WW1ATSEA

Writtenby

JamesTyrell

Allrightsreserved.Nopartofthisbookmaybereproduced,storedinorintroducedintoa
retrievalsystem,ortransmitted,inanyformorbyanymeans(electronic.mechanical,
photocopying,recordingorotherwise)withoutthewrittenpermissionofthepublishers.

Contents

Introduction

TheWarBegins

TheBackgroundtotheBuildUptoWar

Th

e

NavalArmsRace1890

-

1914

TheEarlyStag

e

sofWar

TheBattleofHeligolandBight

TheSurfaceRaidersandtheBattlesofCoronelandtheFalklands

TheSurfaceRaiders

TheBattleofCoronel

TheBattleoftheFalklands

DoggerBank

TurkeyandMesopotamia

GermanyandTurkey1914

ForcingtheDardanelles

Mesopotamia1914-1918

SubmarinesandTheBaltic

TheCreationoftheBritishSubmarineService

TheBaltic

TheBattleofJutland

DefeatingtheU-BoatandtheFinalStagesofWar

UnrestrictedSubmarineWarfare

ZeebruggeandOstend

TheFinalStagesofWar

Profiles

Beatty,David,firstEarlBeatty(1871

-

1936)

Fish

e

r,JohnArbuthnot,fir

s

tBaronFi

s

h

e

r(1841

-

1920)

Hipper,Franzvon(1863-1932)

Jellicoe,JohnRushworth,firstEarlJellicoe(1859-1935)

Keyes,RogerJohnBrownlow,firstBaronKeyes(1872-1945)

Scheer,AdmiralReinhardt(1863

-

1928)

Spee,AdmiralMaximilianvon(1861-1914)

Tirpitz,AdmiralAlfredvan(1849-1930)

Tyrwhitt,SirReginaldYorke(1870-1951)

Chronology

Introduction

I

m

a

geso

fWWIinth

e

popular

c

on

sc

iou

s

n

ess

normall

yi

n

vo

l

ve

th

e

blood

y

attrit

i

onof

tr

e

n

c

h

w

arfar

e,

th

e

mil

es

ofmud

,

th

es

hatt

e

r

e

dearth,th

e

tangl

e

dmil

es

ofbarb

e

dwir

e.

H

oweve

r,th

e

r

e

wasanoth

e

r

s

ignifi

ca

ntar

e

n

ao

f

w

ar

-

th

e

battl

e

forcontrolofth

ese

a.Th

e

w

ar

a

t

se

ah

as

r

ece

i

ve

dl

ess

att

e

ntionpartlybecauseiti

s

l

e

ssimm

e

di

a

t

e

l

y

dr

a

mati

c

.Th

e

RoyalNavyhadtoplayalonggam

e

in

s

u

s

tainingth

e

distantblockadethatwould

eve

ntuall

yc

rippl

e

G

e

rman

y.

TheNavyprovidedthescr

ee

n,which

e

nabl

e

dth

e

waron

land.

In1914,atthebeginningofth

e

war,B

r

itain’

s

maritim

es

upr

e

ma

cy

hadremain

e

d

unchall

e

ng

e

df

o

raroundahundr

e

d

ye

ar

s

.Man

y

exp

e

ct

e

danoth

er

Battl

eo

fTrafal

g

arbut

adv

a

n

ces

intechnolog

y

sa

w

a

ve

r

y

diff

e

r

e

ntkindof

w

arfar

e

withthewidespr

e

adus

e

of

m

i

n

es

,

s

ubmarin

es

and

to

rp

e

d

oes.

Th

e

rewasast

ee

pl

e

arning

c

ur

ve

a

s

th

e

impa

c

t

oft

h

e

n

e

wtechnologywasinitiall

y

und

e

r

es

timat

e

dbyb

o

th

si

d

e

sandn

e

ith

e

rsidehadexp

e

ri

e

n

ce

of

co

mmandinfl

ee

t

actio

n

.

Th

eex

p

e

rien

ceo

fth

e

Fir

s

tW

or

l

d

Wa

rwo

ulddomu

c

hto

informtheSecondWorldWar,parti

c

ularl

y

intheu

seo

fa

v

iation.

Th

e

waratseaaffectedeveryoceanintheworld,andin

a

bookofthissiz

e

itisimpossible

toconsid

e

rallth

es

m

a

ll

e

r

c

onfli

c

tsin

e

ver

y

ar

e

na.Thebook

e

xamin

e

sth

eeve

nt

s

thatled

towarandthenavalarmsrac

e

b

e

t

wee

nBrit

a

inandG

e

rman

y.

Ittra

c

estheeventsofth

e

w

arat

se

a

,

.

l

oo

kingatth

e

majorbattl

e

s,theeffectsofunrestri

c

t

e

d

s

ubmarin

e

warfar

e

and

someofthekeyprotagonists

.

TheWarBegins

Vi

c

toryattheBattleofTrafalgarandthedefeatofNapoleonatWaterloosawth

e

startof

an

e

rainwhichBritain’smaritimesupremacywasvirtuallyunchallengedfornearlya

hundredyears.However,asthenineteenth

ce

nturydrewtoaclose,Britain’sEmpirewas

beginningtof

ee

lthestrain,withwarinSouthAfricaandincreasingt

e

nsionoverthe

questionofHomeRuleinIreland.Noneth

e

l

e

ss,Britainin1900wasstillthewealthiest

nationinth

e

world.Shewasdependentonhers

e

apowerforworldtradeandtoimport

sufficientfoodtof

ee

dadenselypopulat

e

disland.Itwasessentialthatsh

e

maintainedher

maritim

e

supremacyandfearoflosingitwastob

ec

om

e

adominantfeatureofthe

e

arly

tw

e

nti

e

thc

e

ntur

y

.

TheBackgroundtotheBuildUptoWar

T

e

nsionswerebeginningtomountthroughoutEurope

f

romthe1890sonwardsandth

e

s

e

y

e

ar

s

sawanint

e

nsifi

ca

ti

o

n

o

fambitiou

s

nationalismthatw

o

uldultimat

e

l

y

l

e

adtothe

outbreakofWorldWarOn

e

.Th

e

balanc

e

b

e

twe

e

nth

e

majorEuropeanpowersstart

e

dto

shiftwithth

e

riseofth

e

GermanEmpire.Successfulwarsin1866againstth

e

Austrian

EmpireandagainstFrancein1870sawth

e

unif

ic

at

i

onofGermanstateswithth

e

KingdomofPru

ss

iato

c

r

e

at

e

whatwasth

e

mostpowerfulempireinEurop

e.

Th

e

Dual

Monar

c

h

y

ofAustria

-

Hungarywasalsoanall

yo

f.G

e

rmany.

E

ve

na

s

lat

e

asth

e

1890s,Britainperceivedherold

e

n

e

m

y

Fran

c

easherbigg

e

strival.The

b

e

liefwasnot

e

ntir

e

lywithoutfoundation

.

Afteritshumiliatingloss

e

stoG

e

rm

a

n

y

,th

e

Fr

e

ncharmyturnedtoAfrica,whichbroughtitint

oc

onfli

c

twithBritishinterests.In

addition,th

e

Fr

e

n

c

hna

vy

hadbe

e

nkeepingabreastofnewtechnologyandin

s

om

ec

a

se

s

hadintroduceditaheadofBritain.Infact,th

e

RoyalNavywastheonlymajormaritim

e

pow

e

rnott

o

hav

es

ubmarin

es

b

y

1900,althoughtherewereplansf

o

rth

e

irintrodu

c

tion.

Britain’sotherfearintheninete

e

nth

ce

ntur

y

wasFran

ce’

smajorally,theRussianEmpire,

whos

ee

xpansion

e

ndangeredBritishroutesintoIndiathroughth

e

MiddleEast.Inorderto

protecttheseroutesintoIndia,Br

i

tainsupportedtheTurkishEmpire.Russia’sambiti

o

n

s

inth

e

Eastw

e

r

e

haltedwhentheyweredefeat

e

db

y

Japaninth

ew

arof1904-5andthe

y

turn

e

dinst

e

adtoward

s

th

e

OttomanEmpir

e

.SlavcommunitiesinGr

eece,

S

e

rbiaand

BulgariatraditionallylookedtoRussiafor

s

upport.Au

s

tri

a

-

Hungarybecameincreasingl

y

f

e

arfulofitsownmin

o

rit

y

SlavpopulationasRussia

e

ncourag

e

dSlavind

e

p

e

nd

e

n

ce.

.

Britainwasalarm

e

d

w

h

e

nRussiaandFrancesignedth

e

DualEnt

e

nt

e

in1891

.

Asolution

tothecountry’sanxieti

es

ma

y

hav

e

b

e

entoallyhers

e

lfwithGermanybutBritain

was

un

w

illingtomakesuchacommitm

e

nt,G

e

rmandiplo

macy

fail

e

dand,mostimportantl

y

,

G

e

rmany’snavalpr

ogra

mm

e

wasad

i

r

e

ctthr

e

attoBritain

.

Britainwa

saw

ar

e

thath

e

r

maritimesupr

e

ma

cy

wa

s

und

e

rthr

e

atandm

a

d

e

analliancewithJapanin1902

.

Thiswa

s

th

e

firstun

io

nthatBritainhadmadeforn

e

arlyahundr

e

d

ye

ars.In1

9

04,Britainputaside

herr

e

centprobl

e

mswithFranc

eove

rAfr

ic

aandenteredintotheso-call

e

dEntente

Cordiale,

a

lthoughthiswasnotaformalallianc

e

.In1907,aft

e

rJapand

e

f

e

at

e

dRussia,

Britainsettl

e

dth

e

bord

e

rdisput

e

sinP

e

rsiaandAfghanistanwithRussiaandform

e

dthe

TripleEnt

e

ntewiththeTsaristEmpireandwithFrance

.

Th

e

agr

ee

m

e

ntdidnotcommit

Britaintoprovidemilitarysupportintheeventofwarbut,whenGermanyatt

e

mptedto

undermineFrance’sinfluenceinMoroccowithashowofnavalmightin1911,Britain
mad

e

h

e

rbackingofFrancemoreexplicit.Asaresultitbecam

ec

lear

e

rthat,inthe

e

v

e

nt

ofwar,Britainwouldmostlik

e

lyprovid

e

militarysupporttotheEntente

.

WarbetweenGermanyandBritainbegantolookmorelik

e

l

y

,asGermanysteppedupits

naval

e

xpan

s

ionand,atthesametime,relationsbetweenRussiaandAustria-Hungary

worsened.In1908,AustriaannexedBosnia-H

e

rzegovinaandthethenSerbgovernment

setupaliberationmovementthatin

c

ludedthecovertt

e

rroristgroupcalledtheBlack

Hand.WithRussiansupport,Serbiaform

e

dtheBalkanLeaguewithGreece,Bulgariaand

Montenegro

.

Theprimaryaimwastor

e

movetheTurksfromth

e

Balkanpeninsulaandthe

firstBalkanwar

s

tart

e

d

i

n1912,atatim

e

wh

e

ntheTurkswerealsod

e

f

e

ndingth

e

irland

s

inLibyafromtheItalianswhohadgrandplan

s

t

oex

p

a

ndth

e

irown

e

mpire

.

Thecountries

inth

e

B

a

lkanL

eag

u

e

w

e

r

ev

i

c

toriousbut

,

in1913,the

y

foughta

seco

nd

w

a

r

b

e

tw

ee

n

them

s

elv

e

soverthegains

.

Serbia’ssucc

esses

l

e

dt

o

gr

ea

tf

e

arsinAustria,whichreached

theirz

e

nithwith

t

h

e

a

ss

assinationinSarajevooftheheirtotheAustrianthron

e,

Archduk

e

FranzFerdinand,on28July1914.Hisa

s

sa

s

sinwa

s

GavriloPrincip,ayoungmemberof

theBlackHand

.

Au

st

ria

‘s

primaryconcernnowwastodestroytheS

e

rbian

e

n

e

m

y

forgood.Knowingthat

Russiawouldcom

e

outinsupportofS

e

rbia,theAustriansfirstmadesur

e

thatG

e

rm

a

n

y

wo

uldsupportth

e

mandthentheyissuedanultimatumt

o

S

e

rbia.Th

e

ultimatumwas

ignoredandsoAu

s

t

ri

ad

e

c

lar

e

dwaron28July.Russia,unwillingtoabandonS

e

rbia,

mobiliz

e

don30JulyandherallyFrance,

e

quallyunwillingtoabandonRussia,plannedto

follow

s

uit.Ru

ss

i

a

nmobilizationwasfollowedbyGermanmobilizati

o

n

.

G

e

rman

y’s

plan

wa

s

toinvadeBelgiumandtohop

e

for

a

qui

c

k

v

i

c

t

o

r

y

o

ve

rFr

a

n

ces

othattheFrench

wouldb

e

un

a

bl

e

t

o

mobil

ize

insupportofRussia.Itwastheinvasion

o

fB

e

lgium

t

hat

dr

e

wBritainintothewar,becauseanimpli

c

itpart

o

fBritishnavalpolicysinceth

e

sixte

e

nthc

e

nturyhadb

ee

nthatth

e

LowCountri

e

sshouldnotfallint

oene

m

y

h

a

nd

s.

Wh

e

n

th

e

Brit

i

shgov

e

rnm

e

nt’

s

r

e

qu

es

tforBelgiann

e

utralit

y

t

o

b

e

r

e

spectedreceivedno

answer,Britaind

ec

lar

e

d

w

aronG

e

rman

y

on4August1914.

Th

e

NavalArmsRace1890

-

1914

Th

eye

arsl

e

adinguptoth

e

Fir

s

tWorldWars

a

wap

e

riod

o

fint

e

ns

e

navalismthroughout

Eur

o

p

e

,andBritainwasno

exce

ption.Therehadn

e

v

e

rb

ee

nap

e

riodwh

e

nth

eco

n

ce

rns

andarmamentofth

e

Ro

y

alNav

y

figur

e

dmor

e

highl

y

inth

e

publicsph

e

re

.

Organization

s

s

uchasth

e

Na

vy

R

ec

ordsSocietyandtheNavyL

e

agu

e

begantoflouri

s

hand

t

h

e

r

e

w

e

re

numerousnaval

ex

hibitions.Alfr

e

dTha

y

erMahan

’

sTheInfluence

o

fSeapoweron

Hi

s

torywaspublishedatthi

s

tim

e

,anditsideaspartlyaff

ec

tedthed

ec

isionsofoth

e

r

nationstobeginbuildingmod

e

rnfle

e

t

s

ofth

e

irowninthehop

e

thatthe

y

couldwi

e

ldthe

kindofinflu

e

nc

e

thatBritainhadacrosstheworld.Japanwasoneofth

e

firstn

a

tionsto

takeupthemaritim

e

chall

e

ngeandBritain

se

tupanavalmissioninTokyoin1882toaid

th

e

m

.

Th

e

odor

e

Roos

e

v

e

ltwasanenthusiasticsupport

e

rofMahanandsol

e

dAmericato

buildupherownnavy,s

e

eingitsexpansion

.

asthek

e

ytoworldpower

.

Howev

e

r,th

e

re

wasnok

ee

nerdis

c

ipl

e

ofMahanthanG

e

rmany’sKais

e

rWilh

e

lmwhohadlongen

v

ied

thenavyofhisgrandmoth

e

r,Qu

ee

nVi

c

toria

.

Th

ee

xperienceofth

e

Rus

s

o

-

Japan

ese

Warof1904-1905,whentheJapanes

e

wip

e

dout

th

e

Russianfl

ee

tatth

e

battleofTsuchima,d

e

monstrat

e

dtoth

e

worldthat,withth

e

threat

fromminesandtorp

e

do

es

,itmad

e

s

e

ns

e

togr

e

atlyext

e

ndtherang

e

atwhichbattl

e

ships

foughteachoth

e

r

.

ItwasseenthatRussianbattl

e

shipscoulda

cc

urat

e

lyfir

e

ov

e

r18,000

yards

.

Th

e

commonpra

c

ti

ce

atthi

s

tim

ei

nth

e

RoyalNavywastotarg

e

tataround3,000

y

ardsbut

f

utur

e

battl

e

s,itwas

c

l

e

ar,wouldbefoughtatrang

es

off

i

v

e

t

o

t

e

nmil

e

s,and

thism

e

antthatbattleshipswouldb

e

b

es

t

ar

m

e

d

w

ithlong

-

rang

e

12-inchguns

,

support

e

d

b

y

flot

i

lla

softo

rp

e

doboat

s

.AdmiralJohn(Jack

y

)Fish

e

r

,w

h

o

hadju

s

tb

ee

napp

o

int

e

d

Fir

s

tS

e

aLordin1904,almo

s

timm

e

di

a

t

e

l

yse

td

es

ign

e

rstoworktocreatewhatwould

b

ec

om

e

HM

S

Dr

e

adnought,laun

c

h

e

dinFebruary1906

.

Dr

e

adnough

tw

a

sar

m

e

d

w

itht

e

n

12-inchguns,doublethenumb

e

rof

a

n

yo

th

e

rv

esse

l,and

c

ouldr

e

a

c

hspeedsof21knots,

which

w

a

s,o

n

a

v

e

rag

e

,thr

ee

knotsfasterthanmostbattl

e

ships.Th

e

laun

c

h

o

fth

e

Dr

e

adnoughteffectivelymadealloth

e

rbattl

es

hip

so

b

s

ol

e

t

e

andforcedtheGerman

Admiral

,

von

Tirpit

z

,to

s

u

s

p

e

ndhis

s

hipbuildingprogrammesothatth

e

G

e

rm

a

nna

vyco

uldb

e

ginit

s

ownplansfordreadnought-

c

la

ssvesse

l

s

.Itultimat

e

l

y

intensifiedtheAnglo

-

G

e

rman

n

av

alr

ace.

Th

erew

a

sg

r

e

at

e

x

c

it

e

mentinBritainov

e

rth

e

Dreadn

o

ugh

t,

althoughFish

e

r’scritics

wereconc

e

rn

e

d

‘

ab

o

utnotonl

y

th

ee

normouscostofbuildingitbutalsoth

ec

o

s

tof

re

p

l

a

ce

m

e

nt

i

fitwaslost,especiall

y

sinc

e

Fish

e

rhad

ac

tu

a

ll

y

b

ee

n

a

ppoint

e

dtom

a

ke

c

uts

inna

v

alsp

e

nding

.

N

ever

th

e

l

esss

h

e

in

s

p

ire

d

ac

l

asso

f

ve

s

se

lthatb

ec

am

e

k

now

n

un

ivers

all

y

a

s

th

e

d

re

adnoughtandver

y

soonth

e

n

avieso

fth

ewor

ldw

e

r

e

designingtheir

ownv

e

rsions.

F

i

s

h

e

r

was

a

veryco

ntrover

s

ialfigureandth

e

man

y

r

e

f

o

rm

s

thath

e

intr

o

du

ce

db

e

tw

ee

n1904and1909

,

whi

c

h

esse

ntiall

y

m

o

d

er

niz

e

dth

e

R

oy

alNa

vy

,mad

e

himm

a

n

ye

n

e

mi

es.

H

e

wa

sr

uthl

ess

int

a

kingoldervess

e

lsoutof

se

r

v

i

ce

(man

yo

fth

e

m

we

r

e

u

se

dagainduringth

e

war)or

sc

rappingth

e

mbuthealsoreform

e

drecruitm

e

nt,

training

a

ndintr

o

du

c

ednavalreserv

e

s,all

o

fwhi

c

hwouldprov

e

importantinfighting

WorldWarOn

e

.H

e

wa

s

larg

e

l

y

r

es

p

o

n

s

ibl

e

forthec

r

eationofa

s

ubmarin

e

s

e

rvi

ce

ata

ti

m

ew

h

e

nmanyfeltthatsubmarin

e

sw

e

r

e

w

e

apon

s

ofdirt

yw

arfareandnotquite‘British’

.

Britainhadpr

e

viousl

y

m

a

intain

e

dhernavywiththe

e

xp

e

ctationthath

e

rmajor

riva

l

s

wouldbeFranceandRussia,butnowth

ey

wer

efo

r

ce

dtorespondtotheGerman

expansion.

Th

e

ris

e

oftheGermanNavywasremarkabl

e

.Th

e

firstN

avy

Actwaspassedin1898and,

withinlittl

e

mor

e

thanad

ec

ad

e

,th

e

Germansbuiltth

e

s

e

condlargestbattl

e

fle

e

tinth

e

worldfromscratch,larg

e

lyund

e

rAdmiralAlfr

e

dvonTirpitz.Therealizationofth

e

n

e

c

e

s

s

it

y

tor

es

pondtoG

e

rmanyculminatedin1909withth

e

bigg

e

stpeacetimena

v

al

scarethatBritainhadhadinherhistory

.

Int

e

lligenceinLondonreportedthatth

e

rewasto

beafurth

e

racc

e

l

e

r

a

tionintheGermanbuildingofdreadnoughts.Also,theimprov

e

m

e

nts

andexpansionofG

e

rmanshipbuildingm

e

antthattheycouldbuildapproximat

e

l

ye

ight

dr

e

adn

o

ught

s

p

e

ryear,thusequalingth

e

Brit

is

hcapa

c

ity

.

Thisinf

o

rmationledtoahug

e

d

e

bateinParliam

e

nt

ove

rth

e

1909na

v

al

e

stimates(budget)ando

ve

rth

e

qu

e

sti

o

nof

w

h

e

th

e

rfourorsixnewdr

ea

dnought

s

shouldb

e

built

.

Th

era

di

c

alLiberals,including

Llo

y

dG

eo

rg

e

andWin

s

ton

C

hur

c

hill,arguedthatthenation

co

uldonl

y

affordfour

s

hip

s

,

andthattheAdmiralt

y

wa

s

b

e

ingala

r

mi

s

tinw

a

nting

mo

r

e

.Th

e

Conservativesfoughtf

o

r

s

ixships.PrimeMini

s

t

e

rAsquithbroker

e

dasolutionthatironi

c

all

y

w

o

uldprovid

e

for

e

ightnewv

es

s

e

ls

-

fourtobebuiltin1909

-

10

a

ndprovisionforafurtherfourv

e

ss

e

lsifit

prov

e

dn

ecessa

r

y.

Thed

ec

i

s

ionwasprompt

e

dbyfurth

e

rint

e

lli

ge

n

ce

thatG

e

rmany’sally,

Austria,hadbegunplan

s

f

o

rthr

ee

orf

o

urdr

e

adnoughts

.

This,inturn,hadcaus

e

d

c

on

ce

rn

inItal

y,which

hadimm

e

diat

e

lybegunitsownbuildin

g

p

rogr

amm

e

.

F

o

rFish

e

r,how

e

ver,dreadnoughtswerev

e

r

y

mu

c

had

e

t

e

rr

e

nttoth

e

G

e

rmansrath

e

rthan

necessarilyad

ec

i

s

iv

e

in

s

trum

e

nto

f

warandhewasperceptiveinr

e

alizingthatth

e

s

ubmarin

e

andtorp

e

dowouldcometobeasimportantinna

v

al

w

arfar

e

.Fisherwas

confidentthatBritaincouldmain

t

ainh

e

rad

va

ntag

e

ov

e

rGermanyinthestr

e

n

g

thofh

e

r

fl

ee

tand

,

ind

ee

d,thiswastrue

.

However,itwas

c

l

e

arth

a

t

i

t

w

a

s

b

ec

omingtoocostlyfor

Britaintomaintainh

e

rfl

ee

t

s

thr

o

ughoutth

e

wo

r

ldandFisherbegantoconc

e

ntrat

eo

n

d

e

pl

oy

m

e

ntsinhomewaters

.

TheMediterraneanFl

ee

twa

s

v

e

rymuchr

e

duc

e

dand,when

Churchillb

e

cam

e

Fir

s

tLordofth

e

AdmiraltyinOctober1911,heint

e

ndedtotak

e

thi

s

r

e

du

c

tionev

e

nfurther.TheFrenchmov

e

dth

e

ironl

y

battl

es

hipsquadronfromBresttoth

e

M

e

dit

e

rran

e

an.Man

y

t

oo

kthi

s

t

o

b

e

th

e

r

es

ultofanagre

e

m

e

ntBritainhadmad

e

in

ad

va

n

cew

ithFran

ce

undertheEntenteCordialebut

,

inr

e

alit

y,

th

e

Fr

e

nchhadreachedthe

decisionseparat

e

ly

.Esse

ntiall

y

,th

e

movelefttheFrenchtoguardth

e

M

e

dit

e

rran

e

anand

th

e

Britishwithonlyasmallfor

ce

atGibraltar,though

e

noughthatth

ec

ombin

e

dAnglo

-

Fr

e

nchforc

e

wouldoutnumb

e

rth

e

ItalianandAustrianfle

e

t

s.

In1912

,

Chur

c

hillr

eve

al

e

dinParliamentthatBritain

was

n

o

long

e

rmaintainingth

e

long-

h

e

ldpolicyofth

e

two-p

owe

r

s

tandard,meaningthatth

e

Britishfl

ee

tshouldbe

s

up

e

r

ior

to

thecombinedforceofh

e

rt

w

omo

s

tpow

e

rful

r

i

va

l

s.

Nowthefleetwa

s

tob

e

builtto

en

s

ur

es

up

e

riorit

yove

rG

e

rmanyalone.Th

e

r

e

w

e

r

es

om

ee

ffortsaroundthist

i

m

e

tohalt

thenavalrac

e

withG

e

rman

y

(for

e

xampl

e

,

C

hur

c

hill

’

sproposalthatbothcountri

ess

hould

su

s

p

e

nd

f

urth

e

rshipbuildingforay

e

ar)butalldiploma

cye

v

e

ntu

a

ll

y

fail

e

d

.

Infact,

technologicaladvan

ce

sint

e

nsifiedthe

r

a

cee

v

e

nfurtherwiththedev

e

lopm

e

ntofth

e

sup

e

r

dr

e

adn

o

ught,whichcarriedIS-inchguns.

TheEarlyStag

e

sofWar

Th

e

mobilisationoftheNavywentv

e

ry

e

fficientlyandth

e

rewastheaddedbonusthat

th

e

rehadb

ee

namajor

e

x

e

rcis

e

forreservistsinthe

s

umm

e

rof1914.Theyw

e

reaboutto

bedispersedbut,withth

e

outbreakofwar,theyw

e

r

e

detainedandthereforereadyfor

actionalmostimm

e

diatel

y.

TheBritishGrandFle

e

t(previouslyknownasthe

\

FirstFl

ee

t)

withtwentydreadnoughtsandfourbattle

c

rui

se

rswassenttoitswarstation,S

c

apaFlow

intheOrkneys,topreventGerman

e

ntryintotheNorthS

e

a.The

c

ommander-in-chiefwas

thenewlyappointedSirJohnJ

e

llicoewhohadbeenapr

e

viousDir

e

ctorofNaval

OrdnanceandControlleroftheNavy

.

Hereplac

e

dadevastat

e

dSirJohnCallaghanatthe

lastminuteon4August,andhadb

ee

nFisher’spreferredcandidat

e

forsom

e

time.Alsoto

th

e

norththereweretwopatrols,th

e

SixthCruiser

S

quadronwithfourDrake

c

lassvess

e

ls

andth

e

T

e

nth

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ui

se

rSquadronwith

e

ightEdqar

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lasscrui

s

er

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e

lwasVi

ce

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c

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ey

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eig

ht

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npr

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i

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in

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rs

andtwolightcruisers,a

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nD

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lasssubmarinesunderComm

o

dor

e

R

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er

K

eyes

inth

e

EighthSubmarineFlotilla.Inaddition,K

eyes

wa

s

incommandofthe

SixthSubmar

i

n

e

Flotilla

co

mp

r

i

s

ing

s

i

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old

e

rv

e

ss

e

ls

.

Therewerealso

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mall

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rf

orces

at

th

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R

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lG

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org

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patrolsand

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madeupofolderv

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ls,topr

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astandth

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shippinglanestoandfromFran

ce.

H

oweve

r

,

th

e

majorityofcruisersinth

e

Channel

wereF

r

e

n

c

h,andithadbe

e

nagreedin1913that,shouldFran

cea

ndBritainb

e

alli

e

sinwar,theFrenchwouldprot

ec

tth

e

w

e

sternsideb

e

tweentheContentinP

e

ninsula

andEnglandandth

e

RoyalNavywouldberesponsibl

e

forth

es

t

r

ait

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fDov

e

r.

M

erc

hant

s

hip

s

w

e

r

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oanimportantpartofBritishd

e

f

e

n

ses

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o

r

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th

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00

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e

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quisitionedforbl

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k

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e

duti

es

,in

a

dditiontoasmallnumb

e

rofarm

o

re

d

vesse

l

s,

inth

e

firstmonthsofthewar

.

Byth

e

endofth

ew

arth

e

numb

e

rhadgrownto3,700m

e

r

c

hant

v

es

s

e

l

s

inv

o

lv

e

d

i

nauxilia

r

ypatrol.

Th

e

Hi

g

hS

eas

Fl

ee

t,G

er

man

y

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e

stnavalfor

ce,

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se

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e

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r

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e

nohl.Two

s

quadrons(1stand3rd),comprising

e

ight

o

ld

e

r

d

r

e

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c

la

s

sdr

e

adnoughts

(w

ithplansforanothertwotojoin),

w

e

r

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e

datthem

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uth

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fth

e

JadeRiv

e

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e

stG

e

rman

y

with

e

ntry

i

nt

o

th

e

North

Sea.Alsoba

s

edatJad

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Ri

ve

rwa

s

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fo

urb

a

ttl

e

cruiser

s

underth

ec

ommandof

R

e

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Fr

an

z

Hipp

e

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s

enioroffic

e

rincharg

e

of

sco

utinggroups.The

SecondSquadron,with

e

ightpr

e-drea

dn

o

ughts,wasbasedatth

e

mouthofElb

e.

Both

ri

ve

r

mo

uth

s

w

e

r

e

protectedbyanumb

e

roflight

e

rv

es

s

e

lsand

twos

ubmarineflotillas,

mad

e

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e

t

ee

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e

ss

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l

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,w

e

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ea

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h

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ee

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Oth

e

rgroup

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e

n

e

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ithold

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e

ssels,wer

e

b

e

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commandedseparat

e

l

y

b

y

Prin

ce

Heinri

c

hofP

r

ussia,brothertotheKais

e

r

.

At

,

th

e

beginningofwar,man

y

p

e

opl

ee

xp

ec

t

e

dthatth

e

rewouldbeamajorseabattl

e

withinth

e

firstf

e

wda

y

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w

ithadecisivevictorytorivalTrafalgar.Howev

e

r,itwas

immediatelyobviousattheouts

e

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c

lose

blockad

e

wa

s

impracti

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al.The

te

chnologicalbreakthroughsoftorp

e

do

es

,

s

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s,

min

e

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s

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e

n

ses

m

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antthatitwast

o

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s

toblockad

e

at

c

lo

se

qua

r

t

e

r

s.

Inaddition,

s

hips

w

ouldhav

e

toreturntoport

eve

r

y

thr

ee

tofourda

y

st

o

c

oaland,d

e

pendingonth

e

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ce

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port,ablo

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mightrequir

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ee

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n

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e

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,

o

n

e

inportandoneintransit

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whichwouldhav

e

n

ee

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e

d

mor

e

shipsthanwereavailabl

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.Th

es

trat

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e

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e

r

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e

.

Th

e

G

e

rman

s

w

e

r

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surprisedb

o

thb

y

th

e

speedoftheBriti

s

hmobili

z

ationandb

y

thefact

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c

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e

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ce

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c

h

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e

ir

s

trategyhadb

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n

pr

e

dicatedonthat

e

v

e

ntuality.Th

ey

h

a

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s

onotb

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npr

e

paredforthefactthatth

e

Briti

s

h

d

i

d

no

th

ave

asquadronpatrollingHeligoland.Th

e

G

e

rman

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hadint

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nd

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theanti

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ipat

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hFl

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r

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ri

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,a

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ct

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dthatth

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r

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F

l

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izeuponthemas

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l

e

ftp

o

rt

.

Th

ey

w

e

r

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e

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e

whil

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th

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h

mai

n

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irnumericaladvantageinships

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Th

e

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ll

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tradingwithth

e

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orld

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r

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b

y

alsoprotectedBritain’sm

e

rchantfl

ee

t

w

hi

c

h

,

at

a

r

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und19milliontons,account

e

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e

arl

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50

%o

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orld’stotal.The

Chann

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andit

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a

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e

n

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m

y

t

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mplat

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akingthroughandthisleftth

e

north

e

rn

e

ntrytotheNorthSeaastheonly

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e

rmanstog

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tout.Therewereweaknessesinth

e

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e

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apa

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cause,shouldtheFleetv

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,

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etos

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Th

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e

Briti

s

h

Expeditionar

y

F

o

r

ce

(BEF)to

F

ran

cew

h

ic

h

s

tart

e

don7August.

.

Squadron

s

blo

c

king

rout

es

int

o

th

e

Chann

e

lprotectedthem.B

e

for

e

th

ew

arth

e

Germanshadhop

e

dthatth

e

y

mighthamp

e

r

s

u

c

ht

r

ansportsbyattacksonaBritishFl

ee

tin

c

losebl

oc

kad

e,

butwhen

thatdidnotmat

e

rial

ize

th

e

onl

y

wayth

a

tth

e

ycouldha

ve

mad

e

an

y

impa

c

twastou

se

th

e

irbattl

e

fleet.Thistheyw

e

r

e

notpr

e

par

e

dtori

s

k.Inaddit

io

n,th

e

Germanshadgreat

c

onfid

e

nc

e

inth

e

irSchlieff

e

nPlanonland,whichwasessentiall

y

to

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onqu

e

rFrance

sw

i

f

tlyb

e

foreRussiacouldcometoh

e

raid

,

andth

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o

t

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onsiderthattherelatively

smallBEFwouldsignifi

c

antlyaffecttheoutcome.Sothetroopsw

e

r

e

land

e

dinFranc

e

unimpeded.

Thefirstskirmishatseaoccurr

e

don5Augustwh

e

nth

e

G

e

rmanminelayerKoniginLui

se

,

disguis

e

da

s

apass

e

nger

ves

s

e

l(whichinfactsh

e

hadb

ee

nb

e

for

e

th

e

war),wasona

missiontolayminesofftheportofHarwi

c

h.AdmiralTyrwhittwaspatrollingthelin

e

b

e

tw

ee

nHarwichandTersch

e

lling(inDutchwaters)and,onh

e

aringintelligenc

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ofthe

minelayer’spresenc

e

,dispatchedth

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d

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stroyersLanceandLandrailtoinvestigate.The

AmphionalsojoinedthembutitwasLancethatfir

e

dth

e

firstshotofthewaratsea.The

min

e

la

ye

rwa

s

outnumb

e

red,lightlyarm

e

dandstoodlittlechanc

e.

Sh

e

wa

s

sunkwitha

lossof54outofher100crew

.

Theveryn

e

xtday,Amphionwas

s

unkbyoneofthemines

thathadb

ee

nlaidb

y

th

e

KoniginLuise

.

InthefirstweeksofthewarU-boatsw

e

r

e

reachingS

c

apaFlowandasfarasthe

Norw

e

giancoast.Th

e

capacity

o

fthesubmarinestotravelsuchdistanc

e

shadb

e

en

seri

o

u

s

l

y

und

e

rrated.Therewasawak

e

upcallfortheRoyalNavywhenasubmarine

attackedtheMonarchongunnerypracticelessthan500milesfromHeligoland.Whenthe
GermanFirstSubmarineFlotillaheadedintotheNorthSeaon6August,itsmenwerestill
unawareoftheexactlocationoftheshipsoftheGrandFleetwhichhadnotappeared,as
expected,atHeligolandBight.TwoofthetenGermansubmarineswerelost,one
disappearedandanotherrammedbythecruiserBirminghamandsunkwiththelossofall
crew.Withawarenessofthesubmarinedangerheightened,therewerefalsesightingsand
acoupleofmajorscaresthat,injest,cametobereferredtoasthefirstandsecondBattles
ofScapa,However,therewasgenuinedangeratScapaFlow.InNovemberU18managed
toenterHoxaSound,oneoftheentrypointstotheanchorage,althoughitwasforcedbya
trawlertoscuttleitselfbeforeitcouldattack.Throughthesubmarinepatrols,Admiral
IngenohlrealizedthatBritishForceswereatthenorthernentrancetotheNorthSeaandhe
decidedonapolicyofguerrilla-typewarfareofraidsintothe

Britishareas.ThiswasnotdissimilartooriginalGermanideas,whentheyexpecteda
closeblockade,inthattheyintendedtoweardowntheenemygradually.

On15and16AugusttheGermanlightcruisersKolnandStuttgart,accompaniedby
torpedoboats,weresentonreconnaissancearoundHeligolandBightwithamissionto
attackBritishsubmarinesthoughttobeinthearea.Nothingcameofthismissionbutthe
Germansweremoresuccessfulon18AugustwhenthelightcruisersStralsundand
Strassburg,withsubmarinesupport,againwenttoseekoutBritishforces.Theycame
acrossthelightcruiserFearlessaswellas16destroyersoftheFirstFlotillafromthe
Harwichlightforce.TheBritishsightedtheStralsundbuttheymistookherforthemuch
moreheavily-armedGermanvesselYorckand,asaconsequence,CaptainBluntcalledfor
backup.AlthoughtheGermanvesselswereoutnumbered,Bluntwasworriedaboutthe
vulnerabilityofhislightvesselsinthefaceoftheYorck,andsoTyrwhittcameoutwith
therestoftheHarwich-basedforce.Inthemeantime,Stralsundhadgotwindofthetrap
intowhichshewasbeinglured,reversedcourseandgotaway.

TheBattleofHeligolandBight

ItwasafrustratingincidentandtherewasconsiderablefrustrationthroughouttheBritish
fleetwiththelackofactionsofaratsea.Inthemeantime,Keyeshadbeenmaking
reconnaissancearoundtheBightandhadbuiltupagoodpictureofthepatternsofGerman
defense.HemadeaproposaltoattackandattempttoeliminateGermanpatrolsaroundthe
Bight.Consequently,on12August,ChurchillorderedCaptainHerbertRichmond(the
AssistantDirectoroftheOperationsDivisionoftheNavalWarStaff)andAdmiral
Christian(CommanderoftheSouthernForce)toplanaraidonHeligolandBight.The
BightwasofstrategicimportancetotheGermansbecauseofitsproximitytotheirmajor
waterways-theElbe,Jade,WeserandEiderriverswheretheHighSeasFleetwas

s

tation

e

d.Itwasnotthefirsttimesuchaplanhadb

ee

n

s

u

gge

st

e

dbut,ashadhappened

before,nothingcam

e

ofit

.

J

e

lli

c

o

e

,a

se

ag

e

rfora

c

tionasKe

y

esandT

y

rwhitt

,

al

s

o

s

ubmitt

e

danoth

e

rsuchplan,onethatwasmor

e

ambit

i

ou

sa

nd

w

a

s

toin

c

ludeth

e

Grand

Fleetinasw

ee

p

o

f.H

e

ligolandBight.How

e

ver,itwasdecidedtopostpon

e

an

y

plan

s

f

o

r

th

e

mom

e

ntb

e

causethetransportsofth

e

BEF

we

r

es

t

i

llgoinga

c

rossth

e

Channeland

Keyeswasne

e

d

e

dtopr

o

t

ec

tth

e

m

.

Itwa

s

onlyon24AugustthatChurchillcall

e

danoth

e

rm

ee

t

i

ngtoputtog

e

th

e

rfinalplansfor

theraid

.

Thecor

e

for

cew

ouldin

c

lud

e

T

y

rwhitt’sentireHarwichForceandK

eyes’e

ight

s

ubmarin

e

sandtwodestroyers.Supportwastob

e

pr

ov

id

e

db

y

th

e

battl

e

cruis

e

rs

InvincibleandNewZ

e

aland,

s

tation

e

datth

e

HumberunderthecommandofR

e

a

r

Admiral

SirAr

c

hibaldMoore,andRearAdmiralChri

s

ti

a

n

‘s

S

e

v

e

nthCruiserSquadron.Thislast

squadronwasofconc

e

rntoKeyesandTyrwhittbecaus

e

itcomprisedofoldBacchant

e

c

lassships,whichweretobestationedoffT

e

r

sc

h

e

llin

g

toint

e

rc

e

ptanyenemyvessels.

Thesewereso

s

l

ow

thatth

e

Adm

i

ral

s

doubt

e

dthattheywouldbeeffecti

vea

nd

w

orri

e

d

ab

o

utth

e

ir

v

uln

e

rabilit

y.

K

e

y

e

sr

e

qu

es

t

e

dth

es

upp

o

rt

o

fth

e

strong

e

runits

-

Commodore

WilliamG

o

od

e

nough’

s

Fir

s

tLightCruiserSquadronandVi

ce

AdmiralDa

v

idB

e

att

y

’

s

FirstBattleCruiserSquadron.Hisrequestsforbothw

e

r

e

turned

down

.

Asaresult,TyrwhittandK

eyes

,bri

e

fingth

e

ircaptainsabouttheforthcomingraid,

inform

e

dth

e

mthattheonlyBritishshipslargerthanade

s

troyerinvolv

e

dwouldbe

T

y

rwhitt’slightcruisers.Thi

s

wa

s

tohavenear-fatalconsequence

s

duringth

ee

ven

t

u

a

l

b

a

ttl

e.

O

n25August,ade

c

isionwastakentotransport3,000R

oy

alMarinestoOstendtoprot

e

ct

theB

e

lgiancoastfrom

t

h

e

fa

s

t-approachingGermanArm

y.

Churchillsawthatth

er

aidon

Heligolandcouldalsoactasadiversiontoan

yres

pons

e

thattheHighSeasFl

ee

tmight

mak

e

toth

e

mov

e

m

e

ntofthemarines.Theraidther

e

for

e

b

e

cam

e

amor

es

ignificant

operation.Communicationsbetw

e

enth

e

Admiralty,NavalWarStaffandtheCommander-

in

-

Chi

e

fofNavywereslowandinefficientandthesourceof

c

onstantcriticismduringthe

firsty

e

arsofthewar.J

e

lli

c

oedidnothearof

theplansfortheraiduntil26August,which

wasthesamedaythattheforc

e

sw

e

r

e

to

s

orti

e

inpr

e

parationforattack.Hisopinionwas

thatther

e

wouldnotbesuffi

c

ientstrengthtocounteractanattackfromaheavyGerman

warshipandsoheofferedhissupport;theAdmiraltyturnedthisdownbutsaidthathe
mightsendsomebattlecruisersifitwasconvenient.Jellicoewentalittlefurtherin

dispatchingBeatty’sFirstBattleCruiserSquadronaswellasCommodor

e

Goodenough’s

light

c

ruis

e

rs,thesupportthatKeyeshadoriginallywanted.However,TyrwhittandKey

e

s

didnotr

e

ceiv

e

th

e

informationintimeforthestartoftheBattleofHeligolandon28

August.

Tyrwhittwastoleadhis1

s

tand2

nd

Flotillas(32cruis

e

rs)andhistwolightcruisers

Fearl

e

ssandArethusa(hisflagshipthathadbeencommissionedonlytwodaysbefore)in

attack.Keyeswastoformhissubmarinesintotwolines,

o

n

e

toattackG

e

rmancruisers

andonetodraw

c

rui

se

rs

aw

a

y

fromth

e

Bightandouttosea

.

Ano

t

h

e

rp

a

irof

s

ubmarin

es

wastoguardthemouthofth

e

Em

s

.R

e

ar

A

dmiralArchibaldMoorewastocruisetoth

e

north

w

ith

New

Z

e

alandandInvin

c

ible,shouldheavier

s

upp

o

rtb

e

,

re

quir

e

d

,

andth

e

old

BacchanteswereoffTer

sc

h

e

lling

as

pl

a

n

ne

d

.

Forth

e

durationofth

e

battle,whichtook

plac

e

inhaz

e

andfog,

v

isibilitywaspoorand,toaddtotheconfusion,th

e

r

e

wasth

e

mix

-

upincommunications.Inlightoftheinstru

c

tionsr

ece

ivedthattherewouldonlybe

Tyrwhitt’s

c

ruis

e

r

s

inth

e

vi

c

inity,therewasenormousbewilderm

e

ntatth

e

arri

va

lof

Goodenough’scruisers

.

Tyrwhittrecognis

e

dth

e

ma

s

h

e

wa

s

b

e

ginninghissweepofthe

BightbutK

e

y

esi

nitiall

y

r

e

port

e

dth

e

mashostile.Itwasevenhard

e

rfor

t

h

es

ubmarin

es

to

di

s

tinguishfriendfromfoeandone

o

fth

e

mwa

s

r

e

ad

y

t

o

f

i

r

e

b

e

for

e

noticingaBritish

ensign

.

Anoth

e

rE

.

6didactuallyfireattheSouthampton,which,inturn,att

e

mpt

e

dtoram

thesubmarine,assumingittob

e

aG

e

rm

a

n

.

Th

efogc

au

se

dpr

o

bl

e

m

s

fortheGerman

s

,asthe

y

w

e

r

e

unabl

eto

mak

e

fullu

seo

fth

e

coa

s

talbatt

e

ri

es

onH

e

li

go

l

a

nd

.

Th

e

ir

o

th

e

rmainprobl

e

mwasthatitwaslow

wa

t

er,

which

mea

ntthatth

ey

wer

e

unabletocalluponth

e

ir

c

ap

i

tal

s

h

i

p

sas

b

ac

kupb

ec

aus

e

they

wereb

e

hindth

e

Jad

e

b

a

ratth

e

m

o

uth

o

fth

e

J

a

d

e.

Th

e

barwasverydif

f

i

c

ultfor

s

ubmarin

es

t

o

n

ego

t

i

at

e

an

dt

h

ere

f

o

rea

c

t

e

da

sa

natur

a

lprot

ec

tion,butwithth

e

di

s

advantagethatth

ey

w

e

r

e

n

ow

facingit.Th

ey

hadatth

e

irdi

s

posalninedestro

yers

and

nin

e

min

es

weeperspatrollingtheBight,andanothermin

eswee

pingdivision,fourcruis

e

rs

,

fiv

e

small

e

r

c

ruisersandfi

ve

torp

e

do-boatflotillas

.

Th

e

r

e

w

e

res

e

v

e

ncruis

e

rsth

a

t

s

upportedpatrolsbutthe

se

w

e

r

e

inportandsowouldt

a

k

es

om

e

timetobeofanyus

e

in

th

e

battl

e.

AsthesweepofHeligolandb

e

gan,th

e

G

e

rmand

es

tro

ye

rsdispersedintoth

e

mist

,

limiting

th

ee

ffective-n

esso

fBritishfirepower

.

Tyrwhittwashavingprobl

e

ms

w

ithhisnew

flagshipastwoofh

e

rgunsfail

e

dandshewash

i

tbyaGermancruiser,r

e

strictingh

e

r

sp

ee

dcapacity.M

o

r

e

Germancruiserscamepouringoutofth

e

harborsbutth

e

British

werelucky.Ratherthanwaitingforhis

ves

s

e

lstogrouptogether,th

e

GermanAdmiral

s

entthem

e

ag

e

rlyforwardtotryandengag

e

.N

e

v

e

rth

e

less,asTvrwhittbegantowithdraw

fromhisswe

e

pw

e

stwards,th

e

Britishhadnotperformedaswellastheyhadhoped

.

Only

oneGermandestroyerhadbeensunk.

Beatty,whowasabout40milestothenorth,respondedtoarequestforsupportfromth

e

flotillas,becausehewas

c

oncernedthatGoodenough’slightcruisersdidnothav

e

·

s

ufficientstrengthifheavilyarm

e

dGerman

ves

selscameoutfromtheirnearbybas

e

s

.

‘

It

wasariskyd

e

cision,not

s

implybecauseofthedangerofrunningintoG

e

rman

c

apital

ships,submarinesandmines,butbecaus

e

ofthepoorvisibility.However,thesupportof

Good

e

noughandB

e

attyproveddecisiveand,whentheBritishpulledbackfr

o

mthe

island,theyhadsunkthr

e

eG

e

rmanlightcruis

e

rs.

On

e

ofthemwasAdmiralMaas’sflagship,Koln,thatwentdownwiththelossofthe

Admiral.NoBritishshipswerelost,althoughtheArethusaandtwootherd

e

str

o

y

e

r

s

w

e

r

e

s

ignificantlydamag

e

dandhadtobetowedint

o

port.35m

e

nw

e

rekill

e

dtoaG

e

rman

deathtollof712

.

B

y

th

e

tim

et

hatAdmiralHipp

e

rarri

v

edwithhisbattl

ec

ruis

e

r

s,

th

e

Briti

s

hhadalr

e

ad

y

l

e

ft.

Itwa

s

aBriti

s

hvi

c

torythatwasmor

e

importantint

e

rm

sof

moralethanstrateg

y

.They

hadwonth

e

firstbattl

eof

th

e

waranditwasinthe

e

nemy’shomet

e

rritor

y

.Th

e

Kai

se

r,

how

eve

r,wasfuriousandfailedtounderstandwhyhis

e

ntir

e

fl

ee

thadnotb

ee

nordered

outwhenth

e

British

we

r

es

i

g

ht

e

d

.

Hipp

e

rmad

e

changesinhisstrategyforth

e

d

e

f

e

n

seo

f

th

e

Bight,d

e

cidingthatatleastfourcapitalships

wo

uldb

e

po

s

ition

e

doutsid

e

theJadebar

infutureandthatlarg

e

min

e

fi

e

ld

s

wouldb

e

laidtothewestofHeligoland.Th

ev

i

c

t

o

r

y

al

so

mad

e

th

e

Kaiser,fearfulforhisHighS

e

as

Fl

ee

t

,eve

nmor

e

d

e

f

e

nsiveandheinstruct

e

dhis

co

m

ma

nd

er-

in

-c

hi

e

fthath

e

musthavehis

consentb

e

for

ec

ommitt

i

ngth

e

fl

ee

ttoaction.

Th

e

Britishmad

e

anotherattemptonHeligolandon11

Se

pt

e

mb

er

but

,es

p

ec

iallynowthat

highlydang

e

rousmin

e-

f

ie

ld

s

h

a

db

ee

nlaid

,

it

w

a

s

t

o

noa

v

ail.Th

e

highmoral

e

thatth

e

B

ri

ti

s

hh

a

d

wo

n

s

t

a

rt

e

dt

o

b

eer

od

e

da

s

th

e

G

e

rman

s

int

ens

i

fie

dth

ei

r

s

ubmarin

e

warfare

.

Th

e

scoutcrui

se

rPa

t

J

iflnde

r

of

th

eE

igh

t

hD

es

tro

ye

rFlotillawastorp

e

do

e

dand

s

u

nk

b

y

U

.2

1

i

nth

e

first

s

ucces

s

fulsubmarin

e

atta

c

kofth

ewa

r

.

Th

e

Briti

s

hf

o

ughtbackand

Li

e

ut

e

nantC

o

mm

a

nd

e

rMaxH

o

rt

o

n

s

ank

t

h

ec

rui

se

rH

e

la

o

n1

3

S

e

pt

e

mb

er

and

a

d

es

tr

oye

ron6Octob

e

r.Ho

weve

r

,

di

s

ast

e

r

s

tru

c

k

o

n

2

2

Se

pt

e

mb

er

wh

e

ntheG

e

rmans

sankthecrui

se

rsCressy,Aboukir

,

andHoque

-

thr

e

eofthesixoldBa

cc

hant

es

about

whichKeyesandTyrwhitthadb

ee

nsoworri

e

d

-

n

e

artheDutchcoastth

e

yw

e

r

e

patrolling.62offi

ce

rsand1,397menwerelost.Th

e

Navywa

s

nowjusta

s

afraid

,

ifnot

moreso

,

ofth

e

thr

e

atfromsubmarin

es

asit

w

asoftheHighSeasFleet.

Ju

s

tasthethreatofthesubmarin

e

hadb

e

ensomewhatun

de

r

e

stimatedintheBritish

pr

e

parationsforwar,sohadth

ee

ff

e

ctofmines.Thismayhavebe

e

ninpartduetothe

1907Hagu

e

Convention,whichruledagainstthelayingofmin

e

sindiscriminately.

Minesweeperswereaneglectedar

e

awithintheNavyandhadlittl

e

prestige.Th

e

r

e

were

onl

y

t

e

ntorpedogunboatsandthirteentrawlersthatwerefitt

e

dwithsweeps.Bytheendof

thewarth

e

rewouldbe7

2

6minesweepersand,by1917,allv

e

ss

e

lsw

e

refittedwitha

parvanethatworkedbycuttingminemoorings.However,atthebeginning,noneofthis
wasinplace.

Jellicoe,believingittobesaf

e

r,movedthefleetfromanchorageinLochEwetoLochna

K

e

alfurth

e

rsouthandth

e

ntoLoughSwillyonthenorthcoastofIreland.InOctober,

threeGermanminelayerswer

e

sentwithorderstominearoundtheFirthofForthandth

e

Ri

v

erClyde.Not

e

verythingwenttoplanandtheeastcoastpartofthemissionhadtobe

aborted.However,thecaptainoftheminelayerBerlin,realizingthathewouldnotb

e

able

tor

e

achtheClyde,insteadlaidminesoffToryIsland,tothenorthwestofLoughSwilly,

althoughhehadnoideathattheGrandFleetwassocloseby.On26October,amerchant

ve

sselfellfoulofthemines

.

Thefollowingday,oneoftheup

-

to-datesup

e

rdreadnoughts,

theAudacious,wasoutwith

t

h

eSe

condBattleSquadrononfiringexercise

s

.Sh

e

washit

b

y

amin

e

.For12hoursther

e

werefranti

ce

ffort

s

to

s

a

vet

h

es

hip.Th

e

Whit

e

StarLiner

Olympictriedtotak

e

h

e

rint

ow

butitwa

s

alltonoavail.Shockinglyforth

e

Briti

s

h

,

th

e

,

m

ig

ht

yA

uda

c

iou

s

w

e

ntdown,although,untilthe

e

nd

o

fth

ew

ar,th

e

Admiralt

y

maintainedthatshehadonlyb

ee

ndama

ge

d

.

J

e

lli

c

o

e

f

e

aredthathisnumericadvantag

e

ov

e

rth

e

G

e

rmanFl

ee

twasfastdisappearing.

Britishstrat

e

gywasagainstlayingminesinretaliation,b

ec

aus

e

th

ey

want

e

dtoforcethe

GermanFleetoutofportand

e

ngag

e

itrath

e

rthanhemitinwithmines.Another

c

on

s

id

e

rationwasthatminesmightimpedeBritishtraders.Th

e

r

e

wa

s

anadditional

probleminthat,justasmin

es

w

ee

p

e

r

s

hadb

ee

n

e

ssentiallyignored,sohadth

e

t

ec

hnolog

y

forth

e

min

e

sth

e

ms

e

lves

.

Itwouldnotbeuntil1917thatth

e

Briti

s

hw

e

r

e

abletoproduce

aminethatoperatedr

e

liably,andev

e

nthiswascopiedfromar

e

tri

e

v

e

dG

e

rmanmine.

D

es

pond

e

n

cy

wasbeginningtosetin.Therewasfrustration

a

tth

e

la

c

kofopportunit

y

to

engagetheG

e

rmanFl

ee

tandth

e

g

e

n

e

r

a

lpublicwa

s

wonderingwhatth

e

na

v

ywasd

o

in

g

a

s

th

e

G

e

rmanarm

y

pushedalongtheB

e

lgian

c

oa

s

t.G

e

n

era

lJ

o

ffr

e

(chiefoftheFrench

generalstaff)r

e

qu

e

st

e

d

s

upporttoprotecttheportsatDunkirkandNi

e

uwport

.

Th

e

G

e

rman

s

immediat

e

lytriedtotakeadvantag

e

by

se

ndingv

e

ss

e

lstolaymin

e

satthemouth

ofth

e

Tham

e

son17O

c

tob

e

r

.

Th

e

boatswereint

e

rceptedandsunk,althoughth

es

ucc

es

s

wasshort-livedandHermes,a

c

t

i

ng

as

anaircraftcarrier

,

waslosttoasubmarin

e

near

Ca

l

a

i

s.

Thi

s

promptedtheAdmiraltytowithdrawany

vess

e

l

s

bigg

e

rthanadestroy

e

rfrom

th

e

Chann

e

leastofGr

ee

n

w

i

c

h,andtoissu

e

anord

e

rthatsuchv

e

ss

e

l

ss

hould

notc

r

oss

in

thedaylight

.

28Octob

e

rsawthereturnofJa

c

k

y

FisherasFirstS

e

a

Lo

rd,nowinhisseventiesand

r

e

call

e

dfromr

e

tir

e

m

e

nt

.

Hi

s

appointmentwasaresultofther

e

signationofPrinc

eLo

u

is

ofBattenberg,mostlyb

e

causeofpublicill

feeling

a

b

o

uthisGermanbirthandfamilyties.

Fish

e

rand

C

hur

c

hill(asFirstLordoftheAdmiralty)wer

e

aformi

da

bl

e

,volatileandnot

infalliblecombinationthatwouldultimat

e

lyresultinthembothlosingoffice.Fish

e

r,

r

e

ali

z

ingth

e

possibilityofaprolong

e

dwar,b

e

gananambitiousbuildingprogramme.

TheSurfaceRaidersandtheBattlesofCoronelandtheFalklands

TheSurfaceRaiders

Atthebeginningofthewar,Britain’smerchantfleetwasbyfarthelargestintheworld
andBritainwasreliantuponherimports,whichincludedtwothirdsofherfoodaswellas
essentialssuchasironore.SuchreliancenecessarilymadeBritainvulnerabletoattackson
hermerchantfleet.Thesheersizeofthefleetmeantthatprotectionforithadtobe
stretchedworldwide.CommercewasanobvioustargetfortheGermansand,laterinthe
war,theywouldmakeextensiveuseofsubmarinesinattackingalliedshipping.Overthe
firstsixmonthsorso,however,theyusedsurfaceraiders.Thesinkingofmerchantvessels
wasnottheonlyaiminstrikingatcommercialshipping.Itwasalsohopedthatitwould
forcemarineinsurancecostssohighthattheywouldbecomeprohibitiveandhalttrade.

TheBritishdevisedacontingencyplanforthiseventualitybeforethewar,theessenceof
whichwasthatthegovernmentwouldreinsure80%ofallrisksduringthewarandreceive
80%ofthepremiums.ItalsomeantthatmerchantvesselsweresubjecttoAdmiralty
directionsinresp

e

ctofallroutesandportsof

c

all

.

Th

e

Britisheffortsto

c

loseoffexits

fromtheNorthS

e

aatth

e

outbr

e

akofwarwer

e

alsopartoftheplant

o

pr

o

t

ec

t

c

omm

e

r

c

ial

shippingsothathostilevess

e

lscouldn

o

tr

e

a

c

hth

e

maintrad

e

rout

e

sandonl

y

German

v

e

ss

e

l

s

alr

e

ad

ys

tati

o

n

e

dabr

o

adcouldbeutilised

.

Inaddition,m

e

r

c

hant

s

hip

s

w

e

r

e

in

s

tructedtodispersefromtheirusualrout

e

s

,so

it

w

as

c

l

e

arthattherewasnointentionof

prot

ec

tingth

e

mb

yc

onvoy,th

e

traditionalpolicy

.

Itwasfeltthat,with

s

t

e

am

i

n

s

t

e

adof

s

ail,merchantmenhadabetterchan

ce

offl

ee

in

g

an

e

n

e

myb

y

takingarouteoftheirown

choic

e

,asth

ey

didnothavetor

e

lyonwinddirections.Inaddition

,

th

e

d

e

v

e

lopm

e

ntofthe

t

e

legraphmadeitmuchmoredifficultt

o

k

ee

pa

c

onvo

y

secr

e

tandcouldgiveth

e

en

e

m

y

a

chan

ce

topr

e

par

e

anattack.Thesmokegeneratedb

y

alarg

e

numb

e

rof

s

hipstog

e

ther

wouldalsomaketh

e

mmuchmor

e

vi

s

ibl

e

.Th

e

onlyexceptionwastheuseofconvoy

s

to

prot

e

cttroopshipstransportingsoldiersfromCanada,India,AustraliaandNewZealand,

andthiswasmo

s

tl

y

th

e

r

es

ultofpressurefromthedominiongovernm

e

nt

s

.Th

e

Admiralt

y

maywellhav

e

preferr

e

dtod

e

ployth

e

ir

s

hip

s

huntingth

e

G

e

rmancruisers

.

Infact,th

e

G

e

rman

s

had

ve

r

y

f

e

wship

s

abroadatthestartofthewarandth

esewe

r

ew

id

e

l

y

s

c

attered

intheAtlanticandPacific.

Alth

o

u

g

hth

e

G

e

rman

s

hadthesecondlarge

s

tmerchantmarin

e

inth

e

worlditwasway

b

e

lowthesizeofth

e

Britishfle

e

tandth

ey

al

s

o

s

uffer

e

damajordisadvantag

e

intheir

gr

e

atlackofov

e

rs

e

asbas

e

s.ThispresentedaproblemincoalingforGermanv

e

ss

e

ls

,

sinc

e

theregulationsofth

e

1

9

07Hagu

e

Conventionlimitedth

e

amountofcoalthat

co

uld

b

e

obtainedinaneutralporttothatsuffi

c

i

e

ntto

a

ll

ow

a

s

hiptoreachth

e

near

e

stportof

herowncountry.

S

hip

s

w

e

rethennotallowedtous

e

th

es

am

e

n

e

utralarea

aga

inforthree

months

.

Attheoutbreakofwartherewer

e

twoG

e

rmanlight

c

ruis

e

rs,DresdenandKarlsruhe,in

theWestIndi

es

,th

e

light

cr

uiserLeipzigwasoffth

e

Americanw

e

stcoast,andthelight

cruiserKonigsbergwasonth

e

ea

s

tcoastofAfrica.Inadditiontherewereotherminor

craft,suchasgunboatsandsurveyvessels,whichwouldnotreallyb

e

ofanyus

e

inan

e

ngagement.Howeverthemostdang

e

rousforc

e

wasth

e

h

e

avy-armoredGermanEast

Asiati

c

Squadron,basedatTsingtao,China,underthecommandofVic

e

AdmiralCount

MaximilianvonSpee.Th

e

squadronwasmad

e

upoftwoarmouredcruisers,Spee

’

s

flagshiptheScbamhorstandth

e

Gneisenau,andthelightcruisersEroden,Leipzigand

Numberq.ScharnhorstandGneisenauwer

e

newsisterships

e

achwitheight8.2inchand

six5.9in

c

hguns,andtheyhadwonImperialNavyprizesfortheirgunn

e

ry.Thesquadron

wasspreadoutwhenthewarbegan.Sp

e

ewasinth

e

CarolineIslandswithScharnhor

s

t

andGneisenau

,

theErodenwasinTsingtaoandtheLeipzigwasoffthePacific

c

oastof

MexicowithNumberqonherwaytoreliev

e

her.

ThedispersedGermanforcedidnotapp

e

arparti

c

ularlythreatening,especiallysince

Britainandherallieshadfarlargerresourcestocallupon,in

c

ludinganup

-

to-date

dreadnought,theAustralia,about12armoredcruisers,andsome20lightcruisers.The
entryofJapanintothewaron23Augustonth

e

sideoftheA

l

liessign

i

f

ic

antlyin

c

r

e

a

se

d

thispow

e

r.However,evenaloneen

e

m

yc

ruis

e

r

co

uld

c

au

se

havo

c

b

y

turninguptoattack

anun

s

u

s

p

ec

t

i

ngm

erc

hant

ve

ss

e

l.InthevastarenasofthePa

ci

f

ic

andAtlanti

c

O

ce

ans,it

n

e

ededaconsiderabl

y

larg

e

rf

o

r

ce

tot

r

a

c

kth

ee

n

e

m

y

down.TheBritishwereal

s

o

n

e

r

v

ou

s

ab

o

utth

e

largenumberofGermanmerchant

v

e

sse

lsthatw

e

r

e

abroadatth

e

start

ofthewarinneutralportsallov

e

rth

e

world

;

andaboutthepossibilitythattheycould

‘

b

e

c

onv

e

rt

e

dandputtosea,orusedascollierstosupplyG

e

rman

c

ruis

e

rs.Th

e

dangerfrom

thesepotentialauxiliar

yc

rui

se

r

s

turnedouttobeoverestimatedalthoughsom

e

didg

e

t

throughandcauselossestotheAllies

.

Theselossesmightha

ve

b

ee

nmuchworseifithad

notbe

e

nforth

e

ir

s

ur

ve

illan

ce.

Atth

eo

utbreakofwarSpeerecalledNumbergandh

e

ad

ed

forth

e

Ma

r

ianasinthe

northwesternPacific,wher

e

h

e

m

e

twiththeEmdenanddecidedtodispatchhertoth

e

IndianOc

e

antohampertrade.EmdenleftthebaseatT

s

ingta

o

t

o

a

v

oidb

e

ingtrapped

thereand,infact,sh

e

mi

g

ht

we

llha

ve

b

ee

n,hadtheAdmiralt

y

notov

e

rturn

e

dth

eo

r

ig

inal

wa

rpl

a

n

so

fVi

ce

AdmiralSirMart

y

nJ

e

rram

’

sChin

a

Squadr

o

n

.

H

e

wa

s

tohavebeen

station

e

datthem

o

utho

f

th

eYa

n

g

t

ze

wh

e

rehewouldhavealsobeeninapo

s

iti

o

nt

o

pr

e

v

e

ntScharnhorstandGnei

s

enaufromr

e

turningt

o

T

s

ingtaofromthesouth.The

Admiraltysenthimt

o

H

o

n

g

K

o

n

g

in

s

t

e

ad

,

muchtoth

e

disma

y

ofJ

e

rramwho

e

v

e

n

c

on

s

id

e

r

e

dignoringtheorder.Subs

e

quently,for

ces

w

e

r

ese

ntto

c

overJerram’soriginal

positionbutit

wasacase

ofshuttingthestabledooraft

e

rth

e

hors

e

hadb

o

lt

e

d.Ultimately,

British,Japan

e

se,FrenchandRussian

forcesw

ouldallbeemployedtohuntdo

w

nth

e

Emd

e

n

.

S

p

ee

wantedtodistan

ce

him

se

lffromJapan,f

e

aringh

e

r

e

ntr

y

intothewar,andsailedwith

th

e

r

e

stofhi

s

squadron

eas

t

w

ardstorendezvouswiththeLeip

z

igatEasterIslandas

E

md

e

nl

e

ftforhermission.Emdenwasund

e

rth

e

command

ofa

n

e

xceptionallytalented

offic

e

r,KarlvonMull

e

r,andhi

s

pr

ese

nceintheIndianOcean,atth

e

BayofB

e

ngal(on

th

e

Colombo-Calcuttaroute)cameasatotalsurpris

e

to

t

h

e

Alli

e

swhopresumedthathe

wastog

e

th

e

rwithSp

eea

ndth

e

restofthesquadron.Th

e

Emd

e

nwasamod

e

rn

c

rui

se

r,

capableofspeedsupto24knots,andhadt

e

n4.1in

c

hgunsandtwotorp

e

dotub

e

s.Mull

e

r

att

e

mpt

e

dtodi

s

guis

e

hisshipwithadummyfourthfunn

e

lwhichwas

o

nlytwo-

dimensionalbut,fromadistanc

e

,r

e

s

e

mbl

e

d

f

our

-

funn

e

ledBritishcruis

e

rs

.

Hewast

e

dno

timein

c

arryingouthismissionand,b

e

tw

e

en10and14

Se

ptember1914,hemanagedto

sinksixst

e

amers,caughttwotoserv

e

ascolliersandathirdtocarr

y

captur

e

dcr

e

ws

.

N

ormall

y

itwouldhavefallentoR

e

arAdmiralP

e

irseof

t

h

e

Ea

s

tIndi

e

sStationtopursu

e

Mull

e

rbuth

e

waso

c

cupi

e

dwithtransportsfromIndiaandth

e

G

e

rmanlight

c

rui

se

r

Konigsberginthew

es

tofth

e

IndianO

ce

an.Th

e

r

e

for

e

itwastheshipsMinotaur

,

Hamp

s

hireandYarmouth

fr

omJ

e

rram’ssquadron,Ibuki,ChihumaandYahagiofth

e

J

a

pan

e

seNavy,ZhemchugandAskoldofth

e

RussianNavy

a

ndth

e

Fr

e

nchD’Ibervillethat

we

r

e

gath

e

ringtopursu

eE

mden.

Mullerwastenaciousandon22SeptemberhebombardedthePortofMadras,destroying
twooil-storagetankers,beforesailingtotheMinikoi400mileswestofColombo,sinking
anotherfourshipsandtakingoneotherasacollier.Againasixthwascapturedand
releasedwithcrewsfromtheprizevessels.Emdenthenhidfurthersouthattheislandof
DiegoGarcia(soremotethatnewsoftheoutbreakofwarhadnotyetreachedthe
inhabitants)toattendtorepairsandtocoal.ShehadeludedtheBritish,althoughYarmouth
managedtosinkoneoftheGermancolliersandrescueaGreekshipthathadbeentaken
underenemycontrol.ItwasnotlongbeforeMullerwasatlargeagain,returningtothe
Minikoiareaandrepeatinghispatternofsinkingsandcaptures.Thistimehesankfive
steamers,retainingoneasacollierandreleasinganotherwiththecrews.Brimmingwith
confidence,MullerheadedforPenangandraidedtheentrancetotheMalaccaStrait.Using
thefalsefunnel,hesanktheunsuspectingRussianlightcruiserZhemtchupandwasabout
toseizeaBritish

‘

steamercarryingexplosiveswhenhewasdistractedbythereturnofthe

FrenchdestroyerMousquet,whichheimmediat

e

lysank.Asaconsequenceofthislatest

incidentthetroopconvoysfromAustraliaandNewZealandweredelayedsothatamore
powerfulescortcouldbeassembledtoprotectthem.Mullermovedonwithamissionto
raidanddestroythecableandwirelessstationonDirectionIsland,andtheEmdenduly
arrivedon9November

.

Apartywassentashoretosabotagethewirelessbut,unknownto

Muller,theAustralianconvoywasonly52milesaway,andawarningmessagehad
alreadygoneoutfromtheisland.TheAustralianlightcruiserSydney,underthecommand
ofCaptainJohnGlossop,wassentfromtheconvoyandsaileddirectlytoDirectionIsland.
Whenthetwoshipsengaged,theSydneyhadtheadvantagewithhereight6-inchgunsand
theEmdenwasrunashoreonKeelingIslandandburntout.Thelandingpartyhadbeen
leftbehindandmanagedtoescapeinasmallschooner.TheysailedfirsttoPadangwhere
theyboardedaGermansteamerforthe

.

Yemen.Theythentravelledoverland,besetby

attacksfromBedouins,anddidnotreachsafetyinConstantinopleuntilJune1915.In
retrospect,theAdmiraltyfeltthatconvoyprotection,despiteitsinherentproblems,would
havebeenabettersolutiontothethreatoftheEmden.

IntheIndianOceanatthestartofthewartheAllieswerefacingasimilarthreatfromthe
Konigsberg,alightcruiserwithten4.1-inchguns,underthecommandofCaptainLooff,
basedontheEastAfricastation.Looff’smissionwastohindertradeattheentrancetothe
RedSea.On31JulyhesetsailandmanagedtoavoidaBritishpatrolunderthecommand
ofAdmiralKing-Hall,CommanderoftheCapeSquadron.UnfortunatelyKing-HaIl’s
cruiserswereoldervesselsandtheirspeedcapacitycouldnotmatchthe24knotsofthe
moremodernKonigsberg.However,theGermancruiserwasnotnearlyassuccessfulas
theEmden,largelybecausetheBritishhamperedherabilitytocoal.Hercollierwaskept
fromleavingportandtheBritish,withsomeforesight,preventedherfromsourcingcoal
inPortugueseEastAfricabybuyingitupin

a

d

v

anc

e

.Asar

e

sult

,

onlyonemerchant

v

es

s

e

lwa

ss

unkb

e

for

e

th

e

monso

o

n

se

a

so

nlimit

e

dtheKoni8sberg’

se

ff

ect

i

ve

n

ess

e

ve

n

furth

e

r

.

Sh

e

wasforcedtohid

e

onth

e

Afri

c

an

coas

t,b

e

gging

c

oalfroman

y

friendl

y

c

olli

e

r

s

that

s

h

ee

n

c

ount

e

r

e

d.On20S

e

pt

e

mber

,

sheneverth

e

l

ess

man

age

d

tos

inkanold

lightcruis

e

r,th

e

Pegasus,low

e

ringm

o

ral

ea

ndpr

ov

ingthat

s

h

e

wasstillathreat.On30

Octob

e

r,th

e

D

a

rtmou

t

h,makinguseofintelligencegath

e

redfroma

c

aptur

e

dsupplyship,

discoveredtheKonigsberg

s

ixmil

e

supth

e

Ruf

g

iRiv

e

r

.

Acollierwassunktoblockthe

e

xitofth

e

ri

ver

butth

e

gunrang

e

oftheBritishshipcouldnotr

e

achKoni8

s

b

e

r8and

,

as

therewereotherroutesof

e

scap

e

,an

e

xp

e

diti

o

nhadtob

e

organizedtofinallydestro

y

h

e

r

.

Th

e

Ro

y

alNa

v

alAirS

e

rvic

e

attemptedtobombtheshipbutdidnotm

a

nag

e

t

o

hith

e

r

and,inanycase,th

e

siz

e

ofb

o

mb

s

thatitwa

s

possibl

e

fortheplanestocarrywas

s

impl

y

to

os

mall.Twomonitors,MerseyandSevern,whichw

e

r

e

d

e

sign

e

dforriveruse,weresent

inon16July1915

w

ithair

c

raftcov

e

randmanagedtoinflictsom

e

damagebut

,

alth

o

u

g

h

th

e

G

e

rmanshiphadbeenoutofactionfor

so

m

e

t

i

m

e,s

h

e

wa

ss

tillabl

e

tofireandh

e

ld

offth

e

monit

o

r

s.

It

t

o

o

k

aseco

ndatt

e

mpton12Jul

y

tofinall

y

d

e

stro

y

K

o

n

igs

b

e

rg

‘

Althoughultimat

e

l

y

theKoni8sber8didnotcausemu

c

hph

ysica

ldamag

e

,sh

e

n

e

verthelesstiedupanumber

o

fv

esse

l

s

that

co

uldha

ve

beenuseful

e

lsewh

e

r

e

andth

e

thr

e

atofh

e

rpr

ese

n

ce

hadalsod

e

lay

e

dtroopconvoysfromN

e

wZ

ea

la

n

d

.

Inth

e

Caribb

e

an,asth

e

waropen

e

d,th

e

Britishwer

e

tr

o

ubl

e

db

y

th

e

pr

ese

n

ce

ofth

e

Karlsruhe

,

anoth

e

rn

e

w

vesse

l

c

apabl

e

ofgoodspeedandarmedwithtw

e

lv

e

4.1

inc

h

g

un

s.

InNovember1914,th

e

Karlsruh

e

sankasth

eres

ult

o

faninternalexplo

s

ionwhich

wasastrok

e

ofluck

fro

mth

e

Alliedp

e

rsp

e

cti

ve

butitw

a

sn

o

tb

e

for

e

th

eGe

rmanshiphad

sunk15Briti

s

hm

e

rchant

s

hip

s

andon

eD

ut

c

hmerchantvess

e

l.

Th

e

abov

e

werethemajorthr

e

at

s

toBriti

s

h

s

hipping,

a

lth

o

ughitisnotanexhaustiv

e

list

.

Th

e

r

e

w

e

r

e

oth

e

r

Ge

rmanauxiliaryvess

e

lsthatwer

e

abl

e

toinflictcasual-

ties.

However,

themostpowerfulanddang

e

rousG

e

rmant

h

r

e

atwa

s

Spec’sSquadron.

TheBattleofCoronel

A

ftertheEmdenleftthesquadron,Sp

ee

tookacours

ee

ast

a

nd,inordertoprepareforhis

arrivalinSouthAmerica,

se

nttheNurnberqontoHonoluluwithinstructionsforG

e

rman

agentsinSouthAmeri

c

atoarrangecoalandprovisions.WhentheJapanesede

c

lar

e

dwar

th

e

r

e

was,of

c

ourse,nopossibilityofareturntoTsingtao

.

On30

Se

pt

e

mber,hearrivedat

Papeet

e

inTahitiandshelled

F

r

e

nchinstallationsand,inaddition,sankagunboatb

e

for

e

fe

intingacoursenortheast.

On4OctoberSpeewasbeinghunt

e

dbyBritish,Australian,NewZealand,Frenchand

Japan

e

s

e

forcesanda

c

luewasnowgiventohiswh

e

reabouts.AnAlliedshippick

e

dupa

wirelessmessagefromtheScharnhorst,indi

c

atingacourseforMarquesasandEaster

Acc

ordingly,theAlliedforceswererearrang

e

d.

Oneofth

e

stronge

s

tBritishsquadronsinth

e

huntwasfromth

e

SouthAmeri

c

anStation

underthe

c

ommand

o

fth

e

popularR

e

ar

-

AdmiralSirChristopherCrad

oc

k,who

se

res

pon

s

ibilitywastoguardth

e

MagellanStraits

.

Cr

a

d

o

ck

‘s

ba

se

wa

s

th

e

FalklandIslands

wherehehadtwoarm

o

re

d

cr

u

ise

rs,GoodHopeandMonmouth,bothofwhi

c

hw

e

r

e

o

ve

r

t

e

n

yea

r

s

oldandhadad

e

signfaultinthatth

e

ircas

e

mat

eswe

r

es

o

c

los

e

toth

e

waterline

thattheyoftencouldnotb

e

f

i

r

e

d

.

Ev

e

nwh

e

ntheycouldb

e

fired,th

e

ircapa

c

itywas

o

nl

y

about50p

e

rcentofthecapacityofth

e

G

e

rmancrui

se

r

s.

Inadditiontotheseproblems,the

majorityofhis

c

r

ewswe

r

e

r

e

s

e

rvistswhohadnotbeentogetherverylong

a

ndla

c

k

e

d

g

unn

e

rypractice

.

Aswellasth

e

armore

d

c

rui

se

r

s,

Crado

c

khadonemodernlightcruis

e

r,

Glasgow,anda

co

n

ve

rt

e

dlin

e

r,Otranto,withsome4.7-inchguns

.C

rad

oc

k

w

a

s

tok

ee

p

hisforcereadytoengageS

c

ha

r

nh

o

r

s

tand

G

n

e

i

s

enauandhewaspromisedreinforc

e

ments

inth

e

shap

e

ofthebattleshipCanopusandth

ec

rui

se

rD

e

f

e

nc

e

fromtheMediterranean.

Theintend

e

dr

e

inforc

e

m

e

nt,D

e

f

e

nce,wasequaltooneofSpec’scruis

e

rsbut

t

h

e

r

es

tof

Crado

c

k’

ss

quadronwouldstillhav

e

b

ee

nat

a

d

isa

d

v

antag

e.

H

o

w

eve

r

,

itwasdecidedthat

D

e

f

e

n

ce

wouldb

e

b

e

tt

e

rd

e

pl

oye

dwithacruisersquadronop

e

r

a

tin

g

furth

e

rnorthinthe

Atlantic.Finally,sh

e

wouldbeord

ere

dt

o

joinCrado

c

k,althoughshewouldnotarrive

untilth

e

battl

e

hadb

ee

nfought.Thisleftth

e

Canopus,abattl

e

shipw

i

th12

-

in

c

hguns.

Spe

e

’

s

shipsw

e

r

e

muchfast

e

rthanCanopusand,althoughSpeewasnottoknowit,hi

s

s

mall

e

rgunscould,infact

,

outrangethoseonth

eBr

i

tis

h

s

hip.OnceCradockhadth

e

sup

e

riorfor

ce

,h

e

wast

osea

r

c

hthestraits,thoughhewasalsotob

e

pr

e

par

e

d

ei

th

e

rt

o

comebacktocoverth

e

Riv

er

Plat

e

ortos

e

archas

fa

ra

s

Valparaiso,dependingupon

int

e

llig

e

n

ce

r

ece

iv

e

d.

His

missionwastohamp

e

rGermantrad

e

a

s

w

e

llasto

des

t

r

o

y

th

e

Germancruisers.

On18October1914,Sp

ees

ail

e

dfromEa

s

t

e

rIsland,

w

h

e

r

e

h

e

hadcoaled,toMasAfu

e

ra,

whichwasmore

re

m

o

t

e

andhalfwaytotheChileancoast.H

e

nowhadthr

e

el

ig

ht

c

ruis

e

rs

inhiscompanyinadditiontohisarmore

d

vesse

ls

.

Cradock,atPortStanley,heardonth

e

s

am

e

daythatthearrivalofCanopuswouldbedelay

e

db

y

aw

ee

kandthath

e

r

s

peed

capacit

y

wasnotth

e

15knotsthath

e

was

-

e

xp

e

ctingbutabout12,whichwould

s

low

downhi

ss

quadron

.

Onceshearriv

e

d,h

e

l

e

ftPortStanle

y

andh

e

adedthroughthe

MagellanStraitsandupth

e

w

e

stcoast

o

fChile.Canopusfollowedbehind,convoyingth

e

colliers.

Atth

e

sametimeGlasgowhadb

ee

nonth

e

lookoutfor

S

p

ee

andwasheadingfortheport

ofCoron

e

lonthe

C

hil

e

ancoasttorendezvouswithCradock

.

G

e

rmanint

e

llig

e

n

ce

picked

uponthes

e

mov

e

m

e

nt

s

on31O

c

tob

e

rand

S

p

ee

hopedtointerceptth

e

Briti

s

hfor

ce,

whichhetrusted,

w

ouldb

e

inferiortohisown

.

Lat

e

onth

e

aft

e

rnoonof1

N

o

ve

mb

e

r,he

foundGlasgow,alongwithGoodHope,M

o

nmouthandOtranto

.

Crado

c

khadb

ee

n

hopingtoint

e

r

ce

ptLeip

z

igandheknewhertob

e

inth

e

ar

e

afromwir

e

-l

ess

signals.This

hadbeenint

e

nd

e

dbySp

ee

allalongandhehadonlytransmittedfromLeipziginord

e

rto

hid

e

th

e

pres

e

n

ce

oftheothercruisers.

Ataround5pmtheGlasgowspottedSp

ec

‘ssquadronandCrado

c

kpr

e

par

e

dforbattle,

lininguptheG

oo

dHop

e,

Monm

o

u

t

h

,

Gla

s

g

ow

andOtranto

.

Heturn

e

d

c

our

se

to

w

ard

st

h

e

G

e

rmanships

-

Scharnh

o

rst,Gneisenau

,

L

e

ip

z

igandDr

es

d

e

n

(

th

eN

urnb

e

rgwouldjoin

later)

-

withth

e

int

e

nt

i

on

ofi

mm

e

diat

ee

ngag

e

m

e

ntwhiletheGermanshadth

es

un

dir

ec

tl

y

inth

e

irvision

.

However,Speewouldnotb

e

drawn

i

n

.

B

e

for

e

th

e

battl

e

started,

Cradockrealiz

e

dthatth

e

Otrantowouldb

e

v

e

ryvulnerableandoflittlepracti

c

alu

se

and

se

nth

e

rawa

y

tosafety.

Th

e

G

e

rman

s

wait

e

duntiljustbefore7pmwh

e

nvi

s

ibilit

y

f

o

rth

e

Britishwasatitsworst

-

asthesuns

e

tth

e

y

we

r

es

ilh

o

u

e

tt

e

dinfailinglightanditwasincr

e

asingl

y

dif

fic

ulttoha

ve

a

c

l

e

ar

s

ightoftheGermanv

e

ssel

s

inthedu

s

k.Th

eex

p

e

rtG

e

rmangunneryquickl

y

ov

e

rwhelm

e

d

Goo

dH

o

p

e

andMonmouthwhichwerebothsunkwithth

e

l

osso

f

a

llhand

s

.

Itwa

s

only8.20pmwhentheGlasgowhadtoabandonMonmouth,asnothingcouldbe

done,andatt

e

mpttowarnth

e

approachingCanopus,hamper

e

dbyth

e

G

e

rman

s

jamming

wir

e

lesstransmissionsuntilGlasgowwa

so

ut

o

fr

a

n

ge

.It

w

a

s

th

e

f

i

r

s

ttimethattheRo

y

al

Na

vy

hadb

eende

f

e

at

e

d

a

t

se

ain

ove

r100

y

ears

.

It

w

a

s

ahug

es

h

oc

kt

o

th

esys

t

e

m

.

TheBattleoftheFalklands

On4N

ove

mb

e

r

,

Fi

s

h

e

r,whohadb

ee

nbackinoffi

ce

foronl

y

fi

ve

day

s,

h

e

ardofthe

disasterandimm

e

diat

e

ly

o

rd

e

r

e

dth

e

t

w

obattlecruis

e

rs,In

v

in

c

ibl

e

andInfl

ex

ibl

e

,to

th

e

S

outhAtlantic

.

Th

ey

w

e

r

e

fitt

e

dinre

c

ordtimeand

plac

e

dund

e

rth

e

commandofVi

ce

AdmiralSturd

ee

,who

wasc

ho

se

nlarg

e

l

y

becau

se

Fi

s

h

e

r,blaminghimforwhath

e

c

o

n

s

id

e

r

e

dthepoord

e

plo

y

m

e

ntof

s

hip

s,

want

e

dhimout

of

hi

s

positionasChi

e

fofStaff

atth

e

Admiralt

y.

Th

ede

plo

y

m

e

ntwasariskasitund

e

rmin

e

dJ

e

lli

c

o

e’

smargin

of

s

up

e

riorit

y

inthis

c

lassofbattl

e

shipagain

s

tthatofth

e

HighS

e

asFleetintheNorthS

e

a.

J

e

lli

coe

wa

s

und

e

r

s

tand-

a

bl

y

anxiousbutFisherwasboldintakingth

e

ri

s

kand,in

a

ddition,th

e

PrincessRoyal

,

anoth

e

rbattl

ec

rui

se

r,was

d

ispatch

e

dtoNorthAmeri

c

an

w

a

t

e

rs

.

How

eve

r

,

th

e

bigg

e

stqu

es

tionwaswher

e

Sp

ee

wouldplantogon

e

xt.Th

e

r

e

w

ere

manyoptionsandth

e

Alli

e

shadtotr

y

to

se

cond-guessthemall.

Th

e

f

e

arwasthatSpeewouldtak

e

a

c

our

se

throughth

e

PanamaCanalintotheCaribbean

andov

e

rwh

e

lmth

es

mallAlli

e

dforceintheWestIndies

.

Shouldheaccomplishthis,th

e

n

hewouldbefreetoproce

e

dtoN

e

wYorkandr

e

leas

e

th

ec

onsiderablenumbersofGerman

linerstrapp

e

dth

e

re,protect

e

donlybyAdmiralHornb

y

’

se

ld

e

rl

y

squadron.

T

h

e

r

e

w

e

r

e

alsowhispersthataGermanbattl

ec

ruisermight

e

scapetoattackNorthAtlanti

cse

arout

e

s

and

o

p

e

rateinconjunctionwithSp

ee

offth

e

Plat

e

,ifSp

ee’

s

co

urs

e

turn

e

douttob

e

aroundCap

e

Horn

.

AdmiralHornbytookhisforc

e

toth

e

W

es

tIndiestop

re

v

e

ntSpeeenteringthePanama

CanalandthePrinces

sRoy

alwa

s

d

e

plo

y

edinJamai

c

a.Al

s

oinS

o

uthAm

e

ricawas

A

dmiralStoddart’sforc

e

,compri

s

ingth

e

armore

d

cr

ui

se

rsCarnarvon,Cornwall

,

D

e

f

e

nce,

Canopu

s,

K

e

nt

,

Glasgow

,

andOtranto(someofwhichhadbeenredeployedfrom

Cradock’ssquadron),whichwastowaitatMontevideo,laterchangedtoAbrolhosRocks,
forSturdeetojointhem.

IfSpeewentroundtheHorntheworrywasthathewouldheadforSouthAfricaandstir
upanti-Britishfeeling.BeforetheBattleofCoronelanoldbattleship,theAlbion,wassent
totheCapeStationtojoinAdmiralKing-Hallandhistwosmallcruisers,Hyacinthand
Astraea.TheyweresubsequentlyjoinedbythelightcruiserWeymouthandbythearmored
cruisersMinotaurandDefencesothattheforcewouldbesufficienttocombatSpee.On
theWestAfricancoast,tocounteractanyGermanactionagainstBritishandFrench
colonies,anewsquadronwastemporarilyputtogetherbydeployingvesselsfromthe
MediterraneanandtheChannel.InthePacific,theBritishandJapaneseworkedtogether
tocombatSpeeandtopreventhimfromtryingtodoublebackandheadfortheIndian
Ocean.

On7December1914InvincibleandInflexible,aftera

‘

shortdelay,reachedPortStanleyin

theFalklandIslandsandAdmiralsSturdeeandStoddartmadetheirrendezvous.Asthe
Britishshipswerecoaling,GneisenauandNurnbergapproachedPortWilliam,northof
Stanley,unseenotherthanbyCanopus,whichopenedfireonthematabout9am.Coaling
stoppedabruptlyandtheshipsmadereadytosail.TheGermancruisersmadeadashto
joinSpeeintheScharnhor

s

tbutthisprovedtobeatacticalerror.IfSpeehadmoved

towardsthecruisers,hecouldhaveblockedtheBritish,preventingthemfromleavingport

andattackingh

e

mthere.However,Speehadnotreceivedtheintellig

e

n

ce

fromGermany

thatBritishcruiserswereinthearea.No

w

hisshipswereunderseriousthreatfromthe

strength

e

n

e

dBritishforce.Theyhopedtoevad

e

theBritishduringth

e

nightbutwere

underfireby1pm.Sp

e

ehopedthathe

c

ouldsavehislightcruisersand,splittinghis

squadron,he

se

ntthemoff,facingthefirewithjustScharnhorstand

G

n

e

isenau.

TherewassomedoubtastowhetherInvincibleandInflexiblewouldfulfilltheirpotential,
sincetheirshootingappearedpoortotheotherBritishships,especiallyin

c

omparisonto

Spec’scrackgunnery,andtheirvisionwasimpairedbytheamountofsmokethroughout
theaction.SturdeewasendeavoringtokeepoutofrangeoftheGerman8.2-inchgunsbut
withinhisownrangeof12-inchgunsandhemanagedthiswithgreatprowess.Spee
attemptedtomakeadashtowardsbadweatherbuttheBritishwereinfullpursuitand
therewasonlyatemporaryc

e

asefire.Sturdeeclosedrangeandsoonoverwhelmed

Scharnhorst.Firespreadthroughherand,at4.15pm,shewentdownwiththelossofall
hands.TheGneisenaufoughtbravelyonbutshetoowasoverwh

e

lmedandsankat6pm

althoughsome200ofhercrewwererescued.Bycoincid

e

nce,oneoftheGerman

lieutenantsrescuedbytheCarnarvonwasnamedStoddartandturnedouttobeaG

e

rman

relationoftheBritishadmiral.

Sturdeehadalsodividedhisshipsatth

e

beginningofthebattleandsentsomeinpursuitof

Spec’sdispatchedlight

c

ruisers.CornwallandGlasgowchasedtheLeipzigwhileKent

f

ollow

e

dNurnberg.ItlookedasifNurnbergwould

o

utrunh

e

rpursu

e

rbut,und

e

rpressur

e

,

twoofh

e

rboil

e

rsblew

a

ndK

e

nt

c

losedintofir

e

andsunkher.Thebattl

e

forL

e

ip

z

ig

we

nt

o

nfortwohour

sa

ndshefiredthreetorp

e

d

oes

atth

e

Briti

s

h

s

h

i

p

s

,thoughnonefoundtheir

target,befor

es

h

e

s

u

cc

umb

e

da

r

idsank

.

TheonlyGermanvess

e

lto

es

cap

ew

a

s

th

e

Dre

s

den,whichdidmanagetooutrunCarnarvon

.

How

eve

r,sh

e

washunteddownthree

monthslat

e

r,hidinginth

e

JuanF

e

rnandezIslands.KentandGlasgowopenedfire

a

nd

Dr

es

d

e

n

sc

uttl

e

d,sinceshewasoutofcoal,larg

e

lyb

e

cau

se

th

e

Britishhadbeenjamming

herradiosothatshe

c

ouldn

o

tr

e

ndezvouswithhercollier.

Th

e

Battl

e

ofth

e

Falklandswasthemostdecisivebattleofthewarsofar,andimportantin

termsoftheAllies’moral

e

a

swe

llasforAtlanticandPacifictrade.Therew

e

r

e,o

fc

o

ur

se

,

s

tillthingstobelearntandthepursuitofSp

ee

h

ig

hlight

e

dth

e

probl

e

mswithBritish

gunn

e

rythatwouldcontinu

e

forthedurationofthewar.Thehitrateatth

e

Battl

e

ofth

e

Falklandswas5%,which,althoughitwouldb

eco

m

e

anacceptablestandardlater,wasnot

c

on

s

id

ere

dag

o

od

a

verageatthetime.Gunner

y

trainingb

e

for

e

th

ew

a

r

hadf

a

il

e

dto

s

imulatebattl

ec

ondition

ss

uffi

c

i

e

ntl

y

andsmokewasaconstanthindrancetovision,n

o

t

s

impl

yf

r

o

m

co

al

-

fir

e

dgunsbutalso,dependingonthew

e

ath

e

r

co

ndition

s,

fromthe

funnels.Ther

e

wereadditionalpr

o

bl

e

m

s

inthatdir

e

ctfire-controllershadnotb

ee

n

i

nst

a

ll

e

d

,

andth

e

n

e

ar

e

st

s

upplyof12-

i

n

c

hsh

e

llwa

s

mil

es

awayinGibraltar

.

Alsoasa

resultoftheFalklandssuccess,Fi

s

h

e

rord

e

r

e

dtwonewbattl

e

cruisers,Repulseand

R

e

nown,as

w

e

llasthr

ee

of

w

hath

ec

all

e

dlar

ge

li

g

ht

c

ruis

e

rs,

n

a

m

e

dC

o

urageou

s,

G

l

orio

u

sa

nd

F

u

rio

u

s,

whi

c

h

w

e

r

e

almos

tth

es

amethin

g.

DoggerBank

Ba

c

ka

tth

e

Admiralt

y

,

t

h

e

Alli

es

hadb

ee

nlu

c

k

yi

nth

er

e

covery

ofaGermanNa

vyc

iph

e

r

s

ign

a

lb

oo

k

f

roma

c

ru

i

ser

thatwasdestroyedbyth

e

Ru

ss

ian

s

inth

e

Gulfof

Fin

l

a

nd

.

In

addition,theyalsopick

e

dup

c

onfid

e

ntial

c

hart

s

o

ft

h

e

NorthSea,

s

howingth

e

G

e

rman

o

p

e

rationalgrid

t

o

loca

t

e

fri

e

ndl

y

andenem

yve

ss

e

l

s

,aft

e

rth

ey

w

e

r

e

aban

do

n

e

da

s

a

G

e

rmand

e

stro

ye

rsank

.

Sothatfullad

v

antag

e

c

o

uldb

e

mad

e

ofthisintelligen

ce

atop

-

sec

r

e

td

e

partm

e

nt

wasc

r

e

at

e

dwithintheAdmiralt

y

,

w

hichb

ec

am

e

kn

o

wna

s

‘

Ro

om40

’

.

ThemeninRoom40

we

r

e

abl

e

tod

e

ciph

e

r

Ge

rmanm

e

ssagesand,althoughth

ee

n

e

my

qui

c

kly

r

e

a

liz

e

dthis,theythoughtthatthey

c

ould

c

ount

e

ra

c

titb

y

c

on

tinuallychanging

codes.Th

e

Briti

s

h,how

e

v

e

r,w

e

r

eab

l

e

tok

ee

pupwithth

ec

hang

e

s.G

e

rmanint

e

llig

e

n

ce

c

o

uldprobabl

y

ha

ve

tak

e

nadvantag

e

ofth

e

Briti

s

hinth

e

s

amew

a

y

butforth

e

factthat

th

e

R

oya

lNav

y,

unlik

e

th

eGer

manswhousedthem

w

ithoutr

es

tri

c

tion,mad

e

rath

e

r

limi

t

e

dus

e

ofradiotransmission

s.

A

dmiralFranzvonHipperhadb

e

gunraid

s

atth

e

b

e

gin

ningof

Nov

e

mber,withsom

e

s

u

c

c

esses

inmin

e

la

y

ingand

th

e

d

e

s

t

r

u

c

ti

o

nofsmall

e

r

vesse

l

s,

wh

e

nR

o

om40w

a

snot

ye

tinex

i

s

t

e

nc

e.

On24January1915

,

h

e

w

e

nt

o

utwithth

eint

e

ntio

n

o

fattackingBritish

s

hip

s

n

e

arth

e

importantfishinggroundofDoggerBank.Hehopedtofindfishingtrawlers

andhealsohadintelligencethatsuggestedthereweresomelightnavalvesselswithout
protectioninthearea.ThistimetheAdmiraltywasabletoinformBeattythatHipperwas
atlarge,andBeattysetoffwithfivebattlecruisers,hopingtointercepttheGermans
unawares.

HipperhadhopedthathemightbeabletosecurethesupportoftheHighSeasFleetifthey
venturedouttotheeasternpartoftheNorthSeabuttheKaiserwascommittedtohis
policyofcautionandrefused.AdmiralIngenohl,whohadledraidsontheeastcoastof
England,thereforeallocatedtheFirstandSecondscoutinggroups.Thesecomprisedof
battlecruisers,fourlightcruisersandtwoflotillasoftorpedoboats.Hipperhadtwobattle
cruisers,MoltkeandDedfiin8er,andaratherslowarmoredcruiser,Bliicher.Ingenohlwas
unawareofcoursethattheAdmiraltyknewofhisintentionsandthattheRoyalNavy
intendedtosetatrap

.

BeattyandhisbattlecruiserswouldbejoinedbyGoodenough’s

lightcruisersquadron,theHarwichforceunderTyrwhittwiththreelightcruisersand
thirty-fived

e

stroyers,andKeyeswiththedestroyersLurchesandFiredrake,British

submarinesweresenttowardsBorkumRiff,offtheGermancoast

.

TheThirdBattle

SquadronandtheThirdCruiserSquadronweresenttopatroltothenorthshouldthe
Germansattempttoescapethatway,andtotheirnorthJellicoesailedoutofScapaFlowto
makeasweepincaseth

e

HighSeasFleetcameout.

Atdawnon24December,lightcruiserAurorawentintoactionwiththecruiserKolberq
andbothBeattyandHipperh

ea

d

e

dtowardsthem.Hipperrealizedfromintercepting

ra

dio

m

e

ssagesthattheBritishmightwellbeoutinforce

w

hi

c

hmeantthathecouldbeheading

intoatrap.Heth

e

r

e

forechangedcourseandhead

e

dtowardsGerman

w

at

e

rs

.

Beattyhad

alreadysightedhisshipsandgavechase.Ju

s

tafter9amhehadclosedthegapsufficiently

toopenfir

e

withLion,TigerandPrincessRoyal.Theslowerbattle

cr

uisersNewZealand

andIndomitablewerecominguptother

e

ar.HipperfacedthemwithSeydlitzinfrontand

Moltke,DerfflingerandBlucherfollowing.

ItshouldhavebeenaresoundingBritishvictorybuttherewereproblemswithsignalling
duetopoorvisibilityandsomeseriousdamagefromGermanfiringtotheLion,which
disabledher.Tipermisinterpretedamessag

e

fromBeattyandconsequentlyleftMoltke

unengagedandfreetoattacktheBritishfrontline.Bliicherwassoonovercome,Seydlitz
losttwoturretswithonehitandbothDerfflingerandKolbergsustainedheavydamage.
LionwashitbythreeGermanshellsand,asshebegantofallastern,commandhadtopass
fromBeattytoRearAdmiralMoore.AsLionhadnoelectricity,Beattycouldnolonger
sendwirelessm

e

ssagesandhissignalhalyardsw

e

redamagedwhichmadesignaling

difficultanddisastrouslyconfusing.Mooreb

e

lievedthatBeattyintendedhimtoattackthe

rearofthe

e

n

e

myratherthangivingchasetotheGermanfront-runners,sohe

concentratedonthealreadydamagedBlucher.ThesignalthatBeattyhadwantedtosend
was

‘e

ngagetheenemymoreclosely’,justasNelsonhaddoneatTrafalgar,buthewas

frustratedandfurioustofindthatitwasnolongerinthesignalbook.Evenso,Moltkewas
theonlyGermanvesselthatwasinapositiontofightandshedrewback,thinkingthatshe
hadsunkTiqer.Tyrwhittarrivedwithalightcruiserandfourdestroyersandconcentrated
fireontheBlucher,alongwithTiqer,whichhadbroughtherfiresundercontrol.Blucher
wasdulysunkwithunnecessaryBritishforceand234ofher1,200crewwererescued

-

it

wouldhavebeenmoreifaGermanzeppelinhadnotbeguntobombtheBritishships
pickingupthesailors,assumingthattheywererescuingtheirown.BythetimethatBeatty
hadmovedtothedestroyerAttackandreachedPrincessRoyaltoboard,therestofthe
Germanshadgotawaydespitetheheavydamagethattheshipshadtaken.

ItwasaBritishvictorybutadisappointingone.Asaresultofthepoorchoiceshehad
made,MoorewasdeployedtocommandanoldsquadronofcruisersbasedintheCanary
Islandswheretherewaslesschanceofmajoraction.ItwasmoreseriousfortheGermans
whohaddrawnsomeconsolationfromthinkingthattheyhadsunktheTiper.Whenthis
turnedouttobefalse,itwasdecidedthatVonPohlshouldreplacethecommander-in-chief
Ingenohl.

Strategychangestookplaceonbothsides.Tirpitz,despitehavinglargelybeenresponsible
forthebuildingofthedreadnoughtsontheGermanside,nowfavoredairshipattackson
LondonandsubmarineattacksonBritishtrade

.

TheBritishabandonedtheregularcruising

oftheirmorepowerfulshipshopingtotakeGermanvesselsbychanceatthebeginningof
1915,andlaterthesameyearthiswasalsoconsideredanineffectivestrategytobe
undertakenbylightervessels.Theincreasingthreatfromsubmarinesmadeittoo
dangeroustotakesuchchancesand,infuture,vesselswouldonlygooutforspecific
purposes

-

offensiveoperations,exercisesandtorespondtointelligencereportsonenemy

operations.Forbothsidesadecisivestrikeremainedelusive.

TurkeyandMesopotamia

GermanyandTurkey1914

BeforethewarBritainhadbeenkeentomaintaingoodr

e

lationswithTurkey,sinceitwas

strategicallyimportantintermsofaccesstotheBlackSeaandcommunicationswith
Russia.In1908,powerinTurkeyhadbeentakenbyagroupofyoungofficerswhich
wantedtomodernizethecountryandthisattractedconsiderableGermaninvestmentin
infrastructureandintrainingthearmy.Britain,meanwhile,wasworkingwiththeTurkish
navyandBritishyardswerebuildingtwobrandnewdreadnoughtsforthem.Theships
werereadyfordeliveryinAugust1914.Churchill,onthebrinkofwar,madeanorderthat
theyshouldbecompulsorilytransferredtotheBritishFleet,whichnaturallyoutragedthe
Turks.TheywerenotpacifiedbyanofferfromtheAdmiraltytopayafixeddailyratefor
theuseoftheshipsforthedurationofthewar.

TheBritishdeploymentintheMediterraneanwasquite

s

mallatthebeginningofthewar,

asmostoftheFleethadbeenconcentratedintheNorthSea,anditwasexpectedthat
Francewouldtakemostoftheresponsibilityforthear

e

a

.

Historically,thiswasabig

turnaroundinBritishnavalp

o

l

icy

,although,asth

e

warwenton,eventsfor

ce

dth

e

mto

d

e

plo

y

mor

e

r

e

sourc

e

sinthisarena

.

Th

e

Fr

e

n

c

hhadapow

e

rfulbattl

e

shipforceatToulon

althoughonl

yo

n

e

dr

e

adnought

.

Howev

e

r,theCommander-in-Chi

e

f

o

fth

e

M

e

dit

e

rran

e

an,

AdmiralSirArchibaldMiln

e

,hadathisdispo

s

alth

e

2

nd

BattleCruiserSquadron,R

e

ar

AdmiralTroubridge’s1

s

tCruis

e

rSquadronasw

e

llasfourlight

c

ruisersandaflotillaof

16destroyers.ManythoughtthatMiln

e

wasincommandmorebecauseofhisconn

e

ctions

inso

c

i

e

t

y

thanb

e

causeofhisnavalprowess.Inth

e

daysl

e

adinguptoBritain’sentryinto

thewar,Miln

e

wasgiv

e

nordersthathisfirstprioritywastoassisttheFrenchin

transportingtheirAfricanarmyfromAlgeriaov

e

rtoFran

ce

,allth

e

mor

e

n

e

cessaryasthe

Frenchhadsenttwoofth

e

irmo

s

tmoderndreadnoughtstoescortthepresidenton

as

tat

e

triptoRussia

.

Accordingtohisorders,Miln

e

wasalso,ifpossible,tobring‘toaction

individualfastG

e

rmanships,particularlytheGoeben,whomayint

e

rfer

e

‘

withthat

tran

s

portation…Donotatthisstag

e

b

e

broughtt

o

a

c

tionagainstsup

e

riorforces,except

incombination

w

ithth

eF

r

e

n

c

ha

s

p

a

rtofageneralbattl

e

.

‘

Infairn

e

sstoMiln

e

,itwa

s

,in

light

of

whattranspired,aratherun

c

learm

es

sag

e

but

i

twas

e

v

e

nmoreunfortunatethatit

shouldhav

e

b

ee

n

se

ntt

o

anadmiralnotrenownedforhi

s

int

e

ll

e

ctorinitiati

ve.

Th

e

G

er

manshadonl

y

twov

esse

lsinth

e

M

e

diterranean’th

e

afor

e

m

e

ntion

e

dGoeben,a

battl

ec

ruiser,andafa

s

tmod

e

rnlightcrui

se

r,th

e

Bre

s

lau,und

e

rth

e

commandofAdmiral

Souchon.Therewereotherpotentialenemiesinth

e

shapeofasmallAustro-Hungarian

forceandalargerItalianone,althoughon2AugustItalyde

c

laredneutrality.H

o

wever,the

biggestthreatstotheFrenchtransportsr

e

mainedtheGermanvessels.

On3August,BritishintelligencelearnedthatSouchon‘sshipswerecoalingatMessinain
Sicily.TheAdmiraltypresumedthattheywouldnowheadwestandthefearwasthatthey
wouldescapetheMediterraneanthroughtheStraitsofGibraltarandbeapotentialmenace
toBritishAtlantictradevessels.Accordingly,Milneorderedtwobattlecruisersthatwere
watchingtheentrancetotheAdriatic(incaseSouchonshouldattempttomeetupwiththe
Austro-Hungarianfleet)tosailathighspeedtoGibraltarwiththeintentionofintercepting
theGoeben.

AlthoughSouchondidsailwesthewas,infact,headingforAfricawhere,on4August,he
bombardedtheFrenchportsofBoneandPhilippeville.Therewasnotmuchdamagebut
theincidentcaughttheFrenchoffguard

.

AstheGoebenandBreslauheadedbackeast

theymettheBritishbattlecruisers,IndomitableandInflexible,thathadbeensentto
interceptthem.Technically,BritainandGermanywerenotyetatwar,astheBritish
ultimatumdidnotexpireuntilmidnight.Asaresult,thetwogroupsofshipssailedpastin
oppositedirectionswithoutacknowledgingeachother.TheBritishcruisersswitched
courseinordertoshadowtheGermansandwerejoinedbyDublin,alightcruiser.When
Souchonwentaheadonfullspeeditbecameasternchase.TheBritishwereoutrunand
SouchonreturnedtoMessina.WhenMilneheardofSouchon‘slocation,heagain
presumedthattheeventualdestinationwouldbewesteithertotheAdriaticortopass
throughtotheAtlantic.TheAdmiraltyorderedhimtopatroltheAdriatictopreventthe
GermansenteringortheAustriansfromleavingwithoutbeingseen.Accordingly,Milne
sentheavyshipsbetweenSicilyandTunisiainthehopeofinterceptingtheGoebenand
TroubridgewassentwithfourarmoredcruiserstotheentrancetotheAdriatic.Although
theFrenchhadampleprotectionfromtheirownToulonsquadrons,theAdmiraltyhadnot
sentwordofthistoMilneandsohisordertoprotectthetransportswasstillvalid.

On6August,thelightcruiserGloucestersightedtheGermanshipsleavingMessina
throughtheStraits.OnlyGloucesterfollowedthroughthestraits

-

althoughamore

belligerentadmiralmighthavedoneso,Milnedidnotsendmoreheavilyarmedcraftin
ordertorespectItalianneutrality.CaptainHowardKellyoftheGloucestersentmessages
toTroubridge,whowaspatrollingsouthofCorfu,andtoMilne,whowaswelltothewest,
thatSouchonappearedtobeheadingfortheAdriatic.HesentfurtherwordwhenSouchon
changedcoursetothesouthandtheBreslausplitaway

-

thiswasconfirmedbytheDublin

(captainedbyKelly’sbrotherJohn)whichhadinterceptedSouchon’swireless
communicationswhileonthewaytojoinTroubridgewithtwodestroyers.Souchonwas,
infact,headingforConstantinoplewhereafriendlyagreementwithGermanyhadbeen
signedandwherehewouldhavefreeentry.ThecoursetowardstheAdriatichadbeena
feintbutTroubridge,believingthenewcoursewasthefeint,continuedwithhiscourseto
Corfu,thinkingthathecouldengageSouchonthere.

GloucesterkeptclosetoGoebenandwasinstructedtosignalthepositiontoDublin.
PossiblyDublinwouldhavebeenabletointerceptbuttheshipsslippedpasteachotherin
thedarkness.Troubridgemaintainedhispassagenorthuntilmidnight,eventhoughMilne
couldhavetoldhimby10.30pmthattheGoebenwasdefinitelypursuingasouth-ward
course.Earlyinthemorning,BreslauwasseentohaverejoinedGoeben,andthe
GloucesterjoinedDublinastheyshadowedtheGermanvessels.Troubridgesignalledthat
hewasonhiswaytosupportthem.Inthemeantime,hisgunneryexpertconvinced
Troubridgethathewasputtinghisfourcruisersundertoogreatarisk-thatthetenll-Inch
andten6-inchgunsoftheGoebenwoulddestroythecruisersbeforetheycouldgetinto
rangewiththeirowntwenty-two9.2-inch,fourteen7.S-inch,andsixteen6-inchguns.
Troubridgewentagainsthisowninstinctsanddecidednottogivechase.

MilnecouldhavesentIndomitablebutinsteaddecidedtorefuelwithhisentiresquadron
atMaltaandthenspentneedlesstimeonacoursefortheAdriaticinresponsetoan
erroneousAdmiraltysignalthatsaidthatAustriahaddeclaredwaronBritainsixdays
beforethiswasthecase.GloucesterandDublinwerestillinpursuitofSouchonand

GloucestermanagedtoengagetheBreslaubutwasobligedtopullbackasshehadno
morecoal.DublininformedMilnethatSouchon’sintendeddestinationwas
Constantinople,havinginterceptedthemessage,butMilne,nowbelievingthatAustriahad
declaredwar,continuedtoholdback,thinkingthatSouchonmightstillturnbackif
AustriaalsodeclaredwaronItaly.TheGermanvesselsescapedandmadetheirwayup
theDardanellestoConstantinople.

Theimplicationsofthecatalogueofmistakesandfailurestointerceptthevesselssoon
becameapparent.BreslauandGoebenwerepresentedtotheTurkishNavy,becomingthe
MidilliandSelimrespectively.GermansreplacedtheBritishnavalmissionofficerson
boardTurkishshipsand,underpressurefromGermany,Turkeydeclaredwaronthe
Germanside.InadditiontotheunderminingofBritishesteem,allthisultimatelyledtothe
DardanellescampaignandwasresponsibleforisolatingRussia.Fisherwasfurious,seeing
itasashamefulincident,andheblamedMilneofwhomhehadneverthoughthighly.An
inquirybytheAdmiraltydecidedthatTroubridgehadhad‘averyfairchanceofatleast
delayingGoebenbymateriallydamagingher’.Therefore,therehadtobeacourtmartial,
andTroubridgewaschargedthathedid‘fromnegligenceorthroughotherdefault,forbear
topursuethechaseofHisImperialGermanMajesty’sshipGoeben,thenflying’.Some
evenfeltthatheshouldhavebeentriedonthehigherchargeofcowardicebuthewas
eventuallyclearedonthegroundsthathewasfollowingAdmiraltyorders,suchasthey
were,astransmittedthroughMilne.Itexposedtheinefficiencyofthestaffworkatthe
AdmiraltyaswellasMilne’slackofjudgment.Thoughacquitted,Troubridgewasnot
employedatseaagainandwasgivenland-basedcommandsthatfellbelowhis
expectations.Milnealsoneverservedatseaagainandsawoutthewaronhalfpay.

ForcingtheDardanelles

ForsomemonthsaftertheincidentwithGoebenandBreslau,Britainhopedtobeableto
keepTurkeyneutraland,attheendofAugust,Greecehadevenofferedherforceswitha
plantolandtroopsontheGallipolipeninsulawiththeaimofgivingtheAlliescontrolof
theDardanelles.InordernottoantagonizeTurkey,theofferhadbeenturneddown.
However,attheendofOctober,aTurkishsquadron,workingwithSouchon,bombarded
RussianportsintheBlackSea.On31OctoberBritaindeclaredwaronTurkey.Vice
AdmiralSackvilleHamiltonCarden‘sDardanellesSquadronwasorderedbyChurchillto
bombardthefortsontheGallipolicoastinearlyNovember.Thebombardmentsofthe
fortswereeffectivetosomeextentbuttheywerenotfollowedupandsothemain
consequencewastodrawattentiontotheimportanceoftheregiontotheAlliesandto
highlightthethreatofattacktotheGermansandTurks.Therewereseveralreasonswhy
Britainwasinterestedincontrolofthisarea.Mostimportantly,theGallipolipeninsula
dividedtheAegeanSeafromtheDardanellesandtheapproachtotheTurkishcapital,then
Constantinople,ontheSeaofMarmara,andbeyondthattotheBlackSea,whichbordered
Russia.Ifasuccessfulcampaigncouldbemounted,itwashopedthatitwouldrelieve
pressureontheArmyontheWesternFrontaswellaspressureonRussia,sinceGermany
wouldhavetodivertresourcestothearea.Itwasalsohopedthatthiswouldultimately
shortenthewarandbreakthedeadlockontheWesternFront.Britainwasalsoconcerned
bythethreatthattheTurkisharmy(herNavywasverysmall)posedtotheSuezCanal,the
crucialroutetotheMiddleEastandIndia.Indeed,on3February1915,theTurksmounted
anattackonthecanalfromtheSinaiDesert.TheyfailedbutremainedinSinaiuntilthey
wereforcedoutin1916,thusrequiringalargedeploymentofAlliedvessels,alongwith
troopsfromBritainandIndia,toprotectthecanal.Thesouthernapproacheswerealso
protectedwithshipsintheGulfofSuez,theRedSeaandtheGulfofAqaba.Ittiedupa
lotofvesselsthatwouldhavebeenusefulintheDardanelles.

TherewasmuchdiscussionabouthowtodealwiththesituationinTurkey.Churchillwas
anenthusiasticadvocateforanoperationtoforcetheDardanellesincludingactionashore
onGallipoli,andhewaslargelyresponsibleforthe

‘

disastrouscampaigntocome.Fisher,

foreseeingmanyproblems,wassetagainstitandworriedaboutdeployingvess

e

lsaway

fromtheGrandFleet.ChurchillwonthroughandabasewasestablishedattheGreek
IslandofLemnosintheAegeanSea.Churchillconceiveditprimarilyasanaval
campaign,althoughtherewerealsoplanstolandtroops.Fisherthoughtthatitshouldbe
anamphibiousaffairifitwastogoaheadandthecommander-in

-

chiefofthe

MediterraneanFleet,AdmiralLimpus,arguedthatthearmyshoulddealwiththeforts
ratherthanfirefromthe

s

hip

s

.However,theAustralianandNewZealandArmy

Co

rps

basedinEgyptwereputonalerttomovetoL

e

mnos,andtheBritish2

9th

Divisionwas

initiallyonstandby,althoughthiswasoverturnedbyKitchen

e

r

.

H

e

didnotagreeto

releasethedivisionuntil10March,bywhichtim

e

itwouldbetoolateforthemto

participateinthenavalattack

.

Itwasintendedthatlandforceswouldtakecontrolofthefortsalongthecoastsothatthe
navalvess

e

lscouldpassfre

e

lyintotheDardanellesandmoveontotakeConstantinople.It

wasnotaneasyexercisebecausetherewere14fortsintotalandsixofthesesurrounded
theNarrows,abottleneckinthewatersthatwaslessthanamilewide.Theywereall

armedwithgunsrangingbetween4and14inchesand,althoughsomeofthemwere
outdated,theywereneverthelessoperationalandathreattotheships.Inbetweentheforts,
batteriesofhowitzershadbeeninstalledandtherewasaconstantthreatofminesinthe
water.Inadditiontothis,theDardanelleswerediffi

c

ulttonavigateanyway.Nevermore

thanthreemileswidewithstrongcurrentsandmanyshallows,theywer

e

particularly

difficultforsubmarinemano

e

uvres.Convertedtrawlerswererequisitionedtoclearthe

mines,whichpreventedthebattleshipsgetting

c

loseenoughtothefortstodisablethem.

Thetrawlers,however,couldnotreallybe

e

ffectivewhiletheywereunderthreatfromthe

gunsandhowitzers,andthestrongcurrentsmadeitimpossibleforth

e

mtomoveata

speedofmorethanthreeknots.

TheplanwasthattheDardanellesSquadronwouldblastth

e

fortsattheout

e

rareasand,if

necessary,landforcesto

c

ompl

e

t

e

thedemolition

.

Thentheminesw

ee

p

e

rswould

n

e

utrali

ze

theminefi

e

ldssothattheships

c

ouldg

e

tinrang

e

ofthefortsaroundthe

Narrows

.

Onc

e

thiswa

sacc

ompli

s

h

e

d,theAllieswouldgainpassageintoth

e

Seaof

Marmaraandthenlaunchamajornavalattacktoforc

e

theTurk

s

intosurrenderat

Constantinople.On19F

e

bruary1915

,

AdmiralCardenbeganbombardmentsatSedd

-e

l-

BahrandKumKale,withthepre-dreadnoughts

A

gam

e

mnon

,

Vengeance,Triumphand

Cornwallis,thebattle

c

ruis

e

rlnfi

ex

ibleandthecruiserAmethyst.Therewereadditional

d

e

stroy

e

rsaswellasthreeFrenchbattleships,Bouvet

,

Gauloi

s

andSzdf

re

n

.

Theymadea

secondattempton25Februar

y

sin

ce

,d

e

spitetheheavybombardment,littleimpa

c

thad

b

ee

nmad

e

ontheforts,andtherewassomedam

a

g

e

to

s

hip

s

asw

e

llascasualtiesfromthe

Turkishguns

.

Th

ese

condbombardmentwasmoresuccessfulandthistimemarin

e

sand

sailorswerelandedthefollowingdaytodisabl

e

an

y

r

e

mainingguns

.

Inth

e

m

e

antime,ArkRoyalhadreachedLemnos,

c

arr

y

ing

s

ix

a

ir

c

raftthatwouldbeused

forr

e

connais

s

anceandp

rov

id

e

th

e

fl

ee

t

w

ithf

ee

dbackonwh

e

reshell

s

fell

.

Som

e

submarinecommandersaccompaniedpilotsonr

ec

onnai

ss

an

ce

trips

s

othattheywereable

tolocatemine-fi

e

ldsa

swe

lla

s

p

o

t

e

ntialtargets

.

Itwason

e

ofthefirstattempt

s

atu

s

ing

plan

es

forobservationand,du

e

tounreliabl

ee

quipm

e

ntandthen

o

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Turkishdeployedmoretroops.TheGermansalso

decidedtosendsubmarinestotheMediterraneanandapairofsubmarinesbyrailto

Turkishwatersthatwouldbeassembledonarrival.Thesewereathreatbuttheywerenot
thereintimeforthelandingsontheGallipolipeninsula,whichtookplaceon25April.

Intheleaduptothecampaign,theportofMurdosatLemnoswastransformedintoa
harborandjettiesandpontoonsinstalled.Altogether75,000troopshadbeenassembledby

GeneralHamilton.TheBritish2

9th

DivisionwaslandedatthetipofthePeninsulaat

CapeHellesandtheANZACs(AustralianandNewZealandArmyCorps)landedfurther
northtoestablishabeachhead.FrenchforceswereplacedontheAsiaticsidetocreatea
diversion.TheTurkishforcescouldnotforcethetroopsbackintotheseabutneithercould
theAlliespushpastthem,evenwithmorereinforcements,togettothecommanding
heightofAchiBaba.Thesituationrapidlydeterioratedintoastalemate. TheNavyhada
logisticnightmareontheirhandsinsupplyingthearmy,givingartillerysupportand
preparingfortheimminentsubmarinearrivalsreportedbyintelligence.TheNavyhad
itselfbeensuccessfulingettingsubmarinesintotheSeaofMarmaradespitethedifficulty
ofnavigatingtheDardanelles.

Then,on13May,aTurkishdestroyerwithaGermancrewtorpedoedandsunkGoliath
withthelossofallhands.Asaresult,Fisherwasadamantthatthesuper-dreadnought
QueenElizabethshouldreturnwithimmediateeffectandthreatenedtoresignoverthe
issue.(Hehadalreadythreatenedtoresignatleastseventimesin1915.)Churchill
concededbutonlyontheconditionthatQueenElizabethwasreplacedwithtwopre-
dreadnoughtsandtwomonitors.ThiswasnottheendofthewranglingintheWarCouncil
overdeploymentsandreinforcementsintheDardanelles.Itwasadepressingpointinthe
waranyway.AnewoffensiveontheWesternFrontwasalreadygoingbadlyandtherewas
achroniclackofshells.On14May,attheWarCouncilmeeting,ChurchillandFisher
agreedthenavalreinforcementsfortheDardanelles,althoughFisherwasnotentirely
satisfiedsincetheyincludedvesselsthathehadbeenallowedtobuildforhisBaltic
project.Overnight,however,Churchillsubstantiallyrevisedwhathadbeenagreed,
demandingevenmore,and,notforthefirsttime,sentamemorandumthatFisherfound
patronisingintone.ItwasthefinalstrawandFisherreallydidwalkoutoftheAdmiralty
on15May.Therewasahugeoutcrywithevery-body,fromtheQueentothenewspapers,
appealingforhimtostay.HethenwrotetoPrimeMinisterAsquithtowithdrawthe
resignationbuthemadeanumberofill-judgedconditions-thatChurchillberemoved
bothfromofficeandthecabinet,thatthereshouldbeacompletelynewboardof
Admiralty,thatChurchill’ssuccessorshoulddealonlywithpolicyandparliamentary
procedure,thatFisherhimselfshouldhavesoleresponsibilityforallnewshipbuildingand
thatheshouldhavecompleteprofessionalchargeofthewaratsea.Inthemeantimehe
hadrefusedtocarryoutanydutiesattheAdmiraltyeventhoughRoom40hadd

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er

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a

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e

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Maje

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ticmetthesamefat

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condmissioninJuly,thesubmarinetooktheFrench

s

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asonablyeffective

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e

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ar

a

from

Apriluntilth

ec

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tionofth

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ll

esc

ampaign.O

ve

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e

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e

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Ar

e

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ffortwasmountedbyHamiltonwholand

e

d

a

furth

er

22,000troopsatSuvla

Ba

y

,startingon8August.Fromanavalpointofview,thelandingswentwell.TheArmy,

however,havingcaughttheTurksunawares,failedtocapitalizeontheiradvantageanddid
notpushforwardquicklyenoughunderLieutenantGeneralStopfordwhorestedthetroops
foraday.TheOglueTepe,animportantstrongpoint,wasunoccupiedwhentheAllies
arrivedatSulvabut,bythetimetheyadvanced,theTurkshadorganizedtheirtroopsand
theAllieslostover8,000men.TheFrenchtooweredeterminedtobreakthestale-mate
andplannedtoopenupasecondfrontatYukyeriontheAsiaticsideofthepeninsulaby
deployinganotherfourdivisionsfromFrance.However,theynevergotthatfar.

WhenBulgariaenteredthewaronthesideoftheGermanstheywerediverted,together
withBritishtroops,toSalonikainwhatturnedouttobeawastedefforttomarchnorthto
tryandsaveSerbia.

WithBulgariainthewarandwithcommitmentstoanewfrontinMacedonia,inaddition
totheoveralllackofprogress,thehugenumberoffatalitiesandthesicknessamongthe
troopsintheDardanelles,evacuationwasreallytheonlyoptionremaining.Theever
buoyantKeyesstillpressedforafinalnavalattackbutd

e

Robeckremainedunconvinced.

TherewassomesupportfromKitchenerandalsofromtheFrench.Therewerefearsthat,
becausethelandingsthemselveshadresultedinahighnumberofcasualties,the
evacuationmightcauseevenhighernumbers.Theultimatedecision,madeinDecember,
wasforevacuation.Anotherfactorgoverningthisdecisionwasthatadirectraillink
betweenGermanyandConstantinoplewas

aboutto

b

eo

p

e

n

e

d

w

h

ic

h

wo

uldgi

ve

th

e

Tur

ksaconstantmunitio

n

ss

uppl

y.

Theevac

u

atio

n

waso

n

eof

th

e

m

ostwellorganizedaspectsoft

h

eG

allip

o

l

ia

nd

D

ar

d

a

n

e

ll

esca

mp

aignanddidnotresu

l

tint

h

ea

nt

ic

ipat

e

dh

eavy

lo

sses

ofhu

manlife.It

had

.

totake

pl

acesec

r

e

tl

y

und

er

th

ec

ov

e

rofdark

nesssoasnottoprovokeaT

ur

k

i

s

h

at

t

ac

k.Th

e

R

oy

alNa

vy

h

a

dt

oa

rr

angethetransporto

f11

8,

000m

e

n,7

,

000h

o

r

sesa

nd

mul

esaswellasar

t

illery

fr

o

mAn

z

a

c

Cov

e,

H

e

ll

es

and

S

u

v

la

.Evac

u

a

t

io

n

sbegano

n1

2

D

ece

mb

e

rfromAn

z

a

c

andSuvla

andwerecom

pl

eted

b

y

th

e

19D

e

cemb

e

r

w

ith

o

uta

s

in

g

l

elossof

l

ife.T

h

et

r

oo

p

s

at

Ca

p

e

H

e

ll

e

sstart

e

dtob

e

mo

ve

dinJ

a

nu

ary

1

9

1

6.

M

os

t

h

ad

b

ee

n

ev

a

c

uatedb

y

7Januar

y

but

t

h

ereweres

t

i

ll1

9,

000r

e

m

a

iningand,thataft

e

rnoon

,

th

eGermans,having

b

eens

u

rp

ri

se

db

y

th

e

pr

ev

iou

s

eva

c

ua

tions,real

i

zedwhatwas

h

a

pp

e

nin

g

andmount

e

danartill

e

r

ybombardment

.

Itwentonforso

m

e

fourhoursandth

e

Turk

s

w

e

r

eins

tru

c

t

e

dt

oat

t

ac

k.A

s

tonishingly,th

e

yr

e

fu

se

dt

o

do

so.T

h

eysawno

n

ecess

it

y

ifth

e

Allieswerel

e

aving

a

n

yw

a

y.By9

J

an

u

ary,t

h

et

r

oo

p

swe

r

e

alla

w

a

y.

Thi

s

tim

e

th

e

r

e

wa

sjustonecasualty,anava

l

ra

tin

gwas

hita

s

hi

ss

hipl

efts

h

o

r

ebyapieceof

debrisfromanexplosio

n

c

au

sedbyo

n

eof

th

eAll

i

es’time-fusedbom

b

susedto

bl

ow

up

mun

i

tion

s

dump

s.

TheRoyalNavymai

n

ta

in

e

daba

se

atMurd

osa

nditwa

sfromtherethattwoR

NA

S

air

c

raftb

o

mb

e

dC

o

n

s

t

antinopleinApril19

1

6

.

Li

ttl

e

d

am

a

gew

a

sca

u

se

dbut

t

h

eyhad

moresuccessbombingin

t

hesumme

r

of19

1

6w

h

en

th

eT

u

rk

i

s

h

destroyerYad

ighiar-

i-

M

il

e

t

s

u

s

t

a

in

edseriousdamage.T

h

eyalsoattacke

dth

e

ir

o

ldr

e

n

ame

d

advers

a

r

i

e

sSelim

andMidillifromthea

i

r.

T

h

e

onl

y

redeemingfeaturesofth

ew

hol

ec

ampaign

were

th

e

ev

a

c

uationandthecourag

eo

fth

e

tr

o

ops,

e

sp

ecia

ll

y

th

e

ANZACs.Therewer

e

also

so

m

e

l

e

s

s

onsand

ex

p

e

r

ie

nc

e

gainedthatwouldpro

v

eu

sef

ult

o

thenavyin

te

rmsofsubmarine

actionandinth

e

us

e

ofth

e

Ro

y

al

Nav

alAirService.

AftertheDardanelles,BritishandFren

c

hfor

ce

sw

e

r

ered

u

ce

dintheEastern

Mediterraneanassubmarine

w

arfareincreased.However,therew

e

r

e

stillsomesmall

ca

mpaignssuchastheFrenchpatrolofthecoastofSyria

a

ndL

e

banonwithabaseonthe

islandofRaudoffthe

Le

banoncoast

.

TheyalsooccupiedtheislandofCast

e

lorizo

o

ffthe

Turkishcoastandotherislandswereus

e

dtogather

i

nt

e

lligence.

TheBritishalsowishedtomaintainsom

e

kindofpres

e

nceinTurkeyanddeRobeck,with

hismuchreduced

s

quadron,wasresponsibleforinstigatingcattleraidsonthe

c

oastof

Anatolia.Stealinglivestockwasratheranunusual

jo

bfortheRoyalNavybutthebea

s

ts

w

e

r

e

b

e

lievedtobe

fo

rfoodsupplytoGermany.DeRobecku

s

edGreekirregular

s

to

assisthim,astherewerenoa

v

ailabl

e

Britishtroops

.

TheraidsbeganinMarch1916and

wentonuntilth

e

followingOctober.Thecattleweresucc

ess

full

y

rustledbutultimately

therewaslittleimpactonTurkeyandth

eG

r

ee

kgovernment,concern

e

daboutreprisal

attackson

G

r

ee

k

s

livingonthemainlandwhiletheirtroopswere

inv

olved,objected.There

weretobenomoremajornaval

ca

mpaignsintheMediterranean.

Mesopotamia1914-1918

Turk

ey

’

se

ntryintothewaronthesideofG

e

rmanyhad

f

ar

-

r

e

achingimpli

c

ationsforth

e

Alliesinoth

e

rpla

ces

thanth

e

Dardan

e

ll

e

s

.

Ultimat

e

l

y

,italsoledto

c

ampai

g

n

s

in

Egy

pt

andPalestin

e

,Mac

e

doniaandMesopotamia(pr

e

s

e

ntda

y

Iraq).M

e

sopotamia,partofthe

OttomanEmpir

e

,wa

sc

ru

c

ialtoth

e

Alli

e

deffortasamajorsuppli

e

rofoiltoBritain,

m

os

tlythroughth

e

Anglo-PersianOilCompanyatAbadanIslandinth

e

Shatt-al-Arab.In

1914,whenr

e

lationswithTurk

ey

w

e

r

e

d

e

t

e

rioratingandtheGermansw

e

r

es

pr

e

ading

anti

-

Briti

s

hpropagandainMesopotamia,theBriti

s

hgo

ve

rnm

e

ntmov

e

dquicklyand

secr

e

tlys

e

tupafor

ce

inth

e

P

e

r

s

ianGulf.How

e

ver,itwasmadeupofold

vesse

l

s

that

mightha

ve

b

e

encapableofdealingwithanyTu

r

ki

s

h

vesse

l

s

inth

e

vi

c

init

y

butwould

haveb

ee

n

e

a

s

ily

ove

r

co

m

e

b

y

th

e

G

e

rmancruisersEmdenandKoni8sber8wh

e

nth

e

y

w

e

r

e

atlarg

e

intheIndianOcean.Ther

e

foreO

ce

an

,

an

o

th

e

rolderv

e

ss

e

lbutabattleship,

commandedb

y

CaptainHa

yes

-Sadl

e

r,wasalsosentouttoth

e

Gulf.In

d

ia

ntro

op

swe

r

e

se

ntt

o

B

a

hrain,wh

e

r

e

th

e

Sh

e

ikwas

sy

mpath

e

ti

c

t

o

B

r

it

is

h

o

p

e

r

a

t

io

n

s

,andinit

i

all

y

th

e

IndianG

ove

rnm

e

nt

,w

ithRo

ya

l

N

a

vy

support

,

wa

s

r

es

ponsibl

efo

r

o

p

e

rati

o

n

s

inth

e

Gulf.

Th

e

troops,underth

e

command

of

Bri

g

adi

e

rD

e

lamain,r

e

ach

e

dBahrainon23Octob

e

r

1914but,

w

h

e

nth

e

Turki

s

hnavyattackedth

e

Russiansinth

e

Bla

c

k

Se

a

,

th

ey

w

e

r

e

ord

e

r

e

dtotheShatt

-

al-Arab,andanoth

e

rbrigad

e

,For

ce

D,wass

e

nttotheGulf.Th

e

Indiantro

o

p

ss

il

e

nc

e

dth

e

gun

s

atth

e

Faoatth

ee

ntranc

e

toShattaI

-

Arab,whereasmall

garrisonwasleft,whileDelamain’s1

0th

Brigadesetupcampabouttwoandahalfmiles

awayfromtheAnglo-PersianOilCompany‘srefinery

.

TheNavylight-armedsloop

Espieqlewasstationedtoprotecttherefinery.

ThemainobjectivewastoprotecttheoilpipelineandcapturingtheportofBasrawasseen
asessential,sinceitwasthemainoutletforthearea.ItwasessentiallyanArmycampaign
buttheNavyhadanimportantroleinthattheactionwasalongtheriversEuphratesand
Tigris.ThemainaimwasachievedwhenreinforcementsunderLieutenantGeneralSirAA
BartlettarrivedtojoinDelamain’stroops

.

Theyadvancedon19Novemberand,by22

November,thetroops,alongwiththeRoyalNavyshipsEspieqle,Odinandthepaddle
steamerLawrence,hadtakentheport.TheBritishagentinBasra,SirPercyCox,waskeen
thattheyshouldcapitaliseonthevictoryandpushonfurthertoBaghdadbutthe
GovernmentofIndia,consideringthelimitednumberoftroopsandthedifficultiesin
communications,feltthatitwastoosoon.Acompromisewasreachedwherebyitwas
agreedthatthetroopswouldadvanceasfarasKurnahwhich,beingapointwherethe
riversEuphratesandTigrisjoined,wasastrategically

s

oundlocationtoguardthewhole

oftheShatt-al

-

Arab

.

AgaintheEspiepleandOdinwerealongside,althoughtheOdin

damagedherrudderintheshallowwatersandmuch

o

fthesupportworkwasundertaken

bypaddl

e

steamersandrivergunboats.On9DecemberKurnahwastakenandtheTurkish

commandantcaptured.

InMarch1915,th

e

Navywasalsoin

v

olv

e

dinatt

e

mptingtocutoffTurkishsupplies

carri

e

ddownth

eE

uphrat

e

s

.

Aflot

i

llawasputtogetherin

c

ludingtw

o

arm

e

driv

e

r

s

t

e

am

e

rs,abarg

ew

itha4-inchgun

,

tugsandmotor

-

b

o

atsand,inth

e

main,th

e

ywere

successfulinpursuingdho

ws

thatcarriedthesuppliesthroughtheunchart

e

dri

ve

r.

How

e

v

e

r,theTurksw

e

rebuildinguptheirtroopsinM

e

sopotamiaandtheBritishrealised

thattheywouldn

ee

dto

s

tr

e

ngth

e

nth

e

irownposition.AnotherIndianbrigad

e

was

div

e

rt

e

dtoth

e

areaandthesloopCiiowassentinabidtomaintaincontrolofthearea.

Theprioritywasstilltoprot

ec

tth

e

oilfieldsandpip

e

linesbuttheBritishalsowant

e

dto

captureBaghdad.TheBritishandIndiantroopssucc

e

ed

e

din

c

ounteractingthethreatto

Basrafromther

e

infor

ce

dTurkishforc

e.

Followingonfromthissuccess,theaimwastotakeAmarawh

e

r

e

th

e

r

e

wasapossibility

ofinterceptingr

e

tr

e

atingTurkishtroops.Bycollectingnumerousbellums

-

nativewooden

canoes

-

theoperationwasturnedintoanamphibiouson

e

.Itwasanunusualcampaignfor

th

e

RoyalNav

y

a

s

th

e

flotillatooktheplaceofcavalry.Alongwithth

e

bellum

swe

r

e

th

e

thr

ees

loop

s

aswellastwolaunchesfitt

e

dwith

s

w

ee

ps,twogunbarg

e

s,twoarmedhorse

boatsandalarg

e

flotilla

of

smallervessels.Startingon31May,thetr

o

op

s

a

c

hie

ve

dgr

e

at

su

c

cess,securingAmarawithinfourdays.Th

e

r

e

wa

s

growingconfidenceand,inde

e

d,

operationsinM

e

sopotamiahadbe

e

nsom

e

ofthemo

s

tsuccessfulofth

e

war.Thisledto

thedecisiontopushforacaptur

e

ofBaghdad,which

,

ifachi

e

ved,wouldeff

e

ctiv

e

l

y

c

u

t

Ge

rmancommunicationswithP

e

rsiaandAfghanistan.

T

h

e

r

ew

asadelayinwaitingfor

p

e

rmi

ss

iontogoahead

from

L

o

nd

o

nandalsob

e

c

a

u

se

th

e

riv

e

r

w

a

s

atlowwater.

The

Na

vyse

ntoutHMSF

ire

fl

y,

th

e

fir

s

t

o

fth

e

n

e

wFly

-

c

l

assve

s

se

l

s,whichweregunboats,

ord

e

r

e

db

y

Fi

s

h

e

rthat

ha

db

ee

n

o

riginall

y

int

e

nd

e

dfor

w

orkinginth

e

Danub

e.Howeve

r,

th

e

flotillawa

s

unabl

e

tob

e

ofmuch

ass

i

s

tan

ce

to

thes

old

ie

rsastheytri

e

dtobr

e

ak

thr

o

ughth

e

Turkish

tro

opsinNo

ve

mberbe

c

aus

e

th

e

banksw

e

r

e

toohighand

t

h

e

gunboatsw

e

revulnerabl

e

toart

i

ll

e

r

y

atta

c

k

.

Th

e

armyund

e

rMajorGeneralTownsh

e

nd

wa

s

forcedtor

e

treatand

t

h

e

flotilla,inassistingthetroops,lostalaun

c

hthatran

a

ground.

Then,on1Decemb

e

r,Fir

e

flywasSignificantlydamag

e

db

y

artilleryfire.Th

e

tugthat

tri

e

dto

s

av

e

herranagroundandbothhadtob

e

abandon

e

d

.

By9December,Townsh

e

nd

andhisarmywer

e

besieg

e

datthetownofKut.B

e

tweenJanuaryandAprilofthe

followingyear,th

e

r

ew

er

e

continualbutunsuccessfulatt

e

mptstor

e

li

e

v

e

th

e

m.

Mor

e

Fl

y-

c

lassvess

e

lswer

e

d

e

ploy

e

dalongwithMantis,alarg

e

gunboat,butreallymuch

mor

e

powerfulr

e

sourc

e

s

we

r

e

r

e

quir

e

difthe

y

w

e

r

e

tohav

e

an

ye

ff

ec

t.Theriv

e

r

s

t

e

am

e

r

juinarmadeade

s

p

e

rat

ee

fforttog

e

t

s

uppli

es

intoKutbut

s

hecameunderTurkishfir

e

and

ranaground.Her

c

ommand

e

rwaskilledb

y

a

s

hellandh

e

r

se

cond

-

in-

c

ommandwas

murderedbyth

e

Turksaft

e

rcaptur

e

.Ithadb

ee

nhopedthatsuccessatBaghdadwould

recoversomeof

t

h

e

pr

es

tig

e

lostintheDardan

e

ll

e

sbut,on29April1916,Townshendwas

forcedtosurr

e

nder.

InFebruary1916,duringthesieg

e

,th

e

WarOfficetookovercontroloftheMesopotamian

campaignfromtheGovernmentofIndia.InAugust1916,LieutenantGeneralSirStanley
Maudewasmadecommander-in-chiefoftheMesopotamianExpeditionaryForcewith
instructionstomaintainBritishcontrolofBasraandthesurroundingarea

.

and,inFebruary

1917,hefinallyre-tookKut.ItwasdecidedtoreneweffortstotakeBaghdad.Inthemean-
time,theflotillahadbeenguardinglinesofcommunicationagainstraidsandhadbeen
reinforcedwiththeadditionalgunboats,TarantulaandMoth.Theytookpartinthe
advance,againactingascavalry,andsufferedheavyfireandmanycasualtiesbutthey
battledthrough.IntheirretreattheTurksleftbehindthepreviouslyabandonedFireflyand
shewastakenbackintotheflotillaalongwithaTurkishsteamerandatug.Thegunboats
causedgreatpanicamongsttheTurkisharmy,sendingmanyintoflight.Atlast,on
11March,BaghdadwasoccupiedbytheBritishandtheytookcontroloftheMosul

oilfields.

SubmarinesandTheBaltic

TheCreationoftheBritishSubmarineService

In1904,whenFisherwasfirstappointedFirstLordoftheAdmiralty,hewasperceptivein
realizingthepotentiallyimportantrolethatthesubmarinewouldhaveinfuturewarfare.
Althoughhispredecessor,Selbourne,hadorderedthebuildingofsubmarines,theirrole
wasunclearandtherewasmuchoppositiontotheservicebeingsetupatall.Therewere
thoseintheNavywhofeltthatsubmarinesweresomehowun-Britishandthattheywere
theweaponsofweakernations.However,in1901,Holland1waslaunched,althoughthe
acquisitioncameaftermostoftheotherworldnaviesalreadyhadsubmarinesandthe
designitselfwasanAmericanone.VickersMaximinBarrow-in-Furnessbuiltthe
HollandsunderlicensefromAmericanHolland.Withinthenavyitself,thesubmarinersall
volunteeredfortheserviceandweresomewhatseparatefromthemainservicewitha
reputationas‘unwashedchauff

e

urs’.TheFirstWorldWarwouldcompletelychangethis

attitude.

Thefirstsubmarines,aswehaveseen,werethesameastheAmericanvesselssincethe
Admiraltyhadmadenoinvestmentinsubmarinedesign.However,thisrapidlychanged
andearlyexperimentationledtothedevelopmentoftheD-classsubmarinein1907.This
hadasurfacespeedof15knots,aboutdoublethecapacityoftheHolland,andwas500
tons.ThisledtothedevelopmentoftheE-classsubmarine,whichalsohadtorpedotubes,
wascapableoflongdistanceworkandwasmorethanamatchforcontemporaryU-boats.
In1910,RogerKeyeswasappointedasinspectingcaptainofsubmarinesanddisplayed
bothgreatenthusiasmfortheserviceandtheabilitytoinspireothers.Hetravelledabroad
tolookatinnovationsinsubmarineandperiscopedesigninordertoimproveBritish
design.Atthebeginningofthewar,theBritishhad74submarines,whichoutnumbered
theGermans,buttheGermansubmarinesweremoreup-to-date.ManyoftheBritish
submarineswereoldvesselsusedforcoastaloperations.Thecapacityforlong-rangework
hadcertainlynotbeenappreciatedwhenwarbrokeoutandbothsidesenvisagedthe
submarineasadefensiveratherthananoffensiveinstrumentofwar.Attheoutbreakof
war,themostmodernoftheBritishsubmarineswerebasedwithKeyesatHarwichinthe

8thFlotilla.Healsohadfiveotherflotillasmadeupofoldervessels.Therewerein
additionthreesubmarinesapieceinMalta,GibraltarandChina.

KeyesledseveraloperationsatthebeginningofthewararoundHeligolandBight,taking
thesubmarinesandgatheringintelligence.However,healsoneededdestroyersto
accompanythembecauseofthesubmarines‘lackofvision.

Lieutenant-CommanderMaxHorton,whowouldalsobecomeimportantduringthe
SecondWorldWar,madethefirstsignificanthitfortheBritishfromasubmarineon12
September1914whenhetorpedoedtheGermancruiserHela.Britishsubmarineswere
alsoeffectiveintheSeaofMarmaraduringtheDardanellescampaign.Intheopening
monthsofthewar,itwasnotonlytheGermanswhoprovedthethreatanddestructionthat
asmallnumberofsubmarinescouldcause.

TheBaltic

HortonalsoplayedanimportantroleintheBalticcampaign.InsofarastheBalticisa
closedseathatcouldeasilybeblockedbymines,thegeographymadeitparticularly
dangeroustosurfacevesselsbutsubmarinescouldpenetrateit.Thepassagestothesea
wereintheneutralwatersofDenmarkandSwedenbuttheGermanshadamajor
advantageintheKaiserWilhelmCanal(theKielCanal),whichmeanttheycouldpassinto
theseaunimpeded.Incontrast,theBritishandFrench,inordertoreachRussia,theirally,
hadtomaketheirwayviaNorwayandthenorthRussianports.Themainconcernofthe
RussianswastoprotectStPetersburgandhencetheirnavalforcewasconcentratedinthe
GulfofFinland.FisherhadenvisagedaBalticcampaignatthebeginningofthewar,
essentiallywiththeaimofsupportingaRussianinvasionofGermany.TheGermansdid
notenvisagetheBalticasamainarenaanddeployedmanyoftheiroldervesselstherebut
theircrucialinterestintheareawastomaintaintheirsupplyofironorefromSwedish
ports.NotonlywasthisanattractivetargetfortheAlliesbutalsotheHighSeasFleetused
theBalticforexercisesandso,ifitwaspossibletopenetrate,therewasthepossibilityof
destroyingGermannavalvessels.

Consequently,KeyesmadeaproposaltoJellicoeinOctober1914thatheshouldsend
someofhissubmarinesintotheBaltic,whichwasaccepted.Keyesselectedthreeofhis
mostgiftedsubmarinecommandersfortheoperation

-

MaxHortoninE9,NoelLaurence

inE1andMartinNasmithinE11.TheplanwasforthemtopenetratetheBalticatnightso
thattherewouldbelesschanceoftheGermanpatrolspottingthembetweenRugenand
theSwedishcoast.TheyweretosearchfortheHighSeasFleetandattackit,before
makingfortheRussianportofLibau.BothE1andE9enteredtheseasafely,although
theywereobligedtomakeanchorageintheGulfofFinland.TheRussians,whohad
expectedaGermanattackontheport,hadvirtuallydestroyedfacilitiesatLibau
themselves.E11,havingbeenspottedandharassedbyGermandestroyers,decidedto
returntobase.Thetwosubmarinesthathadmadeitthroughwereplacedunderthe
commandoftheRussiancommander-in-chief,AdmiralEssen,andtheyworkedwiththe
Russiansubmarinesandinminelayingoperations.Thereweresometechnicalproblems
withtheBritishsubmarinesanditwasdifficultforsparepartstobetransportedtothem,a
stateofaffairsnothelpedbytheharshwinterconditionsintheBaltic.Bothsubmarines

s

urvivedbuttherewasnorealsuccessin1914.Thepres

e

nceofthesubmarinesdidlead

theGermanstowithdraw

s

omelargewarshipsthathadbeengivinggunnerysupporttothe

armybutlittlemore.However,inthespringof1915,thesubmarinesreallybegantomake
theirmark

.

TheRussiansandtheBritishsubmarineswereupagainsttwoGermanforcescomprising
bothcruisersanddestroyers.OneofthemmadeanattackonLibau,notknowingthatthe
porthadbeenevacuated,andaminesanktheGermanflagship.Hortonhadsomesuccess
withanescortedtransportconvoy,managingtosinkoneofthetransports,andhealso
interceptedtwoGermanbattle-shipsanddisabledoneofthemwithatorpedo.However,
theRussianswerestillunderconsiderablepressureandreinforcementsweredispatchedto
theBalticfromHarwich.Oneofthosesentout,E13,unfortunatelyhadproblemswithher
compassandranagroundonDanishsandbanks.Underinternationallawshehadtomove
andcouldbeofferednoassistance,andagroupofGermandestroyerstookunfair

advantageofthesubmarine.Theytorpedoedherandopenedmachinegunfireatthecrew
evenastheyweretryingtoleaptosafetyfromthesubmarine.Theystoppedfiringonly
whenaDanishvesselsailedbetweenthem.MeanwhileLaurencewashavingmoreluck.
TheGermanbattle-cruisersquadronpassedhimandhetorpedoedanddamagedthe
Moltke.ThehitledtotheGermanswithdrawingfromanattackontheirtarget,Riga.

On5OctoberE8madeherfirsthit,destroyinga

s

t

e

am

e

raft

e

rh

e

rcr

e

whadb

e

entaken

off.On22Octob

e

r,

s

h

e

al

s

otookth

e

cruiserPrin

z

Adalbert.On11O

c

tob

e

r,

E19

hadal

s

o

b

e

ensu

c

c

ess

fulinsinkingfouror

e-ca

rri

e

r

sa

nd

i

nf

o

r

c

ing

a

noth

e

rtorunagroundwhich

s

ub

se

qu

e

ntl

ys

a

nk.

On18and19Octob

e

r,Hortonsankanoth

e

rf

o

u

rmerc

hant

vesse

ls.Th

e

forc

e

mighthaveb

ee

n

e

v

e

nmor

eef

f

ec

ti

ve

atpr

eve

ntingor

e

reachingGermanyifth

e

Ru

ss

ianshadagr

e

edtoconv

e

n

e

prizecourtsforn

e

utral

s

hip

s

that

we

r

es

topp

e

dund

e

r

suspicionofhavingG

e

rman-

ow

n

e

d

c

a

rgo.

Allattacksbyth

e

Britishsubmarin

e

sadh

e

r

e

d

to

th

e

int

er

nati

o

nallawr

e

gardingthetakingofpriz

e

sandth

ey

g

avew

arningb

e

for

e

sinking,givingcrewstim

e

tor

ea

ch

s

af

e

t

y

.

Th

e

Ru

ss

ian

s

w

e

r

e

di

s

appoint

e

dwhen,inDec

e

mb

e

r1915

,

H

o

rt

o

nandLaur

e

n

ce

w

e

r

e

recalled.Th

e

yw

e

r

e

p

ar

ti

c

ul

ar

l

ys

adt

osee

H

o

rtongo,evenmakingaproposalt

o

th

e

A

d

mir

a

lt

y

th

a

th

es

t

ay

a

s

theSeniorNavalOffi

ce

rofth

e

Balti

c

.Itwa

s

nottobe.Butthe

othersubmarin

e

s

s

t

aye

dand

we

nt

o

utagaininthespringof1916whenth

e

G

e

rman

s

h

a

d

im

pl

e

m

e

nt

e

da

c

onvo

y

systemwithalarg

e

numb

erof

t

o

rp

e

d

o

b

o

ats.Th

e

r

ewe

re

s

tillsom

e

minor

s

u

ccesses

butth

ee

nd

o

fth

eca

mpaignoweda

s

mu

c

htoth

e

Ru

ss

ian

sas

th

e

G

e

rman

s

.Di

sc

ont

e

nthadspreadthroughth

e

Balti

c

fl

ee

t

as

mom

e

ntumgr

e

wtowardsthe

1917r

e

volution

.

In

a

ddition

,

th

e

G

e

rman

s

haddevelopedth

e

d

e

pth

c

harg

e

,alth

o

u

g

hall

th

e

Briti

s

h

s

ubmarin

e

smanag

e

dto

esc

ap

ei

t

.

Th

es

ub

marinef

l

o

till

a,

und

e

rC

o

mmand

e

r

Cromi

e

,nownumb

e

r

e

ds

eve

nbutitlookedasifthe

y

w

e

regoingtob

e

fo

rce

dto

s

u

rre

nd

e

r

afterth

e

Rus

s

ianR

evo

lution

.

Cromiedecidedtos

e

ndthecr

e

wsbacktoB

r

itainand

scuttledthesubmarin

e

s.H

e

him

se

lf

s

tay

e

dat

t

h

e

BritishEmbassyinStPetersburgasth

e

NavalAttach

ew

h

e

r

e

h

e

waskilledduringth

e

R

e

volutionb

y

agroupofB

o

l

s

h

ev

iksashe

attemptedtod

e

f

e

ndth

e

building

s

ingl

e-

hand

e

d.

Submarin

e

actionintheDardan

e

ll

e

s

c

ampaign,discuss

e

dinthepreviouschapter,also

e

njoy

e

dsom

es

u

cce

ss.B

e

tweenMay1915andJanuary1916th

e

tallyfor

s

ubmarin

e

s

therewastwobattleships,ad

e

stro

ye

r,twogunboatsands

e

ventransportsinadditionto

197assort

e

d

s

mallerv

e

ssels.AsintheBaltic,loss

e

swer

e

minimal.

Th

e

oth

e

rwayinwhichsubmarin

e

sw

e

r

ee

mplo

ye

dwasa

s

fle

e

tsubmarines

.

TheBritish

b

e

li

e

v

e

dthatusingsubmarineswasthebestmethodofcount

e

ring

e

n

e

my

s

ubmarines.

Theyweretherefor

e

us

e

dasascr

ee

nforth

e

fl

ee

t,althoughinitiallytherewasamajor

probl

e

mwiththispoli

c

yinthatthesubmarinesw

e

r

e

tooslow,

e

v

e

nwh

e

ntra

ve

llingonthe

surface,toke

e

ppac

e

withth

e

fle

e

t.Thisl

e

dtoth

e

developmentofthest

e

am-prop

e

ll

e

dK

-

c

lass

s

ubmarin

e

,withthefirston

e

commission

e

din1916and

a

noth

e

r17followingbythe

endofth

e

war.Onth

e

surfac

e

th

ey

couldmakeaspeedof25knotswhichwa

s

suffici

e

nt

tok

ee

pupwiththefleet,althoughther

e

w

e

r

e

som

e

disad

v

antagesinthattheywereslow

indivingandth

e

irthr

e

e

co

llapsiblesmokestackswereeasytor

e

cogniz

e

.Trials

s

h

owe

d

upm

o

r

e

problems

.

Th

e

h

e

atinth

ee

ngin

e

roomswasalmostunbearableandK13waslost

whentheboilerr

o

omv

e

ntilatorswerenotclosedproperlyandflooded

.

Sh

e

continuedtogodownaftertheordertoblowthet

anks

.

Th

e

rew

e

r

e

49survivorsoutof

the80onboard.Sh

ew

a

sref

loat

e

dsom

e

tim

e

later

.

Furthertrialsbroughtlittl

es

u

ccess

.In

afl

e

et

e

x

e

r

c

iseintheFirthofForthth

ey

w

e

ntdownlik

e

dominoes

.

K4wasaccidentally

rammedbyK6,th

e

nK17wasramm

e

db

y

Fearlesswhichsankh

e

randwasth

e

nit

se

lf

ramm

e

dbyInflexible

.

AnimprovedK

-c

lasswa

s

d

es

ign

e

dbutnotordereduntilafterthe

warand,inth

ee

v

e

nt,onlyon

e

wassubsequentlybuilt.

Ov

e

rthecours

e

ofthewar,theBritishcametoappre

c

iat

e

th

e

valu

e

ofsubmarinewarfare

anddiduseiteff

e

ctiv

e

l

y

inlimit

e

darenas.Infact,theyusedmanyofthesameta

c

ti

cs

as

th

e

G

e

rmansand,atthebeginningofthewar,th

e

yhadalargernumberofsubmarinesthan

theGermanNav

y,

d

es

p

i

t

e

ha

v

ingb

ee

nslowtoembracethemattheb

e

ginningofth

e

c

e

ntury.However,itwastheGermanswhowouldus

e

submarin

e

smostextensiv

e

lyandto

mostd

e

vastating

e

ffect.IntheBritishmerchantmarinetheyhadth

e

p

e

rfecttarg

e

t.

B

e

tw

ee

nth

e

Battl

e

ofDoggerBankandtheBattleofJutland

(

d

e

alt

w

ithinthefollowing

chapter)therew

e

r

e

nom

ee

tin

gs

b

e

t

wee

nth

e

Grand

F

l

ee

tandtheHighS

e

a

s

Fleet

.

Th

e

m

a

j

o

r

e

ngag

e

m

e

ntofth

e

twofleetsthathadbeenanti

c

ipat

e

d

s

in

ce

th

e

b

e

ginningofthe

wardidnotappeartob

eo

nth

e

h

o

ri

z

onanditwasafrustrating18months

.

Aft

e

rth

e

Battl

e

ofDogg

e

rBank,whenAdmiralPohlr

e

pla

ce

dIn

ge

n

o

hla

s

th

eco

mmand

e

rofth

e

High

S

e

a

s

Fl

ee

t,th

e

G

e

rmanpolic

y

ofcautioninriskingtheirfl

e

etc

o

ntinu

e

d.Th

e

Brit

i

sh

maint

a

in

e

dth

e

irdistantblo

c

kad

e

,

e

ffectivelylimitingessentialsuppliestoGermany.

Importantly,asPaulHalpernemphasizesinhisANavalHistoryofWorldWarOne,The
BritishdidnothavetofightorrisktheGrandFleettomaintainthatblockade

.

The

G

e

rmanswouldhavetocometothemiftheywantedtobreakit.‘Thereweretwomain

reasonswhysofartheGermanfleethadnotcomeout

-

theKaiser‘swishtoprotecthis

NavyandtheGermanintentionofredu

c

ingthenumbersofBritishshipssothatGermany

wouldhavethenumericaladvantageshouldthetwofleetsengag

e

.In1915,theGermans

hadstillnotachievedtheiraim,atleastnotenoughtobecertainofvictory,andtheywere
lookingforanewstrategy.

AGermanadmiraltystaffofficer,KorvettenkapitanWolfgangWegener,advocated
concentrationintheBalticwheretheyalreadyhadcontrol,occupationofDenmarkwhere
theycouldcoal,andeventuallytheestablishmentofbasesintheFaeroes,Norway,France
andtheAzores

.

Theideasgainedsomemileageastheywerewidelydistributedaroundthe

fleetinmemorandabutTirpitzwaslargelyagainstthem,especiallysinceWegenerdidnot
seesubmarinewarfareascentraltogainingmaritimesupremacy.Tirpitzhimself,however,
wasnot

c

learaboutthewayforward.HeadvocatedanattackonBritishcommerceto

in

c

ludesubmarineblockade,mining,aircraftattacksonLondonaswellascruiserwarfare

intheAtlantic.Tirpitz

w

a

s

inconsistent,changinghismindaboutcruiserwarfareand

decidingitwouldnotbesoeffective,andatthesametimeheattackedothersenior
commanders.Forboththese

re

a

s

ons,h

e

b

ec

ameincr

e

asinglyostracizedfromhisp

ee

r

s

a

ndl

o

stth

e

confid

e

nc

e

oftheKa

i

ser.

G

e

rmansubmarin

e

act

i

vit

y

was

in

cre

a

s

e

d

i

n

r

e

spon

se

to

w

h

a

tth

ey

p

e

rc

e

iv

e

das

B

r

it

is

h

a

nd

F

r

e

n

c

h

v

io

l

ation

s

of

i

nt

e

rnationa

ll

aw,for

e

xa

mpl

e

t

he

la

y

i

n

gofmine

s

atth

ee

n

t

r

a

n

ce

toth

e

C

h

ann

e

l

andt

h

e

se

i

zi

n

gofGe

rm

antrad

evesse

l

sc

arr

y

i

n

gfoods

uppli

es.

Th

e

Brit

i

sh

a

nd

F

r

enc

h

maintain

e

dth

e

mo

ral

a

d

va

nta

ge

ina

s

mu

c

ha

s

th

eir

c

apt

u

r

e

ofv

e

ss

e

lsdidnot

g

e

n

e

rall

y

in

volvel

os

so

flif

e

w

hi

c

h

s

ub

marin

e

attac

k

so

nBriti

s

h

c

omm

e

r

ce

did

.O

n

4

Febr

u

ary

1

9

15,

G

e

r

m

a

n

y

mad

ea

d

ec

larati

o

nthat

a

llth

e

wat

e

r

s

aroun

dB

r

i

ta

in

a

ndIr

e

land

we

r

e

no

w

a

wa

r

zo

n

ew

h

e

r

e

an

y

m

e

r

c

h

an

t

s

hi

pwo

uldb

e

d

es

tro

y

e

d

wi

th

o

utn

ece

ssar

il

y

e

n

s

u

ri

n

gth

e

s

a

f

e

t

yo

fan

y

pas

se

ng

e

r

sorc

r

e

w.T

h

eya

l

s

or

e

f

u

se

dtog

u

ara

nt

ee

t

h

e

sa

fe

t

yo

f

n

e

utr

a

l

s

hip

-ping

w

ith

i

nth

e

ar

e

a,w

hi

c

hl

e

dt

o

d

i

plomat

ic

cond

e

mna

tion

,

n

o

t

l

e

a

s

tfr

o

m

th

e

Uni

te

d

S

tat

e

s

.

Th

e

campaig

n

hadt

ob

e

ton

e

ddownso

th

a

tn

e

utral

s

h

i

pping,aslonga

s

itwa

sr

eco

gn

ize

d

ass

u

c

h

,wo

ul

d

b

e

immun

e

.Th

e

na

va

ll

ea

d

e

r

sf

e

l

ttha

t

th

ec

ampa

i

gnw

a

s

ru

i

n

e

db

e

cau

s

eth

eco

mpr

omi

ses

in

c

l

u

d

e

dth

es

paringofn

e

u

tra

l

s,

h

os

pi

ta

l

s

h

ip

s

unl

ess

th

ey

w

e

r

eca

rr

y

ingtro

o

p

s

,and

s

hipsof

th

e

B

e

lgian

R

e

li

e

ffund.Th

esew

o

u

ld

li

mitth

e

e

ff

e

cti

v

e

n

ess

o

f

pr

e

ve

nt

i

n

gf

orei

gn

s

u

ppli

es

r

e

a

c

h

ing

B

r

itain.

Neve

rth

e

l

e

s

s

iti

sc

on

si

d

e

red

th

e

fir

s

t

u

nr

e

stri

c

t

e

ds

ubmarin

e

camp

a

ign

a

ndit

b

e

ganon28F

e

br

u

arywith

ju

st37

s

ubmarin

es,

n

o

tall

ofth

e

mop

e

rationa

l.

Some

,

in

c

ludingTirpitz,fe

ltt

ha

tth

e

d

ec

i

s

i

o

n

was

pr

e

m

a

tu

res

i

nce

th

en

umber

of

submarin

esavai

l

a

bl

e

wason

l

y

ar

o

u

n

dathird

o

fth

e

total

and

,w

hil

e

f

urth

e

roneshadbeencommi

s

sion

e

d,n

e

wbuildingwas

s

l

ow

.Submarine

command

e

rshow

e

v

e

rw

e

r

e

instru

c

t

e

dto

procee

dwiththeutmosten

e

rgy

.

B

e

tw

ee

nMarchandMa

y

1915,G

e

rman

s

ubmarin

e

s

w

e

r

e

r

es

ponsibleforsinking115

ship

s,e

qualing

2

55

,

000

g

rosston

s

ofmerchantshipping.Th

e

irlo

sses

w

e

r

e

minimal

a

nd,

althou

g

hth

e

BritishAuxiliar

y

Patrolsw

e

r

e

out

v

aliantly

e

v

e

ryday,theywer

e

larg

e

ly

pow

e

rl

e

ssb

ec

aus

e

ofth

e

siz

e

ofth

e

areathattheywer

e

att

e

mptingtoprot

e

ct.Briti

s

h

min

e

salsoprovedineff

e

ctiv

e

du

e

toad

e

signd

e

f

ec

t.A

s

are

s

ult,th

e

Britishbeganto

a

rm

m

e

r

c

hantm

e

nandord

e

r

e

dth

e

mtorunatho

s

til

e

submarin

es

toforc

e

th

e

mintodi

v

ing

.

AlthoughtheGermansubmarinesw

e

r

ee

ff

ec

ti

ve

,ther

es

ult

s

ofth

e

campaignhadan

adv

e

r

see

ff

e

ctonth

ec

ountry

‘s

propagandaaroundth

e

world

.

Earl

y

inth

ec

ampaigna

Norwegianoiltank

e

rtrav

e

llingfromth

e

Unit

e

dStat

e

stotheNethe

r

landswa

s

hitbya

torp

e

do

w

ith

o

utth

e

submarinegivingwarning

.

Itwa

s

not

s

unkand

w

a

s

tow

e

dintoport.

Th

e

G

e

rman

s

lat

e

rhadtopay

c

omp

e

n

s

ation

.

ASwedishcoalst

e

amerwa

s

not

s

olucky;

w

hil

e

tradingbetweentheT

y

n

e

andLa

s

Pal

m

a

s

,

s

h

e

wastorp

e

do

e

d,againwithout

warning

,w

ithth

e

lo

ss

ofnin

e

ofh

e

r

c

r

e

w

.

Astimew

e

ntonth

e

r

e

w

e

r

e

furth

e

rDut

c

h

,

Gr

ee

kandAmericancasualties.Allofth

ese

caus

e

ddiplomati

c

frictionforGermanybut

themostsignifi

c

antand

b

e

s

tkn

o

wnoftheseincid

e

ntswasth

es

inkingofthe

C

unardliner

Lusitania.On7May1915,Kapitanleutnant

W

alt

e

rSchweigertorpedoedherinth

e

westernapproachesoffthecoastofIreland,justasshewasnearinghomefromNewYork.
Ittookjustonetorpedo,althoughtherewerereportsoftwoexplosions,andshesankwith
thelossof1,201lives.Schweigermaywellhavethoughtthatshewascarryingtroops.
Althoughthiswasnotthe

case,shewascertainlycarryingammunitionandtherehasbeen

muchdiscussionsinceonthenatureandquantityofthearmsthatshehadonboard.There
havealsobeenclaimsthatChurchillorchestratedthesinkingtoencourageAmericanentry
intothewarontheAlliedside.Theargumentisthatthelinerwasmovingataslowpace
thatputheratagreaterriskthannecessary-especiallysurprisingsinceLusitaniaandher
sistervesseltheMauretania(whichheldtheBlueRibbonforthefastestAtlanticcrossing)
wererenownedfortheirspeed.However,theshockofthesinkingwentroundtheworld
anditsreceptionwascomparabletothenewsofthelossoftheTitanic.TheGermanswere
vilifiedbecausenotonlywerethecasualtiesciviliansbutalsomanyofthemwerewomen
andchildren.ItwasonlyonefactorbehindthelaterentryoftheUSAintothewarbutit
certainlyswayedAmericanpublicopinioninfavoroftheAlliedcause,especiallysince
128ofthosewhodiedwereAmericancitizens.WhiletheBritishpolicyofblockadelost
theAmericansmoney,theGermanpolicyofunrestrictedsubmarinewarfarelostthem

innocentlives.TheGermansjustifiedthesinking,arguingthattheGermanconsulatein
NewYorkhadpublishedstatementstotheeffectthatAmericancitizenstravelledonthe
vesselattheirownrisk.Theyalsopointedoutthefactthat,whenthesubmarinecaptain
realisedthenumberofpeopleonboard,hedesistedfromfiringasecondtorpedo.Thisdid
nothingtoreversepublicopinion.

Then,on19August,thelinerArabicwastorpedoed,againoffthecoastofIreland,with
manycasualties,including,onthisoccasion,threeAmericancitizens.Thisbrokethenew
assurancesthatGermanyhadmadetoAmericaaboutpassengervesselsandPresident
Wilsoncalledforactionthatwouldvirtuallybansubmarineactivityagainstmerchant
shipping.From30Augustonwards,theGermansdidagreenottoattackanypassenger
vessels,regardlessoftheflagthattheywereflying.Eagertokeepopencommunications
withtheUSAtopreventherenteringthewaronthesideoftheAllies,theyalsoproposed
aspecialserviceforAmericancitizenstomaketransatlanticcrossingsinmarkedvessels,
withadvancewarnings,thatwouldbesafefromsubmarineattack.TheAmericansrefused
andtheGermanslaterwith-drewsubmarinesfromthewesternwatersandturnedtheir
attentiontominelayingintheNorthSeaanddeployingsubmarinesintheMediterranean
wheretherewasverylittleinthewayofAmericanshipping.Ineffect,thissawtheendof
thefirstsubmarinecampaignagainstcommercialshipping.

Thenewrestrictiondidlittletoalterthesuccessofsubmarineattacksoncommercial
shippingingeneral,althoughBritishmeasuresagainstthemwerebeginningtohavemore
effect.Theywereusingnetsandsweepswithchargesandtherewereexperimentswith
depthcharges.

Th

ey

implementedtheus

e

ofQ-ships,whichw

e

r

e

d

e

coys,

o

ftentrampvesselsand

occasionallysailing

vesse

lsthatappear

e

dd

e

f

e

ncelessandeas

y

targets.Howev

e

r,th

ey

w

e

rearmedandcoulddestroyasubmarineat

c

lo

se

rang

e.

Not

o

nl

y

w

e

r

e

gunsinstalledon

trawl

e

rsbutsom

e

ofth

e

seship

s

als

o

workedintandemwithBritishsubmarin

e

s.The

trawlerwouldtowthesubmarin

e

andstayincontactviaat

e

lephon

e

link.Ifthetrawler

sight

e

danenem

y

,itwouldinformthesubmarinewhichwouldattempttodestroytheU-

boat.How

e

v

e

r,losseswerestillhighandhaditnotbeenforth

e

Stat

e

Insuranc

e

Sch

e

meit

ispossibl

e

thattheGermanswouldhavesucceededinparalysingBritishtrade.

Thetotallo

ss

intonnag

e

fromtheGermanoff

e

nsivebetweenAugust1914andSeptember

1915was1,294,000,althoughthiswasverymuchoffs

e

tbythebuildingofn

e

wv

e

ss

e

ls

andth

e

captureofen

e

myships

.

Howev

e

r

,

numb

e

rsofn

e

wl

y

builtshipswer

e

decr

e

asingandmor

e

ofth

e

mwererequired

foroverseascampaigns,soth

e

br

e

akinunrestrictedsubmarinewarfaregav

e

the

Admiralt

ya

littl

e

breathingspa

ce.

Th

e

G

e

rmansinstigatedas

ec

ondU-boat

c

ampaignagainst

c

omm

e

r

c

ialshipping

o

n11

F

e

bruar

y

1916.Thereweresom

e

r

es

trictions

-

onlym

e

rchantm

e

nwithinthewarzon

e

c

ouldbesunkwithoutwarning,theycouldonlybesunkout

s

ideth

e

zoneifth

ey

were

armed

ves

s

e

lsandpassengerlin

e

rswereoutofbounds

.

Someinth

e

Germannaval

commandf

e

ltthatth

ec

ampaign

c

ouldn

e

v

e

rbeeffectivewhil

e

therew

e

rethes

e

restriction

s

inplace.U-boatcommanderswouldeitherbeovercautiousand

co

nsequ

e

ntly

l

e

ttheirprey

e

scape,ortheirenthusiasm

wo

uldl

e

adtoth

e

sinkingofv

e

ss

e

lsthatw

e

r

e

exempt

w

hichwould,inturn,leadtodiplomaticconflict.AdmiralHenningvon

Holz

e

ndorff,h

e

adoftheAdmiralstabinthis

ne

woff

e

n

s

iv

e

,wassupport

e

dbyhis

equival

e

ntintheGermanArmy

,

G

e

neralErichvonFalkenhayn.Falkenhayn

w

asaboutto

trytoweakenth

e

BritishandFrenchArmy

w

ithamassivepushatVerdun.H

e

didnot

thinkthatthelandcampaignalonewouldprovedecisiveinforcingBritainoutofthewar
buthehopedthat,inconjunction

w

ithanincreas

e

dpressureatsea,itmightbebrought

about.AlsoinFebruary1916,vonPohldiedfromcancerandwasreplacedasthe
commanderoftheHighSeasFleetbythemor

e

aggressiveViceAdmiralScheer

.

The

Germans

c

amebackingreaterforcesthanbefore,with52

s

ubmarinesincomparisonto

the29thatwereoperationalatthebeginningofthefirstcampaign

.

Againitwouldbe

diplomaticr

e

lationsthatbroughtthecampaigntoahaltratherthanmilitaryintervention.

TheDutch,whowereneutral,lostaconsid

e

rablenumberofvess

e

lstoG

e

rmantorpedoes

butitwasAmeri

c

anrelationsthatGermanywaskeentomaintain

.

On24March1916,a

torpedowasfiredattheFrenchpassengerst

e

amer,Sussex,onh

e

rwaytoFolkestone.She

didnotactuallysinkbuttherewer

e

anumberofcasualtiesandthistimetheAmericans

issuedanultimatum.Unlessthiskindofwarfareceasedtheywouldclosediplomatic
communications.ConsequentlyorderswenttotheGermanfleetthat,providingashipdid
notresist,itwasnottooperateoutsidetheprizelawregulations,which includedwarning
ashipbeforeattackandensuringthes afetyofthoseaboard.Scheerwasincensed,
believingthatth ecampaigncouldnotbesuccessfulinthewarzoneif submarineshad
tobeexposedtodangerbydeclaringth emselvesinordertowarnvessels.Hetherefore
orderedthatth esubmarineswithdrawandthattheoffensiveagainstBriti shmerchant
shippingwasover.ManyintheGermannav yfeltScheershouldhavebeenoverruledbut
theKaiser gavehisapprovalon30April1916.Scheernowhadplanstousethe
submarinesinconjunctionwiththeHighSeasFleetandthesewouldultimatelyleadtothe
BattleofJutland.

TheBattleofJutland

EasilythelargestbattleoftheFirstWorldWarand,becausetherewasnosubmarineaction
(althoughsubmarineshadformedpartoftheoriginalGermanplan),ithasremainedthe
biggestsurface-onlyencounterintheyearssince.

WhenViceAdmiralScheertookovercommandoftheHighSeasFleet,hewas
determinedtopressurizetheBritishintomajorfleetactionintheNorthSeaand
implementedanaggressiveprogramme.Manyofthetacticshadbeenusedearlierinthe
war

-

airshipraids,thebombardmentofcoastaltowns,destroyersweeps,miningand

attacksoncommercialtrade.TheGermansintendedtousemorepowerfulforcesin
sweepsandtoensurethatthemainfleetwasavailabletoreinforcethem.

On10February1916,aGermandestroyerflotillacameoutwiththeTenthMinesweeping
Flotilla.Adestroyertookasloop,theArabis,whiletheminelayerswereoperatingtothe
eastofDoggerBank.Jellicoe,BeattyandTvrwhittwent

o

utbutnotonlyweretheyunable

toengagewiththeGermandestroyers,inadditionArethusa,Tyrwhitt’sflag-ship,was
struckbyamineandsankonthewayback.

Scheercoordinatedabiggerattackon5-6Marchandbroughtoutthefleetforasweepas
farasTerschelling

.

SubmarineswerestationedofftheBritishcoastand,atthesametime,

therewerezeppelinattacksonHullandImmingham.Scheerhadhopedthathewouldbe
abletocatchtheGrandFleetandtheHarwichforceoutonpatrolsbut,whenheputouta
radiomessage,itwasinterceptedandtheBritishpatrolswereimmediatelyrecalled.The
Britishpolicyremainedunchanged,sincetheydidnotseethatoffensiveactioncould
possiblybeeffectiveunlesstheHighSeasFleetcameout.However,theydidtakeminor
offensiveactions.SeaplanesfromtheconvertedcarrierVindex,escortedbytheHarwich
Force,wereusedtoraidsuspectedzeppelinshedsatHoyer.Tyrwhittwasalsooutand
readytoprovidereinforcements.Ofthefiveseaplanesonlytworeturned.Theothers
encounteredengineproblemsandhadnochoicebuttolandinGermanterritory.Asthey
searchedfortheaircraftTyrwhitt’sdestroyerscameunderGermanaircraftfireand
encounteredtwoGermanpatroltrawlers,whichtheysank.TheAdmiraltyorderedthe
BritishtowithdrawonintelligencethattheHighSeasFleetwascomingout,although,in
theevent,Scheeronlysentoutsomepowerfulcruisersanddestroyers.AGerman
destroyerwaslosttoamineandasecondonewasrammedandsunkbyCleopatra.
Unfortunately,Cleopatrawasthenaccidentallyrammedandbadlydamagedby
Undaunted.TheGermanspickedupnewsoftheincidentandtheystartedtomovetowards
theBritishbut,becauseofbadweather,theywereunabletotakeadvantageofthe
situation.

TherewassomedisagreementbetweentheAdmiralty

a

ndJellicoeaboutwhetherornotto

continuewithsuchraids.TheAdmiraltyfeltthattherewasstillapossibilitythatsuch
activitywoulddrawouttheHighSeasFleet.J

e

llicoewasunderpressuretomountanother

attackbuthehadreservations.IftheGermansdidcomeoutundersuchmeasures,the
battlemighttakeplaceinanunfavorablelocationfortheBritishfleet,oritmighthaveto
waitforoveradayandthedestroyerswouldneedrefueling.NeverthelesstheBritish
cruisersweresentoutforaraidintotheKattegattointerruptGermancommercialvessels

andtodiverttheirattentionfromRussiansr

e

layingmine-fields.Thefollowingdaythere

wasnewsthattheHighSeasFleetwaspreparingtoleaveportandsotheGrandFleetand
theBattleCruiserFleetwereorderedout.Although,infact,theGermanswerealready
returninghomebythistime,therewasstillapossibilityofinterceptingtheirbattlecruisers
atHornReefs.TheBritishwentatfullspeedbuttheywereforcedtoturnbackasheavy
fogfell,causingchaos.Thecollisionoftwobattlecruiserswasfollowedbyacollision
betweenthreedestroyers,andfinallyamerchantvesselcollidedwithadreadnought.

On24-25April,theGermanbattlecruisers,withtheHighSeasFleetreadytobackthem
up,madearaidonLowestoft,givingtheBritishanotherpotentialopportunitytoengage
them.AgaintheGrandFleetandtheBattleCruiserFleetputtoseaandsodidTyrwhitt’s
force,althoughitsnumbershadbeenreducedbecause12ofhisdestroyerswereona
mine-layingmissionoffFlanders.

Tyrwhitt’sweakenedforcecameacrossfourGermanbattlecruisers,accompaniedbysix
lightcruisers,andheturnedsouthtotrytoluretheGermansintofollowinghim.They
declinedtotakethebaitandwentontobombardbothLowestoftandYarmouth.
Nevertheless,Tyrwhittturnedagainandengagedthemwithhisinferiorforce,badly
damaginghisflagship,Conquest,intheprocess.Despitetheiradvantage,theGermans
turnedforhome.TheGrandFleethadnochanceofreachingthemintimeandthe
Admiraltybecameconcernedabouttheraidsontheeastcoastandtheincapabilityofthe
GrandFleetortheBattleCruiserFleettointerceptGermanshipsastheyreturnedtobase.
Distance,ofcourse,wasafactorwiththeGrandFleetinScapaFlowandtheBattle
CruiserFleetinRosythanditwasdecidedthatthereshouldbeapermanentdeploymentof
shipsintheThamesestuaryatSwin.ItwouldcomprisetheThirdBattleSquadron,
Dreadnought,sevenKingEdwardVII-classbattleshipsandtheThirdCruiserSquadron.In
addition,mostofthesubmarinesformerlybasedatRosythweremovedsouthto
Yarmouth.Althoughpreparationswouldnotbecompleteuntilspring1918,itwasalso
decidedinMaytomovetheGrandFleetfromitsbasefurthersouthtotheFirthofForth.

Inthemeantime,theBritishcontinuedwithraidsthatwerealwayssecondaryintheiraims
tothehopeofgoadingtheGermansouttosea.On4MaytheseaplanesVindexand
EtiqadinewenttoraidzeppelinshedsatTondernand,atthesametime,bothJellicoe‘sand
Beatty’sforceswereatsea.Theseaplaneshadnobetterfortunethanbefore.Onlythreeof
themactuallymanagedtolaunch

-

onecrashedwhenithitthemastofadestroyer,onehad

afaultyengineandhadtoreturnandathirddidmanagetobombTondernbutmissedthe
shedandwasshotdownbyazeppelin.Theothereightplanesfailedontakeoffandhadto
beliftedfromthesea.JellicoewaitedinhopeoftheGermanfleetleavingbaseand,after
aboutsixhours,turnedback,disappointedagain.

TowardstheendofMaybothfleetshadplansforanotherraid.Jellicoe’splanwastosend
twolightcruisersquadronson2JuneonasweeparoundtheSkawtotheKattegatand
southtotheGreatBeltandtheSound.Therewasalsotobeconsiderablesupport.Both
BeattyandJellicoewouldbenorthwestshouldtheGermanscomeoutnorthfrom
Heligoland,abattlesquadronwastobestationedintheSkaggerakandtherewouldbe
submarinesoffDoggerBankandthesouthofHornsReefwheretheminefieldsweretobe
extended.AlsoatHornsReeftheseaplanecarrierEngadine,withalightcruisersquadron
anddestroyerswouldlookoutforzeppelins.Scheer,ontheotherhand,wasplanningto

bombardSunderlandwithcruisers,withtheHighSeasFleettothesouthofDoggerBank
andeighteensubmarinesplacedofftheBritishbases.Sincetheintentionwastodrawout
theBritishfleettothecruisersafterthesubmarineshadattacked,Scheerplannedzeppelin
reconnaissancetomakesurethatthefleetwasnotalreadyatsea.Poorweatherconditions
meantthatthezeppelinscouldnotgooutbuthecouldnotdelaytoolongbecausetheU-
boatscouldonlystayforalimitedtimewithoutneedingtorefuelorexposethemselves.
ScheerthereforedecidedagainstthebombardmentandinsteadorderedasweeponBritish
patrols,orderingthecruiserstomakethemselvesconspicuousneartheNorwegiancoastso
thattheirpresencewouldbereportedandencourageaBritishinterception.

At1amon31May,HipperleftportatJadewithhisbattlecruisers,whileScheerandthe
bestpartoftheHighSeasFleetsailedjustafterwards.TheBritishshipswerealreadyat
sea,havingreceivedintelligencethedaybeforethattheGermanswerepreparingtoleave
port.JellicoeandBeattyhadbeenorderedtoconcentrateintheLongForties.Jellicoe,in
hisflagshipTheIronDuke,had24dreadnoughts,3battlecruisers,12lightcruisers,8
armoredcruisers,5flotillaleaders,46destroyersandaminelayer.Beattyhad6battle
cruisers,4dreadnoughts,14lightcruisers,27destroyersandaseaplanecarrier.The
GermansunderHipperhad5battlecruisers,4lightcruisersand30destroyers.Scheerwas
followingwith16dreadnoughts,6pre

-

dreadnoughts,5lightcruisersand31destroyers.

TheBritishhadaclearadvantageinnumbers.

AlthoughintelligencehadbeeninvaluableinwarningtheBritishFleetoftheimminent
sailingoftheHighSeasFleet,amix

-

upincommunicationsmeantthatJellicoewastoldat

12.30pmthattheGermanswerestillattheJade.Assumingthattimewasonhisside,he
sailedatamoderatepacesoasnottowastefuelandslowedto

e

xamineneutralships.He

wasthereforetakenbysurprisewhenhecameacrosstheHighSeasFleetjustafewhours
later.Themistakehadfarreachingimplications.HadhemadehisrendezvouswithBeatty
earliertheywouldhavehadtheadvantageofmoredaylight.ItalsomeantthatJellicoe
wouldtreatfurtherintelligencemessageswithgreatcircumspectionandthisaffectedthe
decisionsthathewouldmakeduringthebattle.

Whenthetwofleetsencounteredeachotheritwasalmostbyaccident.Ataround2pm,
twoofBeatty’slightcruisers,Galateaandphaeton,spottedaDanishsteamerthathad
cometoahaltandwentclosertoinvestigate.TheythensightedHipper’scruiserElbing
whichwasdoingthesamething.TheyreportedtheGermanpresenceandopenedfirejust
before2.30pm.AlthoughtwoofBeatty’slightcruisersquadronsheadedtowardsthe
action,Beattychangedcoursetothesouth-eastsome12minuteslaterwiththeaimof
interceptingtheGermansandpreventingtheirreturntotheBight.Unfortunately,Evan-
ThomasoftheFifthBattleSquadrondidnotseetheflagsignaltoturn,resultinginaten-
milegapopeningupbetweenBeattyandEvan-Thomas.Thelatteronlyturnedwhenthe
signalwasrepeatedusingsearchlights,whichshouldhavebeenusedinconjunctionwith
theoriginalsignal.

Anhourlater,LionsightedHipper’sforceandBeattyturnedeastatfullspeedtoprevent
themreachingtheBight.Shortlyafterwards,aplanewaslaunchedfromEnpadinebutthe
weatherconditionspreventeditfromtransmittingknowledgeofthesightingby
searchlight.Technicalproblemsforcedtheplanetolandandtheweatherpreventedfurther
launches.TheEngadinedidnoth

aves

u

f

f

ic

ientsp

ee

dcapacit

y

toke

e

pup

wi

th

t

h

ef

l

ee

t

and

sowas

n

o

tabletoparticipat

e

fur

t

h

e

r.Ev

e

n

so,t

h

ei

n

c

id

e

nt

wasno

tableasth

e

fir

s

t

timethata

se

aplan

e

hadt

a

k

e

npart

i

n

aflee

taction.Th

e

intentionhadalsob

ee

nt

o

u

se

th

e

car

ri

e

r

C

ampania,ba

se

dinS

c

apa

,

withJelli

c

o

e

but

s

hehadn

ot

r

ece

iv

e

dth

es

ignalto

l

e

av

e

port.Inth

ee

nd

,s

hel

e

ftto

o

la

te.

Withnopossibilityofcatchingupwiththefl

ee

t

a

ndp

oss

iblyvuln

e

rabletosubmarineatta

c

k,

s

hewasor

de

r

e

dbacktobase.

A

ss

oonasHipp

e

rknewthath

e

hadb

ee

n

s

ighted,h

e

turn

e

d180d

e

gr

e

e

s

totrytodrawthe

BritishtotheHighS

e

a

s

Fl

ee

t.Bothsid

e

sopenedfir

e

at3

.

48pmandbothover

-es

timat

e

d

therang

e.

TheFifthBattleSquadronwasstillov

e

r7milesawayandJellico

e

wasabout53

milesaway.TheHighSeasFl

ee

twasstill46milesawayf

r

omHipper

.

Soatthispoint

th

e

r

e

w

e

r

e

sixBritishshipsandfiv

e

G

e

rm

a

n

ve

ss

el

s.Th

e

r

e

wer

e

m

o

r

e

mistak

e

sasar

e

sult

ofmi

s

s

e

d

s

ignals.B

e

attyintend

e

dthateachBriti

s

hship

s

houldtak

e

itsoppo

s

it

e

numb

e

r

andthatLionandPrincessRo

y

al

,

l

e

adingth

es

quadron

,s

h

o

uld

c

on

ce

ntrateonHipp

e

r

‘s

flagshipLiit

z

o

w

.How

eve

r

,as

som

es

hip

s

didnot

see

th

esi

gnalormisint

e

rpr

e

t

e

dit,

t

h

e

s

e

condG

e

rmanshipD

ed

fi

i

na

er

wa

s

n

o

t

e

ngag

e

dforo

ve

rt

e

nminut

es

.Hi

s

torianshav

e

de

b

a

t

e

dth

e

sign

i

fi

c

anceofthi

s

mistakeinth

e

f

i

naloutcom

eo

fth

e

battl

e

butitispossibl

e

thatitwasnota

s

important

as

f

ir

stthou

g

h

t.

Althoughov

e

rallGermanf

i

ring

i

n

t

h

ein

i

tia

l

s

ta

ges

of

t

h

e

b

att

l

ew

a

sf

a

s

t

era

ndmor

e

ac

c

urat

e

thanth

e

Briti

s

h,Dedfiina

e

r

’

sfir

e

atth

e

b

e

ginningwa

s

no

te

ff

e

cti

ve.

W

eat

h

e

r

co

ndit

io

nsw

e

r

e

p

a

rtl

y

r

e

sponsibleforgivingthe

Germansanadvantage,allowingthemb

e

ttervisibility,andthewinddirectionbl

e

wmost

ofthe

s

moketowardstheBritishships.

LutzowhitLiononhermidshipsQturr

e

t

,

nearlycausingh

e

rlossthroughflash,puttingher

outofactionat4.00pm

.

At4.02Ind

e

fatigablewasblownupandsunkbytheVonderTann,

and,immediatelyafterwards,Evan-Thomasarriv

e

dwiththeFifthBattleSquadronandgot

inrangetoattacktheVonderTann,AlthoughthisarrivalreinforcedtheBritishforcesand
putHipperund

e

rpressure,andthesuperiorrangefindersoftheFifthBattleSquadron

improvedgunneryaccuracy,itwasnot

e

noughtopreventthelossoftheQyeenMaryat

4

.

26.TheDedfiinaerhitherwithtwoorthree12-inchshellsandsheblewupandsank

withthelossofallbut20ofher1,286crew.Flotillaattackswereorderedonbothsides
andtherewasaburstoffuriousdestroyeraction,resultinginthelossofV

.

27andV.29for

HipperandthelossoftheBritishd

e

stroyersNestorand

N

omad

.

Seydlitzwashitbya

Britishtorpedobutdidnotsustainseriousdamage.At4.38thingswereaboutto

c

hange

whenCommodor

e

GoodenoughreportedthesightingofScheerandtheHighSeasFleet

.

Goodenough,intheSouthampton,turnedinordertodrawtheGermanstowardsJellicoe.
OnceagaintheBritishhadsignallingproblemsandagainitwastheFifthBattleSquadron
thatmissedthesignaltoturn

.

Thistimeathree-milegap

o

p

e

nedupb

e

tw

e

enE

v

an

-

ThomasandB

e

att

y

.Thismad

eE

van-ThomasveryvulnerabletotheThirdSquadronofthe

HighSeasFleetandtheGermansengagedbuttheFifthBattleSquadronwasableto
escape.Thisendedthefirstphaseofthebattle,sometimesreferredtoas‘theruntothe
south’,andnowBeattybegantodrawScheerandHippertowardsJellicoe,beginningthe
‘runtothenorth’.

TheBritishbegantohavemoresuccess,despitecontinualproblemswithvisibility,which
alsoaffectedtheGermansafter5.40.ConsiderabledamagewasdonetoHipper’sbattle
cruisersLutzow,DefflingerandSeydlitzand,whiletheyremainedafloat,their
effectivenesswasmuchreduced.ThearmourontheGermanships,oftenthickerthanthat
ofBritishequivalents,madethemveryhardtosinkand,inaddition,theinternaldivisions

withintheshipswerebetterfordamagecontrol.

At4.05pm,theThirdBattleCruiserSquadron(Invincible,Inflexible,Indomitablewithtwo
lightcruisersandfourdestroyers),underRearAdmiralHoodmovedtoreinfor

c

eBeatty

buttheywenttoofartotheeast.Asaresult,Hood’slightcruiserChesterranintoRear
AdmiralBoedicker’sSecondScoutingGroupastheywerescreeningHipper

.

Chesterwas

badlybatteredbeforeshemanagedtofallbacktoHood’sbattlecruisers,whichengaged
anddisabledWiesbaden.HipperwasstillfightingBeatty’sforcebut,seeingHood,
believedthathewasdealingwiththeBritishbattlefleetandmadethedecisiontofallback
onScheer.HehadbeenabouttolaunchadestroyerattackonBeattybutnowdirectedit
somewhatineffectivelyonHood.Thedestroyersdid,however,battertheBritishdestroyer
Sharkthatlatersank.ThemajoradvantageofthearrivalofHood’ssquadronwasthatit
screenedJellicoe’sapproachandalsodrewtheGermanThirdBattle

Squadrontotheeast.ItwaspossiblethathadthisSquadron,underRearAdmiralBehncke,
carriedonitscourseitmighthavebeeninapositiontosurpriseJellicoewhowas
approachingatfullspeed.

Jellicoewassailingwithhisthreebattlesquadronsinacruisingformation,whichwas
unsuitableforengagementbecausetheshipsmaskedeachotheranditwasnotpossibleto
employagreatnumberoftheheavyguns.Hewouldneedtimeforthemtoassumeabattle
formationbuthehadreceived.nointelligencefromBeattybetween4.45and6.00onthe
positionoftheGermansandthoughtthathehadtimetospare.Inaddition,whenhedid
getreports,therewereerrorsintheestimateoftheenemypositions,whichmeantthat
BeattywasmuchfurtherwestthananticipatedandtheGermanswereabouttocomeupon
him.At6.15hesightedtheLionandpositionedhimselfsothathewasabletousemostof
hisheavygunsandtheGermanscouldonlyusealimitednumberoftheirs.Beattymoved
acrosstoheadthelineinfrontoftheBritishFleetinhispreviouslyprescribedposition,
althoughthismeantthatJellicoehadtoslowdowntoallowclearance,andthesmoke
obscuredhisvisionandgotinthewayofBritishfiring.TheFifthBattleSquadrondidnot
havesufficientspeedtofollowandthereforetookthebackoftheline.Warspitehada
luckyescapewhenherhelmjammedandshewasforcedtocircletwiceinfrontofthe
Germandreadnoughtsastheyadvancedbut,althoughshecameunderheavyfire,shedid
notsustainseriousdamage.Brieflyshewasabletomaneuverbut,whenthehelmjammed
again,shewasorderedbacktoport.AtthesametimeRearAdmiralRobertArbuthnot
tookthearmoredcruisersDif

e

nceandWarriortoengagewiththelightcruisersofthe

GermanSecondScoutingGroup.Theywereferociouslyattackedbytheadvancing
Germanshipsand,asaresult,Dif

e

ncewaslostwithallhands.Warriormanagedtoescape

asWarspitedivertedGermanattention.ShewastakenundertowbyEnqadinebutcould
notbesavedandsankthefollowingday.

At6.20,HoodwasinrangetofireonHipper‘sbattlecruiserstogreateffect.Lutzowtook
abatteringthateventuallysawherloss.However,thiswassoonfollowedbythelossof
Invincibleinanotherincidentthatsawahittothe‘Q‘turret,resultinginaflashthatwent
directlytothemaga-zinesandblewtheentireship.Itwasaseriousdesignfaultinthe
Britishbattlecruisers.1,026menwerelost,includingHoodhimself.

By6.40,alloftheGrandFleethadbeendeployedandwereabletofire.Scheerwas
thereforeintroubleandorderedwhatamountedtoanaboutturn,astheGermanThird

FlotillaSquadronmountedatorpedoattackandcovereditwithasmokescreenataround
6.45.OnlytheMarlborouahwashitandshelistedbutwasstilloperational.Itwasnot
immediatelyobvioustoJellicoethattheGermanshadturnedaway.Notforthefirsttime,
hewasletdownbycommunicationssincethosethatwereinapositiontoseewhatthe
Germansweredoingdidnotreportit.Onceherealizedwhatwashappening,hedecidedto
orderthefleetnottofollowclosely,forwhichhehasbeenmuchcriticized.Insteadhe
ordereditonacoursethatwouldultimatelycutthelineofretreattotheGermanbases.
Regardlessofwhetherhemighthaveachievedmorehadhesentsomedivisionsindirect
chaseoftheGermans,hewasfollowingtheGrandFleetBattleOrders.

Justbefore7.00pm,asecondchancecamefortheBritishwhenScheer,forreasonsthatare
stillunclear,orderedanother180-degreeturn,puttinghimselfindirectlineofJellicoe’s
ships.By7.15,alltheBritishshipswereinapositiontofireandtheGermanshipsatthe
vancameunderparticularlyheavyattack.Forthemostpart,theGermanswereunableto
seetheBritishshipsandScheerorderedhisbattlecruiserstoheadstraightforthembuta
minutelaterorderedthemtoattacktheBritishvansothattheywentsouth.TheGerman
destroyerflotillaswereorderedtomakesmoke,attackandthenturn.Inresponse,Jellicoe
orderedadestroyerattackand,until7.45,theycontinuedtoputimmensepressureonthe
Germans,scoring37hitstotwo.However,justastheBritishwereinapositiontoinflict
moreseriousdamage,Jellicoe,againfollowingGrandFleetBattleOrders,orderedthe
fleettoturnaway.Themainjustificationforthisturnwasthattorpedoeswouldnotbeable
toinflictasmuchdamage.Ifthefleetwasturningaway,thetorpedoeswouldlose
effectiveness;hittingtheshipsataslowerspeedbythetimetheyreachedthem.In
addition,hadtheyturnedtowardsthetorpedoestheymighthavebeenvulnerabletofurther
torpedoesfromothersectionsoftheGermanlines.There

are

st

i

llthos

e

w

h

o

b

e

li

ev

e

that

th

e

l

ossesthatJ

e

ll

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ughttoavo

i

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m

ay

h

ave

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ee

n

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c

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Se

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l

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ir

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o

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eo

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rm

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s

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up

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adr

ons

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e

l

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etw

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Sc

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andth

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G

erman

ba

ses

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ith

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ntion

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ewant

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oidni

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e

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e

r

e

q

u

ip

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dto

fig

h

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ind

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ss

.T

h

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e

arc

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li

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ith

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aticall

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e

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Sc

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r

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H

or

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R

ee

f

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A

m

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Cha

n

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e

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e

ll

ico

e

hadn

o

t

e

n

visage

d

and

th

e

r

e

f

ore

hadno

t

cov

e

r

e

d.

T

h

e

nigh

t

e

n

co

u

nt

e

rsw

e

r

emos

tl

y

dominat

e

db

y

th

e

G

e

rm

a

n

s

b

ec

aus

e

ofth

e

i

rs

up

erior

night

-

tim

e

f

i

g

h

tingt

e

ch

n

iq

u

es

.

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t

is

hl

oss

e

sw

e

r

esubstantia

l

-

B

l

a

c

kPri

n

ce(armo

u

r

e

d

c

rui

s

e

r

),

Tipp

e

rar

y(f

l

o

t

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ll

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r),a

swe

ll

as

t

h

e

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Fortun

e

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T

u

r

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e

n

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and

Arde

n

t

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Sparrowhaw

k

wasa

l

solostb

ut

s

h

ewasacc

i

de

n

ta

ll

y

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e

db

y

Britishship

s

.

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e

r

ewe

r

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a

l

s

oG

e

rman

l

osses

-

th

e

pr

e-

d

r

ea

dnou

g

htP

o

mm

e

r

nw

a

s

l

os

t

o

utr

ig

httoa

Britisht

o

r

pedo.I

n

a

d

di

ti

o

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ey

h

ad

t

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aband

o

nt

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ngth

e

Liit

z

o

w,

whi

c

hwaslimping

fromaction

e

arli

e

rintheda

y

,andtw

o

light

c

ruisersw

e

r

e

lostasthe

y

w

e

r

e

ramm

e

db

y

a

G

e

rm

a

ndr

e

adnought.TheRostockwashitb

y

aBritishtorpedoandn

e

ed

e

dtowingbuthad

tob

esc

uttl

e

dlat

e

r

w

h

e

nsh

ec

am

e

underthreatfromth

e

crui

se

rDublin

.

ThedestroyerV4

sank,possiblyasar

es

ultofhittingamin

e

.

Althoughth

e

senightskirmi

s

h

e

srevealedthatS

c

h

ee

rwastakingth

e

rout

e

viaHorn

s

R

ee

f

toreturntoport,no-onethoughttoinformJellico

e

.Doubtless,hewouldhavenotsought

anightbattlebutitwouldhavehadab

e

aringonhissubs

e

qu

e

ntstrategy

.

Th

e

int

e

lligence

mighthav

e

stillreachedhimviaRoom40attheAdmiralty.Initiallytheys

e

ntan

inter

ce

pt

e

dmessagereportingthelocationoftheshipatther

e

aroftheGermanfl

ee

t,an

errortransmittedbytheGermansasitturnedout,butthiswasfollowedbyanother
messagethatgavethecorrectlocation.Probablybecauseofhisexperienceearlierinthe
day,Jellicoeignoredit.TheAdmiraltyreceivedfurtherint

e

llig

e

ncethat

c

orroborat

e

dth

e

secondmessagebutfailedtopassthisonatall

.

HadJellicoereceivedit,itismorelik

e

ly

thathewouldhav

e

positionedth

e

fleettoresumebattlethefollowingday

.

Intheevent,h

e

r

e

turn

e

dtoport

.

TheGermans

c

laimedJutlandasavictory,whi

c

hwascertainlytru

e

intermsoflosses

inflicted.TheBritishlostth

e

thre

e

battl

e

cruisersQueenMary

,

Indifatigableand

Invincible,thearmouredcruisersD

i

f

e

nce,WarriorandBlack

Pr

ince,th

e

fl

o

tillal

e

ader

Tipp

e

rary

,

thedestroy

e

r

sA

rd

e

nt

,

N

estor,Turbul

e

nt

,

Shark

,

NomadandSparrowhawkand

hadatotalof6,094menkilled.TheG

e

rmanslostthebattle

cr

ui

serL

ut

z

ow,thepr

e-

dreadnoughtPommern,th

e

light

cr

ui

se

r

sW

i

es

bad

e

n

,

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,

ElbinaandR

ost

o

c

k

,

th

e

dest

r

oye

r

sV.

2

7,

V

.

29

,

V

.

48

,

5

.

3

5

andV

.

4andhadatotal

of2,5

51

me

nkill

e

d.D

e

spit

e

the

fa

c

tthatther

ewe

r

e

f

ewe

r

Ge

rm

a

nl

os

s

es

,th

e

irFl

ee

twaslarg

e

l

y

unfittogoto

se

a.

A

rm

o

u

r

platinghadpr

eve

ntedth

e

sinkingofman

y

ship

sb

ut

t

h

ey

h

a

d

s

u

s

tain

e

dconsid

e

rable

damage.How

e

v

e

r,in

ter

m

sofs

trat

e

g

y,

th

e

r

e

wasnoadvantagefortheG

e

rman

sw

h

owere

d

e

f

e

at

e

dinth

e

sens

e

thatthebattleresult

e

din

noc

han

ge

f

or

th

e

m.Th

e

GrandSeaFleet

wasstillnum

e

r

ic

all

ys

up

e

ri

o

r

,

theG

e

rmanswer

e

stillmor

e

orl

e

s

s

trapp

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d

i

np

o

rtandth

ey

hadnotmanagedtobr

e

akth

e

Brit

is

hbl

oc

kad

e.

Also

,e

v

e

nhadth

e

Germanssuff

e

r

e

d

heavi

e

rlo

s

s

e

s,itwouldhavemadenodifferenc

e

totheir

s

ubmar

i

n

e

cap

ac

it

y

toinflict

lossesuponBritish

c

omm

erce.Fo

rth

e

Br

i

ti

s

hitwasob

v

iouslydisappointingandth

ere

w

asa

n

e

xt

e

n

s

i

ve

in

ve

st

i

gationintothebattle,

w

hi

c

hhighlight

e

dmanytechnological

deficienci

e

s,particula

r

l

yi

nth

e

ar

e

aofgunneryandammunition

.

Ther

e

wasn

o

t,f

or

exa

mpl

e,a

d

e

quat

e

prot

e

ctionforpreventingflashr

e

a

c

hin

gm

a

g

a

z

in

e

s,Britishcordit

e

charg

e

sw

e

r

e

alsoun

s

af

e

andBriti

s

h

s

h

e

ll

swe

r

e

in

e

ffici

e

nt

.

Thethi

c

kn

e

ssofarmour

platin

gw

a

s

an

o

th

e

r

f

a

c

tor

,

whichhadmadeBriti

s

hship

s

mor

ev

uln

e

rabl

e

thanth

e

ir

Germancount

e

rparts

.

Th

e

g

e

n

e

rall

ygrea

t

e

r

we

ightofBritishshell,how

e

v

e

r,wasan

ad

v

antag

e

a

s

w

e

lla

s

th

e

g

e

n

e

rall

y

superiorsp

ee

d

ca

p

aci

t

yof

B

ritis

hb

att

l

ecr

u

ise

r

s.

S

c

h

ee

rbeli

eve

dthat,

e

v

e

nhadtheyinfli

c

t

e

dmor

e

s

e

v

e

r

e

lo

sses

up

o

nth

e

Briti

s

hFl

ee

t

,

it

w

asunlik

e

l

y

that

s

u

c

hanoutcomewouldhaveindu

ce

ditt

o

surr

e

nder.Th

e

r

e

for

e

,h

e

advocatedar

e

turntounr

es

tri

c

t

e

d

s

ubma

r

in

e

warfar

e

togrindBritaindownb

y

atta

c

king

trad

e.

DefeatingtheU-BoatandtheFinalStagesofWar

UnrestrictedSubmarineWarfare

MoralewaslowaftertheBattleofJutlandandtherewasnogoodnewsfromtheWestern
Front.AfewweeksafterJellicoedeclaredthattheGrandSeaFleetwasfitforseaagain,
theBattleoftheSommewouldbeginon1July1916.On5June,therewasanotherblow
forBritishmoralewhenLordKitchenerwaslostatseaonthecruiserHampshirewhenshe
hitaGermanmineofftheOrkneys.

IttooktheHighSeasFleetuntilAugusttobeseaworthyandon19Augusttheycameout
toraidSunderland,justastheyhadintendedbeforetheBattleofJutland.Room40
performedwellonthisoccasion,informingJellicoeofGermanmovementssothatbothhe
andBeattywereatseainadvanceofScheer.Tyrwhitt’sHarwichforcewasalsoordered
outtoapositionoffYarmouth.However,therewastobenofleetactionthatday.ABritish
patrolsubmarinetorpedoedtheWesifalen,aGermanbattleship,whichwasnotsunkbut
sustainedenoughdamagetoforceherbacktoport.Thewirelesssignalthatshesent
confirmedthattheGermanswereatseaaswellasgivingawaytheirposition.

T

h

e

informationwasr

e

la

ye

dtoJ

e

llicoebuth

e

d

i

dnot

rece

i

ve

ituntillaterbecaus

e

h

e

had

be

e

nd

e

la

ye

dwhen

No

uinphamwa

s

torpedo

e

dand

s

unkb

y

U

.

52.

Wh

e

n

No

ttin

g

hamw

e

nt

down,itwa

s

notimmediat

e

l

y

p

oss

ibl

e

tod

e

termin

e

wh

e

theritwasth

e

r

e

sultofamin

eo

r

atorp

e

do

.

J

e

llic

oew

ant

e

dtobesur

e

thathis

s

hipswer

e

n

o

taboutto

e

nt

e

ramin

e

f

ie

ldso

hechang

e

d

c

ourse.Th

e

r

es

ultwasa

fo

ur-h

o

urd

e

la

y

buthema

ys

tillha

ve

beenintim

e

t

o

inter

ce

ptth

e

HighS

e

asFleethaditnotb

ee

nforamistak

e

onth

e

part

o

fG

e

rm

a

n

intelligen

ce

.A

ze

ppelinthathadb

ee

nmonit

o

ringth

e

Harwichforc

e

r

e

portedthatitwa

s

a

strong

e

nem

y

for

ce

withdreadnoughts,althoughinfactth

e

ywerelight

c

rui

se

r

s

.S

c

h

ee

r,

believingthatitwasth

e

r

e

for

e

apartoftheGrandFleet,abandon

e

dcourseforSund

e

rland

andwent

so

uth.Aft

e

rthesinkingofth

e

Wesifalen,Tyrwhitthadt

a

kenan

o

rth

e

rn

co

urs

e

but,failingtofindan

y

German

s

hips,th

e

n

reverse

dcour

se

forba

se

and,inth

e

process,

unwittingl

y

turn

e

dawayfromSch

ee

r.Scheer,havingheardthatth

e

GrandFl

ee

twas

,

in

fa

c

t,pursuinghimfromthenorth

a

ndh

ewas

thust

oo

lat

e

forabombardm

e

ntof

Sund

er

l

and,

als

o

b

e

gantoh

e

adba

c

khom

e.

On

ce

J

e

llicoeknew

o

fth

e

G

e

rmanr

e

tr

e

at

,

h

e

r

ea

li

ze

dthatn

oe

n

c

ounterwasp

oss

ibl

ea

ndh

e

tooh

ea

d

e

dforbas

e

,althoughtheBriti

s

h

s

tillhad

toc

ontendwith

e

n

e

m

y

submarin

e

s

.

OneofBeatt

y’s

li

g

ht

cr

u

ise

rs

,

Falm

o

uth

,

wa

s

torpedo

e

dandsunkth

e

foll

o

win

gd

a

y

whileb

e

in

g

t

owe

d

.

T

y

rwhitthadturnedag

a

in

a

n

d

h

adsig

ht

e

dth

e

G

ermans

but

,

b

y

thi

stime,itw

asearly

e

v

e

ningandther

e

wa

s

not

e

nough

tim

e

b

e

for

e

dark-nessfellforhimtopositionhims

e

l

ff

a

v

orably

f

o

ranattack.

Asar

e

sultofthelossofthetwobattlecruisersthathadb

e

enpartofa

s

creenforthefl

ee

t,

whichcouldnotb

e

rein-forc

e

dwithoutnewlybuiltships,theBritishstrategyreturnedto

oneofgreatcautionincomingouttothe

s

outh

.

Th

e

distantblockad

e

was

s

tillvery

effectiveanditbegantolookmorelik

e

lythatvictorycouldbewonwithoutamajorfleet

battl

e

.Sch

ee

rhadbeenk

e

entotryasimilarmane

u

veragainwithadifferentsubmarin

e

formationbut,forthetimebeing,unfavorableweatherconditionsprevent

e

dhimfrom

goingaheadwithsuchaplan.Bythetimethathecouldhaveimplementedit,theU-boats
werere-deployedtoattackBritishtradeonceagain

.

Theyweretofollowprizeruleswith

theprovisothatarmedmerchantmencouldbesunkwithoutwarning,eventhoughScheer

believedthatonlyunrestrictedsubmarinewarfarewouldbetrulyeffective.TheHighSeas
FleetwasnottoundertakeanoffensiveoperationintheNorthSeauntilthespringof
1918

.

Sche

e

r,withouthissubmarines,cameupwithanotherplantousehisdestroyers,withthe

backupoftheHighSeasFleet,toattackmerchantmenintheNorthSea.Theplancameto
nothingbecauseBritishintelligencepi

c

keduponhismovementsandrecalledordiverted

merchantcraftandlightforces.Unfavourableweatheralsopreventedthedestroyersfrom
goingoutasfarastheyhadintendedandaBritishsubmarinetorpedoedMunchen,which
hadtobetowedbacktobase

.

Thistim

e

th

e

GrandFleetwasonalertbut,inaccordance

withthenewpolicy,itdidnotleavebase

.

Offensivepatrollingwaslefttothesubmarines.

TheGermanswereunabletoleaveportwithoutbeingdetectedbyBritishsubmarinesbut
Scheer,deprivedoftheuseofhisownsubmarines,wasunabletogleanthesame
informationabouttheBritishFleetcomingout.

ByNovember1916,theresumptionofsubmarineattacksonBritishcommercewas
resultinginthelossofover120,000tonspermonth,morethandoublethemonthly
averagesthattheGermanshadachievedinthecampaignsearlierintheyear.TheGermans
hadintroducedlargerandmorepowerfulsubmarinesintheUB.IIboats

·

thatmadeupthe

FlandersFlotillainthelatterpartof1916.Theywerealargecontributoryfactortothe
increasedrateinsinkings.AnotherfactorintheGermansuccesswasthegreater
availabilityofsubmarinesincomparisontothenumberoperationalatthebeginningof
1916.Therangeoftheiractivitywasalsogreatlyincreased,includingoperationsasfaras
thecoastofNorthAmericaandasuccessfulraidintotheArctic.TheGermansalsobroke
theirearlierpromiseofnotattackingpassengerlinerswhentheP&OlinerArabiawas
torpedoedintheMediterraneanon6November1916,althoughallthepassengerswere
savedwhenothershipsrushedtoheraid.Theonlycasualtieswereengineroomstaff.This
incident,togetherwithsomeotherlostships,againinvolvedAmericancitizensbutwhat
wasofevengreaterconcerntotheUSAweresubmarineoperationswithinAmerican
waters.

AthomeinBritain,theNavywascomingundercriticismforthisaswellasthe
inconclusiveBattleofJutlandandtheFirstLordoftheAdmiralty,Jackson,wasreplaced
byJellicoe.Forthefleet,thehighlypopularJellicoewasasadlossandheshowedsome
reluctancetoleaveforLondonhimself.Althoughtherewereseveralpotentialcandidates
forthepostwhowereseniortohim,BeattywasmadeCommander-in-ChiefoftheGrand
Fleet.HavingperformedwellatJutland,hewasapopularpublicchoice.

ThenewboardinLondonwouldbeoccupiedprimarilywiththesubmarinethreat.The
longgameoftheblockadewasincreasingpressureontheGermanhomefrontandtheir
failuretomakeheadwayontheWesternFrontwasleadingtoafinancialbreakdown.The
Germansweredesperatelylookingforasolutionandweredeterminedoncemoretobreak
Britishtrade.ThistimeitwouldbetheunrestrictedsubmarinewarfarethatScheerhad
longbeenadvocating.TheGermansnowfeltthattheconcessionsthattheyhadmadein
tryingtokeeptheirdiplomaticchannelsopenwithAmericawerepreventingthemfrom
achievingvictory.DespitetheheavylossesofBritishmerchantvessels,overallnumbers
stillequatedto94percentofthetotalatthestartofthewar.Inamemorandumof
December1916,Holtzendorf,chiefoftheAdmiralstab,setouthisargumentfor

unrestrictedsubmarinewarfareandthecampaignbeganon1February1917.

TheGermanhighcommandprioritizedsubmarineconstructionand,throughout1917,they
neverhadlessthan105operationalsubmarines.Atsomepoints,theyhadasmanyas129.
Therewereplansforfurtherconstructiontobereadyin1918and1919ashopesfora
swiftconclusiontothewarbegantolooklessrealistic.

ThesubmarineblockadeofBritainextendedroughlyfromtheDutchcoasttothe
Norwegian

,

coast,nearlyasfarastheFaeroeIslandsandtoCapeFinisterre.Inaddition,

thesubmarinesalsocoveredroutesintotheArcticOcean.Thesewatersinwhatthe
GermansreferredtoasSperrpebeitweredeclaredclosedtoshippingandneutralsusing
themweretoldthattheydidsoattheirownrisk.Thereweresomeminorconcessions-
oneAmericansteamereachweekwouldbeallowedintoFalmouthandoneDutchsteamer
perdaycouldoperatebetweenFlushingandHarwich,aslongastheywereappropriately
markedwithredandwhitestripesandaredandwhitecheckedflag.Theentire
Mediterraneanwasalsodeclaredaprohibitedzone,althoughinitiallyasmallcorridorwas
designatedfreetoenableneutralSpainandGreece(neutralatthispoint)tocontinue
trading.Shipsfromthesetwonationswerenotimmunebutprizeruleswerefollowedin
theareauntilNovember1917whentheconcessionwascancelled.Itwasnotlongbefore
theGermancampaignalienatedtheAmericansaltogether.Theydemonstratedtheir
disapprovalalmostimmediatelybycuttingoffdiplomaticchannelson3February.By
April,followingthesinkingofmorepassengerliners,notablytheLaconiaandthe
Algonquin,andtherevelationbyBritishintelligencethattheGermanswereendeavoring
tomakeallianceswithMexicoandJapan,Americawasfinallyforcedintothewar.War
wasdeclaredonGermanyon6April,althoughthedeclarationdidnotincludeAustria-
Hungary.Withimmediateeffect,anyGermanvesselswereretainedinAmericanports.
TheGermanshopedthatAmericaninterventionwouldarrivetoolatetohaveanyimpact
ontheoutcomeofthewar.

EventhoughthecampaignwasnotbreakingBritishcommerceasquicklyastheGermans
hadenvisaged,thelossesweresavage.Intheearlymonthsof1917,theyincreasedfrom
520,412tonsinFebruaryto860,334tonsinApril.AlthoughtheAprilfigurewasneverto
bematchedagain,hadsucharateoflossescontinuedBritainwouldhavebeencrippledby
November1917.

TheGermansalsosucceededinbringingneutralship-pingtoavirtualstandstillasship
ownerskepttheirshipsinneutralportsandrefusedtoletthemsail.Inordertoensurethat
shecouldstillreceiveessentialimports,Britainimposedharshcounter-measures.She
refusedtoletneutralvesselssailfromBritishportsunlesstheyagreedthattheywouldnot
headforaneutralportwheretheywouldbelaidup.Iftheyweretradingwithaneutral
port,theywereonlyallowedtoleavetheUKiftheyagreedtoreturnwithanapproved
cargotoaBritishoranotherAlliedport.InthecaseofDutchorScandinavianvessels,
theywereonlypermittedtoleaveBritishportsonthearrivalofanequivalentvesselwith
thesameflag.However,nomatterhowBritainforcedneutralstocontinuetosupplyher
ports,itwasoflittleuse

-

iftheshipsweresunkbysubmarinesandtheyhadtolookfor

othersolutions.Thereweresomeprecautionsalreadyinplace.Shipscarryingessential
supplies,forexample,weredirectedtosailonpredeterminedroutespatrolledwith
destroyers,

s

loopsandtrawlers.Merchantmenalsotravell

e

d

ove

rnight,werekeptas

c

lose

totheshorelineaspossibl

e

,

we

r

e

backedupwithpatrolsandweredispersedfromth

e

ir

u

s

ualroutesandports

.

Theyw

e

redirectedbynavaloffi

ce

rsand

,

asfaraspossible,

intellig

e

ncewasusedsothattraffic

co

uldb

e

divertedwhentheauthoritieswereawar

e

of

s

ubmarinethreats

.

Ea

r

lierinthewar,thesekindsofmeasur

es

hadbe

e

nreasonably

effectivebutnow,withfarmor

ei

nt

e

nsiv

e

warfareandterrifyinglosses,theywere

co

mpl

e

t

e

l

y

inadequate.Thequestionofhowtoprotectm

e

r

c

hantshippingdominated

Admiraltydiscussions,aidedb

y

th

e

n

e

wlyformedAnti

-

SubmarineDivisionsetupby

J

e

lli

c

oeinDecemb

e

r1916.Th

e

instinctattheAdmiraltywasforoffensiveactionusing

huntingpatrolsandQ-ships,asfavore

d

byJellico

e

,

tog

e

therwithnets,minesandd

e

pth

c

harges

.

Th

e

r

e

w

e

r

e

al

s

o

e

xperimentswithnewt

e

chnologysuchash

y

droph

o

n

e

s

.

Atthe

beginningofthewar,theBritishhadheldbackonlayingminefieldsbecauseth

ey

mi

g

ht

restricttrad

e

andth

e

firstminefieldwasnotlaiduntilearl

y

1915

.

B

e

att

y

nowcalledfor

intensiv

e

min

e

l

a

ying

,e

speciallyaroundth

e

Bight.Therewa

s

adifficultywithashortage

ofmin

e

sandth

e

designfaultthathadmad

e

Britishmin

e

sunr

e

liabl

es

in

ce

thebeginning

ofthewar

w

a

ss

tillaprobl

e

m

.

B

e

att

y

scaleddownhisplanand,althoughacop

y

ofthe

G

e

rm

a

nmin

e

hadbeenord

e

r

e

din1916,thiswouldnotb

e

r

e

adyuntillate1917.During

th

eseco

ndhalf

o

f1917

,

th

e

m

i

n

es

pr

ove

dquit

es

u

cces

sful

,

d

e

stroying11U

-

boats,but

th

ese

r

e

sultswerestillnotenoughtor

e

allycount

e

ra

c

tth

e

G

e

rmanthreat

.

Th

e

oth

e

roptionwasconsider

e

ddef

e

nsive.Thiswasar

e

turntoth

e

traditionalconvoy

syst

e

mthatwasalreadyb

e

ingusedtoprotecttroopships

.

Ther

e

wasoppositiontoconvoy

becausetheconcentrationof

ves

s

e

lsinoneareamadethempotentiallyevenmore

vulnerabletosubmarin

e

attack

.

Itwouldalsotieuplargenumbersofthemandslowmany

ofthemdownastheywouldallhavetotravelatthespeedoftheslowestship.Howev

e

r,

ashugeloss

e

scontinu

e

dandothermeasuresshoweddisappointingresults,th

e

Admiralty

cameund

e

rincreasingpressuretoimplementaconvoysystem

.

ToB

e

att

y’

simmense

frustration,Jellicoewasvehementlyagainstconvoy.Jellicoe’sdogg

e

dnessonthispoint

wouldleadtohimlosingofficeattheendof1917

.

AttheendofApril,convoyswere

introduced,initiallyonarelativ

e

lysmallscaletocoverDutchroutesaroundtheHookof

Holland,theFrenchcoaltradeandScandinaviantrade.Theyprovedverysuccessfuland
thepolicywasexpanded.America’sentryintothewarhelp

e

dthesituationsincethe

Am

e

ricansprovidedadditionalvessels,firstlyforpatrolsandsubsequentlyonconvoy

duties.Bythe

e

ndofAugust35Americandestroy

e

rswerebasedinQueenstown,Ireland,

andplayedavitalrol

e

inthesuccessoftheconvoysystem.Earlieron6Jun

e

asectionjust

forconvoyshadbeensetupattheAdmiraltyanditworked

c

los

e

lywiththeIntelligence

DivisionandtheMinistryofShipping.Intelligencecouldqui

c

klyb

e

r

e

lay

e

dtoconvoy

c

ommodor

e

sbythewirelesswithwhichtheywereallnowprovided.Increasingly,theU-

boatsfoundtheconvoysmoredifficulttolocateandattackand,as1917wenton,the
Britishintroducedcontinualimprovementsandmodificationsinconvoyefficiency.The
introductionofairships,seaplanesandflyingboatsescortingconvoysalsoproveda
deterrenttotheU-boats,whichwerefindingthemselvesshortoftargets.Associated
factorswerealsoimportantincounteractingtheU-boats.Turnaroundtimestoprevent
congestioninAlliedportswereshortened,forexample,shipswereconcentratedon
shorterroutesandimportswererestrictedtoconcentrateonessentialsupplies.Overthe
summerof1917,theBritishpersistedwithoffensivetacticsinconjunctionwithconvoys.
Theresultswerepaltryonceagainbuttheyseemedreluctanttoabandonthemaltogether.

BytheendofSeptember,withtheconvoysreducingmerchantlosses,confidencebeganto
growandtheGermansbegantodespairofbreakingBritainthroughhercommerce.InJuly
andAugustonlyfivevesselsoutof800convoyedhadbeenlost.However,itshouldbe
notedthatthenumberofshipslostoverallwasstillhigherthanithadbeenbeforethe
introductionofunrestrictedsubmarinewarfareand,althoughtherewasreasonfor
optimism,submarineswouldremainathreatuntiltheendofthewar.

ZeebruggeandOstend

DiscussionshadlongbeenheldbytheBritishtoneutralizetheportsofZeebruggeand
OstendwhentheyfellunderGermancontrolandbecamethebasesfortheirmajorforceof
submarinesandforsomelightforces.Inthesummerof1917,theWarCommitteedecided
thatamajoreffortonlandwouldbemadeinFlanderstowardstheportsandthenavywas
requestedtomountabombardmentofthematthesametime.Jellicoewasagainstthe
bombardment,believingthatitcouldnotbeeffective.InJuneandJuly,itwasproposed
thattheNavyshouldlandadivisionwithtanksandartillery,althoughthiswasdependent
uponHaigmakingsufficientadvancesonland.Intheevent,Haigwasunabletobreak
throughonlandandsotheoperationwascancelledinSeptember.Therewasnoreal
possibilityofdestroyingtheGermanU-boatflotillasanddestroyersastheycouldeasily
hideinthemazeofcanalsleadingfromZeebrugge.Inparticular,Bruges,linkedbycanal
totheport,wastheperfecthidingplace.Beatty,BaylyandTyrwhitthadforsometimehad
anotherideatoblockZeebrugge.Theportwasnarrowanditwasthereforefeasibleto
blockitandpreventtheGermansfromoperatingoutofit.RogerKeyeshadbeenkeenon
theideasincehebecamecommanderoftheDoverPatrolandhesubmittedaproposalthat
wasacceptedattheendofFebruary1918.

Threeobsoletecruisersweretobefilledwithcementandsunkatthemainlockentrance
tothemouthoftheZeebrugge-Brugescanal.Atthesametimeanothertwoblockships
wouldbesunkattheentrancetoOstendharbor.Toreachthesetargetstheblockshipshad
togetpastalargestonemolethatwasconnectedtotheshorewithaviaductformingthe
harborandthenmaketheirwaytothecanalentrance,adistanceofover3,000meters.

Thecrewfromtheblockshipswouldabandonshiponcetheywereinplaceandwouldbe
pickedupbyavarietyofsmallcraft.Therewerebatteriesatthenorthernendofthemole
thattheraidingforcewouldhavetooccupywhiletheoperationtookplaceinorderto
protecttheblockships.ThecruiserVindictivewouldbeadaptedespeciallyfortheraid
withmachineguns,mortars,flamethrowersandhowitzers.Accompanyingherwouldbe
twoMerseyferriesthatwouldcarrylongladdersinordertoreachthemole.Itwasalso
plannedthattwoobsoletesubmarineswouldbefilledwithexplosivesandblow
themselvesupundertheviaductsothatitwouldbeimpossiblefortheGermanstoreach
themole.

Thesewerethecentralelementsoftheoperationbutitwasalsonecessarytosetup
diversions.Theseweretobeaccomplishedwiththeuseofsmokescreens,airattacksand
bombardmentsofcoastalbatteriesclosetotheportsbymonitors

.

Itwasintendedthatthe

bombardmentswouldstartintheweekspriortothemainoperationsothattheGermans
wouldbeledtothinkofthemasroutine.Thewholeoperationwouldrequire165vessels.

KeyesinitiallyplannedtogoaheadinMarchbutwasforcedtowaitbecausetherewere
insufficientchemicalstoproducethesmokescreen.Hisshipssetsailon11Aprilbutwere
forcedtoturnbackasinitiallytherewasalmostnowindandthen,whenitdidblow,it
blewsouthsothatthesmokescreenwouldbeineffectiveandtheshipsexposed.Finally,
theywereabletogoouton23Apriland,inviewofthedate,Keyesonthedestroyer
Warwickmadethesignal,‘StGeorgeforEngland’,towhichVindictivereplied,‘Maywe

givethedragon’stailadamnedgoodtwist’.

TheGermanshadsomewarningofanimpendingattack,sinceplanshadbeendiscovered
aftertheabortiveattempton11April,andtheybegantoreactshortlybeforeVindictive
reachedthemole.Muchofthesmokescreenwaslostduetoachangeinwinddirection
andthedestructionofsomesmokefloatsbyGermanguns.Gunfireraineddownonthe
upperdecksofVindictivewithalargenumberofcasualties.Inspeedinguptotryand
avoidtheguns,shealsomissedtheintendedlandingpoint,withtheresultthatthelanding
partiescouldnotreachthebattery,shecouldnotcoverthemandshewasexposedto
batteriesatthewesternpartofthemole.Despitethedifficulties,compoundedbyproblems
withanchoring,thelanding

partiesgotontothemolealthoughtherewaslittlethatthey

coulddo.Astheblockshipsenteredtheharbor,theyre-embarkedand,luckily,the
VindictiveandtheMerseyferriesescaped.Oneofthesubmarinesmadetheviaduct,
explodedandcutitoff.Thecrew,althoughunderheavyfire,escapedinaskiff.Therewas
alsosomesuccesswiththeblockships.Twoofthemmadeittothecanalentrancewhere
theyscuttledthemselvesasplanned,althoughthethirdvesselsunkshortoftheentrance
underGermanfire.TheattemptonOstendfailedaltogetherbecause,onceagain,the
smokescreenwasrendereduselessbythewindand,inaddition,theGermanshad
deliberatelymovedthelightbuoymarkingtheharborentrancesothatthetwoblockships
sankofftarget.

On

1

0May,KeyestriedagaintocompletetheplanatOstendbutoneoftheblockships

hadaproblemwithitsbo

i

lerand,sinceshecouldonlytravelat6knots,hadtofallback

.

Theothermadetheharborentrancebutcameunderfireandgrounded

.

Thecrewsunkher

butinthewrongposition.Onthewayback,Warwickwashitbyamineandwasfortunate
nottosink.Shehadtobetowedback.KeyesintendedtotryagaininJunebutthiswas
cancelledwhenitseemedasiftheGermans,inlightofthebombardments,werenolonger
usingOstend.TheapparentsuccessatZeebruggedidmuchformoraleonthehomefront.
KeyeswascreatedaKnightCommanderoftheBathand11VCswereawarded.How
trulyeffectivetheblockingofZeebruggewasisquestionable.Ostendwasnotblockedand
thecanalfromBrugesledthereaswellasZeebrugge.Nevertheless,aerialphotographs
showedthatGermandestroyerswereholedupinBrugesandtherewereexposed
submarines.Keyesnowrequestedfouraircraftsquadronstobeplacedunderhiscommand
sothatthesecouldbeattackedfromtheair.Hereceivedonlyasmallproportionofwhat
hehadrequestedandconsequentlytheairraidswerenotheavyenoughorsustainedfora
longenoughtimetoinflictrealdamage.

Overall,theDoverPatrolwassuccessfulinthataftertheraidtherewerenofurtherattacks
ontheDoverbarrage(aseriesofsteelnetsatvaryingheightsanchoredontheseabedto
entrapsubmarines)andsubmarinetrafficintheDoverStraitsbecamenegligible.German
submarinelossesbegantoriseduetosuccessfulconvoysandcountermeasuresandthe
eastcoastbecameincreasinglydangerousforthem.Theywerealsounderthreatfromthe
airandthepotencyoftheFlandersflotillaswasseriouslyunderminedas1918proceeded.
Almostcontinuallythroughoutthewar,theDoverPatrolhadachieveditsmajorobjective
ofkeepingthechannelsofcommunicationwithFranceopen.

TheFinalStagesofWar

In1918,theHighSeasFleetwouldmakeonefinalsortie.ItstargetwastheScandinavian
convoy,whichwasprotectedbyadetachedbattleshipforce.TheBritishknewthatthe
HighSeasFleetwasstillathreatandhadanticipatedpossibleattacksontheDover
barrage,whichdidnotmaterialize.However,Scheerimposedstrictwirelesssilenceonthe
plansfortheconvoyand,asaresult,intelligencedidnotcatchwindoftheoperationin
advance.HipperwentoutwiththeSecondScoutingGroupandtheSecondFlotillaon23
AprilwithbackupfromtheHighSeasFleet

.

Theywerehamperedbyheavyfogatthe

Bight

buttheyremainedundetectedand,onthemorningof24April,theyseemedtobewellon

‘

courseforasuccessfulsurpriseattack.However,forallhismeticulousplanning,Scheer

wasletdownbyintelligencereportswhichhadindicatedthewrongsailingtimesforthe
convoy.TherewasnoconvoyforScheertointercept.Hecontinuedsearchingfurther
northbeforeturningbackintheafternoon.UnfortunatelyfortheGermans,theMoltke
startedtotakeonwaterafterlosinganinnerscrewandshewasforcedtobreaktheradio
silencebeforebeingtakenundertow.Alerted,theAdmiraltyorderedBeattytoseabut
therewasnopossibilityofhisshipsbeingintimetointercepttheHighSeasFleet.The
Scandinavianconvoy,however,hadhadaluckyescape.

Asthewarwascomingtoaclose,aviationtookonamoreimportantrole.Planesand
flyingboatshadbeenincreasinglyusedaspartofsubmarinewarfareandincreasing
numbersofvesselsintheGrandFleetwereadaptedwithplatformsforlaunchingplanes.
Ataconferencein1917,BeattyhadmadeproposalstouseSopwithT.1Cuckootorpedo
planes,alongwithflyingboats,toattacktheHighSeasFleetinport.However,therewere
simplynotenoughplanesorcarrierstomountthekindofoperationthatheenvisagedand
therewasnotyetthetechnicalcapacityforplanestocarryanappropriatesizeoftorpedo
forthepurpose.Beatty’sgrandplanwasoutofthequestionbutthereweresmaller
operations.InOctober1918,forexample,thenewlycommissionedArBus,adedicated
aircraftcarrier,attackedtheHighSeasFleetinWilhelmshavenwiththeSopwithT.1
Cuckoos.FuriouswasinvolvedwithairreconnaissancemissionsfromtheBight,which
alsodestroyedazeppelinshedatthebaseinTondern.Thiswasthefirsttimethatland
planeshadbeenflownoffacarrierinaraid.Itwasthebeginningofwhatwouldbecome
anessentialelementoffuturenavalwarfare.Indeed,manyofthelessonslearntwouldbe
invaluableduringtheSecondWorldWar.ThosewhohadfoughtintheFirstWorldWar
wouldbecometheofficersduringtheSecondand,unliketheirseniorsintheearlier
conflict,theywouldhaveexperienceofmodernwarfareandtechnology.

AstheAllieswereadvancingintoBelgiumattheendofSeptember,theGermanvessels
evacuatedtheFlandersportsbetween29Septemberand3October.Tyrwhitthadbeenon
alerttointerceptthemleavingportbutitseemsthatnobodyexpectedthemtoleaveso
quicklyandconsequentlytheBritishweresomehoursbehindtheGermanfleet.Untilthe
veryendofthewar,therewasapossibilitythatthenavalconfrontationwouldendina
battlethatwouldbethelong-searched-forTrafalgar.Itwasnottobe.

On3October,whenPrinceMaxvonBadenbecameGermanchancellor,hecalledforan
armisticewithPresidentWilson.ThetermsincludedaGermanwithdrawalfromenemy

soilandacessationofU-boatattacksonpassengervessels.Scheerwasfrustrated.While
fightingwasstillgoingon,hewasreluctanttoputanendtotheeffectivenessofthe
submarinecampaign.TheGermans,nowunderimmensepressureontheWesternFront,
werehopingforanall-outbattlewiththeBritishFleetandScheerputtogetherplans.
BritishintelligencewasawareofpossibleGermanmovestoluretheGrandFleettothe
south.However,Scheer’splan,perceivedasasuicidalmission,causedgreatunrestinan
alreadydemoralisedGermanFleet.On29October,whentheGermanFleetwasordered
togetheratSchilligRoads,mutinyerupted.

Whenthearmisticewassignedon11November1918,itsnavaltermsstatedthatten
Germandreadnoughts,sixbattlecruisers,eightlightcruisersandfiftyofthemostmodern
destroyersweretobeinternedundercareandmaintenancepartiesatadesignatedAllied
port.Inaddition,allsubmarineshadtobesurrendered,capturedRussianwarshipshadto
bereturnedandtheblockadewouldnotbelifteduntilapeacetreatywassigned.The
AlliedNavalCouncilagreedonScapaFlowasthelocationfortheinternedGermanFleet.
InnegotiationswithScheer’srepresentative,RearAdmiralMeurer,itwasdecidedthatthe
submarineswouldsurrendertoTyrwhittatHarwichandthesurfaceshipstoBeattyinthe
FirthofForth.TheywouldthenheadforScapaFlowandstaythereuntilthepeacetreaty
determinedtheirultimatefate.

On20November,thefirstsubmarineswereescortedintoportbyTyrwhittwhoremained
onactionstationsuntiltheysurrenderedandorderedthatthereshouldbenocheering.
Eventually176submarinesweresurrendered,includingsomethathadbeenhidingin
neutralports.TheywouldbesharedoutbetweentheAllies.TheGermanFleetarrivedin
theFirthofForthon21November,underthecommandofRearAdmiralvonReuter.
Hipperwastooheartbrokentotakeonthetask.BeattyintheQueenElizabeth,aswellas
around370shipsrepresentingothernavalcommands,mettheGermanships.Thefleet
wasledthroughtwocolumnsof13BritishSquadronsbythe

lightcruiserCardiff.The

columnsthenturnedtoescortthemintoport.AgaintheBritishremainedonactionstations
incasetheGermansattemptedanything.Ataround11amBeattymadethesignal:‘The
Germanflagwillbehauleddownatsunsettoday,Thursday,andwillnotbehoistedagain
withoutpermission.‘FamouslyBeattytoldhisfleet,‘Ialwaystoldyoutheywouldhaveto
comeout.‘

ByJune1919,therewasastillsmallGermancaretakercrewinScapaFlow,asthefateof
thevesselshadstillnotbeenfinalizedforthepeacetreaty.Onthemorningof21June,
whentheBritishshipsatScapawentoutonexercises,Reutersignaledhisfleettoscuttle
immediately.TheBritishreturnedatfullspeedbutvirtuallyalltheshipsweredestroyed;
onlytheBadenandthreecruisersweresaved.Itwasanignominiousendforthefleetof
whichtheKaiserhadbeensoproud.WhiletheBritishappearedoutragedtherewas
probablyalsosomereliefinthatitsolvedtheproblemofhowtheshipsshouldbe
distributedamongsttheAllies.

Althoughthewarendedwithoutagreatvictoryinbattle,itwasneverthelessagreat
victoryoverall.Itwasthesustainedblockadethatgradually,butfinally,forcedthe

surrenderoftheCentralPowers.

Profiles

Beatty,David,firstEarlBeatty(1871

-

1936)

DavidBeattywasborninCheshireon17January1871,thesonofCaptainDavid
LongfieldBeattyofthe4thHussarsandhiswifeKatherine

.

Ahigh-spiritedboy,hejoined

thenavyaged

·

13,enteringtheRoyalNavalCollege,Dartmouth

.

Hewasappointedtothe

Alexandra,theflagshipoftheMediterraneanFleet,ratedmidshipmanin1886andwas
promotedtosub-lieutenantin1890.In1896

-

98,heservedwithdistinctionintheSudan

andinChinaduringtheBoxerRebellion.In1900,alreadymarkedoutasatalented
officer,hereceivedoneoffourspecialpromotionstocaptain,aged29.Theexpectedage
forsuchapromotionwas42.Hemethisfuturewife,Eth

e

lFi

e

ld,whileonleavein1899

andtheymarriedin1901aftershedivorcedherfirsthusband.InJune1902,hetook
commandofJunowiththeChannelFleetbeforebeinggivencommandofthenewcruiser
SuffolkintheMediterranean.BeattybecamenavaladvisertotheArmycouncilin1906
andwasinvolvedinplansfortransportoftheBEFtoFrance

.

Justbeforebeingpromoted

toRearAdmiralin1910,BeattyservedwiththeAtl

a

nti

c

Fl

ee

tunderPrinceLou

i

sof

Battenberg.H

e

turn

e

d

dow

nanappointm

e

ntassecond-in-commandinth

eA

tl

antic,

pr

e

f

e

rringth

e

Hom

e

Fle

e

t,which

e

arn

e

dhim

so

m

ecr

iti

c

ism

,

andun

e

mplo

y

m

e

ntuntil

Januar

y

191

2w

h

e

nh

ew

a

sc

ho

se

nb

y

Chur

c

hillasnaval

sec

r

e

t

a

r

y.

In1

9

1

3

,h

ew

a

s

appoint

e

dCommand

e

rofth

e

GrandFl

ee

t’

s

B

a

ttl

eC

ru

ise

rSquadr

o

nandthatwasthe

positionh

e

h

e

ld

a

tth

eo

utb

re

akofth

e

War.H

e

wasinvolvedinacti

o

natth

eBa

ttl

eso

f

H

e

ligolandBight,DoggerBankandJutland.In1

9

1

6,w

h

e

nJ

e

ll

ic

o

e

wasappointedFirst

SeaLord,B

e

attyt

o

ok

over

a

s

C

o

mmand

e

r-in-ChiefoftheGrandFl

e

et

.

H

e

r

e

main

e

din

thi

s

po

s

tunt

i

l1919,whenhebecam

e

FirstS

e

aLord,th

e

p

os

th

e

h

e

lduntilhisretirement

in1927

.

H

e

wa

s

alsoaward

e

dan

e

arldomandtheOrderofMeritin1919

.

Aft

e

r

r

e

t

i

r

e

m

e

nt,h

e

r

e

gularl

y

spokeintheHouseofL

o

rd

s;a

lthou

g

hh

ew

a

s

notalliedtoany

party.Hedi

e

dofh

e

art

fai

lur

ei

nL

o

nd

o

n

o

n12March1936.

Fish

e

r,JohnArbuthnot,fir

s

tBaronFi

s

h

e

r(1841

-

1920)

John

F

i

s

h

erw

a

st

h

ee

ld

es

t

c

hildofCaptainWilliamFish

e

rofth

e

7

8

th

Hi

g

hlandR

eg

im

e

nt

andhiswif

e

Sophiaandwasbo

rn

inC

ey

l

o

n

o

n

2

5Januar

y

1841.Hisnominationtojoin

th

e

na

vyw

a

s

fr

o

m

A

dmiralSirWilliamPark

e

r,N

e

l

s

on’sla

s

t

s

u

rv

i

v

in

gca

ptain

.

Fi

s

h

e

r

e

nt

e

redasacadetonHMS

Calc

u

tta,sa

i

l

i

ngtot

h

e

Bal

t

i

cd

uringth

e

C

r

im

e

anWar

,

although,a

s

th

e

sh

i

p

w

aspow

e

r

e

dsolelybysail,h

e

didnot

see

a

c

ti

o

n.Aft

e

rh

ew

a

s

promot

e

dtomidshipmanandjoin

e

dHighf1yerontheChinaStation

,

h

e

fir

s

t

s

awa

c

tionat

th

e

Battl

e

ofFatshanCreekandth

ec

aptur

e

ofCantonin1857.In1861,hewonth

e

BeaufortT

e

stimonialforhisfinal

e

xaminationsinnavigationand

w

a

s

appoint

e

dtoth

e

gunn

e

r

y

schoolHMSExcellent.In1863h

e

join

e

dth

e

firstiron

c

ladinthenavy,HMS

Warrior,a

s

gunn

e

r

y

li

e

ut

e

nant.WhenhereturnedtoExcellentin1867,h

e

d

e

velop

e

dhis

interestintorpedoes.Alsoduringthisp

e

riodFi

s

h

e

rmarri

e

dFrancesBroughtonwith

whomhewouldhav

e

fourchildren.In1869,hereturnedtotheChinaStationas

commanderoftheDonegal,beforetransf

e

rringtoHMSOcean

.

In1872,backat

Excellent,h

e

wasputinchargeoftorpedoinstructionandpromotedtocaptainin1874

.

He

wasbackatseain1876incommandofthePalla

s

intheMediterraneanFleetand,in1880,

whentheshipwaspaidoff,heservedasthepresidentofacommitt

e

etorevisethefleet’s

gunnerymanual.April1883sawhimbackatE

x

cellent,thistimetocommandthegunnery

school.In1890,hegainedpromotionasrearadmiralandtookth

e

positionofadmiral-

superintendentofPort

s

mouthDockyard.FisherwasmadeKCBin1894,vi

c

eadmiralin

May1896andwentbacktoseaascommand

e

r

-

in-chiefinNorthAmericaandtheWest

Indies

.

By1899,hehadthepremiercommandinthenavy,commander-in-chi

e

fofthe

MediterraneanFleet,becomingafulladmiralin1901andS

ec

ondS

e

aLordin1902

.

Hi

s

long

-

h

e

ld

a

mbitionwa

s

tob

e

FirstSeaLord,whichheachievedin1904,presidingover

thedreadnoughtbuildingprogrammeandnavalreforms.

In1905,hewaspromotedtoadmiralofthefleetandretiredin1910.Churchillrecalled
himin1914asFirstSeaLord,ashehadhoped,althoughbothofthemwouldlosetheir
positionsin1915overthedisastrousDardanellesandGallipolicampaign.Hethenbecame
chairmanoftheboardofinventionandresearch,whichwasformedtoengenderscientific
workforthenavy.Afterthewar,heworkedontwovolumesofhismemoirs.Hediedof
prostatecanceron10July1920inLondon.

Hipper,Franzvon(1863-1932)

FranzvonHipperwasborninWeilheim,Bavariain1863,andjoinedtheGermanImperial
Navyin1881ascadet.HeservedonthefrigatesNiobeandLeipzigandcommanded
torpedoboatsfrom1888to1903.In1912and1913,heledtheHighSeasFleetScouting
Forcesand,ontheoutbreakofwar,heledhisbattlecruisersonseveralraidsonBritish
coastaltowns.HeplayedmajorrolesintheBattleofDoggerBankand,moreparticularly,
intheBattle

.

ofJutland.HewasknightedbyKingLudwigIIIofBavariaafterJutland

.

In

1918,hewaspromotedtoAdmiralandtookoverfromScheerascommander-in-chiefof
theHighSeasFleet.HehadtheunenviabletaskoforganizingthesurrenderoftheHigh
SeasFleettotheBritishattheendofthewarandretiredfromserviceinNovember1918.
HelivedouttherestofhislifeinOthmarschennearHamburganddiedin1932.

Jellicoe,JohnRushworth,firstEarlJellicoe(1859-1935)

JellicoewasthesecondsonofJohnHenryJellicoe,acaptainintheRoyalMailSteam
PacketCompany,andhiswifeLucyHenrietta.Hewasbornon5December1859in
Southampton.In1872,hejoinedtheNavyasacadetonthetrainingshipHMSBritannia,
passingouttopofhistermin1874.Hisfirstappointmentasmidshipmanwaswiththe
flyingsquadrononthefrigateNewcastle.In1877,hewasappointedtotheAgincourt,
initiallybasedwiththeChannelFleetandthentheMediterraneanFleet.In1880,hewas
promotedandcamehometospecializeingunneryandthefollowingyearhespentanother
spellonAgincourtbeforeattendingtheRoyalNavalCollege,Greenwich.In1884,he
qualifiedasagunnerylieutenantandwasappointedtothestaffofthegunneryschool
Excellent,underJohnFisherwhowouldhaveamajorinfluenceonhiscareer.Hewas
Fisher’spersonalstaffofficerwhenFisherwasflagcaptaintoAdmiralHornbyinthe
BalticFleetin1885and,in1889,whenFisherwasdirectorofnavalordnance,Jellicoe
becamehisassistant.In1891,hewaspromotedtocommanderandbecametheexecutive
officerofthePareilintheMediterraneanFleet,latermovingtotheflagshipVictoria.
WhenhereturnedtoEnglandin1896,hewaspromotedtocaptainandwasappointedto
theordnancecommittee.Hewentbacktoseain1897totheChinaStationinCenturion,
returningtotheAdmiraltyin1902asassistanttotheThirdSeaLord,AdmiralWilliam
May.ThesameyearhemarriedFlorenceGwendolineCayzer.Hecommandedthecruiser
Drakebeforebecomingdirectorofnavalordnancein1904.HewasmadeaCVOinthis
periodforhisworkonthedevelopmentofHMSDreadnoughtand,in1907,becamearear
admiralandwasappointedsecond-

.

in-commandoftheAtlanticFleet.Itwasjustayear

beforehewasbackattheAdmiraltyascontrollerbywhichtimehehadbeenknightedand
createdaKCVO.HewasgivencommandoftheAtlanticFleetin1910,asactingvice
admiral,andthefollowingyearhewassecond-in-commandoftheHomeFleet,before
becomingSecondSeaLordin1912.Whenwarbrokeoutin1914,hewasappointed
commander-in-chiefoftheGrandFleet,whichhereluctantlyleftin1916tobecomeFirst
SeaLord.Afterthewar,hereceivedmanydecorationsathomeandabroad,in

c

luding

beingmadeViscountJellicoeofScapa

,

andtheGVCO

.

Healsowrotehismemoirsofthe

warandwassenttothedominionsasanadvisorfortheirnavies.Hewasreplacedby
BeattyasFirstSeaLordin1919,whentherewascontroversyovertheconductofJutland.
Between1920and1924hewasgovernor-generalofNewZealandandwasmadeanearl
onhisreturn.BackinBritain,heremainedactive,workingfortheLondonCounty
Council,theBoyScouts,theEmpireServiceLeague,theNationalRifleAssociationand
aspresidentoftheBritishLegionuntilhisdeathfrompneumoniaon19November1935

.

Keyes,RogerJohnBrownlow,firstBaronKeyes(1872-1945)

RogerKeyeswasthesecondsonofBrigadierSirCharlesPattonKeyesandKatherine
Jessie.Hewasbornon4October1872atTundianiFortinIndiawherehisfatherwas
commanderofthePunjabfrontierforce.HejoinedthenavyasacadetattheRoyalNaval
College,Dartmouthin1885.In1887,hejoinedHMSRaleighontheAfricastation.He
wasmadesub-lieutenantin1892,servingwiththeChannelFleetonthearmoredcruiser
lmmortalitie,andthenontheroyalyachtVictoriaandAlbert.Hewaspromotedto
lieutenantonthesloopBeagle,servinginSouthAmericabetween1893and1896before
returningtoEngland.Hegainedhisfirstcommandin1897,onthedestroyerOpossumin
theDevonportInstructionalFlotilla,followedin1898withcommandoftheHartonthe
Chinastation.HewasinvolvedinresistingChineseforcesontheKowloonpeninsula,a
cutting-outexpeditionontheBeiheRiverandcampaignsinBeijing.Hewaspromotedto
therankofcommanderinNovember1900,havingalreadyprovedhimselfwillingtotake
onresponsibilityandgainedreputationforusinghisinitiative.From1901

’

-1903,hewas

second-in-commandoftheDevonportDestroyerFlotillabeforeservinginnaval
intelligenceandbecomingthenavalattachétoItalyandAustria-Hungarybetween1905
and1908.Hewaspromotedtocaptainin1905.In1906,hemarriedEvaMarySalvinwith
whomhewouldhavetwosonsandthreedaughters.In1908-10,hecommandedVenus
withtheAtlanticFleetbeforebeingappointedinspectingcaptainofsubmarines,andthen
commodoreinchargeoftheSubmarineServicein1912

.

Hewasstillinthiscommandat

theoutbreakoftheFirstWorldWarandtooktoseaasoftenaspossible.Togetherwith
ReginaldTyrwhitt,hewasinstrumentalintheplanningfortheBattleofHeligoland

.

Bight.

HethenbecamechiefofstafffirstlytoViceAdmiralCarden,whowasincommandofthe
navalforcesofftheDardanelles,andthentodeRobeckwhenhereplacedCarden.He
followeddeRobecktoSalonikawhenanewfrontwasopenedinanefforttosaveSerbia.
InJune1916,hewasgivencommandofthebattleshipCenturioninthe2ndbattle
squadronoftheGrandFleetandpromotedtorearadmiralin1917.Hethenbecame
second-in-commandinthe4thbattlesquadrononColossus.Hewasappointeddirectorof
plansattheAdmiraltyinSeptember1917.HewascreatedaKCBforhispartintheplans
fortheraidonZeebruggeandOstend

.

AttheendofthewarhewascreatedaKCVOand

madeabaronetin1919.Keyestookcommandofthebattlecruisersquadronbetween1919
and1921beforebecomingthedeputychiefofnavalstaffand,in1925,commander-in-
chiefoftheMediterraneanstation.Hislastappointmentcamein1929ascommander-in-
chief,Portsmouth,duringwhichperiod,in1930,hewasmadeAdmiraloftheFleet.He
was,however,disappointednottobeappointedasFirstSeaLord.Inretirement,he
becameaConservativeMPfrom1934until1943whenhewas

-

madeapeer.Healsowrote

accessibleaccountsofhisactionintheFirstWorldWar.DuringtheSecondWorldWar,
ChurchillappointedKeyesasdirectorofcombinedoperationsin1940.Itwasadifficult
timeforhimwithmanyofhisplansrejectedanddeterioratingrelationshipswithchiefsof
staffand,in1941,hewasreplaced.Nevertheless,hewasmadeabaronin1943andtook
diplomaticmissionstotheUSA,AustraliaandNewZealand.Hediedathomein
Buckinghamshireon26December1945andwasrememberedasamanofactionand
spirit.

Scheer,AdmiralReinhardt(1863

-

1928)

ScheerwasborninObernkirchen,Hanoverin1863andenteredtheGermannavyin1879.
Inthe1890s,hegainedareputationasatorpedospecialistandhewaspromotedtothe
rankofcaptainin1907.HemarriedEmilieMohrin1899,whowasmurderedduringan
attemptedrobberyoftheirhomein1920.In1910,hewasappointedchiefofstafftothe
HighSeasFleet,becomingcommanderoftheSecondBattleSquadronin1913.Hewasa
strategistintheuseofsubmarinewarfareandplannedmanyofthesubmarineraidsonthe
EnglishcoastlineduringWorldWarOne.HewasmadecommanderoftheHighSeasFleet
in1916andplayedaprominentpartintheBattleofJutland.InAugust1918,Scheer
becameheadoftheNavalSupremeCommandandplannedalastditchattemptonthe
GrandFleetbutthenavysawthisassuicidalanditpromptedmutiny.Theplancameto
nothing.TheKaiserremovedhimfromofficeinNovember1918andheretiredamonth
later.AfterthewarhepublishedhismemoirsoftheHighSeasFleet.Hediedin
Marktredwitzon26November1928.

Spee,AdmiralMaximilianvon(1861-1914)

MaximilianvonSpeewasborninCopenhagenandjoinedtheImperialGermanNavyin
1878.In1887hewasappointedincommandoftheportsintheGermancolonyof
Cameroonandservedthereuntil1888beforeworkinginweaponsdevelopment.In1908,
hebecamechiefofstafffortheNorthSeaandwaspromotedtorearadmiralin1910.In
1912,SpeebecamecommanderoftheEastAsianSquadronand,fromthemomentwar
brokeout,terrorizedBritishmerchantvesselsinthearea.Healsoplayedaprominentrole
intheBattleofCoronelandtheBattleoftheFalklandIslands.AttheBattleofthe
FalklandsSpec‘sflagshipScharnhorstwassunkandhewaskilled.

Tirpitz,AdmiralAlfredvan(1849-1930)

TirpitzwasthesonofacivilservantandjoinedthePrussianNavyin1865,receivinghis
firstcommissionin1869.Hebecameinterestedinthepotentialofthesubmarinein
warfarewhenheservedasthecommanderofatorpedoflotillaandhesubsequently
becameinspectorgeneralofthetorpedofleet.In1895,hewaspromotedtoRearAdmiral
andservedfirstlyinEastAsiawithacruisersquadronfrom1896,beforebecoming
SecretaryofStateoftheImperialNavyDepartmentthefollowingyear.Tirpitzsharedthe
Kaiser’svisionforamuchlargerGermanfleetandtheyworkedcloselytogether.Tirpitz
waslargelyresponsiblefortheFirstFleetActin1898whichlegislatedforthe
reorganizationandconsiderableexpansionofthenavy.Itwasfollowed,in1900,by
anotheractthatwasmuchmoreambitious,givingthescopetobuildafleetthatwouldbe
amatchfortheRoyalNavy.In1911,hewasmadeGrandAdmiralandbecame
CommanderoftheGermanNavywhenwarbrokeoutin1914.Hewasverymuchinfavor
ofunrestrictedsubmarinewarfare,whichstraineddiplomaticrelationswithAmerica.
Whenthisledtolimitedsubmarinewarfare,Tirpitzresignedin1916,althoughhewas
surprisedthattheKaiseracceptedhisresignation.Afterthewar,hebecameleaderofthe
right-wingFatherlandPartyandwasaDeputyintheReichstagfrom1924to1928.He
diedinEbenhausennearMunichin1930.

Tyrwhitt,SirReginaldYorke(1870-1951)

Tyrwhittwasbornon10May1870,thefifthsonofReverendRichardStJohnTyrwhitt
andthefourthwithhissecondwifeCaroline.Hestartedasanavalcadet,joiningBritannia
inDartmouthin1883.HesubsequentlyservedontheAustraliaandAjax,gaining
promotiontolieutenantin1892,whenhewasappointedtothelightcruiserCleopatra
stationedinNorthAmerica.In1896,hewasgivencommandoftheHart,anearly
destroyerand,atthe

e

ndofthatyear;hebecame1stlieutenantonth

eco

mmand

e

r-in-

chief

’

syachtontheMediterraneanb

e

for

e

t

a

kingupa

s

imilarpositioninNorthAmerica

.

In1903

,

hemar

rie

dSarahCorball

y

withwhomhewouldha

ve

on

eso

n

a

ndtwodaughters.

Alsoin1903hegainedpromotiont

oco

mmand

e

randwascommissionedtoAurora,a

t

e

nd

e

rb

oa

tt

o

th

e

Britannia

.

Hewentontocommandthed

e

stro

ye

rWaven

ey

in1904-5

andtwoscoutvessels

A

tt

e

nti

ve

andSkirmisherin1906and1907respectively

.

H

ew

as

mad

ec

aptainin1908andtookcommandofthed

e

stro

ye

rTopa

z

efortwoyearsbefore

beingmadeflag

c

aptainund

e

rSirDouglasGambleontheMediterran

e

anstation

,

firston

th

e

Ba

c

chanteandthenonGoodHope

.

In1912,her

e

turn

e

dtoBritaintocaptainthe

s

e

condd

es

tr

oyer

fl

o

tillaofth

e

HomeFleetandwaspromotedto

co

mmod

o

r

ei

n1914,in

c

harg

e

ofalldestroyersquadrons.F

o

rth

e

durat

io

n

o

fth

e

Fir

s

tWorldWar,Tyrwhittwas

ba

se

dwithth

e

Harwi

c

hForceandwasmaderear

admiral

i

n1

9

18

.

H

e

wasahighly

effectivewarleaderandjointlyplann

e

dth

eac

ti

o

natH

e

li

g

olandBightwithRogerK

eye

s.

Aft

e

rth

eac

tion,h

e

wa

s

cr

e

atedCBandlater,in1917,KCB.In1

9

16

,

h

ew

a

s

al

so

a

w

arded

aDSO.A

s

wella

s

b

e

inga

s

p

ec

iali

s

t

w

ithd

es

tro

ye

r

s

,hewasalsok

ee

nonth

e

u

seo

f

ai

rc

raft

wi

thinth

e

navyandprovidedth

ec

ov

e

rforth

ese

aplan

e

raidon

ze

pp

e

lin

s

h

e

dsat

theendof1914.H

e

wasinvolv

e

dwithth

e

a

c

tionatDoggerBankandmany

o

th

ersmal

l

er

sca

l

eo

p

e

r

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.

Chronology

1914

4August

Britainde

c

lareswaronGermany.

GoebenandBreslaubombardtheFrenchAlgerianportsofBoneandPhilippeville.

AdmiralJellicoetakesoverasCommander-in-ChiefoftheGrandFleet.

28August

TheBattleofHeligolandBight.

30October

FisherreturnsasFirstSeaLord.

1November

TheBattleofCoronel.

3November

BritishandFrenchbombardtheDardanelles.GermansbombardGreatYarmouthand
Gorleston.

8December

TheBattleoftheFalklands.

1915

24January

TheBattleofDoggerBank.

18February

BritishwatersdeclaredasanunrestrictedwarzonebyGermany.

19February

BritishandFrenchbeginbombardmentofDardanellesforts.

18March BritishandFrenchentertheDardanelles.

7May

LusitaniasunkbyaU-boat.

17May

FisherresignsasFirstSeaLord.

28May

AdmiralSirHenryJacksonbecomesFirstSeaLord.

19December

EvacuationfromGallipolibegins,endingon9January1916.

1916

23February

GermansubmarinecampaignresumedinBritishwaters.

1May

SubmarinecampaignextendedtothewesternAtlantic.

31May

TheBattleofJutland. 26October RaidontheDoverbarrage.

1917

11March

BritishforcestakeBaghdad.

4May

FirstAmericannavalvesselsarriveatQueenstowntoassistconvoys.

26November

OfficialformationoftheWRNS.

1918

1April

FoundingoftheRAF.

12April

GrandFleetmovesbasetoRosyth.

23April

BritishattackZeebruggeandOstend.

19July

AirattackonTondern.

21October

Submarinecampaignoncommercestops.

11November

Armistice.

1919

21

Jun

e

Ger

manfleetscuttlesits

e

lfatS

c

apaFlow

.