American Sociological Review
http://asr.sagepub.com/content/75/1/101
The online version of this article can be found at:
DOI: 10.1177/0003122409357047
2010 75: 101
American Sociological Review
Suzanne C. Eichenlaub, Stewart E. Tolnay and J. Trent Alexander
Moving Out but Not Up : Economic Outcomes in the Great Migration
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Moving Out but Not Up:
Economic Outcomes in the
Great Migration
Suzanne C. Eichenlaub,
a
Stewart E. Tolnay,
a
and
J. Trent Alexander
b
Abstract
The migration of millions of southerners out of the South between 1910 and 1970 is largely
attributed to economic and social push factors in the South, combined with pull factors in
other regions of the country. Researchers generally find that participants in this migration
were positively selected from their region of origin, in terms of educational attainment and
urban status, and that they fared relatively well in their destinations. To fully measure the
migrants’ success, however, a comparison with those who remained in the South is neces-
sary. This article uses data from the U.S. Census to compare migrants who left the South
with their southern contemporaries who stayed behind, both those who moved within the
South and the sedentary population. The findings indicate that migrants who left the
South did not benefit appreciably in terms of employment status, income, or occupational
status. In fact, inter-regional migrants often fared worse than did southerners who moved
within the South or those who remained sedentary. These results contradict conventional
wisdom regarding the benefits of exiting the South and suggest the need for a revisionist
interpretation of the experiences of those who left.
Keywords
Great Migration, migration outcomes
The Great Migration
1
was one of the most
significant demographic events in U.S. his-
tory. Between 1910 and 1970, millions of
southerners left the South in search of better
circumstances and opportunities. At the turn
of the twentieth century, poor economic con-
ditions in the South for both blacks and
whites, along with oppressive social condi-
tions for blacks, served as a substantial
incentive for many to flee the South. At the
same time, other regions of the country, espe-
cially the Northeast and the Midwest, were
experiencing economic growth that consider-
ably expanded the employment opportunities
in those regions. Until World War I, immi-
grant labor from Europe filled many low-
wage, low- and unskilled jobs in the booming
industrial economy of the North.
2
When the
flow of European immigrants was sharply
curtailed, initially as a result of the war in
a
University of Washington
b
University of Minnesota
Corresponding Author:
Suzanne C. Eichenlaub, Department of Sociology,
Box 353340, University of Washington, Seattle,
WA 98195, USA
E-mail: eich@u.washington.edu
American Sociological Review
75(1) 101–125
Ó American Sociological
Association 2010
DOI: 10.1177/0003122409357047
http://asr.sagepub.com
Europe and later because of restrictive U.S.
immigration policies, northern employers’
search for inexpensive workers turned to
the southern United States (Collins 1997).
This created a strong economic incentive
for frustrated and ambitious southerners to
head north. The Great Migration that ensued
saw a massive exodus that effectively redis-
tributed a large proportion of the southern-
born population across the country.
Consistent with its significance as a defining
American demographic phenomenon, the
Great Migration has received a good deal of
attention from social scientists. One group of
scholars describes and interprets the many
ways in which the Great Migration, especially
the resulting growth of black communities in
large metropolitan areas, transformed northern
and western institutions, culture, and led to
increasing residential segregation in virtually
every major urban area (e.g., Boustan forth-
coming; Cutler, Glaeser, and Vigdor 1999;
Gregory
1989,
2005;
Lemann
1991;
Lieberson 1980; Massey and Denton 1993;
Philpott 1978; Wilson 1978, 1987). Others
focus primarily on the migrants’ socioeco-
nomic characteristics and how they fared eco-
nomically after leaving the South (e.g.,
Gregory 1995; Lieberson 1978b; Lieberson
and Wilkinson 1976; Long 1974; Long and
Heltman 1975; Tolnay 1997, 1998b; Tolnay
and Crowder 1999; Tolnay, Crowder, and
Alderman 2000, 2002; Tolnay and Eichenlaub
2006; Wilson 2001). The evidence suggests
that migrants who left the South tended to be
positively selected compared with those who
remained behind (Alexander 1998; Lieberson
1978a, 1980; Marks 1989; Tolnay 1998a;
Vigdor 2002). Furthermore, research docu-
ments a generally successful experience for
southern migrants in the non-South relative to
their northern-born neighbors, at least for
blacks. Despite the important contributions by
these previous efforts to understand the
macro-level
consequences
of
the
Great
Migration and the outcomes for participants
in this watershed sociodemographic event, no
study systematically explores whether leaving
the South was associated with improved cir-
cumstances for the migrants. In this article,
we examine whether southerners who left the
South benefited economically as a result of
migration by comparing them with their coun-
terparts who remained in Dixie.
BACKGROUND AND THEORY
The Great Migration
There were ample reasons to flee the South
during the early decades of the twentieth
century. The agricultural system that domi-
nated the southern economy had long pro-
duced
little
profit
and
considerable
hardship for many whites and blacks. At
the same time, retarded industrial develop-
ment in the region restricted the nonagricul-
tural employment possibilities available to
southern
workers
(Daniel
1972;
Kirby
1987; Mandle 1978; Newby 1989; Raper
1936; Raper and Reid 1941; Woofter and
Winston 1939). In addition to poor eco-
nomic prospects, blacks were also motivated
to escape the South’s oppressive social con-
ditions. The Jim Crow South provided
blacks with limited educational and occupa-
tional opportunities and virtually no politi-
cal voice (Anderson 1988; Kousser 1974;
Margo 1990; Woodward 1966). Racially
segregated and substantially inferior facili-
ties and institutions were constant reminders
of blacks’ subordinate status in southern
society. Racial violence also played a role
in encouraging out-migration from the
South in the early years of the Great
Migration (Tolnay and Beck 1992). By con-
trast, economic opportunities in the indus-
trial Northeast and Midwest held great
attraction for struggling southerners. With
the beginning of World War I, which saw
a demand for accelerated war-related indus-
trial production and a cessation of massive
European immigration, northern employers
began seeking inexpensive labor, both black
and white, from southern states (Collins
102
American Sociological Review 75(1)
1997). In addition, southern blacks’ percep-
tions of a more benign racial climate in the
North served as a powerful attraction.
In the early years of the Great Migration,
the primary migration streams out of the
South were directed to the Northeast and the
Midwest, following established transportation
routes and exploiting networks created by the
earlier migration of friends and family mem-
bers. Although a considerable proportion of
whites headed to the West from the beginning,
it was not until mid-century that blacks began
selecting western destinations, when the
booming West Coast defense industry at-
tracted black and white workers from all
over the country (Tolnay et al. 2005). In addi-
tion to migrating between regions, many
southerners moved within the South in search
of better opportunities. Especially during the
early decades of the Great Migration, there
were limited opportunities for nonagricultural
employment (e.g., mills and mines), but such
industrial opportunities did grow over time.
In addition, many mobile southerners moved
from rural areas to small southern towns and
cities in search of economic and social oppor-
tunities. Of course, many opted not to move at
all (Falk 2004).
The early and persistent images of partic-
ipants in the Great Migration were over-
whelmingly negative (Berry 2000; Drake
and Cayton 1962; Frazier 1932; Gregory
1989). This was especially true for black
migrants who were commonly portrayed as
illiterate, displaced sharecroppers, but it
was also the case for white migrants, who
became
known
as
‘‘hillbillies’’
and
‘‘Okies.’’ These images, however, did not
accurately describe all migrants, who were
a rather heterogeneous group. In fact,
many black migrants came from southern
towns and cities, not from farms, as was typ-
ically depicted (Alexander 1998; Marks
1989). Furthermore, migrants tended to be
more educated than the southerners they
left behind (Hamilton 1959; Lieberson
1978a;
Tolnay
1998a;
Vigdor
2002).
Tolnay (1998a), for example, finds that
black migrants were more likely to be liter-
ate than were nonmigratory southerners in
the early years of the Great Migration. In
later years, when the census reported years
of schooling, black migrants had signifi-
cantly higher educational attainment than
did nonmigrant southerners. Despite the
positive
selection,
and
consistent
with
migration theory (e.g., Lee 1966), migrants
were less likely to be literate and had fewer
years of schooling than did their black coun-
terparts in their northern and western desti-
nations (Tolnay 1998a).
Contrary to claims supported largely by
ethnographic
evidence
(e.g.,
Drake
and
Cayton 1962; Frazier 1932, 1939), more
recent researchers generally find that partici-
pants in the Great Migration fared relatively
well
in
their
non-southern
destinations,
despite a sometimes unfriendly welcoming.
Black migrants, who were relegated to the
lowest rungs of the occupational ladder, actu-
ally fared better than the northern-born black
population in many ways. Black migrants
were more likely to be employed and enjoyed
higher incomes than did northern-born blacks
(Lieberson 1978b; Lieberson and Wilkinson
1976; Long and Heltman 1975), and they
were less likely to receive public assistance
(Long 1974). The southern migrant advantage
for blacks in the North also extended to family
patterns, with lower levels of family disrup-
tion and higher percentages of children living
with two parents (Tolnay 1997, 1998b;
Tolnay and Crowder 1999; Wilson 2001).
For white southern migrants in the non-
South, it is more accurate to say that they
fared no worse, or not much worse, than their
northern-born
counterparts
(Berry
2000;
Gregory 1995).
What If They Had Never Left?
An important assumption, stated or implicit,
of much previous research is that participants
in the Great Migration fared better, socially
and economically, in their non-southern
Eichenlaub et al.
103
destinations than they would have if they had
remained in the South. This is considered
especially true for black migrants, for whom
the non-South offered a more congenial, if
not ideal, social climate, with greater social
and political freedoms and a reduced risk of
racially motivated violence. This assumption,
however, has not been examined empirically.
To determine the extent to which southern mi-
grants benefited from leaving the South, we
need to know what would have happened to
them if they had remained in their home
region. While it is obviously impossible to
know the outcomes of choices that were not
made, we use a comparative approach to
approximate as closely as possible the hypo-
thetical experiences of southern migrants had
they not exited the region. Specifically, we
compare the migrants with their contempora-
ries who chose to remain in the South—both
those who migrated internally within the
region and those who were ‘‘sedentary.’’
3
To be sure, this is a complex issue, given
the variety of migrants’ experiences and the
multidimensional outcomes that might be
used to measure whether moving to the
North was ‘‘worth it.’’ To limit the scope of
our investigation, we use a relatively narrow
set of outcomes that is primarily economic
in nature—employment status, earnings, and
occupational prestige. Migration theory and
evidence from prior research can be used to
support competing predictions about the rela-
tive economic success of the southerners who
moved north. We refer to these as the ‘‘con-
ventional view’’ and a ‘‘revisionist view.’’
The conventional view. The widely
shared assumption that southern migrants
benefited economically by moving to the
North is consistent with the rational deci-
sion-making process fundamental to much
migration theory. Because migrants decide
to move in an effort to maximize their eco-
nomic security and social comfort, they
should fare better than their counterparts
from the same area who stay behind.
According to Lee (1966), for example,
prospective migrants weigh the attributes at
their place of origin, along with the expected
opportunities at potential destinations, against
the cost of moving. Migrants are motivated by
the balance of push factors in their place of
origin and pull factors in potential destina-
tions. Both economic and social conditions
are important in migrants’ decision-making
process. Furthermore, Lee claims that mi-
grants will be positively selected from their
place of origin, especially those who are re-
sponding to pull factors, but that they will
have lower levels of human and social capital
than will the population they join in their des-
tination. As a result, migrants’ characteristics
(e.g., their economic well-being) should fall
between those of the population at origin
and the population at destination. Other,
more macro-level theories of migration, such
as those based on regional wage differentials,
also assume instrumental motives for popula-
tion movements. Such theories suggest that
inter-regional migrants to a higher-wage area
should enjoy greater economic success than
would the sedentary population remaining in
the lower-wage area from which they moved.
The well-documented, positive educational
selection of inter-regional migrants from the
South is also consistent with the conventional
view that migrants should have fared better in
the North than did their sedentary counterparts
in the South (Hamilton 1959; Lieberson
1978a;
Tolnay
1998a;
Vigdor
2002).
Similarly, the consistent findings that black
southern migrants in the North actually en-
joyed higher levels of employment, higher
wages, lower levels of poverty, lower levels
of public assistance, and more stable families
than did their northern-born neighbors, all
suggest the economic benefits of inter-
regional mobility during the Great Migration
(Lieberson 1978b; Lieberson and Wilkinson
1976; Long 1974; Long and Heltman 1975;
Tolnay 1997, 1998b; Tolnay and Crowder
1999; Wilson 2001).
The conventional view of the benefits of
inter-regional mobility during the Great
Migration
is
also
consistent
with
the
104
American Sociological Review 75(1)
substantial regional variation in economic
conditions that prevailed throughout the first
three quarters of the twentieth century.
Regional income differentials are one indica-
tor of these differences. Figure 1 illustrates
regional income per capita at four time points
between 1920 and 1980, as a percentage of the
average U.S. per-capita income. This time
period encompasses most of the Great
Migration. Two important facts can be
gleaned from Figure 1. First, in all four time
periods, income was lower in the South than
in all other regions. Second, the southern
income disadvantage declined substantially
over time, especially after 1940. For example,
in 1940, per-capita income in the South was
only 67 percent of the U.S. average; by
1980, southern incomes had risen to 96 per-
cent of the national average. Despite the con-
vergence over time, there were still notable
differences in income levels in 1980, espe-
cially between the South and the West. The
existence of these regional wage differentials
alone would suggest that southerners who
left the region enjoyed higher incomes than
those who remained in the South—especially
prior to 1960. The substantial attenuation of
the differential, however, hints that the wage
advantage for southern migrants to the North
may have declined over time.
A revisionist view. It is possible that the
economic benefits from exiting the South
were neither as great, nor as universal, as
the conventional view suggests. An alterna-
tive framework, which we refer to as a ‘‘revi-
sionist view,’’ can be constructed from
migration theory and prior research that de-
scribes
possible
impacts
of
the
Great
Migration on opportunity structures in the
South and other regions.
As mentioned earlier, the neoclassical
economic theory of migration, which in-
cludes the influence of inter-regional wage
differentials on population redistribution,
suggests that, on average, migrants improve
their economic standing by moving from
low-wage to high-wage areas. However,
Todaro (1969; Harris and Todaro 1970)
notes that rural-to-urban migrants in the
60
70
80
90
100
110
120
130
1920
1940
1960
1980
Northeast
Midwest
South
West
Figure 1. Price Adjusted Income per Worker Relative to U.S. Average (U.S. average 5 100)
Source: Mitchener and McLean (1999:1019).
Eichenlaub et al.
105
less-developed world may actually experi-
ence a temporary decline in incomes as
they settle into their new destinations.
Such migrants are willing to tolerate this
short-term economic sacrifice as long as
they have a reasonable potential for ulti-
mately moving into better occupational po-
sitions with higher incomes (White and
Lindstrom
2005).
Important
parallels
between the Great Migration in the United
States and internal migration in the less-
developed world (e.g., the importance of
rural-to-urban movement and geographic
variation in employment opportunities and
incomes) suggest that short-term economic
sacrifices might have been required of
South-to-North migrants.
As the Great Migration progressed, both
the South and the North experienced important
changes that could have influenced the degree
to which inter-regional migrants benefited
from leaving the South. Some of these changes
can be linked directly to the Great Migration’s
demographic impact on both regions. Other
changes were less directly connected to the
Great Migration, if they were related at all.
The sheer magnitude of the regional redistri-
bution of population that resulted from the
Great Migration raises the possibility that it
affected local labor markets and wage rates.
For example, as the South lost more and more
of its labor force to out-migration, southern em-
ployers may have raised wages in an effort to
retain workers (Boustan 2009; Parr 1966), sup-
ported the expansion of educational opportuni-
ties (Margo 1991), or encouraged better
treatment of blacks (Margo 1991; Tolnay and
Beck 1992; Vigdor 2006). As a result of
improving economic and social conditions in
the South, partially triggered by the Great
Migration itself, any advantage enjoyed by
inter-regional migrants to the non-South may
have decreased over time. The convergence
of inter-regional wage differentials shown in
Figure 1 is consistent with this possibility.
Within the North, the accumulation of
southern-born migrants over time increased
the supply of workers and may have created
a downward pressure on employment and
wages (Boustan 2009; Boustan, Fishback,
and Kantor 2007; Massey 1990; Vigdor
2006). As a result, later migrants from the
South may have enjoyed a less favorable eco-
nomic opportunity structure than did their fel-
low southerners who preceded them and,
therefore, might have benefited less from leav-
ing the South. Furthermore, the population
changes produced by the Great Migration in
the North likely contributed to other major
transformations, such as ‘‘white flight’’ from
central cities to suburbs (Boustan forthcom-
ing) and the economic decline of inner cities
(Kasarda 1985, 1989), both of which had an
especially deleterious impact on northern
blacks’ economic well-being (Massey and
Denton 1993; Wilson 1987).
4
The rapid growth of the southern-born
population in the North also expanded the
social networks and contacts that newly
arrived migrants in the North, as well as
potential migrants still in the South, could
rely
on
for
information
and
support.
Migration research and theory emphasizes
the importance of family and friendship
networks
for
international
migration
(Massey
1990;
White
and
Lindstrom
2005), but the same processes operate for
internal migration as well (Tilly 1968). By
reducing the cost and difficulty of inter-
regional relocation, strengthened social net-
works could have reduced the selectivity of
migrants from the South. This is certainly
consistent with previous research findings
indicating that the positive educational
selection of migrants from the South
declined over time during the twentieth
century (Tolnay 1998a). On the one hand,
by helping migrants adapt to their new loca-
tions, stronger networks could have led to
more favorable post-migration outcomes.
On the other hand, stronger networks of
family and friends, by weakening the
migrant selection process, may have con-
tributed to worse post-migration outcomes.
To be sure, these conflicting perspectives
could be used to support substantially
106
American Sociological Review 75(1)
different
predictions
about
the
relative
economic well-being of southern migrants
in
the
North
versus
southerners
who
remained in the South. Yet, by distinguishing
between short- and long-term comparisons of
migrants who left the region and those who
stayed in the South, and by taking time
period into consideration, we believe that
the conventional and revisionist views can
be combined to yield a coherent set of gen-
eral hypotheses faithful to both migration
theory and our current understanding of the
Great Migration. First, other things being
equal, we expect to find that southern mi-
grants enjoyed an economic advantage over
southerners who remained in their home
region. Second, among southerners who did
not leave the region, those who migrated
within the South should compare more favor-
ably with the inter-regional migrants than
will those who did not migrate. Third, the
long-term benefits of migration should be
greater than the short-term benefits. Fourth,
because of changing social and economic
conditions in the North and South, some of
which resulted directly or indirectly from
the Great Migration, we expect the economic
benefits of inter-regional migration to have
been greater during the earlier stages of the
Great Migration than near its culmination.
DATA, VARIABLES, METHOD
Data
Data for this study come from the public use
microdata samples (PUMS) of the decennial
U.S. population censuses (Ruggles et al.
2004) for 1940, 1950, 1970, and 1980.
5
Using
data from these years, we compare economic
outcomes across three groups of southern-
born males: (1) South-to-North/West inter-
regional migrants, (2) southern intra-regional
migrants (i.e., those who moved across state
lines within the South), and (3) the sedentary
southern population. We use the 1940 and
1970 files to examine the short-term benefits
of migration for recent migrants (i.e., migrants
who moved within a five-year period preceding
the census). These samples are restricted to
southern-born white and black males who
were 25 to 60 years old
6
at the time of enumer-
ation and were living in the South five years
before the census. We use the 1950 and 1980
PUMS data to estimate long-term benefits of
migration. For the latter analysis, we restrict
our samples to southern-born white and black
males who were 35 to 60 years old and living
in their state of enumeration five years before
the census for 1980, or one year before the cen-
sus for 1950.
7
This sample provides a rough
approximation of the long-term benefits for
the migrants in our primary analyses for 1940
and 1970. For all years, we exclude individuals
who reported that they were currently enrolled
in school or serving in the military. For the pur-
poses of the analyses, we define the South as the
11 states of the confederacy, plus Kentucky and
Oklahoma. We use the census definitions for
the West, Northeast, and Midwest regions,
which we collapse into one region that we refer
to as the North. In addition to the states that fall
into the census definition of Northeast and
Midwest, we include Delaware, Maryland,
Washington, DC, and West Virginia, which
the census defines as southern, in our North
category.
8
Our analyses are limited to men only.
While women played an important role in
the decision to migrate, their migration behav-
iors were often tied to those of their husbands.
Recent research indicates that during the Great
Migration, women’s outcomes were shaped by
marital status and, for married women, related
to their husbands’ outcomes (White et al.
2005). Given the importance of ‘‘tied migra-
tion’’ to women’s mobility experiences, espe-
cially before 1970, a useful exploration of the
economic
benefits
following
the
inter-
regional migration of southern women would
require its own thorough investigation.
Variables
Dependent variables. We use four depen-
dent variables to measure the economic and
Eichenlaub et al.
107
occupational benefit of migration in this anal-
ysis: employment status, income, relative
income, and occupational status. Employment
status is a dichotomous variable that distin-
guishes those who reported being in the labor
force and employed from those who reported
being in the labor force and unemployed dur-
ing the week prior to census enumeration.
9
The second dependent variable is absolute
income. For 1940, this variable includes
income from wages, salaries, cash bonuses,
tips, and other money from a respondent’s
employer during the preceding calendar
year. For 1950, 1970, and 1980, we add
income from personal business and farm
activity to the original income variable.
10
To account for regional variation in income
and cost of living, the third dependent vari-
able is an alternative measure of income.
We measure relative income as the differ-
ence between individuals’ reported income
and the state-level median value of income
for males of their own race (black or white).
Positive values on this variable indicate that
a respondent earned an income higher than
his race’s median income in that state.
Negative values indicate that a respondent’s
reported income was lower than his race’s
median income in that state.
11
The fourth
dependent variable is occupational status, as
measured by the Duncan Socioeconomic
Index (SEI), which assigns a prestige score
for occupations based on the income and
educational attainment associated with par-
ticular occupations in 1950 (Duncan 1961).
Scores range from 3 to 96, with higher scores
representing occupations with greater levels
of prestige. Using a variety of economic out-
come measures, rather than a single indica-
tor, allows us to more thoroughly explore
the relative advantage or disadvantage expe-
rienced by individuals who left the South
during the Great Migration.
Independent variables. The key inde-
pendent variables describe an individual’s
migration history. For the analysis of short-
term benefits of migration in 1940 and
1970, we identify two groups of inter-
regional migrants—individuals who moved
from a southern state to the North or
Midwest, migrants to the North, and those
who moved from a southern state to the
West, migrants to the West. Among individ-
uals who remained in the South, we differen-
tiate migrants within the South, who moved
between southern states between 1935 and
1940 or between 1965 and 1970, from seden-
tary southerners, who remained in the same
state during the same five-year intervals.
12
For the analysis examining long-term out-
comes of migration in 1950 and 1980, we
use a different measure of migration history.
All men in this analysis are southern-born,
but we limit our sample to those who were liv-
ing in their state of enumeration one year prior
to the census in 1950 and five years prior to the
census in 1980. For example, a southern-born
man who was enumerated in New York in
1950 and also lived in New York in 1949
would be included in the migrant to the
North group. If this man lived in any state
other than New York in 1949, southern or oth-
erwise, he would not be included in the analy-
sis. We use this same approach to define
migrants within the South and migrants to
the West. Sedentary southerners, for this anal-
ysis, are identified as those who were living in
their state of birth at the time of enumeration
and at the prior time point (i.e., one year earlier
for the 1950 census and five years earlier for
the 1980 census). Men who moved across state
boundaries between 1949 and 1950 or
between 1975 and 1980 are excluded from
the analysis. Throughout the article, migrants
within the South serves as the reference cate-
gory. In supplementary analyses, we shifted
the reference category to sedentary southern-
ers to test for the significance of differences
between this group and inter-regional mi-
grants. Although we do not present full results
from the auxiliary analyses here, we use these
results to denote the statistical significance of
differences between groups in the tables.
In addition to these key independent
variables, we include a limited number of
108
American Sociological Review 75(1)
control variables in the analyses to avoid
drawing incorrect conclusions that reflect
compositional differences among the vari-
ous groups. That is, these variables may
affect economic outcomes for migrants
while also varying by migration history.
We include six control variables in models
examining both short-term (in 1940 and
1970) and long-term (in 1950 and 1980)
outcomes for migrants. To account for
a possible curvilinear effect of age on eco-
nomic outcomes, we include both age
(in years) and its square, age
2
. We also con-
trol for the effect of co-residing with
a spouse, which may reflect greater family
obligations or the possibility of a positive
selection into marriage. Unmarried men
and married men who were not living with
their
spouse
serve
as
the
referent.
Education, as measured by years of school-
ing completed, is an important predictor of
economic outcomes and is also included in
the
models.
13
Finally,
we
distinguish
between individuals who were residing in
metropolitan areas at the time of enumera-
tion and those who were not (the reference
group), as well as those who were living
on a farm at the time of enumeration versus
those who were not (the reference group).
In addition to these six variables, in our
models predicting relative income, we
include a seventh covariate, race-specific
state median income, to control for the
absolute level of income for each state.
Method
The primary focus of our study is the compar-
ison of economic outcomes between those
who left the South and those who remained
behind. We use binary logistic regression for
our models predicting employment status,
a dichotomous measure. For models predict-
ing income, relative income, and occupational
status, all continuous variables, we use ordi-
nary least squares regression. For both meas-
ures of income, we limit our analysis to
respondents who reported a non-zero income
for the year prior to the census. For SEI, we
limit our analysis to respondents who were
in the labor force and reported an SEI score,
whether or not they were employed at the
time of enumeration.
FINDINGS
Short-Term Benefits of Migration
for Recent Migrants
The bivariate relationships between migra-
tion history and post-migration economic
outcomes are described in Table A1 of the
Appendix. Because they are more appropri-
ate for answering our central research ques-
tions, we move directly to the results from
our multivariate analyses to determine the
net differences by migration history in eco-
nomic outcomes.
1940. Table 1 presents the findings from
our analysis of all post-migration dependent
variables for both blacks and whites in
1940. Results from the analysis of economic
outcomes for blacks are displayed on the left-
hand side of the table. For current employ-
ment status, we find that migrants to the
West were less likely to have been employed
the week prior to census enumeration than
were migrants within the South and seden-
tary southerners. Migrants to the North
were no more likely to have been employed
than were migrants within the South, and
they were significantly less likely to have
been employed when compared with seden-
tary southerners.
Turning to the evidence for income differ-
entials, we find that despite a large regional
variation in income in 1940 (see Figure 1),
black migrants to the West did not enjoy an
income advantage over blacks who moved
within the South during the same time period
or over sedentary southerners. Migrants to
the North, by contrast, reported significantly
higher incomes than both groups who re-
mained in the South, consistent with the evi-
dence reported in Figure 1.
Eichenlaub et al.
109
Table
1.
Results
from
Regression
Analysis
of
Selected
Economic
Characteristics
for
Southern-Born
Males,
Age
25
to
60
Years,
1940
Blacks
Whites
Employment
Status
Income
Relative
Income
SEI
Employment
Status
Income
Relative
Income
SEI
Migrants
to
West
–.44
*
z
21.93
–153.88
*
z
–3.90
z
–.92
*
z
–228.18
*
z
–379.96
*
z
–10.60
*
z
(.20)
(59.03)
(58.37)
(1.96)
(.11)
(54.10)
(95.41)
(1.11)
Migrants
to
North
–.34
z
113.33
*
z
–91.58
–.69
–.34
z
–22.64
–175.64
*
–4.71
*
z
(.24)
(34.55)
(69.61)
(1.04)
(.18)
(63.99)
(74.52)
(1.03)
Sedentary
Southerners
.07
–22.67
–15.92
–.13
.06
–92.20
*
–93.12
*
–.61
(.18)
(21.29)
(22.26)
(.65)
(.09)
(21.68)
(22.62)
(.50)
Age
.07
*
17.59
*
17.87
*
.44
*
.04
*
82.96
*
82.91
*
.99
*
(.02)
(2.25)
(2.10)
(.08)
(.01)
(7.15)
(7.00)
(.06)
Age
2
–.00
*
–.19
*
–.19
*
–.00
*
–.00
*
–.84
*
–.84
*
–.01
*
(.00)
(.03)
(.03)
(.00)
(.00)
(.09)
(.09)
(.00)
Married
1.03
*
63.60
*
67.48
*
.34
1.29
*
225.18
*
230.01
*
.80
*
(.06)
(8.11)
(7.71)
(.19)
(.04)
(14.25)
(14.53)
(.22)
Education
.06
*
18.65
*
18.48
*
1.13
*
.11
*
95.66
*
95.89
*
2.76
*
(.01)
(1.75)
(1.53)
(.07)
(.01)
(2.18)
(1.86)
(.04)
Metropolitan
Status
–.02
111.51
*
102.48
*
–.29
.11
*
320.36
*
306.18
*
3.28
*
(.09)
(11.05)
(10.14)
(.30)
(.05)
(16.93)
(13.82)
(.29)
Farm
Status
1.70
*
–160.90
*
–153.91
*
–.45
.95
*
–336.48
*
–325.00
*
–12.16
*
(.08)
(9.85)
(10.06)
(.35)
(.05)
(15.91)
(15.97)
(.59)
Median
State
Income
–.41
*
–.55
*
(.14)
(.10)
Intercept
–.71
*
–67.45
–294.04
*
–2.52
–.32
–1771.29
*
–2149.74
*
–15.92
*
(.31)
(51.19)
(77.81)
(2.24)
(.27)
(141.53)
(149.84)
(1.24)
Pseudo
R
2
/R
2
.11
.16
.15
.10
.10
.33
.33
.38
N
18,193
11,723
11,723
16,968
52,803
33,132
33,132
49,795
Note:
Robust
standard
errors
are
in
parentheses
and
are
clustered
on
current
state
of
residence.
*
p
\
.05
(two-tailed
tests);
z
denotes
coefficient
is
significantly
different
(p
\
.05)
from
coefficient
for
sedentary
southerners.
110
When we account for interstate variation
in median income levels, we find that mi-
grants to the West experienced a significant
income disadvantage compared with both
migrants within the South (the reference
group)
and
sedentary
southerners.
The
advantage in absolute income for migrants
to the North that we noted in the prior model
disappears when we adjust for variation in
mean incomes across states. We find no dif-
ferences between relative income for mi-
grants to the North and either group that
remained in the South.
Finally, turning to the model predicting
occupational status as measured by Duncan’s
SEI score, we continue to find that, in the
short-term, inter-regional black migrants in
1940 did not enjoy an advantage compared
with their contemporaries who remained in
the South. Adjusted SEI scores for both groups
of inter-regional migrants are statistically
equivalent to SEI scores for migrants within
the South. Furthermore, migrants to the West
reported significantly lower SEI scores than
did sedentary southerners.
The right-hand side of Table 1 presents re-
sults from parallel analyses for whites in
1940. Similar to blacks, white men who left
the South between 1935 and 1940 did not
experience short-term economic benefits
from migration. White migrants to the West
were significantly less likely to have been
employed than were migrants within the
South, the reference group (odds ratio of
.40), and sedentary southerners (odds ratio
of .38).
14
White migrants to the North were
also less likely to have been employed than
were sedentary southerners (odds ratio of
.67), but they are statistically equivalent to
migrants within the South.
White inter-regional migrants did not enjoy
an advantage in absolute income when com-
pared with migrants within the South or seden-
tary southerners, a surprising result given the
considerable variation in regional income lev-
els reported in Figure 1. Migrants to the West
actually earned less than migrants within the
South and sedentary southerners (b 5 –$228
and –$136 annually, respectively). The median
income for white men in the 1940 sample was
only $800, so these income differentials are
substantial. When we control for interstate
income variation, we find that both inter-
regional migrant groups earned significantly
less compared with their race-specific state
median income than did the reference group,
migrants within the South. Additionally, we
find that migrants to the West, compared with
sedentary southerners, experienced lower rela-
tive income.
Finally, the last column of Table 1 reveals
no advantage in occupational status for whites
who left the South between 1935 and 1940. In
fact, we find that migrants to both the West
and the North had lower SEI scores compared
with migrants within the South (b 5 –10.60
and b 5 –4.71, respectively), with a mean
value for SEI of 27.25 for whites in 1940.
Both inter-regional migrant groups also re-
ported significantly lower occupational status
than Southerners who did not move.
Overall, our findings indicate that, on aver-
age, migrants of both races who left the South
for either the North or the West between 1935
and 1940 did not benefit in terms of employ-
ment status, income, or occupational status,
at least in the short run. In many instances,
we find that inter-regional migrants actually
were worse off than those who migrated within
the South and those who did not migrate.
These findings fail to support our hypothesis
that migrants who left the South during this
earlier time period fared better than those
who remained in the South.
1970. Table 2 presents the findings from
analyses for recent migrants in 1970. The
findings for black males reveal that migrants
to the West were less likely to be employed
than were both migrants within the South
(odds ratio of .74) and sedentary southerners
(odds ratio of .58). The likelihood of employ-
ment for migrants to the North is statistically
equivalent to that for migrants within the
South, although it is significantly lower
than the likelihood of employment for
Eichenlaub et al.
111
Table
2.
Results
from
Regression
Analysis
of
Selected
Economic
Characteristics
for
Southern-Born
Males,
Age
25
to
60
Years,
1970
Blacks
Whites
Employment
Status
Income
Relative
Income
SEI
Employment
Status
Income
Relative
Income
SEI
Migrants
to
West
–.30
*
z
798.52
*
z
–510.76
–1.23
–.42
*
z
282.97
–748.97
*
z
–2.34
*
(.15)
(216.59)
(336.64)
(1.20)
(.14)
(204.03)
(257.49)
(1.06)
Migrants
to
North
–.03
z
1196.19
*
z
–106.61
.60
z
.05
z
884.94
*
z
–132.38
–1.86
(.15)
(246.50)
(341.81)
(1.49)
(.11)
(198.93)
(171.55)
(1.39)
Sedentary
Southerners
.25
*
–38.51
–27.55
–2.18
*
.28
*
153.68
147.83
–2.82
*
(.11)
(187.96)
(182.38)
(.86)
(.05)
(93.83)
(114.38)
(.38)
Age
.10
*
168.80
*
165.50
*
.28
*
.12
*
649.69
*
646.91
*
1.01
*
(.01)
(11.92)
(11.76)
(.07)
(.01)
(22.23)
(22.36)
(.05)
Age
2
–.00
*
–1.84
*
–1.82
*
–.00
*
–.00
*
–6.82
*
–6.80
*
–.01
*
(.00)
(.16)
(.16)
(.00)
(.00)
(.24)
(.24)
(.00)
Married
1.46
*
1100.54
*
1105.90
*
1.75
*
1.70
*
2106.35
*
2135.13
*
2.13
*
(.06)
(64.13)
(61.82)
(.20)
(.05)
(53.83)
(51.38)
(.18)
Education
.09
*
245.22
*
237.78
*
2.05
*
.16
*
689.19
*
685.47
*
3.74
*
(.00)
(6.67)
(6.88)
(.03)
(.01)
(10.35)
(10.85)
(.04)
Metropolitan
Status
.09
866.00
*
770.05
*
.91
*
.18
*
1373.63
*
1240.12
*
2.81
*
(.05)
(63.28)
(67.28)
(.35)
(.06)
(66.39)
(92.46)
(.32)
Metropolitan
Status
Missing
.01
440.23
*
418.06
*
.71
*
–.06
671.11
*
630.20
*
1.13
*
(.04)
(114.16)
(96.19)
(.28)
(.09)
(142.40)
(126.24)
(.56)
Farm
Status
.03
–865.23
*
–776.00
*
–1.36
*
.02
–992.15
*
–851.60
*
–11.11
*
(.09)
(100.49)
(68.52)
(.39)
(.05)
(88.47)
(82.03)
(.82)
Median
State
Income
–.48
*
–.30
*
(.08)
(.06)
Intercept
–1.87
*
–2431.89
*
–4453.93
*
–4.60
*
–2.56
*
–16133.62
*
–21296.88
*
–25.48
*
(.24)
(312.09)
(297.86)
(1.56)
(.24)
(575.77)
(998.94)
(1.19)
Pseudo
R
2
/R
2
.11
.16
.14
.21
.16
.20
.20
.36
N
49,433
44,114
44,114
42,546
226,369
212,834
212,834
208,740
Note:
Robust
standard
errors
are
in
parentheses
and
are
clustered
on
current
state
of
residence.
*p
\
.05
(two-tailed
tests);
z
denotes
coefficient
is
significantly
different
(p
\
.05)
from
coefficient
for
sedentary
southerners.
112
sedentary southerners (odds ratio of .76).
Black inter-regional migrants earned signifi-
cantly higher absolute incomes than did
both groups who remained in the South,
which is consistent with the regional varia-
tion in income demonstrated in Figure 1.
When controlling for interstate variation in
income, however, the observed income
advantage disappears for both groups who
left the South. Finally, the Duncan SEI scores
of black migrants who left the South between
1965 and 1970 are statistically equivalent to
those observed for blacks who moved within
the South.
The comparable results for whites in 1970
are reported in the right-hand side of Table 2.
Leaving the South between 1965 and 1970 re-
sulted in no employment advantage for whites.
In fact, migrants to the West fared signifi-
cantly worse than both sedentary southerners
and migrants within the South. The results
for absolute income indicate a significant
advantage for white migrants to the North,
who earned significantly higher annual in-
comes than both migrants within the South
(b 5 $885) and sedentary southerners
(b 5 $731). This was a substantial income ad-
vantage, given that the median income for this
sample of white men in 1970 was $7,450.
Migrants to the West, by contrast, enjoyed
no income advantage compared with individu-
als who remained in the South—migrants or
nonmigrants. Controlling for interstate differ-
ences in median income levels erases the
income advantage for white migrants to the
North. In addition, the relative income level
for migrants to the West drops below that for
both migrants within the South (b 5 –$749)
and sedentary southerners (b 5 –$897). The
findings for occupational status reveal a signif-
icant disadvantage for migrants to the West (b
5 –2.34) compared with men who moved
within the South.
In summary, we again find no substantial
short-term advantage for migrants who left
the South compared with migrants within
the South between 1965 and 1970. The
only exceptions are the significantly higher
absolute incomes enjoyed by black inter-
regional migrants and white migrants to the
North, neither of which holds after adjusting
for interstate differences in median income
levels. In all other cases, inter-regional mi-
grants, both black and white, were either sta-
tistically equivalent to migrants within the
South or fared worse than those who moved
within Dixie during the same time period.
Long-Term Benefits of Migration
The finding that short-term economic bene-
fits did not accompany inter-regional migra-
tion for either 1940 or 1970 raises the
interesting question of comparable benefits
(or lack of them) over the long term.
Perhaps the findings in Tables 1 and 2 reflect
a penalty that recent migrants must pay for
the disruptive consequences of their inter-
regional relocation. That is, realizing the
benefits of migration may require the passage
of time.
15
To examine this possibility, we
moved our analysis forward 10 years and
restricted our sample to southern-born men
who had been living in the same state for at
least one year before the 1950 census and
at least five years before the 1980 census.
We also restricted our sample to men ages
35 to 60 in an attempt to roughly estimate
long-term benefits for those in our 1940
and 1970 samples.
16
An important caveat
must be made regarding our analysis of the
long-term benefits of inter-regional migra-
tion: Although some of the recent migrants
included in our analyses of the short-term
benefits from inter-regional migration in
1940 and 1970 may also be included among
the samples used to investigate the long-term
benefits, the alignment of cohorts is obvi-
ously imperfect. Nevertheless, we believe
that these supplementary findings are at least
suggestive, if not definitive, regarding the
possible long-term benefits accruing from
movement out of the South.
1950. Table 3 shows results from analy-
ses for blacks and whites using the same
Eichenlaub et al.
113
Table
3.
Results
from
Regression
Analysis
of
Selected
Economic
Characteristics
for
Southern-Born
Black
and
White
Males,
Age
35
to
60
Years,
Who
Were
Living
in
Their
Current
State
of
Residence
One
Year
Earlier,
1950
Blacks
Whites
Employment
Status
Income
Relative
Income
SEI
Employment
Status
Income
Relative
Income
SEI
Migrants
to
West
–.53
*
z
646.03
*
z
125.38
.66
.01
–150.05
–511.47
*
–7.03
*
z
(.18)
(121.05)
(118.59)
(1.42)
(.24)
(134.12)
(184.62)
(1.01)
Migrants
to
North
–.07
z
503.93
*
z
5.76
.92
.53
*
z
–27.68
z
–329.22
*
–4.84
*
z
(.20)
(72.84)
(92.77)
(1.04)
(.15)
(112.22)
(109.01)
(.93)
Sedentary
Southerners
.37
*
–77.31
*
–49.26
1.08
.21
*
–331.62
*
–308.11
*
–2.21
*
(.18)
(25.69)
(32.35)
(.76)
(.08)
(73.94)
(75.51)
(.60)
Age
.24
*
84.90
*
78.16
*
.29
.30
*
164.02
*
160.72
*
.93
*
(.09)
(31.97)
(31.35)
(.44)
(.08)
(30.20)
(29.89)
(.39)
Age
2
–.00
*
–.95
*
–.88
*
–.00
–.00
*
–1.65
*
–1.62
*
–.01
(.00)
(.35)
(.34)
(.00)
(.00)
(.33)
(.33)
(.00)
Married
1.21
*
379.61
*
383.03
*
1.22
1.59
*
689.60
*
701.53
*
3.74
*
(.10)
(40.79)
(39.42)
(.61)
(.08)
(77.08)
(77.74)
(.86)
Education
.05
*
41.88
*
39.20
*
1.18
*
.12
*
208.78
*
208.72
*
2.85
*
(.02)
(6.23)
(6.19)
(.12)
(.01)
(8.66)
(7.98)
(.07)
Metropolitan
Status
.35
*
300.30
*
271.64
*
.66
.08
473.98
*
420.98
*
2.14
*
(.17)
(36.90)
(37.23)
(.65)
(.12)
(48.27)
(54.99)
(.62)
Farm
Status
1.77
*
–491.90
*
–452.63
*
–1.52
*
1.08
*
–664.69
*
–629.84
*
–13.77
*
(.28)
(59.77)
(58.97)
(.63)
(.10)
(61.90)
(59.52)
(.76)
Median
State
Income
–.51
*
–.56
*
(.07)
(.06)
Intercept
–4.98
*
–983.60
–1414.40
–1.48
–6.60
*
–3336.21
*
–4323.11
*
–15.75
(2.09)
(702.90)
(713.97)
(9.96)
(1.77)
(710.11)
(745.31)
(8.66)
Pseudo
R
2
/R
2
.11
.26
.13
.09
.15
.23
.22
.33
N
5,077
4,545
4,545
4,589
13,938
12,671
12,671
12,915
Note:
Robust
standard
errors
are
in
parentheses
and
are
clustered
on
current
state
of
residence.
*
p
\
.05
(two-tailed
tests);
z
denotes
coefficient
is
significantly
different
(p
\
.05)
from
coefficient
for
sedentary
southerners.
114
economic
outcomes
considered
earlier.
Despite having lived in their state of resi-
dence for at least one year, black inter-
regional migrants were still less likely to
have been employed than were sedentary
southerners. Migrants to the West were
also significantly less likely to have been
employed compared with migrants within
the South (odds ratio 5 .59). Black migrants
to the North were no more or less likely to
have been employed than the reference
group. Black inter-regional migrants did,
however, enjoy a significant and substantial
absolute income advantage compared with
both groups that remained in the South.
Again, however, this income advantage is
to be expected, given the large regional
wage differentials during this time period.
In fact, after adjusting for these differen-
tials, we find no advantage in relative
income for inter-regional migrants. Finally,
we see that in terms of occupational status,
blacks who left the South fared no better
(and no worse) than either those who moved
within the South or those who did not move.
Parallel results for whites are presented in
the right-hand side of Table 3. Migrants to
the North were more likely to have been em-
ployed than were both migrants within the
South (odds ratio 5 1.70) and sedentary
southerners (odds ratio 5 1.38). Migrants to
the West, by contrast, did not enjoy an
employment
advantage
when
compared
with either group that remained in the
South. While white migrants to the North
were more likely to have been employed in
1950, they earned no more than did those
who migrated within the South during this
time period, despite large regional income
differentials. The same holds true for whites
who moved to the West, compared with
those who chose destinations within the
South. Whites who moved north did enjoy
a significant income advantage over the sed-
entary southern group. When we adjust for
interstate income differences, however, both
groups of inter-regional migrants fared sig-
nificantly worse than did those who moved
within the South. There are no differences
in relative income between either inter-
regional
migrant
group
and
sedentary
Southerners. Finally, both groups of white
migrants who left the South reported signifi-
cantly lower SEI values than did migrants
within the South and sedentary southerners.
Consistent with our findings for 1940, the
evidence from this supplementary analysis of
possible long-term benefits for inter-regional
migrants points to no consistent or significant
economic advantage gained by leaving the
South in the mid-twentieth century. If any-
thing, the results, like those for 1940, are
consistent with a modest disadvantage asso-
ciated with inter-regional migration versus
intra-regional migration.
1980. Table 4 presents results from a simi-
lar analysis of the long-term benefits of inter-
regional migration for southern-born males in
1980. Consistent with the general thread of
evidence that has emerged thus far from our
statistical analyses, we find that black inter-
regional migrants were less likely to have
been employed than migrants within the
South and sedentary southerners. Both inter-
regional migrant groups enjoyed a statistically
significant, absolute income advantage com-
pared with migrants within the South (b 5
$2,411 annually for migrants to the West; b
5 $2,230 for migrants to the North). These
are substantial differences given that the
median income for blacks in the 1980 analysis
was $12,005. When we turn to the results for
relative income, however, the advantage
once again disappears. In fact, both groups
of blacks that left the South now fare signifi-
cantly worse than the reference group.
Finally, black migrants who left the South
before 1975 failed to enjoy an advantage com-
pared with migrants within the South in terms
of occupational status.
Turning to the analyses for whites in
1980, we find that neither inter-regional
migrant group enjoyed an employment
advantage compared with either migrants
within the South or nonmigrants. White
Eichenlaub et al.
115
Table
4.
Results
from
Regression
Analysis
of
Selected
Economic
Characteristics
for
Southern-Born
Black
and
White
Males,
Age
35
to
60
Years,
Who
Were
Living
in
Their
Current
State
of
Residence
Five
Years
Earlier,
1980
Blacks
Whites
Employment
Status
Income
Relative
Income
SEI
Employment
Status
Income
Relative
Income
SEI
Migrants
to
West
–.50
*
z
2411.00
*
z
–792.56
*
.56
z
–.34
*
z
318.21
z
–1445.81
*
–2.96
*
z
(.08)
(442.70)
(349.62)
(.57)
(.10)
(520.29)
(361.39)
(.39)
Migrants
to
North
–.44
*
z
2229.62
*
z
–693.72
*
–.23
–.06
1149.57
z
–477.14
–3.74
*
z
(.10)
(614.75)
(327.42)
(.64)
(.10)
(604.15)
(410.66)
(.79)
Sedentary
Southerners
–.14
*
–742.90
*
–662.87
*
–.57
.01
–1012.08
*
–1113.54
*
–1.54
*
(.07)
(342.16)
(299.58)
(.47)
(.04)
(316.41)
(225.98)
(.29)
Age
.20
*
352.15
*
341.38
*
.41
*
.23
*
1234.61
*
1230.80
*
.83
*
(.02)
(102.93)
(104.10)
(.19)
(.02)
(72.11)
(70.54)
(.11)
Age
2
–.00
*
–3.54
*
–3.46
*
–.00
–.00
*
–12.51
*
–12.48
*
–.01
*
(.00)
(1.07)
(1.09)
(.00)
(.00)
(.75)
(.74)
(.00)
Married
1.18
*
3015.50
*
2998.84
*
2.22
*
1.25
*
4181.63
*
4213.30
*
2.77
*
(.04)
(110.08)
(107.79)
(.27)
(.03)
(126.15)
(120.80)
(.16)
Education
.10
*
619.02
*
609.72
*
2.37
*
.15
*
1376.99
*
1371.72
*
3.49
*
(.01)
(30.94)
(33.38)
(.09)
(.01)
(25.77)
(23.60)
(.04)
Metropolitan
Status
.19
*
1798.52
*
1284.91
*
1.34
*
.35
*
2824.49
*
2369.95
*
2.66
*
(.06)
(196.36)
(192.24)
(.47)
(.08)
(307.88)
(220.45)
(.36)
Metropolitan
Status
Missing
.04
209.53
45.38
.20
.06
615.03
*
452.90
*
–.09
(.09)
(193.58)
(225.82)
(.57)
(.08)
(286.96)
(220.29)
(.31)
Farm
Status
.49
*
354.66
412.25
–3.39
*
.45
*
287.12
363.13
–9.43
*
(.20)
(689.19)
(663.17)
(1.13)
(.06)
(193.37)
(187.35)
(.65)
Median
State
Income
–.35
*
–.39
*
(.06)
(.07)
Intercept
–4.23
*
–5757.15
*
–11693.97
*
–11.78
*
–4.76
*
–31099.68
*
–41010.44
*
–25.33
*
(.48)
(2600.33)
(2631.70)
(4.56)
(.38)
(1889.84)
(2016.05)
(2.77)
Pseudo
R
2
/R
2
.10
.16
.10
.19
.13
.17
.16
.31
N
45,971
36,867
36,867
36,831
154,039
137,453
137,453
135,667
Note:
Robust
standard
errors
are
in
parentheses
and
are
clustered
on
current
state
of
residence.
*p
\
.05
(two-tailed
tests);
z
denotes
coefficient
is
significantly
different
(p
\
.05)
from
coefficient
for
sedentary
southerners.
116
migrants to the West, in fact, were less
likely to have been employed than both
groups
that
remained
in
the
South.
Although inter-regional migrants earned
more than whites who remained in the
South and did not move, their incomes in
1980 are statistically equivalent to the ref-
erence group’s, those who moved within
the South. Once we adjust for state differen-
ces in median income, however, we find
that whites who moved west earned signif-
icantly less than the reference group (b 5
–$1,446).
Finally,
both
inter-regional
migrant groups have lower average occupa-
tional status scores than do both migrants
within the South and sedentary southerners.
Consistent with the evidence for 1950, the
findings for both blacks and whites in 1980
indicate that southern males who moved to
the North or the West enjoyed no long-term
benefits to migration, on average, when com-
pared with migrants within the South. The
main exception to this general pattern is for
black inter-regional migrants in 1950 and
1980, who earned higher incomes than indi-
viduals who moved within the South. In all
cases,
however,
the
income
advantage
disappears when we adjust for interstate
wage differentials. In fact, as we found for
short-term outcomes (see Tables 1 and 2),
in many cases inter-regional migrants fared
worse in the long-term than did those who
migrated within the South and, in some
cases, those who did not move at all.
Synopsis
The statistical evidence presented in Tables 1
through 4 is extensive, involving four sepa-
rate time periods for short- and long-term
benefits, two races, two groups of inter-
regional migrants, and four post-migration
dependent variables. To help distill the evi-
dence, and to facilitate a general conclusion,
Table 5 summarizes our results by concen-
trating on the comparisons between inter-
regional migrants and intra-regional mi-
grants, who represent the most appropriate
comparison group. A general conclusion
can be gleaned from a quick review of
Table 5: that is, the cells are overwhelmingly
dominated by zeroes and minuses (indicating
a nonsignificant difference or a statistically
significant disadvantage, respectively, for
Table 5. Summary of Advantage and Disadvantage Experienced by Inter-regional Migrants
Compared with Migrants within the South
Employment Status
Income
Relative Income
SEI
Black
White
Black
White
Black
White
Black
White
Short-Term Benefits
1940
To West
–
–
0
–
–
–
0
–
To North
0
0
1
0
0
–
0
–
1970
To West
–
–
1
0
0
–
0
–
To North
0
0
1
1
0
0
0
0
Long-Term Benefits
1950
To West
–
0
1
0
0
–
0
–
To North
0
1
1
0
0
–
0
–
1980
To West
–
–
1
0
–
–
0
–
To North
–
0
1
0
–
0
0
–
Note: ‘‘1’’ represents a significant advantage (p \ .05) for inter-regional migrant group; ‘‘–’’ represents
a significant disadvantage (p \ .05) for inter-regional migrant group; ‘‘0’’ represents the absence of
a significant difference between inter-regional migrant group compared with migrants within the South.
Eichenlaub et al.
117
inter-regional migrants), with considerably
fewer pluses (indicating a statistically signif-
icant advantage). Out of 64 possible relation-
ships summarized in Table 5, only nine (14
percent) suggest an economic advantage for
inter-regional migrants. By contrast, 30 rela-
tionships (47 percent) indicate a statistically
nonsignificant association, and 25 (39 per-
cent) indicate a significant economic disad-
vantage
for
inter-regional
migrants.
Furthermore, eight of the nine statistically
significant advantages reported in this table
represent income benefits that are not
adjusted for regional differences in wages.
Overall, we find that the main difference
between the findings for blacks and whites
is the substantially greater percentage of sig-
nificantly negative relationships for whites
than for blacks—53 and 25 percent, respec-
tively. While we are unable to draw conclu-
sions directly comparing the experiences of
black and white migrants, our results indicate
that white inter-regional migrants experi-
enced a greater disadvantage compared with
white intra-regional migrants than did blacks.
Overall, our statistical findings tell a consis-
tent and powerful story of economic sacrifice
by migrants who left the South during the
Great Migration, especially for whites, rather
than a tale of economic advantage.
CONCLUSIONS
Scholars studying the Great Migration funda-
mentally assume, explicitly or implicitly, that
individuals who left the South for the North
or the West benefited economically from their
decision to relocate. Certainly, many who
migrated enjoyed substantial success in their
destinations—enough success to stay and to
provide an impetus for many of their southern
contemporaries to follow. The assumption
that migrants generally benefited economically
is not unreasonable, given the predictions and
explanations of traditional ‘‘push-pull’’ theo-
ries of migration. That is, if migrants move to
maximize
their
social
and
economic
opportunities, then we would expect their
post-migration outcomes to be more favorable
than the corresponding, ‘‘unmeasurable’’ out-
comes that they would have experienced if
they had not moved. Such an assumption is
also consistent with prior evidence that south-
ern migrants, especially African Americans,
fared quite well on a variety of social and eco-
nomic characteristics when compared with
their northern-born neighbors. Perhaps because
of the apparent validity of this assumption, little
effort has been devoted to examining it
empirically.
In this analysis, we used a comparative
approach to assess the economic standing of
inter-regional migrants from the South in rela-
tion to two groups of southerners who remained
in the region: (1) those who stayed in the South
and also migrated across a state line and (2)
those who stayed in the South but did not
migrate (at least not during the five years before
the census). The evidence is clear, and
extremely consistent, in the conclusions that it
yields. Specifically, individuals who left the
South during the Great Migration, on average,
fared no better than those who stayed behind;
in fact, based on some criteria, they may have
done worse. These somewhat surprising con-
clusions are true whether we consider black or
white migrants, short- or long-term economic
outcomes, or earlier or later stages in the
Great Migration.
17
It is also true whether we
compare the inter-regional migrants with those
who remained in the South but migrated across
state lines or, in many cases, with those who
were sedentary.
Our findings cast doubt on the widely
shared assumption that southern migrants
escaped poverty and penury when they left
the South for the urban and industrial North
and West. While not unreasonable, this
assumption has not been directly tested
empirically. In general, migration theory,
especially
conceptual
frameworks
that
emphasize a rational decision-making pro-
cess of evaluating the advantages and dis-
advantages
of
places
of
origin
and
destination,
tends
to
support
such
an
118
American Sociological Review 75(1)
assumption. Moreover, the sharply contrast-
ing images of a backward, agricultural,
southern economy and a vibrant, industrial,
northern economy during the mid-twentieth
century suggest that a migrant relocating
from the former to the latter would prosper
economically. How, then, could the empiri-
cal evidence presented in this article be so
inconsistent with both conventional wisdom
regarding the Great Migration and the domi-
nant migration theories used to understand
this watershed sociodemographic phenome-
non? With respect to the contrast between
our findings and the common wisdom
regarding the Great Migration, we believe
that two factors are useful for understanding
the apparent contradiction: we examine only
first-generation migrants, and we focus
exclusively on their economic experiences.
In the case of the apparent failure of ‘‘dom-
inant migration theories,’’ we believe there
is actually a lack of consensus among rele-
vant theoretical orientations. Our conclusions
clearly contradict at least one prominent the-
ory, but we view our findings as contributing
to a growing body of more complex and
nuanced theories of migratory behaviors.
Our evidence describes the short- and long-
term economic consequences for first-genera-
tion migrants from the South. Yet, it is possi-
ble that the conventional wisdom regarding
the benefits of exiting the South during the
Great Migration conflates the experiences of
those who left the South with the consequen-
ces for their northern-born descendants with
southern roots—that is, the second and later
generations. The inter-regional movement
that occurred during the Great Migration
might actually have more in common with
international migration than scholars have rec-
ognized. The migrants were culturally distinct
and, in some respects, the South and the North
seemed like different countries, especially
during
the
early
phases
of
the
Great
Migration (Cash 1941; Reed 1972). If so,
then we might expect to find that first-gener-
ation migrants struggled to establish them-
selves and it was the second-generation
migrants who first enjoyed the significant eco-
nomic benefits of leaving the South.
Southern migrants, both black and white,
faced many challenges in their new environ-
ment, including living in crowded and dilap-
idated housing, difficulty finding permanent
employment, having to confront unflattering
stereotypes, and trying to adjust to an entirely
new culture (Berry 2000; Gregory 2005).
Their children, by contrast, would have en-
joyed the lifetime benefits of growing up in
the ‘‘foreign’’ setting that offered a less dis-
criminatory social and economic environ-
ment.
Scholars
have
documented
such
generational sequencing in the adjustment
and assimilation process for international mi-
grants in both the historical and the modern
eras (Boyd and Grieco 1998; Hirschman
2001). In addition, as noted earlier, Todaro
(1969; Harris and Todaro 1970) argues that
internal, rural-to-urban migrants in the less-
developed world are required to make
short-term sacrifices as they establish them-
selves and their families in their new loca-
tions.
Our
examination
of
long-term
economic benefits attempts to account for
the possibility of initial economic disruption
caused by the first-generation migrants’ relo-
cation. Perhaps, however, a consideration of
the experiences of southern migrants’ chil-
dren and grandchildren would reveal the
eventual emergence of a significant eco-
nomic advantage among those who moved
to the North and the West. To adequately
examine intergenerational developments re-
quires longitudinal data that are currently
unavailable for all the years encompassed
by the Great Migration.
The scope of our investigation is relatively
narrowly focused on a set of post-migration
economic outcomes. A strictly economic
focus can certainly be justified, given the pri-
macy of economic forces in both migration
theory and the literature on the Great
Migration. It is important, however, to recog-
nize that the lives of the southern migrants,
especially black migrants, were also affected
by a variety of powerful noneconomic
Eichenlaub et al.
119
conditions that differed substantially between
the North and the South. The children of mi-
grants benefited from access to better educa-
tional opportunities and longer school years.
This was especially true for blacks and for
whites who left rural areas of the South
(Anderson 1988; Margo 1990). It is easy to
forget, but important for our story, that black
students were prevented from attending most
southern universities until the 1960s.
18
Black
migrants to the North and the West enjoyed
a less segregated society, with fewer formal
restrictions on their behavior and on their
access to public and private spaces. Southern
blacks, unlike their northern counterparts,
were largely denied a political voice until
the passage of voting rights legislation in the
mid-1960s.
19
And, of course, levels of racially
motivated violence were considerably higher
in the South than in the North or the West
(Pfeifer 2004). Even though the last ‘‘mass
lynching’’
occurred
in
Walton
County,
Georgia in 1946, periodic lynchings and other
forms of southern racial violence continued
long after that (Wexler 2003).
Should our evidence, which contradicts the
common
wisdom
regarding
the
Great
Migration, also be viewed as inconsistent
with prevailing migration theory? Yes and
no. It is true that a simple rational decision-
making perspective, with a narrow focus on
economic outcomes (i.e., the conventional
view), does not predict the results that emerge
from our analyses. Migration behavior, how-
ever, is not as simple as the conventional
view portrays, and migration theorists are not
unanimous in their predictions about post-
migration outcomes, especially in the short
run. Instead, our findings lend strong support
to the revisionist view, which does a better
job of recognizing the complexity of the
migration decision and offers a fuller appreci-
ation of causal influences that transcend the
individual migrant. Within the context of the
Great Migration, the exodus of southerners
simultaneously influences and is influenced
by labor market conditions in the South and
the non-South. For example, the supply of
labor in particular regions affects job avail-
ability and wages. As people leave the South,
the demand for labor should increase, more
jobs should become available, and wages
should increase. In the non-South, the influx
of migrants could crowd a labor market, mak-
ing finding employment more competitive, or,
according to cumulative causation, create
more jobs by expanding the economy. The
complex interplay between migration and the
economic opportunities in the sending and
receiving communities complicates the reali-
zation of economic benefits for migrants.
While we have not been able to examine
directly the impact of such macro-level condi-
tions on the economic outcomes for southern
migrants, that challenge stands as an important
objective for future research.
By casting doubt on a fundamental
assumption about the Great Migration, our
findings raise several questions that can
help establish the agenda for future research
into this important sociodemographic phe-
nomenon that has had such profound conse-
quences for American society, both South
and North (Gregory 2005; Massey and
Denton 1993; Wilson 1987). It will no longer
be possible to rely on the simple explanation
that migrants left the South because they
were assured of improving their economic
condition. They were not. Rather, telling
the story of the Great Migration will require
a more nuanced approach. That approach
must recognize the importance of the
sequencing and scope of post-migration out-
comes as we have described them, and it must
be guided by a more sophisticated frame-
work that combines relevant elements from
different theoretical perspectives, which
themselves may offer conflicting accounts.
120
American Sociological Review 75(1)
APPENDIX
Table A1. Descriptive Statistics for Dependent Variables by Race and Migration History
Employment Status
Income
SEI
Blacks
Whites
Blacks
Whites
Blacks
Whites
1940
Migrants to West
Mean
.75
.76
565.53
893.95
11.95
20.83
SD
.44
.43
347.57
699.82
12.71
20.01
N
60
708
49
611
58
659
Migrants to North
Mean
.76
.85
652.94
1260.61
14.22
30.27
SD
.43
.36
404.33
979.20
13.57
23.28
N
291
735
233
594
261
678
Migrants within
Mean
.84
.89
450.43
1241.63
13.80
33.69
South
SD
.37
.31
390.14
919.62
14.29
23.67
N
447
2,101
341
1,639
402
1,970
Sedentary
Mean
.88
.90
428.71
1003.89
13.27
27.03
Southerners
SD
.33
.30
334.70
849.13
10.90
21.60
N
17,395
49,259
11,100
30,288
16,247
46,488
1970
Migrants to West
Mean
.80
.88
5978.18
9262.74
26.43
45.13
SD
.40
.33
2994.35
6289.46
19.76
26.21
N
400
1,904
362
1,821
350
1,751
Migrants to North
Mean
.83
.92
6218.62
9662.84
27.05
44.75
SD
.38
.28
3483.97
6209.20
20.49
25.98
N
1,522
3,421
1,400
3,309
1,342
3,244
Migrants within
Mean
.82
.92
4790.81
9130.34
25.25
48.22
South
SD
.39
.28
3589.68
5913.74
20.24
24.24
N
836
10,906
756
10,446
716
10,200
Sedentary
Mean
.83
.90
4467.32
8456.10
20.51
39.21
Southerners
SD
.37
.29
3002.65
6349.72
16.81
23.45
N
46,675
210,138
41,596
197,258
40,138
193,545
1950
Migrants to West
Mean
.74
.87
2348.80
3269.17
18.89
32.40
SD
.44
.34
1456.76
1938.24
17.60
22.91
N
236
1,006
208
918
209
930
Migrants to North
Mean
.82
.91
2261.50
3404.61
18.37
34.55
SD
.38
.28
1075.07
2119.67
15.92
23.74
N
1,588
1,504
1,408
1,409
1,419
1,405
Migrants within
Mean
.83
.90
1518.03
3253.71
14.94
37.70
South
SD
.37
.31
1022.51
2342.01
12.29
24.02
N
594
2,185
527
2,006
523
2,013
Sedentary
Mean
.89
.91
1237.47
2565.18
15.20
30.34
Southerners
SD
.32
.29
932.13
2026.62
12.90
22.37
N
2,659
9,243
2,402
8,338
2,438
8,567
1980
Migrants to West
Mean
.74
.83
16420.53
21650.65
32.03
43.28
SD
.44
.38
10239.02
14269.18
22.76
24.83
N
3,939
12,372
3,114
10,909
3,127
10,713
Migrants to North
Mean
.73
.85
15460.92
21270.63
28.14
39.15
SD
.44
.35
9101.27
13439.80
20.23
24.00
N
16,039
15,474
12,749
14,061
12,850
13,892
Migrants within
Mean
.79
.87
12507.11
21483.84
26.12
46.54
South
SD
.41
.33
9077.66
15419.99
20.73
24.10
N
4,688
24,302
3,883
22,014
3,870
21,667
Sedentary
Mean
.76
.85
11155.56
18381.56
24.72
40.09
Southerners
SD
.43
.35
8139.11
13648.32
19.53
23.70
N
21,305
101,891
17,121
90,469
16,984
89,395
Eichenlaub et al.
121
Acknowledgments
We are grateful to Amy Kate Bailey, Avery (Pete)
Guest, and Lowell Hargens for useful comments and
advice and to Patty Glynn for expert programming.
We thank the editors and anonymous reviewers of ASR
for their thoughtful and constructive input.
Authors’ Note
An earlier version of this article was presented at the
annual meeting of the Population Association of
America in New York on March 30, 2007.
Funding
This research was supported by a fellowship to
Eichenlaub funded by an NICHD Population Research
Training Grant (T32 HD007543), a grant to Tolnay
from the National Science Foundation (SES-0317247),
and a grant to Alexander from the National Science
Foundation (SES-0317524).
Notes
1. In this article, we use a broad definition of the Great
Migration, that is, the migration of both blacks and
whites out of the South beginning around World
War I and ending in the late 1960s or early 1970s.
Some researchers use a narrower definition, referring
only to the earliest years of the southern exodus (1915
to 1930). Our usage here is consistent with much of
the previous work on the Great Migration (e.g.,
Tolnay 1997, 1998a, 1998b; Tolnay and Eichenlaub
2006; Tolnay, Crowder, and Adelman 2000; Tolnay
et al. 2005; White et al. 2005).
2. For ease, we refer to the Northeast and the Midwest
as the ‘‘North.’’
3. We use ‘‘sedentary southerners’’ to refer to southern-
born individuals who remained in the South and did
not move across a state line; they may have been
residentially mobile within their southern state of
residence. ‘‘Migrants within the South’’ denotes in-
dividuals who moved across a state line at some
point during the five years before the census.
4. In contrast to the generally negative economic con-
sequences of population growth resulting from in-
migration to the North discussed here, the theory
of ‘‘cumulative causation’’ describes the potential
for a positive impact of in-migration on economic
growth, which creates the potential for even more
migration (Greenwood 1975, 1985; Massey 1990;
Muth 1971; Myrdal 1957; White and Lindstrom
2005). The development of social networks between
previous and potential migrants, mentioned below,
is also part of the broader theory of cumulative cau-
sation (Massey 1990; White and Lindstrom 2005).
5. We do not include data from earlier censuses because
they lack the information required to identify recent
migrants, which is critical to our analysis.
6. In a supplementary analysis with no imposed age
limit, the results were virtually identical. We also
tested a lower age limit (55 years old) and the gen-
eral findings remained the same.
7. In contrast to all other years after 1930 in which the
census asked about residence five years before enu-
meration, the 1950 census inquired about residence
one year before enumeration. Therefore, the mea-
surement of recent migration for 1950 must be
based on the 1949 to 1950 time period, rather
than the 1945 to 1950 period.
8. In supplementary analyses not reported here, we used
the census definitions for all regions and our results
are overwhelmingly consistent. Additionally, we
considered the possibility that our results might
vary based on original location within the South. To
test this, we included a dummy variable indicating
whether a respondent originated in the Deep South
(defined as Alabama, Georgia, Louisiana, South
Carolina, and Mississippi). The results from these
supplementary analyses are virtually identical to the
results presented in this article. Finally, we ran sepa-
rate analyses for individuals who originated in the
Deep South and those who originated in the Border
South (the remaining southern states). The results
from these supplementary analyses reveal no system-
atic differences between individuals originating in
the two southern subregions.
9. In supplementary analyses, we considered an alter-
native approach to measuring employment status by
contrasting individuals who were employed with
those who were unemployed or not in the labor
force. The results from these analyses yield the
same general conclusions as those reported here.
10. Income from businesses or farms is not available for
1940. We also tested an alternate income measure for
1950, 1970, and 1980, which included income from
farms and businesses as well as income from wel-
fare, social security, investments, and other sources.
These supplementary analyses yield similar results.
11. Additionally, we tested an alternate relative income
measure by using the ratio of one’s income to the
state median. These supplementary analyses result
in the same general findings.
12. There are well-known limitations to describing indi-
viduals’ migration histories from census information
on current residence, place of birth, and residence in
the recent past (see Cromartie and Stack 1989). For
example, such a measurement strategy does not cap-
ture multiple moves within a given time period and,
because of return migration to a place of origin, it
may miss some moves entirely. Migrants who returned
to their state of origin before being enumerated could
bias our sample. That is, if individuals returned to their
state of origin after failing in their new destination, any
122
American Sociological Review 75(1)
positive findings for migrants may be overestimated.
If they returned after success, findings for migrants
may be underestimated. There is no clear consensus
in the literature on the Great Migration as to whether
individuals who retuned were positively or negatively
selected (see Tolnay 2003). Despite the limitations, the
approach we use to describe migration histories from
the PUMS data has become conventional practice in
social science research.
13. In addition to including education as a covariate in all of
our models, we considered the possibility of an interac-
tion between human capital and migration history in
their effects on economic outcomes by estimating
a series of models that included multiplicative interac-
tions between education and migration history. The re-
sults from these supplementary analyses, which are not
reported here, reveal some statistically significant inter-
actions. However, considering the possible differential
effects of migration history by level of education does
not alter our basic substantive conclusions.
14. Odds ratios can be determined from the logistic
regression coefficients reported in Table 1 by using
the following simple formula: odds ratio 5 e
b
, where
‘‘e’’ is the mathematical constant and b is the esti-
mated logistic regression coefficient. In this example,
the odds ratio for migrants to the West is e
–.92
5 .40.
The odds ratios can be interpreted to mean that the
‘‘odds’’ of employment for migrants to the West
were only 40 percent as great as the odds of employ-
ment for migrants within the South.
15. It should be noted, however, that our primary com-
parison group is migrants within the South, which
should account somewhat for the disruptive influ-
ence of interstate migration. Still, we consider the
possible long-term benefit of migration given the
likelihood that inter-regional migration is more dis-
ruptive than intra-regional migration.
16. For the sake of consistency, we continued to use an
age limit of 60 for the long-term benefits analysis.
However, we also tested an age limit of 70 for these
models, which resulted in nearly identical results to
those that we present in the article.
17. In supplementary analyses not reported in this article,
we attempted to identify migrants based on informa-
tion on state of residence and state of birth from the
1920 census. With the exception of occupational sta-
tus, we were unable to use the same dependent var-
iables in analyses for 1920 that we use for other
decades. We could, however, approximate employ-
ment status, and we also included home ownership
as a dependent variable. These analyses reveal a story
that is overwhelmingly consistent with the findings
reported in this article: we find no benefit to inter-
regional migration for southern-born men in 1920.
18. For example, the University of Georgia did not
admit its first black students until 1961, while the
University of Mississippi and the University of
Alabama did so in 1962.
19. President Lyndon B. Johnson signed the Voting
Rights Act of 1965 on August 6, 1965.
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Suzanne C. Eichenlaub is a graduate student of sociol-
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health. She is currently working on her dissertation,
which examines how the relationship between education
and health varies by race and ethnicity.
Stewart E. Tolnay is Professor of Sociology at the
University of Washington. He is author of The Bottom
Rung: African American Family Life on Southern
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Alexander is coordinator of the Integrated Public Use
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investigator on an NICHD-funded project titled Baseline
Data for the Analysis of Demographic Change.
Eichenlaub et al.
125