Choice under uncertainty A simple choice problem Consider the following choice problem: Crisis No crisis Safe 0 2 Medium -3 6 Risky-Hedge 10 -6 A simple choice problem Consider the following choice problem: Crisis No crisis Safe 0 2 Medium -3 6 Risky-Hedge 10 -6 The investor is ignorant and he does not know the probability of Crisis/No Crisis. MaxiMin The investor may choose a strategy that maximizes the minimal payoffs across the states MaxiMin The investor may choose a strategy that maximizes the minimal payoffs across the states C NC MaxiMin S 0 2 0 M -3 6 -3 R-H 10 -6 -6 MaxiMin The investor may choose a strategy that maximizes the minimal payoffs across the states C NC MaxiMin S 0 2 0 M -3 6 -3 R-H 10 -6 -6 It seems that the investor is very pessimistic (we will come back to that) MaxiMax Alternatively, the investor may choose a strategy that maximizes the maximal payoffs across the states MaxiMax Alternatively, the investor may choose a strategy that maximizes the maximal payoffs across the states C NC MaxiMax S 0 2 2 M -3 6 6 R-H 10 -6 10 MaxiMax Alternatively, the investor may choose a strategy that maximizes the maximal payoffs across the states C NC MaxiMax S 0 2 2 M -3 6 6 R-H 10 -6 10 It seems that the investor is very optimistic now. Hurwicz Ä… criterion The investor may choose a strategy that maximizes a linear combination of Maximin and Maximax Hurwicz Ä… criterion The investor may choose a strategy that maximizes a linear combination of Maximin and Maximax C NC Hurwicz S 0 2 Ä… × 0 + (1 - Ä…) × 2 M -3 6 Ä… × (-3) + (1 - Ä…) × 6 R-H 10 -6 Ä… × (-6) + (1 - Ä…) × 10 Hurwicz Ä… criterion The investor may choose a strategy that maximizes a linear combination of Maximin and Maximax C NC Hurwicz S 0 2 Ä… × 0 + (1 - Ä…) × 2 M -3 6 Ä… × (-3) + (1 - Ä…) × 6 R-H 10 -6 Ä… × (-6) + (1 - Ä…) × 10 Depending on the investor s optimism or pessimism level you get different solutions Hurwicz Ä… criterion The investor may choose a strategy that maximizes a linear combination of Maximin and Maximax C NC Hurwicz S 0 2 Ä… × 0 + (1 - Ä…) × 2 M -3 6 Ä… × (-3) + (1 - Ä…) × 6 R-H 10 -6 Ä… × (-6) + (1 - Ä…) × 10 Depending on the investor s optimism or pessimism level you get different solutions For Ä… = 0 5 the criterion in equivalent to Laplace but only if there are two states Laplace The investor may assume that each state is equally probable and choose a strategy that maximize expected value Laplace The investor may assume that each state is equally probable and choose a strategy that maximize expected value C NC Laplace 1 1 S 0 2 × 0 + × 2 = 1 2 2 1 1 M -3 6 × (-3) + × 6 = 1 5 2 2 1 1 R-H 10 -6 × (-6) + × 10 = 2 2 2 Laplace The investor may assume that each state is equally probable and choose a strategy that maximize expected value C NC Laplace 1 1 S 0 2 × 0 + × 2 = 1 2 2 1 1 M -3 6 × (-3) + × 6 = 1 5 2 2 1 1 R-H 10 -6 × (-6) + × 10 = 2 2 2 But it sounds arbitrary just to assume that the states are equally probable. Minimax regret The investor may choose a strategy that minimizes a maximal regret across states Minimax regret The investor may choose a strategy that minimizes a maximal regret across states Payoff table Regret table C NC C NC Minimax regret S 0 2 10 4 10 M -3 6 13 0 13 R-H 10 -6 0 12 12 A zero-sum game Let s treat this problem as a game: Investor s problem: what strategy is the best for me? A zero-sum game Let s treat this problem as a game: Investor s problem: what strategy is the best for me? Depends on the "strategy" of the market p1 p2 Safe: 0p1 + 2p2 A zero-sum game Let s treat this problem as a game: Investor s problem: what strategy is the best for me? Depends on the "strategy" of the market p1 p2 Safe: 0p1 + 2p2 Medium: -3p1 + 6p2 Risky-Hedge: 10p1 - 6p2 A zero-sum game Let s treat this problem as a game: Investor s problem: what strategy is the best for me? Depends on the "strategy" of the market p1 p2 Safe: 0p1 + 2p2 Medium: -3p1 + 6p2 Risky-Hedge: 10p1 - 6p2 Investor s problem: max(0p1 + 2p2; -3p1 + 6p2; 10p1 - 6p2) A zero-sum game Let s treat this problem as a game: Investor s problem: what strategy is the best for me? Depends on the "strategy" of the market p1 p2 Safe: 0p1 + 2p2 Medium: -3p1 + 6p2 Risky-Hedge: 10p1 - 6p2 Investor s problem: max(0p1 + 2p2; -3p1 + 6p2; 10p1 - 6p2) Assume the worst case: the market is trying to get as much money from you as possible Vicious market problem Since the market is vicious, it wants to minimize your payoff: min max(0p1 + 2p2; -3p1 + 6p2; 10p1 - 6p2) p1 p2 0 p1 + p2 = 1 Vicious market problem Since the market is vicious, it wants to minimize your payoff: min max(0p1 + 2p2; -3p1 + 6p2; 10p1 - 6p2) p1 p2 0 p1 + p2 = 1 Let s rewrite it as a Linear Programming Problem: min z p1 p2 0 z"R s t z 0p1 + 2p2 z -3p1 + 6p2 z 10p1 - 6p2 1 = p1 + p2 Rewriting min z p1 p2 0 z"R s t z 0p1 + 2p2 z -3p1 + 6p2 z 10p1 - 6p2 1 = p1 + p2 is equivalent to: Rewriting min z p1 p2 0 z"R s t z 0p1 + 2p2 z -3p1 + 6p2 z 10p1 - 6p2 1 = p1 + p2 is equivalent to: min max z + q1[0p1 + 2p2 - z] p1 p2 0 z"R q1 q2 q3 0 v"R + q2[-3p1 + 6p2 - z] + q3[10p1 - 6p2 - z] + v[1 - (p1 + p2)] Rewriting min max z + q1[0p1 + 2p2 - z] p1 p2 0 z"R q1 q2 q3 0 v"R + q2[-3p1 + 6p2 - z] + q3[10p1 - 6p2 - z] + v[1 - (p1 + p2)] is equivalent to: Rewriting min max z + q1[0p1 + 2p2 - z] p1 p2 0 z"R q1 q2 q3 0 v"R + q2[-3p1 + 6p2 - z] + q3[10p1 - 6p2 - z] + v[1 - (p1 + p2)] is equivalent to: max min v + p1[0q1 - 3q2 + 10q3 - v] q1 q2 q3 0 v"R p1 p2 0 z"R + p2[2q1 + 6q2 - 6q3 - v] + z[1 - (q1 + q2 + q3)] Rewriting max min v + p1[0q1 - 3q2 + 10q3 - v] q1 q2 q3 0 v"R p1 p2 0 z"R + p2[2q1 + 6q2 - 6q3 - v] + z[1 - (q1 + q2 + q3)] is equivalent to: Rewriting max min v + p1[0q1 - 3q2 + 10q3 - v] q1 q2 q3 0 v"R p1 p2 0 z"R + p2[2q1 + 6q2 - 6q3 - v] + z[1 - (q1 + q2 + q3)] is equivalent to: max v q1 q2 q3 0 v"R v 0q1 - 3q2 + 10q3 v 2q1 + 6q2 - 6q3 1 = q1 + q2 + q3 Rewriting max v q1 q2 q3 0 v"R v 0q1 - 3q2 + 10q3 v 2q1 + 6q2 - 6q3 1 = q1 + q2 + q3 is equivalent to: Rewriting max v q1 q2 q3 0 v"R v 0q1 - 3q2 + 10q3 v 2q1 + 6q2 - 6q3 1 = q1 + q2 + q3 is equivalent to: max min(0q1 - 3q2 + 10q3; 2q1 + 6q2 - 6q3) q1 q2 q3 0 q1 + q2 + q3 = 1 The investor s problem max min(0q1 - 3q2 + 10q3; 2q1 + 6q2 - 6q3) q1 q2 q3 0 q1 + q2 + q3 = 1 The market is "vicious" so it tries to minimize the investor s payoff min(0q1 - 3q2 + 10q3; 2q1 + 6q2 - 6q3) The investor s problem max min(0q1 - 3q2 + 10q3; 2q1 + 6q2 - 6q3) q1 q2 q3 0 q1 + q2 + q3 = 1 The market is "vicious" so it tries to minimize the investor s payoff min(0q1 - 3q2 + 10q3; 2q1 + 6q2 - 6q3) And the investor is trying maximize his payoff Comparison The problem of the market: min max(0p1 + 2p2; -3p1 + 6p2; 10p1 - 6p2) p1 p2 0 p1 + p2 = 1 The problem of the investor: max min(0q1 - 3q2 + 10q3; 2q1 + 6q2 - 6q3) q1 q2 q3 0 q1 + q2 + q3 = 1 Comparison The problem of the market: min max(0p1 + 2p2; -3p1 + 6p2; 10p1 - 6p2) p1 p2 0 p1 + p2 = 1 The problem of the investor: max min(0q1 - 3q2 + 10q3; 2q1 + 6q2 - 6q3) q1 q2 q3 0 q1 + q2 + q3 = 1 The two problems are DUAL to each other. You can solve one and infer the solution of the other. In practice you solve the problem which is easier to solve. Back to maximin It turns out that: the problem of the investor in the zero-sum game Back to maximin It turns out that: the problem of the investor in the zero-sum game is the same as Back to maximin It turns out that: the problem of the investor in the zero-sum game is the same as the problem of the investor trying to find a Maximin strategy in an individual choice situation Back to maximin It turns out that: the problem of the investor in the zero-sum game is the same as the problem of the investor trying to find a Maximin strategy in an individual choice situation if you allow mixed strategies Back to maximin It turns out that: the problem of the investor in the zero-sum game is the same as the problem of the investor trying to find a Maximin strategy in an individual choice situation if you allow mixed strategies Choosing strategies not for sure but with certain probability Solving for a Maximin strategy max min(0q1 - 3q2 + 10q3; 2q1 + 6q2 - 6q3) q1 q2 q3 0 q1 + q2 + q3 = 1 The solution is (q1 q2 q3) = (0 0 64 0 36 with Minimax value of 1 68. Solving for a Maximin strategy max min(0q1 - 3q2 + 10q3; 2q1 + 6q2 - 6q3) q1 q2 q3 0 q1 + q2 + q3 = 1 The solution is (q1 q2 q3) = (0 0 64 0 36 with Minimax value of 1 68. C NC MaxiMin S 0 2 0 M -3 6 -3 R 10 -6 -6 Solving for a Maximin strategy max min(0q1 - 3q2 + 10q3; 2q1 + 6q2 - 6q3) q1 q2 q3 0 q1 + q2 + q3 = 1 The solution is (q1 q2 q3) = (0 0 64 0 36 with Minimax value of 1 68. C NC MaxiMin S 0 2 0 M -3 6 -3 R 10 -6 -6 0.64 × M + 0.36 × R 1 68 1 68 1 68 Extending other decision rules to mixed strategies The question is: Can we also gain in the case of other decision rules when we allow mixed strategies? Maximax?: Extending other decision rules to mixed strategies The question is: Can we also gain in the case of other decision rules when we allow mixed strategies? Maximax?: NO, we cannot Laplace?: Extending other decision rules to mixed strategies The question is: Can we also gain in the case of other decision rules when we allow mixed strategies? Maximax?: NO, we cannot Laplace?: NO, we cannot Hurwicz?: Extending other decision rules to mixed strategies The question is: Can we also gain in the case of other decision rules when we allow mixed strategies? Maximax?: NO, we cannot Laplace?: NO, we cannot Hurwicz?: NO, we cannot Minimax regret?: Extending other decision rules to mixed strategies The question is: Can we also gain in the case of other decision rules when we allow mixed strategies? Maximax?: NO, we cannot Laplace?: NO, we cannot Hurwicz?: NO, we cannot Minimax regret?: YES, we can. WHY? Minimax regret Payoff table Regret table C NC C NC Minimax regret S 0 2 10 4 10 M -3 6 13 0 13 R 10 -6 0 12 12 0 48 × M 3 76 -0 24 6 24 6 24 6 24 +0 52 × R