JAN WOLE ´

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POLISH ATTEMPTS TO MODERNIZE THOMISM BY LOGIC

(BOCHE ´

NSKI AND SALAMUCHA)

∗

ABSTRACT. This paper reports some attempts undertaken in Poland in the 1930s
to modernize Thomism by means of modern logic. In particular, it concerns J.M.
Boche´nski and J. Salamucha, the leading members of the Cracow Circle. They
attempted to give precise logical form to the Five Ways of Thomas Aquinas. Other
works concerned the concept of transcendentals, the levels of abstraction, and the
concept of essence.

KEY WORDS: essence, logic, transcendentals

This paper concerns Polish attempts to modernize Thomism by
means of modern logic undertaken by a group of philosophers who
called themselves the Cracow Circle. It included Józef (Innocenty)
M. Boche´nski (1902–1995), Jan F. Drewnowski (1896–1978), Jan
Salamucha (1903–1944), and Bolesław Soboci´nski (1906–1980).
Since their works are closely related to the Polish analytic school
(the Lvov-Warsaw School), I will begin with a short description of
the latter.

1

The Lvov-Warsaw School was established by Kazimierz

Twardowski in Lvov at the end 19th century. Twardowski was a
student of Franz Brentano and wanted to transplant the philosoph-
ical programme of his teacher to Poland. In particular, Twardowski
insisted that philosophy should satisfy very high methodological
standards of clarity and justification. These claims favoured research
in general logic. Moreover, Twardowski had a special vision of the
development of Polish philosophy. According to him, in philosophy,
as in other domains of culture, there are centers and provinces.
French, German, and English philosophy dominates world philos-
ophy. Every philosophy that has arisen in a province (a small
country, as Twardowski said) has to define its relation to the
dominant current. Now, there are two ways to do this. Firstly, the
philosophy of a small country can be entirely subordinated to the
dominant philosophy. Secondly, it can try to find its own direc-

Studies in East European Thought 55: 299–313, 2003.
© 2003 Kluwer Academic Publishers. Printed in the Netherlands.

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tion. However, the second pattern is not easy, because while any
national philosophy must respect the situation in world philosophy,
on the one hand, it must also try to remain relatively independent
and thereby original, on the other hand. Thus, a national philos-
ophy should adopt ideas from various sources, but it should like-
wise elaborate them in an orginal way. Twardowski’s advice to
his students was: (a) you must know what is going on in current
philosophy; (b) try to assimilate novelties. Twardowski, an excellent
teacher, very soon attracted many young Polish philosophers; and
they soon found their own way, namely, a logically oriented philos-
ophy. Although Twardowski himself did not work in mathematical
logic and even warned against some possible negative consequences
(symbolomania, pragmatophobia) of applying mathematical logic
in philosophy, he is commonly considered to be the father of logic
and logical philosophy in Poland. This is clearly asserted by Alfred
Tarski:

Almost all researchers who pursue the philosophy of the exact sciences in Poland,
are indirectly or directly the disciples of Twardowski, although his own work
could hardly be counted within this domain.

2

Jan Łukasiewicz, Twardowski’s oldest student, decided to work

in mathematical logic. He obtained his PhD (with a dissertation
on the concept of induction) in 1902. Kazimerz Ajdukiewicz,
Tadeusz Cze˙zowski, Tadeusz Kotarbi´nski, and Zygmunt Zawirski
ended their studies prior to 1914. In 1911, Stanisław Le´sniewski
joined the Lvov Circle. When Poland gained it independence
in 1918, the second main center of the Twardowski school
arose in Warsaw. Kotarbi´nski, Le´sniewski, and Łukasiewicz were
appointed professors in the University of Warsaw. Le´sniewski
and Łukasiewicz, in collaboration with mathematicians, notably
Zygmunt Janiszewski and Wacław Sierpi´nski, created the famous
Warsaw School of Logic (Tarski grew up in this environment), the
most important branch of the entire Lvov-Warsaw School. World
War II brought about the end of the Lvov-Warsaw School as an orga-
nized movement. Many of its members (Salamucha among others)
perished in during the war; many others left Poland (Łukasiewicz,
Soboci´nski, and Tarski, among others).

There are three ways to consider the Lvov-Warsaw School. The

first, or most restricted way, identifies this school with logicians and

POLISH ATTEMPTS TO MODERNIZE THOMISM BY LOGIC

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philosophers influenced by mathematical logic. The Warsaw School
of Logic, together with Ajdukiewicz, Cze˙zowski, Kotarbi´nski, and
Zawirski form the core of the Lvov-Warsaw School, when it is so
understood. A broader picture is acquired as soon as the school
is seen to comprise all philosophers genetically connected with
Twardowski and pursuing philosophical analysis, whether or not it
was carried out in a formal or an informal manner. On this criterion,
but not on the former Twardowski himself belongs to the Lvov-
Warsaw School. Finally, a still broader understanding is possible.
It consists in counting as members of the Lvov-Warsaw School
all Polish philosophers who accepted distinctive metaphilosophical
views and, moreover, were convinced that these views belonged to
the tradition created by Twardowski. This point is well indicated by
the following statement:

The philosophers of the Lvov group were not united by any common doctrine,
by a uniform world-view. Not the content of philosophy but rather the method
of philosophizing and the common language were the factors which formed the
foundations of the spiritual community of those people. That is why the school
could produce spiritualists and materialists, nominalists and realists, logicians and
psychologists, philosophers of nature and art theorists.

3

In addition to the aforementioned claims concerning clarity and

justification in philosophy, Polish philosophers recommended axio-
matic constructions in philosophy as well as an antimetaphysical
attitude. With regard to the last point, it must be remarked that
the criticism of metaphysics in Poland differed from that of the
Vienna Circle. Polish philosophers were opposed to the excesses
of romantic metaphysics rather than metaphysics as a branch of
philosophy in general. In particular, Łukasiewicz proposed an
axiomatic approach to ontology based on the standards of mathe-
matical logic. His analysis of determinism, Kotarbi´nski’s reism,
or Le´sniewski calculus of names, interpreted as a general theory
of objects, can be considered as positive attempts to build onto-
logical constructions. Moreover, some Polish logicians, notably
Łukasiewicz and Le´sniewski, decisively favoured ontology over
epistemology; according to Łukasiewicz, the epistemological turn
in philosophy originated with Descartes and Locke, culminated in
Kant, and became the very misery of philosophy. This attitude to
epistemology was not in conflict with the tradition. In fact, the

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Polish analytic school held classical philosophy in great esteem
and did not exclude most traditional problems from the domain of
scientific philosophical investigations.

Most Thomists were decisively hostile to or at best suspicious of

mathematical logic.

4

Modern logic was accused of conventionalism,

relativism, positivism, and liquidating metaphysics. Some Thomists
pointed out that mathematical logic leads to atheism (Russell was
mentioned as a principal example, in Poland the same charge was
levelled at Kotarbi´nski and Le´sniewski). Hence Catholic philos-
ophers who wanted to apply logic to philosophy found themselves in
a difficult situation. On the other hand, claims of doing philosophy
logically were so strong and widespread in Poland that they could
not be ignored by any philosophical camp. The road to the formation
of the Cracow Circle began at the end of the twenties. Salamucha
studied theology in Warsaw. Rev. Stanisław Kobyłecki, one of
Salamucha’s professors, was quite friendly to mathematical logic
and recommended Łukasiewicz’s courses to his students. Salamucha
became fascinated by logic. He decided to write his PhD on the
concept of modality in Aristotle obtaining his degree from Warsaw
University in 1927 (Łukasiewicz was his supervisor). In 1930, he
published an extensive work on the concept of deduction in Aristotle
and St. Thomas Aquinas.

5

Boche´nski wrote a critical review of this

study, but very soon thereafter became convinced that logic should
serve Thomism.

6

Two important works were published in 1934,

namely, Drewnowski’s programmatic paper (he was a student of
Kotarbi´nski, formerly an atheist who later converted to Catholicism
under the influence of Salamucha) and Salamucha’s analysis of
the first way of Thomas Aquinas.

7

Following his Habilitation,

Salamucha was called to Cracow by Rev. Konstanty Michalski, a
well-known historian of medieval philosophy, who wanted to have
someone competent in logic and theology interpret texts from the
Middle Ages. The most important event took place in 1936. Rev.
Augustyn published a book in which he radically criticized the
use of mathematical logic in philosophy, in particular the attempts
in Poland.

8

Łukasiewicz replied in the same year and patiently

corrected several misunderstandings.

9

In September 1936, the Third Polish Philosophical Congress

took place in Cracow. Michalski invited a group of philosophers

POLISH ATTEMPTS TO MODERNIZE THOMISM BY LOGIC

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to address the question of the mutual relations of Catholic thought
and contemporary logic (32 persons accepted the invitation). Special
papers were delivered by Łukasiewicz (“In Defence of Logistic”),
Boche´nski (“The Tradition of Catholic Thought and Precise-
ness”), Salamucha (“A Confrontation of Scholastic Logical Devices
and Logistic Ones”) and Drewnowski (“New Scholasticism and
the Modern Requirements of Science”). Next, these papers were
discussed by representatives of traditional scholastic philosophy. All
of this material, supplemented by the extensive replies of Boche´nski
(“Logistic ‘Relativism”’) and Salamucha (“On the ‘Mechanization’
of Thinking”, “A Possibility of Formalization of the Domain of
Analogical Concepts”), was published in book from.

10

Michalski,

who hosted the meeting, wrote a special introduction in which he
said:

It is known that Rev. Zybura distributed a questionnaire concerning the vitality
and non-vitality of contemporary peripatetic philosophy in the United States.
Replies came from the camp sympathetic to scholasticism as well as from the
opposite camp. The voices radically condemning the traditional style of philo-
sophical thinking were not numerous. Good advice also came from the opposite
camp. This advice was most often fruitful in its effects, because it exhibits the
existing inaccuracies. Among other things, it was pointed out that contemporary
peripatetic philosophy, mostly taught in seminars for priests, did not enter into
contact with new mathematical logic, although it could find in it inspiration for
own development. [. . .]

Since one of the main centers of creative work in mathematical logic has

arisen in Poland, the relation of peripatetic philosophy to mathematical logic
must necessarily be revised in our country. To pursue an ostrich policy would be
to demonstrate own inner powerlessness. Hence one should positively acknowl-
edge that, on the occasion of the congress of Polish philosophers in Cracow, a
separate meeting should take place between representatives of mathematical logic
and representatives of Christian philosophy for the sake of a trustful and sincere
discussion of the problem.

11

The Cracow Circle was the result of the meeting organized by

Michalski.

12

It is perhaps interesting that a similar problem was

discussed at the Cracow Congress, independently of the methodo-
logical problems of Thomism. Here is Soboci´nski’s report (my
italics):

In Poland special conditions arose, which caused the problem of mathematical
logic and its applications to philosophy to be particularly important and vital.
[. . .] A group of philosophers, although fairly different from one another in

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their philosophical views, quickly grasped the need to replace traditional logic
by mathematical logic. Hence at the Congress in Cracow the representatives
of logistic stressed that [. . .], independently of the accepted world-view and
the philosophical current, one must apply the principles discovered by logic in
performing one’s own inferences. This was emphasized by Prof. K. Ajdukiewicz
during one discussion. He simply said that [. . .] one must be aware that modern
logic should be applied by everyone who wants to infer something responsibly,
independently of assumptions underlying the given philosophical system. This
concerns theists and atheists, Catholics or, let us assume, satanists. Modern logic
must be used in proofs of God’s existence no less than in other proofs. One
should know that modern logic neither assumes nor implies any metaphysics, but
if by using it one derives philosophical consequences, this means that extralogical
theses were assumed. Declarations of this kind were provoked by interventions
of various participants of the Congress who, speaking more or less precisely
and responsibly, expressed a couple of reservations concerning the possibility or
necessity of applying logistic in philosophy. Different accents could be found
in such speeches. The standpoint that an excessive preciseness and responsi-
bility in inferences can damage philosophy [. . .] was the exception. [. . .] The
[other] group declared that philosophy, in particular metaphysics, has it’s own
scientific methods, and that only these methods lead to proper results. On the other
hand, according to this view, the application of mathematical logic, for example
to metaphysics in a manner similar to that occurring in the special sciences,
only simplifies and vulgarizes problems without producing proper solutions. The
representatives of this standpoint almost never questioned the importance of
mathematical logic (incidentally, they seldom had sufficient knowledge of it), but
only denied its usefulness in investigating philosophical questions.

13

In the light of this report, the discussion during the meeting organiz-
ing by Michalski mirrored a more general controversy concerning
the nature of philosophy and its methods conducted at the Cracow
Congress. It is very probable that Soboci´nski also summarized
standpoints concerning the application of modern logic in Thomism.
Thus, the Cracow Circle undertook methodological problems which
were vital for all Polish philosophy.

The Cracow Circle had its own general program. Let me once

more stress its basic feature by citing the following:

Mathematical logic strongly influenced the development of the philosophical
sciences in Poland. Its achievements and methods began to be applied to various
extralogical problems. Mathematical logic taught Polish philosophers how to be
precise in arguments and directed their attention to the importance of logical and
semantic analysis in elaborating philosophical problems.

14

This general program had to be qualified somehow in order to

be consistent with Catholicism as a religion. The Cracow Circle

POLISH ATTEMPTS TO MODERNIZE THOMISM BY LOGIC

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was entirely loyal to Catholic orthodoxy. In particular, theology
was considered as a negative norm for philosophy. Thus, the
philosophers of the Cracow Circle assumed that philosophy and
Christian theology are necessarily coherent. A far-going optimism
was another feature. Drewnowski once said that there is evidence
that catholic thought will outstrip all other philosophical currents.
Drewnowski listed the following points of the programme:

15

(I)

The formulation and defence of the catholic world-view
requires application of all modern methods of thinking;

(II)

One must distinguish the formal elements of the theory
from the proper content of its teaching;

(III)

Making the theory precise consists in changing and
perfecting the formal conceptual apparatus without
destroying any of the essential content given by tradition;

(IV)

Improving the content means that the related research
covers all domains of human thought and takes them into
account, including those neutral or even inimical to the
catholic standpoint;

(V)

The only such catholic current which satisfies the above
claims will be the realization of the directives of Catholic
Action in the field of human thought.

The last point shows that Drewnowski’s program had an

explicitly political flavour. However, other members of the Cracow
Circle concentrated rather on strictly philosophical matters. In
particular, all agreed that Catholic doctrine should be formalized and
axiomatized. This concerned mostly ontology considered as applied
logic. This way of doing philosophy introduces exactness, precision
of form in arguments and makes it possible to eliminate ambiguities
and unclarities (Salamucha demonstrated this by analyzing a frag-
ment from Thomas Aquinas’ Summa contra Gentiles I, 13 where
the matter is whether the negation occurs in the original version).
Drewnowski argued that logic enables us to speak about uncon-
ceivable things (in particular, about the attributes of God) in a simple
and intelligible way. He pointed out that the situation is similar to
that in mathematics where, by formalizing and axiomatizing suitable
theories, we can speak about Non-Euclidean spaces, real numbers
and infinite sets, objects transcending usual human standards and
resources of conceivability.

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An important place in the programme was attributed to its

historical justification. In particular, Boche´nski argued that Catholic
philosophy always, or at least in its golden times, that is in the
Middle Ages, respected the highest standards of precision. In partic-
ular, Thomas Aquinas used the best logical devices accessible in his
time. According to Boche´nski, Aquinas would have no reservations
toward mathematical logic. This was partly based on Łukasiewicz’s
view that there is a continuity in formal logic from Aristotle to the
20th century, eventually with interruptions created by the epistem-
ological trend in philosophy. In general, Boche´nski contrasted
Mr. Paleo (a scholastic orthodox), Mr. Neo (an anti-philosophical
modern logician) and the Aristotelian (an enlightened philosoph-
ical logician who knows mathematical logic as well as history
of logic and philosophy).

16

This last attitude should be adopted

by contemporary Thomists if they actually want to continue the
methodological strategy of their master. Boche´nski also compared
the relation between traditional and (postulated) modern Thomism
to that of positivism and neopositivism.

17

Salamucha formulated

two criteria for assessing philosophical systems. One appeals to
the range of their content, the other to basic methodological prin-
ciples defining the status of their theses. Thus, we can distinguish
(a) maximalism as regards the range of content and methodological
minimalism (for example, Bergson), (b) minimalism as regards the
range of content and methodological maximalism (for example,
logical empiricism). Now we can and should look for (c) methodo-
logical maximalism combined with maximalism as regards in the
range of content. Thomism improved by mathematical logic is a
candidate for such a philosophy.

18

All members of the Cracow Circle had a great respect for Thomas

Aquinas and his philosophical thought. Salamucha and Boche´nski
considered themselves to be Thomists.

19

However, this positive atti-

tude to the Doctor Angelicus was never dogmatic. This was nicely
expressed by Boche´nski:

At a certain philosophical congress I reported my discovery that logic is neither
scholastic nor Aristotelian logic. Then, one young professor, a layman but from
a catholic university, said “As a priest and a Thomist you should know . . .”. I
replied immediately “Stop, please, please; a philosopher never is an “ist”. If one
wants, I am a Thomist in the sense that I accept the principal attitude of Thomas,
but I have no intention to contribute to Thomism; stricly speaking, I dislike it.

20

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Thus, for Boche´nski, logic was the way to change Thomism into a
normal scientific philosophy.

Of course, it is much easier to propose a philosophical pro-

gramme than to realize it. Fortunately, we can also cite concrete
attempts to pursue the declared claims in the case of the Cracow
Circle. I will briefly illustrate this by four examples: (a) a discus-
sion about the proofs of God’s existence; (b) Salamucha’s treatment
of levels of abstraction; (c) Salamucha’s treatment of the concept
of essence; (d) Salamucha’s suggestions about how to formalize
analogical concepts.

21

Ad (a) It is not surprising that Thomas’ Five Ways became the

main object of logical analysis, even before the Cracow Circle
began its official history.

22

The general direction was guided by

the view that the Aristotelian syllogistic used by Aquinas himself
and his followers until our times was not enough for a proper
analysis of the arguments. A full treatment must exhibit all the
assumptions, logical as well extralogical, in particular, the physical
ones, and apply much more advanced logical tools than tradition-
ally admitted. Salamucha tried to outline an axiomatic treatment
based on the logic of relations. He argued that ontology can be
modelled by linear ordering with the first element identified as the
primum movens immobile. This attempt required assuming that the
relation of moving is connected. According to Salamucha, although
the logical structure of ex motu demonstration is sound, its physical
assumptions are not acceptable from the point of view of modern
science. Salamucha’s pioneering analysis gained a wide influence.
Boche´nski, in his review of Salamucha’s paper, argued that Thomas
had in mind not the first universal movens but motionless being.

23

Another point raised by Boche´nski was that the moving relation
does not need to be connected. Boche´nski returned to the problem
in the last years of his life.

24

He entirely rejected the proofs from the

degrees of perfection and the teleogical structure of the world, that
is, the fourth and fifth ways. The other proofs could be improved,
but although it is possible to demonstrate (following Aristotle) the
existence of God conceived philosophically, this being is not the
person in the sense of the Old and New Testaments. In general, the
Five Ways are rather ways of persuasion than proofs in the strict
logical sense.

25

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Ad (b) Thomistic philosophy distinguished three levels of

abstraction: physical (concerning qualities), mathematical (concern-
ing quantities) and metaphysical (concerning analogical concepts).
Logic in its traditional sense was considered as universal and valid at
every level of abstraction. This view motivated the following objec-
tion against mathematical logic. Since it proceeds by mathematical
methods, it is not applicable to analogical concepts. This shows
that the heart of philosophy, the domain of analogical concepts, is
not subject to analysis by means of the new logic, whose validity
is at best restricted to mathematical abstraction. According to
Salamucha, since mathematics is a part of logic, we can continue
the old way of thinking, that is, to consider logic as universal.

26

However, this motivates a revision of the traditional doctrine in two
directions. Firstly, the method of emprical sciences is not purely
quantitative and, secondly, a new treatment of analogical concepts
is required (see ad (d) below).

Ad (c). In Thomism essence was traditionally considered either

as a collection of properties determining that an object just is
such and such or as a collection of properties determining that an
object belongs to a certain kind. For Salamucha, both understand-
ings were very obscure.

27

He proposed returning to Aristotle, who

maintained that essences are modelled by geometry. The axiomatic
method provides a suitable solution here. We can think about the
apriori knowledge of essences of objects as constituted by axioms.
Empirical objects cannot be treated in this way. Eventually, their
essences are limit points. It is noteworthy that this standpoint is
at odds with orthodox Thomism, according to which every object
has its place in the framework of the unique structure of kinds
and species. According to Salamucha, modern science requires a
revision of the traditional account of abstraction. In particular, the
methodology of mathematical physics sets up challenges here.

Ad (d) As I remarked above, analogical concepts play a special

role in philosophy, in particular in metaphysics. Being, truth, and
the good, that is, the transcendentals (I omit other concepts of this
sort), are fundamental metaphysical ideas, and they were classically
regarded as analogical. Transcendentals, according to the tradi-
tional account, transcendunt omnia genera (transcend all kinds).
They are neither univocal nor ambiguous, but analogical. Their

POLISH ATTEMPTS TO MODERNIZE THOMISM BY LOGIC

309

properties cause difficulties in logical analysis. For example, the
traditional modes of definition are not applicable to transcendentals.
Salamucha proposed a very ingenious solution consisting in consid-
ering transcendentals as systematically ambiguous categories.

28

Salamucha based his proposal on the theory of logical types,
developed by Russell and Whitehead in the Principia Mathematica.
Transcendentals are systematically ambiguous in a way similar to
that in which the concepts of set or relations are.

How successful was the programme of the Cracow Circle?

Certainly, it can be considered as a radical attempt to refresh
Thomism and Catholic philosophy. However, reactions were rather
hostile or at best quite sceptical. This was pointed out by Boche´nski
in a quite ironic manner:

This conversation [of Mr. Paleo, Mr. Neo and the Aristotelian; see above – J.W.]
having become known in authoritative circles, the Aristotelian has been excluded
from two Academies of which he was formerly a member, that of Tradition and
that of Science [perhaps Tradition it is an allusion to Clarke and Soboci´nski].
It was stated in the first that a man who dares to tread Principia Mathematica
instead of the Logique du Port Royal is evidently a madman; while the board of
other declared that an Aristotelian could no be longer be tolerated in the company
of scholars who have proved once for all that all truth is relative, including their
own opinion to this effect.

29

Let me also quote another opinion of the same author:

I was greatly annoyed when I was working on my second textbook in logic. It was
an introduction to mathematical logic. My church censor ordered me to strike out
references to scholastic thought. He argued that it is beyond any doubt that the
Schoolmen had something similar to mathematical logic.

30

We wanted to convert teachers in the seminaries, but to no avail avail.

31

We wanted to apply mathematical logic to traditional Christian problems
considered by St. Thomas. However, we lost.

32

Although, as I already noted, some authors continued the efforts

of the Cracow Circle, the criticism of this style of doing Thomism
prevailed. Even in Poland, where the tradition of logical philos-
ophy preserved the dominance of Marxism, Thomists (in particular,
those belonging to the Lublin School) expressed several reserva-
tions concerning the logical analysis of philosophy.

33

The typical

objections of Jakubisiak and others were repeated. It was said that

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although logic is useful as a device of analysis, one must be very
careful with formalization and axiomatization, for the content of
concepts exceeds formal tools. Salamucha’s proposal to consider
analogical concepts as systematically ambiguous was rejected. In
particular, metaphysical abstraction is governed by special prin-
ciples, elaborated by metaphysics but not by logic. This is also the
reason why the Five Ways find their sufficient justification in meta-
physics. In this way, Thomism, as far as mathematical logic and its
significance for philosophy are concerned, returned to the moderate
position of the 1930s. In fact, this is a sign of conservatism.

NOTES

∗

My participation in this colloquium devoted to Boche´nski and the preparation

of this paper were possible owing to the support of the organizers (personally,
Prof. E. ´Swiderski) and the Geneva-Lausanne IRIS project on the Philosophy and
History of Logic (Director Prof. K. Mulligan).

1

This school is extensively presented in H. Skolimowski, Polish Analytical

Philosophy, Routledge and Kegan Paul, London, 1967; and in J. Wole´nski,
Logic and Philosophy in the Lvov-Warsaw School, Kluwer Academic Publishers,
Dordrecht, 1989. See also Z. Wolak, Neothomism and the Lvov-Warsaw School
(in Polish), O´srodek Bada´n Interdyscyplinarnych, Kraków, 1993, and the papers
collected in Logic and Metaphilosophy (in Polish), Z. Wolak (ed.), O´srodek Bada´n
Interdyscyplinarnych, Kraków, 1995.

2

A. Tarski, [“A Letter to O. Neurath 25. IV. 1930”], trans. from German by J.

Tarski, Grazer Philosophische Studien 43 (1992), p. 20.

3

I. D ˛

ambska, “Fifty Years of Philosophy in Lvov 1898–1948” (in Polish),

Przegl ˛

ad Filozoficzny 44 (1948), p. 17.

4

For example, Jacques Maritain was known as a radical critic of modern logic.

The relation of Thomism to new logic is reported in Z. Wolak, Neothomism and
the Lvov-Warsaw School (see note 2), Chapter I.

5

J. Salamucha, The Concept of Deduction in Aristotle and St. Thomas

Aquinas, Polskie Towarzystwo Filozoficzne, Warszawa, 1930. All of Salamucha’s
published and some unpublished works are collected in J. Salamucha, Science
and Faith. Selected Philosophical Papers (in Polish), J.J. Jadacki and K.

´Swi˛etorzewska (eds.), Towarzystwo Naukowe Katolickiego Universytetu Lubel-

skiego, Lublin, 1997 (the editors wrote an extensive report about Salamucha’s
work, also in French translation), pp. 549–594. The book published in 1930
was intended as the Habilitation dissertation. Salamucha’s Habilitation took
place in Cracow in 1933, but it was confirmed by the Ministry only in 1936.
Salamucha was a priest in Warsaw diocese. His superiors attempted several times
to block his scientific career. Finally, the intervention of the Cardinal Sapieha,

POLISH ATTEMPTS TO MODERNIZE THOMISM BY LOGIC

311

the archbishop in Cracow, enabled Salamucha to continue his philosophical
research.

6

Bulletin thomiste 7–10 (1930–1933), pp. 401–405. Boche´nski studied law and

economy in Lvov and Pozna´n before his entering the Dominican Order. Then
he studied philosophy and theology in Rome and Fribourg. His PhD (1931)
was about the concept of Ding an Sich in M. Straszewski, a Polish philosopher
teaching in Cracow at the turn of 19th and 20th century. Boche´nski became inter-
ested in mathematical logic about 1930 and soon began his contacts with Polish
logicians, particularly with Łukasiewicz.

7

J. Salamucha, “The Proof ‘ex motu’ for the Existence of God. Logical Analysis

of St. Thomas’ Argument” (in Polish), Collectanea Theologica 15 (1934), pp. 53–
92 (English trans. by T. Gierymski and M. Heitzman); New Scholsaticism 32
(1958), pp. 334–372; J.F. Drewnowski, “An Outline of Philosophical Programme”
(in Polish), Przegl ˛

ad Filozoficzny 37 (1934), pp. 3–38, 150–181; all Drewnowski’s

published and unpublished works are collected in J.F. Drewnowski, Philosophy
and Precision. An Outline of Philosophical Programme and Other Writings (in
Polish), S. Majda´nski and S. Zalewski (eds.), Towarzystwo Naukowe Katlickiego
Uniwersytetu Lubelskiego, Lublin, 1996 (Majda´nski’s Introduction is only in
Polish, pp. 5–52).

8

A. Jakubisiak, From the Scope to the Content (in Polish), Droga, Warszawa.

9

J. Łukasiewicz, “Logistics and Philosophy” (in Polish), Przeg ˛

ad Filozoficzny

36, pp. 113–131 (English trans. by O. Wojtasiewcz); in J. Łukasiewicz, Selected
Works, L. Borkowski (ed.), North-Holland Publishing Company, Amsterdam,
1970, pp. 218–235.

10

Catholic Thought and Contemporary Logic (in Polish) (Studia Gnesnesia

XV), Ksi˛egarnia ´Sw. Wojciecha, Pozna´n, 1937. This book was prepared by
Salamucha. At the end (pp. 155–193) one can find an extensive French summary
of the papers and discussion. The English translation of Łukasiewicz’s paper
(trans. by O. Wojtasiewicz) is included into J. Łukasiewicz, Selected Works (see
note 10), pp. 236–249.

11

P. 7.

12

Many details about the Cracow Circle are found in Between Logic and Faith.

Jan Parys Interviews with Father Józef M. Boche´nski, Les Editions Noir sur
Blanc, Montricher, 1988 (this book was also simultaneously published in French),
pp. 19–21. Boche´nski says that the Circle existed as of 1934. However, this is a
mistake. Its beginning is usually related to the Cracow meeting in 1936. See Z.
Wolak, “An Outline of the History of the Cracow Circle” (in Polish), in Logic and
Metaphilosophy (see note 2), pp. 79–84.

13

B. Soboci´nski, “The Developmental Tendences in Polish Philosophy (Reflec-

tions on the Occasion of the 3rd Polish Philosophical Congress, Cracow 24–27
IX 1936” (in Polish), Nowa Ksi ˛

a˙zka III (1936), pp. 155–156. Soboci´nski was

a student of Kotarbi´nski, Le´sniewski, and Łukasiewicz. He worked primarily
on Le´sniewski’s systems. He supported the Cracow Circle in spirit rather than
actively.

312

JAN WOLE ´

NSKI

14

B. Soboci´nski, “Polish Philosophical Publications in 1918–1939” (in Polish),

Nowa Ksi ˛

a˙zka III (1936), p. 114.

15

It is a summary on the basis of Drewnowski’s paper mentioned in note 8

and his, Boche´nski’s, and Salamucha’s contributions to Catholic Thought and
Contemporary Logic (see note 11).

16

See P. Banks (pseudonym of Boche´nski), “On the Philosophical Interpretation

of Logic: An Aristotelian Dialogue,” in A. Menne (ed.), Logico-Philosophical
Studies, D. Reidel Publishing Company, Dordrecht, 1962, pp. 1–14; this paper
was originally published in Dominican Studies III (1950), pp. 139–153.

17

See book quoted in note 13, pp. 146/147. Of course, this comparison

concerned the method, not the content.

18

J. Salamucha, “Thomism as philosophia perennis” (in Polish), Tygodnik

Powszechny 5 (1946). Perhaps we should complete Salamucha’s matrix by adding
(d) minimalism as regards the range of content and minimalism in method.
Postmodernism is an example of this combination. Boche´nski would have much
enjoyed this assessment of Derrida and his fans.

19

In the last period of his philosophy, Boche´nski considered himself rather as an

analytic philosopher than a representative of Thomism.

20

Between Logic and Faith (see note 13), p. 125.

21

This report is very selective and mainly concerns works of Salamucha. He

is relatively unknown, although certainly deserves an attention. Boche´nski’s
achievements are much better known. Let me note that Boche´nski’s works about
the concepts of authority and the logic of religion are perhaps the extreme realiza-
tion of the ideology of the Cracow Circle. History of logic was another important
field in which achievements of Boche´nski and Salamucha are very remarkable.

22

See the paper mentioned in note 8.

23

Bulletin thomiste 12 (1935), pp. 601–603.

24

See J.M. Boche´nski, “Die Fünf Wege,” Fribourger Zeitschrift für Philosophie

und Theologie 36(3) (1989), pp. 235–265. Boche´nski’s book about Thomas’s Five
Ways is to be published hy Philosophia Verlag.

25

Analysis of the Five Ways by modern logic was continued by, among

others, J. Bendiek, F. Rivetti Barbò, E. Niezna´nski, and K. Policki. These works
are reported in E. Niezna´nski, “Logical Analysis and Thomism. The Polish
Programme that originated in 1930s,” in J. Srzednicki (ed.), Initiatives in Logic,
Kluwer Academic Publishers, Dordrecht, 1987, pp. 128–155. Several strong
logical tools were used by the mentioned authors, for example, the Zorn Lemma
(Policki) or lattices (Niezna´nski).

26

J. Salamucha, “A Possibility of Formalization of the Domain of Analogical

Concepts” (in Polish), in Catholic Thought and Contemporary Logic (see note
11), pp. 122–153.

27

J. Salamucha, “Remarks on the History of One Word (‘Essence’)” (in Polish),

Tygodnik Powszechny 6 (1947), pp. 3–4.

28

See paper mentioned in note 26. See also J.M. Boche´nski, “Logic and

Ontology,” Philosophy East and West 7(3) (1974), pp. 275–292. Boche´nski
remarked that the expression “systematic ambiguity” was a translation of aequi-

POLISH ATTEMPTS TO MODERNIZE THOMISM BY LOGIC

313

vocatio in consilio, a phrase used in the Middle Ages; see Between Logic and
Faith (see note 13), p. 62.

29

P. Banks, “On the Philosophical Interpretation of Logic: An Aristotelian

Dialogue” (see note 17), p. 14.

30

Between Logic and Faith (see note 13), p. 15.

31

Ibid., p. 19.

32

Ibid., p. 139.

33

See, for example, S. Kami´nski, “What Does the Application of Formal Logic

to Classical Metaphysics Mean?” (in Polish), Roczniki Filozoficzne 12 (1961),
pp. 107–112.

Institute of Philosophy
Jagiellonian University
ul. Grodzka 52
31-044 Krakow
Poland