Cultural theory and risk perception: a proposal for a better measurement

Cultural theory and risk perception: a proposal
for a better measurement

SUSANNE RIPPL*

University of Technology Chemnitz, Department of Sociology, 09107 Chemnitz, Germany

Abstract

In the 1980s, social and cultural perspectives  become increasingly important in the eld
of  risk  research.  In  current  empirical  research  on  the  inuence  of  social  and  cultural
factors  on  risk  perception,  the  cultural  theory  (CT)  of  Douglas  and  Wildavsky  (Risk
and  Culture:  An  Essay  on  Selection  of  Technological  and  Environmental  Dangers,

Berkeley:  California  University  Press,  1982)  is  the  most  inuential  approach.  In  1990
Dake introduced a measurement instrument that is used broadly in quantitative  studies
on  cultural  theory  and  risk.  In  the  discussion  of  Dake’s  work,  two  questions  have
emerged  as most controversial. First, can Douglas  and  Wildavsky’s theoretical  concept
be tested on the basis of data obtained  from individuals, as is done by Dake and many

other  authors?  Second,  does  the  instrument  introduced  by  Dake  (Journal  of  Cross-
Cultural  Psychology,  22,  61–82,  1991)  show  sufcient  validity,  in  the  sense  that
hypotheses  which  could  be  derived  from  CT  hold  true  when  Dake’s  scales  are  used?
Both questions are addressed  here. A new instrument and strategies  to test the validity
are  introduced,  which  address  criticisms of  Dake’s  work.

1. Introduction

The  eld  of  risk  research  is  currently  dominated  by  two  approaches:  the  so-called
psychometric  paradigm,  which  is  rooted  in  psychology  and  decision  theory,  and
the  cultural  theory  of  Douglas  and  Wildavsky  (1982).  The  psychometric  paradigm
focuses  predominantly  on  cognitive  factors  that  inuence  individuals’  perception  of
risk.  On  the  basis  of  empirical  work,  Slovic  and  his  colleagues  in  particular  (Slovic
et  al.

1980; Slovic 1987, 1992) found that two main cognitive factors dominate indi-

viduals’ perception of risk: the dread risk factor and the unknown risk factor.

They

replicated the signicance of these two factors in various studies and different cultural
contexts.

Despite these interesting results, the psychometric perspective neglects social and

cultural  inuences  on  risk  perception.  Although  Slovic  and  his  colleagues  found  this
two-factor  structure  in  different  contexts,  this  approach  cannot  explain  differences  in
levels  of  risk perception  among  social and  ethnic  groups.  Such  differences  were  found
by other researchers  in subsequent  studies (e.g. Vaughan  and Nordenstam, 1991; Flynn

Journal of Risk Research

5 (2), 147–165 (2002)

Journal of Risk Research

http://www.tandf.co.uk/journals

DOI: 10.1080/1366987011004259 8

* Author to whom correspondence should be addressed: E-mail: susanne.rippl@phil.tu-chemnitz.de

The so-called dread risk factor includes characteristics such as calm–dread, voluntary–involuntary, control-

lable–uncontrollable, and catastrophic-not catastrophic. The unknown risk factor includes characteristics such as
known–unknown to the individual, known–unknown to science, and new–old.

et al.

, 1994; Rohrmann, 1994). Cognitive variables could not answer questions such as

‘Why is one technology feared in one society or social context and not in another?’

In the 1980s, however, cultural theory developed by anthropologists and sociologists

entered  the  eld.  Researchers  began  to  analyse  social  and  cultural  inuences  on  risk
perception.  The theoretically  most highly elaborated  approach  dealing with  the  impact
of  such  inuences  is  the  so-called  cultural  theory  (CT)  developed  by  Douglas  and
Wildavsky  (1982).  This  approach  has  been  adopted  and  developed  by  other  authors
(Thompson et al., 1990;  Rayner,  1992).  Dake,  in collaboration with Wildavsky,  tried to
test  the  theory  empirically,  using  a  quantitative  approach  (Dake,  1990,  1991,  1992;
Wildavsky  and  Dake,  1990).

In discussions of Dake’s work, two questions have emerged as most controversial

(Sjöberg, 1995;  Marris et al., 1996,  1998).  The rst is whether  Douglas and Wildavsky’s
theoretical  concept  can  be  tested  on  the  basis  of  data  obtained  from  individuals, as  is
done by Dake (1991,  1992)  and many other  authors (e.g. Marris et al., 1996;  Peters and
Slovic,  1996;  Grendstad  and  Selle,  1997;  Ellis  and  Thompson,  1997;  Coughlin  and
Lockhart,  1998).  The  second  question  is  whether  the  instrument  introduced  by  Dake
(1990)  shows sufcient construct validity: that  is, whether  the  measurement  instrument
holds  true  when  subjected  to  an  empirical  test  according  to  hypotheses  that  could  be
derived from CT, concerning the relations between the four constructs (the four cultural
types)  and  relations  to  other  constructs  (Schnell  et  al.,  1989,  p.  154).  Both  questions
are addressed  in this  paper.  In particular, a  new  instrument  and  a  new  approach  using
structural  equation  modelling  are  presented  as  a  more  appropriate  method  of  testing
the  complex,  interconnected  structure  of  the  four  cultural  types.

2. The cultural theory

In the early 1980s Douglas and Wildavsky (1982)  started a discussion about the impact
of  values  and  cultural  settings  on  the  perception  of  risks  (Johnson  and  Covello,  1987;
Dake,  1991;  Stern  et  al., 1995).  In  their  view,  risk  perception  and  concern  about  envi-
ronmental or social issues are socially and culturally framed. This means that the values
and  worldviews  of  certain  social or  cultural  contexts  shape  the  individual’s perception
and  evaluation  of  risks.  Douglas  and  Wildavsky  (1982)  stress  that  individuals  are
embedded  in  a  social  structure  and  that  the  social  context  of  individuals  shapes  their
values,  attitudes,  and  worldviews.  In  this  way,  socialized  cognitive  patterns  work  like
lters  in the  evaluation  of  information  about  risks (Stern  et  al., 1995,  p.  726).

According to this perspective, the most important predictors for selecting what people

fear  or  do  not  fear  are  not  individual  cognitive  processes  such  as  the  perception  of
threats  to  health  or  feelings  of  uncontrollability  (as  stated  in  psychometric  research),
but socially shared worldviews – so-called cultural biases that determine the individual’s
perceptions  (Wildavsky  and  Dake,  1990,  Dake,  1992).  An  overview  of  international
studies  on  risk  perception  showed,  for  example,  that  there  is  almost  no  relationship
between individual knowledge and concern (Wildavsky, 1993, pp. 193ff). This result can
be  interpreted  as  an  indication  of  the  relevance  of  socialized  cognitive  schemata  that
work  like a  lter  in evaluating  information.  In  this  sense,  values  frame  the  interpreta-
tion of information. Therefore  individuals with environmental  values,  for example,  will
evaluate  a  given  piece  of  information  about  the  probability  of  accidents  in  nuclear
power  plants  totally  differently  than  supporters  of  nuclear power. Ellis and  Thompson

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(1997)  argued  that  concern  (e.g.,  for  environmental  issues)  is  embedded  in  broader
sociocultural orientations  and  is not  merely  a  function of  information about  the safety
of  particular  technologies.

Cultural theory proposes that individuals choose what they fear in relation to their

way  of  life-that  is, in relation  to  the  ‘culture’  they  belong  to  (Douglas  and  Wildavsky,
1982;  Thompson  et  al.,  1990;  Douglas,  1997).  To  identify  different  types  of  cultures
Douglas  and  Wildavsky  developed  the  so-called  grid/group  typology,  which  suggests
four prototypical patterns: Each consists of a characteristic behavioural pattern (pattern
of  social  relations),  accompanied  by  a  justicatory  cosmology  (or  cultural  bias).  The
behavioural  pattern  includes concrete observable  social relations and actions as well as
the social structure.  Cosmology  refers  to a cognitive  system  that  includes  attitudes  and
values  (Gross and  Rayner,  1985,  p. 14): ‘Grid-group  analysis treats  ideas and values  as
both  reecting  and  constituting  the  experience  both  of  belonging  to  a  social organiza-
tion  and  of  social  differentiation  within  the  organization’.

Douglas and Wildavsky (1982) developed the four prototypical cultural types using

two central dimensions of sociality: control (grid) and social commitment (group). (See
Fig. 1.)

Egalitarians, for example, have high interest and high identication regarding group

relations, but they dislike social relations that are shaped by social differences or hier-
archic structures. In their view, social relations are open to negotiation. In this way,
each type is a combination of both dimensions. Diagonally opposed groups show differ-
ences on both dimensions (grid and group), while neighbouring groups show similarities

Cultural theory and risk perception

149

Fig. 1. Typology of ‘ways of life’ using the grid/group-dimension.

on  one  dimension  but  differences  on  the  other.  For  example,  individualists  have  both
low sympathy for hierarchic structures and low sympathy for group attachment. Fatalists,
as  the  neighbouring  category,  also  have  low  sympathy  for  group  attachment,  but  a
different  relation to the grid dimension: they accept externally  ascribed social positions
and  they  recognize  constraint  by  others,  although  they  do  not  feel  that  they  are  part
of  any  social  collective.

For each of the four types, cultural theory offers clear hypotheses about modes of

risk perception. Persons with hierarchic orientations are assumed to accept risks as long
as decisions about those risks are justied by governmental  authorities or experts. They
fear  risks  that  threaten  the  social  order,  however.  Egalitarians  are  assumed  to  oppose
risks that will inict irreversible dangers on many people or on future generations. They
distrust  risks  that  are  forced  on  them  by  the  decisions  of  a  small  elite  of  experts  or
governmental  authorities.  Fatalists  have  a  strong  orientation  toward  socially  assigned
classications, but without a group identication. They try not to know and not to worry
about  things  that  they  believe  they  can  do  nothing  about.  Individualists  perceive  risk
as  opportunity.  New  technologies,  for  example,  are  viewed  more  as  possibilities  and
less  as  dangers  (see  Thompson  et  al.,  1990,  pp.  62f).  They  fear  risks  that  could  limit
their  freedom.

3. The measurement concept

In dealing with measurement  concepts for the cultural types  described above,  different
approaches  can be distinguished. One approach focuses on the analyses of ‘small’ orga-
nizations  or  cultural  groups  (e.g.,  Gross  and  Rayner,  1985).  Here  can  be  used  (for
example)  observational  methods  of  concrete  social  behaviour,  such  as  sociometric
measures (e.g., number of contacts, positions, types of interactions) combined with atti-
tude measures, to record a highly comprehensive  picture of a social unit. This approach
is not applicable to large populations, however. For the analysis of larger units, cultural
aspects  can  be  inferred  in  two  ways;  rst,  for  example,  from  various  cultural  products
such  as  folk  tales,  typical  methods  of  formal  and  informal  learning,  or  legal  systems.
Second,  cultural  aspects  also  can  be  inferred  by  aggregating  individuals’  attitudes  and
value  priorities.

In the following discussion the latter approach is concentrated on through the devel-

opment  of  survey  instruments  for  studies  of  larger  populations.  This  approach,  which
is  used  predominantly  with  attitude  measures,  dominates  quantitative  research  on  CT
today  (e.g.,  Dake,  1991,  1992;  Palmer,  1996;  Peters  and  Slovic,  1996;  Grendstad  and
Selle, 1997; Ellis and Thompson, 1997; Marris et al., 1998; Coughlin and Lockhart, 1998).

Dake (1990, 1991) developed a measurement instrument for survey research,

containing  46  items,  to  assess  the  cultural  biases.  He  took  items  from  several  instru-
ments that  originally  were  developed  to  measure  personal  attitudes  such as condence
in institutions, patriotism, authoritarianism, and law and order. A modied version was
used  in several  studies  by  (among  others)  Marris  et  al. (1996,  1998),  Peters  and  Slovic
(1996),  Palmer  (1996),  and  Grendstad  and  Selle  (1997).

Dake’s approach addresses only one aspect of what, in cultural theory, constitutes a

cultural  type:  cosmologies  or  cultural  biases.  He  works  in  the  usual  paradigm  of  atti-
tude  measurement,  which  is well established  in the  social sciences; the  aspect  of  social
relations  or  behavioural  patterns  is  disregarded.  In  this  sense,  attitude  measures  are

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used as indirect indicators of the more complex latent construct ‘cultural type’. In addi-
tion, the idea of shared values is not explicitly operationalized but is regarded as an
aggregate quality of individual values.

4. Individual-level data, cultural-level data, and cultural theory

In the literature is found a contentious discussion about whether it is possible to measure
‘culture’ with  individual-level  data.  Referring  to  approaches  in the  research  on  values,
it  could  be  argued  critically  that  culture  is  not  merely  an  aggregate  phenomenon  but
has  an  emergent  quality  as  well.  It  is  therefore  not  possible  to  measure  culture  with
individual-level  data.  On the other  hand, it is possible to be attracted  by the argument
of  Hofstede  (1980)  or  Schwartz  and  Ros  (1995),  who  accept  the  possibility  to  infer
cultural  aspects  from  individual-level  data.  They  ‘view  individual  value  priorities  as  a
product  both  of  shared  culture  and  of  unique  individual  experiences’  (Schwartz  and
Ros,  1995,  p.  94).  In  a  cultural  group,  a  pattern  of  shared  values  plus  individual  vari-
ation will be encountered.  ‘However, the average  priorities . . . reect the central thrust
of  their  shared  enculturation.  Hence,  the  average  priorities  point  to  the  underlying,
common cultural  values’  (Schwartz  and  Ros, 1995,  p.  94).  Nevertheless,  as  Nauck  and
Schönpug  (1997)  comment,  the  total  equivalence  of  individual  and  cultural  values  is
imaginable  only  in  a  strictly  functional  conception  of  society.

Thompson (1996, pp. 4ff) focuses on this problem from another perspective when he

argues  that  CT includes an antidualistic conception of the  individual; he points out the
relational  character  of  this  perspective.  This idea  is not  contradictory  to  the  presented
view if a ‘weaker’ relational approach  is considered  whereby  individual preferences  do
not  depend  totally on  patterns  of  social  relations;  they  are  not  altogether  functionally
interconnected.  Only from this perspective  it is useful to measure cultural biases on the
individual  level.

An individual-level approach is claimed not to measure culture directly, but to measure

products  of  relational  processes.  In  the  words  of  Schwartz  and  Ros  (1995),  individual
preferences  are  a  product  of  unique  individual  experiences  and  shared  enculturation.
Empirical evidence  for  the  inuence  of  ‘culture’ is found  in social (in contrast  to  indi-
vidual  or  random)  variations  in  value  preferences  in  different  segments  (groups)  of
society, which are based on distinctly different experiences according to their position in
the social structure  (e.g., Kohn,  1977).  Similarities in value  preferences  often  correlate
with similarities in social background  (e.g., family structure,  preferred  social relations).
This  ‘weak’  relational  perspective  also  can  be  used  to  analyse  tensions  that  develop  if
individual preferences come into conict with social relations that the individual is forced
to observe. Therefore it makes sense to keep the individual and society as separate levels
of analysis. From this viewpoint it is possible learn about social processes from individual-
level analyses. Thus a measurement on the level of individuals is not a direct measure of
culture but a measure of processes that are connected to culture.

5. The validity of survey instruments for measuring cultural theory:

a measurement theory

In the previous section we elaborated on the idea that the measurement of cultural biases
on the individual level produces an indirect measure of cultural types – specically,

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151

of  ‘products’  of  cultural  contexts.  From  there  we  turn  to  problems  of  measurement.
Most authors (Dake, 1991, 1992; Marris et al., 1996; Peters and Slovic, 1996; Palmer, 1996;
Grendstad and Selle, 1997)  composed the  scales largely in the  tradition of classical test
theory,  assuming  unidimensionality  of  constructs.  The  reliability of  the  scales  is tested
mostly  with  parameters  such  as  Cronbach’s  alpha;  the  validity  of  the  scales  is  rarely
tested, however.

The theoretical approach of cultural theory outlined above implicitly involves

numerous  hypotheses  concerning  a  measurement  theory;  this  theory,  however,  is  not
used  explicitly  in the  actual  quantitative  research.  The  term measurement theory refers
here  to  hypotheses  that  could  be  derived  from  CT,  and  that  give  instructions  in  how
to  measure  the  four  cultural  types  (e.g.,  grid  and  group  aspects  of  the  scales,  or  the
internal  rationale  for  distinguishing  the  four  types).  In  contrast,  a  structural  theory or
structural  hypotheses  include  assumptions  about  the  relations  of  the  cultural  types  to
external  criteria  or  other  constructs.  Although  it  may  be  possible  to  argue  about  the
measurement  theory  that  is  proposed  here  (see  next  section),  this  approach  is  an
advance  in the actual survey  research  on CT: in contrast  to approaches  with a more or
less  arbitrary  use  of  measurement  instruments,  it  explicates  testable  hypotheses  for
proving  validity  that  are  derived  theoretically  from  cultural  theory.

Thus, as a rst step, a measurement theory is explicated. As a rst clue regarding

the validity of the scales, the relationships between  the cultural biases should be tested
in  a  way  suggested  by  the  rationale  for  the  typology  of  cultural  theory.  Each  cultural
bias is constructed  according to a certain scheme using the grid/group  dimensions. The
cultural biases that show no similarity on one of the two dimensions should have signif-
icant  negative  correlations.  Neighbouring  cultural  biases  should  show  a  weak
correlation;  whether  this  is  negative  or  positive  depends  on  whether  the  grid  or  the
group  aspect  is  more  dominant  in the  formulation  of  items.

Hypothesis 1

: Individualism and hierarchy should yield a signicant negative correlation.

Hypothesis 2

: Fatalism and egalitarianism should yield a signicant negative correlation.

Hypothesis 3

: Individualism and egalitarianism should not be correlated signicantly or

should yield only a weak correlation at either sign.

Hypothesis 4

: Individualism and fatalism should not be correlated signicantly or should

yield only a weak correlation at either sign.

Hypothesis 5

: Hierarchy and egalitarianism should not be correlated signicantly or

should yield only a weak correlation at either sign.

Hypothesis 6

: Hierarchy and fatalism should not be correlated signicantly or should

yield only a weak correlation at either sign.

The typology also implies that each type includes a certain attitude regarding both

grid  and  group  aspects.  Thus  it  should  be  possible  to  nd  items  that  could  be  identi-
ed  a  priori as grid or group  while also having  variation  in common. The model  given
in Fig.  2  illustrates  this  idea.

Hypothesis 7

: The items that are used to measure a cultural bias should be clearly iden-

tied as ‘grid’ or ‘group’ items.

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6. An empirical test of validity

To  test  Hypotheses  1–6  the  work  began  by  using  the  instruments  of  Dake  that  had
been  implemented  in different  studies. A comparison of  the  results  of Dake (1991),  of
Marris  et  al. (1996),  and  of  a  small  pretest  study  conducted  in  Chemnitz,  a  mid-sized
city  in  eastern  Germany,  in  spring  1997  was  made.  The  data  were  collected  from  106
sociology  students  during  regular  classes  in  which  the  professors  were  willing  to  take
time  for  the  research.  In  this  study  the  scales  used  by  Marris  et  al. (1996)  were  modi-
ed slightly to make them more reliable. Items with an item-total correlation coefcient
of  less  than  0.30  were  disregarded.

Item sum totals were computed for each scale to

make the results comparable with those of Dake and of Marris et al. Scale intercorre-
lations are presented in Table 1.

In all the studies correlations were found that do not conform to the theoretical

assumptions  of  cultural  theory.  In  particular,  the  strong  positive  correlation  between
hierarchy  and  individualism  –  opposite  cultural  biases  in  Douglas  and  Wildavsky’s
typology,  with  dissimilarity  on  both  the  grid  and  the  group  dimension  –  indicates  an
invalid  operationalization  and violates  Hypothesis  1.  Both  constructs  seem  to  measure
a  very  similar  construct.  Also,  egalitarianism  and  fatalism  do  not  show  the  expected
signicant  negative  relation  (Hypothesis  2).  Equally  inadequate  in this  context  are  the
strong  negative  correlations  between  egalitarianism  and  hierarchy  (Hypothesis  5)  and
between egalitarianism and individualism (Hypothesis 3). Egalitarianism has one dimen-
sion in common  with  each  of  these  cultural  biases.

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153

Fig. 2. Measurement model regarding the grid/group aspect.

The items in Dake’s British version and the items used here can be found in the appendix.

To summarize these results, it is concluded that central assumptions of the measure-

ment theory are violated and that Dake’s instruments, in their published form, are
inadequate measures of cultural theory.

This problem of nonconformity of correlations between cultural bias measures is

addressed  in  nearly  every  study  that  works  quantitatively  with  cultural  theory;  yet  no
consequences  are  drawn.  Coughlin  and  Lockhart  (1998,  pp.  40ff)  even  describe  the
special  relational  structure  of  the  four  types  with  a  ‘sharing  of  ideological  grounds’
between  neighbouring  types.  On  the  level  of  measurement,  they  also  draw  no  conse-
quences  regarding  the  invalid  measurement  instruments

Without a clear prediction as to how the four types should correlate, the measure-

ment of cultural theory becomes arbitrary. Therefore theoretically deduced hypotheses
are proposed that can be tested  empirically. As long as there  is no commonly accepted
measurement  theory  (in the  sense  of testable  hypotheses),  the  validity of the  measures
remains  questionable,  and  empirical studies  are  not  based  on  solid ground.

In light of these considerations and results, a new instrument was constructed using

items  from  Dake’s  scales  and  new  items.  Items  were  formulated  that  reect  the
grid/group  dimensions. Therefore each scale should be composed of a number of state-
ments  addressing  the  grid  and  a  number  of  items  addressing  the  group  dimension.

Examples for individualism are as follows:

I don’t join clubs of any kind (group).
My ideal profession would be an independent business (grid).

Thus each item is clearly identied a priori as a grid or a group item.

As argued above, a further peculiarity of the measurement is the similarity of neigh-

bouring types. A respondent who ts (for example) the fatalist type (which is next to
the individualist type on the group dimension) could agree with the group item but

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Table 1. Dake’s measurement instrument: scale intercorrelations in different samples.

Individualism

Hierarchy

Egalitarianism

Hierarchy

1. Dake (1991)

0.54**

2. Replication of Dake by Marris et al. (1996)

0.65**

3. Modied Scales (Marris et al.,1996)

0.53**

4. Replication in Germany (1997)

0.62**

Egalitarianism

–0.30**

–0.28**

–0.45**

–0.37**

–0.42**

–0.16

–0.44**

–0.30**

Fatalism

–

0.38**

0.28**

–0.12

0.25**

0.21

0.07

0.28**

0.21**

0.03

Source

: Dake, 1991; Marris et al., 1996 and own data.

Dake does not report the results of the fatalism scale.

would reject the grid item of the measurement for individualism. As formulated
by Couglin and Lockhart (1998), each type shares some ideological ground with its
neighbour.

The logic of the items thus formulated departs from traditional classical test theory.

This  approach  was  adopted  because  it  is  more  appropriate  for  the  assumptions  of
cultural  theory.  The  construction  of  the  cultural  biases  on  the  basis  of  two dimensions
(grid  and  group)  implies  that  each  cultural  bias  includes  these  two  dimensions;  there-
fore  the  classical  test  theory  assumption  of  unidimensionality  is  not  adequate  in  this
case.  For  this  reason  it  was  also  necessary  to  use  statistical  procedures  other  than
classical  test  theory  to  test  the  reliability  and  the  validity  of  the  instruments.

The new measurement were tested instruments with a new data set from a sample of

475 German sociology students, collected in fall 1997 in Chemnitz and Hildesheim
(Rippl, 1999). Both are mid-sized cities, one in eastern Germany and one in the western
part of the country.

The data were collected during regular classes in which the profes-

sors were willing to take time for the research. The response rate in the classes that
participated was very high: Only 1% of the prospective respondents in the selected
classes refused to participate.

The nonprobability of the sample places a serious limitation on the generalizability

of  the  ndings.  In  this  case,  however,  the  sample  seems acceptable  because  we  do  not
present  distributions  of  variables.  In  this  paper  we  focus  primarily  on  theoretical  and
measurement  hypotheses  that  should  hold  true  in any  sample.

For the analyses structural equation modelling (SEM) employing LISREL 8.1.4 was

used.  With  SEM,  it  is  possible  to  test  a  priori specied  hypotheses  about  the  under-
lying  structure  (Bollen,  1989).  Hypotheses  related  to  the  measurement  of  latent
constructs  and  related  to  the  analysis  of  structural  relations  between  latent  constructs
can  be  tested,  controlling  for  random  measurement  error.  Only  SEM  allows  a  simul-
taneous conrmatory factor  analysis testing  the  conceptually proposed interrelations  of
all  four  latent  constructs  (the  four  cultural  biases).  SEM  allows  double  loadings.  This
violates the classical test theory criterion of unidimensionality, but in the case of cultural
theory  it  must  be  viewed  as  an  adequate  reection  of  the  measurement  concept  we
explicated  above.

This measurement concept does not include the assumption of unidimensionality. On

the contrary, it postulates that each construct incorporates two dimensions (grid/group)
and that neighbouring types have one of the dimensions in common. Thus double load-
ings  of  several  items  in  the  present  case  reect  the  similarities  between  cultural  types
that  are  adjacent  in  the  typology.  Weede  and  Jagodzinski  (1977)  point  out  that  this
procedure is possible and permissible in conrmatory factor analysis, and that it is espe-
cially  useful  if  one  works  with  indicators  that  depend  on  different  factors.

The following test strategy was used. The work commenced with 31 items and a

model tested that reproduces the correlation structure which is implied in Hypotheses

Cultural theory and risk perception

155

In the analyses, no signicant differences between the two samples were found.

CT imposes no limitations regarding to its application to any kind of population.

Therefore Cronbach’s alpha will not be present as a criterion for the quality of the scales; this criterion is impor-

tant only if scales  are used that are  based on sum totals or additive  indices.  Here full measurement  instruments are
included in the estimation of structural relations between different constructs; the quality of the measurement instru-
ments will be considered  in the estimation of structural parameters.  In addition, factor loadings of the measurement
instruments  are  presented.

1–6. In this step 13 items were excluded for which the modication indices

proposed

loadings  that  did  not  conform  to  the  measurement  concept  (Hypotheses  1–6),  so  that
a measurement  model  could be established  with an acceptable  model t that  conforms
to  the  hypotheses.  Hypothesis  7  was  tested  using  the  remaining  18  items.  Because  of
identication  problems,  it  was  not  possible  to  estimate  all  seven  hypotheses  simulta-
neously; therefore  the analyses  was divided into two parts. The test  of Hypotheses  1–6
is presented  in  Fig. 3  and  Table  2,  the  test  of  Hypothesis  7  in Table  3.

The analyses were based on correlation matrices produced by PRELIS2. In the

LISREL analyses the maximum-likelihood estimation method was used. First
Hypotheses 1–6 were tested; the results are presented in Fig. 3

and Table 2.

As Fig. 3 shows, the proposed pattern of relations between the four cultural biases

can  be  found  (see  Hypotheses  1–6).  Although  the  relationships  between  egalitari-
anism/hierarchy  and  hierarchy/fatalism  are  slightly  too  strong,  they  are  still  within
acceptable  boundaries.  Obviously  an  overrepresentation  of  items  reecting  the  grid
dimension  is  responsible  for  the  slightly  oversized  correlations.

Furthermore, following the rationale of grid/group typology, each type (apart from its

special relations to the other types) includes both grid and group aspects (Hypothesis 7).

156

Rippl

Modication indices are used in LISREL for model modications. In the case of a strict theory testing strategy –

as done here – these indices indicate differences between model specication and empirical covariances.

It is tested if the specied model ts the empirical covariance matrix. One speaks of a model’s acceptable t when

the t indices reach the following values.  The  goodness-of-t index  (GFI) should have  a value  > 0.90;  the standard-
ized  root  mean  square  residual  (standard  RMR)  should  be  0.05;  the  root  mean  square  error  of  approximation
(RMSEA) should  be  < 0.08  (see  Jaccard  and  Wan,  1996,  pp.  86ff).  The  value  of  chi-square  should  be  as  small  as
possible, but it increases automatically with the sample size (see Bollen, 1989, pp. 263ff). Therefore it is suggested that
one use the relationship of chi-square to degrees of freedom (df) as the criterion. Different relationships are accepted
in the literature: Some authors demand a ratio of 2:1;  others accept a ratio of 5:1 (see Bollen, 1989, pp. 278).

Fig. 3. Intercorrelations of the four cultural biases.

Cultural theory and risk perception

157

Table 2. A new measurement instrument for cultural biases – item wording and factor loadings.

Hierarchy Egalitarianism Individualism Fatalism

v6c

I would not participate in civil

0.22

–

0.48

action groups. The ones in power
do only allow what they like.

v6e Important questions for our

–

0.36

–

society should not be decided
by experts but by the people.

v6f

A person is better off if he or

–

0.65

she doesn’t trust anyone.

v6g In a family adults and children

–

0.43

–

should have the same inuence
in decisions.

v6h It is important to me that in the

–

0.55

–

case of important decisions at my
place of work everybody is asked.

v6j

We have to accept the limits in

0.41

–

0.17

our life if we want or not.

v6m There is no use in doing things

–

0.68

for other people – you only get it
in the neck in the long run.

v6n Firms and institutions should be

–

0.83

–

organized in a way that everybody
can inuence important decisions.

v7a It is important to preserve our

0.37

–

customs and cultural heritage.

v7b I don’t join clubs of any kind.

–

0.17

0.33

v7c

The freedom of the individual

–

0.25

0.23

–

should not be limited for reasons
for preventing crime.

v7g My ideal job would be an

–

0.33

–

independent business.

v7k The police should have the right

0.34

–

to listen to private phone calls
when investigating crime.

v7l

When I have problems I try to

–

0.54

–

solve them on my own.

v7n I prefer tasks where I work

–

0.47

–

something out on my own.

v7o Order is a probably unpopular

0.65

–

but a important virtue.

V7p I prefer clear instruction from

0.44

–

my superiors about what to do.

v7q An intact family is the basis of

0.54

–

a functioning society.

< 0.01; the presented analyses are based on the German version of this items.

This means that all of the items should possess variation because of their commonality
in one type and their differences in the aspects that represent grid and group. To address
the assumption that each cultural bias contains both the grid and the group aspect, how
far each item expresses the culture-specic attitude of one of these two basic dimensions
should be tested. This further test criterion makes the measurement theory more strin-
gent and falsication more probable.

To test these assumptions, again conrmatory factor analysis was conducted, in this

case,  for  each  cultural  bias  separately.  The  items  were  assigned  a  priori to  the  grid  or
the group dimension. Only the  items that had been  left in the  previous step  of analysis
were  included,  and  the  pattern  given  in  Table  3  was  found.

For hierarchy and fatalism constructs consisting of both grid and group items have

been balanced with signicant factor loadings. For individualism there is one grid item;
item v7b ts fatalism better. Egalitarianism is measured only by grid items. Thus a clear
identication of the items in regard to the grid or the group dimension is found. Because
of  the  exclusion  of  items  in  the  rst  step  of  the  analysis,  which  concentrates  on  the
correlation  pattern  between  the  four  cultural  biases,  the  scales  for  individualism  and
especially  for  egalitarianism  are  not  yet  balanced  for  both  dimensions.  This  solution
regarding  the  correlation  pattern  was  accepted  as  the  more  important  aspect.
Nevertheless,  in future  research,  grid  items  should  be  added  to  the  scale  for  individu-
alism,  and  group  items  to  the  scale  for  egalitarianism.

For a further validation of the measurement concept in the sense of construct validity,

the theory was scanned for further hypotheses about relations of the four cultural biases
to  other  concepts.  Cultural  biases  are  dened  as  a  pattern  of  attitudes  and  values
concerning  the  functioning  of  society  and  environment  (Dake,  1992,  p.  62;  Thompson
et  al.

, 1990, pp. 29ff); therefore they should be connected to attitudes that deal with

these aspects.

Thompson et al. (1990) argue that the four cultural biases are connected to special

myths about the functioning of nature. They distinguish four such myths. In nature
benign

, the world is forgiving and always nds its way back to an equilibrium. Essentially

this laissez-faire attitude should be found in individualists. Nature ephemeral is the oppo-
site:  small changes  made  by  human  beings  could  lead  to  a  collapse. This  myth  will  be
cherished primarily by egalitarians. In nature tolerant, nature forgives events to a certain
point;  experts  are  needed  to  show  the  boundaries.  This  should  be  the  favourite  myth
of  hierarchically  oriented  persons.  Nature  capricious is the  myth  of a  random  world  in
which  human  beings,  even  experts,  can  control  almost  nothing.  This view  will  be  held
by fatalists (see Thompson, 1990, pp. 26ff). A German translation of the items employed
by  Marris  et al. (1996)  was  used.

In the same validation logic – seeing cultural biases as ideas about the functioning

of the world – a so-called fairness scale was included. This scale measures how far indi-
viduals  think  the  principle  of  fairness  should  dominate  public  decisions  and  how  far
the  public  should  be  involved  in  decisions  about  global  risk  taking  (item  1).  Another
item consists of the  question ‘Is it acceptable to decide about risks that could endanger
further  generations?’  (item  2).  Here  reference  is  made  to  the  idea  of  cultural  theory
whereby  (for example)  the  perception  of  risk and the  perception  of  other  social orien-
tations  are  used  as  metaphors  (Marris  et al., 1996,  pp.  11)  for  a  view  of  society,  which
institutions  are  trusted,  and  what  is understood  to  be  meant  by  the  terms  fairness and
justice

158

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The relations between these myths, the fairness scale, and cultural bias measures are

shown  in  Table  4.  Again  a  SEM  analyses  was  conducted  using  the  specications
described  above  so  that  the  proposed  pattern  of  intercorrelations  between  the  four
cultural biases is part of each tested model. All correlations were tested simultaneously.
Acceptable t indices were found for this model: chi-square: 720, 05; df: 307; GFI: 0.90;
RMSEA:  0.05;  RMR:  0.05.

The empirically discovered relationships t closely with previous assumptions. Only

in the case of individualism was no clearly corresponding myth about nature found.

Cultural theory and risk perception

159

Table 3. Conrmatory factor analyses of grid/group dimensions for each cultural bias.

grid

group

Hierarchy: x

: 41,95; df: 13; RMSEA: 0.07; RMR: 0.04; GFI: 0.98

v6c

I would not participate in civil action groups. The ones in

0.38

–

power do only allow what they like.

v6j

We have to accept the limits in our life if we want or not.

0.56

–

v7a It is important to preserve our customs and cultural heritage.

–

0.42

v7k The police should have the right to listen to private phone

0.44

–

calls when investigating crime.

v7o Order is a probably unpopular but a important virtue.

–

0.70

v7p I prefer clear instruction from my superiors about what to do.

0.40

–

v7q An intact family is the basis of a functioning society.

–

0.53

Egalitarianism: x

: 9,7; df: 5; RMSEA: 0.04; RMR: 0.03; GFI: 0.96

v6e Important questions for our society should not be decided by

0.38

–

experts but by the people.

v6g In a family adults and children should have the same inuence

0.46

–

in decisions.

v6h It is important to me that in the case of important decisions at

0.57

–

my place of work everybody is asked.

v6n Firms and institutions should be organized in a way that

0.78

–

everybody can inuence important decisions.

v7c

The freedom of the individual should not be limited for reasons

0.28

–

for preventing crime.

Individualism: x

4,4; df: 5; RMSEA: 0.00; RMR: 0.02; GFI: 1.00

v7b I don’t join clubs of any kind.

–

0.08

v7c

The freedom of the individual should not be limited for reasons

1.00

–

for preventing crime.

v7g My ideal job would be an independent business.

–

0.40

v7l

When I have problems I try to solve them on my own.

–

0.43

v7n I prefer tasks where I work something out on my own.

–

0.68

Fatalism: x

: 15,5; df: 4; RMSEA: 0.07; RMR: 0.03; GFI: 0.99

v6c

I would not participate in civil action groups. The ones in power

0.83

–

do only allow what they like.

v6f

A person is better off if he or she doesn’t trust anyone

–

0.65

v6j

We have to accept the limits in our life if we want or not.

0.33

–

v6m There is no use in doing things for other people – you only get

–

0.69

it in the neck in the long run.

v7b I don’t join clubs of any kind.

–

0.31

In a further step, a variable was taken that reects behavioural rather than cognitive

aspects as a criterion for validation. Information about memberships in certain institu-
tionalized groups was used that can be viewed as manifestations of the social relations
aspect. To obtain this information, the respondents were asked about memberships in any
kind of clubs, associations, unions, and the like.

According to cultural theory, individuals

with a low score on the group dimension should participate in such groups to a lesser
degree than others. The results show that individualists (–0.46; p < 0.01) and fatalists
(–0.10; p < 0.05) tend to reject such memberships, as proposed by the theory. For egali-
tarians and persons with hierarchic orientations we found nonsignicant correlations.

In a nal step the four central assumptions of cultural theory about the connection

of cultural biases to perception of risk were analysed (Douglas and Wildavsky, 1982;
Rayner, 1992; Thompson et al., 1990). As stated above, the perception of risks is socially
framed in the light of cultural theory.

For our analyses four different types of risks have been taken into account . Ecological

risks were measured as a latent variable encompassing various aspects: ozone depletion,
nuclear power, genetic engineering, shortage of natural resources.

Dangers to the social

order also were measured as latent construct including crime, demonstrations, conicts
between social groups, and civil disobedience.

Becoming infected with AIDS was

measured by only one indicator, as was unemployment. The cultural biases were spec-
ied as independent variables, the risks as dependent variables.

In the analyses two models were tested. In one model, ecological risks and dangers

to the social order were the dependent variables; in the other, becoming infected with
AIDS and the personal risk of unemployment were the dependent variables. The gamma
coefcients are presented in Table 5.

For the model that includes risks to ecology and social order as dependent constructs,

an  acceptable  t  was  found:  chi-square,  629,33;  df,  275;  GFI,  .91;  RMSEA,  .05;  RMR,
0.05. The perception  of ecological risks and risks to the  social order  correlated  at 0.36.
AIDS  and  unemployment  also  were  tested  simultaneously,  and  here  an  acceptable
model  t  was  also  found:  chi-square,  354,  33;  df,  150;  GFI, 0.93;  RMSEA,  0.05;  RMR,
0.05.  The  perception  of  the  risk  of  being  infected  with  AIDS  and  the  personal  risk  of
becoming  unemployed  correlated  at  0.33.

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Table 4. Myths of nature and cultural biases – phi-coefcients.

Hierarchy

Egalitarianism

Individualism

Fatalism

Nature tolerant

0.34

–0.21

–

Nature ephemeral

–

0.43

–

Nature benign

–

Nature capricious

–

–0.26

0.70

Fairness

–

0.47

–

* In cells without coefcient we found no signicant correlations; p < 0.01

The variable regarding memberships is coded as a dummy variable: yes (2) or no (1).

These four aspects loaded in the following pattern on the factor ‘ecological risks’: ozone depletion 0.47, nuclear

power 0.76, genetic engineering 0.56, shortness of natural resources 0.51.

These four aspects loaded in the following pattern on the factor ‘social order’: crime 0.53, demonstrations 0.74,

conicts between social groups 0.47 and civil disobedience 0.79.

Regarding ecological risks, the assumptions of cultural theory are conrmed. Egali-

tarians tend to show a higher perception of risk than all others; persons with hierarchic
orientations show the lowest perception. For disturbance of the social order, persons with
hierarchic orientations  were  found  to express  the  strongest  perception  of risk. Fatalists
show a higher risk perception with regard to individual dangers such as personal unem-
ployment  and  becoming  infected  with  AIDS;  this  result  is  also  found  for  egalitarians.
Individualists  show  the  lowest  level  of  perception  for  all  types  of  risks.  This  nding
possibly implies strong self-condence and perception of individual control.

7. Conclusion

In  this  article  two  questions  have  been  addressed.  First,  is  cultural  theory  testable  by
individual-level  data  that  emerge  from  quantitative  studies?  Second,  are  the  measure-
ment  instruments  that  are  used  in this  quantitative  paradigm  valid?

The rst question is answered on a theoretical level. An individual-level measure-

ment  is  not  a  measure  of  culture  but  a  measure  of  processes  that  are  connected  to
culture. Thus the instruments discussed here present ‘only’ indirect measures of cultural
types, but they are connected to a cultural level. Relecting this ‘limitation’ it is possible
to measure  culture  with individual-level  data.  To test  this idea  empirically it should be
possible  to  show  their  correlations  to  structural  variables  such  as  family  structure  or
preferred  social  contexts.

The second question must be answered empirically. In this article it is argued for

the  necessity  to  formulate  a  measurement  theory  to  establish  a  valid  measurement  of
CT. Furthermore, a strategy for developing a measurement instrument is demonstrated.
To  test  the  validity  of  the  instrument  a  clear  measurement  theory  was  explicated
from  cultural  theory.  The  usefulness  of  structural  equation  modelling  (SEM)  when  it
is necessary  to work with a complex measurement  concept is shown, as in this case. As
a  result,  it  is  concluded  that  the  measurement  instruments  presented  by  Dake  (1990,
1991)  have  been  improved.  In reference  to  the theoretically  proposed  interrelations  of
the four cultural biases, a model is developed  that is consistent  with these assumptions.
Also  regarding  the  approaches  to  validate  instruments  acceptable  results  were  found.
In  this  sense  the  approach  is  a  contribution  to  better  measurement:  it  overcomes  the
restrictions  and  contradictions  of  a  more  or  less  arbitrary  use  of  diverse  measurement
instruments  in  survey  research  on  cultural  theory.

Using the approach presented, it is possible to refute the criticism regarding the

ability to measure the concepts of cultural theory quantitatively. The overall ‘poor’

Cultural theory and risk perception

161

Table 5. Cultural biases and risk perception – gamma-coefcients.

Ecology

Social order

Unemployment

Aids

hierarchy

–0.29

0.27

n.s.

egalitarianism

0.29

n.s.

0.23

0.16

individualism

n.s.

–0.26

–0.14

fatalism

n.s.

0.22

0.12

n.s. Not signicant, all other coefcients are signicant p < 0.01

Further analyses especially the relation to coping styles are documented in Rippl (1999).

power of cultural biases for explaining risk perception (Sjöberg, 1995) was not improved
by using more valid instruments. Nevertheless, the results of this study prove that a
theoretically conforming measurement of cultural biases is possible.

In respect to deductive theory development, further work on this theory would be

fruitful even  when  the  explanatory  power of inductively discovered  variables  is greater
(such  as  the  variables  used  in  the  psychometric  approach).  The  argument  of  explana-
tory  power  is  relative  regarding  variables  that  are  not  embedded  in  a  broader  theory;
such variables hardly increase the understanding of complex social contexts. In contrast
to the psychometric approach, cultural theory uses very basic theoretical concepts, such
as  values,  to  explain  a  special  phenomenon  (risk  perception).  In  this  sense,  the  argu-
ment  imputing  poor  explanatory  power  fails.

Acknowledgement

The research for this paper was supported by Grant DFG: RI 858/1-1 from the German
Research Council. For helpful comments I would like to thank Klaus Boehnke, Christian
Seipel and Claudia Stromberg.

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Bayerische Rück (ed.) Risiko ist ein Konstrukt, pp. 191–211. München: Bayerische Rück.

Cultural theory and risk perception

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Appendix

CULTURAL BIAS ITEMS USED BY DAKE

Hierarchy (15 items)
I  think  there  should  be  more  discipline in the  youth  of  today.  +
I  would  support  the  introduction  of  compulsory  National  Service.  +
I  am  more  strict  than  most  people  about  what  is  right  and  wrong.
We  should  have  stronger  armed  forces  than  we  do  now.  +
The  police  should  have  the  right  to  listen  to  private  phone  calls  when  investigating
crime.+
Those  in  power  often  withhold  information  about  things  which  are  harmful  to  us.
One  of  the  problems  with  people  is  that  they  challenge  authority  too  often.  +
It  is  important  to  preserve  our  customs  and  heritage.  +
I  think  it  is important  to  carry  on  family  traditions.  +
In  my  household,  family  members  have  their  own  places  at  the  dinner  table.
I  always  sort  out  clothes  into  separate  categories  before  washing.  +
I  value  regular  routines  highly.  +
I  think  being  on  time  is  important.  +
My  time-tabling  of  meals  is haphazard.  (score  reversed)
I  like to  plan  carefully  so  that  nancial  risks are  not  taken.  +

Individualism (9 items)
In  a  fair  system  people  with  more  ability  should  earn  more.  +
A  free  society  can  only  exist  by  giving  companies  the  opportunity  to  prosper.  +
If  a person  has  the get-up-and-go  to acquire  wealth,  that  person  should  have  the  right
to  enjoy  it.  +
It is just as well that life tends to sort out those who try harder from those who don’t. +
Continued  economic  growth  is the  answer  to  improved  quality  of  life.  +
This country  would  be  better  off  if  we  didn’t  worry  so  much  about  how  equal  people
are.  +
Making  money  is the  main  reason  for  hard  work.
I  don’t  join  clubs  of  any  kind.  (score  reversed)
I  tend  to  be  sceptical  of  health  food  fads.

Egalitarianism (11 items)
If  people  in  this  country  were  treated  more  equally  we  would  have  fewer  problems.
The  government  should  make  sure  everyone  has  a  good  standard  of  living.  +
Those  who  get  ahead  should  be  taxed  more  to  support  the  less  fortunate.  +
I  would  support  a  tax  change  that  made  people  with  large  incomes pay  more.  +
The  world  could  be  a  more  peaceful  place  if  its  wealth  were  divided  more  equally
among  nations.  +
Social Security  tends  to  stop  people  from  trying  harder  to  get  on.  (score  reversed)
Racial  discrimination  is  a  very  serious  problem  in our  society.
What  this  country  needs  is  a  ‘fairness  revolution’  to  make  the  distribution  of  goods
more  equal.  +
Most  of  the  meals  I eat  are  vegetarian.

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