The Atlantic Conference - August 9-12, 1941
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The Atlantic Conference : Introduction
THE ATLANTIC CONFERENCE BETWEEN PRESIDENT ROOSEVELT AND PRIME MINISTER CHURCHILL AUGUST 12, 1941 (1)
[The following account of the arrangements for the August 1941 meeting between President Roosevelt and Prime Minister Churchill is based on notes in the Hyde Park Library dictated by the President on August 23, 1941, for historical purposes:
When Harry Hopkins went to England as the President's personal representative in January 1941, he was told to express the President's hope to the Prime Minister that they could meet some day to talk over the problem of the defeat of Germany. Before Hopkins could deliver the message, the Prime Minister expressed exactly the same thought to Hopkins. The date mentioned at that time was March or April, and the places mentioned were Bermuda and Newfoundland. However, the President, on account of pending legislation, found it impossible to get away from Washington until April, and by that time the Prime Minister was prevented from leaving by the war in Greece- and later by the war in Crete.
The trip was mentioned again in May and June, and was finally decided upon in late July (when Hopkins was in England on his second mission). The date of actual rendezvous was set for August 8, 9, or 10, and Argentia Harbor off Placentia Bay in Newfoundland was selected as the meeting place.
The President was notified that the Prime Minister would said from Scotland on H.M.S. Prince of Wales on August 4 and would be accompanied by Admiral Pound, General Dill, Air Marshal Freeman, and Harry Hopkins. The President in turn notified the Prime Minister that he would bring Admiral Stark, General Marshall, and General Arnold. When the Prime Minister later sent word that he would bring the Permanent Under Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, Sir Alexander Cadogan, the President decided to bring the Under Secretary of State, Sumner Welles, and Averell Harriman (who had just flown back to Washington from London where he had been sent to expedite Lend Lease).
NOTES
(1) The record here given covers the political aspects of the Conference in which Under Secretary of State Sumner Welles participated as the representative of the Department of State. For an account of the military discussions, see Department of the Army, United States Army in World War II. The War Department, Chief of Staff: Prewar Plans and Preparations by Mark Skinner Watson (Washington, Government Printing Office, 1950), pp. 400 ff. Back
© 1997 The Avalon Project.
The Avalon Project : The Atlantic Conference was last modified on: 12/24/2007 08:32:19
The Atlantic Conference : Telegram - Welles to Winant 07/14/41
740.0011 European War 1939/13132b: Telegram
The Acting Secretary of State to the Ambassador to the United Kingdom (Winant)
Washington, July 14,1941-6 p.m.
2600. For Former Naval Person (1) from the President:
"I know you will not mind my mentioning to you a matter which is not in any way serious at this time but which might cause unpleasant repercussions over here later on. I refer to rumors which of course are nothing more nor less than rumors regarding trades or deals which the British Government is alleged to be making with some of the occupied nations. As for example the stupid story that you have promised to set up Yugoslavia again as it formerly existed and the other story that you had promised Trieste to Yugoslavia.
In certain racial groups in this country there is of course enthusiastic approval for such promises in relation to post-war commitments, but on the other hand there is dissension and argument among other groups such as the Czechs and Slovaks and among the Walloons and Flemish.
You will of course remember that back in early 1919 there was serious trouble over actual and alleged promises to the Italians and to others.
It seems to me that it is much too early for any of us to make any commitments for the very good reason that both Britain and the United States want assurance of future peace by disarming all trouble makers and secondly by considering the possibility of reviving small states in the interest of harmony even if this has to be accomplished through: plebiscite methods.
The plebiscite was on the whole one of the few successful outcomes of the Versailles Treaty and it may be possible for us to extend the idea by suggesting in some cases preliminary plebiscites to be followed a good deal later on by second or even third plebiscites.
For example none of us know at the present time whether it is advisable in the interest of quiet conditions to keep the Croats away from the throats of the Serbs and vice versa.
I am inclined to think that an overall statement on your part would be useful at this time, making it clear that no post war peace commitments as to territories, populations or economies have been given. I could then back up your statement in very strong terms.
There is no hurry about this but you might think it over. Roosevelt."
Welles
NOTES
(1) Code name for Prime Minister Winston Churchill. Back
The Atlantic Conference : Telegram - Winant to the Secretary of State 07/16/41
740.0011 European War 1939/132036: Telegram
The Ambassador in the United Kingdom (Winant) to the Secretary of State
LONDON, July 16, 1941-noon.
[Received July 16-7: 19 a. m.]
3012. For the President and the Acting Secretary. Delivered your 2600, July 14th, to the Prime Minister personally. I know he feels as you do on this subject. At the same time he is asking Mr. Eden (1) to get a complete statement covering all situations which will be forwarded to you. He was delighted to hear that Harry is conning. So am I.
WINANT
NOTES
(1) Anthony Eden, British Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs. Back
The Atlantic Conference : Telegram - Winant to the Secretary of State 08/01/41
740.0011 European War 1939/13620: Telegram
The Ambassador in the United Kingdom (Winant) to the Secretary of State : [Extract]
London, August l, 1941-midnight.
[Received August1-10: 14 p.m.]
3366. For the President. Re your message 2600, July 14, directed to the Former Naval Person and with reference to my message 3308 - of July 30.(1) In the next to the last paragraph you asked for an over all statement "making it clear that no post war peace commitments as to territories, populations or economies have been given" and stating that you could back his statement in very strong terms, but adding that there is "no hurry about this". For your information, both Mr. Eden's and the Prime Minister's promised statements have not as yet been forthcoming. I believe with little difficulty you could arrange the language of the statement to be made by the Prime Minister perhaps indicating to him the substance of your supporting statement.
WINANT
NOTES
(1) Not printed. Back
The Atlantic Conference : Telegram - Winant to the Secretary of State 08/05/41
740.0011 European War 1939/136731: Telegram
The Ambassador in the United Kingdom (Winant) to the Secretary of State
LONDON, August 5, 1941-10 p. m.
[Received August 5 5:22 p. m.]
3428. Personal for the Secretary. Mr. Eden sent for me this afternoon to say that there had been some leakage or very clever guesswork as to the Prime Minister's present move. It first came out on the German radio at 8:15 last night as a report from Lisbon. Press correspondents here have been putting several factors together today to arrive at the same conclusion.
Before he left the Prime Minister had prepared a statement to be given out for publication only in the event of a leakage. Eden foresees the possibility that something may have to be made public tomorrow and if so the Government does not want to say anything without our prior approval. The Government hopes to avoid having to make a statement but if it must be done, Eden thinks it would be best to make it to the House of Commons tomorrow, where the Prime Minister's absence with Attlee (1) as deputy is bound to be noted and may give rise to questions. This would furnish the occasion for making the statement. The text of the Prime Minister's own draft of a statement mentioned above is as follows:
"The Prime Minister accepted an invitation to meet President Roosevelt for a discussion of the general course of the war, the methods of United States' aid to Britain and matters of common interest.
The Prime Minister is accompanied by the First Sea Lord, the Chief of the Imperial General Staff, and the Permanent Under Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs.
The meeting is taking place on board ship somewhere in the Atlantic.
No further statement can be made at this stage as to the matters discussed at the meeting or the date of the Prime Minister's return to this country."
If it is necessary to issue the above statement the President might want to have a statement made to the people of the United States.
Eden said that a reply as to our concurrence or other views would be most useful if he might have it before 4 o'clock London time tomorrow afternoon.
If there is no reply he would tell the House that he had nothing to say at the time.
WINANT
NOTES
(1) Clement Attlee, British Lord Privy Seal. Back
The Atlantic Conference : Memorandum of Conversation, by the Under Secretary of State (Welles). 08/10/41
740.0011 European War 1930/14007
Memorandum of Conversation, by the Under Secretary of State (Welles).
AT SEA, AUGUST 10,1941.
I accompanied the President this Morning to attend the religious services and the lunch which the Prime Minister was giving for the President on the Prince of Wales. Sir Alexander Cadogan told me before lunch that in accordance with the conversation which was had ; between the President, the Prime Minister, Sir Alexander and myself at the President's dinner last night he had made two tentative drafts covering proposed parallel and simultaneous declarations by the United States and British Governments relating to Japanese policy in the Pacific and of a proposed joint-declaration to be made by the President; and the Prime Minister when their present meeting was terminated.(1) The two drafts read as follows:
"Draft of Parallel Communications to the Japanese Government.
"Declaration by the United States Government that:
"1. Any further encroachment by Japan in the Southwestern Pacific would produce a situation in which the United States Government would be compelled to take counter measures even though these might lead to war between the United States and Japan.
"2. If any third Power becomes the object of aggression by Japan in consequence of such counter measures or of their support of them, the President would have the intention to seek authority from Congress to give aid to such Power."
"Declaration by His Majesty's Government that:
"1. Any further encroachment by Japan in the Southwestern Pacific would produce a situation in which His Majesty's Government would be compelled to take counter measures even though these might lead to war between Great Britain and Japan.
"2. If any third Power becomes the object of aggression by Japan in consequence of such counter measures or of their support of them, His Majesty's Government would give all possible aid to such Power."
"Declaration by the Netherlands Government:
"1. Any further encroachment by Japan in the Southwestern Pacific would produce a situation in which Her Majesty's Government would be compelled to take counter measures even though these might lead to war between the Netherlands and Japan.
"2. If any third Power becomes the object of aggression by Japan in consequence of such counter measures or of their support of them, Her Majesty's Government would give all possible aid to such Power."
Keep the Soviet Government informed. It will be for consideration whether they should he pressed to make a parallel declaration.
The draft of the proposed joint declaration reads as follows
The President of the United States of America and the Prime Minister, Mr. Churchill, representing His Majesty's Government in the United Kingdom, being met together to resolve and concert the means of providing for the safety of their respective countries in face of Nazi and German aggression and of the dangers to all peoples arising therefrom, deem it right to make known certain principles which they both accept for guidance in the framing of their policy and on which to base their hopes for better future for the world.
First, their countries seek no aggrandizement, territorial or other;
Second, they desire to see no territorial changes that do not accord with the freely expressed wishes of the peoples concerned;
Third, they respect the right of all peoples to choose the form of government under which they will live; they are only concerned to defend the rights of freedom of speech and of thought without which such choosing must be illusory;
Fourth, they will strive to bring about a fair and equitable distribution of essential produce not only within their territorial jurisdiction but between the nations of the world.
Fifth, they seek a peace which will not only cast down forever the Nazi tyranny but by effective international organization will afford to all States and peoples the means of dwelling in security within their own bounds and of traversing the seas and oceans without fear of lawless assault or need of getting burdensome armaments."
As I was leaving the ship to accompany the President back to his flagship, Mr. Churchill said to me that he had likewise given the President copies of these documents. He impressed upon me his belief that some declaration of the kind he had drafted with respect to Japan was in his opinion in the highest degree important, and that he did not think that there was much hope left unless the United States made such a clear-cut declaration of preventing Japan from expanding further to the south, in which event the prevention of war between Great Britain and Japan appeared to be hopeless. He said in the most emphatic manner that if war did break out between Great Britain and Japan, Japan immediately would be in a position through the use of her large number of cruisers to seize or to destroy all of the British merchant shipping in the Indian Ocean and in the Pacific, and to cut the lifelines between the British Dominions and the British Isles unless the United States herself entered the war. He pled with me that a declaration of this character participated in by the United States, Great Britain, the Dominions, the Netherlands and possibly the Soviet Union would definitely restrain Japan. If this were not done, the blow to the British Government might be almost decisive.
SUMNER WELLES
NOTES
(1) For Winston Churchill's account of the drafting of the Joint declaration known as the Atlantic Charter, see his book The Grand Alliance, pp. 433 ff. Back
The Atlantic Conference : Memorandum of Conversation, by the Under Secretary of State (Welles) 08/11/41
740.0011 European War 1939/140078
Memorandum of Conversation, by the Under Secretary of State (Welles)
AT SEA, August 11, 1941.
The President received Mr. Churchill this morning on the Augusta at 11:00 a. m. There were present at the meeting Sir Alexander Cadogan, Harry Hopkins and myself.
I
The conference commenced with the subject of Portugal. The President read to Mr. Churchill the letter addressed to the former by the Prince Minister of Portugal (1) It was agreed both that the contents of the letter were highly satisfactory and made possible without any difficulty the carrying out of arrangements for the occupation of the Azores as a means of assurance that the islands would not be occupied by Germany.
Mr. Churchill stated that a highly secret operation had been decided upon by the British Government, namely, the occupation of the Canary Islands during the days immediately after the September full moon. This date, as Mr. Churchill remembered it, would be about the 15th of September. The British Government were undertaking this operation with full knowledge that the islands had been recently heavily fortified and that a very large number of German officers were engaged there in the training and preparation of the Spanish troops. It was undertaken with the further realization that this step would almost inevitably involve a Spanish attack either in conjunction with or upon the instigation of German military forces and that such attack would render untenable by the British Navy the harbor of Gibraltar. The British Government, however, had decided upon the step in view of its belief that the situation in Spain from the British standpoint was going from bad to worse and that Hitler almost inevitably would undertake the occupation of Spain and Portugal with the subsequent penetration of North Africa if any collapse took place on the part of the Russian Army or even if a winter stalemate resulted. In that event Mr. Churchill stated Gibraltar would be isolated anyway and the occupation of Great Britain of the Canary Islands was of the utmost importance in guarding a southern Atlantic convoy route into the British Isles.
In view of this operation, the British Government would not be in a position conveniently to carry out the commitment they had made to the Portuguese Government to assist in the defense of the Azores.
In view of the contents of Dr. Salazar's letter to the President, it was therefore agreed that the British Government immediately upon the return of Mr. Churchill to London would notify Dr. Salazar that the British Government could not conveniently undertake to assist in the defense of the Azores and would further inform Dr. Salazar that they therefore desired him to request the United States for such assistance. It was agreed on the part of the President that immediately upon the receipt of Such notification from Dr. Salazar the United States would send the necessary forces of occupation to the Azores and that the Brazilian Government would be simultaneously requested to send at least a token force to take part in the expedition.
The President stated to Mr. Churchill that in view of our present military situation if the United States undertook to occupy the Azores it would not be in a position in the near future at least to undertake the protection of the Cape Verde Islands. Mr. Churchill stated that the British Government would be in a position to occupy the Cape Verde Islands with the understanding that it would later turn over the protection of those islands to the United States at such time as the United States was in a position to take those measures. Mr. Churchill further stated that during the time that the United States was landing the necessary forces in the Azores, the British Navy would maintain a large force between the Azores and the mainland of Portugal in order to render impossible the sending of any German expeditionary forces should Portugal at that time be already occupied by Germany.
II
The Prime Minister then said that he desired to discuss the situation in the Far East. He had with him a copy of a draft memorandum, of which he had already given the President a copy and which suggested that the United States, British and Dutch Governments simultaneously warn Japan that further military expansion by Japan in the South Pacific would lead to the taking of counter measures by the countries named even though such counter measures might result in hostilities between them and Japan, and, second, provided that the United States declare to Japan that should Great Britain go to the assistance of the Netherlands East Indies as a result of aggression against the latter on the part of Japan the President would request from the Congress of the United States authority to assist the British and Dutch Governments in their defense against Japanese aggression.
The President gave Mr. Churchill to read copies of the two statements handed to Secretary Hull by the Japanese Ambassador on August 6.(2)
The Prime Minister read them carefully and then remarked that the implication was that Japan, having already occupied Indochina, said that she would move no further provided the United States would abandon their economic and financial sanctions and take no further military or naval defensive measures and further agree to concessions to Japan, including the opportunity for Japan to strangle the Chinese Government, all of which were particularly unacceptable.
The President replied that that was about the picture as he saw it, that he felt very strongly that every effort should be made to prevent the outbreak of war with Japan. He stated that what he intended to do was to request Secretary Hull by radio to inform the Japanese Ambassador that the President would return to Washington next Saturday or Sunday and desired to see the Ambassador immediately upon his return.(3) The President stated that in that interview he would inform the Japanese Ambassador that provided the Japanese Government would give the commitment contained in the first paragraph of the proposal of the Japanese Government of August 6, namely, that the Japanese Government "will not further station its troops in the Southwestern Pacific areas, except French Indochina, and that the Japanese troops now stationed in French Indochina will be withdrawn", specifically and not contingently, the United States Government, while making it clear that the other conditions set forth by the Japanese Government were in general unacceptable, the United States would, nevertheless, in a friendly spirit seek to explore the possibilities inherent in the various proposals made by Japan for the reaching of a friendly understanding between the two Governments. The President would further state that should Japan refuse to consider this procedure and undertake further steps in the nature of military expansions, the President desired the Japanese Government to know that in such event in his belief various steps would have to be taken by the United States notwithstanding the President's realization that the taking of such further measures might result in war between the United States and Japan.
Mr. Churchill immediately declared that the procedure suggested appeared to him to cover the situation very well. He said it had in it an element of "face-saving" for the Japanese and yet at the same time would constitute a flat United States warning to Japan of the consequences involved in a continuation by Japan of her present course.
There was then discussed the desirability of informing Russia of the steps which would be taken as above set forth and of possibly including in the warning to Japan a statement which would cover any aggressive steps by Japan against the Soviet Union.
I stated that in my judgment the real issue which was involved was the continuation by Japan of its present policy of conquest by force in the entire Pacific region and regardless whether such policy was directed against China, against the Soviet Union or against the British Dominions or British colonies, or the colonies of the Netherlands in the Southern Pacific area. I said it seemed to me that the statement which the President intended to make to the Japanese Government might more advantageously be based on the question of broad policy rather than be premised solely upon Japanese moves in the Southwestern Pacific area.
The President and Mr. Churchill both agreed to this and it was decided that the step to be taken by the President would be taken in that sense.
The question then arose as to the desirability of the President's making reference in his proposed statement to the Japanese Ambassador to British policy in the southern Pacific region and specifically with regard to Thailand. The President said that he thought it would be advantageous for him to be in a position at that time to state that he had been informed by the British Government that Great Britain had no aggressive intentions whatever upon Thailand. Winston Churchill said that in this he heartily concurred.
I asked whether it would not be better for the President to be in a position to state not only that Great Britain had no intentions of an aggressive character with regard to Thailand, but also that the British Government had informed the United States Government that it supported wholeheartedly the President's proposal for the neutralization of Indochina and of Thailand.
Mr. Churchill stated that he agreed that it would be well to make an all-inclusive statement of that character with respect to British policy, that he trusted that the President would, therefore, inform the Japanese Ambassador that he had consulted the British Government, and that the British Government was in complete accord with the neutralization proposal, and that it had likewise informed the President that it would in no event undertake any initiative in the occupation of Thailand.
It was agreed that Sir Alexander Cadogan, after further consultation with Mr. Churchill, would give me in writing a statement which the British Government was prepared to make with regard to this issue.
The President expressed the belief that by adopting this course any further move of aggression on the part of Japan which might result in war could be held off for at least thirty days. Mr. Churchill felt that if negotiations or conversations actually took place between the United States and Japan on the basis which had been formulated, there was a reasonable chance that Japanese policy might be modified and that a war in the Pacific might be averted.
III
Mr. Churchill then said that he desired to bring up for discussion the proposed joint declaration by the President and himself.
The President said that he believed the best solution of this problem was for an identic statement to be made in London and in the United States, probably on Thursday, August 14, to the effect that the Prime Minister and the President had met at sea, accompanied by the various members of the respective staffs; that these members of the two Governments had discussed the question of aid, under the terms of the Lease-Lend Act to nations resisting aggression, and that these military and naval conversations had in no way involved any future commitments between the two Governments, except as authorized under the terms of the Lease-Lend Act; that the Prime Minister and the President had between them discussed certain principles relating to a better future for the world and had agreed upon a joint declaration which would then be quoted verbatim.
Mr. Churchill dissented very strongly from the form in which the President had desired to make it clear that no future commitments had been entered into. The President stated that that portion of the proposed statement was of extreme importance from his standpoint in as much as a statement of that character would make it impossible for extreme isolationist leaders in the United States to allege that every kind of secret agreement had been entered into during the course of these conversations.
Mr. Churchill said that he understood that side of the question, but that he believed that any categorical statement of that character would prove deeply discouraging to the populations of the occupied countries and would have a very serious effect upon their morale. He likewise made it clear that a similar effect would be created by British public opinion. He asked if the statement could not be worded in such a way as to make it positive rather than negative, namely, that the members of the staffs of the Prime Minister and of the President had solely discussed questions relative to the furnishing of aid to the countries resisting aggression under the terms of the Lease-Lend Act. The President replied that he believed that the statement could be drawn up in that way and that if he then were queried in the United States he need merely reply that nothing had been discussed or agreed upon other than that which had already been indicated in his public statement.
I then gave the President, Mr. Churchill and Sir Alexander Cadogan copies of a redraft which I had made this morning of the proposed joint declaration before Mr. Churchill had arrived and had had an opportunity of going over it with the President, and the latter had approved it. Mr. Churchill then commenced to read it. He suggested that there be inserted in the text of the third point before the word "self-government" the words "sovereign rights and". This was agreed upon.
Mr. Churchill then read the fourth point which read as follows: "Fourth, they will endeavor to further the enjoyment by all peoples of access, without discrimination and on equal terms, to the markets and to the raw materials of the world which are needed for their economic prosperity."
He immediately inquired whether this was meant to apply to the terms of the Ottawa agreements. I replied that, of course, it did, since the policy which the United States Government had been pursuing for the better part of nine years had been addressed primarily towards the removal of all of those artificial restrictions and controls upon international trade which had created such tragic havoc to world economy during the past generation. I said I understood fully the immediate difficulties which this occasioned him but he pointed out that the phraseology was "they will endeavor to further" and that this naturally did not imply a formal and immediate contractual obligation on the part of his Government. The President stated that he believed the point was of very great importance as a measure of assurance to the German and Italian peoples that the British and the United States Governments desired to offer them, after the war, fair and equal opportunity of an economic character.
The Prime Minister said that, of course, he was without any power himself to agree upon this point. He set forth in considerable detail the position of the United Kingdom vis-a-vis the Dominions and emphasized his inability, without the agreement of the Dominions, to enter into the proposed declaration insofar as this point was concerned. He said that insofar as he himself was concerned the issue was one with which his own personal life history was connected. He referred to the days at the outset of the century when Joseph Chamberlain (4) first brought up the proposal for Empire preferences and the predominant part which this issue had played in the political history of Great Britain during the past forty years. He said that he felt the proposal as now phrased would have the enthusiastic support of all the liberals everywhere. He said that he himself was heartily in accord with the proposal and that he himself had always been, as was well known, emphatically opposed to the Ottawa agreements. He said, however, that it would be at least a week before he could hope to obtain by telegraph the opinion of the Dominions with regard to this question.
Harry Hopkins then suggested that Sir Alexander Cadogan and I be requested to draft new phraseology which would take care of these difficulties and prevent the delay of which Mr. Churchill spoke. He said it was inconceivable that the issuance of the joint declaration should be held up by a matter of this kind.
I said that in my own judgment further modification of that article would destroy completely any value in that portion of the proposed declaration. I said that it was not a question of phraseology, that it was a question of a vital principle which was involved I said; that if the British and the United States Governments could not agree to do everything within their power to further, after the termination of the present war, a restoration of free and liberal trade policies they might as well throw in the sponge and-realize that one of the greatest factors in creating the present tragic situation in the world was going to be permitted to continue unchecked in the post-war world. I said that the trade policies of the British Empire during the latter portion of the nineteenth century had, I felt, contributed enormously to the same and prosperous condition of the world at that time, and that, of course, I realized that the tariff policies pursued by the United States and many other countries during that period had played an important part in the creation of the evils which had sprung up after the last war. I said, however, that it seemed to be imperative that we try to agree now upon the policy of constructive sanity in world economics as a fundamental factor in the creation of a new and better world and that except through an agreement upon such a policy by our two governments there would be no hindrance whatever to a continuation later to the present German practices of utilizing their trade and financial policies in order to achieve political ends.
Mr. Churchill agreed very emphatically to this policy. He and Sir Alexander Cadogan both agreed that it was not a question of phraseology, but that they were up against a material obstacle which Mr. Churchill had already indicated. The Dominions would have to be consulted. It might well be that an agreement could not be had from the Dominions and that consequently the proposed joint declaration could only be issued some time after news of the meeting between the President and the Prime Minister had been given out. Mr. Churchill suggested that the inclusion before the phrase "they will endeavor to further" of the phrase which would read "with due regard for our present obligations might ease the situation.
The President suggested, and Mr. Churchill agreed, that the latter would try and draft some phraseology which would make that situation easier, and it was arranged that I would call later in the afternoon upon the Prime Minister and Sir Alexander Cadogan to go over with them such redraft as they might have in mind.
Mr. Churchill was in entire accord with points five and six.
He then read point seven and after discussion at the meeting of this point it was agreed that the phrase "to use force" be replaced by the word "aggression" in the second sentence of the seventh point.
Mr. Churchill said that, of course, he was heartily and enthusiastically in favor of this point seven, which had been initiated by the President. He inquired, however, whether the President would not agree to support some kind of defective international organization" as suggested by the Prime Minister in his original draft of The proposed joint declaration.
The President replied that he did not feel that; he could agree to this because of the suspicions and opposition that such a statement on his part would create in the United States. He said that he himself would not be in favor of the creation of a new Assembly of the League of Nations, at least until after a period of time had transpired and during which an international police force composed of the United States and Great Britain had had an opportunity of functioning. Or Churchill said that he did not feel that he would be candid if he did not express to the President his feeling that point seven would create a great deal of opposition from the extreme internationalists. The President replied that he realized that, but that he felt that the time had come to be realistic and that in his judgment the main factor in the seventh point was complete realism. Mr. Churchill then remarked that of course he was wholeheartedly in favor of it and shared the President's view.
The meeting then broke up and I arranged with the President that I would drop by to see him after my conference later in the afternoon with the Prime Minister. The latter stated that he would not be able to leave until at least 5:00 p.m., tomorrow, August 12, and that as he felt it of importance to reach a complete meeting of minds with the President upon all of the issues involved, that he would be willing to spend an additional twenty-four hours should that be necessary.
SUMNER WELLES
NOTES
(1) See footnote 5, p. 345. Back
(2) Foreign Relations, Japan, 1931-1941, vol II; pp. 548 and 549. Back
(3) See memorandum by the Secretary of State, August 17, 1941, and state" meets handed by President Roosevelt to the Japanese Ambassador during the conversation on that date, ibid., pp. 554, 556, and 557. Back
(4) British Secretary of State for Colonies, 1895-1903. After his resignation he continued his campaign for imperial tariff preference. Back
© 1997 The Avalon Project.
The Avalon Project : The Atlantic Conference was last modified on: 12/24/2007 08:37:12
The Atlantic Conference : Memorandum of Conversation, by the Under Secretary of State (Welles) 08/11/41
740.0011 European War 1939/140076
Memorandum of Conversation, by the Under Secretary of State (Welles)
AT SEA, August 11, 1941.
I went by arrangement to see Sir Alexander Cadogan on the Prince of Wales this afternoon. He gave me to read memoranda which he had already completed on the conference between the Prime Minister and the President this morning and, with a few changes which I indicated, they appeared to be a correct presentation of the discussion ant of the agreements reached.
With regard to the draft of the joint declaration, Sir Alexander told me that the Prime Minister had already radioed to London the text of the proposed joint declaration incorporating therein modifications of points four and seven.. Sir Alexander gave me the revised text to read. Inasmuch as the Prime Minister's draft of point four was far broader and more satisfactory than the minimum which the President had instructed me, after our conference of the morning, to accept, I raised no objection thereto, and with regard to the proposed change in point seven I stated that while it was completely satisfactory to me and entirely in accord with my own way of thinking I had no idea what the President's decision might be. I said that I would have to submit it to trim.
Sir Alexander stated that the Prime Minister felt very strongly- perhaps exaggeratedly-the opposition which would be created on the part of a certain pro-League-of-Nations group in England to the contents of point seven declaring for the disarmament of nations which undertook aggression outside of their frontiers. He went on to say that while he believed there w oiled not be the amount of opposition which the Prime Minister anticipated he nevertheless thought that it would be a tragic thing to concentrate solely upon the transition period after the war was ended when some kind of joint police power would have to be exercised by the British and by the United States Governments and omit any reference to the need of the creation of some effective and practicable international organization which would function after the transition period was concluded. I said that as I had already indicated while I was in full agreement with his own views the matter would have to be determined by the President.
We discussed the desirability of informing the Chinese Government of the steps which the United States Government in the person of the President was taking with regard to Japan. I said that while I felt very definitely that every effort should be made to keep China closely informed of what was being done in her interest by Great Britain and by the United States I wondered whether telling China of what the President intended to state to the Japanese Government at this particular moment would not mean that the Government at Chungking for its own interests would make public the information so received. If publicity resulted, I stated I feared that the extreme militaristic element in Tokio and that portion of the Tokio press which was controlled by Germany would immediately take advantage of the situation so created to inflame sentiment in Japan to such an extent as to make any possibility remote, as it might anyhow be, of achieving any satisfactory result through negotiation with Japan. Sir Alexander said he was entirely in accord and would be governed by those views. He said, of course, I realized how terribly persistent the Chinese were and that the present Ambassador in London, Dr. Wellington Koo, would undoubtedly press him day in and day out to know what had transpired at the meeting between the Prime Minister and the President with regard to China. He said that he felt that the best solution was for him merely to say in general terms that the two governments had agreed that every step should be taken that was practicable at this time for China and its defense and avoid going into any details.
I subsequently went to see the President. The President said that he was entirely in accord with the redraft of point four which was better than he had thought Mr. Churchill would be willing to concede. He also accepted without question the amendment made by Mr. Churchill to point seven and the President said that it seemed to him entirely desirable since the amendment made it clear that once the war was over a transition period would have to take place and that the permanent international organization would only be set up after that experimental period had passed. He had jotted down certain minor changes in the text of the proposed joint declaration, most of which were merely verbal changes for the purpose of clarification.
I said I felt it necessary for me to ask him whether he did not believe that a very considerable opposition on the part of extreme isolationists in the United States would result from that portion of point seven which declares in the judgment of the United States that it is essential that aggressor nations be disarmed. I said that if a great Power like the United States publicly declares that something is essential, the inference is that that Power is going to do something itself about it. I said it appeared to me more than likely that the isolationists will insist that this public statement by the President meant that the United States would go to war in order to disarm not only Germany but even possibly Japan and theoretically, at least, even the Soviet Union if that country should later once more embark upon aggression on its neighbors. The President replied that the whole intent of point seven, as he save it, was to make clear what the objective would be if the war was won and that he believed people in the United States would take that point of view. He further said he felt the realism inherent in article seven was one which would be apparent to the enormous majority of the American people and that they would enthusiastically support the need for the disarmament of aggressor nations.
I said I also had been surprised and somewhat discouraged by a remark that the President had casually made in our morning's conference-if I had understood him correctly-which was that nothing could be more futile than the reconstitution of a body such as the Assembly of the League of Nations. I said to the President that it seemed to me that if he conceived of the need for a transition period upon the termination of the war during which period Great Britain and the United States would undertake the policing of the world, it seemed to me that it would be enormously desirable for the smaller Powers to have available to them an Assembly in which they would all be represented and in which they could make their complaints known and join in recommendations as to the policy to be pursued by the major Powers who were doing the police work. I said it seemed to me that an organization of that kind would be the most effective safety valve that could be devised.
The President said that he agreed fully with what I said and-that all that he had intended by the remark he made this morning was to make clear his belief that a transition period was necessary and that during that transition period no organizations such as the Council or the Assembly of the League could undertake the powers and prerogatives with which they had been entrusted during the existence of the League of Nations.
I further said that while from the practical standpoint I was in agreement that the United States and Great Britain were the only Powers which could or would exercise the police trusteeship and that it seemed to me that it would be impossible if such a trusteeship were set up to exclude therefrom the other American republics or for that matter the countries at present occupied such as Norway, the Netherlands, and even Belgium. The President said that he felt that a solution for this difficulty could probably be found through the ostensible joining with Great Britain and the United States of those Powers, but it would have to be recognized that it would be ostensible since none of the nations mentioned would have the practical means of taking any effective or, at least, considerable part in the task involved.
I said that it seemed to me that now that the text of the joint declaration had been agreed upon, since I assumed from what Mr. Churchill had told me that the British Government would support his recommendations with regard thereto, all that was left to do in the way of drafting was the preparation of the brief statement which would be issued simultaneously in London and at Washington announcing that the President and the Prime Minister had met, referring to the discussions under the Lease-Lend Act and the inclusion at the termination thereof of the text of the joint declaration. I said that Mr. Churchill had told me that he had cabled his Government that he was not leaving Argentia until Wednesday afternoon (1) and said it seemed to me that everything could be definitely agreed upon and cleared up by 1:00 p. m. tomorrow, and I could see no practical reason for waiting another twenty-four hours. The President agreed and said that he would try and get indecision reached in that sense when he saw Mr. Churchill this evening.
SUMNER WELLES
NOTES
(1) August 13. Back
© 1997 The Avalon Project.
The Avalon Project : The Atlantic Conference was last modified on: 12/24/2007 08:38:04
The Atlantic Conference : Joint Statement by President Roosevelt and Prime Minister Churchill, August 14, 1941
The following statement signed by the President of the United States and the Prime Minister of Great Britain is released for the information of the Press:
The President of the United States and the Prime Minister, Mr. Churchill, representing His Majesty's Government in the United Kingdom, have met at sea.
They have been accompanied by officials of their two Governments, including high ranking officers of the Military, Naval and Air Services
The whole problem of the supply of munitions of war, as provided by the Lease-Lend Act, for the armed forces of the United States and for those countries actively engaged in resisting aggression has been further examined.
Lord Beaverbrook, the Minister of Supply of the British Government, has joined in these conferences. He is going to proceed to Washington to discuss further details with appropriate officials of the United States Government. These conferences will also cover the supply problems of the Soviet Union.
The President and the Prime Minister have had several conferences They have considered the dangers to world civilization arising from the policies of military domination by conquest upon which the Hitlerite government of Germany and other governments associated therewith have embarked, and have made clear the stress which their countries are respectively taking for their safety in the face of these dangers.
They have agreed upon the following joint declaration: (2)
Joint declaration of the President of the United States of America and the Prime Minister, Mr. Churchill, representing His Majesty's Government in the United Kingdom, being met together, deem it right to make known certain common principles in the national policies of their respective countries on which they base their hopes for a better future for the world.
First, their countries seek no aggrandizement, territorial or other;
Second, they desire to see no territorial changes that do not accord with the freely expressed wishes of the peoples concerned;
Third, they respect the right of all peoples to choose the form of government under which they will live; and they wish to see sovereign rights and self government restored to those who have been forcibly deprived of them;
Fourth, they will endeavor, with due respect for their existing obligations, to further the enjoyment by all States, great or small, victor or vanquished, of access, on equal terms, to the trade and to the raw materials of the world which are needed for their economic prosperity;
Fifth, they desire to bring about the fullest collaboration between all nations in the economic field with the objector securing, for all, improved labor standards, economic advancement and social security;
Sixth, after the final destruction of the Nazi tyranny, they hope to see established a peace which will afford to all nations the means of dwelling in safety within their own boundaries, and which will afford assurance that all the men in all the lands may live out their lives in freedom from fear and want;
Seventh, such a peace should enable all men to traverse the high seas and oceans without hindrance;
Eighth, they believe that all of the nations of the world, for realistic as well as spiritual reasons must come to the abandonment of the use of force. Since no future peace can be maintained if land, sea or air armaments continue to be employed by nations which threaten, or may threaten, aggression outside of their frontiers, they believe, pending the establishment of a wider and permanent system of general security, that the disarmament of such nations is essential. They will likewise aid and encourage all other practicable measures which will lighten for peace-loving peoples the crushing burden of armaments
FRANKLIN D. ROOSEVELT
WINSTON S. CHURCHILL
NOTES
(1) The copy in the Department files is a press release which indicates signature by President Roosevelt and Prime Minister Churchill. Apparently, however, there was no signed copy. Back
(2) Known as the Atlantic Charter, published in Department of State Executive Agreement Series No. 236. Back
© 1997 The Avalon Project.
The Avalon Project : The Atlantic Conference was last modified on: 12/24/2007 08:38:24
The Atlantic Conference : The Ambassador to the Polish Government in Exile (Biddle) to the Secretary of State
740.0011 European War 1939/15422
The Ambassador to the Polish Government in Exile (Biddle) to the Secretary of State
NO. 46 LONDON, September 12,1941. [Received September 26.]
SIR: I have the honor to report that on August 26, General Sikorski (1) informed me that the Allied Conference, called for August 27, for the purpose of passing a resolution in support of the Atlantic Declaration, formulated by President Roosevelt and Mr. Churchill, had been postponed for two weeks. This had been due, he said, to requests from the Yugoslav, the Czechoslovak, the Greek and the Polish Governments, for more time in which: to study the contents of the Declaration. Moreover, the Free French Administration had made a like request. The General said that insofar as his Government was concerned, it would hay; to examine the various points in light of their bearing on Poland's interests. While it might accordingly be considered necessary to make certain "mental reservations", these, he thought, might be set forth in a confidential memorandum to be attached to the resolution.
Subsequently, Polish Minister for Foreign Affairs, Raczynski, elaborated the Polish point of view. He said that he and his associates had greeted with deep satisfaction the close solidarity of the United States and Great Britain, as manifested by a joint British-American program of war and peace aims. They had considered it, moreover, a political move of most far-reaching consequences. It had also provided Allied "political warfare" with a basis upon which to work. The Polish Government, he said, had hailed the Roosevelt-Churchill Declaration in the same spirit of solidarity which ought to unite all nations struggling for the freedom of the world. The Polish nation, just as other nations of the European continent, would regard this Declaration, together with British-American solidarity therein symbolized, as a guarantee of Allied victory and of the freeing of Europe from the German yoke.
Minister Raczynski went on to say that his Government was profoundly convinced that the principles of this Declaration would be applied in future in the spirit of justice, in accordance with the Declaration of the Secretary of State, as of August 6 [4?], 1941;(2) namely, with due consideration of the merits and the demerits of individual nations in the present struggle against German hegemony.
There were several points in the Declaration however, which had engaged his Government's concern.
While his Government was deeply sensible of the great importance of the Declaration, his Government felt however, that the abstract character of the policy of justice, as set forth therein, would render its practice inadequate to meet actual conditions on the continent. For example, mass deportation which had taken place in certain sections of Poland, rendered the principle of self-determination set forth in point 2 of the Declaration, difficult, to say the least. Moreover, in Yugoslavia, mass slaughter had almost wiped out certain sections of the country. These were just some of the complications involved.
Moreover, the Declaration made no distinction between the Allies who had originally chosen to fight, rather than to collaborate with Germany, and those who had either succumbed to German pressure at the outset, or had come to terms with the Germans in the course of the fight. Moreover, the Declaration made no reference to compensation for losses inflicted by the invader-no reference to righting the wrongs already done.
The Polish nation, he said, which had consistently rejected, and continued to reject all German suggestions of collaboration with the Nazi regime, and which was the first nation to 'oppose the military power of Germany at a tremendous cost in masses of victims, in the cultural achievements of many generations, and in material worth, had the undoubted right to expect reparations of the wrongs inflicted on it. Destruction and removal of machinery, he emphasized, great loss of man power, including so many of the nation's foremost intellectuals, and the choking off of education, had already cost Poland a serious national set-back.
The Declaration, as it was understood by the Polish Government placed security against another war, and the achievement of economic prosperity, in the forefront, as the principal aims of a new democratic order. These aims were also those of Poland. The British Prime Minister had, in his broadcast speech on August 25, given assurances that Great Britain and the United States did not wish to repeat the mistakes of 1918, by believing that this war was certain to be the last.
It followed that prevention against aggression and the outbreak of a third World War, would remain as a major problem of the post-war period. The remedial measures against a new war should be varied, as were also the causes of the outbreak of the two wars.
Point 8 of the Joint Declaration concerning the disarmament of nations guilty of aggression, represented an important guarantee. It could hardly, however, remain as the sole guarantee. Experience of the past 20 years was there to prove it. It would be necessary to find other additional guarantees, such as limiting the war potential of nations which had shown an inclination to provoke wars-also strengthening of the defensive position of nations which were the victims of the first or second war. Insofar as Poland was concerned, Poland earnestly hoped for greater security in light of strategic considerations. In the Polish mind, this called for straightening out of the age-old Polish-German tangle on the Baltic: for securing Poland's position on the sea, and for doing away with the East Prussian enclave, which had for so long afforded Germany a strangle grip on Poland.
The solution of the problem of European security, as well as the task of assuring prosperity to Europe, were unthinkable without a close collaboration of the continent with the British Empire and the United States of America. The continental nations would assuredly see in the Roosevelt-Churchill Declaration, a new proof that the two Democracies were determined to maintain their interests in the continent after victory over Nazism had been achieved.
He earnestly hoped, the Minister continued, that the spirit of his observations might be understood. The abstract character of some of the points as set forth in the Declaration opened the way for an interpretation which exposed some of Poland's historic interests, and thus did not present a very engaging vista for the future. As a matter of fact, the German propagandists were already vigorously engaged in radio broadcasting an interpretation of the Declaration in a light unfavorable not only to the people in Poland, but also throughout Eastern and Central Europe. At the same time, the Germans were broadcasting an appeal to Poles to join forces against the "Infidel".
Finally, the Minister said that all shades of opinion in Polish circles here believed freedom-loving peoples of the European continent would welcome an endorsement of the Declaration by the Soviet Union. Such a step would thwart German attempts to exploit any doubts which might exist in Europe about Soviet peace aims.
In weighing the Minister's remarks, I discern traces of a continuation (a) of reaction characteristic of exiled governmental mentality; (b) of reaction peculiar to a long-standing Polish point of view, in terms of Polish geopolitical considerations; and (a) a desire for territorial compensation against possible loss of Eastern Polish territory in case of an unsatisfactory final settlement of Polish-Russian frontiers.
In connection with (a) of the foregoing, I am mindful of the hopes of the Allied Governments established here of returning after the war to their respective countries, and of the fact that in the backs of the minds of most of the officials of these Governments there exists an ever present consciousness that they will in the future be judged by their respective peoples on the merits or demerits of whatever decisions they make here. Hence, they feel they must build up a record of having left no stone unturned in defending the interests of their respective countries.
In connection with (b) in the foregoing, I am aware that the Polish Government's thoughts on the subject of doing away with the East Prussian enclave, as above confidentially expressed by Minister Raczynski, find their roots in a long-standing aim on part of the Polish people as a whole. While, for political reasons this was not frequently expressed in pre-war public addresses or in the press, it was nonetheless shared by all shades of opinion in Poland. Only during the tense weeks which led up to the outbreak of war, did one hear it mentioned in public utterances, or read it in the Polish press. Even then, the devotion in the German press to those statements was so violent that it caused the Polish Government to "soft-pedal" further references to East Prussia. I recall having reported on this at the time of its occurrence.
In connection with (c) in the foregoing, I am aware that during the final phase of negotiations which led up to the conclusion of the Polish-Russian Agreement, the Polish Government gained the distinct impression that the Russian Government's ideas on a future settlement of Polish-Russian frontiers envisaged the retention of certain territories of Eastern Poland, on the grounds that the populations thereof were predominantly Russian.
The Polish Government, and according to its reports from Poland, the Polish people, intend, in event of an Allied victory, to insist vigorously upon the re-establishment of Polish-Russian frontiers as defined by the Treaty of Riga. (3)
I am aware, however, that notwithstanding the Government's set determination on this score, it is not unmindful of Moscow's no less determined point of view in the matter, and of consequent difficulties to be overcome, if ever a settlement satisfactory to Poland's standpoint is to be effected.
Moreover; the Polish Government's concern over Moscow's attitude is not without consideration for its own post-war political ambitions. Hence the acquisition of East Prussia is envisaged not only as the answer to Poland's long-standing "dream", but also as compensation to the people for whatever loss Poland might incur in a settlement of Eastern frontiers.
By way of rallying support for their own project, Polish officials shave been sounding officials of other Allied Governments as to their possible respective territorial ambitions, pointing out the potential effectiveness of collective action.
Among the first the Poles approached in the matter were certain members of the Netherlands Government. Replying they had no territorial ambitions, the latter asked whether it was East Prussia the Poles had in mind for themselves, and, if so, did they propose to evacuate the East Prussians, and where to. Perhaps, the Netherlands officials suggested, the Poles had in mind offering some other territory for the settlement of evacuated East Prussians. In response, the Polish officials admitted it was East Prussia they were thinking of, but added they had in mind' no territory for the accommodation of an East Prussian population other than Germany. To this remark the Netherlanders replied that any ideas of this character called for condieration [consideration?] of Germany's already dense population. Moreover, it seemed to them that what the Poles proposed was in the nature of an expulsion of inhabitants, more than a contemplated exchange of populations, which, in some cases in the past had proved mutually satisfactory.
In recounting the foregoing to me confidentially, the Netherlands official said he had done so only to illustrate the form which some of the - post-war aspirations of certain of his colleagues was taking.
Respectfully yours,
A. J. Drexel Biddle, Jr.
NOTES
(1) Gen. Wladyslaw Sikorski, Polish Prime Minister and Commander in Chief. Back
(2) Department of State Bulletin August 9,.1941, p. 113. Back
(3) Signed March 18, 1921, League of Nations Treaty Series, vol. VI, p. 151. Back
© 1997 The Avalon Project.
The Avalon Project : The Atlantic Conference was last modified on: 12/24/2007 08:39:12
The Atlantic Conference : The Polish Embassy to the Department of State
740.0011 European War 1939/15071
The Polish Embassy to the Department of State
PRO MEMORIA
The Polish Government has informed Ambassador Biddle of their views regarding the Joint Declaration of President Roosevelt and Prime Minister Churchill and of their representations made to the British Government in this matter to the effect that:
a) point 2 of the Declaration is causing depression in Poland in view of the policy of ruthless extermination and mass transfers of populations, applied to Poland by Germany;
b) the Polish Government are apprehensive that the wording of the Joint Declaration as regards the security of the post-war world does not appear to take into account strategic and economic factors of security. The Polish Government regard these factors as fundamental and essential, regardless of the degree in which the future status of European peace will be improved in comparison to the Versailles settlement;
c) likewise the necessity for compensating damages willfully inflicted and of obtaining just reparations which would, at last partly, equalize Poland's economic possibilities with that of her neighbors seems to be entirely left out.
Poland hopes that the British and U. S. Governments will consult with one another in this matter and that the points referred to will receive satisfactory interpretation in order to clarify this situation.
WASHINGTON, September 12, 1941.
© 1997 The Avalon Project.
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The Atlantic Conference : Resolution of September 24, 1941
[At the Inter-Allied Meeting held in London on September 24, 1941, the following resolution was unanimously adopted:
"The Governments of Belgium, Czechoslovakia, Greece, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Norway, Poland, Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, and Yugoslavia, and representatives of General de Gaulle, leader of Free Frenchmen, having taken note of the declaration recently drawn up by the President of the United States and by the Prime Minister (Mr. Churchill) on behalf of His Majesty's Government in the United Kingdom, now make known they adherence to the common principles of policy set forth in that declaration and their intention to cooperate to the best of their ability in giving erect to them.
See British Cmd. 6315, Misc. No. 3 (1941): Inter-Allied Meeting Held in London at St. James's Palace of September 24,194l, Report of Proceedings; and Department of State Bulletin September 2l, 1941, pages 233-235.]
© 1997 The Avalon Project.
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The Avalon Project
at Yale Law School
Atlantic Charter
AUGUST 14, 1941
The President of the United States of America and the Prime Minister, Mr. Churchill, representing His Majesty's Government in the United Kingdom, being met together, deem it right to make known certain common principles in the national policies of their respective countries on which they base their hopes for a better future for the world.
First, their countries seek no aggrandizement, territorial or other;
Second, they desire to see no territorial changes that do not accord with the freely expressed wishes of the peoples concerned;
Third, they respect the right of all peoples to choose the form of government under which they will live; and they wish to see sovereign rights and self government restored to those who have been forcibly deprived of them;
Fourth, they will endeavor, with due respect for their existing obligations, to further the enjoyment by all States, great or small, victor or vanquished, of access, on equal terms, to the trade and to the raw materials of the world which are needed for their economic prosperity;
Fifth, they desire to bring about the fullest collaboration between all nations in the economic field with the object of securing, for all, improved labor standards, economic advancement and social security;
Sixth, after the final destruction of the Nazi tyranny, they hope to see established a peace which will afford to all nations the means of dwelling in safety within their own boundaries, and which will afford assurance that all the men in all lands may live out their lives in freedom from fear and want;
Seventh, such a peace should enable all men to traverse the high seas and oceans without hindrance;
Eighth, they believe that all of the nations of the world, for realistic as well as spiritual reasons must come to the abandonment of the use of force. Since no future peace can be maintained if land, sea or air armaments continue to be employed by nations which threaten, or may threaten, aggression outside of their frontiers, they believe, pending the establishment of a wider and permanent system of general security, that the disarmament of such nations is essential. They will likewise aid and encourage all other practicable measure which will lighten for peace-loving peoples the crushing burden of armaments.
Franklin D. Roosevelt
Winston S. Churchill
© 1996 The Avalon Project.
The Avalon Project : THE ATLANTIC CHARTER was last modified on: 12/24/2007 08:44:02
Above -- British Prime Minister Winston Churchill and U.S. President Franklin D. Roosevelt aboard a warship off the coast of Newfoundland during the Atlantic Conference. The conference took place from August 9-12, 1941, and resulted in the Atlantic Charter, a joint proclamation by the United States and Britain declaring that they were fighting the Axis powers to "ensure life, liberty, independence and religious freedom and to preserve the rights of man and justice."
The Atlantic Charter served as a foundation stone for the later establishment of the United Nations, setting forth several principles for the nations of the world, including -- the renunciation of all aggression, right to self-government, access to raw materials, freedom from want and fear, freedom of the seas, and disarmament of aggressor nations. (Photo credit: U.S. National Archives)
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