The Revolt of

the Masses

Jose Ortega y Gassett

(1929)

PREFATORY NOTE

IN my book España Invertebrada, published in 1922, in an

article in El Sol entitled "Masas" (1926), and in two lectures given
to the Association of Friends of Art in Buenos Aires (1928), I have
treated the subject developed in the present essay. My purpose
now is to collect and complete what I have already said, so as to
produce an organic doctrine concerning the most important fact of
our time.

CHAPTER I

The Coming of the Masses

THERE is one fact which, whether for good or ill, is of utmost

importance in the public life of Europe at the present moment.
This fact is the accession of the masses to complete social power.
As the masses, by definition, neither should nor can direct their
own personal existence, and still less rule society in general, this
fact means that actually Europe is suffering from the greatest
crisis that can afflict peoples, nations, and civilisation. Such a
crisis has occurred more than once in history. Its characteristics
and its consequences are well known. So also is its name. It is
called the rebellion of the masses. In order to understand this
formidable fact, it is important from the start to avoid giving to
the words "rebellion," "masses," and "social power" a meaning
exclusively or primarily political. Public life is not solely political,
but equally, and even primarily, intellectual, moral, economic,
religious; it comprises all our collective habits, including our
fashions both of dress and of amusement.

Perhaps the best line of approach to this historical

phenomenon may be found by turning our attention to a visual
experience, stressing one aspect of our epoch which is plain to our
very eyes. This fact is quite simple to enunciate, though not so to
analyse. I shall call it the fact of agglomeration, of "plenitude."
Towns are full of people, houses full of tenants, hotels full of
guests, trains full of travellers, cafés full of customers, parks full
of promenaders, consulting-rooms of famous doctors full of
patients, theatres full of spectators, and beaches full of bathers.
What previously was, in general, no problem, now begins to be an
everyday one, namely, to find room.

That is all. Can there be any fact simpler, more patent more

constant in actual life? Let us now pierce the plain surface of this
observation and we shall be surprised to see how there wells forth
an unexpected spring in which the white light of day, of our actual
day, is broken up into its rich chromatic content. What is it that
we see, and the sight of which causes us so much surprise? We see
the multitude, as such, in possession of the places and the
instruments created by civilisation. The slightest reflection will
then make us surprised at our own surprise. What about it? Is this
not the ideal state of things? The theatre has seats to be occupied
—in other words, so that the house may be full—and now they are
overflowing; people anxious to use them are left standing outside.
Though the fact be quite logical and natural, we cannot but
recognise that this did not happen before and that now it does;
consequently, there has been a change, an innovation, which
justifies, at least for the first moment, our surprise.

To be surprised, to wonder, is to begin to understand. This is

the sport, the luxury, special to the intellectual man. The gesture
characteristic of his tribe consists in looking at the world with eyes
wide open in wonder. Everything in the world is strange and
marvellous to well-open eyes. This faculty of wonder is the delight
refused to your football "fan," and, on the other hand, is the one

which leads the intellectual man through life in the perpetual
ecstasy of the visionary. His special attribute is the wonder of the
eyes. Hence it was that the ancients gave Minerva her owl, the
bird with ever-dazzled eyes.

Agglomeration, fullness, was not frequent before. Why then is

it now? The components of the multitudes around us have not
sprung from nothing. Approximately the same number of people
existed fifteen years ago. Indeed, after the war it might seem
natural that their number should be less. Nevertheless, it is here
we come up against the first important point. The individuals who
made up these multitudes existed, but not qua multitude.
Scattered about the world in small groups, or solitary, they lived a
life, to all appearances, divergent, dissociate, apart. Each
individual or small group occupied a place, its own, in country,
village, town, or quarter of the great city. Now, suddenly, they
appear as an agglomeration, and looking in any direction our eyes
meet with the multitudes. Not only in any direction, but precisely
in the best places, the relatively refined creation of human
culture, previously reserved to lesser groups, in a word, to
minorities. The multitude has suddenly become visible, installing
itself in the preferential positions in society. Before, if it existed,
it passed unnoticed, occupying the background of the social stage;
now it has advanced to the footlights and is the principal
character. There are no longer protagonists; there is only the
chorus.

The concept of the multitude is quantitative and visual.

Without changing its nature, let us translate it into terms of
sociology. We then meet with the notion of the "social mass."
Society is always a dynamic unity of two component factors:
minorities and masses. The minorities are individuals or groups of
individuals which are specially qualified. The mass is the
assemblage of persons not specially qualified. By masses, then, is
not to be understood, solely or mainly, "the working masses." The

mass is the average man. In this way what was mere quantity—the
multitude—is converted into a qualitative determination: it
becomes the common social quality, man as undifferentiated from
other men, but as repeating in himself a generic type. What have
we gained by this conversion of quantity into quality? Simply this:
by means of the latter we understand the genesis of the former. It
is evident to the verge of platitude that the normal formation of a
multitude implies the coincidence of desires, ideas, ways of life,
in the individuals who constitute it. It will be objected that this is
just what happens with every social group, however select it may
strive to be. This is true; but there is an essential difference. In
those groups which are characterised by not being multitude and
mass, the effective coincidence of its members is based on some
desire, idea, or ideal, which of itself excludes the great number.
To form a minority, of whatever kind, it is necessary beforehand
that each member separate himself from the multitude for
special, relatively personal, reasons. Their coincidence with the
others who form the minority is, then, secondary, posterior to
their having each adopted an attitude of singularity, and is
consequently, to a large extent, a coincidence in not coinciding.
There are cases in which this singularising character of the group
appears in the light of day: those English groups, which style
themselves "nonconformists," where we have the grouping
together of those who agree only in their disagreement in regard
to the limitless multitude. This coming together of the minority
precisely in order to separate themselves from the majority is a
necessary ingredient in the formation of every minority. Speaking
of the limited public which listened to a musician of refinement,
Mallarmé wittily says that this public by its presence in small
numbers stressed the absence of the multitude.

Strictly speaking, the mass, as a psychological fact, can be

defined without waiting for individuals to appear in mass
formation. In the presence of one individual we can decide

whether he is "mass" or not. The mass is all that which sets no
value on itself—good or ill—based on specific grounds, but which
feels itself "just like everybody," and nevertheless is not concerned
about it; is, in fact, quite happy to feel itself as one with
everybody else. Imagine a humble-minded man who, having tried
to estimate his own worth on specific grounds—asking himself if he
has any talent for this or that, if he excels in any direction—
realises that he possesses no quality of excellence. Such a man
will feel that he is mediocre and commonplace, ill-gifted, but will
not feel himself "mass."

When one speaks of "select minorities" it is usual for the evil-

minded to twist the sense of this expression, pretending to be
unaware that the select man is not the petulant person who thinks
himself superior to the rest, but the man who demands more of
himself than the rest, even though he may not fulfil in his person
those higher exigencies. For there is no doubt that the most
radical division that it is possible to make of humanity is that
which splits it into two classes of creatures: those who make great
demands on themselves, piling up difficulties and duties; and
those who demand nothing special of themselves, but for whom to
live is to be every moment what they already are, without
imposing on themselves any effort towards perfection; mere buoys
that float on the waves. This reminds me that orthodox Buddhism
is composed of two distinct religions: one, more rigorous and
difficult, the other easier and more trivial: the Mahayana—"great
vehicle" or "great path"—and the Hinayana—"lesser vehicle" or
"lesser path." The decisive matter is whether we attach our life to
one or the other vehicle, to a maximum or a minimum of demands
upon ourselves.

The division of society into masses and select minorities is,

then, not a division into social classes, but into classes of men,
and cannot coincide with the hierarchic separation of "upper" and
"lower" classes. It is, of course, plain that in these "upper" classes,

when and as long as they really are so, there is much more
likelihood of finding men who adopt the "great vehicle," whereas
the "lower" classes normally comprise individuals of minus quality.
But, strictly speaking, within both these social classes, there are
to be found mass and genuine minority. As we shall see, a
characteristic of our times is the predominance, even in groups
traditionally selective, of the mass and the vulgar. Thus, in the
intellectual life, which of its essence requires and presupposes
qualification, one can note the progressive triumph of the pseudo-
intellectual, unqualified, unqualifiable, and, by their very mental
texture, disqualified. Similarly, in the surviving groups of the
"nobility", male and female. On the other hand, it is not rare to
find to-day amongst working men, who before might be taken as
the best example of what we are calling "mass," nobly disciplined
minds.

There exist, then, in society, operations, activities, and

functions of the most diverse order, which are of their very nature
special, and which consequently cannot be properly carried out
without special gifts. For example: certain pleasures of an artistic
and refined character, or again the functions of government and of
political judgment in public affairs. Previously these special
activities were exercised by qualified minorities, or at least by
those who claimed such qualification. The mass asserted no right
to intervene in them; they realised that if they wished to
intervene they would necessarily have to acquire those special
qualities and cease being mere mass. They recognised their place
in a healthy dynamic social system.

If we now revert to the facts indicated at the start, they will

appear clearly as the heralds of a changed attitude in the mass.
They all indicate that the mass has decided to advance to the
foreground of social life, to occupy the places, to use the
instruments and to enjoy the pleasures hitherto reserved to the
few. It is evident, for example, that the places were never

intended for the multitude, for their dimensions are too limited,
and the crowd is continuously overflowing; thus manifesting to our
eyes and in the clearest manner the new phenomenon: the mass,
without ceasing to be mass, is supplanting the minorities.

No one, I believe, will regret that people are to-day enjoying

themselves in greater measure and numbers than before, since
they have now both the desire and the means of satisfying it. The
evil lies in the fact that this decision taken by the masses to
assume the activities proper to the minorities is not, and cannot
be, manifested solely in the domain of pleasure, but that it is a
general feature of our time. Thus—to anticipate what we shall see
later—I believe that the political innovations of recent times
signify nothing less than the political domination of the masses.
The old democracy was tempered by a generous dose of liberalism
and of enthusiasm for law. By serving these principles the
individual bound himself to maintain a severe discipline over
himself. Under the shelter of liberal principles and the rule of law,
minorities could live and act. Democracy and law—life in common
under the law—were synonymous. Today we are witnessing the
triumphs of a hyperdemocracy in which the mass acts directly,
outside the law, imposing its aspirations and its desires by means
of material pressure. It is a false interpretation of the new
situation to say that the mass has grown tired of politics and
handed over the exercise of it to specialised persons. Quite the
contrary. That was what happened previously; that was
democracy. The mass took it for granted that after all, in spite of
their defects and weaknesses, the minorities understood a little
more of public problems than it did itself. Now, on the other hand,
the mass believes that it has the right to impose and to give force
of law to notions born in the café. I doubt whether there have
been other periods of history in which the multitude has come to
govern more directly than in our own. That is why I speak of
hyperdemocracy.

The same thing is happening in other orders, particularly in the

intellectual. I may be mistaken, but the present-day writer, when
he takes his pen in hand to treat a subject which he has studied
deeply, has to bear in mind that the average reader, who has never
concerned himself with this subject, if he reads does so with the
view, not of learning something from the writer, but rather, of
pronouncing judgment on him when he is not in agreement with
the commonplaces that the said reader carries in his head. If the
individuals who make up the mass believed themselves specially
qualified, it would be a case merely of personal error, not a
sociological subversion. The characteristic of the hour is that the
commonplace mind, knowing itself to be commonplace, has the
assurance to proclaim the rights of the commonplace and to
impose them wherever it will. As they say in the United States: "to
be different is to be indecent." The mass crushes beneath it
everything that is different, everything that is excellent,
individual, qualified and select. Anybody who is not like
everybody, who does not think like everybody, runs the risk of
being eliminated. And it is clear, of course, that this "everybody" is
not "everybody." "Everybody" was normally the complex unity of
the mass and the divergent, specialised minorities. Nowadays,
"everybody" is the mass alone. Here we have the formidable fact
of our times, described without any concealment of the brutality
of its features.

CHAPTER II

The Rise of the Historic Level

SUCH, then, is the formidable fact of our times, described

without any concealment of the brutality of its features. It is,
furthermore, entirely new in the history of our modern
civilisation. Never, in the course of its development, has anything
similar happened. If we wish to find its like we shall have to take a
leap outside our modern history and immerse ourselves in a world,
a vital element, entirely different from our own; we shall have to
penetrate the ancient world till we reach the hour of its decline.
The history of the Roman Empire is also the history of the uprising
of the Empire of the Masses, who absorb and annul the directing
minorities and put themselves in their place. Then, also, is
produced the phenomenon of agglomeration, of "the full." For that
reason, as Spengler has very well observed, it was necessary, just
as in our day, to construct enormous buildings. The epoch of the
masses is the epoch of the colossal.

1

We are living, then, under the

brutal empire of the masses. Just so; I have now twice called this
empire "brutal," and have thus paid my tribute to the god of the
commonplace. Now, ticket in hand, I can cheerfully enter into my
subject, see the show from inside. Or perhaps it was thought that I
was going to be satisfied with that description, possibly exact, but
quite external; the mere features, the aspect under which this
tremendous fact presents itself when looked at from the view-
point of the past? If I were to leave the matter here and strangle
off my present essay without more ado, the reader would be left
thinking, and quite justly, that this fabulous uprising of the masses
above the surface of history inspired me merely with a few

1 - The tragic thing about this process is that while these agglomerations were in formation
there was beginning that depopulation of the countryside which was to result in an absolute
decrease of the number of inhabitants in the Empire.

petulant, disdainful words, a certain amount of hatred and a
certain amount of disgust. This all the more in my case, when it is
well known that I uphold a radically aristocratic interpretation of
history. Radically, because I have never said that human society
ought to be aristocratic, but a great deal more than that. What I
have said, and still believe with ever-increasing conviction, is that
human society is always, whether it will or no, aristocratic by its
very essence, to the extreme that it is a society in the measure
that it is aristocratic, and ceases to be such when it ceases to be
aristocratic. Of course I am speaking now of society and not of the
State. No one can imagine that, in the face of this fabulous
seething of the masses, it is the aristocratic attitude to be
satisfied with making a supercilious grimace, like a fine gentleman
of Versailles. Versailles—the Versailles of the grimaces—does not
represent aristocracy; quite the contrary, it is the death and
dissolution of a magnificent aristocracy. For this reason, the only
element of aristocracy left in such beings was the dignified grace
with which their necks received the attentions of the guillotine;
they accepted it as the tumour accepts the lancet. No; for anyone
who has a sense of the real mission of aristocracies, the spectacle
of the mass incites and enflames him, as the sight of virgin marble
does the sculptor. Social aristocracy has no resemblance whatever
to that tiny group which claims for itself alone the name of
society, which calls itself "Society"; people who live by inviting or
not inviting one another. Since everything in the world has its
virtue and its mission, so within the vast world this small "smart
world" has its own, but it is a very subordinate mission, not to be
compared with the Herculean task of genuine aristocracies. I
should have no objection to discussing the meaning that lies in this
smart world, to all appearance so meaningless, but our subject is
now one of greater proportions. Of course, this selfsame
"distinguished society" goes with the times. Much food for thought
was given me by a certain jeune fille en fleur, full of youth and
modernity, a star of the first magnitude in the firmament of

"smart" Madrid, when she said to me: "I can't stand a dance to
which less than eight hundred people have been invited." Behind
this phrase I perceived that the style of the masses is triumphant
over the whole area of modern life, and imposes itself even in
those sheltered corners which seemed reserved for the "happy
few."

I reject equally, then, the interpretation of our times which

does not lay clear the positive meaning hidden under the actual
rule of the masses and that which accepts it blissfully, without a
shudder of horror. Every destiny is dramatic, tragic in its deepest
meaning. Whoever has not felt the danger of our times palpitating
under his hand, has not really penetrated to the vitals of destiny,
he has merely pricked its surface. The element of terror in the
destiny of our time is furnished by the overwhelming and violent
moral upheaval of the masses; imposing, invincible, and
treacherous, as is destiny in every case. Whither is it leading us? Is
it an absolute evil or a possible good? There it is, colossal, astride
our times like a giant, a cosmic note of interrogation, always of
uncertain shape, with something in it of the guillotine or the
gallows, but also with something that strives to round itself into a
triumphal arch.

The fact that we must submit to examination may be

formulated under two headings: first, the masses are to-day
exercising functions in social life which coincide with those which
hitherto seemed reserved to minorities; and secondly, these
masses have at the same time shown themselves indocile to the
minorities—they do not obey them, follow them, or respect them;
on the contrary, they push them aside and supplant them.

Let us analyse what comes under the first heading. By it I mean

that the masses enjoy the pleasures and use the instruments
invented by the select groups, and hitherto exclusively at the
service of the latter. They feel appetites and needs which were

previously looked upon as refinements, inasmuch as they were the
patrimony of the few. Take a trivial example: in 1820 there cannot
have been ten bathrooms in private houses in Paris (see the
Memoirs of the Comtesse de Boigne). But furthermore, the masses
to-day are acquainted with, and use with relative skill, many of
the technical accomplishments previously confined to specialised
individuals. And this refers not only to the technique of material
objects, but, more important, to that of laws and society. In the
XVIII

th

Century, certain minority groups discovered that every

human being, by the mere fact of birth, and without requiring any
special qualification whatsoever, possessed certain fundamental
political rights, the so-called rights of the man and the citizen and
further that, strictly speaking, these rights, common to all, are
the only ones that exist.

Every other right attached to special gifts was condemned as

being a privilege. This was at first a mere theory, the idea of a few
men; then those few began to put the idea into practice, to
impose it and insist upon it. Nevertheless, during the whole of the
XIX

th

Century, the mass, while gradually becoming enthusiastic for

those rights as an ideal, did not feel them as rights, did not
exercise them or attempt to make them prevail, but, in fact,
under democratic legislation, continued to feel itself just as under
the old regime. The "people"—as it was then called—the "people"
had learned that it was sovereign, but did not believe it. To-day
the ideal has been changed into a reality; not only in legislation,
which is the mere framework of public life, but in the heart of
every individual, whatever his ideas may be, and even if he be a
reactionary in his ideas, that is to say, even when he attacks and
castigates institutions by which those rights are sanctioned. To my
mind, anyone who does not realise this curious moral situation of
the masses can understand nothing of what is to-day beginning to
happen in the world. The sovereignty of the unqualified individual,
of the human being as such, generically, has now passed from

being a juridical idea or ideal to be a psychological state inherent
in the average man. And note this, that when what was before an
ideal becomes a component part of reality, it inevitably ceases to
be an ideal. The prestige and the magic that are attributes of the
ideal are volatilised. The levelling demands of a generous
democratic inspiration have been changed from aspirations and
ideals into appetites and unconscious assumptions.

Now, the meaning of this proclamation of the rights of man was

none other than to lift human souls from their interior servitude
and to implant within them a certain consciousness of mastery and
dignity. Was it not this that it was hoped to do, namely, that the
average man should feel himself master, lord, and ruler of himself
and of his life? Well, that is now accomplished. Why, then, these
complaints of the liberals, the democrats, the progressives of
thirty years ago? Or is it that, like children, they want something,
but not the consequences of that something? You want the
ordinary man to be master. Well, do not be surprised if he acts for
himself, if he demands all forms of enjoyment, if he firmly asserts
his will, if he refuses all kinds of service, if he ceases to be docile
to anyone, if he considers his own person and his own leisure, if he
is careful as to dress: these are some of the attributes
permanently attached to the consciousness of mastership. To-day
we find them taking up their abode in the ordinary man, in the
mass.

The situation, then, is this: the life of the ordinary man is to-

day made up of the same "vital repertory" which before
characterised only the superior minorities. Now the average man
represents the field over which the history of each period acts; he
is to history what sea-level is to geography. If, therefore, to-day
the mean-level lies at a point previously only reached by
aristocracies, the signification of this is simply that the level of
history has suddenly risen—after long subterraneous preparations,
it is true—but now quite plainly to the eyes, suddenly, at a bound,

in one generation. Human life taken as a whole has mounted
higher. The soldier of to-day, we might say, has a good deal of the
officer; the human army is now made up of officers. Enough to
watch the energy, the determination, the ease with which each
individual moves through life to-day, snatches at the passing
pleasure, imposes his personal will.

Everything that is good and bad in the present and in the

immediate future has its cause and root in the general rise of the
historic level. But here an observation that had not previously
occurred to us presents itself. This fact, that the ordinary level of
life to-day is that of the former minorities, is a new fact in
Europe, but in America the natural, the "constitutional" fact. To
realise my point, let the reader consider the matter of
consciousness of equality before the law. That psychological state
of feeling lord and master of oneself and equal to anybody else,
which in Europe only outstanding groups succeeded in acquiring,
was in America since the XVIII

th

Century (and therefore, practically

speaking, always) the natural state of things. And a further
coincidence, still more curious, is this: when this psychological
condition of the ordinary man appeared in Europe, when the level
of his existence rose, the tone and manners of European life in all
orders suddenly took on a new appearance which caused many
people to say: "Europe is becoming Americanised." Those who
spoke in this way gave no further attention to the matter; they
thought it was a question of a slight change of custom, a fashion,
and, deceived by the look of things, attributed it to some
influence or other of America on Europe. This, to my mind, is
simply to trivialise a question which is much more subtle and
pregnant with surprises. Gallantry here makes an attempt to
suborn me into telling our brothers beyond the sea that, in fact,
Europe has become Americanised, and that this is due to an
influence of America on Europe. But no; truth comes into conflict
with gallantry, and it must prevail. Europe has not been

Americanised; it has received no great influence from America.
Possibly both these things are beginning to happen just now; but
they did not occur in the recent past of which the present is the
flowering. There is floating around a bewildering mass of false
ideas which blind the vision of both parties, Americans and
Europeans. The triumph of the masses and the consequent
magnificent uprising of the vital level have come about in Europe
for internal reasons, after two centuries of education of the
multitude towards progress and a parallel economic improvement
in society. But it so happens that the result coincides with the
most marked aspect of American life; and on account of this
coincidence of the moral situation of the ordinary man in Europe
and in America, it has come about that for the first time the
European understands American life which was to him before an
enigma and a mystery. There is no question, then, of an influence,
which indeed would be a little strange, would be, in fact, a
"refluence," but of something which is still less suspected, namely,
of a levelling. It has always been obscurely seen by Europeans that
the general level of life in America was higher than in the Old
World. It was the intuition, strongly felt, if unanalysed, of this fact
which gave rise to the idea, always accepted, never challenged,
that the future lies with America. It will be understood that such
an idea, widespread and deep-rooted, did not float down on the
wind, as it is said that orchids grow rootless in the air. The basis of
it was the realisation of a higher level of average existence in
America, in contrast with a lower level in the select minorities
there as compared with those of Europe. But history, like
agriculture, draws its nourishment from the valleys and not from
the heights, from the average social level and not from men of
eminence.

We are living in a levelling period; there is a levelling of

fortunes, of culture among the various social classes, of the sexes.
Well, in the same way there is a levelling of continents, and as the

European was formerly lower from a vital point of view, he has
come out the gainer from this levelling. Consequently, from this
standpoint, the uprising of the masses implies a fabulous increase
of vital possibilities, quite the contrary of what we hear so often
about the decadence of Europe. This is a confused and clumsy
expression, in which it is not clear what is being referred to,
whether it is the European states, or European culture, or what
lies underneath all this, and is of infinitely greater importance,
the vital activity of Europe.

Of European states and culture we shall have a word to say

later on—though perhaps what we have already said is enough—but
as regards the vitality, it is well to make clear from the start that
we are in the presence of a gross error. Perhaps if I give it another
turn, my statement may appear more convincing or less
improbable; I say, then, that to-day the average Italian, Spaniard,
or German is less differentiated in vital tone from the North
American or the Argentine than he was thirty years ago. And this is
a fact that the people of America ought not to forget.

CHAPTER III

The Height of the Times

THE rule of the masses, then, presents a favourable aspect,

inasmuch as it signifies an all-round rise in the historical level, and
reveals that average existence to-day moves on a higher altitude
than that of yesterday. This brings home to us the fact that life
can have different altitudes, and that there is a deep sense in the
phrase that is often senselessly repeated when people speak of the
height of our times. It will be well to pause and consider here,
because this point offers us a means of establishing one of the
most surprising characteristics of our age.

It is said, for example, that this or that matter is not worthy of

the height of a certain time. And, in fact, not the abstract time of
chronology, of the whole temporal plain, but the vital time, what
each generation calls "our time," has always a certain elevation; is
higher to-day than yesterday, or keeps on the level, or falls below
it. The idea of falling contained in the word decadence has its
origin in this intuition. Likewise, each individual feels, with more
or less clearness, the relation which his own life bears to the
height of the time through which he is passing. There are those
who feel amid the manifestations of actual existence like a
shipwrecked man who cannot keep his head above water. The
tempo at which things move at present, the force and energy with
which everything is done, cause anguish to the man of archaic
mould, and this anguish is the measure of the difference between
his pulse-beats and the pulse-beats of the time. On the other
hand, the man who lives completely and pleasurably in agreement
with actual modes is conscious of the relation between the level
of our time and that of various past times. What is this relation?

It would be wrong to suppose that the man of any particular

period always looks upon past times as below the level of his own,
simply because they are past. It is enough to recall that to the
seeming of Jorge Manrique, "Any time gone by was better." But this
is not the truth either. Not every age has felt itself inferior to any
past age, nor have all believed themselves superior to every
preceding age. Every historical period displays a different feeling
in respect of this strange phenomenon of the vital altitude, and I
am surprised that thinkers and historians have never taken note of
such an evident and important fact. Taken very roughly, the
impression described by Jorge Manrique has certainly been the
most general one. The majority of historical periods did not look
upon their own time as superior to preceding ages. On the
contrary, the most usual thing has been for men to dream of
better times in a vague past, of a fuller existence; of a "golden
age," as those taught by Greece and Rome have it; the Alcheringa
of the Australian bushmen. This indicates that such men feel the
pulse of their own lives lacking in full vigour, incapable of
completely flooding their blood channels. For this reason they
looked with respect on the past, on "classic" epochs, when
existence seemed to them fuller, richer, more perfect and
strenuous than the life of their own time. As they looked back and
visualised those epochs of greater worth, they had the feeling, not
of dominating them, but, on the contrary, of falling below them,
just as a degree of temperature, if it possessed consciousness,
might feel that it does not contain within itself the higher degree,
that there are more calories in this than in itself. From A.D. 150
on, this impression of a shrinking of vitality, of a falling from
position, of decay and loss of pulse shows itself increasingly in the
Roman Empire. Had not Horace already sung: "Our fathers, viler
than our grandfathers, begot us who are even viler, and we shall
bring forth a progeny more degenerate still"?

*

*

Aetas parentum pejor avis tulit

nos nequiores, mox daturos

progeniem vitiosiorem.

—Odes, III. 6.

Two centuries later there were not in the whole Empire

sufficient men of Italian birth with courage equal to filling the
places of the centurions, and it was found necessary to hire for
this post first Dalmatians, and afterwards Barbarians from the
Danube and the Rhine. In the meantime the women were
becoming barren, and Italy was depopulated.

Let us now turn to another kind of epoch which enjoys a vital

sentiment, seemingly the most opposed to the last. We have here
a very curious phenomenon which it is most important should be
defined. When not more than thirty years ago politicians used to
perorate before the crowds, it was their custom to condemn such
and such a Government measure, some excess or other on its part,
by saying that it was unworthy of the advanced times. It is curious
to recall that we find the same phrase employed by Trajan in his
famous letter to Pliny, advising him not to persecute the Christians
on the strength of anonymous accusations: nec nostri saeculi est.
There have been, then, various periods in history which have felt
themselves as having attained a full, definitive height, periods in
which it is thought that the end of a journey has been reached, a
long-felt desire obtained, a hope completely fulfilled. This is "the
plenitude of the time," the full ripening of historic life. And, in
fact, thirty years ago, the European believed that human life had
come to be what it ought to be, what for generations previous it
had been desiring to be, what it was henceforward always bound
to be. These epochs of plenitude always regard themselves as the

result of many other preparatory periods, of other times lacking in
plenitude, inferior to their own, above which this time of full-
flower has risen. Seen from this height, those preparatory periods
give the impression that during them life was an affair of mere
longing and illusion unrealised, of unsatisfied desire, of eager
precursors, a time of "not yet," of painful contrast between the
definite aspiration and the reality which does not correspond to it.
Thus the XIX

th

Century looks upon the Middle Ages. At length, the

day arrives on which that old, sometimes age-long, desire seems
to be fully attained, reality accepts it and submits to it. We have
arrived at the heights we had in view, the goal to which we had
looked forward, the summit of time. To "not yet," has succeeded
"at last."

This was the feeling with regard to their own time held by our

fathers and all their century. Let it not be forgotten; our time is a
time which follows on a period of plenitude. Hence it is that,
inevitably, the man living on the other bank, the man of that
plenary epoch just past, who sees everything from his own view-
point, will suffer from the optical illusion of regarding our age as a
fall from plenitude, as a decadent period. But the lifelong student
of history, the practised feeler of the pulse of times, cannot allow
himself to be deceived by this system of optics based on imaginary
periods of plenitude. As I have said, for such a "plenitude of time"
to exist, it is that a long-felt desire, dragging its anxious, eager
way through centuries, is at last one day satisfied, and in fact
these plenary periods are times which are self-satisfied;
occasionally, as in the XIX

th

Century, more than satisfied with

themselves.

2

But we are now beginning to realise that these

centuries, so self-satisfied, so perfectly rounded-off, are dead
within. Genuine vital integrity does not consist in satisfaction, in

2 - In the moulds for the coinage of Hadrian, we read phrases as these: Italia Felix, Saeculum
aureum, Tellus stabilita, Temporum felicitas. Besides the great work on numismatics of
Cohen, see the coins reproduced in Rostowzeff, Social and Economic History of the Roman
Empire, 1926, Plate LII, and p. 588, note 6.

attainment, in arrival. As Cervantes said long since: "The road is
always better than the inn." When a period has satisfied its
desires, its ideal, this means that it desires nothing more; that the
wells of desire have been dried up. That is to say, our famous
plenitude is in reality a coming to an end. There are centuries
which die of self-satisfaction through not knowing how to renew
their desires, just as the happy drone dies after the nuptial flight.

3

Hence we have the astonishing fact that these epochs of so-

called plenitude have always felt in the depths of their
consciousness a special form of sadness. The desires so long in
conception, which the XIX

th

Century seems at last to realise, is

what it named for itself in a word as "modern culture." The very
name is a disturbing one; this time calls itself "modern," that is to
say, final, definitive, in whose presence all the rest is mere
preterite, humble preparation and aspiration towards this present.
Nerveless arrows which miss their mark!

4

Do we not here touch upon the essential difference between

our time and that which has just passed away? Our time, in fact,
no longer regards itself as definitive, on the contrary, it discovers,
though obscurely, deep within itself an intuition that there are no
such epochs, definitive, assured, crystallised for ever. Quite the
reverse, the claim that a certain type of existence—the so-called
"modern culture"—is definitive seems to us an incredible narrowing
down and shutting out of the field of vision. And as an effect of
this feeling we enjoy a delightful impression of having escaped
from a hermetically sealed enclosure, of having regained freedom,

3 - The wonderful pages of Hegel on periods of self-satisfaction in his Philosophy of History
should be read.
4 - The primary meaning of the words "modern," "modernity," with which recent times have
baptised themselves, brings out very sharply that feeling of "the height of time" which I am at
present analysing. "Modern" is what is "in the fashion," that is to say, the new fashion or
modification which has arisen over against the old traditional fashions used in the past. The
word "modern" then expresses a consciousness of a new life, superior to the old one, and at
the same time an imperative call to be at the height of one's time. For the "modern" man, not
to be "modern" means to fall below the historic level.

of coming out once again under the stars into the world of reality,
the world of the profound, the terrible, the unforeseeable, the
inexhaustible, where everything is possible, the best and the
worst. That faith in modern culture was a gloomy one. It meant
that to-morrow was to be in all essentials similar to to-day, that
progress consisted merely in advancing, for all time to be, along a
road identical to the one already under our feet. Such a road is
rather a kind of elastic prison which stretches on without ever
setting us free. When in the early stages of the Empire some
cultured provincial—Lucan or Seneca—arrived in Rome, and saw
the magnificent imperial buildings, symbols of an enduring power,
he felt his heart contract within him. Nothing new could now
happen in the world. Rome was eternal. And if there is a
melancholy of ruins which rises above them like exhalations from
stagnant waters, this sensitive provincial felt a melancholy no less
heavy, though of opposite sign: the melancholy of buildings meant
for eternity.

Over against this emotional state, is it not clear that the

feelings of our time are more like the noisy joy of children let
loose from school? Nowadays we no longer know what is going to
happen to-morrow in our world, and this causes us a secret joy;
because that very impossibility of foresight, that horizon ever
open to all contingencies, constitute authentic life, the true
fullness of our existence. This diagnosis, the other aspect of
which, it is true, is lacking, stands in contrast to the plaints of
decadence which wail forth in the pages of so many contemporary
writers. We are in the presence of an optical illusion arising from a
multiplicity of causes. I shall consider certain of these some other
time; for the moment I wish to advance the most obvious one. It
arises from the fact that, faithful to an ideology which I consider a
thing of the past, only the political or cultural aspects of history
are considered, and it is not realised that these are the mere
surface of history; that in preference to, and deeper than, these,

the reality of history lies in biological power, in pure vitality, in
what there is in man of cosmic energy, not identical with, but
related to, the energy which agitates the sea, fecundates the
beast, causes the tree to flower and the star to shine.

As an offset to the diagnosis of pessimism, I recommend the

following consideration. Decadence is, of course, a comparative
concept. Decline is from a higher to a lower state. But this
comparison may be made from the most varied points of view
imaginable. To the manufacturer of amber mouthpieces this is a
decadent world, for nowadays hardly anyone smokes from amber
mouthpieces. Other view-points may be more dignified than this
one, but strictly speaking none of them escapes being partial,
arbitrary, external to that very life whose constituents we are
attempting to assay. There is only one view-point which is
justifiable and natural; to take up one's position in life itself, to
look at it from the inside, and to see if it feels itself decadent,
that is to say, diminished, weakened, insipid. But even when we
look at it from the inside, how can we know whether life feels
itself on the decline or not? To my mind there can be no doubt as
to the decisive symptom: a life which does not give the preference
to any other life, of any previous period, which therefore prefers
its own existence, cannot in any serious sense be called decadent.
This is the point towards which all my discussion of the problem of
the height of times was leading, and it turns out that it is precisely
our time which in this matter enjoys a most strange sensation,
unique, as far as I know, in recorded history.

In the drawing-room gatherings of the last century there

inevitably arrived a moment when the ladies and their tame poets
put this question, one to the other: "At what period of history
would you like to have lived?" And straightaway each of them,
making a bundle of his own personal existence, started off on an
imaginary tramp along the roads of history in search of a period
into which that existence might most delightfully fit. And the

reason was that although feeling itself, because it felt itself,
arrived at plenitude, the XIX

th

Century was still, in actual fact,

bound to the past, on whose shoulders it thought it was standing;
it saw itself actually as the culmination of that past. Hence it still
believed in periods relatively classic—the age of Pericles, the
Renaissance—during which the values that hold to-day were
prepared. This should be enough to cause suspicion of these
periods of plenitude; they have their faces turned backwards,
their eyes are on the past which they consider fulfilled in
themselves.

And now, what would be the sincere reply of any

representative man of to-day if such a question were put to him? I
think there can be no doubt about it; any past time, without
exception, would give him the feeling of a restricted space in
which he could not breathe. That is to say, the man of to-day feels
that his life is more a life than any past one, or, to put it the other
way about, the entirety of past time seems small to actual
humanity. This intuition as regards present-day existence renders
null by its stark clarity any consideration about decadence that is
not very cautiously thought out. To start with, our present life
feels itself as ampler than all previous lives. How can it regard
itself as decadent? Quite the contrary; what has happened is, that
through sheer regard of itself as "more" life, it has lost all respect,
all consideration for the past. Hence for the first time we meet
with a period which makes tabula rasa of all classicism, which
recognises in nothing that is past any possible model or standard,
and appearing as it does after so many centuries without any
break in evolution, yet gives the impression of a commencement,
a dawn, an initiation, an infancy. We look backwards and the
famous Renaissance reveals itself as a period of narrow
provincialism, of futile gestures—why not say the word?—ordinary.

Some time ago I summed up the situation in the following way:

"This grave dissociation of past and present is the generic fact of

our time and the cause of the suspicion, more or less vague, which
gives rise to the confusion characteristic of our present-day
existence. We feel that we actual men have suddenly been left
alone on the earth; that the dead did not die in appearance only
but effectively; that they can no longer help us. Any remains of
the traditional spirit have evaporated. Models, norms, standards
are no use to us. We have to solve our problems without any active
collaboration of the past, in full actuality, be they problems of art,
science, or politics. The European stands alone, without any living
ghosts by his side; like Peter Schlehmil he has lost his shadow. This
is what always happens when midday comes."

5

What, then, in a word is the "height of our times"? It is not the

fullness of time, and yet it feels itself superior to all times past,
and beyond all known fullness. It is not easy to formulate the
impression that our epoch has of itself; it believes itself more than
all the rest, and at the same time feels that it is a beginning.
What expression shall we find for it? Perhaps this one: superior to
other times, inferior to itself. Strong, indeed, and at the same
time uncertain of its destiny; proud of its strength and at the same
time fearing it.

5 - The Dehumanisation of Art.

CHAPTER IV

The Increase of Life

THE rule of the masses and the raising of the level, the height

of the time which this indicates, are in their turn only symptoms
of a more complete and more general fact. This fact is almost
grotesque and incredible in its stark and simple truth. It is just
this, that the world has suddenly grown larger, and with it and in
it, life itself. To start with, life has become, in actual fact, world-
wide in character; I mean that the content of existence for the
average man of to-day includes the whole planet; that each
individual habitually lives the life of the whole world. Something
more than a year ago the people of Seville could follow, hour by
hour, in the newspapers, what was happening to a few men near
the North Pole; that is to say, that icebergs passed drifting against
the burning background of the Andalusian landscape. Each portion
of the earth is no longer shut up in its own geometrical position,
but for many of the purposes of human life acts upon other
portions of the planet. In accordance with the physical principle
that things are wherever their effects are felt, we can attribute
to-day to any point on the globe the most effective ubiquity. This
nearness of the far-off, this presence of the absent, has extended
in fabulous proportions the horizon of each individual existence.

And the world has also increased from the view-point of time.

Prehistory and archaeology have discovered historical periods of
fantastic duration. Whole civilisations and empires of which till
recently not even the name was suspected, have been annexed to
our knowledge like new continents. The illustrated paper and the
film have brought these far-off portions of the universe before the
immediate vision of the crowd.

But this spatio-temporal increase of the world would of itself

signify nothing. Physical space and time are the absolutely stupid
aspects of the universe. Hence, there is more reason than is
generally allowed in that worship of mere speed which is at
present being indulged in by our contemporaries. Speed, which is
made up of space and time, is no less stupid than its constituents,
but it serves to nullify them. One stupidity can only be overcome
by another. It was a question of honour for man to triumph over
cosmic space and time,

6

which are entirely devoid of meaning, and

there is no reason for surprise at the fact that we get a childish
pleasure out of the indulgence in mere speed, by means of which
we kill space and strangle time. By annulling them, we give them
life, we make them serve vital purposes, we can be in more places
than we could before, enjoy more comings and goings, consume
more cosmic time in less vital time.

But after all, the really important increase of our world does

not lie in its greater dimensions, but in its containing many more
things. Each of these things—the word is to be taken in its widest
acceptation—is something which we can desire, attempt, do,
undo, meet with, enjoy or repel; all notions which imply vital
activities. Take any one of our ordinary activities; buying, for
example. Imagine two men, one of the present day and one of the
XVIII

th

Century, possessed of equal fortunes relatively to money-

values in their respective periods, and compare the stock of
purchasable things offered to each. The difference is almost
fabulous. The range of possibilities opened out before the present-
day purchaser has become practically limitless. It is not easy to
think of and wish for anything which is not to be found in the
market, and vice versa, it is not possible for a man to think of and
wish for everything that is actually offered for sale. I shall be told

6 - It is precisely because man's vital time is limited, precisely because he is mortal, that he
needs to triumph over distance and delay. For an immortal being, the motor-car would have
no meaning.

that with a fortune relatively equal, the man of to-day cannot buy
more goods than the man of the XVIII

th

Century. This is not the

case. Many more things can be bought to-day, because
manufacture has cheapened all articles. But after all, even if it
were the case, it would not concern my point, rather would it
stress what I am trying to say. The purchasing activity ends in the
decision to buy a certain object, but for that very reason it is
previously an act of choice, and the choice begins by putting
before oneself the possibilities offered by the market. Hence it
follows that life, in its "purchasing" aspect, consists primarily in
living over the possibilities of buying as such. When people talk of
life they generally forget something which to me seems most
essential, namely, that our existence is at every instant and
primarily the consciousness of what is possible to us. If at every
moment we had before us no more than one possibility, it would
be meaningless to give it that name. Rather would it be a pure
necessity. But there it is: this strangest of facts that a
fundamental condition of our existence is that it always has before
it various prospects, which by their variety acquire the character
of possibilities among which we have to make our choice.

7

To say

that we live is the same as saying that we find ourselves in an
atmosphere of definite possibilities. This atmosphere we generally
call our "circumstances." All life means finding oneself in
"circumstances" or in the world around us.

8

For this is the

fundamental meaning of the idea "world." The world is the sum-
total of our vital possibilities. It is not then something apart from
and foreign to our existence, it is its actual periphery. It
represents what it is within our power to be, our vital potentiality.
This must be reduced to the concrete in order to be realised, or

7 - In the worst case, if the world seemed reduced to one single outlet there would still be two:
either that or to leave the world. But leaving the world forms part of the world, as a door is
part of a room.
8 - See the prologue to my first book, Meditaciones del Quijote, 1916. In Las Atlantidas I use
the word horizon. See also the essay El origen deportivo del Estado, 1926, now included in
Vol. 7 of El Espectador.

putting it another way, we become only a part of what it is
possible for us to be. Hence it is that the world seems to us
something enormous, and ourselves a tiny object within it. The
world or our possible existence is always greater than our destiny
or actual existence. But what I wanted to make clear just now was
the extent to which the life of man has increased in the dimension
of potentiality. It can now count on a range of possibilities
fabulously greater than ever before. In the intellectual order it
now finds more "paths of ideation," more problems, more data,
more sciences, more points of view. Whereas the number of
occupations in primitive life can almost be counted on the fingers
of one hand—shepherd, hunter, warrior, seer—the list of possible
avocations to-day is immeasurably long. Something similar occurs
in the matter of pleasures, although (and this is a phenomenon of
more importance than it seems) the catalogue of pleasures is not
so overflowing as in other aspects of life. Nevertheless, for the
man of the middle classes who lives in towns—and towns are
representative of modern existence—the possibilities of enjoyment
have increased, in the course of the present century, in fantastic
proportion. But the increase of vital potentiality is not limited to
what we have said up to this. It has also grown in a more
immediate and mysterious direction. It is a constant and well-
known fact that in physical effort connected with sport,
performances are "put up" to-day which excel to an extraordinary
degree those known in the past. It is not enough to wonder at each
one in particular and to note that it beats the record, we must
note the impression that their frequency leaves on the mind,
convincing us that the human organism possesses in our days
capacities superior to any it has previously had. For something
similar happens in the case of science. In no more than a decade
science has extended the cosmic horizon to an incredible degree.
The physics of Einstein moves through spaces so vast, that the old

physics of Newton seems by comparison lodged in an attic.

9

And

this extensive increase is due to an intensive increase in scientific
precision. Einstein's physics arose through attention to minute
differences which previously were despised and disregarded as
seeming of no importance. The atom, yesterday the final limit of
the world, turns out to-day to have swollen to such an extent that
it becomes a planetary system. In speaking of all this I am not
referring to its importance in the perfecting of culture—that does
not interest me for the moment—but as regards the increase of
subjective potency which it implies. I am not stressing the fact
that the physics of Einstein is more exact than the physics of
Newton, but that the man Einstein is capable of greater
exactitude and liberty of spirit,

10

than the man Newton; just as the

boxing champion of to-day can give blows of greater "punch" than
have ever been given before, just as the cinematograph and the
illustrated journals place before the eyes of the average man the
remotest spots on the planet; newspapers and conversations
supply him with accounts of these new intellectual feats, which
are confirmed by the recently-invented technical apparatus which
he sees in the shop windows. All this fills his mind with an
impression of fabulous potentiality. By what I have said I do not
mean to imply that human life is to-day better than at other
times. I have not spoken of the quality of actual existence, but of
its quantitative advance, its increase of potency. I believe I am
thus giving an exact description of the conscience of the man of
to-day, his vital tone, which consists in his feeling himself
possessed of greater potentiality than ever before and in all
previous time seeming dwarfed by the contrast. This description
was necessary in order to meet the pronouncements on

9 - The world of Newton was infinite; but this infinity was not a matter of size, but an empty
generalisation, an abstract, inane Utopia. The world of Einstein is finite, but full and concrete
in all its parts, consequently a world richer in things and effectively of greater extent.
10 - Liberty of spirit, that is to say, intellectual power, is measured by its capacity to dissociate
ideas traditionally inseparable. It costs more to dissociate ideas than to associate them, as
Kohler has shown in his investigations on the intelligence of chimpanzees. Human
understanding has never had greater power of dissociation than at present.

decadence, and specifically on the decadence of the West, which
have filled the air in the last decade. Recall the argument with
which I set out, and which appears to me as simple as it is
obvious. It is useless to talk of decadence without making clear
what is undergoing decay. Does this pessimistic term refer to
culture? Is there a decadence of European culture? Or is there
rather only a decadence of the national organisations of Europe?
Let us take this to be the case. Would that entitle us to speak of
Western decadence? By no means, for such forms of decadence are
partial decreases relating to secondary historical elements—
culture and nationality. There is only one absolute decadence; it
consists in a lowering of vitality, and that only exists when it is felt
as such. It is for this reason that I have delayed over the
consideration of a phenomenon generally overlooked: the
consciousness or sensation that every period has experienced of its
own vital level. This led us to speak of the "plenitude" which some
centuries have felt in regard to others which, conversely, looked
upon themselves as having fallen from greater heights, from some
far-off brilliant golden age. And I ended by noting the very plain
fact that our age is characterised by the strange presumption that
it is superior to all past time; more than that, by its leaving out of
consideration all that is past, by recognising no classical or
normative epochs, by looking on itself as a new life superior to all
previous forms and irreducible to them. I doubt if our age can be
understood without keeping firm hold on this observation, for that
is precisely its special problem. If it felt that it was decadent, it
would look on other ages as superior to itself, which would be
equivalent to esteeming and admiring them and venerating the
principles by which they were inspired. Our age would then have
clear and firmly held ideals, even if incapable of realising them.
But the truth is exactly the contrary; we live at a time when man
believes himself fabulously capable of creation, but he does not
know what to create. Lord of all things, he is not lord of himself.
He feels lost amid his own abundance. With more means at its

disposal, more knowledge, more technique than ever, it turns out
that the world to-day goes the same way as the worst of worlds
that have been; it simply drifts.

Hence the strange combination of a time of power and a sense

of insecurity which has taken up its abode in the soul of modern
man. To him is happening what was said of the Regent during the
minority of Louis XV: he had all the talents except the talent to
make use of them. To the XIX

th

Century many things seemed no

longer possible, firm-fixed as was its faith in progress. To-day, by
the very fact that everything seems possible to us, we have a
feeling that the worst of all is possible: retrogression, barbarism,
decadence.

11

This of itself would not be a bad symptom; it would

mean that we are once again forming contact with that insecurity
which is essential to all forms of life, that anxiety both dolorous
and delicious contained in every moment, if we know how to live
it to its innermost core, right down to its palpitating vitals.
Generally we refuse to feel that fearsome pulsation which makes
of a moment of sincerity a tiny fleeting heart; we strain in the
attempt to find security and to render ourselves insensible to the
fundamental drama of our destiny, by steeping it in habits, usages,
topics—in every kind of chloroform. It is an excellent thing, then,
that for the first time for nearly three centuries we are surprised
to find ourselves with the feeling that we do not know what is
going to happen to-morrow.

Every man who adopts a serious attitude before his own

existence and makes himself fully responsible for it will feel a
certain kind of insecurity which urges him to keep ever on the
alert. The gesture which the Roman Army Orders imposed on the
sentinel of the Legion was that he should keep his finger on his lips
to avoid drowsiness and to maintain his alertness. The gesture has

11 - This is the root-origin of all our diagnoses of decadence. Not that we are decadent, but
that, being predisposed to admit every possibility, we do not exclude that of decadence.

its value, it seems to ordain an even greater silence during the
silence of the night, so as to be able to catch the sound of the
secret germination of the future. The security of periods of
"plenitude"—such as the last century—is an optical illusion which
leads to neglect of the future, all direction of which is handed
over to the mechanism of the universe. Both progressive
Liberalism and Marxist Socialism presume that what is desired by
them as the best or possible futures will be necessarily realised,
with necessity similar to that of astronomy. With consciences
lulled by this idea, they have cast away the rudder of history, have
ceased to keep their watch, have lost their agility and their
efficiency. And so, life has escaped from their grasp, has become
completely unsubmissive and to-day is floating around without any
fixed course. Under his mask of generous futurism, the progressive
no longer concerns himself with the future; convinced that it holds
in store for him neither surprises nor secrets, nothing adventurous,
nothing essentially new; assured that the world will now proceed
on a straight course, neither turning aside nor dropping back, he
puts away from him all anxiety about the future and takes his
stand in the definite present. Can we be surprised that the world
to-day seems empty of purposes, anticipations, ideals? Nobody has
concerned himself with supplying them. Such has been the
desertion of the directing minorities, which is always found on the
reverse side of the rebellion of the masses.

But it is time for us to return to the consideration of this last.

After having stressed the favourable aspect presented by the
triumph of the masses, it will be well to descend now by the other
slope, a much more dangerous one.

CHAPTER V

A Statistical Fact

THIS essay is an attempt to discover the diagnosis of our time,

of our actual existence. We have indicated the first part of it,
which may be resumed thus: our life as a programme of
possibilities is magnificent, exuberant, superior to all others
known to history. But by the very fact that its scope is greater, it
has overflowed all the channels, principles, norms, ideals handed
down by tradition. It is more life than all previous existence, and
therefore all the more problematical. It can find no direction from
the past.

12

It has to discover its own destiny.

But now we must complete the diagnosis. Life, which means

primarily what is possible for us to be, is likewise, and for that
very reason, a choice, from among these possibilities, of what we
actually are going to be. Our circumstances—these possibilities—
form the portion of life given us, imposed on us. This constitutes
what we call the world. Life does not choose its own world, it
finds itself, to start with, in a world determined and
unchangeable: the world of the present. Our world is that portion
of destiny which goes to make up our life. But this vital destiny is
not a kind of mechanism. We are not launched into existence like
a shot from a gun, with its trajectory absolutely predetermined.
The destiny under which we fall when we come into this world—it
is always this world, the actual one—consists in the exact contrary.
Instead of imposing on us one trajectory, it imposes several, and
consequently forces us to choose. Surprising condition, this, of our
existence! To live is to feel ourselves fatally obliged to exercise
our liberty, to decide what we are going to be in this world. Not

12 - We shall see, nevertheless, how it is possible to obtain from the past, if not positive
orientation, certain negative counsel. The past will not tell us what we ought to do, but it will
what we ought to avoid.

for a single moment is our activity of decision allowed to rest.
Even when in desperation we abandon ourselves to whatever may
happen, we have decided not to decide.

It is, then, false to say that in life "circumstances decide." On

the contrary, circumstances are the dilemma, constantly renewed,
in presence of which we have to make our decision; what actually
decides is our character. All this is equally valid for collective life.
In it also there is, first, a horizon of possibilities, and then, a
determination which chooses and decides on the effective form of
collective existence. This determination has its origin in the
character of society, or what comes to the same thing, of the type
of men dominant in it. In our time it is the mass-man who
dominates, it is he who decides. It will not do to say that this is
what happened in the period of democracy, of universal suffrage.
Under universal suffrage, the masses do not decide, their role
consists in supporting the decision of one minority or other. It was
these who presented their "programmes"—excellent word. Such
programmes were, in fact, programmes of collective life. In them
the masses were invited to accept a line of decision.

To-day something very different is happening. If we observe

the public life of the countries where the triumph of the masses
has made most advance—these are the Mediterranean countries—
we are surprised to find that politically they are living from day to
day. The phenomenon is an extraordinarily strange one. Public
authority is in the hands of a representative of the masses. These
are so powerful that they have wiped out all opposition. They are
in possession of power in such an unassailable manner that it
would be difficult to find in history examples of a Government so
all-powerful as these are. And yet public authority—the
Government—exists from hand to mouth, it does not offer itself as
a frank solution for the future, it represents no clear
announcement of the future, it does not stand out as the
beginning of something whose development or evolution is

conceivable. In short, it lives without any vital programme, any
plan of existence. It does not know where it is going, because,
strictly speaking, it has no fixed road, no predetermined
trajectory before it. When such a public authority attempts to
justify itself it makes no reference at all to the future. On the
contrary, it shuts itself up in the present, and says with perfect
sincerity: "I am an abnormal form of Government imposed by
circumstances." Hence its activities are reduced to dodging the
difficulties of the hour; not solving them, but escaping from them
for the time being, employing any methods whatsoever, even at
the cost of accumulating thereby still greater difficulties for the
hour which follows. Such has public power always been when
exercised directly by the masses: omnipotent and ephemeral. The
mass-man is he whose life lacks any purpose, and simply goes
drifting along. Consequently, though his possibilities and his
powers be enormous, he constructs nothing. And it is this type of
man who decides in our time. It will be well, then, that we
analyse his character.

The key to this analysis is found when, returning to the

starting-point of this essay, we ask ourselves: "Whence have come
all these multitudes which nowadays fill to overflowing the stage
of history?" Some years ago the eminent economist, Werner
Sombart, laid stress on a very simple fact, which I am surprised is
not present to every mind which meditates on contemporary
events. This very simple fact is sufficient of itself to clarify our
vision of the Europe of to-day, or if not sufficient, puts us on the
road to enlightenment. The fact is this: from the time European
history begins in the VI

th

Century up to the year 1800—that is,

through the course of twelve centuries—Europe does not succeed
in reaching a total population greater than 180 million inhabitants.
Now, from 1800 to 1914—little more than a century—the
population of Europe mounts from 180 to 460 millions! I take it
that the contrast between these figures leaves no doubt as to the

prolific qualities of the last century. In three generations it
produces a gigantic mass of humanity which, launched like a
torrent over the historic area, has inundated it. This fact, I
repeat, should suffice to make us realise the triumph of the
masses and all that is implied and announced by it. Furthermore,
it should be added as the most concrete item to that rising of the
level of existence which I have already indicated.

But at the same time this fact proves to us how unfounded is

our admiration when we lay stress on the increase of new
countries like the United States of America. We are astonished at
this increase, which has reached to 100 millions in a century, when
the really astonishing fact is the teeming fertility of Europe. Here
we have another reason for correcting the deceptive notion of the
Americanisation of Europe. Not even that characteristic which
might seem specifically American—the rapidity of increase in
population—is peculiarly such. Europe has increased in the last
century much more than America. America has been formed from
the overflow of Europe.

But although this fact ascertained by Werner Sombart is not as

well known as it should be, the confused idea of a considerable
population increase in Europe was widespread enough to render
unnecessary insistence on it. In the figures cited, then, it is not
the increase of population which interests me, but the fact that by
the contrast with the previous figures the dizzy rapidity of the
increase is brought into relief. This is the point of importance for
us at the moment. For that rapidity means that heap after heap of
human beings have been dumped on to the historic scene at such
an accelerated rate, that it has been difficult to saturate them
with traditional culture. And in fact, the average type of European
at present possesses a soul, healthier and stronger it is true than
those of the last century, but much more simple. Hence, at times
he leaves the impression of a primitive man suddenly risen in the
midst of a very old civilisation. In the schools, which were such a

source of pride to the last century, it has been impossible to do
more than instruct the masses in the technique of modern life; it
has been found impossible to educate them. They have been given
tools for an intenser form of existence, but no feeling for their
great historic duties; they have been hurriedly inoculated with the
pride and power of modern instruments, but not with their spirit.
Hence they will have nothing to do with their spirit, and the new
generations are getting ready to take over command of the world
as if the world were a paradise without trace of former footsteps,
without traditional and highly complex problems.

To the last century, then, falls the glory and the responsibility

of having let loose upon the area of history the great multitudes.
And this fact affords the most suitable view-point in order to
judge that century with equity. There must have been something
extraordinary, incomparable, in it when such harvests of human
fruit were produced in its climate. Any preference for the
principles which inspired other past ages is frivolous and ridiculous
if one does not previously show proof of having realised this
magnificent fact and attempted to digest it. The whole of history
stands out as a gigantic laboratory in which all possible
experiments have been made to obtain a formula of public life
most favourable to the plant "man." And beyond all possible
explaining away, we find ourselves face to face with the fact that,
by submitting the seed of humanity to the treatment of two
principles, liberal democracy and technical knowledge, in a single
century the species in Europe has been triplicated.

Such an overwhelming fact forces us, unless we prefer not to

use our reason, to draw these conclusions: first, that liberal
democracy based on technical knowledge is the highest type of
public life hitherto known; secondly, that that type may not be the
best imaginable, but the one we imagine as superior to it must
preserve the essence of those two principles; and thirdly, that to

return to any forms of existence inferior to that of the XIX

th

Century is suicidal.

Once we recognise this with all the clearness that the clearness

of the fact itself demands we must then rise up against the XIX

th

Century. If it is evident that there was in it something
extraordinary and incomparable, it is no less so that it must have
suffered from certain radical vices, certain constitutional defects,
when it brought into being a caste of men—the mass-man in revolt
—who are placing in imminent danger those very principles to
which they owe their existence. If that human type continues to
be master in Europe, thirty years will suffice to send our continent
back to barbarism. Legislative and industrial technique will
disappear with the same facility with which so many trade secrets
have often disappeared.

13

The whole of life will be contracted.

The actual abundance of possibilities will change into practical
scarcity, a pitiful impotence, a real decadence. For the rebellion
of the masses is one and the same thing with what Rathenau
called "the vertical invasion of the barbarians." It is of great
importance, then, to understand thoroughly this mass-man with
his potentialities of the greatest good and the greatest evil.

13 - Hermann Wely, one of the greatest of present-day physicists, the companion and
continuer of the work of Einstein, is in the habit of saying in conversation that if ten or twelve
specified individuals were to die suddenly, it is almost certain that the marvels of physics to-
day would be lost for ever to humanity. A preparation of many centuries has been needed in
order to accommodate the mental organ to the abstract complexity of physical theory. Any
event might annihilate such prodigious human possibilities, which in addition are the basis of
future technical development.

CHAPTER VI

The Dissection of the Mass-Man Begins

WHAT is he like, this mass-man who to-day dominates public

life, political and non-political, and why is he like it, that is, how
has he been produced?

It will be well to answer both questions together, for they

throw light on one another. The man who to-day is attempting to
take the lead in European existence is very different from the man
who directed the XIX

th

Century, but he was produced and prepared

by the XIX

th

Century. Any keen mind of the years 1820, 1850, and

1880 could by simple a priori reasoning, foresee the gravity of the
present historical situation, and in fact nothing is happening now
which was not foreseen a hundred years ago. "The masses are
advancing," said Hegel in apocalyptic fashion. "Without some new
spiritual influence, our age, which is a revolutionary age, will
produce a catastrophe," was the pronouncement of Comte. "I see
the flood-tide of nihilism rising," shrieked Nietzsche from a crag of
the Engadine. It is false to say that history cannot be foretold.
Numberless times this has been done. If the future offered no
opening to prophecy, it could not be understood when fulfilled in
the present and on the point of falling back into the past. The idea
that the historian is on the reverse side a prophet, sums up the
whole philosophy of history. It is true that it is only possible to
anticipate the general structure of the future, but that is all that
we in truth understand of the past or of the present. Accordingly,
if you want a good view of your own age, look at it from far off.
From what distance? The answer is simple. Just far enough to
prevent you seeing Cleopatra's nose.

What appearance did life present to that multitudinous man

who in ever-increasing abundance the XIX

th

Century kept

producing? To start with, an appearance of universal material
ease. Never had the average man been able to solve his economic
problem with greater facility. Whilst there was a proportionate
decrease of great fortunes and life became harder for the
individual worker, the middle classes found their economic horizon
widened every day. Every day added a new luxury to their
standard of life. Every day their position was more secure and
more independent of another's will. What before would have been
considered one of fortune's gifts, inspiring humble gratitude
towards destiny, was converted into a right, not to be grateful for,
but to be insisted on.

From 1900 on, the worker likewise begins to extend and assure

his existence. Nevertheless, he has to struggle to obtain his end.
He does not, like the middle class, find the benefit attentively
served up to him by a society and a state which are a marvel of
organisation. To this ease and security of economic conditions are
to be added the physical ones, comfort and public order. Life runs
on smooth rails, and there is no likelihood of anything violent or
dangerous breaking in on it. Such a free, untrammelled situation
was bound to instil into the depths of such souls an idea of
existence which might be expressed in the witty and penetrating
phrase of an old country like ours: "Wide is Castile." That is to say,
in all its primary and decisive aspects, life presented itself to the
new man as exempt from restrictions. The realisation of this fact
and of its importance becomes immediate when we remember
that such a freedom of existence was entirely lacking to the
common men of the past. On the contrary, for them life was a
burdensome destiny, economically and physically. From birth,
existence meant to them an accumulation of impediments which
they were obliged to suffer, without possible solution other than to
adapt themselves to them, to settle down in the narrow space
they left available.

But still more evident is the contrast of situations, if we pass

from the material to the civil and moral. The average man, from
the second half of the XIX

th

Century on, finds no social barriers

raised against him. That is to say, that as regards the forms of
public life he no longer finds himself from birth confronted with
obstacles and limitations. There is nothing to force him to limit his
existence. Here again, "Wide is Castile." There are no "estates" or
"castes." There are no civil privileges. The ordinary man learns
that all men are equal before the law.

Never in the course of history had man been placed in vital

surroundings even remotely familiar to those set up by the
conditions just mentioned. We are, in fact, confronted with a
radical innovation in human destiny, implanted by the XIX

th

Century. A new stage has been mounted for human existence, new
both in the physical and the social aspects. Three principles have
made possible this new world: liberal democracy, scientific
experiment, and industrialism. The two latter may be summed up
in one word: technicism. Not one of those principles was invented
by the XIX

th

Century; they proceed from the two previous

centuries. The glory of the XIX

th

Century lies not in their discovery,

but in their implantation. No one but recognises that fact. But it is
not sufficient to recognise it in the abstract, it is necessary to
realise its inevitable consequences.

The XIX

th

Century was of its essence revolutionary. This aspect

is not to be looked for in the scenes of the barricades, which are
mere incidents, but in the fact that it placed the average man—
the great social mass—in conditions of life radically opposed to
those by which he had always been surrounded. It turned his
public existence upside down. Revolution is not the uprising
against pre-existing order, but the setting up of a new order
contradictory to the traditional one. Hence there is no
exaggeration in saying that the man who is the product of the XIX

th

Century is, for the effects of public life, a man apart from all

other men. The XVIII

th

-Century man differs, of course, from the

XVII

th

-Century man, and this one in turn from his fellow of the XVI

th

Century, but they are all related, similar, even identical in
essentials when confronted with this new man. For the "common"
man of all periods "life" had principally meant limitation,
obligation, dependence; in a word, pressure. Say oppression, if
you like, provided it be understood not only in the juridical and
social sense, but also in the cosmic. For it is this latter which has
never been lacking up to a hundred years ago, the date at which
starts the practically limitless expansion of scientific technique—
physical and administrative. Previously, even for the rich and
powerful, the world was a place of poverty, difficulty and danger.

14

The world which surrounds the new man from his birth does

not compel him to limit himself in any fashion, it sets up no veto
in opposition to him; on the contrary, it incites his appetite, which
in principle can increase indefinitely. Now it turns out—and this is
most important—that this world of the XIX

th

and early XX

th

Centuries not only has the perfections and the completeness which
it actually possesses, but furthermore suggests to those who dwell
in it the radical assurance that to-morrow it will be still richer,
ampler, more perfect, as if it enjoyed a spontaneous,
inexhaustible power of increase. Even to-day, in spite of some
signs which are making a tiny breach in that sturdy faith, even to-
day, there are few men who doubt that motorcars will in five
years' time be more comfortable and cheaper than to-day. They
believe in this as they believe that the sun will rise in the morning.
The metaphor is an exact one. For, in fact, the common man,
finding himself in a world so excellent, technically and socially,
believes that it has been produced by nature, and never thinks of

14 - However rich an individual might be in relation to his fellows, as the world in its totality
was poor, the sphere of conveniences and commodities with which his wealth furnished him
was very limited. The life of the average man to-day is easier, more convenient and safer than
that of the most powerful of another age. What difference does it make to him not to be richer
than others if the world is richer and furnishes him with magnificent roads, railway,
telegraphs, hotels, personal safety and aspirin?

the personal efforts of highly-endowed individuals which the
creation of this new world presupposed. Still less will he admit the
notion that all these facilities still require the support of certain
difficult human virtues, the least failure of which would cause the
rapid disappearance of the whole magnificent edifice.

This leads us to note down in our psychological chart of the

mass-man of to-day two fundamental traits: the free expansion of
his vital desires, and therefore, of his personality; and his radical
ingratitude towards all that has made possible the ease of his
existence. These traits together make up the well-known
psychology of the spoilt child. And in fact it would entail no error
to use this psychology as a "sight" through which to observe the
soul of the masses of to-day. Heir to an ample and generous past—
generous both in ideals and in activities—the new commonalty has
been spoiled by the world around it. To spoil means to put no limit
on caprice, to give one the impression that everything is permitted
to him and that he has no obligations. The young child exposed to
this regime has no experience of its own limits. By reason of the
removal of all external restraint, all clashing with other things, he
comes actually to believe that he is the only one that exists, and
gets used to not considering others, especially not considering
them as superior to himself. This feeling of another's superiority
could only be instilled into him by someone who, being stronger
than he is, should force him to give up some desire, to restrict
himself, to restrain himself. He would then have learned this
fundamental discipline: "Here I end and here begins another more
powerful than I am. In the world, apparently, there are two
people: I myself and another superior to me." The ordinary man of
past times was daily taught this elemental wisdom by the world
about him, because it was a world so rudely organised, that
catastrophes were frequent, and there was nothing in it certain,
abundant, stable. But the new masses find themselves in the
presence of a prospect full of possibilities, and furthermore, quite

secure, with everything ready to their hands, independent of any
previous efforts on their part, just as we find the sun in the
heavens without our hoisting it up on our shoulders. No human
being thanks another for the air he breathes, for no one has
produced the air for him; it belongs to the sum-total of what "is
there," of which we say "it is natural," because it never fails. And
these spoiled masses are unintelligent enough to believe that the
material and social organisation, placed at their disposition like
the air, is of the same origin, since apparently it never fails them,
and is almost as perfect as the natural scheme of things.

My thesis, therefore, is this: the very perfection with which the

XIX

th

Century gave an organisation to certain orders of existence

has caused the masses benefited thereby to consider it, not as an
organised, but as a natural system. Thus is explained and defined
the absurd state of mind revealed by these masses; they are only
concerned with their own well-being, and at the same time they
remain alien to the cause of that well-being. As they do not see,
behind the benefits of civilisation, marvels of invention and
construction which can only be maintained by great effort and
foresight, they imagine that their role is limited to demanding
these benefits peremptorily, as if they were natural rights. In the
disturbances caused by scarcity of food, the mob goes in search of
bread, and the means it employs is generally to wreck the
bakeries. This may serve as a symbol of the attitude adopted, on a
greater and more complicated scale, by the masses of to-day
towards the civilisation by which they are supported.

CHAPTER VII

Noble Life and Common Life, or Effort and Inertia

TO start with, we are what our world invites us to be, and the

basic features of our soul are impressed upon it by the form of its
surroundings as in a mould. Naturally, for our life is no other than
our relations with the world around. The general aspect which it
presents to us will form the general aspect of our own life. It is for
this reason that I stress so much the observation that the world
into which the masses of to-day have been born displays features
radically new to history. Whereas in past times life for the average
man meant finding all around him difficulties, dangers, want,
limitations of his destiny, dependence, the new world appears as a
sphere of practically limitless possibilities, safe, and independent
of anyone. Based on this primary and lasting impression, the mind
of every contemporary man will be formed, just as previous minds
were formed on the opposite impression. For that basic impression
becomes an interior voice which ceaselessly utters certain words
in the depths of each individual, and tenaciously suggests to him a
definition of life which is, at the same time, a moral imperative.
And if the traditional sentiment whispered: "To live is to feel
oneself limited, and therefore to have to count with that which
limits us," the newest voice shouts: "To live is to meet with no
limitation whatever and, consequently, to abandon oneself calmly
to one's self. Practically nothing is impossible, nothing is
dangerous, and, in principle, nobody is superior to anybody." This
basic experience completely modifies the traditional, persistent
structure of the mass-man. For the latter always felt himself, by
his nature, confronted with material limitations and higher social
powers. Such, in his eyes, was life. If he succeeded in improving
his situation, if he climbed the social ladder, he attributed this to
a piece of fortune which was favourable to him in particular. And if

not to this, then to an enormous effort, of which he knew well
what it had cost him. In both cases it was a question of an
exception to the general character of life and the world; an
exception which, as such, was due to some very special cause.

But the modern mass finds complete freedom as its natural,

established condition, without any special cause for it. Nothing
from outside incites it to recognise limits to itself and,
consequently, to refer at all times to other authorities higher than
itself. Until lately, the Chinese peasant believed that the welfare
of his existence depended on the private virtues which the
Emperor was pleased to possess. Therefore, his life was constantly
related to this supreme authority on which it depended. But the
man we are now analysing accustoms himself not to appeal from
his own to any authority outside him. He is satisfied with himself
exactly as he is. Ingenuously, without any need of being vain, as
the most natural thing in the world, he will tend to consider and
affirm as good everything he finds within himself: opinions,
appetites, preferences, tastes. Why not, if, as we have seen,
nothing and nobody force him to realise that he is a second-class
man, subject to many limitations, incapable of creating or
conserving that very organisation which gives his life the fullness
and contentedness on which he bases this assertion of his
personality?

The mass-man would never have accepted authority external

to himself had not his surroundings violently forced him to do so.
As to-day, his surroundings do not so force him, the everlasting
mass-man, true to his character, ceases to appeal to other
authority and feels himself lord of his own existence. On the
contrary the select man, the excellent man is urged, by interior
necessity, to appeal from himself to some standard beyond
himself, superior to himself, whose service he freely accepts. Let
us recall that at the start we distinguished the excellent man from
the common man by saying that the former is the one who makes

great demands on himself, and the latter the one who makes no
demands on himself, but contents himself with what he is, and is
delighted with himself.

15

Contrary to what is usually thought, it is

the man of excellence, and not the common man who lives in
essential servitude. Life has no savour for him unless he makes it
consist in service to something transcendental. Hence he does not
look upon the necessity of serving as an oppression. When, by
chance, such necessity is lacking, he grows restless and invents
some new standard, more difficult, more exigent, with which to
coerce himself. This is life lived as a discipline—the noble life.
Nobility is defined by the demands it makes on us—by obligations,
not by rights. Noblesse oblige. "To live as one likes is plebeian; the
noble man aspires to order and law" (Goethe). The privileges of
nobility are not in their origin concessions or favours; on the
contrary, they are conquests. And their maintenance supposes, in
principle, that the privileged individual is capable of reconquering
them, at any moment, if it were necessary, and anyone were to
dispute them.

16

Private rights or privileges are not, then, passive

possession and mere enjoyment, but they represent the standard
attained by personal effort. On the other hand, common rights,
such as those "of the man and the citizen," are passive property,
pure usufruct and benefit, the generous gift of fate which every
man finds before him, and which answers to no effort whatever,
unless it be that of breathing and avoiding insanity. I would say,
then, that an impersonal right is held, a personal one is upheld.

It is annoying to see the degeneration suffered in ordinary

speech by a word so inspiring as "nobility." For, by coming to mean
for many people hereditary "noble blood," it is changed into
something similar to common rights, into a static, passive quality

15 - That man is intellectually of the mass who, in face of any problem, is satisfied with
thinking the first thing he finds in his head. On the contrary, the excellent man is he who
contemns what he finds in his mind without previous effort, and only accepts as worthy of
him what is still far above him and what requires a further effort in order to be reached.
16 - Vide España Invertebrada (1922), p. 156.

which is received and transmitted like something inert. But the
strict sense, the etymon of the word nobility is essentially
dynamic. Noble means the "well known," that is, known by
everyone, famous, he who has made himself known by excelling
the anonymous mass. It implies an unusual effort as the cause of
his fame. Noble, then, is equivalent to effortful, excellent. The
nobility or fame of the son is pure benefit. The son is known
because the father made himself famous. He is known by
reflection, and in fact, hereditary nobility has an indirect
character, it is mirrored light, lunar nobility, something derived
from the dead. The only thing left to it of living, authentic,
dynamic is the impulse it stirs in the descendant to maintain the
level of effort reached by the ancestor. Always, even in this
altered sense, noblesse oblige. The original noble lays an
obligation on himself, the noble heir receives the obligation with
his inheritance. But in any case there is a certain contradiction in
the passing-on of nobility from the first noble to his successors.
The Chinese, more logical, invert the order of transmission; it is
not the father who ennobles the son, but the son who, by
acquiring noble rank, communicates it to his forbears, by his
personal efforts bringing fame to his humble stock. Hence, when
granting degrees of nobility, they are graduated by the number of
previous generations which are honoured; there are those who
ennoble only their fathers, and those who stretch back their fame
to the fifth or tenth grandparent. The ancestors live by reason of
the actual man, whose nobility is effective, active—in a word: is
not was.

17

"Nobility" does not appear as a formal expression until the

Roman Empire, and then precisely in opposition to the hereditary
nobles, then in decadence.

17 - As in the foregoing it is only a matter of bringing the word "nobility" back to its original
sense which excludes inheritance, this is not the place to study the fact that a "nobility of
blood" makes its appearance so often in history. This question, then, is left untouched.

For me, then, nobility is synonymous with a life of effort, ever

set on excelling oneself, in passing beyond what one is to what
one sets up as a duty and an obligation. In this way the noble life
stands opposed to the common or inert life, which reclines
statically upon itself, condemned to perpetual immobility, unless
an external force compels it to come out of itself. Hence we apply
the term mass to this kind of man—not so much because of his
multitude as because of his inertia.

As one advances in life, one realises more and more that the

majority of men—and of women—are incapable of any other effort
than that strictly imposed on them as a reaction to external
compulsion. And for that reason, the few individuals we have
come across who are capable of a spontaneous and joyous effort
stand out isolated, monumentalised, so to speak, in our
experience. These are the select men, the nobles, the only ones
who are active and not merely reactive, for whom life is a
perpetual striving, an incessant course of training. Training =
askesis. These are the ascetics.

18

This apparent digression should

not cause surprise. In order to define the actual mass-man, who is
as much "mass" as ever, but who wishes to supplant the
"excellent," it has been necessary to contrast him with the two
pure forms which are mingled in him: the normal mass and the
genuine noble or man of effort.

Now we can advance more rapidly, because we are now in

possession of what, to my thinking, is the key—the psychological
equation—of the human type dominant to-day. All that follows is a
consequence, a corollary, of that root-structure, which may be
summed up thus: the world as organised by the XIX

th

Century,

when automatically producing a new man, has infused into him
formidable appetites and powerful means of every kind for
satisfying them. These include the economic, the physical

18 - Vide "El Origen deportivo del Estado," in El Espectador, VII, recently published.

(hygiene, average health higher than any preceding age), the civil
and the technical (by which I mean the enormous quantity of
partial knowledge and practical efficiency possessed by the
average man to-day and lacking to him in the past). After having
supplied him with all these powers, the XIX

th

Century has

abandoned him to himself, and the average man, following his
natural disposition, has withdrawn into himself. Hence, we are in
presence of a mass stronger than that of any preceding period, but
differing from the traditional type in that it remains, hermetically
enclosed within itself, incapable of submitting to anything or
anybody, believing itself self-sufficient—in a word, indocile.

19

If

things go on as they are at present, it will be every day more
noticeable in Europe—and by reflection, throughout the whole
world—that the masses are incapable of submitting to direction of
any kind. In the difficult times that are at hand for our continent,
it is possible that, under a sudden affliction, they may for a
moment have the good will to accept, in certain specially urgent
matters, the direction of the superior minorities.

But even that good will will result in failure. For the basic

texture of their soul is wrought of hermetism and indocility; they
are from birth deficient in the faculty of giving attention to what
is outside themselves, be it fact or person. They will wish to
follow someone, and they will be unable. They will want to listen,
and will discover they are deaf.

On the other hand, it is illusory to imagine that the mass-man

of to-day, however superior his vital level may be compared with
that of other times, will be able to control, by himself, the
process of civilisation. I say process, and not progress. The simple
process of preserving our present civilisation is supremely
complex, and demands incalculably subtle powers. Ill-fitted to

19 - On the indocility of the masses, especially of the Spanish masses, I have already spoken
in España Invertebrada (1922), and I refer the reader to what is there said.

direct it is this average man who has learned to use much of the
machinery of civilisation, but who is characterised by root-
ignorance of the very principles of that civilisation.

I reiterate to the reader who has patiently followed me up to

this point, the importance of not giving to the facts enunciated a
primarily political significance. On the contrary, political
activities, of all those in public life the most efficient and the
most visible, are the final product of others more intimate, more
impalpable. Hence, political indocility would not be so grave did it
not proceed from a deeper, more decisive intellectual indocility. In
consequence, until we have analysed this latter, the thesis of this
essay will not stand out in its final clarity.

CHAPTER VIII

The Masses Intervene in Everything, and Why

Their Intervention is Solely by Violence

WE take it, then, that there has happened something

supremely paradoxical, but which was in truth most natural; from
the very opening-out of the world and of life for the average man,
his soul has shut up within him. Well, then, I maintain that it is in
this obliteration of the average soul that the rebellion of the
masses consists, and in this in its turn lies the gigantic problem set
before humanity to-day.

I know well that many of my readers do not think as I do. This

also is most natural and confirms the theorem. For although my
opinion turn out erroneous, there will always remain the fact that
many of those dissentient readers have never given five minutes'
thought to this complex matter. How are they going to think as I
do? But by believing that they have a right to an opinion on the
matter without previous effort to work one out for themselves,
they prove patently that they belong to that absurd type of human
being which I have called the "rebel mass." It is precisely what I
mean by having one's soul obliterated, hermetically closed. Here it
would be the special case of intellectual hermetism. The
individual finds himself already with a stock of ideas. He decides
to content himself with them and to consider himself intellectually
complete. As he feels the lack of nothing outside himself, he
settles down definitely amid his mental furniture. Such is the
mechanism of self-obliteration.

The mass-man regards himself as perfect. The select man, in

order to regard himself so, needs to be specially vain, and the
belief in his perfection is not united with him consubstantially, it is
not ingenuous, but arises from his vanity, and even for himself has

a fictitious, imaginary, problematic character, Hence the vain man
stands in need of others, he seeks in them support for the idea
that he wishes to have of himself. So that not even in this diseased
state, not even when blinded by vanity, does the "noble" man
succeed in feeling himself as in truth complete. Contrariwise, it
never occurs to the mediocre man of our days, to the New Adam,
to doubt of his own plenitude. His self-confidence is, like Adam's,
paradisiacal. The innate hermetism of his soul is an obstacle to the
necessary condition for his discovery of his insufficiency, namely: a
comparison of himself with other beings. To compare himself
would mean to go out of himself for a moment and to transfer
himself to his neighbour. But the mediocre soul is incapable of
transmigrations—the supreme form of sport.

We find ourselves, then, met with the same difference that

eternally exists between the fool and the man of sense. The latter
is constantly catching himself within an inch of being a fool; hence
he makes an effort to escape from the imminent folly, and in that
effort lies his intelligence. The fool, on the other hand, does not
suspect himself; he thinks himself the most prudent of men, hence
the enviable tranquillity with which the fool settles down, installs
himself in his own folly. Like those insects which it is impossible to
extract from the orifice they inhabit, there is no way of dislodging
the fool from his folly, to take him away for a while from his blind
state, and to force him to contrast his own dull vision with other
keener forms of sight. The fool is a fool for life; he is devoid of
pores. This is why Anatole France said that the fool is much worse
than the knave, for the knave does take a rest sometimes, the fool
never.

20

20 -

I often asked myself the following question. There is no doubt that at all times

for many men one of the greatest tortures of their lives has been the contact, the

collision with the folly of their neighbours. And yet how is it that there has never
been attempted—I think this is so—a study on this matter, an Essay on Folly? For the

pages of Erasmus do not treat of this aspect of the matter.

It is not a question of the mass-man being a fool. On the

contrary, to-day he is more clever, has more capacity of
understanding than his fellow of any previous period. But that
capacity is of no use to him; in reality, the vague feeling that he
possesses it seems only to shut him up more within himself and
keep him from using it. Once for all, he accepts the stock of
commonplaces, prejudices, fag-ends of ideas or simply empty
words which chance has piled up within his mind, and with a
boldness only explicable by his ingenuousness, is prepared to
impose them everywhere. This is what in my first chapter I laid
down as the characteristic of our time; not that the vulgar
believes itself super-excellent and not vulgar, but that the vulgar
proclaims and imposes the rights of vulgarity, or vulgarity as a
right.

The command over public life exercised to-day by the

intellectually vulgar is perhaps the factor of the present situation
which is most novel, least assimilable to anything in the past. At
least in European history up to the present, the vulgar had never
believed itself to have "ideas" on things. It had beliefs, traditions,
experiences, proverbs, mental habits, but it never imagined itself
in possession of theoretical opinions on what things are or ought to
be—for example, on politics or literature. What the politician
planned or carried out seemed good or bad to it, it granted or
withheld its support, but its action was limited to being an echo,
positive or negative, of the creative activity of others. It never
occurred to it to oppose to the "ideas" of the politician others of
its own, nor even to judge the politician's "ideas" from the tribunal
of other "ideas" which it believed itself to possess. Similarly in art
and in other aspects of public life. An innate consciousness of its
limitation, of its not being qualified to theorise,

21

effectively

prevented it doing so. The necessary consequence of this was that
the vulgar never thought, even remotely, of making a decision on

21 - There is no getting away from it; every opinion means setting up a theory.

any one of the public activities, which in their greater part are
theoretical in character. To-day, on the other hand, the average
man has the most mathematical "ideas" on all that happens or
ought to happen in the universe. Hence he has lost the use of his
hearing. Why should he listen if he has within him all that is
necessary? There is no reason now for listening, but rather for
judging, pronouncing, deciding. There is no question concerning
public life, in which he does not intervene, blind and deaf as he is,
imposing his "opinions."

But, is this not an advantage? Is it not a sign of immense

progress that the masses should have "ideas," that is to say, should
be cultured? By no means. The "ideas" of the average man are not
genuine ideas, nor is their possession culture. An idea is a putting
truth in checkmate. Whoever wishes to have ideas must first
prepare himself to desire truth and to accept the rules of the
game imposed by it. It is no use speaking of ideas when there is no
acceptance of a higher authority to regulate them, a series of
standards to which it is possible to appeal in a discussion. These
standards are the principles on which culture rests. I am not
concerned with the form they take. What I affirm is that there is
no culture where there are no standards to which our fellow-men
can have recourse. There is no culture where there are no
principles of legality to which to appeal. There is no culture where
there is no acceptance of certain final intellectual positions to
which a dispute may be referred.

22

There is no culture where economic relations are not subject

to a regulating principle to protect interests involved. There is no
culture where aesthetic controversy does not recognise the
necessity of justifying the work of art.

22 - If anyone in a discussion with us is concerned with adjusting himself to truth, if he has no
wish to find the truth, he is intellectually a barbarian. That, in fact, is the position of the mass-
man when he speaks, lectures, or writes.

When all these things are lacking there is no culture; there is in

the strictest sense of the word, barbarism. And let us not deceive
ourselves, this is what is beginning to appear in Europe under the
progressive rebellion of the masses. The traveller who arrives in a
barbarous country knows that in that territory there are no ruling
principles to which it is possible to appeal. Properly speaking,
there are no barbarian standards. Barbarism is the absence of
standards to which appeal can be made.

The varying degrees of culture are measured by the greater or

less precision of the standards. Where there is little such
precision, these standards rule existence only grosso modo; where
there is much they penetrate in detail into the exercise of all the
activities.

23

Anyone can observe that in Europe, for some years past,

"strange things" have begun to happen. To give a concrete example
of these "strange things" I shall name certain political movements,
such as Syndicalism and Fascism. We must not think that they
seem strange simply because they are new. The enthusiasm for
novelty is so innate in the European that it has resulted in his
producing the most unsettled history of all known to us. The
element of strangeness in these new facts is not to be attributed
to the element of novelty, but to the extraordinary form taken by
these new things. Under the species of Syndicalism and Fascism
there appears for the first time in Europe a type of man who does
not want to give reasons or to be right, but simply shows himself
resolved to impose his opinions. This is the new thing: the right
not to be reasonable, the "reason of unreason." Here I see the
most palpable manifestation of the new mentality of the masses,

23 - The paucity of Spanish intellectual culture is shown, not in greater or less knowledge, but
in the habitual lack of caution and care to adjust one's self to truth which is usually displayed
by those who speak and write. It is not the fact of judging rightly or wrongly—the truth is not
within our reach—but the lack of scruple which makes them omit the elementary
requirements for right judgment. We are like the country priest who triumphantly refutes the
Manichean without having troubled to inquire what the Manichean believes.

due to their having decided to rule society without the capacity
for doing so. In their political conduct the structure of the new
mentality is revealed in the rawest, most convincing manner; but
the key to it lies in intellectual hermetism. The average man finds
himself with "ideas" in his head, but he lacks the faculty of
ideation. He has no conception even of the rare atmosphere in
which ideas live. He wishes to have opinions, but is unwilling to
accept the conditions and presuppositions that underlie all
opinion. Hence his ideas are in effect nothing more than appetites
in words, something like musical romanzas.

To have an idea means believing one is in possession of the

reasons for having it, and consequently means believing that there
is such a thing as reason, a world of intelligible truths. To have
ideas, to form opinions, is identical with appealing to such an
authority, submitting oneself to it, accepting its code and its
decisions, and therefore believing that the highest form of
intercommunion is the dialogue in which the reasons for our ideas
are discussed. But the mass-man would feel himself lost if he
accepted discussion, and instinctively repudiates the obligation of
accepting that supreme authority lying outside himself. Hence the
"new thing" in Europe is "to have done with discussions," and
detestation is expressed for all forms of intercommunion which
imply acceptance of objective standards, ranging from
conversation to Parliament, and taking in science. This means that
there is a renunciation of the common life based on culture, which
is subject to standards, and a return to the common life of
barbarism. All the normal processes are suppressed in order to
arrive directly at the imposition of what is desired. The hermetism
of the soul which, as we have seen before, urges the mass to
intervene in the whole of public life, also inevitably leads it to one
single process of intervention: direct action.

When the reconstruction of the origins of our epoch is

undertaken, it will be observed that the first notes of its special

harmony were sounded in those groups of French syndicalists and
realists of about 1900, inventors of the method and the name of
"direct action." Man has always had recourse to violence;
sometimes this recourse was a mere crime, and does not interest
us here. But at other times violence was the means resorted to by
him who had previously exhausted all others in defence of the
rights of justice which he thought he possessed. It may be
regrettable that human nature tends on occasion to this form of
violence, but it is undeniable that it implies the greatest tribute to
reason and justice. For this form of violence is none other than
reason exasperated. Force was, in fact, the ultima ratio. Rather
stupidly it has been the custom to take ironically this expression,
which clearly indicates the previous submission of force to
methods of reason. Civilisation is nothing else than the attempt to
reduce force to being the ultima ratio. We are now beginning to
realise this with startling clearness, because "direct action"
consists in inverting the order and proclaiming violence as prima
ratio, or strictly as unica ratio. It is the norm which proposes the
annulment of all norms, which suppresses all intermediate process
between our purpose and its execution. It is the Magna Charta of
barbarism.

It is well to recall that at every epoch when the mass, for one

purpose or another, has taken a part in public life, it has been in
the form of "direct action." This was, then, the natural modus
operandi of the masses. And the thesis of this essay is strongly
confirmed by the patent fact that at present when the overruling
intervention in public life of the masses has passed from casual
and infrequent to being the normal, it is "direct action" which
appears officially as the recognised method.

All our communal life is coming under this regime in which

appeal to "indirect" authority is suppressed. In social relations
"good manners" no longer hold sway. Literature as "direct action"

appears in the form of insult. The restrictions of sexual relations
are reduced.

Restrictions, standards, courtesy, indirect methods, justice,

reason! Why were all these invented, why all these complications
created? They are all summed up in the word civilisation, which,
through the underlying notion of civis, the citizen, reveals its real
origin. By means of all these there is an attempt to make possible
the city, the community, common life. Hence, if we look into all
these constituents of civilisation just enumerated, we shall find
the same common basis. All, in fact, presuppose the radical
progressive desire on the part of each individual to take others
into consideration. Civilisation is before all, the will to live in
common. A man is uncivilised, barbarian in the degree in which he
does not take others into account. Barbarism is the tendency to
disassociation. Accordingly, all barbarous epochs have been times
of human scattering, of the pullulation of tiny groups, separate
from and hostile to one another.

The political doctrine which has represented the loftiest

endeavour towards common life is liberal democracy. It carries to
the extreme the determination to have consideration for one's
neighbour and is the prototype of "indirect action." Liberalism is
that principle of political rights, according to which the public
authority, in spite of being all-powerful, limits itself and attempts,
even at its own expense, to leave room in the State over which it
rules for those to live who neither think nor feel as it does, that is
to say as do the stronger, the majority. Liberalism—it is well to
recall this to-day—is the supreme form of generosity; it is the right
which the majority concedes to minorities and hence it is the
noblest cry that has ever resounded in this planet. It announces
the determination to share existence with the enemy; more than
that, with an enemy which is weak. It was incredible that the
human species should have arrived at so noble an attitude, so
paradoxical, so refined, so acrobatic, so anti-natural. Hence, it is

not to be wondered at that this same humanity should soon appear
anxious to get rid of it. It is a discipline too difficult and complex
to take firm root on earth.

Share our existence with the enemy! Govern with the

opposition! Is not such a form of tenderness beginning to seem
incomprehensible? Nothing indicates more clearly the
characteristics of the day than the fact that there are so few
countries where an opposition exists. In almost all, a homogeneous
mass weighs on public authority and crushes down, annihilates
every opposing group. The mass—who would credit it as one sees
its compact, multitudinous appearance?—does not wish to share
life with those who are not of it. It has a deadly hatred of all that
is not itself.

CHAPTER IX

The Primitive and the Technical

IT is much to my purpose to recall that we are here engaged in

the analysis of a situation—the actual one which is of its essence
ambiguous. Hence I suggested at the start that all the features of
the present day, and in particular the rebellion of the masses,
offer a double aspect. Any one of them not only admits of, but
requires, a double interpretation, favourable and unfavourable.
And this ambiguity lies, not in our minds, but in the reality itself.
It is not that the present situation may appear to us good from one
view-point, and evil from another, but that in itself it contains the
twin potencies of triumph or of death.

There is no call to burden this essay with a complete

philosophy of history. But it is evident that I am basing it on the
underlying foundation of my own philosophical convictions. I do
not believe in the absolute determinism of history. On the
contrary, I believe that all life, and consequently the life of
history, is made up of simple moments, each of them relatively
undetermined in respect of the previous one, so that in it reality
hesitates, walks up and down, and is uncertain whether to decide
for one or other of various possibilities. It is this metaphysical
hesitancy which gives to everything living its unmistakable
character of tremulous vibration. The rebellion of the masses may,
in fact, be the transition to some new, unexampled organisation of
humanity, but it may also be a catastrophe of human destiny.
There is no reason to deny the reality of progress, but there is to
correct the notion that believes this progress secure. It is more in
accordance with facts to hold that there is no certain progress, no
evolution, without the threat of "involution," of retrogression.
Everything is possible in history; triumphant, indefinite progress
equally with periodic retrogression. For life, individual or

collective, personal or historic, is the one entity in the universe
whose substance is compact of danger, of adventure. It is, in the
strict sense of the word, drama.

24

This, which is true in general, acquires greater force in

"moments of crisis" such as the present. And so, the symptoms of
new conduct which are appearing under the actual dominion of
the masses, and which we have grouped under the term "direct
action," may also announce future perfections. It is evident that
every old civilisation drags with it in its advance worn-out tissues
and no small load of callous matter, which form an obstacle to
life, mere toxic dregs. There are dead institutions, valuations and
estimates which still survive, though now meaningless,
unnecessarily complicated solutions, standards whose lack of
substance has been proved. All these constituents of "indirect
action," of civilisation, demand a period of feverish simplification.
The tall hat and frock-coat of the romantic period are avenged by
means of present-day deshabille and "shirt-sleeves." Here, the
simplification means hygiene and better taste, consequently a
more perfect solution, as always happens when more is obtained
by smaller means. The tree of romantic love also was badly in
need of pruning in order to shed the abundance of imitation
magnolias tacked on to its branches and the riot of creepers,
spirals, and tortuous ramifications which deprived it of the sun.

24 - Needless to say, hardly anyone will take seriously these expressions, and even the best-
intentioned will understand them as mere metaphors, though perhaps striking ones. Only an
odd reader, ingenuous enough not to believe that he already knows definitively what life is, or
at least what it is not, will allow himself to be won over by the primary meaning of these
phrases, and will be precisely the one who will understand them—be they true or false.
Amongst the rest there will reign the most effusive unanimity, with this solitary difference:
some will think that, speaking seriously, life is the process of existence of a soul, and others
that it is a succession of chemical reactions. I do not conceive that it will improve my position
with readers so hermetically sealed to resume my whole line of thought by saying that the
primary, radical meaning of life appears when it is employed in the sense not of biology, but
of biography. For the very strong reason that the whole of biology is quite definitely only a
chapter in certain biographies, it is what biologists do in the portion of their lives open to
biography. Anything else is abstraction, fantasy and myth.

In general, public life and above all politics, urgently needed

to be brought back to reality, and European humanity could not
turn the somersault which the optimist demands of it, without
first taking off its clothes, getting down to its bare essence,
returning to its real self. The enthusiasm which I feel for this
discipline of stripping oneself bare, of being one's real self, the
belief that it is indispensable in order to clear the way to a worthy
future, leads me to claim full liberty of thought with regard to
everything in the past. It is the future which must prevail over the
past, and from it we take our orders regarding our attitude
towards what has been.

25

But it is necessary to avoid the great sin of those who directed

the XIX

th

Century, the lack of recognition of their responsibilities

which prevented them from keeping alert and on the watch. To let
oneself slide down the easy slope offered by the course of events
and to dull one's mind against the extent of the danger, the
unpleasant features which characterise even the most joyous hour,
that is precisely to fail in one's obligation of responsibility. To-day
it has become necessary to stir up an exaggerated sense of
responsibility in those capable of feeling it, and it seems of
supreme urgency to stress the evidently dangerous aspect of
present-day symptoms.

There is no doubt that on striking a balance of our public life

the adverse factors far outweigh the favourable ones, if the
calculation be made not so much in regard to the present, as to
what they announce and promise for the future.

25 - This freedom of attitude towards the past is not, then, a peevish revolt, but, on the
contrary, an evident obligation, on the part of every "period of criticism." If I defend the
liberalism of the XIX

th

Century against the masses which rudely attack it, this does not mean

that I renounce my full freedom of opinion as regards that same liberalism. And vice versa,
the primitivism which in this essay appears in its worst aspect is in a certain sense a condition
of every great historic advance. Compare what, a few years ago, I said on this matter in the
essay "Biologia y Pedagogia" (El Espectador, III, La paradoja del salvajismo).

All the increased material possibilities which life has

experienced run the risk of being annulled when they are faced
with the staggering problem that has come upon the destiny of
Europe, and which I once more formulate: the direction of society
has been taken over by a type of man who is not interested in the
principles of civilisation. Not of this or that civilisation but—from
what we can judge to-day—of any civilisation. Of course, he is
interested in anaesthetics, motor-cars, and a few other things. But
this fact merely confirms his fundamental lack of interest in
civilisation. For those things are merely its products, and the
fervour with which he greets them only brings into stronger relief
his indifference to the principles from which they spring. It is
sufficient to bring forward this fact: since the nuove scienze, the
natural sciences, came into being—from the Renaissance on, that
is to say—the enthusiasm for them had gone on increasing through
the course of time. To put it more concretely, the proportionate
number of people who devoted themselves to pure scientific
research was in each generation greater. The first case of
retrogression—relative, I repeat—has occurred in the generation of
those between twenty and thirty at the present time. It is
becoming difficult to attract students to the laboratories of pure
science. And this is happening when industry is reaching its highest
stage of development, and when people in general are showing
still greater appetite for the use of the apparatus and the
medicines created by science. If we did not wish to avoid prolixity,
similar incongruity could be shown in politics, art, morals,
religion, and in the everyday activities of life.

What is the significance to us of so paradoxical a situation? This

essay is an attempt to prepare the answer to that question. The
meaning is that the type of man dominant to-day is a primitive
one, a Naturmensch rising up in the midst of a civilised world. The
world is a civilised one, its inhabitant is not: he does not see the
civilisation of the world around him, but he uses it as if it were a

natural force. The new man wants his motor-car, and enjoys it,
but he believes that it is the spontaneous fruit of an Edenic tree.
In the depths of his soul he is unaware of the artificial, almost
incredible, character of civilisation, and does not extend his
enthusiasm for the instruments to the principles which make them
possible. When some pages back, by a transposition of the words
of Rathenau, I said that we are witnessing the "vertical invasion of
the barbarians" it might be thought (it generally is) that it was
only a matter of a "phrase." It is now clear that the expression may
enshrine a truth or an error, but that it is the very opposite of a
"phrase," namely: a formal definition which sums up a whole
complicated analysis. The actual mass-man is, in fact, a primitive
who has slipped through the wings on to the age-old stage of
civilisation.

There is continual talk to-day of the fabulous progress of

technical knowledge; but I see no signs in this talk, even amongst
the best, of a sufficiently dramatic realisation of its future.
Spengler himself, so subtle and profound—though so subject to
mania—appears to me in this matter far too optimistic. For he
believes that "culture" is to be succeeded by an era of
"civilisation," by which word he understands more especially
technical efficiency. The idea that Spengler has of "culture" and of
history in general is so remote from that underlying this essay, that
it is not easy, even for the purpose of correction, to comment here
upon his conclusions. It is only by taking great leaps and neglecting
exact details, in order to bring both view-points under a common
denominator, that it is possible to indicate the difference between
us. Spengler believes that "technicism" can go on living when
interest in the principles underlying culture are dead. I cannot
bring myself to believe any such thing. Technicism and science are
consubstantial, and science no longer exists when it ceases to
interest for itself alone, and it cannot so interest unless men
continue to feel enthusiasm for the general principles of culture.

If this fervour is deadened—as appears to be happening—
technicism can only survive for a time, for the duration of the
inertia of the cultural impulse which started it. We live with our
technical requirements, but not by them. These give neither
nourishment nor breath to themselves, they are not causae sui,
but a useful, practical precipitate of superfluous, unpractical
activities.

26

I proceed, then, to the position that the actual

interest in technical accomplishment guarantees nothing, less than
nothing, for the progress or the duration of such accomplishment.
It is quite right that technicism should be considered one of the
characteristic features of "modern culture," that is to say, of a
culture which comprises a species of science which proves
materially profitable. Hence, when describing the newest aspect
of the existence implanted by the XIX

th

Century, I was left with

these two features: liberal democracy and technicism. But I
repeat that I am astonished at the case with which when speaking
of technicism it is forgotten that its vital centre is pure science,
and that the conditions for its continuance involve the same
conditions that render possible pure scientific activity. Has any
thought been given to the number of things that must remain
active in men's souls in order that there may still continue to be
"men of science" in real truth? Is it seriously thought that as long
as there are dollars there will be science? This notion in which so
many find rest is only a further proof of primitivism. As if there
were not numberless ingredients, of most disparate nature, to be
brought together and shaken up in order to obtain the cock-tail of
physico-chemical science! Under even the most perfunctory
examination of this subject, the evident fact bursts into view that
over the whole extent of space and time, physico-chemistry has
succeeded in establishing itself completely only in the small

26 - Hence to my mind, a definition of North America by its "technicism" tells us nothing.
One of the things that most seriously confuse the European mind is the amount of puerile
judgments that one hears pronounced on North America even by the most cultured persons.
This is one particular case of the disproportion which I indicate later on as existing between
the complexity of present-day problems and the capacity of present-day minds.

quadrilateral enclosed by London, Berlin, Vienna, and Paris, and
that only in the XIX

th

Century. This proves that experimental

science is one of the most unlikely products of history. Seers,
priests, warriors and shepherds have abounded in all times and
places. But this fauna of experimental man apparently requires for
its production a combination of circumstances more exceptional
than those that engender the unicorn. Such a bare, sober fact
should make us reflect a little on the supervolatile, evaporative
character of scientific inspiration.

27

Blissful the man who believes

that, were Europe to disappear, the North Americans could
continue science! It would be of great value to treat the matter
thoroughly and to specify in detail what are the historical
presuppositions, vital to experimental science and, consequently,
to technical accomplishment. But let no one hope that, even when
this point was made clear, the mass-man would understand. The
mass-man has no attention to spare for reasoning, he learns only
in his own flesh.

There is one observation which bars me from deceiving myself

as to the efficacy of such preachments, which by the fact of being
based on reason would necessarily be subtle. Is it not altogether
absurd that, under actual circumstances, the average man does
not feel spontaneously, and without being preached at, an ardent
enthusiasm for those sciences and the related ones of biology? For,
just consider what the actual situation is. While evidently all the
other constituents of culture—politics, art, social standards,
morality itself—have become problematic, there is one which
increasingly demonstrates, in a manner most indisputable and
most suitable to impress the mass-man, its marvellous efficiency:
and that one is empirical science. Every day furnishes a new
invention which this average man utilises. Every day produces a

27 - This, without speaking of more internal questions. The majority of the investigators
themselves have not to-day the slightest suspicion of the very grave and dangerous internal
crisis through which their science is passing.

new anaesthetic or vaccine from which this average man benefits.
Everyone knows that, if scientific inspiration does not weaken and
the laboratories are multiplied three times or ten times, there will
be an automatic multiplication of wealth, comfort, health,
prosperity. Can any more formidable, more convincing propaganda
be imagined in favour of a vital principle? How is it, nevertheless,
that there is no sign of the masses imposing on themselves any
sacrifice of money or attention in order to endow science more
worthily? Far from this being the case, the post-war period has
converted the man of science into a new social pariah. And note
that I am referring to physicists, chemists, biologists, not to
philosophers. Philosophy needs neither protection, attention nor
sympathy from the masses. It maintains its character of complete
inutility,

28

and thereby frees itself from all subservience to the

average man. It recognises itself as essentially problematic, and
joyously accepts its free destiny as a bird of the air, without asking
anybody to take it into account, without recommending or
defending itself. If it does really turn out to the advantage of
anyone, it rejoices from simple human sympathy; but does not live
on the profit it brings to others, neither anticipating it nor hoping
for it. How can it lay claim to being taken seriously by anyone if it
starts off by doubting its own existence, if it lives only in the
measure in which it combats itself, deprives itself of life? Let us,
then, leave out of the question philosophy, which is an adventure
of another order. But the experimental sciences do need the
cooperation of the mass-man, just as he needs them, under pain
of dissolution, inasmuch as in a planet without physico-chemistry
the number of beings existing to-day cannot be sustained.

What arguments can bring about something which has not been

brought about by the motor-car in which those men come and go,
and pantopon injection which destroys, miraculously, their pains?
The disproportion between the constant, evident benefit which

28 - Aristotle, Metaphysics.

science procures them and the interest they show in it is such that
it is impossible to-day to deceive oneself with illusory hopes and
to expect anything but barbarism from those who so behave.
Especially if, as we shall see, this disregard of science as such
appears, with possibly more evidence than elsewhere, in the mass
of technicians themselves—doctors, engineers, etc., who are in
the habit of exercising their profession in a state of mind identical
in all essentials to that of the man who is content to use his
motor-car or buy his tube of aspirin—without the slightest intimate
solidarity with the future of science, of civilisation.

There may be those who feel more disturbed by other

symptoms of emergent barbarism which, being positive in quality,
results of action and not of omission, strike the attention more,
materialise into a spectacle. For myself, this matter of the
disproportion between the profit which the average man draws
from science and the gratitude which he returns—or, rather, does
not return—to it; this is much more terrifying.

29

I can only succeed

in explaining to myself this absence of adequate recognition by
recalling that in Central Africa the negroes also ride in motor-cars
and dose themselves with aspirin. The European who is beginning
to predominate—so runs my hypothesis—must then be, in relation
to the complex civilisation into which he has been born, a
primitive man, a barbarian appearing on the stage through the
trap-door, a "vertical invader."

29 - The monstrosity is increased a hundredfold by the fact that, as I have indicated, all the
other vital principles, politics, law, art, morals, religion, are actually passing through a crisis,
are at least temporarily bankrupt. Science alone is not bankrupt; rather does it every day pay
out, with fabulous interest, all and more than it promises. It is, then, without a competitor; it is
impossible to excuse the average man's disregard of it by considering him distracted from it
by some other cultural enthusiasm.

CHAPTER X

Primitivism and History

NATURE is always with us. It is self-supporting. In the forests of

Nature we can be savages with impunity. We can likewise resolve
never to cease being so, without further risk than the coming of
other peoples who are not savages. But, in principle, it is possible
to have peoples who are perennially primitive. Breyssig has called
these "the peoples of perpetual dawn," those who have remained
in a motionless, frozen twilight, which never progresses towards
midday.

This is what happens in the world which is mere Nature. But it

does not happen in the world of civilisation which is ours.
Civilisation is not "just there," it is not self-supporting. It is
artificial and requires the artist or the artisan. If you want to
make use of the advantages of civilisation, but are not prepared to
concern yourself with the upholding of civilisation—you are done.
In a trice you find yourself left without civilisation. Just a slip, and
when you look around everything has vanished into air. The
primitive forest appears in its native state, just as if curtains
covering pure Nature had been drawn back. The jungle is always
primitive and, vice versa, everything primitive is mere jungle.

The romantics of every period have been excited by those

scenes of violation, in which the natural and infrahuman assaults
the white form of woman, and they have depicted Leda and the
swan, Pasiphae and the bull, Antiope and the goat. Generalising
the picture, they have found a more subtly indecent spectacle in
the landscape with ruins, where the civilised, geometric stone is
stifled beneath the embrace of wild vegetation. When your good
romantic catches sight of a building, the first thing his eyes seek is
the yellow hedge-mustard on cornice and roof. This proclaims,

that in the long run, everything is earth, that the jungle springs up
everywhere anew. It would be stupid to laugh at the romantic. The
romantic also is in the right. Under these innocently perverse
images there lies an immense, ever-present problem: that of the
relations between civilisation and what lies behind it—Nature,
between the rational and the cosmic. I reserve, then, the right to
deal with this subject on another occasion and to be a romantic
myself at an opportune moment.

But just now I am engaged in a contrary task. It is a question of

keeping back the invading jungle. The "good European" must at
present busy himself with something similar to what caused grave
concern to the Australian states: how to prevent the prickly-pear
from gaining ground and driving man into the sea. Sometime in the
forties a Mediterranean emigrant, home-sick for his native scenery
—Malaga, Sicily?—took with him to Australia a pot with a wretched
little prickly-pear. To-day the Australian budgets are weighed down
with the burden of charges for the war against the prickly-pear,
which has invaded the continent and each year advances over a
square kilometre of ground.

The mass-man believes that the civilisation into which he was

born and which he makes use of, is as spontaneous and self-
producing as Nature, and ipso facto he is changed into primitive
man. For him, civilisation is the forest. This I have said before;
now I have to treat it in more detail.

The principles on which the civilised world—which has to be

maintained—is based, simply do not exist for the average man of
to-day. He has no interest in the basic cultural values, no solidarity
with them, is not prepared to place himself at their service. How
has this come about? For many reasons, but for the moment I am
only going to stress one. Civilisation becomes more complex and
difficult in proportion as it advances. The problems which it sets
before us to-day are of the most intricate. The number of people

whose minds are equal to these problems becomes increasingly
smaller. The post-war period offers us a striking example of this.
The reconstruction of Europe—as we are seeing—is an affair
altogether too algebraical, and the ordinary European is showing
himself below this high enterprise. It is not that means are lacking
for the solution. What are lacking are heads. Or, rather, there are
some heads, very few, but the average mass of Central Europe is
unwilling to place them on its shoulders.

This disproportion between the complex subtlety of the

problems and the minds that should study them will become
greater if a remedy be not found, and it constitutes the basic
tragedy of our civilisation. By reason of the very fertility and
certainty of its formative principles, its production increases in
quantity and in subtlety, so as to exceed the receptive powers of
normal man. I do not think that this has ever happened in the
past. All previous civilisations have died through the insufficiency
of their underlying principles. That of Europe is beginning to
succumb for the opposite reason. In Greece and Rome it was not
man that failed, but principles. The Roman Empire comes to an
end for lack of technique. When it reached a high level of
population, and this vast community demanded the solution of
certain material problems which technique only could furnish, the
ancient world started on a process of involution, retrogression,
and decay.

But to-day it is man who is the failure, because he is unable to

keep pace with the progress of his own civilisation. It is painful to
hear relatively cultured people speak concerning the most
elementary problems of the day. They seem like rough farmhands
trying with thick, clumsy fingers to pick up a needle lying on a
table. Political and social subjects, for example, are handled with
the same rude instruments of thought which served two hundred
years since to tackle situations in effect two hundred times less
complex.

Advanced civilisation is one and the same thing as arduous

problems. Hence, the greater the progress, the greater danger it is
in. Life gets gradually better, but evidently also gradually more
complicated. Of course, as problems become more complex, the
means of solving them also become more perfect. But each new
generation must master these perfected means. Amongst them—to
come to the concrete—there is one most plainly attached to the
advance of a civilisation, namely, that it have a great deal of the
past at its back, a great deal of experience; in a word: history.
Historical knowledge is a technique of the first order to preserve
and continue a civilisation already advanced. Not that it affords
positive solutions to the new aspect of vital conditions—life is
always different from what it was—but that it prevents us
committing the ingenuous mistakes of other times. But if, in
addition to being old and, therefore, beginning to find life
difficult, you have lost the memory of the past, and do not profit
by experience, then everything turns to disadvantage. Well, it is
my belief that this is the situation of Europe. The most "cultured"
people to-day are suffering from incredible ignorance of history. I
maintain that at the present day, European leaders know much
less history than their fellows of the XVIII

th

, even of the XVII

th

Century. That historical knowledge of the governing minorities—
governing sensu lato—made possible the prodigious advance of the
XIX

th

Century. Their policy was thought out—by the XVIII

th

Century—

precisely in order to avoid the errors of previous politics, thought
out in view of those errors and embraced in its substance the
whole extent of experience. But the XIX

th

Century already began to

lose "historic culture," although during the century the specialists
gave it notable advance as a science.

30

To this neglect is due in

great part its peculiar errors, which to-day press upon us. In the
last third of the century there began—though hidden from sight—
that involution, that retrogression towards barbarism, that is,

30 - Here we catch a glimpse of the difference we shall shortly have to treat of between the
state of the sciences during a given period and the state of its culture.

towards the ingenuousness and primitivism of the man who has no
past, or who has forgotten it.

Hence, Bolshevism and Fascism, the two "new" attempts in

politics that are being made in Europe and on its borders, are two
clear examples of essential retrogression. Not so much by the
positive content of their doctrine, which, taken in isolation,
naturally has its partial truth—what is there in the universe which
has not some particle of truth?—as on account of the anti-historic,
anachronistic way in which they handle the rational elements
which the doctrine contains. Typical movements of mass-men,
directed, as all such are, by men who are mediocrities,
improvised, devoid of a long memory and a "historic conscience,"
they behave from the start as if they already belonged to the past,
as if, though occurring at the present hour, they were really fauna
of a past age.

It is not a question of being, or not being, a Communist or a

Bolshevist. I am not discussing the creed. What is inconceivable
and anachronistic is that a Communist of 1917 should launch out
into a revolution which is identical in form with all those which
have gone before, and in which there is not the slightest
amendment of the defects and errors of its predecessors. Hence,
what has happened in Russia possesses no historic interest, it is,
strictly speaking, anything but a new start in human life. On the
contrary, it is a monotonous repetition of the eternal revolution, it
is the perfect commonplace of revolutions. To such an extent, that
there is not one stock-phrase of the many that human experience
has produced regarding revolutions which does not receive
distressful confirmation when applied to this one. "Revolution
devours its own children." "Revolution starts—from a moderate
party, proceeds to the extremists, and soon begins to fall back on
some form of restoration," etc., etc. To these venerable
commonplaces might be added other truths less well known,
though no less probable, amongst them this one: a revolution does

not last more than fifteen years, the period which coincides with
the flourishing of a generation.

31

Whoever aspires to create a new social or political reality must

before all concern himself to ensure that these humble
commonplaces of historical experience will be invalidated by the
situation which he brings into being. For my part, I shall reserve
the title of "man of genius" for the politician who has hardly begun
his operations when the professors of history in our colleges begin
to go mad, as they see all the "laws" of their science interrupted in
their action, falling to pieces, reduced to dust.

By changing the sign proper to Bolshevism, we might make

similar statements in regard to Fascism. Neither of these
experiments is "at the height of our time." They do not represent
the whole of the past in foreshortening, a condition which is
essential in order to improve on that past. The struggle with the
past is not a hand-to-hand fight. The future overcomes it by
swallowing it. If it leaves anything outside it is lost.

Both Bolshevism and Fascism are two false dawns; they do not

bring the morning of a new day, but of some archaic day, spent
over and over again: they are mere primitivism. And such will all
movements be which fall into the stupidity of starting a boxing-
match with some portion or other of the past, instead of
proceeding to digest it. No doubt an advance must be made on the
liberalism of the XIX

th

Century. But this is precisely what cannot be

done by any movement such as Fascism, which declares itself anti-

31 - A generation lasts about thirty years. But its activity divides into two stages and takes two
forms: during approximately one half, the new generation carries out the propaganda of its
ideas, preferences, and tastes, which finally arrive at power and are dominant in the second
half of its course. But the generation educated under its sway is already bringing forward
other ideas, preferences, and tastes, which it begins to diffuse in the general atmosphere.
When the ideas, preferences, and tastes of the ruling generation are extremist, and therefore
revolutionary, those of the new generation are anti-extremist and anti-revolutionary, that is to
say, substantially restorationist in spirit. Of course, by restorationist is not to be understood a
simple "return to the old ways," a thing which restorations have never been.

liberal. Because it was that fact—the being anti-liberal or non-
liberal—which constituted man previous to liberalism. And as the
latter triumphed over its opposite, it will either repeat its victory
time and again, or else everything—liberalism and anti-liberalism—
will be annihilated in the destruction of Europe. There is an
inexorable chronology of life. In it liberalism is posterior to anti-
liberalism, or what comes to the same, is more vital than it, just
as the gun is more of a weapon than the lance.

At first sight, an attitude "anti-anything" seems posterior to this

thing, inasmuch as it signifies a reaction against it and supposes its
previous existence. But the innovation which the anti represents
fades away into an empty negative attitude, leaving as its only
positive content an "antique." When his attitude is translated into
positive language, the man who declares himself anti-Peter does
nothing more than declare himself the upholder of a world where
Peter is non-existent. But that is exactly what happened to the
world before Peter was born. The anti-Peterite, instead of placing
himself after Peter, makes himself previous to him and reverses
the whole film to the situation of the past, at the end of which the
re-apparition of Peter is inevitable. The same thing happens to
these antis as, according to the legend, happened to Confucius. He
was born, naturally, after his father, but he was born at the age of
eighty, while his progenitor was only thirty! Every anti is nothing
more than a simple, empty No.

This would be all very nice and fine if with a good, round No

we could annihilate the past. But the past is of its essence a
revenant. If put out, it comes back, inevitably. Hence, the only
way to separate from it is not to put it out, but to accept its
existence, and so to behave in regard to it as to dodge it, to avoid
it. In a word, to live "at the height of our time," with an
exaggerated consciousness of the historical circumstances.

The past has reason on its side, its own reason. If that reason is

not admitted, it will return to demand it. Liberalism had its
reason, which will have to be admitted per saecula saeculorum.
But it had not the whole of reason, and it is that part which was
not reason that must be taken from it. Europe needs to preserve
its essential liberalism. This is the condition for superseding it.

If I have spoken here of Fascism and Bolshevism it has been

only indirectly, considering merely their aspect as anachronisms.
This aspect is, to my mind, inseparable from all that is apparently
triumphant to-day. For to-day it is the mass-man who triumphs,
and consequently, only those designs inspired by him, saturated
with his primitive style, can enjoy an apparent victory. But apart
from this, I am not at present discussing the true inwardness of
one or the other, just as I am not attempting to solve the eternal
dilemma of revolution and evolution. The most that this essay
dares to demand is that the revolution or the evolution be
historical and not anachronistic.

The theme I am pursuing in these pages is politically neutral,

because it breathes an air much ampler than that of politics and
its dissensions. Conservative and Radical are none the less mass,
and the difference between them—which at every period has been
very superficial—does not in the least prevent them both being
one and the same man—the common man in rebellion.

There is no hope for Europe unless its destiny is placed in the

hands of men really "contemporaneous," men who feel palpitating
beneath them the whole subsoil of history, who realise the present
level of existence, and abhor every archaic and primitive attitude.
We have need of history in its entirety, not to fall back into it, but
to see if we can escape from it.

CHAPTER XI

The Self-Satisfied Age

TO resume; the new social fact here analysed is this: European

history reveals itself, for the first time, as handed over to the
decisions of the ordinary man as such. Or to turn it into the active
voice: the ordinary man, hitherto guided by others, has resolved
to govern the world himself. This decision to advance to the social
foreground has been brought about in him automatically, when the
new type of man he represents had barely arrived at maturity. If
from the view-point of what concerns public life, the psychological
structure of this new type of mass-man be studied, what we find is
as follows: (1) An inborn, root-impression that life is easy,
plentiful, without any grave limitations; consequently, each
average man finds within himself a sensation of power and
triumph which, (2) invites him to stand up for himself as he is, to
look upon his moral and intellectual endowment as excellent,
complete. This contentment with himself leads him to shut himself
off from any external court of appeal; not to listen, not to submit
his opinions to judgment, not to consider others' existence. His
intimate feeling of power urges him always to exercise
predominance. He will act then as if he and his like were the only
beings existing in the world and, consequently, (3) will intervene
in all matters, imposing his own vulgar views without respect or
regard for others, without limit or reserve, that is to say, in
accordance with a system of "direct action."

It was this series of aspects which made us think of certain

defective types of humanity, such as the spoiled child, and the
primitive in revolt, that is, the barbarian. (The normal primitive,
on the other hand, is the most submissive to external authority
ever known, be it religion, taboo, social tradition, or customs.)
There is no need to be surprised at my heaping up hard names

against this type of human being. This present essay is nothing
more than a preliminary skirmish against this triumphant man, and
the announcement that a certain number of Europeans are about
to turn energetically against his attempt to tyrannise. For the
moment it is only a first skirmish, the frontal attack will come
later, perhaps very soon, and in a very different form from that
adopted by this essay. The frontal attack must come in such a way
that the mass-man cannot take precautions against it; he will see
it before him and will not suspect that it precisely is the frontal
attack.

This type which at present is to be found everywhere, and

everywhere imposes his own spiritual barbarism, is, in fact, the
spoiled child of human history. The spoiled child is the heir who
behaves exclusively as a mere heir. In this case the inheritance is
civilisation—with its conveniences, its security; in a word, with all
its advantages. As we have seen, it is only in circumstances of easy
existence such as our civilisation has produced, that a type can
arise, marked by such a collection of features, inspired by such a
character. It is one of a number of deformities produced by luxury
in human material. There might be a deceptive tendency to
believe that a life born into a world of plenty should be better,
more really a life than one which consists in a struggle against
scarcity. Such is not the case, for reasons of the strictest and most
fundamental nature, which this is not the place to enlarge upon.
For the present, instead of those reasons, it is sufficient to recall
the ever-recurrent fact which constitutes the tragedy of every
hereditary aristocracy. The aristocrat inherits, that is to say, he
finds attributed to his person, conditions of life which he has not
created, and which, therefore, are not produced in organic union
with his personal, individual existence. At birth he finds himself
installed, suddenly and without knowing how, in the midst of his
riches and his prerogatives. In his own self, he has nothing to do
with them, because they do not come from him. They are the

giant armour of some other person, some other human being, his
ancestor. And he has to live as an heir, that is to say, he has to
wear the trappings of another existence. What does this bring us
to? What life is the "aristocrat" by inheritance going to lead, his
own or that of his first noble ancestor? Neither one nor the other.
He is condemned to represent the other man, consequently to be
neither that other nor himself. Inevitably his life loses all
authenticity, and is transformed into pure representation or fiction
of another life. The abundance of resources that he is obliged to
make use of gives him no chance to live out his own personal
destiny, his life is atrophied. All life is the struggle, the effort to
be itself. The difficulties which I meet with in order to realise my
existence are precisely what awakens and mobilises my activities,
my capacities. If my body was not a weight to me, I should not be
able to walk. If the atmosphere did not press on me, I should feel
my body as something vague, flabby, unsubstantial. So in the
"aristocratic" heir his whole individuality grows vague, for lack of
use and vital effort. The result is that specific stupidity of "our old
nobility" which is unlike anything else—a stupidity which, strictly
speaking, has never yet been described in its intimate, tragic
mechanism—that tragic mechanism which leads all hereditary
aristocracy to irremediable degeneration.

So much merely to counteract our ingenuous tendency to

believe that a superabundance of resources favours existence.
Quite the contrary. A world superabundant

32

in possibilities

automatically produces deformities, vicious types of human life,
which may be brought under the general class, the "heir-man," of

32 - The increase, and even the abundance, of resources are not to be confused with the
excess. In the XIX

th

Century the facilities of life increase, and this produces the amazing

growth—quantitative and qualitative—of life that I have noted above. But a moment has
come when the civilised world, in relation to the capacity of the average man, has taken on an
appearance of superabundance, of excess of riches, of superfluity. A single example of this:
the security seemingly offered by progress (i.e. the ever-growing increase of vital advantages)
demoralised the average man, inspiring him with a confidence which is false, vicious, and
atrophying.

which the "aristocrat" is only one particular case, the spoiled child
another, and the mass-man of our time, more fully, more radically,
a third. (It would, moreover, be possible to make more detailed
use of this last allusion to the "aristocrat," by showing how many of
his characteristic traits, in all times and among all peoples,
germinate in the mass-man. For example: his propensity to make
out of games and sports the central occupation of his life; the cult
of the body—hygienic regime and attention to dress; lack of
romance in his dealings with woman; his amusing himself with the
"intellectual," while at bottom despising him and at times ordering
his flunkeys or his bravoes to chastise him; his preference for
living under an absolute authority rather than under a regime of
free-discussion,

33

etc.)

I persist then, at the risk of boring the reader, in making the

point that this man full of uncivilised tendencies, this newest of
the barbarians, is an automatic product of modern civilisation,
especially of the form taken by this civilisation in the XIX

th

Century. He has not burst in on the civilised world from outside
like the "great white barbarians" of the V

th

Century; neither has he

been produced within it by spontaneous, mysterious generation, as
Aristotle says of the tadpoles in the pond; he is its natural fruit.
One may formulate, as follows, a law confirmed by palaeontology
and biogeography: human life has arisen and progressed only when
the resources it could count on were balanced by the problems it
met with. This is true, as much in the spiritual order as in the

33 - In this, as in other matters, the English aristocracy seems to be an exception to what we
have said. But though the case is an admirable one, it would suffice to indicate in outline the
history of England in order to show that this exception proves the rule. Contrary to what is
usually said, the English nobility has been the least "superabundant" of Europe, and has lived
in more constant danger than any other. And because it has always lived in danger, it has
succeeded in winning respect for itself—which implies that it has ceaselessly remained in the
breach. The fundamental fact is forgotten that England was until well on into the XVIII

th

Century the poorest country in Western Europe. It was this fact that saved the nobility. Not
being abundant in resources, it had very early to enter into commercial and industrial
occupation—considered ignoble on the Continent—that is to say, it decided very soon to lead
an economic existence creative in character, and not to depend solely on its privileges. See
Olbricht, Klima and Entwicklung, 1923.

physical. Thus, to refer to a very concrete aspect of corporal
existence, I may recall that the human species has flourished in
zones of our planet where the hot season is compensated by a
season of intense cold. In the tropics the animal-man degenerates,
and vice versa, inferior races—the pygmies, for example—have
been pushed back towards the tropics by races born after them
and superior in the scale of evolution. The civilisation of the XIX

th

Century is, then, of such a character that it allows the average
man to take his place in a world of superabundance, of which he
perceives only the lavishness of the means at his disposal, nothing
of the pains involved. He finds himself surrounded by marvellous
instruments, healing medicines, watchful governments,
comfortable privileges. On the other hand, he is ignorant how
difficult it is to invent those medicines and those instruments and
to assure their production in the future; he does not realise how
unstable is the organisation of the State and is scarcely conscious
to himself of any obligations. This lack of balance falsifies his
nature, vitiates it in its very roots, causing him to lose contact
with the very substance of life, which is made up of absolute
danger, is radically problematic. The form most contradictory to
human life that can appear among the human species is the "self-
satisfied man." Consequently, when he becomes the predominant
type, it is time to raise the alarm and to announce that humanity
is threatened with degeneration, that is, with relative death. On
this view, the vital level represented by Europe at the present day
is superior to the whole of the human past, but if we look to the
future, we are made to fear that it will neither preserve the level
reached nor attain to a higher one, but rather will recede and fall
back upon lower heights.

This, I think, brings out with sufficient clearness the

superlative abnormality represented by the "self-satisfied man."
He is a man who has entered upon life to do "what he jolly well
likes." This, in fact, is the illusion suffered by the fils de famille.

We know the reason why: in the family circle, everything, even
the greatest faults, are in the long run left unpunished. The family
circle is relatively artificial, and tolerates many acts which in
society, in the world outside, would automatically involve
disastrous consequences for their author. But the man of this type
thinks that he can behave outside just as he does at home;
believes that nothing is fatal, irremediable, irrevocable. That is
why he thinks that he can do what he likes.

34

An almighty mistake!

"You will go where you are taken to," as the parrot is told in the
Portuguese story. It is not that one ought not to do just what one
pleases; it is simply that one cannot do other than what each of us
has to do, has to be. The only way out is to refuse to do what has
to be done, but this does not set us free to do something else just
because it pleases us. In this matter we only possess a negative
freedom of will, a noluntas. We can quite well turn away from our
true destiny, but only to fall a prisoner in the deeper dungeons of
our destiny. I cannot make this clear to each of my readers in what
concerns his individual destiny as such, because I do not know
each of my readers; but it is possible to make it clear in those
portions, those facets, of his destiny which are identical with
those of others. For example, every present-day European knows,
with a certainty much more forcible than that of all his expressed
"ideas" and "opinions," that the European of to-day must be a
liberal. Let us not discuss whether it is this or the other form of
liberalism which must be his. I am referring to the fact that the
most reactionary of Europeans knows, in the depths of his
conscience, that the effort made by Europe in the last century,
under the name of liberalism, is, in the last resort, something

34 - What the home is in relation to society, such on a larger scale is one nation before the
assemblage of nations. One of the manifestations, at once most evident and overwhelming, of
the ruling "self-satisfaction" is, as we shall see, the determination taken by some nations to
"do what they jolly well please" in the consortium of nations. This, in their ingenuousness,
they call "nationalism." I, who detest all false submission to internationalism, find absurd, on
the other hand, this passing phase of self-conceit on the part of the least developed of the
nations.

inevitable, inexorable; something that Western man to-day is,
whether he likes it or not.

Even though it be proved, with full and incontrovertible

evidence, that there is falsity and fatality in all the concrete
shapes under which the attempt has been made to realise the
categorical imperative of political liberty, inscribed on the destiny
of Europe, the final evidence that in the last century it was right
in substance still holds good. This final evidence is present equally
in the European Communist as in the Fascist, whatever attitudes
they may adopt to convince themselves to the contrary. All "know"
that beyond all the just criticisms launched against the
manifestations of liberalism there remains its unassailable truth, a
truth not theoretic, scientific, intellectual, but of an order
radically different and more decisive, namely, a truth of destiny.
Theoretic truths not only are disputable, but their whole meaning
and force lie in their being disputed, they spring from discussion.
They live as long as they are discussed, and they are made
exclusively for discussion. But destiny—what from a vital point of
view one has to be or has not to be—is not discussed, it is either
accepted or rejected. If we accept it, we are genuine; if not, we
are the negation, the falsification of ourselves.

35

Destiny does not

consist in what we feel we should like to do; rather is it
recognised in its clear features in the consciousness that we must
do what we do not feel like doing.

Well, then, the "satisfied man" is characterised by his "knowing"

that certain things cannot be, and nevertheless, for that very
reason, pretending in act and word to be convinced of the
opposite. The Fascist will take his stand against political liberty,

35 - Abasement, degradation is simply the manner of life of the man who has refused to be
what it is his duty to be. This, his genuine being, none the less does not die; rather is changed
into an accusing shadow, a phantom which constantly makes him feel the inferiority of the life
he lives compared with the one he ought to live. The debased man survives his self-inflicted
death.

precisely because he knows that in the long run this can never fail,
but is inevitably a part of the very substance of European life, and
will be returned to when its presence is truly required, in the hour
of grave crisis. For the tonic that keeps the mass-man in form is
insincerity, "the joke." All his actions are devoid of the note of
inevitability, they are done as the fils de famille carries out his
escapades. All that haste, in every order of life, to adopt tragic,
conclusive, final attitudes is mere appearance. Men play at
tragedy because they do not believe in the reality of the tragedy
which is actually being staged in the civilised world.

It would be a nice matter if we were forced to accept as the

genuine self of an individual, whatever he tried to make us accept
as such. If anyone persists in maintaining that he believes two and
two make five, and there is no reason for supposing him to be
insane, we may be certain that he does not believe it, however
much he may shout it out, or even if he allows himself to be killed
for maintaining it. A hurricane of farsicality, everywhere and in
every form, is at present raging over the lands of Europe. Almost
all the positions taken up and proclaimed are false ones. The only
efforts that are being made are to escape from our real destiny, to
blind ourselves to its evidence, to be deaf to its deep appeal, to
avoid facing up to what has to be. We are living in comic fashion,
all the more comic the more apparently tragic is the mask
adopted. The comic exists wherever life has no basis of
inevitableness on which a stand is taken without reserves. The
mass-man will not plant his foot on the immovably firm ground of
his destiny, he prefers a fictitious existence suspended in air.
Hence, never as now have we had these lives without substance or
root—deracinés from their own destiny—which let themselves float
on the lightest current. This is the epoch of "currents" and of
"letting things slide." Hardly anyone offers any resistance to the
superficial whirlwinds that arise in art, in ideas, in politics, or in
social usages. Consequently, rhetoric flourishes more than ever.

The surrealist thinks he has outstripped the whole of literary
history when he has written (here a word that there is no need to
write) where others have written "jasmines, swans and fauns." But
what he has really done has been simply to bring to light another
form of rhetoric which hitherto lay hidden in the latrines.

The present situation is made more clear by noting what, in

spite of its peculiar features, it has in common with past periods.
Thus, hardly does Mediterranean civilisation reach its highest point
—towards the III

rd

Century B.C.—when the cynic makes his

appearance. Diogenes, in his mud-covered sandals, tramps over
the carpets of Aristippus. The cynic pullulated at every corner, and
in the highest places. This cynic did nothing but sabotage the
civilisation of the time. He was the nihilist of Hellenism. He
created nothing, he made nothing. His role was to undo—or rather
to attempt to undo, for he did not succeed in his purpose. The
cynic, a parasite of civilisation, lives by denying it, for the very
reason that he is convinced that it will not fail. What would
become of the cynic among a savage people where everyone,
naturally and quite seriously, fulfils what the cynic farcically
considers to be his personal role? What is your Fascist if he does
not speak ill of liberty, or your surrealist if he does not blaspheme
against art?

None other could be the conduct of this type of man born into

a too well-organised world, of which he perceives only the
advantages and not the dangers. His surroundings spoil him,
because they are "civilisation," that is, a home, and the fils de
famille feels nothing that impels him to abandon his mood of
caprice, nothing which urges him to listen to outside counsels from
those superior to himself. Still less anything which obliges him to
make contact with the inexorable depths of his own destiny.

CHAPTER XII

The Barbarism of "Specialisation"

MY thesis was that XIX

th

-Century civilisation has automatically

produced the mass-man. It will be well not to close the general
exposition without analysing, in a particular case, the mechanism
of that production. In this way, by taking concrete form, the thesis
gains in persuasive force.

This civilisation of the XIX

th

Century, I said, may be summed up

in the two great dimensions: liberal democracy and technicism.
Let us take for the moment only the latter. Modern technicism
springs from the union between capitalism and experimental
science. Not all technicism is scientific. That which made the
stone axe in the Chelian period was lacking in science, and yet a
technique was created. China reached a high degree of technique
without in the least suspecting the existence of physics. It is only
modern European technique that has a scientific basis, from which
it derives its specific character, its possibility of limitless progress.
All other techniques—Mesopotamian, Egyptian, Greek, Roman,
Oriental—reach up to a point of development beyond which they
cannot proceed, and hardly do they reach it when they commence
to display a lamentable retrogression.

This marvellous Western technique has made possible the

proliferation of the European species. Recall the fact from which
this essay took its departure and which, as I said, contains in germ
all these present considerations. From the VI

th

Century to 1800,

Europe never succeeds in reaching a population greater than 180
millions. From 1800 to 1914 it rises to more than 460 millions. The
jump is unparalleled in our history. There can be no doubt that it
is technicism—in combination with liberal democracy—which has
engendered mass-man in the quantitative sense of the expression.

But these pages have attempted to show that it is also responsible
for the existence of mass-man in the qualitative and pejorative
sense of the term.

By mass—as I pointed out at the start—is not to be specially

understood the workers; it does not indicate a social class, but a
kind of man to be found to-day in all social classes, who
consequently represents our age, in which he is the predominant,
ruling power. We are now about to find abundant evidence for
this.

Who is it that exercises social power to-day? Who imposes the

forms of his own mind on the period? Without a doubt, the man of
the middle class. Which group, within that middle class, is
considered the superior, the aristocracy of the present? Without a
doubt, the technician: engineer, doctor, financier, teacher, and so
on. Who, inside the group of technicians, represents it at its best
and purest? Again, without a doubt, the man of science. If an
astral personage were to visit Europe to-day and, for the purpose
of forming judgment on it, inquire as to the type of man by which
it would prefer to be judged, there is no doubt that Europe,
pleasantly assured of a favourable judgment, would point to her
men of science. Of course, our astral personage would not inquire
for exceptional individuals, but would seek the generic type of
"man of science," the high-point of European humanity.

And now it turns out that the actual scientific man is the

prototype of the mass-man. Not by chance, not through the
individual failings of each particular man of science, but because
science itself—the root of our civilisation—automatically converts
him into mass-man, makes of him a primitive, a modern barbarian.
The fact is well known; it has made itself clear over and over
again; but only when fitted into its place in the organism of this
thesis does it take on its full meaning and its evident seriousness.

Experimental science is initiated towards the end of the XVI

th

Century (Galileo), it is definitely constituted at the close of the
XVII

th

(Newton), and it begins to develop in the middle of the

XVIII

th

. The development of anything is not the same as its

constitution; it is subject to different conditions. Thus, the
constitution of physics, the collective name of the experimental
sciences, rendered necessary an effort towards unification. Such
was the work of Newton and other men of his time. But the
development of physics introduced a task opposite in character to
unification. In order to progress, science demanded specialisation,
not in herself, but in men of science. Science is not specialist. If it
were, it would ipso facto cease to be true. Not even empirical
science, taken in its integrity, can be true if separated from
mathematics, from logic, from philosophy. But scientific work
does, necessarily, require to be specialised.

It would be of great interest, and of greater utility than at first

sight appears, to draw up the history of physical and biological
sciences, indicating the process of increasing specialisation in the
work of investigators. It would then be seen how, generation after
generation, the scientist has been gradually restricted and
confined into narrower fields of mental occupation. But this is not
the important point that such a history would show, but rather the
reverse side of the matter: how in each generation the scientist,
through having to reduce the sphere of his labour, was
progressively losing contact with other branches of science, with
that integral interpretation of the universe which is the only thing
deserving the names of science, culture, European civilisation.

Specialisation commences precisely at a period which gives to

civilised man the title "encyclopaedic." The XIX

th

Century starts on

its course under the direction of beings who lived
"encyclopaedically," though their production has already some
tinge of specialism. In the following generation, the balance is
upset and specialism begins to dislodge integral culture from the

individual scientist. When by 1890 a third generation assumes
intellectual command in Europe we meet with a type of scientist
unparalleled in history. He is one who, out of all that has to be
known in order to be a man of judgment, is only acquainted with
one science, and even of that one only knows the small corner in
which he is an active investigator. He even proclaims it as a virtue
that he takes no cognisance of what lies outside the narrow
territory specially cultivated by himself, and gives the name of
"dilettantism" to any curiosity for the general scheme of
knowledge.

What happens is that, enclosed within the narrow limits of his

visual field, he does actually succeed in discovering new facts and
advancing the progress of the science which he hardly knows, and
incidentally the encyclopaedia of thought of which he is
conscientiously ignorant. How has such a thing been possible, how
is it still possible? For it is necessary to insist upon this
extraordinary but undeniable fact: experimental science has
progressed thanks in great part to the work of men astoundingly
mediocre, and even less than mediocre. That is to say, modern
science, the root and symbol of our actual civilisation, finds a
place for the intellectually commonplace man and allows him to
work therein with success. The reason of this lies in what is at the
same time the great advantage and the gravest peril of the new
science, and of the civilisation directed and represented by it,
namely, mechanisation. A fair amount of the things that have to be
done in physics or in biology is mechanical work of the mind which
can be done by anyone, or almost anyone. For the purpose of
innumerable investigations it is possible to divide science into
small sections, to enclose oneself in one of these, and to leave out
of consideration all the rest. The solidity and exactitude of the
methods allow of this temporary but quite real disarticulation of
knowledge. The work is done under one of these methods as with
a machine, and in order to obtain quite abundant results it is not

even necessary to have rigorous notions of their meaning and
foundations. In this way the majority of scientists help the general
advance of science while shut up in the narrow cell of their
laboratory, like the bee in the cell of its hive, or the turnspit in its
wheel.

But this creates an extraordinarily strange type of man. The

investigator who has discovered a new fact of Nature must
necessarily experience a feeling of power and self-assurance. With
a certain apparent justice he will look upon himself as "a man who
knows." And in fact there is in him a portion of something which,
added to many other portions not existing in him, does really
constitute knowledge. This is the true inner nature of the
specialist, who in the first years of this century has reached the
wildest stage of exaggeration. The specialist "knows" very well his
own tiny corner of the universe; he is radically ignorant of all the
rest.

Here we have a precise example of this strange new man,

whom I have attempted to define, from both of his two opposite
aspects. I have said that he was a human product unparalleled in
history. The specialist serves as a striking concrete example of the
species, making clear to us the radical nature of the novelty. For,
previously, men could be divided simply into the learned and the
ignorant, those more or less the one, and those more or less the
other. But your specialist cannot be brought in under either of
these two categories. He is not learned, for he is formally ignorant
of all that does not enter into his speciality; but neither is he
ignorant, because he is "a scientist," and "knows" very well his own
tiny portion of the universe. We shall have to say that he is a
learned ignoramus, which is a very serious matter, as it implies
that he is a person who is ignorant, not in the fashion of the
ignorant man, but with all the petulance of one who is learned in
his own special line.

And such in fact is the behaviour of the specialist. In politics,

in art, in social usages, in the other sciences, he will adopt the
attitude of primitive, ignorant man; but he will adopt them
forcefully and with self-sufficiency, and will not admit of—this is
the paradox—specialists in those matters. By specialising him,
civilisation has made him hermetic and self-satisfied within his
limitations; but this very inner feeling of dominance and worth
will induce him to wish to predominate outside his speciality. The
result is that even in this case, representing a maximum of
qualification in man—specialisation—and therefore the thing most
opposed to the mass-man, the result is that he will behave in
almost all spheres of life as does the unqualified, the mass-man.

This is no mere wild statement. Anyone who wishes can

observe the stupidity of thought, judgment, and action shown to-
day in politics, art, religion, and the general problems of life and
the world by the "men of science," and of course, behind them,
the doctors, engineers, financiers, teachers, and so on. That state
of "not listening," of not submitting to higher courts of appeal
which I have repeatedly put forward as characteristic of the mass-
man, reaches its height precisely in these partially qualified men.
They symbolise, and to a great extent constitute, the actual
dominion of the masses, and their barbarism is the most
immediate cause of European demoralisation. Furthermore, they
afford the clearest, most striking example of how the civilisation
of the last century, abandoned to its own devices, has brought
about this rebirth of primitivism and barbarism.

The most immediate result of this unbalanced specialisation

has been that to-day, when there are more "scientists" than ever,
there are much less "cultured" men than, for example, about 1750.
And the worst is that with these turnspits of science not even the
real progress of science itself is assured. For science needs from
time to time, as a necessary regulator of its own advance, a labour
of reconstitution, and, as I have said, this demands an effort

towards unification, which grows more and more difficult,
involving, as it does, ever-vaster regions of the world of
knowledge. Newton was able to found his system of physics
without knowing much philosophy, but Einstein needed to saturate
himself with Kant and Mach before he could reach his own keen
synthesis. Kant and Mach—the names are mere symbols of the
enormous mass of philosophic and psychological thought which has
influenced Einstein—have served to liberate the mind of the latter
and leave the way open for his innovation. But Einstein is not
sufficient. Physics is entering on the gravest crisis of its history,
and can only be saved by a new "Encyclopaedia" more systematic
than the first.

The specialisation, then, that has made possible the progress

of experimental science during a century, is approaching a stage
where it can no longer continue its advance unless a new
generation undertakes to provide it with a more powerful form of
turnspit.

But if the specialist is ignorant of the inner philosophy of the

science he cultivates, he is much more radically ignorant of the
historical conditions requisite for its continuation; that is to say:
how society and the heart of man are to be organised in order that
there may continue to be investigators. The decrease in scientific
vocations noted in recent years, to which I have alluded, is an
anxious symptom for anyone who has a clear idea of what
civilisation is, an idea generally lacking to the typical "scientist,"
the high-point of our present civilisation. He also believes that
civilisation is there in just the same way as the earth's crust and
the forest primeval.

CHAPTER XIII

The Greatest Danger, the State

IN a right ordering of public affairs, the mass is that part which

does not act of itself. Such is its mission. It has come into the
world in order to be directed, influenced, represented, organised
—even in order to cease being mass, or at least to aspire to this.
But it has not come into the world to do all this by itself. It needs
to submit its life to a higher court, formed of the superior
minorities. The question as to who are these superior individuals
may be discussed ad libitum, but that without them, whoever they
be, humanity would cease to preserve its essentials is something
about which there can be no possible doubt, though Europe spend
a century with its head under its wing, ostrich-fashion, trying if
she can to avoid seeing such a plain truth. For we are not dealing
with an opinion based on facts more or less frequent and
probable, but on a law of social "physics," much more immovable
than the laws of Newton's physics. The day when a genuine
philosophy

36

once more holds sway in Europe—it is the one thing

that can save her—that day she will once again realise that man,
whether he like it or not, is a being forced by his nature to seek
some higher authority. If he succeeds in finding it of himself, he is
a superior man; if not, he is a mass-man and must receive it from
his superiors.

For the mass to claim the right to act of itself is then a

rebellion against its own destiny, and because that is what it is
doing at present, I speak of the rebellion of the masses. For, after

36 - For philosophy to rule, it is not necessary that philosophers be the rulers—as Plato at first
wished—nor even for rulers to be philosophers—as was his later, more modest, wish. Both
these things are, strictly speaking, most fatal. For philosophy to rule, it is sufficient for it to
exist; that is to say, for the philosophers to be philosophers. For nearly a century past,
philosophers have been everything but that—politicians, pedagogues, men of letters, and men
of science.

all, the one thing that can substantially and truthfully be called
rebellion is that which consists in not accepting one's own destiny,
in rebelling against one's self. The rebellion of the archangel
Lucifer would not have been less if, instead of striving to be God—
which was not his destiny—he had striven to be the lowest of the
angels—equally not his destiny. (If Lucifer had been a Russian, like
Tolstoi, he would perhaps have preferred this latter form of
rebellion, none the less against God than the other more famous
one.)

When the mass acts on its own, it does so only in one way, for

it has no other: it lynches. It is not altogether by chance that
lynch law comes from America, for America is, in a fashion, the
paradise of the masses. And it will cause less surprise, nowadays,
when the masses triumph, that violence should triumph and be
made the one ratio, the one doctrine. It is now some time since I
called attention to this advance of violence as a normal
condition.

37

To-day it has reached its full development, and this is

a good symptom, because it means that automatically the descent
is about to begin. To-day violence is the rhetoric of the period, the
empty rhetorician has made it his own. When a reality of human
existence has completed its historic course, has been shipwrecked
and lies dead, the waves throw it up on the shores of rhetoric,
where the corpse remains for a long time. Rhetoric is the
cemetery of human realities, or at any rate a Home for the Aged.
The reality itself is survived by its name, which, though only a
word, is after all at least a word and preserves something of its
magic power.

But though it is not impossible that the prestige of violence as

a cynically established rule has entered on its decline, we shall
still continue under that rule, though in another form. I refer to
the gravest danger now threatening European civilisation. Like all

37 - Vide España Invertebrada, 1912.

other dangers that threaten it, this one is born of civilisation
itself. More than that, it constitutes one of its glories: it is the
State as we know it to-day. We are confronted with a replica of
what we said in the previous chapter about science: the fertility of
its principles brings about a fabulous progress, but this inevitably
imposes specialisation, and specialisation threatens to strangle
science.

The same thing is happening with the State. Call to mind what

the State was at the end of the XVIII

th

Century in all European

nations. Quite a small affair. Early capitalism and its industrial
organisations, in which the new, rationalised technique triumphs
for the first time, had brought about a commencement of increase
in society. A new social class appeared, greater in numbers and
power than the pre-existing: the middle class. This astute middle
class possessed one thing, above and before all: talent, practical
talent. It knew how to organise and discipline, how to give
continuity and consistency to its efforts. In the midst of it, as in an
ocean, the "ship of State" sailed its hazardous course. The ship of
State is a metaphor re-invented by the bourgeoisie, which felt
itself oceanic, omnipotent, pregnant with storms. That ship was,
as we said, a very small affair: it had hardly any soldiers,
bureaucrats, or money. It had been built in the Middle Ages by a
class of men very different from the bourgeois—the nobles, a class
admirable for their courage, their gifts of leadership, their sense
of responsibility. Without them the nations of Europe would not
now be in existence. But with all those virtues of the heart, the
nobles were, and always have been, lacking in virtues of the head.
Of limited intelligence, sentimental, instinctive, intuitive—in a
word, "irrational." Hence they were unable to develop any
technique, a thing which demands rationalisation. They did not
invent gunpowder. Incapable of inventing new arms, they allowed
the bourgeois, who got it from the East or somewhere else, to
utilise gunpowder and automatically to win the battle for the

warrior noble, the "caballero," stupidly again covered in iron so
that he could hardly move in the fight, and who had never
imagined that the eternal secret of warfare consists not so much
in the methods of defence as in those of attack, a secret which
was to be rediscovered by Napoleon.

38

As the State is a matter of technique—of public order and

administration—the "ancien régime" reaches the end of the XVIII

th

Century with a very weak State, harassed on all sides by a
widespread social revolt. The disproportion between State power
and social power at this time is such that comparing the situation
then with that of the time of Charlemagne, the XVIII

th

-Century

State appears degenerate. The Carolingian State was of course
much less powerful than the State of Louis XVI, but, on the other
hand, the society surrounding it was entirely lacking in strength.

39

The enormous disproportion between social strength and the
strength of public power made possible the Revolution, the
revolutions—up to 1848.

But with the Revolution the middle class took possession of

public power and applied their undeniable qualities to the State,

38 - We owe to Ranke this simple picture of the great historic change by which for the
supremacy of the nobles is substituted the predominance of the bourgeois; but of course its
symbolic geometric outlines require no little filling-in in order to be completely true.
Gunpowder was known from time immemorial. The invention by which a tube was charged
with it was due to someone in Lombardy. Even then it was not efficacious until the invention
of the cast cannon-ball. The "nobles" used firearms to a small extent, but they were too dear
for them. It was only the bourgeois armies, with their better economic organisation, that could
employ them on a large scale. It remains, however, literally true that the nobles, represented
by the medieval type of army of the Burgundians, were definitely defeated by the new army,
not professional but bourgeois, formed by the Swiss. Their primary force lay in the new
discipline and the new rationalisation of tactics.
39 - It would be worth while insisting on this point and making clear that the epoch of
absolute monarchies in Europe has coincided with very weak States. How is this to be
explained? Why, if the State was all-powerful, "absolute," did it not make itself stronger? One
of the causes is that indicated, the incapacity—technical, organising, bureaucratic—of the
aristocracies of blood. But this is not enough. Besides that, it also happened that the absolute
State and those aristocracies did not want to aggrandise the State at the expense of society in
general. Contrary to the common belief, the absolute State instinctively respects society much
more than our democratic State, which is more intelligent but has less sense of historic
responsibility.

and in little more than a generation created a powerful State,
which brought revolutions to an end. Since 1848, that is to say,
since the beginning of the second generation of bourgeois
governments, there have been no genuine revolutions in Europe.
Not assuredly because there were no motives for them, but
because there were no means. Public power was brought to the
level of social power. Good-bye for ever to Revolutions! The only
thing now possible in Europe is their opposite: the coup d'état.
Everything which in following years tried to look like a revolution
was only a coup d'état in disguise.

In our days the State has come to be a formidable machine

which works in marvellous fashion; of wonderful efficiency by
reason of the quantity and precision of its means. Once it is set up
in the midst of society, it is enough to touch a button for its
enormous levers to start working and exercise their overwhelming
power on any portion whatever of the social framework.

The contemporary State is the easiest seen and best-known

product of civilisation. And it is an interesting revelation when one
takes note of the attitude that mass-man adopts before it. He sees
it, admires it, knows that there it is, safeguarding his existence;
but he is not conscious of the fact that it is a human creation
invented by certain men and upheld by certain virtues and
fundamental qualities which the men of yesterday had and which
may vanish into air to-morrow. Furthermore, the mass-man sees in
the State an anonymous power, and feeling himself, like it,
anonymous, he believes that the State is something of his own.
Suppose that in the public life of a country some difficulty,
conflict, or problem presents itself, the mass-man will tend to
demand that the State intervene immediately and undertake a
solution directly with its immense and unassailable resources.

This is the gravest danger that to-day threatens civilisation:

State intervention; the absorption of all spontaneous social effort

by the State, that is to say, of spontaneous historical action, which
in the long run sustains, nourishes, and impels human destinies.
When the mass suffers any ill-fortune or simply feels some strong
appetite, its great temptation is that permanent, sure possibility
of obtaining everything—without effort, struggle, doubt, or risk—
merely by touching a button and setting the mighty machine in
motion. The mass says to itself, "L'État, c'est moi," which is a
complete mistake. The State is the mass only in the sense in which
it can be said of two men that they are identical because neither
of them is named John. The contemporary State and the mass
coincide only in being anonymous. But the mass-man does in fact
believe that he is the State, and he will tend more and more to set
its machinery working on whatsoever pretext, to crush beneath it
any creative minority which disturbs it—disturbs it in any order of
things: in politics, in ideas, in industry.

The result of this tendency will be fatal. Spontaneous social

action will be broken up over and over again by State intervention;
no new seed will be able to fructify. Society will have to live for
the State, man for the governmental machine. And as, after all, it
is only a machine whose existence and maintenance depend on the
vital supports around it, the State, after sucking out the very
marrow of society, will be left bloodless, a skeleton, dead with
that rusty death of machinery, more gruesome than the death of a
living organism.

Such was the lamentable fate of ancient civilisation. No doubt

the imperial State created by the Julii and the Claudii was an
admirable machine, incomparably superior as a mere structure to
the old republican State of the patrician families. But, by a
curious coincidence, hardly had it reached full development when
the social body began to decay.

Already in the times of the Antonines (II

nd

Century), the State

overbears society with its anti-vital supremacy. Society begins to

be enslaved, to be unable to live except in the service of the
State. The whole of life is bureaucratised. What results? The
bureaucratisation of life brings about its absolute decay in all
orders. Wealth diminishes, births are few. Then the State, in order
to attend to its own needs, forces on still more the
bureaucratisation of human existence. This bureaucratisation to
the second power is the militarisation of society. The State's most
urgent need is its apparatus of war, its army. Before all the State is
the producer of security (that security, be it remembered, of
which the mass-man is born). Hence, above all, an army. The
Severi, of African origin, militarise the world. Vain task! Misery
increases, women are every day less fruitful, even soldiers are
lacking. After the time of the Severi, the army has to be recruited
from foreigners.

Is the paradoxical, tragic process of Statism now realised?

Society, that it may live better, creates the State as an
instrument. Then the State gets the upper hand and society has to
begin to live for the State.

40

But for all that the State is still

composed of the members of that society. But soon these do not
suffice to support it, and it has to call in foreigners: first
Dalmatians, then Germans. These foreigners take possession of the
State, and the rest of society, the former populace, has to live as
their slaves—slaves of people with whom they have nothing in
common. This is what State intervention leads to: the people are
converted into fuel to feed the mere machine which is the State.
The skeleton eats up the flesh around it. The scaffolding becomes
the owner and tenant of the house.

When this is realised, it rather confounds one to hear Mussolini

heralding as an astounding discovery just made in Italy, the
formula: "All for the State; nothing outside the State; nothing

40 - Recall the last words of Septimus Severus to his sons: "Remain united, pay the soldiers,
and take no heed of the rest."

against the State." This alone would suffice to reveal in Fascism a
typical movement of mass-men. Mussolini found a State admirably
built up—not by him, but precisely by the ideas and the forces he
is combating: by liberal democracy. He confines himself to using it
ruthlessly, and, without entering now into a detailed examination
of his work, it is indisputable that the results obtained up to the
present cannot be compared with those obtained in political and
administrative working by the liberal State. If he has succeeded in
anything, it is so minute, so little visible, so lacking in substance
as with difficulty to compensate for the accumulation of the
abnormal powers which enable him to make use of that machine
to its full extent.

Statism is the higher form taken by violence and direct action

when these are set up as standards. Through and by means of the
State, the anonymous machine, the masses act for themselves.
The nations of Europe have before them a period of great
difficulties in their internal life, supremely arduous problems of
law, economics, and public order. Can we help feeling that under
the rule of the masses the State will endeavour to crush the
independence of the individual and the group, and thus definitely
spoil the harvest of the future?

A concrete example of this mechanism is found in one of the

most alarming phenomena of the last thirty years: the enormous
increase in the police force of all countries. The increase of
population has inevitably rendered it necessary. However
accustomed we may be to it, the terrible paradox should not
escape our minds that the population of a great modern city, in
order to move about peaceably and attend to its business,
necessarily requires a police force to regulate the circulation. But
it is foolishness for the party of "law and order" to imagine that
these "forces of public authority" created to preserve order are
always going to be content to preserve the order that that party
desires. Inevitably they will end by themselves defining and

deciding on the order they are going to impose—which, naturally,
will be that which suits them best.

It might be well to take advantage of our touching on this

matter to observe the different reaction to a public need
manifested by different types of society. When, about 1800, the
new industry began to create a type of man—the industrial worker
—more criminally inclined than traditional types, France hastened
to create a numerous police force. Towards 1810 there occurs in
England, for the same reasons, an increase in criminality, and the
English suddenly realise that they have no police. The
Conservatives are in power. What will they do? Will they establish
a police force? Nothing of the kind. They prefer to put up with
crime, as well as they can. "People are content to let disorder
alone, considering it the price they pay for liberty." "In Paris,"
writes John William Ward, "they have an admirable police force,
but they pay dear for its advantages. I prefer to see, every three
or four years, half a dozen people getting their throats cut in the
Ratcliffe Road, than to have to submit to domiciliary visits, to
spying, and to all the machinations of Fouché."

41

Here we have two

opposite ideas of the State. The Englishman demands that the
State should have limits set to it.

41 - Vide Elie Halevy, Histoire du peuple anglais au XIX siécle, Vol. I, P. 40 (1912).

CHAPTER XIV

Who Rules the World?

EUROPEAN civilisation, I have repeated more than once, has

automatically brought about the rebellion of the masses. From one
view-point this fact presents a most favourable aspect, as we have
noted: the rebellion of the masses is one and the same thing as
the fabulous increase that human existence has experienced in our
times. But the reverse side of the same phenomenon is fearsome;
it is none other than the radical demoralisation of humanity. Let us
now consider this last from new view-points.

1.

The substance or character of a new historical period is the

resultant of internal variations—of man and his spirit; or of
external variations—formal, and as it were mechanical. Amongst
these last, the most important, almost without a doubt, is the
displacement of power. But this brings with it a displacement of
the spirit.

Consequently, when we set about examining a period with a

view to understanding it, one of our first questions ought to be:
who is governing in the world at the time? It may happen that at
the time humanity is scattered in different groups without any
communication, forming interior, independent worlds. In the days
of Miltiades, the Mediterranean world was unaware of the
existence of the Far-Eastern world. In such cases we shall have to
refer our question, "Who rules in the world?" to each individual
group. But from the XVI

th

Century, humanity has entered on a vast

unifying process, which in our days has reached its furthest limits.

There is now no portion of humanity living apart—no islands of
human existence. Consequently, from that century on, it may be
said that whoever rules the world does, in fact, exercise
authoritative influence over the whole of it. Such has been the
part played by the homogeneous group formed by European
peoples during the last three centuries. Europe was the ruler, and
under its unity of command the world lived in unitary fashion, or
at least was progressively unified. This fashion of existence is
generally styled the Modern Age, a colourless, inexpressive name,
under which lies hidden this reality: the epoch of European
hegemony.

By "rule" we are not here to understand primarily the exercise

of material power, of physical coercion. We are here trying to
avoid foolish notions, at least the more gross and evident ones.
This stable, normal relation amongst men which is known as "rule"
never rests on force; on the contrary, it is because a man or group
of men exercise command that they have at their disposition that
social apparatus or machinery known as "force." The cases in which
at first sight force seems to be the basis of command, are revealed
on a closer inspection as the best example to prove our thesis.
Napoleon led an aggressive force against Spain, maintained his
aggression for a time, but, properly speaking, never ruled in Spain
for a single day. And that, although he had the force, and precisely
because he had it. It is necessary to distinguish between a process
of aggression and a state of rule. Rule is the normal exercise of
authority, and is always based on public opinion, to-day as a
thousand years ago, amongst the English as amongst the Bushmen.
Never has anyone ruled on this earth by basing his rule essentially
on any other thing than public opinion.

It may be thought that the sovereignty of public invention of

the lawyer Danton, in 1789, or of Saint Thomas Aquinas in the XIII

th

Century. The notion of that sovereignty may have been discovered
in one place or another, at one time or another, but the fact that

public opinion is the basic force which produces the phenomenon
of rule in human societies is as old, and as lasting, as mankind. In
Newton's physics gravitation is the force which produces
movement. And the law of public opinion is the universal law of
gravitation in political history. Without it the science of history
would be impossible. Hence Hume's acute suggestion that the
theme of history consists in demonstrating how the sovereignty of
public opinion, far from being a Utopian aspiration, is what has
actually happened everywhere and always in human societies.
Even the man who attempts to rule with janissaries depends on
their opinion and the opinion which the rest of the inhabitants
have of them.

The truth is that there is no ruling with janissaries. As

Talleyrand said to Napoleon: "You can do everything with bayonets,
Sire, except sit on them." And to rule is not the gesture of
snatching at power, but the tranquil exercise of it. In a word, to
rule is to sit down, be it on the throne, curule chair, front bench,
or bishop's seat. Contrary to the unsophisticated suggestions of
melodrama, to rule is not so much a question of the heavy hand as
of the firm seat. The State is, in fine, the state of opinion, a
position of equilibrium.

What happens is that at times public opinion is non-existent. A

society divided into discordant groups, with their forces of opinion
cancelling one another out, leaves no room for a ruling power to
be constituted. And as "nature abhors a vacuum" the empty space
left by the absence of public opinion is filled by brute force. At
the most, then, the latter presents itself as a substitute for the
former. Consequently, if we wish to express the law of public
opinion as the law of historical gravitation, we shall take into
consideration those cases where it is absent, and we then arrive at
a formula which is the well-known, venerable, forthright
commonplace: there can be no rule in opposition to public
opinion.

This enables us to realise that rule signifies the predominance

of an opinion, and therefore of a spirit; that rule is, when all is
said and done, nothing else but a spiritual power. This is confirmed
with precision by the facts of history. All primitive rule has a
"sacred" character, for it is based on religion and religion is the
first form under which appears what is afterwards to be spirit,
idea, opinion; in a word, the immaterial and ultra-physical. In the
Middle Ages the same phenomenon is reproduced on a larger scale.
The first State or public authority formed in Europe is the Church,
with its specific, well-defined character of "the spiritual power."
From the Church the political power learns that it, too, in its
origin, is a spiritual authority, the prevalence of certain ideas, and
there is created the Holy Roman Empire. Thus arises the struggle
between two powers, which, having no differentiation in
substance (as they are both spirit), reach an agreement by which
each limits itself to a time-category; the temporal and the
eternal. Temporal power and religious power are equally spiritual,
but the one is the spirit of time, public opinion, mundane and
fluctuating, whilst the other is the spirit of eternity, the opinion of
God, God's view of man and his destiny. It comes to the same thing
then to say: At a given period, such a man, such a people, or such
a homogeneous group of peoples, are in command, as to say: At
this given period there predominates in the world such a system of
opinions—ideas, preferences, aspirations, purposes.

How is this predominance to be understood? The majority of

men have no opinions, and these have to be pumped into them
from outside, like lubricants into machinery. Hence it is necessary
that some mind or other should hold and exercise authority, so
that the people without opinions—the majority—can start having
opinions. For without these, the common life of humanity would
be chaos, a historic void, lacking in any organic structure.
Consequently, without a spiritual power, without someone to
command, and in proportion as this is lacking, chaos reigns over

mankind. And similarly, all displacement of power, every change of
authority, implies a change of opinions, and therefore nothing less
than a change of historical gravitation. Let us go back again to
where we started from. For several centuries the world has been
ruled by Europe, a conglomerate of peoples akin in spirit. In the
Middle Ages there was no such rule in temporal matters. So it has
happened in all the middle ages of history. That is why they
represent a relative chaos, relative barbarism, a deficit of public
opinion. They are times in which men love, hate, desire, detest;
all this without limit; but, on the other hand, there is no opinion.
Such epochs are not without their charm. But in the great epochs,
what mankind lives by is opinion, and therefore, order rules. On
the further side of the Middle Ages we also find a period in which,
as in the Modern Age, there is someone in command, though only
over a limited portion of the world: Rome, the great director. It
was she who set up order in the Mediterranean and its borders.

In these post-war times the word is beginning to go round that

Europe no longer rules in the world. Is the full gravity of this
diagnosis realised? By it there is announced a displacement of
power. In what direction? Who is going to succeed Europe in ruling
over the world? But is it so sure that anyone is going to succeed
her? And if no one, what then is going to happen?

2.

It is true, of course, that at any moment, and therefore

actually, an infinity of things is happening in the world. Any
attempt, then, to say what is happening in the world to-day must
be taken as being conscious of its own irony. But for the very
reason that we are unable to have directly complete knowledge of
reality, there is nothing for us but arbitrarily to construct a reality,
to suppose that things are happening after a certain fashion. This

provides us with an outline, a concept or framework of concepts.
With this, as through a "sight," we then look at the actual reality,
and it is only then that we obtain an approximate vision of it. It is
in this that scientific method consists. Nay, more, in this consists
all use of the intellect. When we see our friend coming up the
garden path, and we say: "Here's Peter," we are committing,
deliberately, ironically, an error. For Peter implies for us a complex
of ways of behaviour, physical and moral—what we call
"character"—and the plain truth is that, at times, our friend Peter
is not in the least like the concept "our friend Peter."

Every concept, the simplest and the most technical, is framed

in its own irony as the geometrically cut diamond is held in its
setting of gold. The concept tells us quite seriously: "This thing is
A, that thing is B." But the seriousness is that of the man who is
playing a joke on you, the unstable seriousness of one who is
swallowing a laugh, which will burst out if he does not keep his
lips tight-closed. It knows very well that this thing is not just
merely A, or that thing just merely B. What the concept really
thinks is a little bit different from what it says, and herein the
irony lies. What it really thinks is this: I know that, strictly
speaking, this thing is not A, nor that thing B; but by taking them
as A and B, I come to an understanding with myself for the
purposes of my practical attitude towards both of these things.
This theory of rational knowledge would have displeased a Greek.
For the Greek believed that he had discovered in the reason, in
the concept, reality itself. We, on the contrary, believe that the
concept is one of man's household utensils, which he needs and
uses in order to make clear his own position in the midst of the
infinite and very problematic reality which is his life. Life is a
struggle with things to maintain itself among them. Concepts are
the strategic plan we form in answer to the attack. Hence, if we
penetrate to the true inwardness of a concept, we find that it tells
us nothing of the thing itself, but only sums up what one can do

with it, or what it can do to one. This opinion, according to which
the content of a concept is always vital, is always a possible
activity or passivity, has not been maintained, as far as I know, by
anyone before now, but it seems to me to be the inevitable
outcome of the philosophical processes initiated by Kant. Hence, if
by its light, we examine the whole past of philosophy up to the
time of Kant, it will seem to us that, at bottom, all philosophers
have said the same thing. Well, then, every, philosophical
discovery is nothing else than an uncovering, a bringing to the
surface, of what was lying in the depths.

But this is an inordinate introduction to what I am going to say;

something quite foreign to philosophical problems. I was simply
going to say that what is actually happening in the world of history
is this and this alone: for three centuries Europe has been the
ruler in the world, and now Europe is no longer sure that she is, or
will continue to be, the ruler. To reduce to such a simple formula
the historic reality of the present time is doubtless, at the best,
an exaggeration, and hence the need I was in of recalling that to
think is, whether you want or not, to exaggerate. If you prefer not
to exaggerate, you must remain silent; or, rather, you must
paralyse your intellect and find some way of becoming an idiot.

I believe, then, that this is what is happening in the world at

present, and that all the rest is mere consequence, condition,
symptom, or incident of the first. I have not said that Europe has
ceased to rule, but that in these times, Europe feels grave doubts
as to whether she does rule or not, as to whether she will rule to-
morrow. Corresponding to this, there is in the other peoples of the
earth a related state of mind, a doubt as to whether they are at
present ruled by anyone. They also are not sure of it.

There has been a lot of talk in recent years about the

decadence of Europe. I would ask people not to be so simple-
minded as to think of Spengler immediately the decadence of

Europe or of the West is mentioned. Before his book appeared,
everyone was talking of this matter, and as is well known, the
success of his book was due to the fact that the suspicion was
already existing in people's minds, in ways and for reasons of the
most heterogeneous.

There has been so much talk of the decadence of Europe, that

many have come to take it for a fact. Not that they believe in it
seriously and on proof, but that they have grown used to take it as
true, though they cannot honestly recall having convinced
themselves decidedly in the matter at any fixed time. Waldo
Frank's recent book The Rediscovery of America is based entirely
on the supposition that Europe is at its last gasp. And yet, Frank
neither analyses nor discusses, nor submits to question this
enormous fact, which is to serve him as a formidable premise.
Without further investigation, he starts from it as from something
incontrovertible. And this ingenuousness at the very start is
sufficient to make me think that Frank is not convinced of the
decadence of Europe; far from it, he has never set himself the
problem. He takes it as he would take a tram. Commonplaces are
the tramways of intellectual transportation. And as he does, so do
many others. Above all, it is done by nations, whole nations.

The world at the present day is behaving in a way which is a

very model of childishness. In school, when someone gives the
word that the master has left the class, the mob of youngsters
breaks loose, kicks up its heels, and goes wild. Each of them
experiences the delights of escaping the pressure imposed by the
master's presence; of throwing off the yoke of rule, of feeling
himself the master of his fate. But as, once the plan which
directed their occupations and tasks is suspended, the youthful
mob has no formal occupation of its own, no task with a meaning,
a continuity, and a purpose, it follows that it can only do one thing
—stand on its head. The frivolous spectacle offered by the smaller
nations to-day is deplorable. Because it is said that Europe is in

decadence and has given over ruling, every tuppenny-ha'penny
nation starts skipping, gesticulating, standing on its head or else
struts around giving itself airs of a grown-up person who is the
ruler of his own destinies. Hence the vibrionic panorama of
"nationalisms" that meets our view everywhere.

In previous chapters I attempted to put in his classification a

new type of man who to-day predominates in the world: I called
him the mass-man, and I observed that his main characteristic lies
in that, feeling himself "common," he proclaims the right to be
common, and refuses to accept any order superior to himself. It
was only natural that if this mentality is predominant in every
people, it should be manifest also when we consider the nations as
a group. There are then also relatively mass-peoples determined
on rebelling against the great creative peoples, the minority of
human stocks which have organised history. It is really comic to
see how this or the other puny republic, from its out-of-the-way
corner, stands up on tip-toe, starts rebuking Europe, and declares
that she has lost her place in universal history.

What is the result? Europe had created a system of standards

whose efficacy and productiveness the centuries have proved.
Those standards are not the best possible; far from it. But they
are, without a doubt, definite standards as long as no others exist
or are visualised. Before supplanting them, it is essential to
produce others. Now, the mass-peoples have decided to consider
as bankrupt that system of standards which European civilisation
implies, but as they are incapable of creating others, they do not
know what to do, and to pass the time they kick up their heels and
stand on their heads. Such is the first consequence which follows
when there ceases to be in the world anyone who rules; the rest,
when they break into rebellion, are left without a task to perform,
without a programme of life.

3.

The gypsy in the story went to confession, but the cautious

priest asked him if he knew the commandments of the law of God.
To which the gypsy replied: "Well, Father, it's this way: I was going
to learn them, but I heard talk that they were going to do away
with them."

Is not this the situation in the world at present? The rumour is

running round that the commandments of the law of Europe are no
longer in force, and in view of this, men and peoples are taking
the opportunity of living without imperatives. For the European
were the only ones that existed. It is not a question—as has
happened previously—of new standards springing up to displace
the old, or of a new fervour absorbing in its youthful vigour the old
enthusiasms of diminishing temperature. That would be the
natural procedure. Furthermore, the old is proved to be old not
because it is itself falling into senility, but because it has against it
a new principle which, by the fact of being new, renders old the
pre-existing. If we had no children, we should not be old, or
should take much longer to get old. The same happens with
machines. A motor-car ten years old seems older than a
locomotive of twenty years ago, simply because the inventions of
motor production have followed one another with greater rapidity.
This decadence, which has its source in the rising-up of fresh
youth, is a symptom of health.

But what is happening at present in Europe is something

unhealthy and unusual. The European commandments have lost
their force, though there is no sign of any others on the horizon.
Europe—we are told—is ceasing to rule, and no one sees who is
going to take her place. By Europe we understand primarily and
properly the trinity of France, England, Germany. It is in the
portion of the globe occupied by these that there has matured
that mode of human existence in accordance with which the world

has been organized. If, as is now announced, these three peoples
are in decadence, and their programme of life has lost its validity,
it is not strange that the world is becoming demoralised.

And such is the simple truth. The whole world—nations and

individuals—is demoralised. For a time this demoralisation rather
amuses people, and even causes a vague illusion. The lower ranks
think that a weight has been lifted off them. Decalogues retain
from the time they were written on stone or bronze their
character of heaviness. The etymology of command conveys the
notion of putting a load into someone's hands. He who commands
cannot help being a bore. Lower ranks the world over are tired of
being ordered and commanded, and with holiday air take
advantage of a period freed from burdensome imperatives. But the
holiday does not last long. Without commandments, obliging us to
live after a certain fashion, our existence is that of the
"unemployed." This is the terrible spiritual situation in which the
best youth of the world finds itself to-day. By dint of feeling itself
free, exempt from restrictions, it feels itself empty. An
"unemployed" existence is a worse negation of life than death
itself. Because to live means to have something definite to do—a
mission to fulfil—and in the measure in which we avoid setting our
life to something, we make it empty. Before long there will be
heard throughout the planet a formidable cry, rising like the
howling of innumerable dogs to the stars, asking for someone or
something to take command, to impose an occupation, a duty. This
for those people who, with the thoughtlessness of children,
announce to us that Europe is no longer in command. To command
is to give people something to do, to fit them into their destiny, to
prevent their wandering aimlessly about in an empty, desolate
existence.

It would not matter if Europe ceased to command, provided

there were someone able to take her place. But there is not the
faintest sign of one. New York and Moscow represent nothing new,

relatively to Europe. They are both of them two sections of the
European order of things, which, by dissociating from the rest,
have lost their meaning. In sober truth, one is afraid to talk of
New York and Moscow, because one does not know what they
really are; the only thing one knows is that the decisive word has
not yet been said about either of them. But even without full
knowledge of what they are, one can arrive at sufficient to
understand their generic character. And, in fact, both of them fit
in perfectly with what I have sometimes called "phenomena of
historical camouflage." Of its nature, camouflage is a reality which
is not what it seems. Its appearance, instead of declaring,
conceals its substance. Hence the majority of people are
deceived. The deception can only be avoided by one who knows
beforehand, and in general, that there is such a thing as
camouflage. It is the same as with the mirage. The concept we
have of the phenomenon corrects our vision.

In every instance of historical camouflage we have two

realities superimposed; one genuine and substantial, underneath;
the other apparent and accidental, on the surface. So, in Moscow,
there is a screen of European ideas—Marxism—thought out in
Europe in view of European realities and problems. Behind it there
is a people, not merely ethnically distinct from the European, but
what is much more important, of a different age to ours. A people
still in process of fermentation; that is to say, a child-people. That
Marxism should triumph in Russia, where there is no industry,
would be the greatest contradiction that Marxism could undergo.
But there is no such contradiction, for there is no such triumph.
Russia is Marxist more or less as the Germans of the Holy Roman
Empire were Romans. New peoples have no ideas. When they grow
up in an atmosphere in which an old civilisation exists, or has
existed, they disguise themselves in the ideas which it offers to
them. Here is the camouflage and the reason for it. As I have
observed on other occasions, it is forgotten that there are two

main types of evolution for a people. There is the people which is
born into a "world" empty of all civilisation, for example the
Egyptians or the Chinese. In such a people everything is
autochthonous, and their acts have a clear direct sense of their
own. But there are other peoples who spring up and develop in a
situation already occupied by a civilisation of long history. So
Rome, which grows up by the Mediterranean, whose waters were
impregnated with Graeco-Oriental culture. Hence half the
"gestures" of the Romans are not their own, they have been learnt.
And the "gesture" which has been learnt, accepted, has always a
double aspect, its real meaning is oblique, not direct. The man
who performs an act which he has learnt—speaks a foreign word,
for example—carries out beneath it an act of his own, genuine; he
translates the foreign term to his own language. Hence, in order
to penetrate camouflage an oblique glance is required, the glance
of one who is translating a text with the dictionary by his side. I
am waiting for the book in which Stalin's Marxism will appear
translated into Russian history. For it is this which is Russia's
strength, what it has of Russian, not what it has of Communist.
Goodness knows what it will be like! The only thing one can assert
is that Russia will require centuries before she can aspire to
command. Because she is still lacking in commandments she has
been obliged to feign adherence to the European principles of
Marx. As she has abundant youth, that fiction is enough for her.
Youth does not require reasons for living, it only needs pretexts.
Something very similar is happening with New York. It is again an
error to attribute its actual strength to the commandments it
obeys. In the last resort these are reduced to one—technicism.
How strange! Another European invention, not an American.
Technicism is invented by Europe during the XVIII

th

and XIX

th

Centuries. Again how strange! The very centuries in which America
is coming into existence. And we are told quite seriously that the
essence of America is its practical and technicist conception of
life. Instead of being told that America is, as all colonies are, a

rejuvenescence of old races, in particular of Europe. For different
reasons to those in the case of Russia, the United States also
affords an example of that specific historic reality which we call "a
new people." This is looked upon as a mere phrase, when in reality
it is a fact as precise as that of youth in man. America is strong by
reason of its youth, which has put itself at the service of the
modern commandment of technicism, just as it might have put
itself at the service of Buddhism, if that were the order of the day.
But while acting thus, America is only starting its history. It is only
now that its trials, its dissensions, its conflicts, are beginning. It
has yet to be many things; amongst others, some things quite
opposed to the technical and the practical. America is younger
than Russia. I have always maintained, though in fear of
exaggeration, that it is a primitive people camouflaged behind the
latest inventions.

42

And now Waldo Frank, in his Rediscovery of

America, declares this openly. America has not yet suffered; it is
an illusion to think that it can possess the virtues of command.

Anyone who wishes to escape from the pessimistic conclusion

that nobody is going to be in command, and that therefore the
historic world is returning into chaos, will have to fall back to the
point we started from, and ask himself seriously: Is it as certain as
people say that Europe is in decadence; that it is resigning its
command; abdicating? May not this apparent decadence be a
beneficial crisis which will enable Europe to be really literally
Europe. The evident decadence of the nations of Europe, was not
this a priori necessary if there was to be one day possible a United
States of Europe, the plurality of Europe substituted by its formal
unity?

42 - See El Espectador (VII. Hegel y America).

4.

The function of commanding and obeying is the decisive one in

every society. As long as there is any doubt as to who commands
and who obeys, all the rest will be imperfect and ineffective. Even
the very consciences of men, apart from special exceptions, will
be disturbed and falsified. If man were a solitary being, finding
himself only on occasion thrown into association with others, he
might come out intact from such disturbances, brought about by
the displacements and crises of the ruling Power. But as he is
social in his most intimate texture, his personal character is
transformed by changes which strictly speaking only immediately
affect the collectivity. Hence it is, that if an individual be taken
apart and analysed, it is possible without further data to deduce
how his country's conscience is organised in the matter of
command and obedience.

It would be interesting and even useful to submit to this test

the individual character of the average Spaniard. However, the
operation would be an unpleasant one, and though useful,
depressing, so I avoid it. But it would make clear the enormous
dose of personal demoralisation, of degradation, which is
produced in the average man of our country by the fact that Spain
is a nation which has lived for centuries with a false conscience in
the matter of commanding and obeying. This degradation is
nothing else than the acceptance, as a normal, constituted
condition, of an irregularity, of something which, though
accepted, is still regarded as not right. As it is impossible to
change into healthy normality what is of its essence unhealthy and
abnormal, the individual decides to adapt himself to the thing that
is wrong, making himself a part of the crime or irregularity. It is a
mechanism similar to that indicated by the popular saying, "One
lie makes a hundred." All countries have passed through periods
when someone who should not rule has made the attempt to rule

over them, but a strong instinct forced them at once to
concentrate their energies and to crush that irregular claim to
exercise power. They rejected the passing irregularity and thus
reconstituted their morale as a people. But the Spaniard has done
just the opposite; instead of resisting a form of authority which his
innermost conscience repudiated, he has preferred to falsify all
the rest of his being in order to bring it into line with that initial
unreality. As long as this continues in our country it is vain to hope
for anything from the men of our race. There can be no elastic
vigour for the difficult task of retaining a worthy position in
history in a society whose State, whose authority, is of its very
nature a fraud.

There is, then, nothing strange in the fact that a slight doubt,

a simple hesitation as to who rules in the world, should be
sufficient to bring about a commencement of demoralisation in
everyone, both in his public and his private life.

Human life, by its very nature, has to be dedicated to

something, an enterprise glorious or humble, a destiny illustrious
or trivial. We are faced with a condition, strange but inexorable,
involved in our very existence. On the one hand, to live is
something which each one does of himself and for himself. On the
other hand, if that life of mine, which only concerns myself, is not
directed by me towards something, it will be disjointed, lacking in
tension and in "form." In these years we are witnessing the gigantic
spectacle of innumerable human lives wandering about lost in
their own labyrinths, through not having anything to which to give
themselves. All imperatives, all commands, are in a state of
suspension. The situation might seem to be an ideal one, since
every existence is left entirely free to do just as it pleases—to look
after itself. The same with every nation. Europe has slackened its
pressure on the world. But the result has been contrary to what
might have been expected. Given over to itself, every life has
been left empty, with nothing to do. And as it has to be filled with

something, it invents frivolities for itself, gives itself to false
occupations which impose nothing intimate, sincere. To-day it is
one thing, to-morrow another, opposite to the first. Life is lost at
finding itself all alone. Mere egoism is a labyrinth. This is quite
understandable. Really to live is to be directed towards
something, to progress towards a goal. The goal is not my motion,
not my life, it is the something to which I put my life and which
consequently is outside it, beyond it. If I decide to walk alone
inside my own existence, egoistically, I make no progress. I arrive
nowhere. I keep turning round and round in the one spot. That is
the labyrinth, the road that leads nowhere, which loses itself,
through being a mere turning round within itself. Since the war
the European has shut himself up within himself, has been left
without projects either for himself or for others. Hence we are
continuing historically as we were ten years ago.

Command is not exercised in the void. It implies a pressure

exercised on others. But it does not imply this alone. If it were
only this, it would be mere violence. We must not forget that
command has a double effect—someone is commanded, and he is
commanded to do something. And in the long run what he is
ordered to do is to take his share in an enterprise, in a historic
destiny. Hence there is no empire without a programme of life;
more precisely, without a programme of imperial life. As the line
of Schiller says: "When kings build, the carters have work to do." It
will not do, then, to adopt the trivial notion which thinks it sees in
the activity of great nations—as of great men—a merely egoistic
inspiration. It is not as easy as you imagine to be a pure egoist,
and none such have ever succeeded. The apparent egoism of great
nations and of great men is the inevitable sternness with which
anyone who has his life fixed on some undertaking must bear
himself. When we are really going to do something and have
dedicated ourselves to a purpose, we cannot be expected to be
ready at hand to look after every passer-by and to lend ourselves

to every chance display of altruism. One of the things that most
delight travellers in Spain is that if they ask someone in the street
where such a building or square is, the asked will often turn aside
from his own path and generously sacrifice himself to the stranger,
conducting him to the point he is interested in. I am not going to
deny that there may be in this disposition of the worthy Spaniard
some element of generosity, and I rejoice that the foreigner so
interprets his conduct. But I have never, when hearing or reading
of this, been able to repress a suspicion: "Was my countryman,
when thus questioned, really going anywhere?" Because it might
very well be, in many cases, that the Spaniard is going nowhere,
has no purpose or mission, but rather goes out into life to see if
others' lives can fill his own a little. In many instances I know quite
well that my countrymen go out to the street to see if they will
come across some stranger to accompany on his way.

It is serious enough that this doubt as to the rule over the

world, hitherto held by Europe, should have demoralised the other
nations, except those who by reason of their youth are still in
their pre-history. But it is still more serious that this marking-time
should reach the point of entirely demoralising the European
himself. I do not say this because I am a European or something of
the sort. I am not saying "If the European is not to rule in the
immediate future, I am not interested in the life of the world."
Europe's loss of command would not worry me if there were in
existence another group of countries capable of taking its place in
power and in the direction of the planet. I should not even ask so
much. I should be content that no one rule, were it not that this
would bring in its train the volatilisation of all the virtues and
qualities of European man.

Well, this is what would inevitably happen. If the European

grows accustomed not to rule, a generation and a half will be
sufficient to bring the old continent, and the whole world along
with it, into moral inertia, intellectual sterility, universal

barbarism. It is only the illusion of rule, and the discipline of
responsibility which it entails, that can keep Western minds in
tension. Science, art, technique, and all the rest live on the tonic
atmosphere created by the consciousness of authority. If this is
lacking, the European will gradually become degraded. Minds will
no longer have that radical faith in themselves which impels them,
energetic, daring, tenacious, towards the capture of great new
ideas in every order of life. The European will inevitably become a
day-to-day man. Incapable of creative, specialised effort, he will
be always falling back on yesterday, on custom, on routine. He will
turn into a commonplace, conventional, empty creature, like the
Greeks of the decadence and those of the Byzantine epoch.

A creative life implies a regime of strict mental health, of high

conduct, of constant stimulus, which keep active the
consciousness of man's dignity. A creative life is energetic life, and
this is only possible in one or other of these two situations: either
being the one who rules, or finding oneself placed in a world
which is ruled by someone in whom we recognise full right to such
a function: either I rule or I obey. By obedience I do not mean
mere submission—this is degradation—but on the contrary, respect
for the ruler and acceptance of his leadership, solidarity with him,
an enthusiastic enrolment under his banner.

5.

It will be well now to get back again to the starting-point of

these articles; to the curious fact that there has been so much talk
in these years about the decadence of Europe. It is a surprising
detail that this decadence has not been first noticed by outsiders,
but that the discovery of it is due to the Europeans themselves.

When nobody outside the Old Continent thought of it, there
occurred to some men of Germany, England, France, this
suggestive idea: "Are we not starting to decay?" The idea has had a
good press, and to-day everyone is talking of European decadence
as if it were an incontrovertible fact.

But just beckon to the man who is engaged in proclaiming it,

and ask him on what concrete, evident data he is basing his
diagnosis. At once you will see him make vague gestures, and
indulge in that waving of the arms towards the round universe
which is characteristic of the shipwrecked. And in truth he does
not know what to cling to. The only thing that appears, and that
not in great detail, when an attempt is made to define the actual
decadence of Europe, is the complex of economic difficulties,
which every one of the European nations has to face to-day. But
when one proceeds to penetrate a little into the nature of these
difficulties, one realises that none of them seriously affect the
power to create wealth, and that the Old Continent has passed
through much graver crises of this order.

Is it, perhaps, the case that the Germans or the English do not

feel themselves to-day capable of producing more things and
better things, than ever? Nothing of the kind; and it is most
important that we investigate the cause of the real state of mind
of Germany or England in the sphere of economics. And it is
curious to discover that their undoubted depressed state arises not
from the fact that they feel themselves without the capacity; but,
on the contrary, that feeling themselves more capable than ever,
they run up against certain fatal barriers which prevent them
carrying into effect what is quite within their power. Those fatal
frontiers of the actual economics of Germany, England, France,
are the political frontiers of the respective states. The real
difficulty, then, has its roots, not in this or that economic problem
which may present itself, but in the fact that the form of public
life in which the economic capabilities should develop themselves

is altogether inadequate to the magnitude of these latter. To my
mind, the feeling of shrinkage, of impotency, which undoubtedly
lies heavy on the vitality of Europe in these times is nourished on
that disproportion between the great potentialities of Europe and
the form of political organisation within which they have to act.
The impulse to tackle questions of grave urgency is as vigorous as
it has ever been, but it is trammelled in the tiny cages in which it
is imprisoned, in the relatively small nations into which up to the
present Europe has been organised. The pessimism, the
depression, which to-day weighs down the continental mind is
similar to that of the bird of widely-spreading wings which, on
stretching them out for flight, beats against the bars of its cage.

The proof of this is that the situation is repeated in all the

other orders, whose factors are apparently so different from those
of economics. Take, for example, intellectual life. Every
"intellectual" to-day in Germany, England, or France feels
suffocated within the boundaries of his country; feels his
nationality as an absolute limitation. The German professor now
realises the absurdity of the type of production to which he is
forced by his immediate public of German professors, and misses
the superior freedom of the French writer or the English essayist.
Vice versa, the Parisian man of letters is beginning to understand
that an end has come to the tradition of literary mandarinism, of
verbal formalism, and would prefer, while keeping some of the
better qualities of that tradition, to amplify it with certain virtues
of the German professor.

The same thing is happening in the order of internal politics.

We have not yet seen a keen analysis of the strange problem of
the political life of all the great nations being at such a low ebb.
We are told that democratic institutions have lost prestige. But
that is precisely what it should be necessary to explain. Because
such loss of prestige is very strange. Everywhere Parliament is
spoken ill of, but people do not see that in no one of the countries

that count is there any attempt at substitution. Nor do even the
Utopian outlines exist of other forms of the State which seem, at
any rate ideally, preferable. Too much credit, then, is not to be
given to the authenticity of this loss of prestige. It is not
institutions, qua instruments of public life, that are going badly in
Europe; it is the tasks on which to employ them. There are lacking
programmes of a scope adequate to the effective capacities that
life has come to acquire in each European individual. We have
here an optical illusion which it is important to correct once for
all, for it is painful to listen to the stupidities uttered every hour,
with regard to Parliaments, for example. There are a whole series
of valid objections to the traditional methods of conducting
Parliaments, but if they are taken one by one, it is seen that none
of them justifies the conclusion that Parliaments ought to be
suppressed, but all, on the contrary, indicate directly and
evidently that they should be reformed. Now the best that
humanly speaking can be said of anything is that it requires to be
reformed, for that fact implies that it is indispensable, and that it
is capable of new life. The motor-car of to-day is the result of all
the objections that were made against the motor-car of 1910. But
the vulgar disesteem into which Parliament has fallen does not
arise from such objections. We are told, for example, that it is not
effective. Our question should then be, "Not effective for what?"
for efficacy is the virtue an instrument possesses to bring about
some finality. The finality in this case would be the solution of the
public problems of each nation. Hence, we demand of the man
who proclaims the inefficacy of Parliaments, that he possess a
clear notion of wherein lies the solution of actual public problems.
For if not, if in no country is it to-day clear, even theoretically,
what it is that has to be done, there is no sense in accusing
institutions of being inefficient. It would be better to remind
ourselves that no institution in history has created more
formidable, more efficient States, than the Parliaments of the
XIX

th

Century. The fact is so indisputable that to forget it implies

stark stupidity. We are not, then, to confuse the possibility and
the urgency of thoroughly reforming legislative assemblies, in
order to render them "even more" efficacious, with an assertion of
their inutility.

The loss of prestige by Parliaments has nothing to do with their

notorious defects. It proceeds from another cause, entirely foreign
to them, considered as political instruments. It arises from the
fact that the European does not know in what to utilise them; has
lost respect for the traditional aims of public life; in a word,
cherishes no illusion about the national States in which he finds
himself circumscribed and a prisoner. If this much-talked-of loss of
prestige is looked into a little carefully, what is seen is that the
citizen no longer feels any respect for his State, either in England,
Germany, or France. It would be useless to make a change in the
detail of institutions, because it is not these which are unworthy
of respect, but the State itself which has become a puny thing.

For the first time, the European, checked in his projects,

economic, political, intellectual, by the limits of his own country,
feels that those projects—that is to say, his vital possibilities—are
out of proportion to the size of the collective body in which he is
enclosed. And so he has discovered that to be English, German, or
French is to be provincial. He has found out that he is "less" than
he was before, for previously the Englishman, the Frenchman, and
the German believed, each for himself, that he was the universe.
This is, to my mind, the true source of that feeling of decadence
which to-day afflicts the European. It is therefore a source which
is purely spiritual, and is also paradoxical, inasmuch as the
presumption of decadence springs precisely from the fact that his
capacities have increased and find themselves limited by an old
organisation, within which there is no room for them. To give some
support to what I have been saying, let us take any concrete
activity; the making of motor-cars, for example. The motor-car is
a purely European invention. Nevertheless, to-day, the North-

American product is superior. Conclusion: the European motor-car
is in decadence. And yet the European manufacturer of motors
knows quite well that the superiority of the American product does
not arise from any specific virtue possessed by the men overseas,
but simply from the fact that the American can offer his product,
free from restrictions, to a population of a hundred and twenty
millions. Imagine a European factory seeing before it a market
composed of all the European States, with their colonies and
protectorates. No one doubts that a car designed for five hundred
or six hundred million customers would be much better and much
cheaper than the Ford. All the virtues peculiar to American
technique are, almost of a certainty, effects and not causes of the
scope and homogeneity of the market. The "rationalisation" of
industry is an automatic consequence of the size of the market.

The real situation of Europe would, then, appear to be this: its

long and splendid past has brought it to a new stage of existence
where everything has increased; but, at the same time, the
institutions surviving from that past are dwarfed and have become
an obstacle to expansion. Europe has been built up in the form of
small nations. In a way, the idea and the sentiment of nationality
have been her most characteristic invention. And now she finds
herself obliged to exceed herself. This is the outline of the
enormous drama to be staged in the coming years. Will she be able
to shake off these survivals or will she remain for ever their
prisoner? Because it has already happened once before in history
that a great civilisation has died through not being able to adopt a
substitute for its traditional idea of the state.

6.

I have recounted elsewhere the sufferings and death of the

Graeco-Roman world, and for special details I refer my reader to

what is there said.

43

But just now we can take the matter from

another point of view.

Greeks and Latins appear in history lodged, like bees in their

hives, within cities, poleis. This is a simple fact, mysterious in its
origin, a fact from which we must start, without more ado, as the
zoologist starts from the bald, unexplained fact that the sphex
lives a solitary wanderer, whereas the golden bee exists only in
hive-building swarms. Excavation and archaeology allow us to see
something of what existed on the soil of Athens and Rome before
Athens and Rome were there. But the transition from that pre-
history, purely rural and without specific character, to the rising-
up of the city, a fruit of a new kind produced on the soil of both
peninsulas, this remains a secret. We are not even clear about the
ethnic link between those prehistoric peoples and these strange
communities which introduce into the repertoire of humanity a
great innovation: that of building a public square and around it a
city, shut in from the fields. For in truth the most accurate
definition of the urbs and the polis is very like the comic definition
of a cannon. You take a hole, wrap some steel wire tightly round
it, and that's your cannon. So, the urbs or the polis starts by being
an empty space, the forum, the agora, and all the rest is just a
means of fixing that empty space, of limiting its outlines. The polis
is not primarily a collection of habitable dwellings, but a meeting-
place for citizens, a space set apart for public functions. The city
is not built, as is the cottage or the domus, to shelter from the
weather and to propagate the species—these are personal, family
concerns—but in order to discuss public affairs. Observe that this
signifies nothing less than the invention of a new kind of space,
much more new than the space of Einstein. Till then only one
space existed, that of the open country, with all the consequences
that this involves for the existence of man. The man of the fields
is still a sort of vegetable. His existence, all that he feels, thinks,

43 - El Espectador, VI.

wishes for, preserves the listless drowsiness in which the plant
lives. The great civilisations of Asia and Africa were, from this
point of view, huge anthropomorphic vegetations. But the Graeco-
Roman decides to separate himself from the fields, from "Nature,"
from the geo-botanic cosmos. How is this possible? How can man
withdraw himself from the fields? Where will he go, since the
earth is one huge, unbounded field? Quite simple; he will mark off
a portion of this field by means of walls, which set up an enclosed,
finite space over and against amorphous, limitless space. Here you
have the public square. It is not, like the house, an "interior" shut
in from above, as are the caves which exist in the fields, it is
purely and simply the negation of the fields. The square, thanks to
the walls which enclose it, is a portion of the countryside which
turns its back on the rest, eliminates the rest and sets up in
opposition to it. This lesser, rebellious field, which secedes from
the limitless one, and keeps to itself, is a space sui generis, of the
most novel kind, in which man frees himself from the community
of the plant and the animal, leaves them outside, and creates an
enclosure apart which is purely human, a civil space. Hence
Socrates, the great townsman, quintessence of the spirit of the
polis, can say: "I have nothing to do with the trees of the field, I
have to do only with the man of the city." What has ever been
known of this by the Hindu, the Persian, the Chinese, or the
Egyptian?

Up to the time of Alexander and of Caesar, respectively, the

history of Greece and of Rome consists of an incessant struggle
between these two spaces: between the rational city and the
vegetable country, between the lawgiver and the husbandman,
between jus and rus.

Do not imagine that this origin of the city is an invention of

mine, of merely symbolic truth. With strange persistence, the
dwellers in the Graeco-Latin city preserve, in the deepest, primary
stratum of their memories, this recollection of a synoikismos. No

need to worry out texts, a simple translation is enough.
Synoikismos is the resolution to live together; consequently, an
assembly, in the strict double sense of the word, physical and
juridical. To vegetative dispersion over the countryside succeeds
civil concentration within the town. The city is the super-house,
the supplanting of the infra-human abode or nest, the creation of
an entity higher and more abstract than the oikos of the family.
This is the res publica, the politeia, which is not made up of men
and women, but of citizens. A new dimension, not reducible to the
primitive one allied to the animal, is offered to human existence,
and within it those who were before mere men are going to
employ their best energies. In this way comes into being the city,
from the first a State.

After a fashion, the whole Mediterranean coast has always

displayed a spontaneous tendency towards this State-type. With
more or less purity the North of Africa (Carthage = the city)
repeats the same phenomenon. Italy did not throw off the City-
State till the XIX

th

Century, and our own East Coast splits up easily

into cantonalism, an after-taste of that age-old inspiration.

44

The City-State, by reason of the relative smallness of its

content, allows us to see clearly the specific nature of the State-
principle. On the one hand, the word "state" implies that historic
forces have reached a condition of equilibrium, of fixedness. In
this sense, it connotes the opposite of historic movement: the
State is a form of life stabilised, constituted, static in fact. But
this note of immobility, of definite, unchanging form, conceals, as
does all equilibrium, the dynamism which produced and upholds
the State. In a word, it makes us forget that the constituted State
is merely the result of a previous movement, of struggles and

44 - It would be interesting to show that in Catalonia there is a collaboration of opposing
tendencies: the nationalism of Europe and the urbanism of Barcelona, where the tendency of
early Mediterranean man survives. I have said elsewhere that our East Coast contains the
remnant of homo antiquus left in the Peninsula.

efforts which tended to its making. The constituted state is
preceded by the constituent state, and this is a principle of
movement.

By this I mean that the State is not a form of society which

man finds ready-made—a gift, but that it needs to be laboriously
built up by him. It is not, like the horde or tribe or other societies
based on consanguinity which Nature takes on itself to form
without the collaboration of human effort. On the contrary, the
State begins when man strives to escape from the natural society
of which he has been made a member by blood. And when we say
blood, we might also say any other natural principle: language, for
example. In its origins, the State consists of the mixture of races
and of tongues. It is the superation of all natural society. It is
cross-bred and multi-lingual.

Thus, the city springs from the reunion of diverse peoples. On

the heterogeneous basis of biology it imposes the abstract
homogeneous structure of jurisprudence.

45

Of course, this juridical

unity is not the aspiration which urges on the creative movement
of the State. The impulse is more substantial than mere legality; it
is the project of vital enterprises greater than those possible to
tiny groups related by blood. In the genesis of every State we see
or guess at the figure of a great "company-promoter."

If we study the historical situation immediately preceding the

birth of a State, we shall always discover the following lines of
development. Various small groups exist, whose social structure is
designed so that each may live within itself. The social form of
each serves only for an "internal" existence in common. This
indicates that in the past they did actually live in isolation, each
by itself and for itself, without other than occasional contacts
with its neighbours. But to this effective isolation there has

45 - A juridical homogeneousness which does not necessarily imply centralisation.

succeeded an "external" common life, above all in the economic
sphere. The individual in each group no longer lives only in his own
circle, part of his life is linked up with individuals of other groups,
with whom he is in commercial or intellectual relations. Hence
arises a disequilibrium between the two common existences, the
"internal" and the "external." Established social forms—laws,
customs, religion—favour the internal and make difficult the
external which is a newer, ampler existence. In this situation, the
State-principle is the movement which tends to annihilate the
social forms of internal existence, and to substitute for them a
social form adequate to the new life, lived externally. Apply this
to actual conditions in Europe, and these abstract expressions will
take on form and colour.

There is no possible creation of a State unless the minds of

certain peoples are capable of abandoning the traditional
structure of one form of common life, and in addition, of thinking
out another form not previously existing. That is why it is a
genuine creation. The State begins by being absolutely a work of
imagination. Imagination is the liberating power possessed by
man. A people is capable of becoming a State in the degree in
which it is able to imagine. Hence it is, that with all peoples there
has been a limit to their evolution in the direction of a State;
precisely the limit set by Nature to their imaginations.

The Greek and the Roman, capable of imagining the city which

triumphs over the dispersiveness of the countryside, stopped short
at the city walls. There were men who attempted to carry Graeco-
Roman minds further, to set them free from the city, but it was a
vain enterprise. The imaginative limitations of the Roman,
represented by Brutus, took in hand the assassination of Caesar,
the greatest imagination of antiquity. It is of importance to us
Europeans of to-day to recall this story, for ours has reached the
same chapter.

7.

Of clear heads—what one can call really clear heads—there

were probably in the ancient world not more than two:
Themistocles and Caesar, two politicians. There were, no doubt,
other men who had clear ideas on many matters—philosophers,
mathematicians, naturalists. But their clarity was of a scientific
order; that is to say, concerned with abstract things. All the
matters about which science speaks, whatever the science be, are
abstract, and abstract things are always clear. So that the clarity
of science is not so much in the heads of scientists as in the
matters of which they speak. What is really confused, intricate, is
the concrete vital reality, always a unique thing. The man who is
capable of steering a clear course through it, who can perceive
under the chaos presented by every vital situation the hidden
anatomy of the movement, the man, in a word, who does not lose
himself in life, that is the man with the really clear head. Take
stock of those around you and you will see them wandering about
lost through life, like sleep-walkers in the midst of their good or
evil fortune, without the slightest suspicion of what is happening
to them. You will hear them talk in precise terms about
themselves and their surroundings, which would seem to point to
them having ideas on the matter. But start to analyse those ideas
and you will find that they hardly reflect in any way the reality to
which they appear to refer, and if you go deeper you will discover
that there is not even an attempt to adjust the ideas to this
reality. Quite the contrary: through these notions the individual is
trying to cut off any personal vision of reality, of his own very life.
For life is at the start a chaos in which one is lost. The individual
suspects this, but he is frightened at finding himself face to face
with this terrible reality, and tries to cover it over with a curtain
of fantasy, where everything is clear. It does not worry him that his
"ideas" are not true, he uses them as trenches for the defence of
his existence, as scarecrows to frighten away reality.

The man with the clear head is the man who frees himself from

those fantastic "ideas" and looks life in the face, realises that
everything in it is problematic, and feels himself lost. As this is the
simple truth—that to live is to feel oneself lost—he who accepts it
has already begun to find himself, to be on firm ground.
Instinctively, as do the shipwrecked, he will look round for
something to which to cling, and that tragic, ruthless glance,
absolutely sincere, because it is a question of his salvation, will
cause him to bring order into the chaos of his life. These are the
only genuine ideas; the ideas of the shipwrecked. All the rest is
rhetoric, posturing, farce. He who does not really feel himself
lost, is lost without remission; that is to say, he never finds
himself, never comes up against his own reality. This is true in
every order, even in science, in spite of science being of its nature
an escape from life. (The majority of men of science have given
themselves to it through fear of facing life. They are not clear
heads; hence their notorious ineptitude in the presence of any
concrete situation.) Our scientific ideas are of value to the degree
in which we have felt ourselves lost before a question; have seen
its problematic nature, and have realised that we cannot find
support in received notions, in prescriptions, proverbs, mere
words. The man who discovers a new scientific truth has
previously had to smash to atoms almost everything he had learnt,
and arrives at the new truth with hands bloodstained from the
slaughter of a thousand platitudes.

Politics is much more of a reality than science, because it is

made up of unique situations in which a man suddenly finds
himself submerged whether he will or not. Hence it is a test which
allows us better to distinguish who are the clear heads and who
are the routineers. Caesar is the highest example known of the
faculty of getting to the roots of reality in a time of fearful
confusion, in one of the most chaotic periods through which
humanity has passed. And as if Fate had wished to stress still more

the example, she set up, by the side of Caesar's, a magnificent
"intellectual" head, that of Cicero, a man engaged his whole life
long in making things confused. An excess of good fortune had
thrown out of gear the political machinery of Rome. The city by
the Tiber, mistress of Italy, Spain, Northern Africa, the classic and
Hellenistic East, was on the point of falling to pieces. Its public
institutions were municipal in character, inseparable from the city,
like the hamadryads attached under pain of dissolution to the
trees they have in tutelage.

The health of democracies, of whatever type and range,

depends on a wretched technical detail—electoral procedure. All
the rest is secondary. If the regime of the elections is successful, if
it is in accordance with reality, all goes well; if not, though the
rest progresses beautifully, all goes wrong. Rome at the beginning
of the I

st

Century B.C. is all-powerful, wealthy, with no enemy in

front of her. And yet she is at the point of death because she
persists in maintaining a stupid electoral system. An electoral
system is stupid when it is false. Voting had to take place in the
city. Citizens in the country could not take part in the elections.
Still less those who lived scattered over the whole Roman world.
As genuine elections were impossible, it was necessary to falsify
them, and the candidates organised gangs of bravoes from army
veterans or circus athletes, whose business was to intimidate the
voters. Without the support of a genuine suffrage democratic
institutions are in the air. Words are things of air, and "the
Republic is nothing more than a word." The expression is Caesar's.
No magistracy possessed authority. The generals of the Left and of
the Right—the Mariuses and the Sullas—harassed one another in
empty dictatorships that led to nothing.

Caesar has never expounded his policy, but he busied himself in

carrying it out. That policy was Caesar himself, and not the
handbook of Caesarism which appears afterwards. There is nothing
else for it; if we want to understand that policy, we must simply

take Caesar's acts and give them his name. The secret lies in his
main exploit: the conquest of the Gauls. To undertake this he had
to declare himself in rebellion against the constituted Power. Why?
Power was in the hands of the republicans; that is to say the
conservatives, those faithful to the City-State. Their politics may
be summed up in two clauses. First: the disturbances in the public
life of Rome arise from its excessive expansion. The City cannot
govern so many nations. Every new conquest is a crime of lese-
republique. Secondly to prevent the dissolution of the institutions
of the State a Princeps is needed. For us the word "prince" has an
almost opposite sense to what "princeps" had for a Roman. By it he
understood a citizen precisely like the rest, but invested with high
powers, in order to regulate the functioning of republican
institutions. Cicero in his books, De Re Publica, and Sallust in his
memorials to Caesar, sum up the thoughts of the politicians by
asking for a princeps civitatis, a rector rerum publicarum, a
moderator.

Caesar's solution is totally opposed to the Conservative one. He

realises that to remedy the results of previous Roman conquests
there was no other way than to continue them, accepting to the
full this stern destiny. Above all it was necessary to conquer the
new peoples of the West, more dangerous in a not-distant future
than the effete peoples of the East. Caesar will uphold the
necessity of thoroughly romanising the barbarous nations of the
West.

It has been said (by Spengler) that the Graeco-Romans were

incapable of the notion of time, of looking upon their existence as
stretching out into time. They existed for the actual moment. I am
inclined to think the diagnosis is inaccurate, or at least that it
confuses two things. The Graeco-Roman does suffer an
extraordinary blindness as to the future. He does not see it, just
as the colour-blind do not see red. But, on the other hand, he lives
rooted in the past. Before doing anything now, he gives a step

backwards, like Lagartijo, when preparing to kill. He searches out
in the past a model for the present situation, and accoutred with
this he plunges into the waves of actuality, protected and
disguised by the diving-dress of the past. Hence all his living is, so
to speak, a revival. Such is the man of archaic mould, and such the
ancients always were. But this does not imply being insensible to
time. It simply means an incomplete "chronism"; atrophy of the
future, hypertrophy of the past. We Europeans have always
gravitated towards the future, and feel that this is the time-
dimension of most substance, the one which for us begins with
"after" and not "before." It is natural, then, that when we look at
Graeco-Roman life, it seems to us "achronic."

This mania for catching hold of everything in the present with

the forceps of a past model has been handed on from the man of
antiquity to the modern "philologue." The philologue is also blind
to the future. He also looks backward, searches for a precedent
for every actuality, which he calls in his pretty idyllic language, a
"source." I say this because even the earliest biographers of Caesar
shut themselves out from an understanding of this gigantic figure
by supposing that he was attempting to imitate Alexander. The
equation was for them inevitable: if Alexander could not sleep
through thinking of the laurels of Miltiades, Caesar had necessarily
to suffer from insomnia on account of those of Alexander. And so in
succession. Always the step backwards, to-day's foot in yesterday's
footprint. The modern philologue is an echo of the classical
biographer.

To imagine that Caesar aspired to do something in the way

Alexander did it—and this is what almost all historians have
believed—is definitely to give up trying to understand him. Caesar
is very nearly the opposite of Alexander. The idea of a universal
kingdom is the one thing that brings them together. But this idea is
not Alexander's, it comes from Persia. The image of Alexander
would have impelled Caesar towards the East, with its past full of

prestige. His decided preference for the West reveals rather the
determination to contradict the Macedonian. But besides, it is not
merely a universal kingdom that Caesar has in view. His purpose is
a deeper one. He wants a Roman empire which does not live on
Rome, but on the periphery, on the provinces, and this implies the
complete supersession of the City-State. It implies a State in which
the most diverse peoples collaborate, in regard to which all feel
solidarity. Not a centre which orders, and a periphery which obeys,
but an immense social body, in which each element is at the same
time an active and a passive subject of the State. Such is the
modern State, and such was the fabulous anticipation of Caesar's
futurist genius. But this presupposed a power extra-Roman, anti-
aristocratic, far above the republican oligarchy, above its
princeps, who was merely a primus inter pares. That executive
power, representative of universal democracy, could only be the
Monarchy, with its seat outside Rome. Republic! Monarchy! Two
words which in history are constantly changing their authentic
sense, and which for that reason it is at every moment necessary
to reduce to fragments in order to ascertain their actual essence.

Caesar's confidential followers, his most immediate

instruments, were not the archaic-minded great ones of the City,
they were new men, provincials, energetic and efficient
individuals. His real minister was Cornelius Balbus, a man of
business from Cadiz, an Atlantic man. But this anticipation of the
new State was too advanced; the slow-working minds of Latium
could not take such a great leap. The image of the City, with its
tangible materialism, prevented the Romans from "seeing" that
new organisation of the body politic. How could a State be formed
by men who did not live in a City? What new kind of unity was
that, so subtle, so mystic as it were? Once again, I repeat: the
reality which we call the State is not the spontaneous coming
together of men united by ties of blood. The State begins when
groups naturally divided find themselves obliged to live in

common. This obligation is not of brute force, but implies an
impelling purpose, a common task which is set before the
dispersed groups. Before all, the State is a plan of action and a
programme of collaboration. The men are called upon so that
together they may do something. The State is neither
consanguinity, nor linguistic unity, nor territorial unity, nor
proximity of habitation. It is nothing material, inert, fixed,
limited. It is pure dynamism—the will to do something in common
—and thanks to this the idea of the State is bounded by no physical
limits.

There was much ingenuity in the well-known political emblem

of Saavedra Fajardo: an arrow, and beneath it, "It either rises or
falls." That is the State. Not a thing, but a movement. The State is
at every moment something which comes from and goes to. Like
every movement, it has its terminus a quo and its terminus ad
quem. If at any point of time the life of a State which is really
such be dissected there will be found a link of common life which
seems to be based on some material attribute or other—blood,
language, "natural frontiers." A static interpretation will induce us
to say: That is the State. But we soon observe that this human
group is doing something in common—conquering other peoples,
founding colonies, federating with other States; that is, at every
hour it is going beyond what seemed to be the material principle
of its unity. This is the terminus ad quem, the true State, whose
unity consists precisely in superseding any given unity. When there
is a stoppage of that impulse towards something further on, the
State automatically succumbs, and the unity which previously
existed, and seemed to be its physical foundation—race, language,
natural frontier—becomes useless; the State breaks up, is
dispersed, atomised.

It is only this double aspect of each moment in the State—the

unity already existing and the unity in project—which enables us to
understand the essence of the national State. We know that there

has been as yet no successful definition of a nation, taking the
word in its modern acceptation. The City-State was a clear notion,
plain to the eyes. But the new type of public unity sprung up
amongst Germans and Gauls, the political inspiration of the West,
is a much vaguer, fleeting thing. The philologue, the historian of
to-day, of his nature an archaiser, feels, in presence of this
formidable fact, almost as puzzled as Caesar or Tacitus when they
tried to indicate in Roman terminology the nature of those
incipient States, transalpine, further Rhine, or Spanish. They
called them civitas, gens, natio, though realising that none of
these names fits the thing.

46

They are not civitas, for the simple

reason that they are not cities. But it will not even do to leave the
term vague and use it to refer to a limited territory. The new
peoples change their soil with the greatest ease, or at least they
extend or reduce the position they occupy. Neither are they ethnic
unities—gentes, nationes. However far back we go, the new States
appear already formed by groups unconnected by birth. They are
combinations of different blood-stocks. What, then, is a nation, if
it is neither community of blood nor attachment to the territory,
nor anything of this nature?

As always happens, in this case a plain acceptance of facts

gives us the key. What is it that is clearly seen when we study the
evolution of any "modern nation," France, Spain, Germany? Simply
this: what at one period seemed to constitute nationality appears
to be denied at a later date. First, the nation seems to be the
tribe, and the no-nation the tribe beside it. Then the nation is
made up of the two tribes, later it is a region, and later still a
county, a duchy or a kingdom. Leon is a nation but Castile not;
then it is Leon and Castile, but not Aragon. The presence of two
principles is evident: one, variable and continually superseded—
tribe, region, duchy, kingdom, with its language or dialect; the

46 - See Dopsch, Economic and Social Foundations of European Civilisation, 2

nd

ed., 1914,

Vol. II, pp. 3, 4.

other, permanent, which leaps freely over all those boundaries and
postulates as being in union precisely what the first considered as
in radical opposition.

The philologues—this is my name for the people who to-day

claim the title of "historians"—play a most delightful bit of foolery
when, starting from what in our fleeting epoch, the last two or
three centuries, the Western nations have been, they go on to
suppose that Vercingetorix or the Cid Campeador was already
struggling for a France to extend from Saint-Malo to Strasburg, or
a Spain to reach from Finisterre to Gibraltar. These philologues—
like the ingenuous playwright—almost always show their heroes
starting out for the Thirty Years' War. To explain to us how France
and Spain were formed, they suppose that France and Spain pre-
existed as unities in the depths of the French and Spanish soul. As
if there were any French or any Spaniards before France and Spain
came into being! As if the Frenchman and the Spaniard were not
simply things that had to be hammered out in two thousand years
of toil!

The plain truth is that modern nations are merely the present

manifestation of a variable principle, condemned to perpetual
supersession. That principle is not now blood or language, since
the community of blood and language in France or in Spain has
been the effect, not the cause, of the unification into a State; the
principle at the present time is the "natural frontier." It is all very
well for a diplomatist in his skilled fencing to employ this concept
of natural frontiers, as the ultima ratio of his argumentation. But
a historian cannot shelter himself behind it as if it were a
permanent redoubt. It is not permanent, it is not even sufficiently
specific.

Let us not forget what is, strictly stated, the question. We are

trying to find out what is the national State—what to-day we call a
nation—as distinct from other types of State, like the City-State,

or to go to the other extreme, like the Empire founded by
Augustus.

47

If we want to state the problem still more clearly and

concisely, let us put it this way: What real force is it which has
produced this living in common of millions of men under a
sovereignty of public authority which we know as France, England,
Spain, Italy, or Germany? It was not a previous community of
blood, for each of those collective bodies has been filled from
most heterogeneous blood-streams. Neither was it a linguistic
unity, for the peoples to-day brought together under one State
spoke, or still speak, different languages. The relative
homogeneousness of race and tongue which they to-day enjoy—if
it is a matter of enjoyment—is the result of the previous political
unification. Consequently, neither blood nor language gives birth
to the national State, rather it is the national State which levels
down the differences arising from the red globule and the
articulated sound. And so it has always happened. Rarely, if ever,
has the State coincided with a previous identity of blood and
language. Spain is not a national State to-day because Spanish is
spoken throughout the country,

48

nor were Aragon and Catalonia

national States because at a certain period, arbitrarily chosen, the
territorial bounds of their sovereignty coincided with those of
Aragonese or Catalan speech. We should be nearer the truth if,
adapting ourselves to the casuistry which every reality offers
scope for, we were to incline to this presumption: every linguistic

47 - It is well known that the Empire of Augustus is the opposite of what his adoptive father
Caesar aspired to create. Augustus works along the lines of Pompey, of Caesar's enemies. The
best book on the subject up to the present is E. Meyer's The Monarchy of Caesar and the
Principate of Pompey (1918). Though it is the best, it seems to me greatly insufficient, which
is not strange, for nowhere to-day do we find historians of wide range. Meyer's book is
written in opposition to Mommsen, who was a formidable historian, and although he has
some reason for saying that Mommsen idealises Caesar and converts him into a superhuman
figure, I think Mommsen saw the essence of Caesar's policy better than Meyer himself. This is
not surprising, for Mommsen, besides being a stupendous "philologue," had plenty of the
futurist in him. And insight into the past is approximately proportionate to vision of the future.
48 - It is not even true in actual fact that all Spaniards speak Spanish, or all English English,
or all Germans High-German.

unity which embraces a territory of any extent is almost sure to be
a precipitate of some previous political unification.

49

The State has

always been the great dragoman.

This has been clear for a long time past, which makes more

strange the obstinate persistence in considering blood and
language as the foundations of nationality. In such a notion I see as
much ingratitude as inconsistency. For the Frenchman owes his
actual France and the Spaniard his actual Spain to a principle X,
the impulse of which was directed precisely to superseding the
narrow community based on blood and language. So that, in such a
view, France and Spain would consist to-day of the very opposite
to what made them possible.

A similar misconception arises when an attempt is made to

base the idea of a nation on a territorial shape, finding the
principle of unity which blood and language do not furnish, in the
geographical mysticism of "natural frontiers." We are faced with
the same optical illusion. The hazard of actual circumstances
shows us so-called nations installed in wide lands on the continent
or adjacent islands. It is thought to make of those actual
boundaries something permanent and spiritual. They are, we are
told, natural frontiers, and by their "naturalness" is implied some
sort of magic predetermination of history by terrestrial form. But
this myth immediately disappears when submitted to the same
reasoning which invalidated community of blood and language as
originators of the nation. Here again, if we go back a few
centuries, we find France and Spain dissociated in lesser nations,
with their inevitable "natural frontiers." The mountain frontier
may be less imposing than the Pyrenees or the Alps, the barrier of
water less considerable than the Rhine, the English Channel, or
the Straits of Gibraltar. But this only proves that the "naturalness"

49 - Account is not taken, of course, of such cases as Koinon and lingua franca, which are not
national, but specifically international, languages.

of the frontiers is merely relative. It depends on the economic and
warlike resources of the period.

The historic reality of this famous "natural frontier" lies simply

in its being an obstacle to the expansion of people A over people
B. Because it is an obstacle—to existence in common or to warlike
operations—for A it is a defence for B. The idea of "natural
frontiers" presupposes, then, as something even more natural than
the frontier, the possibility of expansion and unlimited fusion
between peoples. It is only a material obstacle that checks this.
The frontiers of yesterday and the day before do not appear to us
to-day as the foundations of the French or Spanish nation, but the
reverse; obstacles which the national idea met with in its process
of unification. And notwithstanding this, we are trying to give a
definite, fundamental character to the frontiers of to-day, in spite
of the fact that new methods of transport and warfare have
nullified their effectiveness as obstacles.

What, then, has been the part played by frontiers in the

formation of nationalities, since they have not served as a positive
foundation? The answer is clear, and is of the highest importance
in order to understand the authentic idea behind the national
State as contrasted with the City-State. Frontiers have served to
consolidate at every stage the political unification already
attained. They have not been, therefore, the starting-point of the
nation; on the contrary, at the start they were an obstacle, and
afterwards, when surmounted, they were a material means for
strengthening unity. Exactly, the same part is played by race and
language. It is not the natural community of either of these which
constituted the nation; rather has the national State always found
itself, in its efforts towards unification, opposed by the plurality
of races and of tongues, as by so many obstacles. Once these have
been energetically overcome, a relative unification of races and
tongues has been effected, which then served as a consolidation
of unity.

There is nothing for it, then, but to remove the traditional

misconception attached to the idea of the national State, and to
accustom ourselves to consider as fundamental obstacles to
nationality precisely those three things in which it was thought to
consist. (Of course, in destroying this misconception, it is I who
will now appear to be suffering from one.) We must make up our
minds to search for the secret of the national State in its specific
inspiration as a State, in the policy peculiar to itself, and not in
extraneous principles, biological or geographical in character.

Why, after all, was it thought necessary to have recourse to

race, language, and territory in order to understand the
marvellous fact of modern nationalities? Purely and simply
because in these we find a radical intimacy and solidarity between
the individual and the public Power that is unknown to the ancient
State. In Athens and in Rome, the State was only a few individuals:
the rest—slaves, allies, provincials, colonials—were mere subjects.
In England, France, Spain, no one has ever been a mere subject of
the State, but has always been a participator in it, one with it.
The form, above all the juridical form, of this union in and with
the State has been very different at different periods. There have
been great distinctions of rank and personal status, classes
relatively privileged and others relatively unprivileged; but if we
seek to interpret the effective reality of the political situation in
each period and to re-live its spirit, it becomes evident that each
individual felt himself an active subject of the State, a
participator and a collaborator.

The State is always, whatever be its form—primitive, ancient,

medieval, modern—an invitation issued by one group of men to
other human groups to carry out some enterprise in common. That
enterprise, be its intermediate processes what they may, consists
in the long run in the organisation of a certain type of common
life. State and plan of existence, programme of human activity or
conduct, these are inseparable terms. The different kinds of State

arise from the different ways in which the promoting group enters
into collaboration with the others. Thus, the ancient State never
succeeds in fusing with the others. Rome rules and educates the
Italians and the provincials, but it does not raise them to union
with itself. Even in the city it did not bring about the political
fusion of the citizens. Let it not be forgotten that during the
Republic Rome was, strictly speaking, two Romes: the Senate and
the people. State-unification never got beyond a mere setting up
of communication between groups which remained strangers one
to the other. Hence it was that the Empire, when threatened,
could not count on the patriotism of the others, and had to defend
itself exclusively by bureaucratic measures of administration and
warfare.

This incapacity of every Greek and Roman group to fuse with

other groups arose from profound causes which this is not the
place to examine, but which may definitely be summed up in one:
the man of the ancient world interpreted the collaboration in
which the State inevitably consists, in a simple, elemental, rough
fashion, namely, as a duality of governors and governed.

50

It was

for Rome to command and not to obey; for the rest, to obey and
not to command. In this way the State is materialised within the
pomoerium, the urban body physically limited by walls. But the
new peoples bring in a less material interpretation of the State.
Since it is a plan of a common enterprise, its reality is purely
dynamic; something to be done, the community in action. On this
view everyone forms a part of the State, is a political subject who
gives his support to the enterprise; race, blood, geographical
position, social class—all these take a secondary place. It is not
the community of the past which is traditional, immemorial—in a

50 - This is confirmed by what at first sight seems to contradict it: the granting of citizenship
to all the inhabitants of the Empire. But it turns out that this concession was made precisely
when it was losing the character of political status and changing into mere burden and service
to the State, or into mere title in civil law. Nothing else could be expected from a State in
which slavery was accepted as a principle. For our "nations," on the other hand, slavery was
merely a residual fact.

word, fatal and unchangeable—which confers a title to this
political fellowship, but the community of the future with its
definite plan of action. Not what we were yesterday, but what we
are going to be to-morrow, joins us together in the State. Hence
the ease with which political unity in the West leaps over all the
limits which shut in the ancient State. For the European, as
contrasted with the homo antiquus, behaves like a man facing the
future, living consciously in it, and from its view-point deciding on
his present conduct.

Such a political tendency will advance inevitably towards still

ampler unifications, there being nothing in principle to impede it.
The capacity for fusion is unlimited. Not only the fusion of one
people with another, but what is still more characteristic of the
national State: the fusion of all social classes within each political
body. In proportion as the nation extends, territorially and
ethnically, the internal collaboration becomes more unified. The
national State is in its very roots democratic, in a sense much
more decisive than all the differences in forms of government.

It is curious to observe that when defining the nation by basing

it on community in the past, people always end by accepting as
the best the formula of Renan, simply because in it there is added
to blood, language and common traditions, a new attribute when
we are told that it is a "daily plebiscite." But is the meaning of this
expression clearly understood? Can we not now give it a
connotation of opposite sign to that suggested by Renan, and yet a
much truer one?

8.

"To have common glories in the past, a common will in the

present; to have done great things together; to wish to do greater;

these are the essential conditions which make up a people. . . . In
the past, an inheritance of glories and regrets; in the future, one
and the same programme to carry out. . . . The existence of a
nation is a daily plebiscite." Such is the well-known definition of
Renan. How are we to explain its extraordinary success? No doubt,
by reason of the graceful turn of the final phrase. That idea that
the nation consists of a "daily plebiscite" operates on us with
liberating effect. Blood, language, and common past are static
principles, fatal, rigid, inert; they are prisons. If the nation
consisted in these and nothing more, it would be something lying
behind us, something with which we should have no concern. The
nation would be something that one is, not something that one
does. There would even be no sense in defending it when
attacked.

Whether we like it or not, human life is a constant

preoccupation with the future. In this actual moment we are
concerned with the one that follows. Hence living is always,
ceaselessly, restlessly, a doing. Why is it not realised that all doing
implies bringing something future into effect? Including the case
when we give ourselves up to remembering. We recall a memory
at this moment in order to effect something in the moment
following, be it only the pleasure of re-living the past. This modest
secret pleasure presented itself to us a moment ago as a desirable
future thing, therefore we "make remembrance of things past."
Let it be clear, then, that nothing has a sense for man except in as
far as it is directed towards the future.

51

51 - On this view, the human being has inevitably a futuristic constitution; that is to say, he
lives primarily in the future and for the future. Nevertheless, I have contrasted ancient man
with European man, by saying that the former is relatively closed against the future, the latter
relatively open to it. There is, then, an apparent contradiction between the two theses. This
appears only when we forget that man is a being of two aspects: on the one hand, he is what
he really is; on the other, he has ideas of himself which coincide more or less with his
authentic reality. Evidently, our ideas, preferences, desires cannot annul our true being, but
they can complicate and modify it. The ancient and the modern are both concerned about the
future, but the former submits the future to a past regime, whereas we grant more autonomy to
the future, to the new as such. This antagonism, not in being, but in preferring, justifies us

If the nation consisted only in past and present, no one would

be concerned with defending it against an attack. Those who
maintain the contrary are either hypocrites or lunatics. But what
happens is that the national past projects its attractions—real or
imaginary—into the future. A future in which our nation continues
to exist seems desirable. That is why we mobilise in its defence,
not on account of blood or language or common past. In defending
the nation we are defending our to-morrows, not our yesterdays.

This is what re-echoes through the phrase of Renan; the nation

as a splendid programme for the morrow. The plebiscite decides
on a future. The fact that in this case the future consists in a
continuance of the past does not modify the question in the least;
it simply indicates that Renan's definition also is archaic in nature.
Consequently, the national State must represent a principle nearer
to the pure idea of a State than the ancient polis or the "tribe" of
the Arabs, limited by blood. In actual fact, the national idea
preserves no little element of attachment to the past, to soil, to
race; but for that reason it is surprising to observe how there
always triumphs in it the spiritual principle of a unification of
mankind, based on an alluring programme of existence. More than
that, I would say that that ballast of the past, that relative
limitation within material principles, have never been and are not
now completely spontaneous in the Western soul; they spring from
the erudite interpretation given by Romanticism to the idea of the
nation. If that XIX

th

-Century concept of nationality had existed in

the Middle Ages, England, France, Spain, Germany would never
have been born.

52

For that interpretation confuses what urges on

qualifying the modern as a futurist and the ancient as an archaiser. It is a revealing fact that
hardly does the European awake and take possession of himself when he begins to call his
existence "the modern period." As is known, "modern" means the new, that which denies the
ancient usage. Already at the end of the XIV

th

Century stress was beginning to be laid on

modernity, precisely in those questions which most keenly interested the period, and one
hears, for example, of devotio moderna, a kind of vanguard of "mystical theology."
52 - The principle of nationalities is, chronologically, one of the first symptoms of
Romanticism—at the end of the XVIII

th

Century.

and constitutes a nation with what merely consolidates and
preserves it. Let it be said once and for all—it is not patriotism
which has made the nations. A belief in the contrary is a proof of
that ingenuousness which I have alluded to, and which Renan
himself admits into his famous definition. If in order that a nation
may exist it is necessary for a group of men to be able to look
back upon a common past, then I ask myself what are we to call
that same group of men when they were actually living in a
present which from the view-point of to-day is a past. Evidently it
was necessary for that common existence to die away, in order
that they might be able to say: "We are a nation." Do we not
discover here the vice of all the tribe of philologues, of record-
searchers, the professional optical defect which prevents them
from recognising reality unless it is past? The philologue is one
who, to be a philologue, requires the existence of the past. Not so
the nation. On the contrary, before it could have a common past,
it had to create a common existence, and before creating it, it
had to dream it, to desire it, to plan it. And for a nation to exist,
it is enough that it have a purpose for the future, even if that
purpose remain unfulfilled, end in frustration, as has happened
more than once. In such a case we should speak of a nation
untimely cut off; Burgundy, for example.

With the peoples of Central and South America, Spain has a

past in common, common language, common race; and yet it does
not form with them one nation. Why not? There is one thing
lacking which, we know, is the essential: a common future. Spain
has not known how to invent a collective programme for the
future of sufficient interest to attract those biologically related
groups. The futurist plebiscite was adverse to Spain, and therefore
archives, memories, ancestors, "mother country," were of no avail

Where the former exists, these last serve as forces of
consolidation, but nothing more.

53

I see, then, in the national State a historical structure,

plebiscitary in character. All that it appears to be apart from that
has a transitory, changing value, represents the content, or the
form, or the consolidation which at each moment the plebiscite
requires. Renan discovered the magic word, filled with light,
which allows us to examine, as by cathode rays, the innermost
vitals of a nation, composed of these two ingredients: first, a plan
of common life with an enterprise in common; secondly, the
adhesion of men to that attractive enterprise. This general
adhesion gives rise to that internal solidity which distinguishes the
national State from the States of antiquity, in which union is
brought about and kept up by external pressure of the State on
disparate groups, whereas here the vigour of the State proceeds
from spontaneous, deep cohesion between the "subjects." In
reality, the subjects are now the State, and cannot feel it—this is
the new, the marvellous thing, in nationality—as something
extraneous to themselves. And yet Renan very nearly annuls the
success of his definition by giving to the plebiscite a retrospective
element referred to a nation already formed, whose perpetuation
it decides upon. I should prefer to change the sign and make it
valid for the nation in statu nascendi. This is the decisive point of
view. For in truth a nation is never formed. In this it differs from
other types of State. The nation is always either in the making, or
in the unmaking. Tertium non datur. It is either winning adherents,
or losing them, according as the State does or does not represent
at a given time, a vital enterprise.

53 - We are at present about to assist, as in a laboratory, at a gigantic definitive experiment:
we are going to see if England succeeds in maintaining in a sovereign unity of common life
the different portions of her Empire, by furnishing them with an attractive programme of
existence.

Hence it would be most instructive to recall the series of

unifying enterprises which have successively won enthusiasm from
the human groups of the West. It would then be seen that
Europeans have lived on these, not only in their public life, but in
their most intimate concerns, that they have kept in training, or
become flabby, according as there was or was not an enterprise in
sight.

Such a study would clearly demonstrate another point. The

State-enterprises of the ancients, by the very fact that they did
not imply the close adherence of the human groups among whom
they were launched by the very fact that the State properly so-
called was always circumscribed by its necessary limitation—tribe
or city—such enterprises were practically themselves limitless. A
people—Persia, Macedonia, Rome—might reduce to a unit of
sovereignty any and every portion of the planet. As the unity was
not a genuine one, internal and definitive, it remained subject to
no conditions other than the military and administrative efficiency
of the conqueror. But in the West unification into nations has had
to follow an inexorable series of stages. We ought to be more
surprised than we are at the fact that in Europe there has not
been possible any Empire of the extent reached by those of the
Persians, of Alexander and of Augustus.

The creative process of nations in Europe has always followed

this rhythm:

First movement.—The peculiar Western instinct which causes

the State to be felt as the fusion of various peoples in a unity of
political and moral existence, starts by acting on the groups most
proximate geographically, ethnically, and linguistically. Not that
this proximity is the basis of the nation, but because diversity
amongst neighbours is easier to overcome.

Second movement.—A period of consolidation in which other

peoples outside the new State are regarded as strangers and more
or less enemies. This is the period when the nationalising process
adopts an air of exclusiveness, of shutting itself up inside the
State; in a word, what to-day we call nationalism. But the fact is
that whilst the others are felt politically to be strangers and
opponents, there is economic, intellectual, and moral communion
with them. Nationalist wars serve to level out the differences of
technical and mental processes. Habitual enemies gradually
become historically homogeneous. Little by little there appears on
the horizon the consciousness that those enemy peoples belong to
the same human circle as our own State. Nevertheless, they are
still looked on as foreigners and hostile.

Third movement.—The State is in the enjoyment of full

consolidation. Then the new enterprise offers itself to unite those
peoples who yesterday were enemies. The conviction grows that
they are akin to us in morals and interests, and that together we
form a national group over against other more distant, stranger
groups. Here we have the new national idea arrived at maturity.

An example will make clear what I am trying to say. It is the

custom to assert that in the time of the Cid

54

Spain (Spania) was

already a national idea, and to give more weight to the theory it is
added that centuries previously St. Isidore was already speaking of
"Mother Spain." To my mind, this is a crass error of historical
perspective. In the time of the Cid the Leon-Castile State was in
process of formation, and this unity between the two was the
national idea of the time, the politically efficacious idea. Spania,
on the other hand, was a mainly erudite notion; in any case, one
of many fruitful notions sown in the West by the Roman Empire.
The "Spaniards" had been accustomed to be linked together by
Rome in an administrative unity, as a diocesis of the Late Empire.

54 - Rodrigo de Bivar, ca. 1040-1099.

But this geographical-administrative notion was a matter of mere
acceptation from without, not an inspiration from within, and by
no manner of means an aspiration towards the future.

However much reality one may wish to allow to this idea in the

XI

th

Century, it will be recognised that it does not even reach the

vigour and precision which the idea of Hellas had for the Greeks of
the IV

th

. And yet, Hellas was never a true national idea. The

appropriate historical comparison would be rather this: Hellas was
for the Greeks of the IV

th

Century, and Spania for the "Spaniards" of

the XI

th

and even of the XIV

th

, what Europe was for XIX

th

-Century

"Europeans."

This shows us how the attempts to form national unity advance

towards their purpose like sounds in a melody. The mere tendency
of yesterday will have to wait until to-morrow before taking shape
in the final outpouring of national inspirations. But on the other
hand it is almost certain that its time will come. There is now
coming for Europeans the time when Europe can convert itself into
a national idea. And it is much less Utopian to believe this to-day
than it would have been to prophesy in the XI

th

Century the unity

of Spain. The more faithful the national State of the West remains
to its genuine inspiration, the more surely will it perfect itself in a
gigantic continental State.

9.

Hardly have the nations of the West rounded off their actual

form when there begins to arise, around them, as a sort of
background—Europe. This is the unifying landscape in which they
are to move from the Renaissance onwards, and this European
background is made up of the nations themselves which, though
unaware of it, are already beginning to withdraw from their

bellicose plurality. France, England, Spain, Italy, Germany, fight
among themselves, form opposing leagues, and break them only to
re-form them afresh. But all this, war as well as peace, is a living
together as equals, a thing which neither in peace nor war Rome
could ever do with Celtiberian, Gaul, Briton, or German. History
has brought out into the foreground the conflicts and, in general,
the politics, always the last soil on which the seed of unity springs
up; but whilst the fighting was going on in one field, on a hundred
others there was trading with the enemy, an exchange of ideas and
forms of art and articles of faith. One might say that the clash of
fighting was only a curtain behind which peace was busily at work,
interweaving the lives of the hostile nations. In each new
generation the souls of men grew more and more alike. To speak
with more exactitude and caution, we might put it this way: the
souls of French and English and Spanish are, and will be, as
different as you like, but they possess the same psychological
architecture; and, above all, they are gradually becoming similar
in content. Religion, science, law, art, social and sentimental
values are being shared alike. Now these are the spiritual things by
which man lives. The homogeneity, then, becomes greater than if
the souls themselves were all cast in identical mould. If we were
to take an inventory of our mental stock to-day—opinions,
standards, desires, assumptions—we should discover that the
greater part of it does not come to the Frenchman from France,
nor to the Spaniard from Spain, but from the common European
stock. To-day, in fact, we are more influenced by what is European
in us than by what is special to us as Frenchmen, Spaniards, and so
on. If we were to make in imagination the experiment of limiting
ourselves to living by what is "national" in us, and if in fancy we
could deprive the average Frenchman of all that he uses, thinks,
feels, by reason of the influence of other sections of the
Continent, he would be terror-stricken at the result. He would see
that it was not possible to live merely on his own; that four-fifths
of his spiritual wealth is the common property of Europe.

It is impossible to perceive what else worth while there is to be

done by those of us who live on this portion of the planet but to
fulfil the promise implied by the word Europe during the last four
centuries. The only thing opposed to it is the prejudice of the old
"nations," the idea of the nation as based on the past. We are
shortly to see if Europeans are children of Lot's wife who persist in
making history with their heads turned backwards. Our reference
to Rome, and in general to the man of the ancient world, has
served us as a warning; it is very difficult for a certain type of man
to abandon the idea of the State which has once entered his head.
Happily, the idea of the national State which the European,
consciously or not, brought into the world, is not the pedantic idea
of the philologues which has been preached to him.

I can now sum up the thesis of this essay. The world to-day is

suffering from a grave demoralisation which, amongst other
symptoms, manifests itself by an extraordinary rebellion of the
masses, and has its origin in the demoralisation of Europe. The
causes of this latter are multiple. One of the main is the
displacement of the power formerly exercised by our Continent
over the rest of the world and over itself. Europe is no longer
certain that it rules, nor the rest of the world that it is being
ruled. Historic sovereignty finds itself in a state of dispersion.
There is no longer a "plenitude of the times," for this supposes a
clear, prefixed, unambiguous future, as was that of the XIX

th

Century. Then men thought they knew what was going to happen
to-morrow. But now once more the horizon opens out towards new
unknown directions, because it is not known who is going to rule,
how authority is going to be organised over the world. Who, that is
to say, what people or group of peoples; consequently, what ethnic
type, what ideology, what systems of preferences, standards, vital
movements. No one knows towards what centre human things are
going to gravitate in the near future, and hence the life of the
world has become scandalously provisional. Everything to-day is

done in public and in private—then in one's inner conscience—is
provisional, the only exception being certain portions of certain
sciences. He will be a wise man who puts no trust in all that is
proclaimed, upheld, essayed, and lauded at the present day. All
that will disappear as quickly as it came. All of it, from the mania
for physical sports (the mania, not the sports themselves) to
political violence; from "new art" to sun-baths at idiotic
fashionable watering-places. Nothing of all that has any roots; it is
all pure invention, in the bad sense of the word, which makes it
equivalent to fickle caprice. It is not a creation based on the solid
substratum of life; it is not a genuine impulse or need. In a word,
from the point of view of life it is false. We are in presence, of the
contradiction of a style of living which cultivates sincerity and is
at the same time a fraud. There is truth only in an existence which
feels its acts as irrevocably necessary. There exists to-day no
politician who feels the inevitableness of his policy, and the more
extreme his attitudes, the more frivolous, the less inspired by
destiny they are. The only life with its roots fixed in earth, the
only autochthonous life, is that which is made up of inevitable
acts. All the rest, all that it is in our power to take or to leave or
to exchange for something else, is mere falsification of life. Life
to-day is the fruit of an interregnum, of an empty space between
two organisations of historical rule—that which was, that which is
to be. For this reason it is essentially provisional. Men do not know
what institutions to serve in truth; women do not know what type
of men they in truth prefer.

The European cannot live unless embarked upon some great

unifying enterprise. When this is lacking, he becomes degraded,
grows slack, his soul is paralysed. We have a commencement of
this before our eyes to-day. The groups which up to to-day have
been known as nations arrived about a century ago at their highest
point of expansion. Nothing more can be done with them except
lead them to a higher evolution. They are now mere past

accumulating all around Europe, weighing it down, imprisoning it.
With more vital freedom than ever, we feel that we cannot
breathe the air within our nations, because it is a confined air.
What was before a nation open to all the winds of heaven, has
turned into something provincial, an enclosed space.

Everyone sees the need of a new principle of life. But as always

happens in similar crises, some people attempt to save the
situation by an artificial intensification of the very principle which
has led to decay. This is the meaning of the "nationalist" outburst
of recent years. And, I repeat, things have always gone that way.
The last flare, the longest; the last sigh, the deepest. On the very
eve of their disappearance there is an intensification of frontiers—
military and economic.

But all these nationalisms are so many blind alleys. Try to

project one into the future and see what happens. There is no
outlet that way. Nationalism is always an effort in a direction
opposite to that of the principle which creates nations. The former
is exclusive in tendency, the latter inclusive. In periods of
consolidation, nationalism has a positive value, and is a lofty
standard. But in Europe everything is more than consolidated, and
nationalism is nothing but a mania, a pretext to escape from the
necessity of inventing something new, some great enterprise. Its
primitive methods of action and the type of men it exalts reveal
abundantly that it is the opposite of a historical creation.

Only the determination to construct a great nation from the

group of peoples of the Continent would give new life to the
pulses of Europe. She would start to believe in herself again, and
automatically to make demands on, to discipline, herself. But the
situation is much more difficult than is generally realised. The
years are passing and there is the risk that the European will grow
accustomed to the lower tone of the existence he is at present
living, will get used neither to rule others nor to rule himself. In

such a case, all his virtues and higher capacities would vanish into
air.

But, as has always happened in the process of nation-forming,

the union of Europe is opposed by the conservative classes. This
may well mean destruction for them, for to the general danger of
Europe becoming definitely demoralised and losing all its historic
strength is added another, more concrete and more imminent.
When Communism triumphed in Russia, there were many who
thought that the whole of the West would be submerged by the
Red torrent. I did not share that view; on the contrary I wrote at
the time that Russian Communism was a substance not assimilable
by the European, a type that has in its history thrown all its efforts
and energies in the scale of individualism. Time has passed, and
the fearful ones of a while since have recovered their tranquillity.
They have recovered their tranquillity precisely at the moment
when they might with reason lose it. Because now indeed is the
time when victorious, overwhelming Communism may spread over
Europe.

This is how it appears to me. Now, just as before, the creed of

Russian Communism does not interest or attract Europeans—offers
them no tempting future. And not for the trivial reasons that the
apostles of Communism—obstinate, unheeding, strangers to fact—
are in the habit of alleging. The bourgeois of the West knows quite
well, that even without Communism, the days are numbered of
the man who lives exclusively on his income and hands it down to
his children. It is not this that renders Europe immune to the
Russian creed, still less is it fear. The arbitrary bases on which
Sorel founded his tactics of violence twenty years ago seem to us
stupid enough to-day. The bourgeois is no coward, as Sorel
thought, and at the actual moment is more inclined to violence
than the workers. Everybody knows that if Bolshevism triumphed

in Russia, it was because there were in Russia no bourgeois.

55

Fascism, which is a petit bourgeois movement, has shown itself
more violent than all the labour movement combined. It is nothing
of all this then that prevents the European from flinging himself
into Communism, but a much simpler reason. It is that the
European does not see in the Communistic organisation an
increase of human happiness.

And still, I repeat, it seems to me quite possible that in the

next few years Europe may grow enthusiastic for Bolshevism. Not
for its own sake, rather in spite of what it is. Imagine that the
"five-years plan" pursued with Herculean efforts by the Soviet
Government fulfils expectations and that the economic situation
of Russia is not only restored, but much improved. Whatever the
content of Bolshevism be, it represents a gigantic human
enterprise. In it, men have resolutely embraced a purpose of
reform, and live tensely under the discipline that such a faith
instils into them. If natural forces, so responseless to the
enthusiasms of man, do not bring failure to this attempt; if they
merely give it free scope to act, its wonderful character of a
mighty enterprise will light up the continental horizon as with a
new and flaming constellation. If Europe, in the meantime,
persists in the ignoble vegetative existence of these last years, its
muscles flabby for want of exercise, without any plan of a new
life, how will it be able to resist the contaminating influence of
such an astounding enterprise? It is simply a misunderstanding of
the European to expect that he can hear unmoved that call to new
action when he has no standard of a cause as great to unfurl in
opposition. For the sake of serving something that will give a
meaning to his existence, it is not impossible that the European
may swallow his objections to Communism and feel himself carried
away not by the substance of the faith, but by the fervour of

55 - This ought to be enough to convince us once for all that Marxian Socialism and
Bolshevism are two historical phenomena which have hardly a single common denominator.

conduct it inspires. To my mind the building-up of Europe into a
great national State is the one enterprise that could
counterbalance a victory of the "five-years plan." Experts in
political economy assure us that such a victory has little
probability in its favour. But it would be degradation indeed, if
anti-Communism were to hope for everything from the material
difficulties encountered by its adversary. His failure would then be
equivalent to universal defeat of actual man. Communism is an
extravagant moral code, but nothing less than a moral code. Does
it not seem more worthy and more fruitful to oppose to that
Slavonic code, a new European code, the inspiration towards a
new programme of life?

CHAPTER XV

We Arrive at the Real Question

THIS is the question: Europe has been left without a moral

code. It is not that the mass-man has thrown over an antiquated
one in exchange for a new one, but that at the centre of his
scheme of life there is precisely the aspiration to live without
conforming to any moral code. Do not believe a word you hear
from the young when they talk about the "new morality." I
absolutely deny that there exists to-day in any corner of the
Continent a group inspired by a new ethos which shows signs of
being a moral code. When people talk of the "new morality" they
are merely committing a new immorality and looking for a way of
introducing contraband goods.

56

Hence it would be a piece of

ingenuousness to accuse the man of to-day of his lack of moral
code. The accusation would leave him cold, or rather, would
flatter him. Immoralism has become a commonplace, and anybody
and everybody boasts of practising it.

If we leave out of question, as has been done in this essay, all

those groups which imply survivals from the past-Christians,
Idealists, the old Liberals—there will not be found amongst all the
representatives of the actual period, a single group whose attitude
to life is not limited to believing that it has all the rights and none
of the obligations. It is indifferent whether it disguises itself as
reactionary or revolutionary; actively or passively, after one or
two twists, its state of mind will consist, decisively, in ignoring all
obligations, and in feeling itself, without the slightest notion why,
possessed of unlimited rights. Whatever be the substance which
takes possession of such a soul, it will produce the same result,

56 - I do not suppose there are more than two dozen men scattered about the world who can
recognise the springing-up of what one day may be a new moral code. For that very reason,
such men are the least representative of this actual time.

and will change into a pretext for not conforming to any concrete
purpose. If it appears as reactionary or anti-liberal it will be in
order to affirm that the salvation of the State gives a right to level
down all other standards, and to manhandle one's neighbour,
above all if one's neighbour is an outstanding personality. But the
same happens if it decides to act the revolutionary; the apparent
enthusiasm for the manual worker, for the afflicted and for social
justice, serves as a mask to facilitate the refusal of all obligations,
such as courtesy, truthfulness and, above all, respect or esteem
for superior individuals. I know of quite a few who have entered
the ranks of some labour organisation or other merely in order to
win for themselves the right to despise intelligence and to avoid
paying it any tribute. As regards other kinds of Dictatorship, we
have seen only too well how they flatter the mass-man, by
trampling on everything that appeared to be above the common
level.

This fighting-shy of every obligation partly explains the

phenomenon, half ridiculous, half disgraceful, of the setting-up in
our days of the platform of "youth" as youth. Perhaps there is no
more grotesque spectacle offered by our times. In comic fashion
people call themselves "young," because they have heard that
youth has more rights than obligations, since it can put off the
fulfilment of these latter to the Greek Kalends of maturity. The
youth, as such, has always been considered exempt from doing or
having done actions of importance. He has always lived on credit.
It was a sort of false right, half ironic, half affectionate, which the
no-longer young conceded to their juniors. But the astounding
thing at present is that these take it as an effective right precisely
in order to claim for themselves all those other rights which only
belong to the man who has already done something.

Though it may appear incredible, "youth" has become a

chantage; we are in truth living in a time when this adopts two
complementary attitudes, violence and caricature. One way or the

other, the purpose is always the same; that the inferior, the man
of the crowd, may feel himself exempt from all submission to
superiors.

It will not do, then, to dignify the actual crisis by presenting it

as the conflict between two moralities, two civilisations, one in
decay, the other at its dawn. The mass-man is simply without
morality, which is always, in essence, a sentiment of submission to
something, a consciousness of service and obligation. But perhaps
it is a mistake to say "simply." For it is not merely a question of
this type of creature doing without morality. No, we must not
make his task too easy. Morality cannot be eliminated without
more ado. What, by a word lacking even in grammar, is called
amorality, is a thing that does not exist. If you are unwilling to
submit to any norm, you have, nolens volens, to submit to the
norm of denying all morality, and this is not amoral, but immoral.
It is a negative morality which preserves the empty form of the
other. How has it been possible to believe in the amorality of life?
Doubtless, because all modern culture and civilisation tend to that
conviction. Europe is now reaping the painful results of her
spiritual conduct. She has adopted blindly a culture which is
magnificent, but has no roots.

In this essay an attempt has been made to sketch a certain

type of European, mainly by analysing his behaviour as regards the
very civilisation into which he was born. This had to be done
because that individual does not represent a new civilisation
struggling with a previous one, but a mere negation. Hence it did
not serve our purpose to mix up the portrayal of his mind with the
great question: What are the radical defects from which modern
European culture suffers? For it is evident that in the long run the
form of humanity dominant at the present day has its origin in
these defects.

This great question must remain outside these pages. Its

treatment would require of us to unfold in detail the doctrine of
human existence which, like a leitmotiv, is interwoven, insinuated,
whispered in them. Perhaps, before long, it may be cried aloud.