeterred by regional
restrictions or language barriers.
4. Because a large majority of urban commoners are obtaining food from the
markets, steps should be taken to revitalize them and strengthen the
purchasing powers, and market activities should not be discouraged.
5. Ineffective collective farming system should be abolished, and an
agricultural reform for a transition into private farming system should take
place
6. “Military First” policy, which gives the military priority over every other
policies, should be put aside and resources must be first be distributed to
resolve food shortage. Nuclear and missile development must be stopped and
a policy to import large amount of food to fill the shortage should be framed.
7. Today’s food shortage in North Korea is a natural consequence of a rigid
system devoid of freedom. North Korean Government must put an effort to
guarantee its people’s civil and political rights.
WITNESS ACCOUNT _ _ _ ____ __
Moving from Japan to North Korea,
and to South Korea Again
Chul-Yoon Kim (Alias)
Arrived in South Korea, in July 2007
Moving from Japan to North Korea
I was born in Japan in 1963 when activities of the General Association of
Korean Residents in Japan (GAKR, Chongryon) were the most lively. I
learned about North Korea from my kindergarten days, which was affiliated
with Chongryon, and envisioned North Korea as a country of Utopia. Tears
flew down even when we would hear the name, 'KIM Il-Sung' and any
appearance of KIM Il-Sung on a TV documentary would lead to enthusiastic
standing ovations. My grandfather made a lot of money doing civil
engineering work and he was even the city councilor in the city we lived. But
as Chongryon came into existence, the ideas (ideologies) changed and
everyone wanted to go back to North Korea. My grandfather was one of the
executives of the
Federation of Koreans in Japan (J
oryun, the earlier form of
GAKR(Chongryon)) and he devoted
himself to mak
e the Chongryon school
by using profits made from selling his business to a friend. Personally, I was
influenced a lot by my grandfather as my parents had divorced early. Thus I
was extremely pleased when I heard that he had decided to return to North
Korea. In 1976, when I was 13 years old, I left to North Korea from my birth
country of Japan. My grandfather's duty was honorary chairperson of
Chongryon at that time.
When we arrived, we went first to Chodaeso (a building for inviting new
people). The others were greatly disappointed by what they saw in North
Korea and they put the whole responsibility on my grandfather and almost
beat him to death. My grandfather decided to live in Sinchon in Hwanghaedo,
the place where my uncle had already settled and lived for a year, because he
wanted to live close with his family even though he was ensured to live in
Pyongchon in Pyongyang. My grandparents passed away within a year after
Citizens’ Alliance for North Korean Human Rights (NKHR)
22
coming to North Korea, and uncle told me to write letters to my parents, who
were still in Japan, to ask for necessary goods and my father obliged by
sending materials to me.
I was much taller than my other friends in school. They called me "Jjokbari".
It was compared to "Josenjing" that I was called in Japan. I played volleyball
in school because of my tall height. I was eventually scouted by a gymnasium
in Haeju. Thereafter, I practically lived in the gymnasium as they fed me and
provided me a place to stay. I stayed there for two years playing basketball.
As it came closer to my college graduation day, I gave a Seiko clock as a gift
to the admissions consultant. He immediately put me in a physical education
college where I could receive certification to be a physical education teacher
in one year. This was in 1984 when I also happened to get married.
Living in Haeju with my wife in early 80’s, I had a television I had brought
from Japan from which I saw many South Korean singers like NA Hoon-Ah
and CHO Yong-Pil. I could also watch the South Korean television program
because of the NTS television network system. I began to watch the 'Cinema
in Saturday' programming and learn more about South Korea.
In 1986 I asked to create a women’s volleyball team but was refused by the
school president. I quit my position and subsequently was taken as a
“revolutionary”. When I refused to work, the district administration officer
called me to write a self-criticizing paper. After about 15 days, they told me to
keep teaching or I’d be sent to the mines. I still refused to work and thus was
sent to Haeju port. At the port were ships loading several thousand tons of
fluorescent materials called lin (minerals similar to cement) from Malta. I
loaded these materials with two other people for days. It was compulsory
labor. I thought it was revolutionary in the fact that a college-educated teacher
was being made to do compulsory labor. After about 20 days, they sent me to
Youngmaedo, an island located in front of Hwanghaedo. Originally the place
was meant to be a center for trading, but the island was full of clamshells and
we were made to dig them up. There were too many of the clams to even think
about enjoying them for consumption. One tons of clamshells was about the
price of one black-and-white television. Back then Korea Workers
Party(KWP) members earned a lot by shovelling clamshells. I returned to the
college in 1986 and saw my first poster of South Korea.
In the poster was a painting of a bikini-wearing woman saying, "Come to
Seoul." or "Do not be fooled by the dictatorial government of KIM Jung-Il".
There were so many posters in Hwanghaedo that I picked them up during the
day and night. Despite the quantity, people ignored these posters then.
Life & Human Rights in North Korea
23
Our family maintained its relatively comfortable life until 1999 when my
children began to enter college. My first born child went to Pyongyang
medical college and second born child went to Kim Il Sung University. As my
wife and I were both graduates from the college of education there were many
people we knew. My first born child was admitted to the department of
pharmacy even though he wanted to enter the department of medical basis
because he was not the child of party executive. We ended up paying 500
dollars to the Central Party to change the department of pharmacy to the
department of medical basis. Our second born child needed 1,000 dollars.
Even at that time the admission fees to enter college in North Korea was
known and set. Provincial students who wanted to go to the central university
needed at least 1,500 dollars and Pyongyang students needed at least 3,500
dollars. The nation did not provide rice to children anymore when they went
to voluntary help in countryside. Each child had to prepare rice, clothes and
money to give teachers on a regular basis. Even the car taking students to the
countryside was supplied by the money collected and paid for by themselves.
With the 200 dollars provided by the family, children hardly made it past a
month.
Students in KIM Il-Sung University did not even wear school uniform. They
wore t-shirt and cotton pants because jeans were prohibited. They also wore t-
shirts with 'Adidas' written in big letters.
I worked in the interpretation booth at the National Academy of Sciences. I
mainly translated foreign science books into Korean as I was trilingual in
Japanese, Chinese and English. The National Academy of Sciences, at the
time, was in a state of paralysis; they could not buy books from abroad and
concentrated on research because of the lack of property. When we heard the
news that KIM Il-Sung succeeded in its nuclear experiment, other scientists
said, "How is that possible with only 1 or 2 kilograms of Plutonium? Maybe
that was a lie." I later heard that 30 young scientists were dead from the
radiation while preparing the nuclear experiment. Scientists who dealt with
the nuclear experiments were made to write a loyalty oath to risk their lives on
that experiment to KIM Il-Sung. There were talks that one artificial satellite
would be able to save all the people in Hwanghaedo. Because there were no
works being done in the academy, the scientists would by electric light stone
from the gold mines with their own money and, after melting it into electricity,
they would re-sell the gold. There were about one hundred middle class
factory workers and thirty of them were researchers in that academy in
Haewoondong, Haeju City.
Citizens’ Alliance for North Korean Human Rights (NKHR)
24
Earnings of foreign currency
I eventually quit my position at the National Academy of Sciences and started
to collect and trade foreign currencies like the US dollar. Used cars were often
imported to Wonsan from Japan. A returnee I knew worked for the vice chief
in Guksabong associated with the Culture and Guidance Department of
Central Party. I established a branch office between Nampo and Wonsan, and
sold copy rights of used cars which were certificated by KIM Jung-Il. When I
failed to sell a 2.5ton truck that I bought in 2500 dollars I purchased a
smuggling vessel that was selling pine nuts from Nampo to China in 2006. For
the first time I traveled across territorial waters of China to reach Dandong in
China. I remember it was before the 10
th
of October. Usually, North Korean
coastal defense ships could not chase the other ships because of the lack of
fuel. But, our ship was controlled because it was hard regulation season before
the festival days when they can earn some extra money. The executive of the
smuggling vessel took our ship licence and ordered us to drop by when
returning from China. Most people who could travel across to China were rich.
Executives were not worried because they had no reason to escape.
After anchoring the ship in the harbor in China, we took a Chinese ship and
went inside China. When I set foot in China, I knew this was an opportunity to
escape. The trade was not smooth and I gave all my money to the person
accompanying me and told him that I would stay behind. There were about 4
people in the ship that I took and I attempted to send the ship back. As hearing
that I had relatives in Japan, the Chinese merchants let me stay in China
believing they could receive some money. I borrowed a phone from them and
made a call to my aunt in Japan. She told me she would be coming to China
around Christmas. Back then it was the middle of the November. But then the
people from the boat threatened to report me to the National Security Agency.
I think they wanted money because they knew that most of the returnees had
some properties. The Chinese merchants persuaded me to return to North
Korea and come back by other means. Therefore, I returned to North Korea.
As soon as I arrived, they threatened me again. Because I did not have a
certificate of qualification that was approved by an authority, they threatened
to report me to Bowibu (National Security Agency) saying I had deceived
them and stayed in China. They demanded one thousand and five hundred
dollars from me but at that time, I had only four or five hundred dollars. I
wanted to go back to China because my parents were supposed to come to
China at Christmas time. I hid with help from somebody who was from
Nampo. In the winter of 2006, Measles was prevailing throughout the country.
I had been to Pyongyang but gave up because the situation was not good. Next
Life & Human Rights in North Korea
25
year, on the first day of May, I departed the place I had lived in Hoeryong and
I got out of North Korea on May 4
th
.
Leaving North Korea to China
After crossing the river, I stayed at someone’s house and made a call to my
relatives in Japan saying I needed some money to stay in China. But 10 days
later, while waiting for the money, I was caught on May 14
th
(Sunday). I didn’t
know it at that time, but the house I was in was a trafficker’s house. They had
been trafficking in Korean women as well as drugs. The Chinese police had
been watching the house for an opportunity to catch them. After being
inquired, taking a picture, and shackling me I was detained in Yanji Detention
Center where foreigners were gathered. I can’t forget the thick shackle that
was locked up on my feet and tightened. It was locked up on my feet for 15
days. Whenever I walked, my ankles became scratched. After 20 days, I was
sent to Tumen district Security Prison.
Right after getting off the bus, they drew us up into a line and pushed us into a
room. There were men and women there, the youngest one being 21 years old,
and the rest were women in their 30’s and 40’s. The guards were standing with
a stick. They wore rubber gloves and they ordered us to take off our clothes.
They checked our anuses without changing gloves. They took all our money
and belts.
They took out the women every night and made women massage them and did
other acts on the women. Sometimes, they took the women out even during
the daytime. In the interrogation room, there was a room, a door with iron bars,
and chairs. They investigated people by putting them in handcuffs on chairs
across outside the iron bars. During the daytime, they took women into that
room and made them take off their lower garment and turn around and face
them. They watched the women do this. I was there for 20 days before they
transferred me to Namyang on June 6
th
, 2007.
Hellish Bowibu
Arriving at the customs, Chinese police unfastened our handcuffs and the
North Korean guards took custody over us. In the beginning they treated us
kindly saying “What a difficult time you must have had,” and “We will give
you a nice meal in Namyang Hotel.” But when the Chinese police handed
over all the documents and left in their cars, one of the North Korean military
officials came and suddenly began kicking us. They put handcuffs linking ten
people together, and kept hitting us with hands without any reason. After
Citizens’ Alliance for North Korean Human Rights (NKHR)
26
taking off shoes, we entered the room, and we were made to kneel down.
The initial process was to check fever because they thought that we might be
infected with AIDS. Then, they asked us whether we had any family member
working in the army. Those who had family members in the army, he/she went
to Bowisaryeongbu(Headquarter of Security Agency) directly. The others
were made to tell their addressed and re-shackled and taken by car. From then
on we were no longer treated as humans.
We left on June 6
th
at night, and entered Bowibu, located in Onsong, at around
2 or 3 in the morning. While heading there they ordered us to bend our necks.
If we put up our heads at all, they beat our heads severely with their guns. We
got off the car with handcuffs and they made us stand up in front of the
building of Bowibu for about 4 hours. I stood out to them because I was tall
and unshaved and was poorly dressed. They asked me what I did. I answered
that I came from the Hwanghae Province and I worked to earn foreign
currency. Then, they kicked me. I felt humiliated. They took pictures of us
with digital camera and saved it on their computers. The other prisoners
probably had no idea what they were doing since they didn’t know about the
digital camera. The people at Bowibu told us that we would be in big trouble
because our pictures and documents were saved in computer. The leaders of
Bowibu and passersby looked us when they passed the building. It was really
shameful. Even when we needed to go to the toilet, we had to ask for
permission. When the guard permitted someone to go, a man and a woman
went to the toilet together because they were tied. For men it was okay but
how could a woman do their needs with tied hands? When one of the women,
who had escaped to North Korea with me, was on her period she had to go to
the toilet to change her sanitary pad with a young man. She asked him to close
his eyes and he held a feminine pad for her. Seeing this situation, young
guards from Bowibu laughed. I thought they were not human beings.
They did not interrogate me in Bowibu located at Onsong. We went to Bowibu
at Jongsong after loading equipments and monitors. We arrived there in the
dark. There, they forced women to be naked and stand up and sit down
repeatedly in “pumping” exercises. They also searched all our clothes and
luggage. They called us one by one to the office where the people of Bowibu
were gathered. They asked us our name, occupation, address, and the day we
were caught and wrote them down. The guards said, “From now on, you don’t
have name. You are number one. Okay? ” Then, we went out with our bare
feet. The building of Bowibu at Jongsong was shaped like the character of
giyeok, the first letter of the Korean alphabet. It was enclosed with a wooden
fence taller than five meters. It was, in essence, a jail. It looked like a cattle
Life & Human Rights in North Korea
27
pen. Opening the door of fence and walking into it, a garage was at the end of
the building, and besides that, there was a warehouse. Inside of the tall
building, there was a jail. In the jail, there were tiny rooms. They forced us to
take off all our clothes and to kneel down, facing the wall. The guards took
out belts and rubber bands and inspected our clothes down to every stitch. If
there was no money, we were beaten. I was beaten with my belt. The guard
asked, “Whose belt was this?” If I answered “It was mine,” they hit me
severely with saying “how dare you look that way at me?” Although I bled, I
was too afraid to feel pain. I sat there for about two hours. It was about
midnight or one in the morning. Then, I went out to the hallway with my
clothes in my hands. The guard went ahead to the entrance which looked like
a dog hole and he told us to go inside. I slept in that 180 meter wide room.
Sometimes there were as many as 18 people in there together. When it was
bath time we washed ourselves in a small hole next to the toilet. They gave us
a towel which was cut in a half not to hang oneself. With the towel, we could
clean ourselves roughly when the guards ordered us to do. Because they
wanted to prevent lice from appearing we were made to wash every morning.
I was investigated usually at 10 or 11 o’clock at night. Women were pulled
along to them and were raped at night. They returned to the jail about 1 or 2
o’clock in the morning. We could know who was going out because our sense
of hearing and vision had become more acute while incarcerated there. After
women came back, we could hear their crying. The guards made the women
sit on chairs where they would be raped. If they cried upon returning to their
cells, the guards called them out and beat them with locked handcuffs.
The investigation was held during the day and the night. Perhaps because I
was taller than the others they made baskets for me with iron 8mm thick with
a 40-50centimeter round shape frame. They put the baskets in my leg from my
calf to the upper part of knee which made me unable to bend my knee. While
fastened to this and while walking with a limp, I would be called out for
interrogations. The head officer was in charge of me. I went to his office
because there was no interrogation room. When we were examined, we sat
down with the back of the chair in front of us. Maybe they did this to make it
easier to hit the back. They fastened my shackles between the chairs and
started to beat me with a stick made of oak. The stick was one meter and 20
centimeter long and five centimeter thick. When I didn’t admit to the
questions they hit me with the stick more severely.
The first time I was called in, I wasn’t beaten and I only had a one-on-one talk
with the head of office. He asked me questions about whether I had contacts
with anyone in South Korea or Japan and if I had tried to enter those two
Citizens’ Alliance for North Korean Human Rights (NKHR)
28
countries. I answered “no” with all those questions. I had called the Japanese
consulate but I never told this fact to them. Despite the fact that the woman
who was captured with me knew this too, she kept it a secret.
But from the second interrogation, they started to hit me. The head officer was
sitting but when he called the men waiting outside by shouting “hey!” two
men came into the room and they stood up behind me. The head officer asked
me, “Haven’t you met some South Koreans?” and I answered, “No, sir.” Then,
the two men started to hit me from the behind. It felt like they were using a
heated iron skewer. Interrogations took one or two hours. One time, the head
officer and a young man called me and hit my hands on the desk while putting
a pen between my fingers. They kept asking me about how many times I had
met Chinese traders. If my answer didn’t correspond with my answers that I
told them before, they hit me. The most painful torture was being beaten with
the sticks. People who were living in Jongsong were not beaten. During my
last interrogation, the head officer ordered me to call Japan. He asked me,
“How much money could you get if you call to Japan? Why did you cross the
river instead of telling us? Do you think people in Bowibu are idiots?” It
meant, in other words, that if I were to ever be caught again, I’d be in big
trouble so if I was able to obtain some money, I should just bring it into the
office. The head officer was about 65 years old and raged at me but didn’t hit
me. I had stayed from June 6
th
to July 22
nd
. Sometimes interrogation was not
held for a week and sometimes they made me to write down critics. It was the
most comfortable time because when I wrote down the critics, they gave me
wooden board to hold up papers, and I could move my bodies a little bit.
Without that time, I had to stand at attention.
They gave me three spoons of corn and rotten beans for one meal. They also
gave me bean-paste soup with the radish and cabbage roots which were not
washed. If they asked to me, “Hey, number one, are you still hungry?” and I
replied “yes” sometimes they gave me a little more. It was really pathetic.
Depending on the guards, they gave me time to exercise. If they told me “take
a rest for a minute” then we could take a posture of rest but we could not stand
up. The head officer carried out anal examination once a week while making
his rounds in the prison. We would be made to take off our clothes and turn
back on the latticed door lying our face down on the ground. It was for
checking our nutritive condition. When people suffered from malnutrition, the
anus got loose due to a lack of energy. The head officer made us sunbathe
wearing only panties. The word ‘panties’ is Korean and not used in North
Korea but they used it. When it rained, they sang a South Korean song, sung
by Shim Sue-Bong, with the lyrics ‘the person I remind when it rains…’ and
Life & Human Rights in North Korea
29
they watched Korean movies in their room. The cultures of South Korea such
as songs, movies, and words had infiltrated North Korean society even then.
A month after my last interrogation, I was no longer investigated anymore.
Because I suffered from malnutrition at that time, one side of my eyes and
ears didn’t work well and I couldn’t walk well either. One day, in the morning,
they called me to take a walk, and gave me a piece of round candy. I almost
lost my senses then and into a fit of frenzy for anything edible. I only wanted
something to eat. When I was alone with my guard, I asked him whether I
could get out of the jail and he told me that I could. Then, I was released on
September 20
th
. In shackles, we came to Bowibu at Onsong. They told four
people included me, the woman from Nampo, and a married couple, who went
to Musan to sell some goods, to remain in Onsong only for three days. But we
went to Jipgyeolso (Detention Center) at Chongjin right away and stayed there
about twenty days. Then the guard in charge of me and his wife offered me
some food privately for a week. I had been sentenced to six months in
Rodongdanryeondae(Labor Re-education Facility). However, due to the
money my wife gave them again, I didn’t have to go to Rodongdanryeondae
and everything was over by the end of October. I found out later that I was
able to get out because my wife gave money to a man working in Bowibu who
was a friend of my son.
There wasn’t any explanation about the law in Bowibu. When they read my
official document, they said, “You’re really something, you’re going to die
soon.” They told me that with it, I might live in a jail for a minimum of six
years. However, the guard in charge of me burnt it.
After I got out of Bowibu, they kept a close watch on me. They called and
came to my house directly to check periodically to see if I was home or not.
They demanded from me money and other goods on special days such as their
own birthdays or their relative’s birthdays. At first, I gave some money to
them once or twice but because they came too many times, it made my living
difficult. During that time, a person who I went to Bowibu with and had
known I had made a call to the Japanese Embassy before but did not report it,
and threatened me demanding money. I became anxious about being arrested
again and concerned for my family so I decided to cross the river with friends
who I had met in prison. On December 27
th
, 2007, we departed from Sariwon
and arrived at the church in Yanji, China, on January 4
th
, 2008. Then, we
traveled to Thailand through Beijing with the help of a Christian missionary,
who was an ethnic Korean in China (Joseonjok) on March, 5th. After staying
in Thailand for a month and a half, I entered into South Korea on April, 25
th
.
Citizens’ Alliance for North Korean Human Rights (NKHR)
30
Because of being beaten in Bowibu I had severe back pains and was examined
from a hospital in South Korea. I found that my vertebral discs 4 and 5 were
damaged. Also, the tremor in my hands has not disappeared. I don’t know if
it’s because my heart is bad. When it gets severe, I can’t even trim my nails.
■ Translated by Jisun Kim, Sohee Shim, and Stewart Seongwook Ho
DOCUMENT___________________________________________________
United Nations
A/64/224
General Assembly
Distr.: General
4 August 2009
Original: English
Sixty-fourth session
Item 71 (c) of the provisional agenda
*
Promotion and protection of human rights: human
rights situations and reports of special rapporteurs
and representatives
Situation of human rights in the Democratic
People’s Republic of Korea
Note by the Secretary-General
The Secretary-General has the honour to transmit to the General
Assembly the report of the Special Rapporteur on the situation of human
rights in the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea, Vitit Muntarbhorn.
*
A/64/150.
Report of the Special Rapporteur on the Situation of Human
Rights in the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea
Summary
This report covers the period from the latter part of 2008 to mid-2009.
The analysis points to an array of rights and freedoms which are violated
egregiously by the authorities on a daily basis, much to the pain and suffering
of the ordinary population. The violations are evidently widespread,
systematic and abhorrent in their impact and implications. The freedoms from
want, from fear, from discrimination, from persecution and from exploitation
are regrettably transgressed with impunity by those authorities, in an
astonishing setting of abuse after abuse, multiplied incessantly. They
compromise and threaten not only human rights, but also international peace
and security. To counter these violations, the Special Rapporteur’s urgent call
for action demands comprehensive responses at all levels, national and
international.
The authorities in the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea are
advised to take measures to respond effectively with regard to the right to
freedom from want by ensuring effective provision of and access to food and
other basic necessities for those in need and to cooperate constructively with
United Nations agencies and other humanitarian actors on the issue; to enable
people to undertake economic activities to satisfy their basic needs and
supplement their livelihood without State interference; to respect the right to
freedom from persecution by ending the punishment of those who seek
asylum abroad and who are sent back to the country, and by instructing
officials clearly to avoid the detention and inhumane treatment of such
persons; to address the fear factor in the country by terminating public
executions and abuses against security of the person by means of law reform,
clearer instructions to law enforcers to respect human rights, and related
capacity-building and monitoring of their work to ensure accountability; to
cooperate effectively to resolve the issue of foreigners abducted to the
country; to respond constructively to the recommendations of the Special
Rapporteur; and to institute a democratic process, shifting the military budget
to the social sector.
The international community is invited to underline concretely the need
for an integrated approach to overcome the exploitation of the people by the
State authorities by advocating for a “people first” rather than the current
“military first” policy, coupled with an equitable development process; and to
Life & Human Rights in North Korea
33
enable the totality of the United Nations system to activate measures to
overcome key violations and help guarantee fundamental freedoms in the
Democratic People’s Republic of Korea.
I. Introduction
1. The mandate of the Special Rapporteur was established by the Commission
on Human Rights in 2004 and has been renewed annually to date. Under the
mandate, the Special Rapporteur submits, on a yearly basis, one report to the
Human Rights Council and another to the General Assembly. The Special
Rapporteur warmly thanks Governments, members of civil society, United
Nations agencies and other entities which have helped to provide information
for the present report. Although he has sought to engage constructively and
consistently with the authorities in the Democratic People’s Republic of
Korea, it is regrettable that they have declined to cooperate with the mandate.
2. The present report covers the human rights situation in the Democratic
People’s Republic of Korea from the latter part of 2008 to mid-2009. In it, the
Special Rapporteur intends to appraise the situation of human rights and
fundamental freedoms from the following angles: freedom from want,
freedom from fear, freedom from discrimination, freedom from persecution
and freedom from exploitation. It builds upon the report he submitted to the
Human Rights Council earlier in 2009 (A/HRC/10/18), in which he
underlined the need for more effective strategies of prevention, protection,
provision and participation.
II. Situation
3. The Democratic People’s Republic of Korea is a country with a centralized
system of Government geared to upholding the topmost leadership (the
Suryong) in a non-democratic setting.
1
In recent years, the authorities in the
country have become slightly more open to engaging with the international
community in some areas. First, the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea is
1
For recent literature on human rights in the country, see: White Paper on Human
Rights in North Korea 2009, Korea Institute for National Unification (Seoul, 2009);
White Paper on Human Rights in North Korea, Korean Bar Association (Seoul, 2009);
State of the World’s Human Rights, Amnesty International (London, 2009); Country
Report: North Korea, Economist Intelligence Unit (London, 2008); White Paper on
Human Rights in North Korea 2008, Korea Institute for National Unification (Seoul,
2008).
Citizens’ Alliance for North Korean Human Rights (NKHR)
34
a party to four human rights treaties, the International Covenant on Civil and
Political Rights, the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural
Rights, the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination
against Women and the Convention on the Rights of the Child. It appeared
before the Committee on the Rights of the Child in 2009.
4. Second, subsequent to devastating floods in 2006 and 2007, the country has
become more accessible to international aid and cooperated relatively well
with the United Nations agencies that delivered aid to it in 2008. However, the
door became less open in 2009, as described below. At times, there are also
possibilities for constructive cooperation with a bilateral input, for instance,
through the Republic of Korea-supported malaria control programme in the
Democratic People’s Republic of Korea, which has helped to provide
medicines and offered capacity-building for reduction of the illness, in
cooperation with the World Health Organization (WHO). Third, it has
undertaken some law reform in recent years. For example, the Criminal Code
and Criminal Procedure Code were amended several times during the period
2004-2007, partly in response to the country’s obligations under the
abovementioned human rights treaties.
5. Yet the general atmosphere in 2008-2009 has been negative for a number of
reasons. The six-party talks aimed at denuclearizing the country are currently
stalled because of the intransigence of the Democratic People’s Republic of
Korea. The various nuclear and missile tests carried out by the country in
2009 were both provocative and in violation of international law. They led to
the imposition of a variety of sanctions by the Security Council. In resolution
1874 (2009), imposing such sanctions, however, the Council recalled the issue
of human rights implicitly by underlining the importance of the Democratic
People’s Republic of Korea responding to other security and humanitarian
concerns of the international community, and exempted from such sanctions
the provision of international humanitarian aid to the country.
6. As a whole, the human rights situation in the country remains abysmal
owing to the repressive nature of the power base: at once cloistered, controlled
and callous. The array of violations cuts across civil, political, economic,
social and cultural rights. They are fuelled by the country’s stifling political
environment and stultifying developmental process, compounded by a range
of stupefying cruelties.
A. Freedom from want
7. Food shortages have been at the heart of the “want” factor confronting the
Life & Human Rights in North Korea
35
general population since the mid-1990s. Food rations were provided by the
State from the early days of the regime, through a public distribution system,
as a means of maintaining State control over its people. The system failed
drastically in the mid-1990s when a prolonged food crisis led to rampant
malnutrition and other tragedies. This crisis was brought about by a
combination
of
natural
disasters,
environmental
degradation
and
mismanagement on the part of the authorities. The regime then started to
accept foreign food aid to alleviate the chronic situation. In 2005/06, it tried to
reduce such aid and the presence of international agencies working on the
issue, in an attempt to curb outside influence, but this was overtaken by other
events: devastating floods in 2006 and 2007.
8. These disasters put pressure on the authorities to reopen the door to outside
aid. In 2006, the main United Nations agency dealing with the issue, the WFP,
began its two-year Protracted Relief and Recovery Operation, aiming to
access 1.9 million people with food aid. In 2008, a new agreement was
reached between the authorities and WFP to assist some 6.5 million people.
The WFP and the Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations
(FAO) carried out an important food security assessment in June 2008. The
initial findings revealed very disquieting features indicating a serious decline
in food availability, food accessibility and food consumption. Particularly
worrying was the finding that cases of children affected by diarrhoea had
increased markedly, to nearly twice the number recorded in the previous
Government/United Nations nutritional survey in 2005. Child malnutrition
and illnesses have thus been on the rise.
9. WFP highlighted three groups as particularly food insecure: the socially
vulnerable (children in child institutions, the elderly and children in paediatric
wards); the physiologically vulnerable (pregnant and lactating women,
children under 5 years of age and adolescents); and the geographically
vulnerable (particularly in the north-east and southern parts of the country).
The immediate food needs are closely related to the shortage of fertilizers and
fuel.
10. A joint WFP/FAO report later in the year (December 2008) noted that,
despite better climatic conditions in 2008, there would still be a severe food
shortage, necessitating international assistance. It is estimated that the total
food production for 2008/09 will be 4.21 million tons, with a cereal deficit of
836,000 tons, despite possible commercial imports of some 500,000 tons.
Particularly at risk are the urban poor and people in remote food-deficit areas
in the north-east. The amount of food assistance needed until the next harvest
(October 2009) is therefore calculated to be some 800,000 tons. FAO and
Citizens’ Alliance for North Korean Human Rights (NKHR)
36
WFP observed that the agricultural sector had not been able to benefit fully
from the favourable weather in 2008 for the following main reasons:
• A long-term decline of soil fertility, mostly due to built-up acidity in
soils reducing the plant absorption of nutrients from fertilizer;
• Perennial shortages of critical agricultural inputs, especially fuel and
fertilizer;
• Vulnerability to extreme weather events, i.e. alarming trends in the
concentration of summer rains, build-up in riverbeds, making them prone
to flooding, and damaged or obsolete infrastructure;
• Structural factors, including constraints on market activities, use of
natural resources, and unresolved distribution of benefits from higher
productivity in both lowland and slope agriculture.
2
11. Some 8.7 million people are food insecure and thus need help. Given that
situation, there is also need for consistent nutritional assessment of the people
concerned.
12. From mid-2008 to mid-2009, the World Food Programme (WFP) had
more access to the field than it had had since 2005, covering 131 counties in
eight provinces, up from the 50 counties supported under the Protracted Relief
and Recovery Programme, and thereby (in principle) accessing 6,237,000
beneficiaries. The groups covered are mainly lactating women, primary
schoolchildren, the elderly and persons with disabilities. There are also food
for (work-related) community development activities. Food aid includes
locally produced fortified foods, such as corn soya blend, rice milk blend and
cereal milk blend. In 2009, FAO also initiated the Agricultural Rehabilitation
and Recovery Programme aimed at prioritizing agricultural inputs,
conservation agriculture, double cropping, vegetable production, agroforestry,
and recovery of the livestock sector, with future emphasis on expanding dairy
production, preparedness planning and vegetable seed multiplication.
13. Yet in 2009 the aid situation became more desperate. Owing to the
shortage of international aid, influenced doubtlessly by the reaction to the
nuclear and missile tests carried out by the Democratic People’s Republic of
Korea, the aid programme only managed to cover less than 2 million people.
On another front, although in 2008 the offer by the United States of America
of some 500,000 tons of food aid over a 12-month period was accepted by the
country, and a group of United States (US) non-governmental organizations
2
FAO/WFP, Special Report: FAO/WFP Crop and Food Security Assessment Mission
to the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (8 December 2008), p. 3.
Life & Human Rights in North Korea
37
(NGOs) were permitted access to the country to help with the delivery, at the
beginning of 2009, the country stopped accepting US aid and asked all the
NGOs to leave. This was a result of the authorities’ unease with the
monitoring of the food aid process and the use of Korean interpreters from
outside the country.
14. Other planned changes, due to the authorities’ more stringent approach in
the middle of 2009, include the following:
The reduction of WFP operations to cover only 57 counties in 6
provinces;
A reduction in the number of WFP staff;
WFP would no longer be able to employ international Korean speakers;
One week’s advance notice would need to be given for monitoring visits
(rather than 24 hours as before);
The authorities’ interest in operating the various food-related warehouses
now under WFP;
The Government’s postponement of the nutritional assessment survey
requested by United Nations agencies.
15. It should be noted that United Nations agencies work on the premise of
“no access, no food”, that is to say, food will not be given unless they have
access to the targeted recipients. Also, United Nations and other agencies
(such as the International Federation of Red Cross and Red Crescent
Societies) are moving beyond food aid to more food-security oriented
activities which may help to prevent disasters and deprivation, for example,
watershed management and reforestation, and improvement of slope-land
agriculture to supplement the food intake of the population.
16. Yet the suffering of the general population has been aggravated by the
negative role of the authorities, for a number of reasons. First, it can be
recalled that in 2002 the Government adopted various measures which opened
the door to quasi-market activities, thus enabling the population to engage in
the market system, to a limited extent, to produce, buy and sell their goods.
The public distribution system was seen as non-functional, and people were
given additional wages to fend for themselves. However, in 2005, for fear of
losing their grip on the population, the authorities started to reimpose the
Citizens’ Alliance for North Korean Human Rights (NKHR)
38
public distribution system on the population and began to prohibit market
activities. This was despite the fact that the public distribution system,
especially in view of the inadequate rations available, was and remains unable
to respond effectively to the needs of the population. FAO and WFP noted the
erratic nature of the public distribution system (PDS) as follows:
“In 2004 PDS rations were in the range of 200-250 grams, but were
increased to 500 grams in October 2005. However, the PDS continued to
experience serious implementation challenges in providing nutritionally
adequate quantities of cereals for many counties. In 2007 PDS rations
were still at 500 grams until the floods in August, when distributions
were interrupted due to losses of food stocks and damages to ration
levels of 300-400 grams. At the beginning of 2008, the PDS ration was
consistently reported by officials and households to be 350 grams, which
was then reduced to 250 grams in May and further to 150 grams (around
500 Kcal per day/per person) between June and September. In October,
they were adjusted upwards to 300 grams.”
3
17. Second, economic initiatives, particularly on the part of women, were
severely curtailed in 2007/08 when the authorities prohibited women under 40
years of age from trading. Later, this age limit was raised to 49. Third, at the
end of 2008, in the pursuit of State control over the population, the authorities
planned to close general markets and banned rice sales in such markets, even
though those markets had been a major source of income and food for the
population. The authorities are now compelling the population to obtain grain
and other produce directly from State-run stores. There have been various
protests by traders against that diktat. The country’s biggest wholesale market,
in Pyongsung, was ordered closed, as part of the campaign to close general
markets and convert them to farmers’ markets.
4
18. Fourth, it was reported that the authorities were beginning to register small
plots of land with a view to eliminating private patch farming.
5
This “kitchen
farming” has to date been very important for the survival of the general
population, who lack adequate food and who undertake such farming to
supplement food availability and intake. Such a restriction would cause
further hardships for the general population, for whom the authorities are
unable adequately to provide food and other assistance. Other deprivations
include shortage of fertilizers, electricity, fuel and medicines. The social
welfare system, including the quality of hospitals, is in serious decline.
3
Ibid., p. 24.
4
“North Korea today No. 283”, 27 June 2009.
5
“North Korea today No. 252”, 19 November 2008.
Life & Human Rights in North Korea
39
19. On another front, the authorities cooperate relatively well with the United
Nations Children’s Fund (UNICEF) on a variety of activities which contribute
to the fulfilment of the Millennium Development Goals, such as enrolment in
primary schools, completion rates and literacy. Immunization services are
reported to have improved substantially. Data will also be gathered through a
multi-indicators cluster survey to be completed by the end of 2009. However,
a key test of the statistics is their verification. On a more disquieting front,
UNICEF reports that:
“malnutrition in children, pregnant women and lactating mothers
continues to be a serious concern in the Democratic People’s Republic of
Korea as a result of floods in 2007 and drastic reductions in food imports
that traditionally meet a big chunk of such deficits. Child mortality (55
per 1,000 live births), chronic malnutrition among children under five
(37 per cent) and malnutrition of pregnant women (32 per cent) remain
high as a result of prolonged poverty, under-resourced health systems,
decaying water and sanitation infrastructure, inadequate caring practices
for young children and pregnant women, and fragile food security.
Although access to education is quasi universal, the school environment
with hundreds of classrooms damaged or destroyed by floods remains
poor as well as the quality of education due to lack of resources and
exposure.”
6
20. The authorities have also been cooperating with the United Nations
Population Fund (UNFPA) on a long overdue national census and the final
results are pending. Preliminary results at the beginning of 2009 revealed a
population of 24 million and an estimated population growth rate of 0.8 per
cent per annum since the previous census in 1993. The new census should
make the situation more transparent and enable all concerned to plan and
programme the provision and delivery of food and other necessities more
effectively. The authorities also need to ensure that there is no discrimination
against groups covered by the census based on the new information available.
B. Freedom from fear
21. The pervasive repression imposed by the authorities ensures that the
people live in continual fear and are pressed to inform on each other. The
State practices extensive surveillance over its inhabitants and even officials
live in daily apprehension, since their colleagues are encouraged to
6
UNICEF, Humanitarian Action Report 2009, Asia and the Pacific, Democratic
People’s Republic of Korea, available at
http://www.unicef.org/har09/index_dprkorea.php.
Citizens’ Alliance for North Korean Human Rights (NKHR)
40
“whistleblow” mutually. Throughout the years, the authorities have bred a
culture of mistrust and a policy of divide and rule that permeate families and
communities. Matters are made more complicated by the fact that the regime
posits a “military first” (songan) policy and monitors its population through
the tentacles of its iron-fisted security machinery.
22. The fear factor is most evident when a person does not belong to or does
not share the ideology of the elite linked with the dynasty-based leadership
and is ostracized or marginalized accordingly. A plethora of crimes are listed
in the criminal law, which helps to bolster the regime and instrumentalizes the
fear factor. They include: 14 types of anti-State crime; 16 types of crime
disruptive of national defence systems; 104 types of crime injurious to the
socialist economy; 26 types of crime injurious to socialist culture; 39 types of
crime injurious to administrative systems; 20 types of crime harmful to
collective life; and 26 types of crime injuring life and damaging property of
citizens.
7
23. The situation is aggravated by the divisive practices adopted by the regime
in controlling its population. Throughout the years, the authorities have
separated the population implicitly into three groups: those close to the top;
the middle level (usually the mass of the urban and rural population); and
those classified as hostile to the regime, for instance, political dissidents, those
who fall out of favour with the regime and those with various links to the
Republic of Korea and Japan. Collective punishments are used against people,
with whole families being persecuted and sent into detention where a member
falls out of favour with the authorities.
24. Public executions continue to take place; they have been applied more
particularly in recent years to those involved in human trafficking. A recent
case which has come to the Special Rapporteur’s notice is that of seven
persons caught for human trafficking. Four of them were sent to re-education
centres and three, university students, were executed in public.
8
Another case
was of five women reportedly publicly executed for human trafficking in late
2008.
9
25. Many punishments are totally unreasonable and abusive, and represent
widespread and systematic violations of human rights. For instance, students
are reported to have been sent to labour training (re-education and forced
7
White Paper on Human Rights in North Korea 2008, Korea Institute for National
Unification, p. 79
8
“North Korea today No. 206”, 13 September 2008, p. 2.
9
“North Korea today No. 237”, 31 October 2008, p. 1.
Life & Human Rights in North Korea
41
labour) for watching drama from the Republic of Korea.
10
Citizens who fail
to turn up for work allocated to them by the State are sent to labour camps.
The wide variety of detention facilities range from political detention camps
(kwanliso) for political crimes to correctional labour punishment in labour
camps (kyohwaso) for other crimes. There are reports of public executions
and secret executions in political detention camps.
11
In 2004, a new type of
punishment was introduced in the form of labour training, sentencing to which
ranges from six months to two years. That punishment has been used, in
particular, for those caught exiting the country illegally.
26. Although torture is prohibited by law, it is extensively practised. In
addition, the substandard prison conditions, including lack of food, poor
hygiene, freezing temperatures in wintertime, forced labour and corporal
punishment, constitute a myriad of abuses and deprivations, ensuring that
many prisons are akin to purgatory for the inmates. Bribery may help to
mitigate their plight.
27. The justice system leaves much to be desired. It lacks an independent
judiciary, lawyers who would act genuinely on behalf of accused persons and
juries who would provide the necessary checks and balances for the delivery
of justice. Even though judges, lawyers and juries all exist in the system, they
are subservient to the “powers that be” and do not uphold the internationally
recognized notion of the rule of law. In fact, judges are appointed by the State
and operate under the direction of the Supreme People’s Assembly. The jury
system is based upon two persons who work with the courts, not to ensure that
the rights of the accused are upheld but to confirm the list of crimes presented
at the trials and to affirm the conviction of the alleged wrongdoer.
12
The
lawyer’s role is to pressure the accused to confess to a crime rather than to
defend his client
.
13
28. On-site open trials are also used, imputedly to educate the public; in
reality, they are an instrument to intimidate the public, without due regard for
the right to a fair trial and the right of defendants to privacy. Extensive
discretion is conferred on the authorities to impose sanctions through
extrajudicial means. In particular, the 2004 Administrative Penalty Act grants
great powers to administrative bodies to punish people, in disregard of the
need for due process of law. Various sanctions, such as labour training (re-
10
“North Korea today No. 183”, 12 August 2008.
11
Korea Institute for National Unification, “White paper on human rights in North
Korea 2008”, p. 68.
12
Ibid., p. 144.
13
Ibid., p. 155.
Citizens’ Alliance for North Korean Human Rights (NKHR)
42
education), forced labour, demotion and dismissal from work, can be imposed
by administrative bodies, such as people’s security agencies and inspectors’
offices.
14
29. Freedoms associated with human rights and democracy, such as the
freedom to choose one’s government, freedom of association, freedom of
expression, freedom of communication and information, privacy and freedom
of religion, are flouted on a daily basis by the nature and practices of the
regime in power. A single party rules over the country and, despite the
pretence of national elections to the Supreme People’s Assembly in 2009,
such elections are cosmetic; they merely rubber-stamp one-party rule with its
determined grip on the population. It is reported that there was a 100 per cent
turn-out for the 2009 elections and that 299 of the 687 members of the
Assembly were replaced by that election, leaving the topmost echelon of the
power base untouched. Political dissent is heavily punished and has an
intergenerational impact: where the parents are seen as antithetical to the
regime, the child and the rest of the family are discriminated against in their
access to schools, hospitals and other necessities.
30. Article 67 of the national Constitution (1998) exemplifies the deceptive
façade of commitment to the basic freedoms. It states that “civilians shall have
freedom of the press, publication, association, demonstration and assembly”.
In reality, the converse is true. There are no genuine trade unions, apart from
those which prop up the regime. Interestingly, reports have been received of
protests, led by women, during 2008/09, concerning food prices and against
the clamp-down by the authorities on market-related activities, suggesting that
discontent is boiling under the surface of oppression. Freedom of association
and expression are a crucial avenue for those who seek justice and redress
from the authorities.
31. On a related front, the media are heavily controlled and censored, and they
form the backbone of an enormous propaganda machine. Reading of books
from the Republic of Korea is punishable as a crime of espionage.
15
Chinese
books are also prohibited. There is extensive wiretapping of telephones.
Interestingly, mobile telephones are now permitted in Pyongyang, but not in
border areas. Unless one belongs to the elite, it is forbidden to own computers
and to use the Internet without official permission and it is prohibited to watch
foreign videos. There are reports of official clamp-downs on compact discs,
and surveillance teams of inspectors raid homes to see whether families are
(illegally) watching or listening to foreign films and radio or television
14
Ibid., p. 175.
15
Ibid., p. 219.
Life & Human Rights in North Korea
43
broadcasts. Such raids are particularly intense near the border with
neighbouring countries. Radio and television sets are pre-tuned to
Government programmes and there are punishments against those who
disobey. Leniency may be obtained from the inspectors at a price, thus
breeding extensive bribery and corruption in the country.
32. Despite all this, there are reports of an increasing number of people who
watch foreign programmes and who have mobile phones. There is also a
spread of USB handy drive, suggesting clandestine access to computers. The
rigidity of the regime in the pursuit of social prescription versus individual
self-expression is taken to the extreme by the ban on the wearing of blue jeans.
33. Given the extensive intelligence and informant system in the country, the
right to privacy is continually infringed by the State apparatus.
Neighbourhood groups are also used as an instrument of social control and
surveillance, creating a system of fear and mistrust, with multiple layers of
surveillance.
16
34. There are, possibly, outward signs of religious practice, such as the
construction of church buildings. The following religious sites have been
reported: 2,500 Christian family service sites, 12 Catholic assembly sites, 60
Buddhist temples and 800 Chundokyo secret prayer sites
.
17
Some religious
ceremonies seem to be allowed. Is there burgeoning freedom of religion in the
country? The claim on the part of the authorities that freedom of religion is
enjoyed in the country is unconvincing from other evidence available. It is
reported that the religious sites are limited to Pyongyang and that local
citizens are still barred from using the facilities available. There are
indications that practising religion at a personal level would give rise to
persecution.
18
35. In reality, religions are seen as unwanted competition for the cult-based
indoctrination based upon the 10 principles for unitary ideology preached by
the regime, which deifies the leadership at the top in a pseudo-theocratic
manner. The regime lauds people who give up their lives to save portraits of
the country’s leader.
19
Recent reports indicate that security agents from the
National Security Agency (bowibu) and public security agency (anjeobu) have
stepped up their surveillance and infiltration at borders aimed at halting
16
Ibid., p. 230.
17
Ibid., p. 236.
18
Ibid., pp. 240-41.
19
Ibid., p. 251.
Citizens’ Alliance for North Korean Human Rights (NKHR)
44
religious activities.
20
At times, they pose as pastors or set up fake prayer
meetings to entrap new converts. Those who seek refuge in other countries
and who link up with missionaries are liable to be punished severely if sent
back to the country of origin.
36. On another front, the authorities have been involved in kidnapping a
number of foreign nationals, usually with the aim of using them for espionage
purposes and/or of stealing their identity with a view to later infiltration into
their countries of origin. A number of cases concerning Japanese nationals
abducted by the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea remain unresolved
and require an effective response from the authorities of the latter country to
ensure transparency and accountability. It should be recalled that working-
level consultations were held between the two countries in August 2008 at
which they agreed on the concrete modality and related measures to ensure a
comprehensive investigation of the abductions issue, to be conducted by the
Democratic People’s Republic of Korea, including the need for that country to
establish an investigation committee to undertake and conclude investigations
effectively and to cooperate with Japan so that the latter will be able to
confirm the results of the investigation with information from relevant sources.
37. Over 10 countries have been affected by the Democratic People’s
Republic of Korea perpetrating such crimes extraterritorially. A long-
neglected question deserving closer attention and expeditious response is the
large number of persons abducted from the Republic of Korea.
21
From the
1950-1953 Korean war, there remain key issues to be settled, including
prisoners of war, family reunification and missing persons. Indeed, there is a
sense of urgency, given that many of the persons concerned and their families
are dying of old age, unable to be reunited owing to the impasse created by
the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea. In mid-2009, that country also
seized four fishermen from the Republic of Korea who had reportedly strayed
into its waters.
38. Moreover, during the year under review, a worker from the Republic of
Korea in the Kaesong Industrial Zone (the joint industrial complex between
the two countries using, primarily, workers from the Democratic People’s
Republic of Korea and investment from the Republic of Korea) was arrested
in opaque circumstances. Likewise, the plight of two journalists from the
United States, arrested and sentenced to long terms of imprisonment for
20
See also United States Commission on International Religious Freedom, A Prison
without Bars (Washington, 2008).
21
See also White Paper on Human Rights in North Korea 2009, Korea Institute for
National Unification.
Life & Human Rights in North Korea
45
alleged illegal entry and “grave crime”, was of major concern to the Special
Rapporteur (see para. 71 below). These cases await expeditious resolution
based on international human rights standards and the international rule of law.
C. Freedom from discrimination
39. Given the very hierarchical system in the country, those in the elite group
live well, while the rest of the population suffers. The discrimination which
results from such stratification can be seen through the plight of various
groups.
40. Women (other than in the elite group) often have to perform multiple tasks
as housewives, breadwinners/traders and labourers forced to undertake
Government-ordered programmes, and are under inordinate pressure. While
the Constitution guarantees equal rights for men and women, access of
women to key decisionmaking positions lags behind that of men.
22
41. Women constitute a large proportion of the population involved in the
economic sector, particularly in commercial and informal activities. They
have been particularly affected by the State’s reassertion of control over its
population in the economic sphere, as seen from the various examples
provided above, such as the prohibition on women under a certain age trading,
and the closure of markets, with resulting clashes between women traders and
the authorities. As noted in a recent report:
“In Cheonggin, Hamkyeongbuk-do, there was a confrontation between
the women who do business in the market and the market officer
checking on the‘No business for females under 49 years old’ regulation.
It is known that more than 1,000 female merchants protested against the
regulation.
“According to a Korean Chinese, K …, who visited a market in a city of
North Korea in mid-March 2008, when the North Korean government
forbade people of less than 45 years old from trading, a scene like one in
a spy movie happened. K … reported that people were chased here and
there because they were prevented from selling their goods. So, young
women took their mothers-in- law or grandmothers and sat them down at
the front of the stalls while they continued selling secretly from the rear.
Occasionally they were caught and arrested by security agents.
22
Ibid., p. 294.
Citizens’ Alliance for North Korean Human Rights (NKHR)
46
“In conclusion, the more food aid to North Korea from the international
community increases, the more distribution by the State will be
accelerated and, furthermore, it means that the right of access of the
people to food can be controlled.”
23
42. A key concern is the impediment facing freedom to undertake economic
activities for one’s survival, especially where the State fails to provide
adequately for the population. The authorities have also been prohibiting
women from using bicycles (a key vehicle for access to trade) and compelling
them to wear skirts.
43. The food and other shortages have taken their toll, particularly on women,
with grave consequences since the mid-1990s. This is seen from the high
malnutrition rate among pregnant women and also explains why United
Nations agencies have been targeting this group for special attention. It can be
recalled that in the last nutritional assessment undertaken by United Nations
agencies, dating from 2004, maternal anaemia was found to be around 35 per
cent.
44. Violence, neglect, abuse and exploitation pose continuing concern to
women at home, outside the home, within the country and across its borders.
The issue of sexual violence at home has not been dealt with adequately,
while women who are on the move are often abused and exploited for many
purposes. There is rampant human smuggling and trafficking where women
and other groups seek to leave the country.
45. With regard to assessment of the implementation of children’s rights, 2009
has proved to be a key year, as a delegation from the Democratic People’s
Republic of Korea appeared before the Committee on the Rights of the Child
as part of the country’s obligations under the Convention on the Rights of the
Child. The Special Rapporteur commented on the most recent report of the
Democratic People’s Republic of Korea to that Committee (CRC/C/PRK/4) in
his reports to the Human Rights Council (HRC/10/18) and to the General
Assembly (A/63/322) in 2008. Suffice it to note that the report of the
Democratic People’s Republic of Korea is decidedly thin on special protection
measures for children in various difficulties, such as street children, children
of those who do not belong to the elite, children of political dissidents, child
refugees and children who have to face the criminal justice system.
23
Sing Hyun-uk, “The right to food”, in White Paper on Human Rights in North
Korea, Korean Bar Association, pp. 297-298.
Life & Human Rights in North Korea
47
46. A detailed report in this regard has also been submitted by civil society.
Based on interviews with children, it contains various elements deserving
attention and analysis, including forced labour of children and forced
separation from the parents, such as for manure collection and construction
work.
24
47. Another area of concern is linked with the reforms of the criminal law in
2007 having an impact on children, namely, the introduction of “public
education” so as to rehabilitate those who have committed minor crimes.
“The 8th revised Criminal Law, amended and supplemented in July 2007,
provides that ‘a person who underwent public education is considered to be
innocent’ in Article 66, and ‘public education for a criminal should be given
by the institution, company, group or district to which s/he belong’. … The
new ‘public education’ measures should be thus understood as a social
measure for re-education, not as a punishment. Moreover, ‘public education’,
which is usually applied to minors is undertaken by the school concerned, and
occasionally by the Children’s Union which consists of 8-13 year old children
and the Youth League of 14 to 16 year old children.”
25
48. This provides leeway to local authorities, such as schools, to “educate” the
children concerned to improve their behaviour. While the trend of not sending
children into detention is welcome, the new system needs to be made
transparent and capacity-building provided for local authorities responsible
for such education with a view to their respecting the children’s rights and
using humane methods in offering such education.
49. Samples drawn from the concluding observations of the Committee on the
Rights of the Child (CRC/C/PRK/CO/4) in response to the country’s report in
2009 highlight key anomalies as follows:
“The Committee is concerned that, despite the Constitutional guarantees,
the principle of non-discrimination is not fully respected in practice, vis-
à-vis children with disabilities, children living in institutions, and
children who are in conflict with the law. The Committee is further
concerned that children may be faced with discrimination on the basis of
the political or other opinion, social origin, or other status, either of
24
Situation Report on the Rights of the Child in the DPRK, Citizens’ Alliance for
North Korean Human Rights and the Asia Centre for Human Rights, Seoul, 2008.
25
Young-Hwan Lee, “Assessments of the situation of torture and recommendations to
North Korea”, in Life and Human Rights in North Korea, vol. 48, Summer 2008, pp.
21-22.
Citizens’ Alliance for North Korean Human Rights (NKHR)
48
themselves, or of their parents. ...
“The Committee is alarmed that many of the children placed in
residential care are in fact not orphans and that a large number of
children are customarily placed in residential institutions due to the lack
of effective gate-keeping mechanisms or care alternatives. The
Committee also reiterates its previous concern that triplets are
automatically institutionalized by the State and that parents are not
offered alternative solutions that would allow them to raise their children
at home. The Committee is also concerned about the situation of children
whose parents are detained. ...
“The Committee is concerned about children who cross the border into
neighbouring countries who may face harsh treatment upon return or
repatriation. …
“The Committee also expresses concern at the reportedly growing
incidence of substance abuse by children and information that children
are being mobilized to work on State opium poppy farms. …
“The Committee regrets that the State party has not developed a full-
fledged juvenile justice standard in compliance with the Convention and
other relevant United Nations standards.”
50. The Democratic People’s Republic of Korea is not yet a party to the
optional protocols to the Convention on the sale of children, child prostitution
and child pornography, and on the involvement of children in armed conflict,
or to various International Labour Organization (ILO) conventions. Accession
to those instruments will help to raise standards in this area and ensure more
transparency of the situation, with a view to effective reform.
51. With regard to persons with disabilities, a constructive development was
the adoption of a new law on this issue in 2003 which opened the door to
reform of an antiquated system and the former practice of incarcerating
persons with disabilities. The Special Rapporteur underlines that the damage
caused by State practices in the past also needs to be rectified. Those who
were victims of inhumane conditions need to be assisted to recover and
reintegrate fully into society. Some of the abhorrent past practices which
require accountability include the reported “neutering” of those with dwarfism
to prevent them from reproducing.
26
There is also the need to accede to the
26
White Paper on Human Rights in North Korea 2008, Korea Institute for National
Life & Human Rights in North Korea
49
new international treaty on the rights of persons with disabilities.
52. With regard to persons in the ageing group, clearly one negative impact of
the food crisis has been the rise in their deprivations, especially as they are
among the first to suffer from cutbacks by the Government. United Nations
agencies are increasingly aware of this, and food aid and allocations are
therefore being targeted also to this group. Basic needs of the ageing
population which also require attention are access to medical care and other
social benefits.
D. Freedom from persecution
53. The oppressive environment in the country, coupled with persecution of
those who fall foul of the regime, has resulted in forced displacements of
people. Paradoxically, since the beginning of the regime, the authorities have
followed a policy of strict control over the movement of its citizens. Internally,
travel permits are required if people wish to travel across the country. For
external travel, an exit visa is required by article 9 of the Immigration Law,
which states that “all citizens may leave or enter the country on official as
well as personal business. Citizens wanting to travel abroad must obtain a
certificate of exit/entry from the Foreign Ministry, or relevant agencies or
organizations in charge of exit/entry affairs”.
27
54. In 2003, there were indications that the strict control exercised by the
authorities could be relaxed slightly for those who had relatives in an
immediately neighbouring country. Thus, travel permits facilitated the
movement of persons in this group to and fro between the country and its
immediate neighbours.
55. In reality, the situation is more complex. For a long time, there has been
an outflow of persons persecuted by the authorities who have left the country
spontaneously and clandestinely without travel permits. The food crisis of the
mid-1990s and thereafter has led to increased migration of people in search of
food and other necessities across the border. There has thus been a persistent
flow of people into neighbouring countries, at times in search of food,
employment and livelihood, at times escaping from persecution and
oppression, at times as composite flows. In recent years, there has also been a
small flow of migrant labour within the country, travelling to work in special
Unification, p. 182.
27
Ibid., p. 201.
Citizens’ Alliance for North Korean Human Rights (NKHR)
50
economic zones, as well as across the border to other countries as part of
bilateral arrangements on the importation of labour.
56. There has been much discussion internationally on whether these flows
are tantamount to forced migration in search of asylum, giving rise to refugee
status. This would be coupled with the application of the principle of
international law concerning non-refoulement, the inherent right of the
refugee not to be pushed back to areas of danger. The Special Rapporteur has
addressed this topic extensively in his previous reports to the Human Rights
Council, bearing in mind that the international definition of the “refugee” is a
person who leaves his or her country of origin for a “well-founded fear of
persecution” (see A/HRC/4/15, A/62/264, A/HRC/7/20, A/63/322 and
A/HRC/10/18). This “well-founded fear of persecution” factor may arise
before he/she leaves the country and/or after he/she leaves the country,
persons in the latter category being known as refugees “sur place”. In the case
of those leaving the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea, particularly for
food and economic reasons, while at first glance they are not refugees because
they do not leave the country for fear of persecution, they may be seen as
refugees if they fear persecution upon return to the country of origin. Such
fear is particularly caused by the fact that most people who leave the country
in such situations leave without an exit visa and are subject to the threat of
prosecution upon return for having left the country illegally. “Well-founded
fear of persecution” due to that threat may give rise to refugee status
subsequently.
57. Whether one classifies a person as a refugee or not, it is important to
highlight the need for all persons in migration situations to be treated
humanely, in keeping with internationally recognized human rights. A
worrying trend in some countries (first asylum countries) which receive
persons who seek asylum from the country in question is the tendency to
classify them as illegal immigrants and subject them to detention, prosecution
and even threat of push-back to the country of origin, where dangers lurk
ominously. The Special Rapporteur has consistently been of the opinion that
illegal immigrants and refugees are different categories and should be treated
differently. While the former are still protected by their country of origin, the
latter are not, and the two categories should not be confused. The refugee thus
falls under international protection, for lack of national protection. The main
United Nations agency which has the mandate to deal with those who seek
asylum, the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees,
needs to be well supported to enable it to access those who seek asylum and to
provide assistance and protection to those falling into the classification of
refugees. Bilateral links with and supports from possible countries of
Life & Human Rights in North Korea
51
destination may also help to attenuate the strictures of the countries of first
asylum.
58. During the past year, owing to the factors described above, arrivals in
neighbouring countries have dwindled, and the scenario facing those who seek
asylum has become more stringent. There are now more extensive checks on
persons who travel within the country. More restrictions have been imposed
on exit from the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea and entry into
neighbouring countries. There are reports of more severe sanctions being
imposed on those who seek to leave the country and those who are forcibly
returned to the country, despite possible indications of a more lenient attitude
on the part of the authorities in recent years. Some sources report a “shoot on
sight” policy in regard to those who seek to leave the country clandestinely, in
addition to violence against pregnant women forcibly returned to the country.
One report notes as follows:
“Female repatriates suffer what is called ‘pumping’ torture, which is a
common sexual torture to find money hidden inside a woman’s vagina.
Women who face this torture are stripped of their clothing, and their
arms are tied behind their backs. Then they squat and stand repeatedly
until they lose consciousness. It maximizes the sense of shame in women
… Assault against pregnant women is also routinized, and wrapping the
forcibly aborted baby’s face with plastic to [induce] death is known [in]
frequent occurrences.”
28
59. Instead of the previous practice of imposing fines on returnees, prison
sentences are now being applied. Bribery may attenuate the sanctions
concerned. Children are being punished more severely upon return. It is
reported that the families of those left behind by asylum-seekers are now
being targeted for punishment as a collective deterrent measure.
60. The movements are facilitated by human smugglers and traffickers, who
often prey on those who seek asylum. Recent information indicates that many
women end up in forced marriage situations.
29
The background of those on the
move and the ensuing complications may differ. On the one hand, there are
those who stay for a long period in a neighbouring country or other country of
first asylum before moving to the Republic of Korea as their final destination.
On the other hand, there are those who transit only briefly through countries
28
Kim Tae-Hoon, “Human rights for the socially marginalized class”, in White Paper
on Human Rights in North Korea, Korean Bar Association, p. 431.
29
“Lives for sale”, Center for Human Rights in North Korea, Washington, 2009.
Citizens’ Alliance for North Korean Human Rights (NKHR)
52
of first asylum before reaching the country of final destination. From
information received, the former are often more traumatized than the latter
group, as they have to endure a myriad of abuses for a long time before
reaching the country of destination and may thus need longer-term support.
61. Currently, women constitute the majority of those seeking asylum using
routes passing through other countries. They are at times accompanied by
children and in many cases are seeking to be reunited with their spouses and
families in the country of final asylum. During the past year, some were
threatened, in some South-east Asian countries, with detention and
deportation, in breach of their rights and the principle of non-refoulement. The
Special Rapporteur calls for improved measures from countries of asylum,
especially countries of first asylum, to offer shelter to these groups in
adequate welfare centres, to shun detention in principle and in practice, to
abide by the principle of non-refoulement and to expedite the process to
enable them to resettle in the country of final destination.
62. More consideration should also be given to possibilities for family reunion.
This is particularly pertinent to those who are forced to marry nationals of the
neighbouring country along the way and leave their spouses and children
behind in their quest for asylum in other countries. This invites reflection on
whether the children who are the offspring of such relationships are stateless
in practice. The matter needs to be resolved on the basis of international
solidarity and cooperation to mitigate the plight of families and to ensure that
the children born of unions between citizens of the Democratic People’s
Republic of Korea and nationals of other countries are protected and are
accorded citizenship by an appropriate State, rather than being left in the
limbo condition of statelessness.
E. Freedom from exploitation
63. Multiple forms of exploitation are committed by the authorities and other
actors against the general population, from systemic exploitation to
exploitation at the community and personal levels. Most evidently, it is the
power base at the apex of the system which exploits the people to ensure its
own survival. This is linked with the question of who will be the successor in
the dynastic process and whether the military arm of the regime is gaining
more powers. The current ideological drive of the regime is to ensure a strong
and prosperous nation by 2012. The year 2009 is also the year of the “150-day
campaign”, which compels people to produce more food and implement
various Government-imposed programmes, such as road building and
Life & Human Rights in North Korea
53
construction work.
30
It is ironic that people are being forced to work more
through mass mobilization, even though this is not necessarily to their benefit
but to the benefit of the regime in power and its own sustenance.
64. There is also a basic paradox: while many members of the population are
in abject poverty and suffering the prolonged deprivations linked with
shortage of food and other necessities, the country itself is endowed with vast
mineral resources controlled by the authorities. The exploitation of the
ordinary people has become the pernicious prerogative of the ruling elite. This
is all the more ironic, since it is reported that the economy has improved
slightly over the past year, an indication that more resources could be
available to help the population. According to information received, the
country’s trade with the outside world (excluding that with the Republic of
Korea) reached a record 3.8 billion United States dollars in 2008 and trade
rose by 29.7 per cent compared with 2007. In April 2009, the Supreme
People’s Committee approved the current year’s budget, set at 482.6 billion
won (US$ 1 = 140 won), an increase of some 5 per cent compared with last
year.
65. Thus, some national resources are available, but are misplaced and
misspent, resulting in the exploitation of and detriment to the general
population. It was recently reported also that the authority to export the
country’s most valuable export item, anthracite, has been transferred from the
civilian arm of the Cabinet to a military trading company, indicating greater
control by the military over national resources. Those budgetary resources
would be, and should be, much better spent on the welfare of the population.
66. The authorities also exploit and manipulate the population through other
ways and means. First, as already referred to above, the authorities seek to
control the food distribution process as a means of controlling the population
and making them dependent on the regime. The issue is not simply lack of
food for the population, but rather the manipulative control of food
distribution by those in power. Second, while humanitarian aid has helped the
population to a great extent, it should be acknowledged that such aid has also
provided the authorities with the opportunity of not using its resources to help
its people, thereby avoiding committing national resources to food purchases
on the world market. Those resources have been channelled instead to
sustaining the power elite and the militarization drive. Third, the State has
failed to commit itself adequately to the generation of food security. Even
where there are natural disasters afflicting the general population, the root
30
North Korea Today, No. 281, 15 June 2009; No. 283, 27 June 2009; No. 285, 24 July
2009; and No. 286, 17 July 2009.
Citizens’ Alliance for North Korean Human Rights (NKHR)
54
causes are often man-made, and it is the regime in power which shares
responsibility for this. United Nations agencies are increasingly aware of the
dilemma and this is why they are placing greater emphasis on environmental
conservation, avoidance of excessive double-cropping, advocacy of rotation
of crops, disaster preparedness and enabling people to be more involved in
safeguarding their livelihood. An important component of the right to life and
the right to work which needs to be protected from exploitation is the ability
to undertake economic activities of one’s own choice. Yet current
developments undercut these economic possibilities, since the State seeks to
assert more control over its citizens and to rein in market activities which are
linked to people’s choices.
67. On another front, impunity is enjoyed by the regime in power and the
machinery surrounding it. For instance, the justice system is in desperate need
of revamping, despite the various legislative reforms in recent years. The
capacity of law enforcers to shun malpractice should also be built up, while
the authorities are in need of a clear policy to stop public executions and other
abuses in the law enforcement process.
68. Opening the door to freedoms such as the freedom to choose a
government and the freedom of expression and association invites reflection
on the wherewithal and avenues to institute more democratization in the
country, to ensure genuine self-determination.
69. Interestingly, non-governmental organizations have repeatedly called for
more action, especially at the highest level from the United Nations, to ensure
that the State and the related power base meet their responsibility to protect
human rights and to take action against egregious violations. A recent report
advocates that the United Nations should refer more concretely to the State’s
responsibility to protect its citizens and establish a group of experts to
investigate whether the egregious violations in the country are tantamount to a
violation of the “responsibility to protect”.
31
Both the Security Council and
the General Assembly have a key role to play in such a process, and there is a
need for them to take more dynamic measures on this front.
70. In the meantime, the widespread, systematic and reprehensible violations
of human rights continue unabated in the country. They require strong action
from the international community, including a comprehensive approach by the
United Nations system, to influence the authorities to respond substantively
31
DLA Piper, Committee for Human Rights in North Korea and the Oslo Center for
Peace and Human Rights, Failure to Protect: The Ongoing Challenge of North Korea
(Washington, 2008).
Life & Human Rights in North Korea
55
and constructively to the human rights challenge. The Universal Periodic
Review process instituted by the Human Rights Council, under which the
Democratic People’s Republic of Korea will appear in future before the
Council to be assessed in regard to its human rights performance, can also be
an avenue for addressing those issues and for encouraging the country to
reform its governmental system and overcome past excesses that have
engendered systemic exploitation.
III. Communications
71. The Special Rapporteur on the situation of human rights in the Democratic
People’s Republic of Korea, the Special Rapporteur on the promotion and
protection of the right to freedom of opinion and expression, the Special
Rapporteur on the situation of human rights defenders, the Special Rapporteur
on violence against women, its causes and consequences and the Chairperson-
Rapporteur of the Working Group on Arbitrary Detention jointly sent an
urgent appeal to the Government of the Democratic People’s Republic of
Korea on 2 April 2009, seeking clarification on the circumstances of the arrest
and detention of two United States journalists and the initial steps taken by the
Government to safeguard their rights. In a communication dated 8 April 2009,
the Government of the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea replied that
the two reporters had been detained on 17 March 2009 as a result of their
hostile acts and illegal entry into the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea
by crossing the border between the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea
and China. It also said that, while investigations were under way, consular
contact was allowed and treatment of the detained was in accordance with
international law.
IV. Conclusions and recommendations
72. The above analysis points to an array of rights and freedoms which
are violated egregiously by the authorities in the Democratic People’s
Republic of Korea on a daily basis, much to the pain and suffering of the
ordinary population. The violations are evidently widespread, systematic
and abhorrent in their impact and implications. The freedoms from want,
from fear, from discrimination, from persecution and from exploitation
are regrettably transgressed with a sense of impunity on the part of those
authorities, in an astonishing setting of abuse after abuse, multiplied
incessantly. The violations compromise and threaten not only human
rights, but also international peace and security, demanding effective
counter-action. The urgent call for action demands comprehensive
Citizens’ Alliance for North Korean Human Rights (NKHR)
56
responses from the United Nations system and other stakeholders at all
levels, national and international.
73. The authorities in the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea should
take the following measures:
(a) Immediately (short term):
(i) Respond effectively with regard to freedom from want by
ensuring effective provision of and access to food and other basic
necessities for those in need of assistance; cooperate constructively
with United Nations agencies and other humanitarian actors on the
issue; and enable people to undertake economic activities to satisfy
their basic needs and supplement their livelihood without State
interference;
(ii) End the punishment of those who seek asylum abroad and who
are sent back to the country, and instruct officials clearly to avoid
the detention and inhumane treatment of such persons;
(iii) Terminate public executions and abuses against the security of
the person, and other violations of rights and freedoms, by means of
law reforms and related implementation measures, clearer
instructions to law enforcers to respect human rights, related
capacity-building and monitoring of their work to ensure
accountability;
(iv) Cooperate effectively to resolve the issue of foreigners abducted
to the country and to address the other issues, including the
consequences of the Korean war, which give rise to fear in the
country;
(v) Respond constructively to the recommendations of the Special
Rapporteur; reply effectively to his communications; and invite the
Special Rapporteur to visit the country to take stock of the situation
and recommend needed action;
(b) Progressively (longer term):
(i) Modernize the governmental system by instituting reforms to
ensure greater participation and compliance with international
human rights standards;
Life & Human Rights in North Korea
57
(ii) Institute equitable development policies based upon “people
first” policy and reallocate national budgets, including military
budgets, to the social sector;
(iii) Introduce more extensive food-security-related measures, such
as sound agricultural practices and environmental conservation, and
people’s participation and mobilization in planning, programming
and benefit-sharing;
(iv) Guarantee personal security and freedoms by dismantling the
pervasive surveillance and informant/intelligence system, reforming
the justice system and abiding by the rule of law, with safeguards for
accused persons, fair trials, development of an independent judiciary,
and checks and balances against abuse of power;
(v) Become a party to core human rights treaties and ILO
conventions, and adopt measures to implement them effectively;
(vi) Pay special attention to overcoming discrimination and reducing
the vulnerability of specific groups such as women, children, those
with disabilities and the elderly, by improving human rights
protection against neglect, abuse, exploitation and violence;
(vii) Address freedom from persecution in relation to refugee
outflows by tackling the root causes of displacement; and criminalize
those who exploit refugees through human smuggling and trafficking,
while not criminalizing the victims;
(viii) Act against the impunity of those responsible for the violence
and violations by means of effective remedies at the national and
local levels;
(ix) Engage well with the Universal Periodic Review process to
ensure transparency and reform; and request technical assistance
from the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for
Human Rights to help promote and protect human rights
comprehensively;
(x) Undertake a constructive dialogue with the treaty bodies that
monitor the implementation of the human rights treaties to which
the country is a party, and cooperate with all United Nations
mechanisms, including the special procedures, concerning effective
Citizens’ Alliance for North Korean Human Rights (NKHR)
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follow-up of their recommendations and access to the country.
74. The international community is invited to take the following
measures:
(i) Underline concretely the need for an integrated approach that
calls for the prevention of violations, the effective protection of
human rights, the provision of care and assistance in an accessible
and accountable manner and the enjoyment by the people of their
rights and freedoms;
(ii) Advocate strongly the need to overcome the exploitation of the
people by the State authorities by advocating for a “people first”
rather than the current “military first” policy, with an equitable
development process, food aid and food security, and with due
respect for the principle of “no access, no food”, coupled with
adequate monitoring;
(iii) Respect the rights of refugees, particularly concerning the
principle of non-refoulement, and the human rights of migrants, and
reform national immigration laws that might otherwise lead to the
detention or forced return of refugees or those who seek asylum;
(iv) Use the country’s refusal to cooperate with the Special
Rapporteur as a key indicator for the Universal Periodic Review;
(v) Maximize dialogue with the Government of the Democratic
People’s Republic of Korea to promote dispute resolution, and open
up the space for human rights discourse and action, providing
relevant packages of incentives and graduated measures, possibly
linked with security guarantees, as appropriate;
(vi) Address the issue of impunity through a variety of actions,
whether in terms of State responsibility or individual criminal
responsibility, and enable the totality of the United Nations system,
especially the Security Council, to adopt measures to prevent
egregious violations, protect people from victimization and provide
effective redress, with due regard for broad-based people’s
participation in governance and government.