25 November 2010

winter 11

Dancing with the big boys

In its foreign policy Poland has chosen realism over romanticism

CRITICS and supporters of Polish foreign policy agree on one thing. Relations with Russia have been transformed in the past three years. But into what?

To the critics, a planned visit by Dmitry Medvedev, Russia's president, to Warsaw in December epitomises surrender, stemming from naivety or cynicism. They see Poland scampering after big countries such as Russia, France and Germany, rather like a teenager desperate to hang out with adults, heedless of the national interest. According to the leader of the opposition (and former prime minister), Jaroslaw Kaczynski, Poland has become a Russian-German condominium. Some in his Law and Justice party blame Russian dirty deeds for the plane crash in Smolensk in April that killed his brother Lech, the Polish president, and scores of aides and officials. Two party members have just been in Washington, DC, trying to win American support for an investigation into what they believe is a huge cover-up.

Most others find such paranoia puzzling. Poland has never been safer, richer or better regarded in the world. The government is strong, stable and overwhelmingly popular. Its image abroad, bizarre visits to Washington aside, is vastly improved. Under the Kaczynskis, Poland was a laughing-stock, with a foreign policy marked by disorganisation, prickliness and pettiness. Today officials in Brussels are impressed by the focus of Poland's planning for its stint in the rotating European Union presidency in the second half of 2011. For the first time in decades Poland is a player, not a playground, in European diplomacy.

And for perhaps the first time in its history, Poland has good relations with Germany, Russia and America at the same time. The opposition sees this as further evidence of a sell-out. But it is hard to argue that, on principle, worse relations would be preferable. Government supporters argue that a calmer atmosphere towards Russia has helped trade almost to double in three years, without big concessions. The only climbdown has been a muting of public criticism of Russia's nostalgic attitude to Soviet history. Even this has produced results, such as an agreement to set up a joint documentation centre.

Some Polish steps towards Russia have been startling. In September the Poles briefly arrested Akhmed Zakayev, an exiled Chechen leader, on an Interpol warrant instigated by Russia. Mr Zakayev is a moderate, secular leader (at one point he negotiated formally with the Russian government). The arrest looked like a kowtow to the Kremlin. So did inviting Sergei Lavrov, Russia's foreign minister, to address an annual meeting of Polish ambassadors.

Yet Poland's policy towards Russia is still, mostly, quite tough. It refused, despite American arm-twisting, to invite Mr Lavrov to a big democracy shindig in Cracow in September. The Polish state is paying legal costs in a case at the European Court of Human Rights in Strasbourg over the massacre in 1940 of 20,000 captured Polish officers at Katyn. Their relatives are suing Russia, which is quibbling over its responsibility. Poland's foreign minister, Radek Sikorski, backs a visa ban for those involved in the torture-killing of a Russian lawyer, Sergei Magnitsky, and the beneficiaries of a $230m fraud he uncovered.

Poland has also caught and deported two Russian spies this year and put a Russian sleeper agent on trial. In most other EU countries, such things tend to be hushed up. And it has lobbied the European Commission to put the Nord Stream pipeline contract under the same legal scrutiny that will apply to Poland's gas deal with Russia.

Ties with America are not as close as they were. But they are still warm. Poland will play a central role in NATO's new contingency plans to defend its north-east flank. Officials hint that a new American military presence in Poland will be announced shortly. The American and Polish armies staged their first serious exercises in the Baltic region this year. More are planned. This is a reply to Russia's menacing manoeuvres in 2009, which concluded with a dummy nuclear attack on Poland.

Poland has successfully shed its reputation, dating from the Kaczynski era, for knee-jerk Russophobia. But it was also more idealistic then. It was keen to help America in Iraq and Afghanistan, it took risks for Georgia and it cared deeply about democracy in Ukraine and Belarus. It also did a lot to help the Baltic states.

Now Ukraine has become, in Polish eyes, a sump of corruption. Mr Sikorski and his Swedish counterpart, Carl Bildt, visited Kiev shortly before this week's EU/Ukraine summit to deliver a tough message to its president, Viktor Yanukovich, about the need for discipline and realism. Three weeks ago Mr Sikorski and Guido Westerwelle, the German foreign minister, also went to Belarus to push, with only limited success, for a fair presidential election in December. That may be a tougher policy. But it hardly amounts to the neglect that some accuse the Poles of.

Feelings of betrayal are stronger in Georgia, which once counted Poland as a stalwart ally. But to Mr Sikorski and his colleagues, Georgia's leaders blew their credibility with erratic decision-making during the August 2008 war with Russia. Ties with Lithuania are icy because of a row over its Polish minority, which wants to use the Polish alphabet in official documents.

Poland has, in short, become more pragmatic and less romantic. It no longer idolises America, or sees itself as part of a messianic consolidation of freedom, justice and prosperity in the post-Soviet neighbourhood. The main engine of its foreign policy now is the national interest. The “reset” with Russia fits this perfectly.

What may be missing—as initially with the American “reset”—is reassurance. For the Baltics, Poland is vital to national, energy and economic security. Romantic-era Poland avuncularly ignored local difficulties in places like Lithuania. Pragmatic Poland prefers hard numbers to nice words. If they don't add up, tough: Poland will build the power plants, roads, railways and pipelines that serve its interests. If it has to, it will sell Mazeikiai, a loss-making refinery in Lithuania, to the Russians.

Polish foreign policy could be seen as catching up on time lost under communism. A senior diplomat says the Poles' biggest historical disasters came from overestimating their power. In future Poland must be stronger, not braver.

1. Prepare to comment on the statements contained in the blue (grey?) table above. What are the reasons of such feelings/reactions? Are they justified?

2. How do you assess current foreign policy of Poland. What do you like about it? What would you criticise?

3. Make a list of 3 countries that you have positive associations with. Explain the reasons. Similarly, think of 3 countries that you perceive negatively. Why?

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