0333_984617_02_prevxxiv.qxd 10/21/02 1:50 PM Page vii
Contents
List of Tables, Figures and Documents xvii
Preface to the Fifth Edition xviii
List of Abbreviations xx
Map of the Member States and Applicant States of the
European Union xxiv
PART 1 THE HISTORICAL EVOLUTION
1 The Transformation of Western Europe 3
Historical Divisions 3
The Post-War Transformation 6
Unbroken peace 6
A transformed agenda 7
New channels and processes 7
Explanations of the Transformation 8
The deep roots of integration? 9
The impact of the Second World War 11
Interdependence 17
National considerations 19
Concluding Remarks: The Ragged Nature of the
Integration Process 20
2 European Integration and the States of Western Europe 22
The Founding Members of the European Community:
Belgium, France, West Germany, Italy, Luxembourg and
the Netherlands 22
The 1973 Enlargement: The United Kingdom,
Denmark and Ireland 24
The 1981 and 1986 Enlargements: Greece, Spain
and Portugal 28
The 1995 Enlargement: Austria, Finland and Sweden 30
Non-EU West European Countries: Norway,
Switzerland and Iceland 32
Concluding Remarks 33
vii
0333_984617_02_prevxxiv.qxd 10/21/02 1:50 PM Page viii
viii Contents
3 The Creation of the European Community 34
The European Coal and Steel Community 34
From the ECSC to the EEC 38
The EEC and Euratom Treaties 41
The policy concerns of the EEC Treaty 41
The policy concerns of the Euratom Treaty 43
The institutional provisions of the treaties 43
Concluding Remarks 44
4 From European Community to European Union 46
Treaty Development 46
Enlargement 48
Development of Policy Processes 49
Development of Policies 50
Concluding Remarks 53
PART 2 THE EVOLVING TREATY FRAMEWORK
5 From Rome to Amsterdam 57
Up to the Single European Act 57
The Treaty Establishing a Single Council and a
Single Commission of the European
Communities 57
The Treaty Amending Certain Budgetary
Provisions of the Treaties and the Treaty Amending
Certain Financial Provisions of the Treaties 58
The Act Concerning the Election of the
Representatives of the Assembly by Direct
Universal Suffrage 58
The Single European Act (SEA) 58
The Maastricht Treaty 60
The origins of the Treaty 60
The making of the Treaty 62
The contents of the Treaty 63
Ratification of the Treaty 69
The Treaty of Amsterdam 70
The making of the Treaty 70
The contents of the Treaty 72
Concluding Remarks 79
0333_984617_02_prevxxiv.qxd 10/21/02 1:50 PM Page ix
Contents ix
6 The Treaty of Nice 81
The Background to the Treaty 81
The Contents of the Treaty 82
The composition and functioning of the institutions 82
Decision-making procedures 87
New competences 89
The Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union 89
The Significance of the Treaty 91
7 Treaties and the Integration Process 93
The Making of Treaties 93
Treaties and the Nature of European Integration 98
Economics before politics 98
Flexibility 98
Incrementalism 99
Increased complexity 103
Variable pace 105
Interplay between supranational and national actors 106
Benefits for everybody 106
An elite-driven process 107
Concluding Remarks: An Ongoing Process 108
PART 3 THE INSTITUTIONS AND POLITICAL
ACTORS OF THE EUROPEAN UNION
8 The Commission 111
Appointment and Composition 111
The College of Commissioners 111
The Commission bureaucracy 118
Organisation 120
The Directorates General and other services 120
The hierarchical structure 121
Decision-making mechanisms 122
Responsibilities and Powers 126
Proposer and developer of policies and legislation 126
Executive functions 131
The guardian of the legal framework 140
External representative and negotiator 145
Mediator and conciliator 146
Promoter of the general interest 147
Concluding Remarks 148
0333_984617_02_prevxxiv.qxd 10/21/02 1:50 PM Page x
x Contents
9 The Council of Ministers 150
Responsibilities and Functions 150
Composition 153
The ministers 153
The Committee of Permanent Representatives 156
Committees and working groups 158
The General Secretariat 160
The Operation of the Council 161
The Council Presidency 161
The hierarchical structure 163
Decision-making procedures 168
Concluding Remarks 176
10 The European Council 178
Origins and Development 178
Membership 182
Organisation 183
Number, location and length of summits 183
Preparing summits 184
Setting the agenda 186
The conduct of business 187
Roles and Activities 189
The evolution of the European Union 189
Constitutional and institutional matters 190
The economic and monetary policies of the
European Union 191
External relations 192
Specific internal policy issues 192
The European Council and the EU System 194
Concluding Remarks 195
11 The European Parliament 197
Powers and Influence 197
Parliament and EU legislation 197
Parliament and the EU budget 204
Control and supervision of the executive 206
Elections 212
Political Parties and the European Parliament 215
The transnational federations 215
The political groups in the European Parliament 216
National parties 223
Composition 223
The dual mandate 223
Continuity 224
0333_984617_02_prevxxiv.qxd 10/21/02 1:50 PM Page xi
Contents xi
Gender 224
Competence and experience 225
Organisation and Operation 225
The multi-site problem 225
Arranging Parliamentary business 226
The committees of the EP 228
Plenary meetings 231
Concluding Remarks: Is the EP becoming
a  Proper Parliament? 233
12 European Union Law and the Courts 235
The Need for EU Law 235
The Sources of EU Law 236
The treaties 236
EU legislation 238
Judicial interpretation 242
International law 242
The general principles of law 243
The Content of EU Law 243
The Status of EU Law 244
Direct effect 244
Primacy 245
The Court of Justice 245
Membership and organisation 245
The procedure of the Court 247
Types of cases before the Court 248
The impact and influence of the Court 253
The Court of First Instance 256
Concluding Remarks 258
13 Other Institutions and Actors 259
The Economic and Social Committee 259
Origins 259
Membership 259
Organisation 260
Functions 261
Influence 263
The Committee of the Regions 264
Origins 264
Membership, organisation, functions and powers 265
The European Investment Bank 268
Responsibilities and functions 268
Organisation 270
Concluding comments 271
0333_984617_02_prevxxiv.qxd 10/23/02 6:41 PM Page xii
xii Contents
The European System of Central Banks 271
The operating context 271
Objectives and tasks 273
Organisational structure 274
Functioning 275
The Court of Auditors 276
Membership and organisation 276
Activities of the Court 277
The effectiveness of financial controls 280
Interests 280
Different types 280
Access to decision-makers 285
Influence 290
Concluding comments 292
PART 4 POLICIES AND POLICY PROCESSES OF
THE EUROPEAN UNION
14 Policies 295
The Origins of EU Policies 295
The EU s Policy Interests and Responsibilities 298
Establishing the Single European Market 298
Macroeconomic and financial policies 305
Functional policies 308
Sectoral policies 320
External policies 323
Characteristics of EU Policies 323
The range and diversity of EU policies 323
The regulatory emphasis 324
The differing degrees of EU policy involvement 326
The patchy and somewhat uncoordinated nature of
EU policies 328
Concluding Remarks 330
15 Policy Processes 331
Variations in EU Processes 331
The actors 331
The channels 331
Factors Determining EU Policy Processes 332
The treaty base 333
The proposed status of the matter under consideration 334
The degree of generality or specificity of the
policy issue 334
0333_984617_02_prevxxiv.qxd 10/21/02 1:50 PM Page xiii
Contents xiii
The newness, importance, controversiality or political
sensitivity of the issue in question 335
The balance of policy responsibilities between EU and
national levels 335
Circumstances and the perceptions of circumstances 336
The Making of EU Legislation 337
The consultation procedure 339
The co-decision procedure 347
The assent procedure 352
EU Legislation after Adoption 353
The need for additional legislation 354
The need to transpose legislation 355
The need to apply legislation 355
Characteristic Features of EU Policy Processes 356
Compromises and linkages 356
Inter-institutional cooperation 357
Difficulties in effecting radical change 359
Tactical manoeuvring 360
Variable speeds 360
The Efficiency of EU Policy Processes 361
16 The Budget 366
The Budget in Context 366
The Financial Perspectives 366
The Composition of the Budget 370
Revenue 370
Expenditure 371
Budgetary Decision-Making 374
The budgetary process 374
Characteristic features of the budgetary process 382
Concluding Remarks 383
17 Agricultural Policy and Policy Processes 385
The Common Agricultural Policy in Context 385
What is Special about Agriculture? 386
The distinctive nature of agriculture 387
Political factors 388
How the Common Agricultural Policy Works 393
A Single Internal Market 393
Community preference 397
Joint financing 397
The Impact and Effects of the Common Agricultural Policy 398
Policy Processes 400
0333_984617_02_prevxxiv.qxd 10/23/02 6:41 PM Page xiv
xiv Contents
Commission initiation and formulation 400
Council decision-making 403
Management and implementation of the
Common Agricultural Policy 405
Concluding Remarks 406
18 External Relations 407
External Trade 407
The EU in the world trading system 407
Trade policies 408
Trade and trade-dominated agreements 409
Policy processes 411
Foreign, Security and Defence Policies 414
Evolution of foreign policy 414
Evolution of security and defence policies 417
Policy content and policy action 421
Policy processes: foreign policy 424
Policy processes: defence policy 431
Development Cooperation 432
Policies 432
Policy processes 435
The External Dimension of Internal Policies 436
The Consistency and Representational Problems 438
Concluding Remarks 440
19 National Influences and Controls on European
Union Processes 442
Governments 443
Influencing the Commission 443
Influencing the Council 444
Parliaments 449
Courts 451
Subnational Levels of Government 452
Citizens Views 453
Referendums 453
European Parliament elections 455
National elections 456
Public opinion 456
Political Parties 457
Interests 458
Concluding Remarks 459
0333_984617_02_prevxxiv.qxd 10/21/02 1:50 PM Page xv
Contents xv
PART 5 STEPPING BACK AND LOOKING FORWARD
20 Conceptualising and Theorising 463
Conceptualising the European Union 464
States and intergovernmental organisations 465
Federalism 468
State-centrism and consociationalism 470
Multi-level governance 473
Three Key Concepts: Sovereignty, Intergovernmentalism
and Supranationalism 475
Defining the terms 475
The intergovernmental/supranational balance in the EU 475
A pooling and sharing of sovereignty? 478
Theorising European Integration: Grand Theory 478
Neofunctionalism 479
Intergovernmentalism 482
Interdependency 484
The future of integration theory 485
Theorising the Functioning of the EU: Middle-Range Theory 488
New institutionalism 488
Policy networks 490
Concluding Remarks 492
21 Enlargement 494
The Unfolding of the Current Enlargement Round 495
The Central and Eastern European countries 495
Cyprus and Malta 496
Turkey 497
Why is the EU Willing to Enlarge? 498
An Outline of the Negotiating Process 500
The Challenge of Enlargement for the EU 501
The identity problem 502
Institutions and decision-making processes 502
Internal dynamics and balances 503
Economic difficulties 503
External relations and policies 504
EU Preparations for Enlargement 504
Working with applicants 505
Adjusting the EU for enlargement 505
What are the Implications for Widening and Deepening? 507
Looking Ahead 508
0333_984617_02_prevxxiv.qxd 10/21/02 1:50 PM Page xvi
xvi Contents
22 Conclusion: Present Realities and Future Prospects 510
The European Union and the Changing Nature of the
International System 510
The Uniqueness of the European Union 511
The Future of the European Union 512
Factors affecting prospects 512
Challenges 514
The EU and the Reshaping of Europe 517
Chronology of Main Events in the European
Integration Process 518
Guide to Further Reading 528
Bibliography and References 534
Index 547
0333_984617_03_cha01.qxd 10/21/02 1:55 PM Page 1
Part 1
The Historical Evolution
No political system or organisation can properly be understood unless
it is set in its historical and operational contexts. The structure and func-
tioning of government institutions, the nature and dynamics of political
forces, and the concerns and conduct of those who exercise power do
not happen as a matter of chance. They are shaped, and are constantly
being remoulded, by evolving forces and events.
Though a relatively new organisation, the European Union (EU) is no
less subject to these dictates than are long established nation states, and
like them its nature cannot be appreciated without reference to its his-
torical sources or to the world in which it functions. Thus, the EU is often
criticised for being weak in structure and quarrelsome in nature, with far
too much bickering over matters such as the price of butter and not
enough visionary thinking and united action to tackle unemployment,
regional imbalances and other major problems. Unquestionably there is
much in these criticisms, but that the EU should find harmonious collec-
tive policy-making difficult is not surprising to anyone with a historical
perspective. For before they joined the European Community
(EC)/European Union member states made decisions for themselves on
most matters. It is not easy, especially for large states or for states that
believe themselves to have special interests, to have to cede sovereignty
by transferring decision-making responsibilities to a multinational organi-
sation in which other voices may prevail. Any explanation and under-
standing of what the EU is, and what it has and has not achieved, must
recognise this. The EU must, in other words, be seen in the context of the
forces that have made it and are still making it. Some of these forces have
served to push the states together. Others have resulted in progress
towards cooperation and integration sometimes being slow, difficult and
contested.
The sovereignty issue may be used to illustrate the importance of both
historical background and contemporary operational context in
explaining and evaluating the European Union. Many of the EU s oppo-
nents and critics subscribe to the view that the nation state, not an inter-
national organisation, is the  natural supreme political unit. They argue
that insofar as transferences of power to Brussels, Luxembourg and
Strasbourg  the three main seats of the EU s institutions  undermine
national sovereignty, they should be resisted. But what proponents of
this view all too often fail to recognise is that national sovereignties were
being steadily eroded long before the EC/EU was established, and since
1
0333_984617_03_cha01.qxd 10/21/02 1:55 PM Page 2
2 The Historical Evolution
it was established they have seen their sovereignties further eroded by
forces that are not a consequence of EU membership. Whether it has
been because of movements in financial markets, transfers of capital
within multinational corporations, changing trade patterns, or United
States military dominance, virtually all West European states have
become increasingly affected by, and at the mercy of, international devel-
opments they cannot control. This loss of power may not have involved
legal transfers of sovereignty as has been the case within the EU, but it
has had a very similar effect. The fact is that in an ever expanding range
of policy sectors, states have not been able to act in isolation but have
had to adjust and adapt so as to fit in with an array of external influ-
ences. The EU should not, therefore, be viewed as constituting a unique
threat to the sovereignties of its member states. On the contrary, it is in
some ways an attempt to meet this threat by providing a means by which
member states, if not able to regain their sovereignty, can at least reassert
control over aspects of decision-making by cooperating together at levels
and in ways that match post-war internationalism.
The purpose of Part 1 is thus to provide a base for understanding the
EU by tracing its evolution and placing it in its historical and operational
settings.
In Chapter 1 the sharp divide between pre-war and post-war West
European inter-state relations is examined. The factors that explain
what amounted to a post-war transformation in those relations are
analysed, and the early organisational responses to that transformation
are described.
Chapter 2 looks at the main constituent elements of the process of
West European integration  the states  and considers their varying
positions towards, and inputs into, the process.
Chapter 3 analyses the creation of the three European Communities:
the European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC), which was founded
by the Treaty of Paris in 1951, and the European Atomic Energy
Community (Euratom) and the European Economic Community (EEC),
which were both established in March 1957 with the signing of the
Treaties of Rome.
Chapter 4 describes the major features of the evolution of the
European integration process since the Rome Treaties.
0333_984617_03_cha01.qxd 10/21/02 1:55 PM Page 3
Chapter 1
The Transformation of
Western Europe
Historical Divisions
The Post-War Transformation
Explanations of the Transformation
Concluding Remarks: The Ragged Nature of the Integration Process
Historical Divisions
It is common today, with Western European integration proceeding
apace, with democratic and market-based systems having been estab-
lished throughout Central and Eastern Europe, and with the two  halves
of Europe scheduled to be united in the European Union, for commen-
tators on and observers of European affairs to emphasise the increasing
unity and identity of the continent.
It is well to remember, however, that such unity and identity as there
can be said to exist  and in truth it is limited if all of Europe is lumped
together  is of very recent vintage. For the fact is that throughout its his-
tory Europe has been characterised much more by divisions, tensions and
conflicts than it has by any common purpose or harmony of spirit. Even
if attention is restricted to just that part of Europe where unity has been
most developed  Western Europe  the peoples and nation states have
long differed and been divided from one another in many ways.
Language has been perhaps the obvious divisive force. Linguists may
identify structural similarities between European languages, but the fact is
that most peoples have not been able to, and still cannot, directly converse
with one another. (Today, 24 per cent of the citizens of the European Union
speak German as their first language, 17 per cent English, 17 per cent
French, and 16 per cent Italian. In total 53 per cent of EU citizens claim to
be able to speak at least one European language in addition to their mother
tongue, with 41 per cent claiming to know English (Eurobarometer,
2001: 4).) Religion has been another source of division, with the north-
ern countries (except Ireland) being mainly Protestant, and the southern
countries (including France but excluding Orthodox Greece) being pre-
dominantly Catholic. Contrasting cultural traditions and historical
experiences have further served to develop distinct identifications  and
feelings of  us and  them  across the map of Europe.
3
0333_984617_03_cha01.qxd 10/21/02 1:55 PM Page 4
4 The Historical Evolution
Such differences have helped to bind some peoples together, but they
have also served to separate others from one another. Along with the
legacies of power struggles and wars they help to explain why Western
Europe has been divided into so many states, each with its own identity
and loyalties. Some of these states  France, Spain and the United
Kingdom for example  have existed in much their present geographical
form for centuries. Others  including Germany, Italy and Ireland  were
constituted only comparatively recently, mostly in the nineteenth and
early twentieth centuries as nationalism flourished and as force was used
to bring nation and state into closer alignment.
Until at least the Second World War, and in some cases well beyond,
linguistic, religious and cultural divisions between the West European
states were exacerbated by political and economic divisions.
Political divisions took the form of varying systems of government
and competing ideological orientations. In the nineteenth and early
twentieth centuries autocracies existed alongside emerging, and more
liberal, parliamentary democracies. Between the two world wars parlia-
mentary democracy found itself under attack and in some cases was
overthrown: in Italy in 1922 by Fascism, in Germany in 1933 by
Nazism, and in Spain after the 1936 9 civil war by conservative author-
itarianism. It was not until the mid 1970s  following the collapse of the
dictatorships of the Iberian peninsula and the overthrow of the military
regime in Greece  that parliamentary democracy finally became general
throughout Western Europe.
Economic divisions were no less marked. From the beginning of the
Industrial Revolution until the middle of the nineteenth century Britain
was industrially and commercially dominant. Gradually it was chal-
lenged  particularly by Germany, but also by Belgium, France and
others  so that by the early years of the twentieth century competition
between these countries for overseas markets was fierce. At the same
time, the economies of the northern countries were increasingly differ-
entiated from those of the south, with the former mostly having sub-
stantial industrial bases while the latter remained predominantly
agricultural and underdeveloped.
Western Europe was thus long divided and many of its divisions were
sources of tension, hostility and war. Finding their expression in eco-
nomic and ideological competition, in drives for national power and
prestige and in territorial disputes, and compounded by dangerous mix-
tures of assertive/weak/incompetent leaderships, the divisions ensured
that until after the Second World War rivalry and distrust governed the
relationships between most of the states most of the time.
In the twentieth century alone two devastatingly destructive world wars,
both of which began as European wars, were fought. The First (1914 18)
saw the countries of the triple entente  Britain, France and Russia 
plus Italy from 1915, fighting against Germany and Austria-Hungary.
0333_984617_03_cha01.qxd 10/21/02 1:55 PM Page 5
The Transformation of Western Europe 5
The Second (1939 45) saw Germany, assisted from 1940 by Italy, attempt-
ing to impose itself by force on virtually the whole of Europe outside the
Iberian peninsula.
The background to the Second World War is worth outlining briefly
because it puts in perspective how dramatically different, and how sud-
denly found, were the more cooperative relationships between the West
European states in the post-1945 era. In short, the period between the
wars was characterised by particularly sharp and fluid inter-state
relations. There was no stable alliance system and no clear balance of
power. For the most part, European states, including West European
states, regarded one another with, at best, suspicion. Though multilat-
eral and bilateral treaties, agreements and pacts abounded, there was
little overall pattern to them and few had any lasting effect. States
came together in varying combinations on different issues in a manner
that, far from indicating mutual confidence, was increasingly suggestive
of fear.
From time to time in the inter-war period proposals for greater coop-
eration between European states were advanced but little came of them.
The international climate  characterised by national rivalries and clash-
ing interests  was not favourable, and most of the leading advocates of
closer linkages were seen as having, as indeed they did have, specific
national purposes in mind. Aristide Briand, for example, who was
French Foreign Minister from 1925 to 1932, supported European coop-
eration but clearly had as his prime aim a stable European political sys-
tem that would preserve the peace settlement that had been imposed on
Germany by the 1919 Versailles Treaty. Gustav Stresemann, by contrast,
who was the German Foreign Minister from 1923 to 1929, saw
European cooperation as a way in which Germany could loosen the grip
of Versailles and regain its position as a major power.
The lack of any real interest in European cooperation before the
Second World War is revealed in the functioning of the League of
Nations. Established in 1919 to provide for international collective secu-
rity, in practice it was dominated by the Europeans and had some poten-
tial as a forum for developing understandings and improving
relationships between the European states. It failed, and did so for three
main reasons. First, its aims were vague and were interpreted in differ-
ent ways. Second, it was intergovernmental in its structure and therefore
dependent on the agreement of all member states before any action
could be taken. Third, and crucially, the states wanted different things
from it: some  notably France, most of the medium-sized central
European countries that had been constituted in 1918 19 out of the col-
lapsed Austria-Hungarian Empire, and to some extent Britain  saw it
as a means of preserving the Versailles status quo; others  particularly
Germany and Italy  wanted to use it to change the 1919 settlement and
were prepared to leave or ignore it if it did not serve that purpose.
0333_984617_03_cha01.qxd 10/21/02 1:55 PM Page 6
6 The Historical Evolution
Inter-war Europe thus experienced rising tensions as national rivalries
remained unharnessed and, above all, as German territorial and power
ambitions could not be satisfied. When war finally did break out, the
Axis Powers (Germany and Italy) gained control for a while over virtu-
ally the whole of the continent from the Atlantic to deep inside the
Soviet Union. In Western Europe only Britain and those countries which
remained neutral (Ireland, Portugal, Spain, Sweden and Switzerland)
were not occupied. By May 1945, when German government represen-
tatives agreed to unconditional surrender, Nazism and Fascism had been
defeated, but economies and political systems throughout Europe had
been severely shaken, cities and towns had been destroyed and millions
had been killed.
The Post-War Transformation
Since the Second World War the relations between the states of Western
Europe have been transformed. There are three principal aspects of this.
Unbroken peace
The states have lived peacefully with one another since 1945 and armed
confrontation between any two does not now appear to be even remotely
possible. As Altiero Spinelli, one of the great advocates and architects of
European integration, observed in 1985 shortly before his death:
[a] major transformation & has occurred in the political conscious-
ness of Europeans, something which is completely new in their his-
tory. For centuries, neighbouring countries were seen as potential
enemies against whom it was necessary to be on one s guard and ready
to fight. Now, after the end of the most terrible of wars in Europe,
these neighbours are perceived as friendly nations sharing a common
destiny (Spinelli, 1986: xiii).
Spinelli s belief in a common destiny is questionable, but the reality and
importance of the transformation from hostile to friendly relations is
not. Certainly the states have continued to compete against one another
in many areas, and this has sometimes led to strains and tensions, but
these disagreements have been mostly on issues where military conflict
has not been relevant to the resolution of differences.
Indeed, not only has military conflict been irrelevant to the resolution of
differences, but such friction as has occurred has been within a context in
which West European states have usually shared similar views on who can
be seen as friends and who are real or potential enemies. Until the revolu-
tions and upheavals in Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union in the late
1980s/early 1990s, communism was the most obvious common threat and
0333_984617_03_cha01.qxd 10/23/02 6:18 PM Page 7
The Transformation of Western Europe 7
this led most significant Western European states to become full or part
members of the same military alliance: the North Atlantic Treaty
Organisation (NATO). With the communist danger now removed,
Western security arrangements are being revamped to adjust to a situation
in which Central and Eastern European countries (CEECs) are seen as
partners rather than as foes, and in which the main potential security con-
cerns for Western Europe are seen as lying in the Balkans, in bubbling
national and ethnic tensions in parts of the former Soviet Empire, in the
turbulence of the Middle East, and in the threat of international terrorism.
As part of this revamping, new European-wide security arrangements have
been developed, three CEECs  Hungary, Poland and the Czech Republic
 have become members of NATO and others are scheduled to become so,
and ten CEECs have applied to  and are on course to join  the EU.
A transformed agenda
Throughout the international system the subject matter of discussions
and negotiations between states has become much more varied. Whilst,
as regional conflicts show, the case should not be overstated, interna-
tional agendas have clearly become less focused on traditional  high pol-
icy issues and more on  low policy issues. That is, policies concerned
with the existence and preservation of the state (such as territorial issues,
defence policy and balance of power manoeuvrings) have been joined by
policies that are more concerned with the wealth and welfare of popu-
lations (such as policies on trade, monetary stability, environmental
protection, and airline safety).
This change in the content of agendas has been particularly marked
throughout the Western industrialised world, and above all in Western
Europe where a transformation can be said to have occurred. Classic
 power politics have not of course disappeared, but they are not as dom-
inant or as prominent as they were. When representatives of the fifteen
EU states meet it is normally to consider topics that a generation or two
ago would not even have been regarded as proper subjects for interna-
tional negotiations, such as what constitutes  fair economic competition,
how might research information be pooled to the general advantage, to
what extent and by what means should sheep farmers be subsidised, and
what should be the maximum weight of lorries permitted on roads?
New channels and processes
Paralleling, and partly occasioned by, the increasingly diverse interna-
tional agenda, there has been a transformation in the ways in which
states interrelate with one another. The traditional diplomatic means of
inter-state communications via Ministries of Foreign Affairs and
0333_984617_03_cha01.qxd 10/21/02 1:55 PM Page 8
8 The Historical Evolution
embassies have declined in importance as new channels and processes
have become established.
As with changing agendas, changing forms of inter-state communica-
tion have been taken further in the Western industrialised world, and
particularly in the EU, than anywhere else. There are now few signifi-
cant parts of any Western state s political and administrative systems
that do not have some involvement in the management of external rela-
tions. Written communications, telephone conversations, electronically
transmitted messages, and bilateral and multilateral meetings between
states increase by the year. Contacts range from the ad hoc and informal
to the regularised and highly structured.
In the EU, representatives of the governments of the member states
meet every working day for such purposes as taking binding decisions
(decisions that in many circumstances may be taken by majority vote),
exploring possibly advantageous policy coordination, and exchanging
views and information. At the lower end of the seniority scale, junior and
middle-ranking officials, often working from tightly drawn negotiating
briefs and with their actions subject to later approval from national cap-
itals, convene in committees to try to hammer out detailed agreements
on proposed legislation. At the top end of the scale, Heads of Govern-
ment regularly meet, for what are often wide-ranging deliberations, in
forums such as: the European Council, which meets at least four times a
year and where all fifteen EU states are represented; in bilateral meetings,
which in the case of the British Prime Minister, the French President, the
German Chancellor and the Italian Prime Minister take place at least
once a year; and in the broader setting of the annual Group of Eight (G8)
summits, which bring together the political leaders of Britain, France,
Germany, Italy, Canada, Japan, Russia and the United States, plus the
President of the European Commission and the Head of Government of
the member state that is currently chairing the EU s Council of Ministers
if she or he is not already present.
Explanations of the Transformation
In seeking to explain post-war cooperation and integration in Western
Europe  which includes locating both the foundations and the reasons
for the development of the European Union  different observers have
often highlighted different factors, and sometimes indeed have looked in
rather different directions. Amongst the questions that have caused dif-
ficulties are these: to what extent do the developments have deep his-
torical roots and to what extent have they been a reaction to specifically
post-1945 circumstances?; what has been the balance between political
and economic factors?; what has been the role of general international
influences as opposed to more narrowly based West European ones?;
0333_984617_03_cha01.qxd 10/21/02 1:55 PM Page 9
The Transformation of Western Europe 9
and has there been a constant underlying movement in an integrationist
direction or just a series of specific, and not very well coordinated,
responses to specific problems?
In looking at the ways in which questions of this sort have been
answered, four broad explanatory themes can be found in the literature.
For analytical purposes they will be considered here separately, but it
should be recognised that, in practice, they are by no means mutually
exclusive but rather complement, overlap and reinforce one another. It
should be recognised, too, that their usefulness as explanations is not
constant, but varies over time. So, for example, whilst political ideals
and utopian visions of a united Europe may have had at least some part
to play in the early post-war years, more recently they have counted for
little and it has been hard-headed national calculations of economic and
political advantages and disadvantages that have been the principal
determinants of the nature and pace of the integration process.
The deep roots of integration?
Some commentators and practitioners have found the roots of post-war
developments in the distant past. Supporters and advocates of European
integration have been especially prominent in this regard. They have
suggested that Europe is, and has long been, a unique and identifiable
entity. As evidence of this it is often argued that Europe was the cradle
of modern civilisation and from this there developed European values
and a European culture, art and literature. Walter Hallstein, the first
President of the Commission of the EEC, typifies this sort of view:
Europe is no creation. It is a rediscovery. The main difference between
the formation of the United States of Europe and that of the United
States of America is not that America did not have to merge a num-
ber of firmly established nation states, but that for more than a thou-
sand years the idea of a unified Europe was never quite forgotten &
[The advocates of a European federation] know that Europe shares
a sense of values: of what is good and bad; of what a man s rights
should be and what are his duties; of how society should be ordered;
of what is happiness and what disaster. Europe shares many things:
its memories that we call history; achievements it can take pride in
and events that are shameful; its joys and its sufferings; and not least
its tomorrows (Hallstein, 1972: 15 and 16).
Clearly there is much idealism in this. People such as Hallstein are
suggesting that transcending the differences, divergences and conflicts
between peoples and states there has long been a certain commonality and
identity of interest in Europe based on interrelationships between geogra-
phy and historical, political, economic, social and cultural developments.
0333_984617_03_cha01.qxd 10/21/02 1:55 PM Page 10
10 The Historical Evolution
It is a contentious view and certainly not one to which many historians
would attach much importance. Divisions and dissension, they would
contend, have been more prominent than identity of interest or shared
values and experiences. Such limited commonality as has existed has
largely been a consequence of geographical proximity.
But if the  idealistic interpretation no longer finds much favour, there
are still those who stress the importance of the historical dimension of
Western European integration. Inter-state relations in the nineteenth
century are sometimes seen as foreshadowing post-1945 developments
insofar as peace endured for much of the century and did so, in part at
least, as a result of understandings and agreements between the major
powers. However, a problem with this view is that it overstates the
extent to which the nineteenth century was a century of peace, and it
also exaggerates the extent to which the states did cooperate. Arguably,
the so-called Concert of Nations was an embryonic attempt to exercise
strategic control through diplomacy and summitry, but that was at a
time when conservative autocracies ruled much of Europe and many of
today s states did not even exist in their present form. And in any event,
the system lasted at best only from 1815 to the Crimean War. It then
gave way to the wars of the mid-century and later to the balance of
power  which was hardly based on European trust and cooperation 
as the means of seeking to preserve the peace.
It is perhaps in the field of economic history that the most fertile ground
for identifying long-term influences and explanations is to be found. From
about the late eighteenth century national economic integration began to
occur, as barriers to economic activity within states were dismantled. This
helped to promote, and in turn was encouraged by, national political inte-
gration, which manifested itself in nationalism and in the elevation of the
sovereign state to the status of the supreme collective unit. From about the
middle of the nineteenth century the achievement and successes of this
internal economic and political integration, allied with an increasing inter-
connectedness in Europe that followed from technological change and
economic advance, resulted in increasing inter-state cooperation to pro-
mote trade, competition and growth. For some economic historians an
embryonic European economy was being established. Pollard, for exam-
ple, has written of the mid-nineteenth century:
Europe s industrialisation proceeded relatively smoothly, among other
reasons, precisely because it took place within what was in many
essentials a single integrated economy, with a fair amount of move-
ment for labour, a greater amount of freedom for the movement of
goods, and the greatest freedom of all for the movement of technol-
ogy, know-how and capital (Pollard, 1981: 38 9).
But unlike the customary pattern within nation states, there was noth-
ing inevitable about European economic integration. Nor was there a
0333_984617_03_cha01.qxd 10/21/02 1:55 PM Page 11
The Transformation of Western Europe 11
clear and developing relationship between it and political integration.
On the contrary, from the last quarter of the nineteenth century, states,
for a variety of reasons, moved increasingly in the direction of economic
protectionism and at the same time developed national identities and
consciousness such as had not been seen before. In the first part of the
twentieth century, and especially between the wars, the European free
trading system virtually disappeared, as states sought to protect them-
selves at the expense of others and national economies were increasingly
reshaped along autarkic lines. Alongside these increasingly closed eco-
nomic systems developed the ever sharper political tensions and rivalries
between the states that were noted earlier.
The European historical experience thus emphasises the extremely
important, but often overlooked, fact that although industrialisation and
economic liberalisation provide potential bases for the furtherance of
interconnections, agreements, and harmonious relations between states,
they do not ensure or guarantee them. The powers of Europe went to war
with their principal trading partners in 1914. Furthermore, between the
wars economic linkages did little to bring the nations together or to act as
a restraint on governments when divergences developed in their aims
and strategies. This must be borne in mind when, later in this chapter
(pp. 17 19), attention is turned to modernisation and interdependence as
explanations for post-war political and economic integration. Doubtless
they have both been extremely important, but as pre-1939 European his-
tory shows, they do not have an inevitable integrationist logic attached to
them. Much depends on their relationship to the circumstances of the time
and, as will now be shown, these were very different in the post-1945
world from what they had been before the Second World War.
The impact of the Second World War
The Second World War unquestionably marked a turning point in the
West European state system. Just a few years after the end of the war
states were cooperating, and in some instances and in some respects
were even integrating, in a manner that would have been inconceivable
before the war. Fundamental to this transformation were a number of
factors resultant upon the war that combined to bring about a radical
change in both the climate of opinion and perceptions of requirements.
These factors were political and economic in nature.
Political factors
These may be subdivided into four broad areas.
(1) Combating nationalism. The Second World War produced a greater
realisation than had existed ever before that unfettered and uninhibited
nationalism was a recipe for war, which in the post-1945 world was
0333_984617_03_cha01.qxd 10/21/02 1:55 PM Page 12
12 The Historical Evolution
increasingly seen as meaning mass destruction. At the international level
this thinking was reflected in calls for a larger and more powerful body
than the pre-war League of Nations, and it played an important part in
the establishment of the United Nations in 1944. But the fact that the
two world wars had begun as European wars, and that Germany was
generally considered to be responsible for those wars, also brought forth
demands and moves for specifically European arrangements. Amongst
the strongest advocates of the creation of European arrangements were
many of those who had been associated with the Resistance movements
of Continental Europe which, from 1943 onwards, had come to be
linked via liaising networks and from which ideas and proposals had
been generated looking forward to a post-war world that would be based
more on cooperation and less on confrontation.
There was thus a widely shared optimism at the end of the Second
World War that if the European states could work together in joint
schemes and organisations, barriers of mistrust could be broken down.
On this basis, over 750 prominent Europeans came together in The
Hague in May 1948 and from their Congress issued a call to the nations
of Europe to create a political and economic union. This stimulated dis-
cussions at governmental levels, and in May 1949 the Statute of the
Council of Europe was signed by representatives of ten states. Article 1
of the Statute includes the following:
(a) The aim of the Council of Europe is to achieve a greater unity
between its Members for the purpose of safeguarding and realising the
ideals and principles which are their common heritage and facilitating
their economic and social progress.
(b) This aim shall be pursued through the organs of the Council by
discussions of questions of common concern and by agreements and
common action in economic, social, cultural, scientific, legal and
administrative matters and in the maintenance and further realisation
of human rights and fundamental freedoms (Robertson, 1961,
Appendix  the Statute).
Despite these grandiose ambitions, however, the Council of Europe
proved to be a disappointment to those who had hoped it might serve
as the basis for a new West European state system. In part the problem
was that its aims were too vague, in part that its decision-making struc-
ture was essentially intergovernmental and therefore weak, but the main
problem was that some of its members, notably the UK, were not very
interested in anything that went beyond limited and voluntary coopera-
tion. (Ernest Bevin, British Foreign Secretary, commented on proposals
for a really effective Council of Europe thus:  Once you open that
Pandora s box, you ll find it full of Trojan horses. ) But the weaknesses
0333_984617_03_cha01.qxd 10/21/02 1:55 PM Page 13
The Transformation of Western Europe 13
of the Council should not be overstated. It was to perform, and contin-
ues to perform, certain useful functions  notably in the sphere of human
rights through its European Convention of Human Rights, and as a
forum for the discussion of matters of common interest to its member
states. (The value of this latter function long lay in the fact that, unlike
other Western European regional groups, virtually all West European
states were members of the Council. More recently, as East European
countries have become members, an additional value has been as a
forum for establishing links and building understanding between
Western and Eastern Europe.)
(2) The new political map of Europe. Although it was not immediately
apparent when hostilities ceased in 1945, the Second World War was to
result in a fundamental redrawing of the political map of Europe. By the
late 1940s it was clear that the legacy of war had left the Continent, and
with it Germany, divided in two. In Winston Churchill s phrase, an  Iron
Curtain now divided East from West.
In the West there was no question of the victorious powers  Britain
and the United States  seeking or being able to impose anything like a
Soviet-style straitjacket on the liberated countries. Nonetheless, if
Western Europe did not quite take on the form of a bloc, liberal demo-
cratic systems were soon established and not wholly dissimilar political
ideas were soon prevailing in most of the states. Inevitably this facili-
tated intergovernmental relations.
Perhaps the most important idea shared by the governments stemmed
directly from the East West division: a determination to preserve Western
Europe from communism. Not only had the Soviet Union extended its
influence far into the European heartland, but in France and Italy domes-
tic communist parties were commanding considerable support and from
1947 were engaging in what looked to many like revolutionary activities.
The United States shared this anti-communist concern, and the encour-
agement and assistance which it gave to the West European states after
the war to cooperate was partly driven by a belief that such cooperation
could play a major part in helping to halt the communist advance. In
March 1947 President Truman, concerned with events in Greece  where
communists were trying to overthrow the government  outlined what
became known as the Truman doctrine, which amounted to a political
guarantee of support to  free peoples who are resisting attempted subju-
gation by armed minorities or by outside pressures . This political com-
mitment was quickly followed up in 1948 by economic assistance in the
form of Marshall Aid (see p. 15), and in 1949 by military protection with
the foundation of NATO and a guarantee to the then ten West European
member states (Canada and the United States brought the founding mem-
bership to twelve) of US military protection against a Soviet attack.
0333_984617_03_cha01.qxd 10/21/02 1:55 PM Page 14
14 The Historical Evolution
A role for the United States in Western Europe at this time should not
be seen as having been unwelcome, for contrary to the impression that
is sometimes given, US aid was not insidiously imposed on unwilling
states but was actively sought. At the same time, the extent of US influ-
ence should not be exaggerated. By its political, economic and military
interventions and assistance the United States did exert integrationist
pressures and did help to make a number of developments possible, but
the US government wanted much more West European inter-state inte-
gration than was actually achieved.
(3) The new international power balance. With the post-war division of
Europe, the moving of the international power balance from inter-
European state relations to US Soviet relations, and the onset of the
Cold War from 1947 8 producing the possibility of Europe becoming a
battleground between East and West, there was a sense from the late
1940s that Western Europe was beginning to look like an identifiable
political entity in a way that it had not done before. Not all states or
politicians shared this perspective, but from many of those who did
there emerged a desire that the voice of Western Europe should be heard
on the world stage and a belief that this could be achieved only through
unity and by speaking with one voice. For some of the smaller European
states, which had rarely exercised much international influence and
whose very existence had periodically been threatened by larger neigh-
bours, the prospects of such cooperation were particularly attractive.
(4) The German problem. The future of Germany naturally loomed
large in the minds of those who had to deal with post-war reconstruc-
tion. Three times in seventy years, and twice in the twentieth century,
Germany had occupied much of Europe. Rightly or wrongly it had come
to be seen as innately aggressive. As a consequence, the initial inclina-
tion of most governments after the war was to try to contain Germany
in some way. Just how this should be done, however, divided the
wartime allies, with the result that matters drifted until what was ini-
tially intended as an interim division of Germany into zones gave way,
as the Cold War developed, into a de jure division: the Federal Republic
of Germany (West Germany) and the German Democratic Republic
(East Germany) were both formally constituted in 1949.
By this time, the Soviet Union was replacing Germany as the perceived
principal threat to democracy and stability in Western Europe. As this
occurred, those who were already arguing that a conciliatory approach
towards Germany ought to be tried  since a policy of punitive con-
tainment had demonstrably failed between the wars  saw their hands
strengthened by a growing feeling that attempts must be made to
avoid the development of a political vacuum in West Germany that the
communists might attempt to exploit. Furthermore, and the US govern-
ment played an important role in pressing this view from the early
0333_984617_03_cha01.qxd 10/21/02 1:55 PM Page 15
The Transformation of Western Europe 15
1950s, use of West Germany s power and wealth could help to reduce
the contributions that other countries were making to the defence of
Europe. The perceived desirability and need to incorporate the Federal
Republic into the Western European mainstream thus further stimulated
the pressure for inter-state cooperation and integration.
Economic factors
Just as pre-war and wartime experiences helped to produce the United
Nations, so they also stimulated an interest in the creation of new inter-
national economic and financial arrangements. The first fruits of this
were realised at the Bretton Woods Conference in 1944, where the rep-
resentatives of forty-four countries, with the United Kingdom and the
United States playing the leading roles, agreed to the establishment of
two new bodies. The first was the International Monetary Fund (IMF),
which was to alleviate currency instability by creating facilities for coun-
tries with temporary balance of payments difficulties to have access to
short-term credit facilities. The second was the International Bank for
Reconstruction and Development (the World Bank), which was to pro-
vide long-term loans for schemes that required major investment. In
1947, at much the same time as the IMF and the World Bank became
operative, international economic cooperation was taken a stage further
when twenty-three countries negotiated the General Agreement on
Tariffs and Trade (GATT), whose purpose was to facilitate trade through
the lowering of international trade barriers.
Although West European governments (or, more usually, national rep-
resentatives, since governments on the Continent were not properly
restored until 1945 6) played their part in creating the new interna-
tional economic arrangements, it was felt in many quarters that there
should also be specifically West European-based economic initiatives
and organisations. In 1947 8 this feeling was given a focus, an impetus
and an urgency when the rapid post-war economic recovery that most
states were able to engineer by the adoption of expansionist policies cre-
ated massive balance of payments deficits, and dollar shortages in par-
ticular. Governments were faced with major currency problems, with
not being able to pay for their imports and with the prospect of their
economic recovery coming to a sudden and premature end. In these cir-
cumstances, and for reasons that were not altogether altruistic  a strong
Western Europe was in its political, security and economic interests  the
United States stepped in with economic aid in the form of the European
Recovery Programme, or Marshall Aid as it came to be known after the
US Secretary of State, George Marshall, who championed it. But there
was a condition attached to the aid: the recipient states must endeavour
to promote greater economic cooperation among themselves. As a
result, the first major post-war Western European organisation, the
0333_984617_03_cha01.qxd 10/21/02 1:55 PM Page 16
16 The Historical Evolution
Organisation for European Economic Cooperation (OEEC), was estab-
lished, with sixteen founding member states in April 1948. Its short-
term task was to manage the US aid, encourage joint economic policies,
and discourage barriers to trade; in the longer term, its stated aim was
to build  a sound European economy through the cooperation of its
members . In the event, although the OEEC did some valuable work 
the most notable perhaps being to establish payments schemes which in
the 1940s and 1950s did much to further trade between the member
countries  it never made much progress towards its grander ambitions.
Rather like the Council of Europe, its large and somewhat heteroge-
neous membership, coupled with the strictly intergovernmental nature
of its decision-making structure, meant that ambitious proposals were
always successfully opposed. Partly as a result of this, and partly in
recognition of growing interdependence among all industrialised coun-
tries, in 1961 the OEEC gave way to the Organisation for Economic
Cooperation and Development (OECD), whose membership was made
open to non-European countries and which was to have broader objec-
tives reflecting wider and changing interests.
The OEEC thus stemmed from post-war circumstances that mixed the
general with the particular. That is to say, attitudes coming out of the
war that favoured economic cooperation between West European states
were given a direction by particular requirements that were related to
the war and its immediate aftermath. Only three years later, as will be
described in Chapter 3, a similar mixture of general underlying and spe-
cific triggering factors combined to produce the first of the European
Communities: the European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC).
* * *
The effects of some of the political and economic factors associated with
the Second World War that have just been considered, such as the exis-
tence of Resistance leaders in governments, were essentially short-term.
Furthermore, some of the factors, such as the increased need and will-
ingness of the states to cooperate with one another to promote economic
growth, were not so much caused by the war as given a push by it.
Nonetheless, it can hardly be disputed that the factors taken together
produced a set of circumstances that enabled Western European coop-
eration and integration to get off the ground in the 1940s and 1950s.
States naturally differed in the particulars and perceptions of their
post-war situations. As a result, there was no general agreement on pre-
cisely what the new spirit of cooperation should attempt to achieve.
Many different schemes were advanced and many different organisa-
tions were established to tackle particular issues, problems and require-
ments. Thus the war did not produce anything remotely like a united
West European movement between the states. But it did produce new
0333_984617_03_cha01.qxd 10/21/02 1:55 PM Page 17
The Transformation of Western Europe 17
realities and changed attitudes that enabled, or forced, virtually all the
states to recognise at least some commonalities and shared interests. As
a consequence, it became possible for new inter-state European organi-
sations to be established. Of these organisations, those that were able to
offer clear advantages and benefits to members were able to act as a base
for further developments. As the ECSC in particular quickly demon-
strated, cooperation and integration can breed more of the same.
Interdependence
It has become customary to suggest that whilst both political and eco-
nomic factors were crucial to Western European cooperation and inte-
gration in the formative post-war years, the former have now declined
in relation to the latter. The impact of modernisation is generally agreed
to be a key reason for this. It has broadened the international agenda
from its traditional power and security concerns to embrace a range of
economic and social issues, and at the same time it has produced an
interconnectedness and interrelatedness between states, especially in the
economic and monetary spheres, that amounts to an interdependence.
Economic interdependence has arisen particularly from three features
of the post-1945 world: the enormously increased volume of world
trade; the internationalisation of production, in which multinational
corporations have played a prominent part; and  especially since the
early 1970s  the fluctuations and uncertainties associated with currency
exchange rates and international monetary arrangements. Within
Western Europe there have been many regional dimensions to this devel-
opment of interdependence, two of which have been especially impor-
tant in promoting the integration process. First, since the Second World
War the external trade of all significant Western European countries has
become increasingly West European focused. The EC/EU has played an
important role in encouraging this trend, and all the EU member states
now conduct at least 50 per cent of their trade inside the EU. Second,
from the 1960s monetary power within Western Europe increasingly
came to be held by those who made the monetary decisions for the
strongest economy: Germany. Changes in German interest rates or
exchange rates had immense and potentially very destabilising implica-
tions elsewhere in Western Europe.
As a result of interdependence a wide variety of economic and finan-
cial issues can thus no longer be limited to, and indeed in some respects
do not even bear much relationship to, national boundaries. States are
increasingly vulnerable to outside events and are increasingly unable to
act in isolation. They must consult, cooperate and, some would argue,
integrate with one another in the interests of international and national
economic stability and growth. In consequence, when a problem has been
0333_984617_03_cha01.qxd 10/21/02 1:55 PM Page 18
18 The Historical Evolution
seen to require a truly international economic effort most West
European states have been prepared to try to find solutions at this level:
in the IMF, in GATT and its successor the World Trade Organisation
(WTO), in the Bank for International Settlements, and elsewhere. When
a regional response has seemed more appropriate or more practical,
West European-based arrangements have been sought. The most obvi-
ous examples of such arrangements are EU-based. For instance: the cre-
ation of the Single European Market (SEM) is rooted in the belief that
the dismantlement of trade barriers will further economic efficiency and
prosperity in the participating states; the creation of Economic and
Monetary Union (EMU) is based on the assumption that the coordina-
tion and the convergence of national economic and monetary policies
and the establishment of a centrally managed single currency is neces-
sary for the completion of the SEM programme and will serve to pro-
mote further trade, growth and prosperity; and the development at the
EU level of advanced research programmes is a response to the growing
belief that European states must pool their scientific and technological
resources and knowledge if they are to compete successfully in world
markets against the Americans, the Japanese and other competitors.
Economic interdependence is not the only feature of modern interde-
pendence. Advances in communications and travel have placed on the
international and European agendas issues that a generation or two ago
either did not exist or were seen as being of purely domestic concern.
Now it is commonly accepted that if these issues are to be properly man-
aged they must be dealt with at the inter-state level. Governments thus
discuss, and in Western Europe have adopted understandings and made
decisions on, matters as diverse as transfrontier television arrangements,
data protection, action against drug traffickers and football hooliganism.
But despite all the attention that is now given to interdependence as
the motor of European integration, and despite the associated assertion
that economic factors now far outweigh political factors in shaping rela-
tions between the EU states, the case should not be overstated. One rea-
son for this is that modern interdependence does not necessarily produce
an inescapable and wholly unavoidable set of integrationist processes
and developments: there is certainly an integrationist logic attached to
modern interdependence, but for much of integration to actually proceed
political choices and decisions have to be made. As the history of West
European negotiations on integration since the Second World War
demonstrate  from the negotiations in the late 1940s to establish the
Council of Europe to the negotiations in the late 1990s on the Treaty of
Nice  politicians, and indeed publics, are capable of adopting an array
of often sharply conflicting views of what is necessary and what is desir-
able when they are faced with particular choices and decisions. A second
reason for exercising some caution when evaluating the impact on inte-
gration of economic interdependence is that political factors continue to
0333_984617_03_cha01.qxd 10/21/02 1:55 PM Page 19
The Transformation of Western Europe 19
be important in shaping the nature and pace of integration processes.
This was clearly illustrated in the wake of the 1990 reunification of
Germany, when a powerful stimulus to a new round of integrationist
negotiations was the growing conviction among decision-making elites,
most particularly in France, that if Germany was to be prevented from
dominating the Continent it must be tied more tightly to its neighbours.
A third reason for not overemphasising the importance of modern inter-
dependence to the neglect of other factors is that interdependence of a
quite different kind  different in that it has arisen not from modernisa-
tion but rather from the relatively diminished significance of the
European states in the post-1945 period  continues to play a part in
encouraging cooperation and integration between states. So, for exam-
ple, with respect to the external political role of the EU, the fact that
European states have relatively limited power and weight when acting
individually has provided a powerful inducement for them to try to
speak as one if they wish to exert a significant influence on world polit-
ical events. Most of the EU states do wish to exert such an influence and
consequently, since the early 1970s, they have gradually strengthened
their mechanisms for inter-state foreign policy cooperation so as to
enable them to engage in extensive consultations, and increasingly to
adopt joint positions, on foreign policy issues. Similar processes have
been under way also in respect of security considerations, with the per-
ception, until the collapse of communism, of the Soviet Union as
Western Europe s main political enemy, allied with the inability of any
single Western Europe state to offer by itself a wholly credible defence
capability, encouraging close military cooperation between the states in
the context of both the Western alliance and associated Western Europe
defence groupings. The Soviet threat has now disappeared, but poten-
tial security dangers of many kinds still abound and these have played
an important part in ensuring that not only civil security but also military
security is now on the EU s agenda.
National considerations
Although most Western European states since 1945 have paid at least
lip service to the idea of a united Western Europe, and more recently to
a united Europe, there has never been any consensus between them on
what this should mean in practice. The rhetoric has often been grand,
but discussions on specific proposals have usually revealed considerable
variations in ambitions, motives, intentions and perceptions. Most cru-
cially of all, states have differed in their assessments of the consequences
for them, in terms of gains and losses, of forging closer relations with
their neighbours. As a result, some states have been prepared and able
to go further than others, or have been prepared to do so at an earlier
time. There has not, therefore, been coherent and ordered progress
0333_984617_03_cha01.qxd 10/21/02 1:55 PM Page 20
20 The Historical Evolution
towards West European unity. In the late 1940s and the 1950s most
states were willing to be associated with intergovernmental organisa-
tions that made few demands on them  and hence joined the OEEC and
the Council of Europe  but they were less enthusiastic when organisa-
tions were proposed that went beyond intergovernmental cooperation
into supranational integration. Consequently, the more ambitious post-
war schemes  for the ECSC, for a European Defence Community
(EDC  which in the event was never established), and for the EEC and
Euratom  initially involved only a restricted membership. It was not
until circumstances and attitudes in other states changed, and until an
obstacle that emerged amongst the founding states themselves  in the
form of President de Gaulle s opposition to UK membership  was
removed, that the EC gradually expanded in the 1970s, 1980s and
1990s to include eventually virtually all of Western Europe s larger and
medium-sized states.
So while all West European states have long been touched by at least
some of the factors that have been examined on the last few pages, the
differences between them have resulted in their interest in, and their
capacity and enthusiasm for, cooperation and integration varying in
terms of both nature and timing. The nature of these differences is exam-
ined in Chapter 2.
Concluding Remarks: The Ragged Nature of the
Integration Process
Since the Second World War the way in which West European govern-
ments relate to and communicate with one another has been transformed.
A key role in this has been played by new international governmental
organisations. Some of these are global in their composition, others are
regionally based; some have sweeping but vaguely defined responsibili-
ties, others have specific sectoral briefs; some are purely intergovernmen-
tal in structure, others are overlain with supranational powers. At a
minimum, all provide frameworks in which national representatives meet
with one another to discuss matters of mutual interest.
The best known, most developed and most important West European-
wide organisation is the EU. But it has never been the only significant
West European-wide organisation, and it was not the first such organi-
sation to be established. On the contrary, since the end of the Second
World War numerous proposals have been advanced and many arrange-
ments have been set in place for organised cooperation and integration
among the states. The more ambitious of these have sought to bring the
whole of Western Europe together in some sort of federal union. The
more cautious have limited themselves to the pursuit of restricted aims
for just some of the states.
0333_984617_03_cha01.qxd 10/21/02 1:55 PM Page 21
The Transformation of Western Europe 21
So although the logic of circumstances and of political and economic
changes have brought the states much more closely together, there can
hardly be said to have been a common and coherent integrationist force
at work in Western Europe in the post-war years. Far from the states
being bound together in the pursuit of a shared visionary mission, rela-
tions between them have frequently been extremely uncomfortable and
uneasy, based as they have been on a host of different needs and differ-
ent perceptions of what is possible and necessary. In consequence, the
processes of cooperation and integration have operated in many differ-
ent forums, at many different levels, in many different ways, and at
many different speeds. Even in the EC/EU, which has been at the inte-
grationist core, the course of the integration process has varied consid-
erably, with the mid-1970s until the early 1980s being the years of
slowest integrationist advance, and the mid-1980s until the early 1990s
being the fastest.
It is, of course, the conflicting nature of many of the factors which
affect the integration process that has resulted in the process being so
rocky, uncertain and unpredictable. Moreover, the factors themselves
have been subject to considerable and unforeseeable change, as has been
no more clearly demonstrated than since the late 1980s with the context
in which the pressures which affect the furtherance of integration being
transformed by the ending of the Cold War and the break-up of the
Soviet Union. After four decades of Europe having been politically
divided in two, decades in which Western Europe tended to think of
itself as being Europe, fundamental issues concerning the nature of the
Continent as a whole came onto the agenda. In these circumstances, new
links, contacts and forms of cooperation were rapidly established
between the countries of Western and Eastern Europe, advanced not
least by many of the latter seeking EU membership within five years of
having been released from Soviet domination. The manner in which the
integration of Western Europe is now widening into the integration of a
much broader Europe is considered in Chapter 21.
0333_984617_28_Ind.qxd 10/23/02 6:35 PM Page 547
Index
accession partnerships 505 Belgium 4, 23 4, 453
activity-based management 134, 375 Benelux countries 22 3
activity-based budgeting 134, 375 see also Belgium; Luxembourg;
Adenauer, Konrad 23, 35 Netherlands
advisory committees 129 31, 136 40, Bevin, Ernest 12
287 8, 342 Blair, Tony 27, 71 2, 419, 445, 457
Afghanistan 418 Bosnia see Former Republic of
African, Caribbean and Pacific (ACP) Yugoslavia
countries 397, 433 4 Briand, Aristide 5
Agenda 2000 128, 325, 364, 368, Britain see United Kingdom
396, 401 2, 507, 526 Brittan, Sir Leon 412
agriculture 40 1, 42, 52, 320, Brussels, Treaty of (1948) see Treaties
385 406 passim 504, 519 budget (of the EU) 204 6, 325 6,
Agriculture Ministers 385, 403 5 366 84 passim
annual price review 400 Bulgaria 494, 500, 504, 508, 525
Common Agricultural Policy
(principles and effects of) capital, free movement of see Single
393 400 European Market
expenditure on 366 70, 372 3 Cassis de Dijon case 254 5, 301
European Agricultural Guidance and Central and Eastern European
Guarantee Fund 133, 312, countries (CEECs) 6 7, 49, 61,
397 8 128, 396, 406, 494, 499, 503 4
management committees 136 40, see also under country names
406 Charter of Fundamental Rights of the
reform of 395 7, 400 5, 406 European Union 89 91, 237 8
Special Committee on Agriculture see Chirac, Jacques 396
Council of Ministers Christian Democracy, Christian
Albania 423, 509 Democratic parties 217
Amsterdam Treaty see Treaties Churchill, Winston 13, 24
Andriessen, Frans 413 citizenship (of the EU) 64 5, 75
Antici Group 157 co-decision procedure 47, 65, 77, 88,
assent procedure 59, 65, 88, 200, 151, 200, 333, 347 52, 358 9
333, 352 3 Cohesion Fund 67, 107, 313
association agreements 410 11, 505 cohesion policy 311 13
Association of European Automobile Cold War 14, 30, 61, 415
Constructors (ACEA) 283 comitology 136 40
Association of Petrochemical Producers Commission, European 43, 49 50,
and Exporters (APPE) 283 57, 111 456 passim (but especially
Association of South East Asian 111 49, 194, 273, 286 8, 218 19,
Nations (ASEAN) 407 297, 340 53, 391, 439 40)
atomic energy policy 320 advisory committees 129 31,
see also European Atomic Energy 136 40
Community appointment and composition 65,
Austria 30 1, 523, 575 78, 82, 112 16
cabinets (of Commissioners)
Balkans 416, 418, 421, 509 117 18, 124 5, 341 2
Barber v. Guardian Royal Exchange College of Commissioners 111 18,
Assurance Group case 254 123, 124 5
0333_984617_28_Ind.qxd 10/23/02 6:35 PM Page 548
548 Index
Commission, European  continued conceptualisations (of the EU)
Directorates-General 120 6 463 75
portfolios 117 conciliation committees 349 52
Presidency 78, 82, 112 13, Confederal Group of the European
116 17, 124, 125 Union Left/Nordic Green Left
reform of 119, 134 219
resignation of 113 14, 122, 208, consociationalism 470 3
279, 526 consultation procedure 65, 77, 199,
responsibilities and powers 126 48, 333, 339 47
374 6, 400 3, 411 14, 429 30, consultative committees see advisory
500 1 committees
Secretariat General 116, 120 1, Convention on the Future of Europe
124 516 17, 527
size 111 12 cooperation procedure 47, 59, 65, 77,
staff 118 20 199 200, 333, 347
Commission v. Germany case 255 Costa v. ENEL case 244
Committee of Agricultural Cotonou Agreement 397, 433 4, 436,
Organisations in the European 526
Union (COPA) 282 5, 288, 292, Council of Europe 12 13, 20, 34, 45,
389 91 518
Committee of Independent Experts Council of Ministers 36 7, 43, 44,
114, 208, 356, 526 49 50, 57, 83 6, 146 8, 150 456,
Committee of Permanent passim (but especially 150 77,
Representatives (COREPER) see 195, 285 6, 345 53)
Council of Ministers Antici Group 157
Committee of the Regions 65 6, Article 133 (ex 113) Committee
264 7, 345, 453, 525 158, 412
Common Agricultural Policy (CAP) see budgetary powers and role 376 81
agriculture committees and working groups
Common Assembly (of ECSC) 37, 44 157, 158 60, 164 5, 346
see also European Parliament composition 153 6
Common Commercial Policy (CCP) Correspondents Group 427
41 2, 158, 407 14 Committee of Permanent
Common Customs Tariff see Common Representatives (COREPER)
External Tariff (CET) 156 8, 165 6, 346, 426 7
Common External Tariff (CET) 41 2, decision-making processes 83 6,
303 4, 407 168 76, 376 9, 403 5, 411 14,
Common Fisheries Policy (CFP) 136, 425 9
312, 321 2, 522 Ecofin Council 154 5, 156, 182,
Common Foreign and Security Policy 272, 376
(CFSP) 53, 67 8, 75 6, 146, Economic and Financial Committee
181, 416 17, 421 31 157, 158 9, 273
Common Market see Single European General Affairs Council 153,
Market 166 7, 185 6, 425 6
Communism, communist parties 6 7, General Secretariat 160 1, 428
13, 61 High Representative 76, 160, 417,
Community Charter of the 428
Fundamental Social Rights of ministerial meetings 153 6, 166 7,
Workers 67, 288, 313 14, 457 185 6
Community Initiatives 313 Monetary Committee 157
Community Support Frameworks Policy Planning and Early Warning
(CSFs) 133 Unit 417, 428 9
competition policy 132, 142 3, Political and Security Committee
302 3 (COPs) 157, 159, 427, 431 2
0333_984617_28_Ind.qxd 10/23/02 6:35 PM Page 549
Index 549
Council of Ministers  continued Economic and Monetary Union (EMU)
Political Committee (PoCo) 157, 18, 51 2, 66, 271 3, 305 8,
159, 427 514 15, 524, 525, 526, 527
Presidency 97, 152, 160 3, 174 5, Economic and Social Committee (ESC)
426 259 64, 266 7, 345
responsibilities 150 3, 425 9 employment policy 31 15
Special Committee on Agriculture energy policy 315 16
157, 346, 385 Energy Charter Treaty 316
Court of Auditors 58, 208, 209, 212, enhanced cooperation see flexibility
276 80, 382 enlargement 48 9, 73, 81, 145 6,
Court of First Instance 59, 87, 242, 128, 190, 396, 494 509 passim
251, 252, 253, 256 8 environmental policy 296, 318 20,
Court of Justice 37, 44, 59, 87, 195, 437 8
242, 245 58 Estonia 494, 504, 525, 526
membership and organisation Euro 12 Council 272
245 47 Eurocorps European Agricultural
powers and responsibilities 248 53 Guidance and Guarantee Fund
President 246 (EAGGF) 133, 312, 397 8
procedure 247 8 Eurogroups 281 5
Cox, Pat 218 Eurojust 310
Cresson, Edith 114, 116, 208 European Anti-Fraud Office (OLAF)
Croatia 416, 509 135, 356
Crotty, Raymond 452 European Atomic Energy Community
Cyprus 29, 496 7, 498, 500, (Euratom) 20, 43 4
523, 526 see also Treaty of Rome (Euratom)
Czech Republic 7, 494, 525, 526 European Bureau of Consumers
Czechoslovakia 523 Associations (BEUC) 282, 391 2
European Central Bank 52, 66, 212,
Davignon Report 520 272 6
decisions, definition of 240 see also European System of Central
defence policy 67 8, 75 6, 416 24, Banks
431 2 European Chemical Industry Council
Dehaene, Jean-Luc 112, 191, 525 (CEFIC) 283 4, 291
Delors, Jacques 51, 115, 117, 124, European Coal and Steel Community
297, 413, 466, 513, 523 (ECSC) xviii, 15, 20, 34 8
Delors Committee and Report on see also Treaty of Paris (1951)
Economic and Monetary Union European Committee for
(1989) 306, 523 Electrotechnical Standardisation
democracy (and EU) 214 15, 222 3, (CENELEC) 355
362 3, 455 6 European Committee for
Denmark 27 8, 69 70, 72, 451, Standardisation (CEN) 355
454 5, 458, 523 European Confederation of Iron and
development policy 66, 432 6 Steel Industries (EUROFER) 291,
Directorates-General see Commission 337
directives, definition of 239 40 European Convention of Human
Dublin Convention 311 Rights 68
Duisenberg, Wim 191, 212, 275, 276 European Council 50, 59, 127 8,
Dunkirk, Treaty of (1947) see 152 3, 163, 167, 178 96 passim,
Treaties 273, 404 5
activities 189 94, 424 5
Economic and Financial Committee see membership 182 3
Council of Ministers origins 178 82
economic and monetary policies organisation 183 9
191 2, 295 6, 305 8 Presidency 97, 184
0333_984617_28_Ind.qxd 10/23/02 6:35 PM Page 550
550 Index
European Council  continued European Development Fund (EDF)
summits: Amsterdam (1997) 71 2, 434
191, 525 (see also Treaty of European Economic Area (EEA) 31,
Amsterdam); Barcelona (2002) 32 3, 523, 525
316; Berlin (1999) 114, 184, European Economic Community (EEC)
190, 206, 368, 384, 396, 526; xviii, 20, 38 44
Brussels (1988) 191, 367, 401; see also under particular policies and
Brussels I (1993) 190 1; institutions
Brussels (1994) 525; Brussels European Environmental Bureau 282
(1998) 522; Cardiff (1998) European Environment Agency 212,
186, 425; Cologne (1999) 89, 319
191, 419; Copenhagen (1993) European Federation of Pharmaceutical
190, 495, 523; Corfu (1994) Industry Associations (EFPIA)
71, 191; Dublin (1975) 521; 283, 291
Dublin (1984) 522; Dublin I European Food Safety Authority 399
(1990) 523; Dublin II (1990) European Free Alliance 218, 219
523; Edinburgh (1992) 190, European Free Trade Association
270, 357, 368, 523, 370; Essen (EFTA) 25, 31, 32 3, 61, 407,
(1994) 190; Fontainebleau 519, 520
(1984) 367, 522; Florence European Insurance Committee 283
(1996) 193, 525; Göteborg European Investment Bank 268 71
(2001) 186; Hanover (1988) European Investment Fund 270
523; Helsinki (1999) 153, 186, European Liberal, Democrat and
419, 496, 526; Laeken (2001) Reform Party (ELDR) 215, 218
349, 516 17; Lisbon (1992) European Judicial Cooperation Unit
422; Lisbon (2000) 183, 187, (Eurjust) 89
314; London (1977) 179; European Monetary System (EMS)
Luxembourg (1985) 58, 128, 296, 305, 515, 521
191, 298, 522; Luxembourg I European Parliament 37, 47, 49 50,
(1997) 314, 495; Luxembourg 86 7, 197 234 passim, 279,
II (1997) 186; Maastricht 288 90
(1991) 62 3, 191, 523 4 budgetary powers and role 204 6,
(see also Treaty on European 378 81
Union, 1992); Madrid (1989) Bureau 227
523; Madrid (1995) 128, 191; committees 209 10, 228 31
Milan (1985) 58 9, 128, 191, composition 223 5
298, 522; Nice (2000) 81 2, Conference of Committee Chairs
97, 111 12, 191 (see also Treaty 227 8, 232
of Nice); Rome I (1990) 523; Conference of Delegation Chairs
Rome II (1990) 523; Santa 227 8
Maria Da Feira (2000) 187, Conference of Presidents 227, 228,
419; Seville (2002) 153 6, 232
161 2, 166 7, 182, 183 5, control of Commission 112 14,
188 9, 190, 311, 365, 376; 207 10, 280
Strasbourg (1989) 313 14, control of Council 210 11
523; Stuttgart (1983) 179, 522; control of European Council 195,
Tampere (1999) 89, 90, 187, 211
310; Turin (1996) 71, 525 elections 212 15, 455 6
European Court of Human Rights intergroups 220 1, 289
245 legislative powers and role
European Court of Justice see Court of 197 204
Justice organisation and operation 225 32
European Defence Community (EDC) plenary sessions 231 2
38 9, 518, 519 political groups 216 23
0333_984617_28_Ind.qxd 10/23/02 6:35 PM Page 551
Index 551
European Parliament  continued Former Republic of Yugoslavia (FRY)
political parties 215 23 416, 418
powers and influence 47, 49 50, France 23 6, 38 41, 62, 70, 386,
58, 65, 77 8, 88 9, 197 212 388, 399, 453 5, 523
passim, 273, 344 53, 430 Franco, General 30
Presidency 188, 189, 211, 227, Francovich and Bonifaci v. Italy case
232 254
size 84 5, 86 7
European Patent Office 511 Gaulle, Charles de 20, 24, 25, 170 1,
European People s Party 215, 217, 218 475, 519
European Political Cooperation (EPC) General Agreement on Tariffs and
59, 68, 179, 296, 415 Trade (GATT) 15, 171, 392,
see also foreign policy; Common 395 6, 401, 408, 413
Foreign and Security Policy generalised preferences 397, 433
European Police Office (Europol) 309 Germany 12, 14 15, 23 6, 38 41,
European Recovery Programme 15, 62, 70, 307, 326, 386, 416, 448,
518 452, 499
European Regional Development Fund German Democratic Republic 14,
(ERDF) 312 13, 521 24
European Research Coordinating German unification 19, 61
Agency (EUREKA) 317 Germany (pre-1949) 4 6
European Round Table of Industrialists Germany, Federal Republic of 14,
European Social Fund (ESF) 283 24
European Security and Defence Identity Germany v European Parliament and
(ESDI) 418 Council case 255 6
European Security and Defence Policy Giscard d Estaing, Valéry 178, 189,
(ESDP) 162, 420 445, 516, 527
European Social Fund (ESF) 312 13 goods, free movement of see Single
European System of Central Banks European Market
66, 271 6 Greece 4, 28 9, 307, 458, 497 8,
European Trade Union Confederation 519, 521, 527
(ETUC) 282, 288 Green Group in the European
European Union Military Committee Parliament 218, 219
(EUMC) 431 2 Group for a Europe of Democracies
Europol 309 and Diversities (EDD) 219
Exchange Rate Mechanism (ERM) see Group of Eight (G8) 8
European Monetary System Gulf crisis and war 416
Expert committees 129 30
Hague Congress (1948) 12, 518
Fascism 4 6 Haider, Jörg 89
Federalism 468 70 Hallstein, Walter 9, 297
finances (of EU) 132 5, 277 80 Heath, Edward 26
financial perspectives 205 6, 364, High Authority (of ECSC) 35 6, 57
366 70, 376, 383 4 High Representative (for the CFSP)
Finland 30 1, 451, 523, 525 76, 160, 417, 428
Fischler, Franz 122, 403 Holland see Netherlands
fishing see Common Fisheries Policy Hungary 7, 523, 525, 526
flexibility (in EU) 78 9, 82, 88, 98 9,
333, 515 16 Iceland 31 3, 508
Fontaine, Nicole 218, 219 implementation (of EU policies and
foreign policy 414 32 law) 131 45, 355 6, 381 2,
see also European Political 405 6
Cooperation; Common Foreign industrial policy 329 30
and Security Policy integration theory 478 87
0333_984617_28_Ind.qxd 10/23/02 6:35 PM Page 552
552 Index
interdependence 17 19 Lisbon Strategy/Process 183, 186,
interdependency theory 484 5 187, 192, 270, 314 15
interests and interest groups 280 92, Lithuania 494, 504, 525, 576
458 9 Lomé Conventions 434, 521, 522, 523
see also under names of individual London Report 429
interest groups Luxembourg 23 4
Intergovernmental conferences 96 8 Luxembourg Compromise 76, 170 2,
Intergovernmental Conference 179, 475, 520
(1996 7) 71 3
Intergovernmental Conference (2000) Maastricht Treaty see Treaties
81 2, 97 MacSharry, Raymond 413
Intergovernmental Conference on Major, John 26
Economic and Monetary Union Malta 494, 496 7, 523
(1991) 62 3, 91, 306, 523 management committees 136 40
Intergovernmental Conference on Mansholt, Sicco 400
Political Union (1991) 62 3, 91, Marshall Aid and Marshall Plan 13,
98, 523 15, 518
intergovernmental organisations (IGOs) member states (of EU) 3 527 passim
465 8 (but especially 22 32, 442 5)
intergovernmentalism 106, 475 7, national courts 451 2
482 4 national governments 443 9
inter-institutional cooperation 357 8 see also Council of Ministers
internal market see Single European national parliaments 449 51
Market national political parties 223,
International Bank for Reconstruction 457 8
and Development 15 national public opinion 453 5
International Monetary Fund (IMF) subnational levels of government
15, 18 264 7, 280 1, 452 3
Ionnina Compromise 169 see also under names of individual
Ireland 27 8, 91 2, 108, 307, 450 1, countries
454 5 Merger Treaty see Treaties
Iraq 416, 423 Merger Control Regulation 143 4,
isoglucose case 199, 255 303
Italy 4 6, 454 Messina Conference 40, 519
Middle East 421
Japan 408 Military Staff of the European Union
Jenkins, Roy 297 (EUMS) 432
Joint Research Centre 317 Mitterrand, François 70, 445, 454
Justice and Home Affairs, policies 53, Moldova 509
68 9, 74 5, 309 11 Monetary Committee see Council of
Ministers
Kissinger, Henry 440 Monnet, Jean 35 6
Kohl, Helmut 24, 72, 77, 445, 514 Morocco 494
Kosovo 418 multi-level governance 473 4
Kuwait 416
Kyoto Protocol 438 National Farmers Union (of UK) 390
Nazism 4 6
labour, free movement of see Single Neofunctionalism 479 81
European Market Netherlands, The 23 4
Latvia 494, 504, 525, 526 new institutionalism 488 90
law (of the EU) 235 58 passim Nice Treaty see Treaties
League of Nations 5, 12 North Atlantic Treaty Organisation
liberal intergovernmentalism 482 4 (NATO) 7, 13, 418 20,
Liechtenstein 31, 33 423 4, 518
0333_984617_28_Ind.qxd 10/23/02 6:35 PM Page 553
Index 553
Norway 30, 32 3, 494, 508, 519, Reflection Group 71
520, 523, 525 regional policy see European Regional
Development Fund; Committee of
Ombudsman 66, 212 the Regions
open method of coordination (OMC) regulations, definition of 238 9
315 regulatory committees 136 40
Organisation for Economic research and technological development
Cooperation and Development policy 316 18
(OECD) 16, 145 Romania 494, 500, 504, 508, 525
Organisation for European Economic Rome, Treaties of (1957) see Treaties
Cooperation (OEEC) 15 16, 34, Russia 4
518, 519
Organisation for Security and Santer, Jacques 73, 112 14, 117, 207,
Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) 208, 279, 525, 526
423, 519 Schengen Agreement 74 5, 310, 525
Schlüter, Poul 454
Palestine Liberation Organisation 421 Schmidt, Helmut 178, 189, 445
Paris, Treaty of (1951) see Treaties Schröder, Gerhard 404
Party of European Socialists (PES) Schuman, Robert, and Schuman Plan
215, 217 18 34 5, 518
Patten, Christopher 429, 440 services, free movement of see Single
Petersberg Tasks 76, 417, 419, 420 European Market
Pleven, René 39, 518 shipbuilding policy 322 3
Poland 7, 494, 500, 504, 523, 525, Simmenthal v. Commission case 245
526 Single European Act see Treaties
Political and Security Committee see Single European Market 18, 51,
Council of Ministers 58 9, 298 305
Political Committee see Council of Single Programming Documents (SPDs)
Ministers 133
political parties national 223 skimmed milk cases 252
see also under names of individual Slovakia 494, 504, 525, 526
parties political groups in the EP Slovenia 416, 494, 503, 525, 526
216 23 Social Chapter 67, 70, 75
transnational 215 16 Social Charter see Community Charter
Police and Judicial Cooperation in of the Fundamental Social Rights
Criminal Matters 75, 310 111 for Workers
policy making models 362 3, 488 92 Social Fund see European Social Fund
policy networks 362, 490 2 social policy 42, 89, 313 15
policy planning 363 5, 375 Social Protocol and Agreement 67,
Pompidou, Georges 25, 26, 453, 520 70, 75
Portugal 28 30, 146, 521, 522 Socialist Group (in EP) see Party of
preliminary rulings 252 3 European Socialists
pressure groups see interests and Solana, Javier 428, 440
interest groups Solemn Declaration on European
primacy (of EU Law) 245 Union 522
Prodi, Romano 114, 116, 117, 364, Sovereignty 1 2, 465, 475 8
429, 526 Soviet Union 13 14, 19, 60 1, 415
public opinion 456 7 Spaak, Paul Henri, and Spaak
Committee 40, 519
qualified majority voting 47, 76, 77, Spain 4, 28 30, 311, 520, 521, 522
83 6, 168 9, 172 4 Spain, Belgium and Italy v.
Commission case 255
recommendations, definition of 240 Special Committee on Agriculture
referenda (general) 453 5 (SCA) see Council of Ministers
0333_984617_28_Ind.qxd 10/23/02 6:35 PM Page 554
554 Index
Spinelli, Altiero 6 Treaty Establishing a Single Council
Stability and Growth Pact 52, 72, and a Single Commission of the
273, 307, 308, 515 European Communities (1965,
Stability Pact for South Eastern Europe commonly known as the Merger
420, 509 Treaty) 57, 519, 520
Standing Committee on Employment Treaty Establishing the European
159 Community (1992) xviii, 64 7
state-centrism 470 3 Treaty Establishing the European
steel policy 336 7 Community (Consolidated
see also European Coal and Steel Version, 1997) xviii, 79, 94 6,
Community 104
Stresemann, Gustav 5 Treaty of Amsterdam (1997) xviii,
Structural Funds 52, 133, 312 13, 24, 47, 70 80, 81 2, 105, 179,
367 70, 372 3 see also Eurocorps 310 11, 506, 525, 526
European Agricultural Guidance Treaty of Brussels (1948) 39, 518
and Guarantee Fund; European Treaty of Dunkirk (1947) 518
Regional Development Fund; Treaty of Nice (2001) 28, 48,
European Social Fund 81 92 passim, 108, 113, 179,
subnational levels of government 506, 527
264 7, 280 1, 452 3 Treaty of Paris (1951, ECSC) 2,
subsidiarity 64, 341, 470 35 8, 44, 46, 518
summits Treaty of Rome (1957, EEC) 2,
Hague (1969) 520 40 4, 518
Paris (1972) 178 9, 521 Treaty of Rome (1957, Euratom)
Paris (1974) 521 22, 40, 43 4, 518
St. Malo (1998) 418 19 Treaty of Versailles (1919) 5
see also European Council Treaty on European Union (1992,
supranationalism 106, 475 7 commonly known as the
Sweden 30 1, 451, 523, 525 Maastricht Treaty) xviii, 27, 47,
Switzerland 32 3, 523, 524 60 70, 80, 97, 105, 179, 523 4
Treaty on European Union
Technical Group 219 (Consolidated Version, 1997)
terrorism 7, 311, 379, 515 xviii, 79, 94, 104
Thatcher, Margaret 26, 189, 367, 522 Trevi process 103, 309
Tobacco Advertising Ban Directive Trichet, Claude 191, 275
256 Truman, Harry, and Truman Doctrine
trade and trade policy 77, 132, 13
303 4, 407 14 Turkey 414, 423, 494, 496 8, 504,
see also Common Commercial 508, 522, 523
Policy; Single European Market
transnational parties 215 16 Ukraine 509
transport policy 42 3, 295 Union of Industrial and Employers
Treaties and Acts 43 5, 46 8, 56 108 Confederation of Europe (UNICE)
passim, 236 8, 295 6, 516 17 282, 283, 288
Act Concerning the Election of the Union for Europe Group (UFE) 219
Representatives of the Assembly Union for Europe of the Nations
(1976) 58 Group (UEN) 219
Single European Act 47, 58 60, 80, United Kingdom (UK) 15, 24 8, 40,
298, 452, 522 61 2, 71 2, 80, 272, 314, 367 71,
Treaty Amending Certain Budgetary 447 8, 453, 458
Provisions (1970) 58, 204, 520 United Nations 12, 145, 421
Treaty Amending Certain Financial United Nations Conference on Trade
Provisions (1975) 58, 204, and Development (UNCTAD)
276, 521 407 8
0333_984617_28_Ind.qxd 10/23/02 6:35 PM Page 555
Index 555
United States of America (USA) workers, free movement of see Single
13 15, 25, 395 6, 399, 408, European Market
415 16, 418, 423 working parties (of Council of
Uruguay Round see General Agreement Ministers) see Council of Ministers
on Tariffs and Trade World Bank see International Bank for
Reconstruction and Development
Value Added Tax (VAT) 366 7, World Trade Organisation 18, 145,
370 1 396, 407, 409, 515
Van Gend en Loos case 244 5 World War, First (1914 18) 4
World War, Second (1939 45) 4 6,
Western European Union (WEU) 39, 11 17
68, 423
West Germany see Germany Yaoundé Conventions 519, 520
wood pulp cases 255