[Philipp H Fluri, Gustav E Gustenau, Plamen I P(BookFi org)

The Evolution of Civil-Military Relations

in South East Europe

Philipp H. Fluri ´ Gustav E. Gustenau

Plamen I. Pantev

(Editors)

The Evolution

of Civil-Military Relations

in South East Europe

Continuing Democratic Reform

and Adapting to the Needs

of Fighting Terrorism

Physica-Verlag

A Springer Company

Philipp H. Fluri, Dr.

Geneva Centre for the Democratic Control of ArmedForces

Rue de Chantepoulet 11

1211 Geneva 1

Switzerland

p.fluri@dcaf.ch
Gustav E. Gustenau, BG Mag.

Bureau for Security Policy at the Austrian Ministry of Defence

Stiftgasse 2a

1070 Vienna

Austria

gustav.gustenau@bmlv.at
Plamen I. Pantev, Professor

Institute for Strategic andInternational Studies

P.O. Box 231

1618 Sofia

Bulgaria

isis@cserv.mgu.bg
Editorial Office: Mag. Walter Matyas

Managing Editors: Mjr. Mag. Ernst M. Felberbauer and Frederic Labarre M.A.

The publication of this book was made possible through a generous con-

tribution from the Bureau for Security Policy at the Austrian Ministry of

Defence andthe Geneva Centre for the Democratic Control of ArmedForces

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Preface by the Editors

As in the rest of Europe, September 11

and its global consequences have

triggered an intensive security-political debate in the European Union, the
effects of which will become noticeable in the field of the Reform of the
Security Sector. Although there was considerable awareness for the dan-
gers of terrorism even before the devastating attacks in the United States,
which stem from memories of potential terrorists attacks by extremist po-
litical or religious groups, complete awareness of the dangers of terror
were limited to few European countries (which experienced separatist
movements). After 9/11, the “war on terrorism” was rapidly turned into the
central security-political issue and found entrance into all strategic docu-
ments and policy and military planning scenarios.

Nearly all over Europe, the increased attention security forces need to

pay to preventing and defending against potential terror threats have lead
to strains in civil-military relationships. On the one hand, civilians showed
an increased need for security, but on the other hand, one fears that
through concentration of power with security forces, civil rights could
be undermined and democratic control of armed forces and the police
weakened.

Within the context of coping with these new security-political tasks,

civil-military relations have become a new challenge to the reform coun-
tries in South East Europe. Different than in the well-established democra-
cies and market societies in Western and Middle Europe, where the popu-
lation demonstrates a high level of acceptance versus security institutions,
South East European citizens fact their own security apparatuses with mas-
sive mistrust. The reasons for this damaged relationship are numerous:
they range from negative experiences with security forces in the past au-
thoritarian communist regimes, which dominated the region until 1990/91
to the catastrophic humanitarian consequences of the Yugoslav wars of
dissolution in the 1990s, which made it difficult to differentiate between
the practices of paramilitaries and “regular” armed forces.

Even following the end of the fighting, “weak states” in the Western

Balkans struggle to make their population find confidence in government
institutions again. In this context, the European Union and NATO play a
central role. The perspective of future membership in these two organisa-
tions has become the main propulsive factors for reforms of the security
sector. The EU and NATO will have to stand up to the responsibility of

VI Preface

promoting the establishment of democratic mechanisms for regulating and
controlling civil-military relationships – in spite of, or even in the face of
the danger of global terror.

European and Euro-Atlantic institutions have engaged South East

Europe in a comprehensive discourse on the comprehensive reform of state
and societal institutions. Structured and well-planned reform programmes
aimed at creating integrated European institutions and norms have inevita-
bly created a focus on Brussels, Strasbourg, The Hague, and Washington
D.C., adding extra demands to each national government’s domestic, re-
gional and international activities. This is not always to the advantage of
the government in office: exceeding compliance with international reform
programmes while at the same time under-focusing on the socio-economic
needs of voters may lead to a failure to achieve re-election, as in the case
of the last Bulgarian government.

The explicit understanding is that all South East European states should

be considered eligible for membership of the Euro-Atlantic institutions.
Reforms therefore coincide largely with programmes whose ultimate ob-
jective is integration. The tacit understanding is that security sector reform
cannot ultimately be successful without democratic-institutional reform,
and improvement of socio-economic conditions. The Stability Pact for
South Eastern Europe has explicitly made this three-pronged approach its
own, and added a so-called ‘table’ for regional programmes to it. Other
European and Euro-Atlantic organizations focus on one or the other point.

The invitation to reform the security sector has as its objective an im-

provement of the security institutions and security-providing services as a
change of the very ‘culture of security’. What is at stake is a shift from the
‘culture of state security’ to a ‘culture of cooperative security’, embedded
in the Euro-Atlantic system of cooperative security.

This again implies not only a process of insightful adaptation to Euro-

Atlantic standards, norms and procedures. It also implies a process of ‘un-
learning’ the past. Accountability – the construction of transparent lines of
responsibility for each individual regardless of their position in govern-
ment – will need to replace the expectation of collective responsibility.
Parliamentary and public democratic oversight of the security sector
budgets and personnel will need to replace the expectation that state secu-
rity comes before individual security, and that budgets are therefore best
kept secret and security-providing services best kept beyond the reach of
parliamentary and public control. Civil-military relations with a strong ac-
cent on civilian political leadership structures within Ministries of De-
fense, and the successful integration of the General Staff within them, will
have to replace the expectation that the military forms a state within the
state. Civil society organizations will develop the sufficient competence

Preface

VII

and expertise to independently assess security sector governance, replacing
the para-state or para-party organizations that previously disseminated
ideas to the public (for good or ill, as vested political interests dictated).
Collective cooperative security, as provided by an alliance of sovereign
states, will replace the expectation of a rigid system of artificially ho-
mogenized and integrated states and their militaries, as well as expecta-
tions of Darwinian battles of nation against nation. The concept of human
security will replace the concept of security for one’s nation alone.

Though the whole of South East Europe is engaged in a discourse on se-

curity sector reform, democratic oversight of the security sector, and civil-
military relations, it would be incorrect to assume that the joint efforts of
European, Transatlantic, regional and national actors (including the media,
civil society and academia) have yet led to homogenous or at least sym-
metrical and sustainable progress. The added challenge of joining the
global coalition in the ‘fight against terrorism’ has accelerated develop-
ment in some departments of the security sector (even Bosnia-Herzegovina
is preparing participation in peacekeeping operations). It has, however, at
the same time led to a standstill if not a backlash in the evolution of a cul-
ture of human and civil rights, not to mention international humanitarian
law. As security sector reform unfolds in South East Europe, human rights
and will need to triumph over all supposed justifications to curb them.

While security sector reform undoubtedly progresses in South East

Europe, the same can not be said about global developments in the security
sector. As Robin Luckham points out in Governing Insecurity

, the trium-

phal advance of Western liberal democracy in some parts of the world is
paralleled by international inequalities and a new form of military politics.
Whereas coups and military governance have been on rapid decline, new
forms of civilian autocracies are emerging, based on coalitions of the rul-
ing elites with security services other than the traditional military. Whereas
many countries are ‘in transition’, it remains doubtful what this transition
will lead to. The image of one ‘happy Transatlantic security family’ as
cherished by securocrats on both sides of the Atlantic is thus put seriously
into question when we decide to apply finer instruments of heuristic con-
cepts such as assessing ‘countries genuinely in transit’, those that are
‘challenged democracies’, ‘democracies managed by elites’, and those that
are regressing toward authoritarianism behind a smoke-screen of democ-
racy. In most ‘transition’ democracies there remains a struggle over who

Gavin Cawthra and Robin Luckham (eds.), Governing Insecurity: Democratic Control of

Military and Security Establishments in Transiational Democracies (London: Zed Books,
2003).

VIII Preface

defines ‘national security’ and national security policy. The revival of in-
ternational realpolitik in the last two years could also raise a demand for
strategically placed military regimes (in places such as in Pakistan and
Colombia).

The dissenting and disaffected in South East Europe, those who believe

that things were better for everyone before, because in nostalgic retrospect
they were better for them, will be hard to please. Their voices are hardly
ever heard at meetings at the governmental level, for governmental poli-
cies foresee compliance with (or at least the need not to challenge) the
stipulations of security sector reform. They are, however, most unlikely at
this point in time to try to voice their grievances by means other than the
democratically permitted ones: demonstrations; votes for opposition par-
ties; and lengthy declarations read out at meetings (often made possible by
well-meaning non-governmental organizations funded by the same gov-
ernments which propose security sector reform as a transfer of norms).

It would thus be insincere to claim that all citizens of South East Euro-

pean states (1) understand and (2) willingly accept security sector reform,
or in fact, the trinity of democratic-, economic- and security sector- reform,
as it would be insincere to claim that most citizens of the Euro-Atlantic
community member states (1) understand and would (2) gladly accept far-
reaching interferences with their customary lifestyles, even though their ul-
timate goal may be substantial improvement of people’s welfare and secu-
rity. Security sector reform because of its strong impact on society is a ne-
gotiated process. The incentive of ultimately being able to join the very
institutions which propose security sector reform may, however, itself be
as strong a motivation as added human security is.

The present study, supported by many enthusiastic experts, provides and

excellent outline to the status of civil-military relations in South East
Europe – from Slovenia to Turkey – and reflects on the progress, problems
and challenges to the Reform of the Security Sector. Additional value can
be found that its authors seek to view these topics in the light of the current
global security-political issues, above all in the war against terrorism. It is
to be hoped that the effort to independently monitor South East European
reforms in the security sector will be continued.

Philipp H. Fluri

Gustav E. Gustenau

Plamen I. Pantev

Table of Contents

Introduction................................................................................................ 1
Plamen I. Pantev

Part 1:
Old and New Security Risks and Instability in the Balkans

Theoretic Preconditions of Fighting Terrorism:
The View from South East Europe ........................................................ 11
Plamen I. Pantev

State Violence, State Weakness – Explaining the Plethora of
Security Risks and Instability in South East Europe ........................... 23
Henriette Riegler

Part 2:
Civil-Military Relations, Democratic Control of the Armed
Forces and Security Sector Reform During the Fight Against
Terrorism

Civil-Military Relations: Continuity and Change
in an Age of Terror .................................................................................. 37
Richard Cohen

Untying the Gordian Noose: Humanitarian Law,
Democratic Control and the New Security Environment .................... 49
Jean-Jacques de Dardel

Table of Contents

Part 3:
The Process of Reform of Civil-Military Relations, the Democ-
ratic Control of the Armed Forces and the Security Sector in
South East Europe and the Impact of the Launch of the
Counter-Terrorist Campaign: The National Perspectives

Process of Reform of Civil-Military Relations, the Democratic
Control of Armed Forces and the Security Sector in Albania............. 67
Blendi Kajsiu

Civil-Military Relations in Bosnia and Herzegovina............................ 81
Bisera Turkoviü

Bulgaria: Completing Requirements for NATO Membership,
Accelerating the Security Sector Reform and Adapting to the
Counter-Terrorism Era......................................................................... 101
Plamen I. Pantev, Valeri Ratchev, Todor Tagarev

The Evolution of Civil-Military Relations in South East Europe:
The Case of Croatia ............................................................................... 115
Mladen Staniþiü

The Evolution of Civil-Military Relations in South East Europe:
The Case of Greece ................................................................................ 131
Thanos P. Dokos

Regulating the Intelligence System and Oversight in
the Hungarian Constitutional Democracy........................................... 149
Tibor Babos, Linda Royer

Macedonian Reform Perspectives ........................................................ 169
Petar Atanasov

Romania’s Participation in the Fight Against International
Terrorism: Implications for Civil-Military Relations and
the Security Sector Reform................................................................... 185
Claudiu Degeratu

The Evolution of Civil-Military Relations in FRY/
the State Union of Serbia and Montenegro ......................................... 197
Dragan Simiü

Table of Contents

Towards Civilian Supremacy: Civil-Military Relations
in Slovenia............................................................................................... 211
Marjan Malešiþ, Ljubica Jelušiþ

Civil-Military Relations in Turkey....................................................... 229
Nilüfer Narli

Analysis and Conclusions...................................................................... 259
Plamen I. Pantev

List of Abbreviations ............................................................................. 271

Editors and Authors .............................................................................. 273

Introduction

Plamen I. Pantev

The study of evolving civil-military relations in South East Europe and the
special accent on the continuation of democratic reforms while adapting to
the needs of fighting terrorism is both a logical follow-up inquiry into the
subject, and a reflection on the new challenges life posed to the peoples
and states in the region after the tragic events of 11 September 2001. Stud-
ies published by the Geneva Centre for Democratic Control of the Armed
Forces (DCAF)

, by the Groningen Centre of European Security Studies

and by the UK-run Civil-Military Relations Network Newsletter

among

others have showed the subject has attracted the interest of an increasing
number of respected experts in the last five years.

The present study was carried out by the Institute for Security and Inter-

national Studies (ISIS), Sofia as part of a collaborative effort with two
long-standing partners – first, the Austrian Directorate General for Secu-
rity Policy, the Bureau for Security Policy and the Austrian National De-
fense Academy, Vienna, and, second, the Geneva Center for the Democ-
ratic Control of the Armed Forces in the combined context of the Regional
Stability in South East Europe Study Group and the Security Sector Re-
form Study Group of the PfP Consortium of the Defense Academies and
Security Studies Institutes.

The research effort, undertaken by ISIS with the support of the project

co-partners was taking place when issues of civil-military relations and

Ph. Fluri and Vel. Shalamanov (eds.), Security Sector Reform: Does It Work? Problems
of Civil-Military and Inter-Agency Cooperation in the Security Sector (Sofia: CorectA
2003), 77–185; Jan Trapans and Ph. Fluri (eds.), Defense and Security Sector Govern-
ance and Reform in South East Europe: Insights and Perspectives. A Self-Assessment
Study, Vol. I and II (Geneva/Belgrade: Dragan Srnic, Sabac 2003); Ph. Fluri and David
Law (eds.), Security Sector Expert Formation – Achievements and Needs in South East
Europe (Vienna: NDA, IPSCM May 2003).

David Greenwood and Peter Volten, Security and Defense in South East Europe: The
ESCADA Report (Groningen: CESS 2003).

Andrew Cottey, ‘Civil-Military Relations and Defense Diplomacy After 11 September:
New Dynamics’, CMR Network Newsletter, http://civil-military.dsd.kcl.ac.uk, Issue
Five 2002; Tim Edmunds, ‘Security Sector Reform in Southeastern Europe’, CMR Net-
work Newsletter, http://civil-military.dsd.kcl.ac.uk, Issue Six, 2002.

2 Pantev

democratic control of the security institutions in the post-Cold War world
were evolving and gaining support South East Europe or the Balkans as a
valid theoretic assessment tool. We considered enough time has passed
since the study of 2001 to come back to the topic, re-evaluate previous as-
sumptions and try to understand better new processes and facts. The press-
ing needs of the security sector to reform and fight terrorism in a more ef-
ficient way were also calling for assessing the impact that this change will
have on civil-military relations and democratic control over security and
defense organizations in South East Europe. The need for having more
homogeneous criteria, essential to assess recent developments was obvious
during our first study. It was persistently stemming from the general trend
of the emergence of a security community of nations in the Balkans – part
of the enlarging Euro-Atlantic civic and security space. Both the theoretic
progress and the practical needs to cope with a new threat – terrorism – in-
tensified the need for greater homogeneity of standards for the evaluation
of civil-military relations and democratic control of the armed forces and
the other security agencies in the region.

Another important reason to come back to the issue is the invariably

high worth of the commodity called “regional stability”. As observed in
the previous study, the maturity of civil-military relations and democratic
control of the security institutions is reflected significantly in the general
security situation of the region. A democratically- and legally-established
system of transparency and accountability of security and defense institu-
tions is a confidence-building measure with a broad positive effect on sta-
bility in bilateral, multilateral and regional relations in the Balkans.

The study aims at outlining the theoretic preconditions of fighting ter-

rorism and at reviewing the persisting old and the new security risks and
instability in the Balkans. It aims at analysing continuity and change in
civil-military relations, democratic control of the armed forces and the se-
curity sector reform during the fight against terrorism and at finding spe-
cific reflections of these developments on the Balkan countries and the re-
gion. Specific humanitarian law requirements for democratic control of the
armed forces are analysed with the intention that this normative perspec-
tive will be realised and internalised by the security sector players from the
region. There is a worrisome tendency of exaggerating protection of soci-
ety and state at the expense of the individual’s freedoms and liberties – a
tendency we consider should be temporary and proportional to the battle
on terrorism. The study aims also to acquaint the reader with the specific
national perceptions, wording, terminology, and expressions brought by
the individual authors, to record the level of discussion in each of the
countries of the region. Finally, the study aims at comparing the national

Introduction

perspectives of the discussed topics – a comparison – made according to a
relevant methodology.

The core of this methodology is the understanding that civil-military re-

lations (CMR), democratic control (DEMCON) and security sector reform
(SSR) are at different stages of their evolution in the different Balkan
countries, as concluded in the first study on these issues in 2001. Being a
significant component of the regional security and stability they need to be
continuously monitored, studied and improved in each individual case. The
need to adapt to the requirements of fighting terrorism has an impact on
CMR, DEMCON, and SSR. The consequence of this adaptation on the in-
dividual nations deserves a special theoretic inquiry and may lead to ade-
quate recommendations for the future. The harmonisation of activity of the
South East European countries on CMR, DEMCON and SSR, considering
the variety of levels of evolution in these areas of the individual national
cases is more than a theoretic challenge – it is a practical need in the ef-
forts of homogenising security and defense fields essential to the process
of shaping a common Euro-Atlantic strategic culture.

Another core element of the methodology is the tailoring of specific

questions about the individual nations’ evolution of CMR, DEMCON and
SSR. After the initial screening of the CMR in South East Europe in the
study of 2000/01, the targeted state of these relations led us deductively to
a definition of problem areas in each country. The ‘targeted state of affairs’
included the standard NATO/PfP requirements on CMR, DEMCON and
SSR as well as developed and tangible normative expectations in the
evolving security situation. The South East European experience is also
expected to contribute to improvements in that field.

There are three exceptions in the applied methodology, intentionally

made in the study for the purposes of the geographic widening of the re-
search. First, the inclusion of the Greek and the Turkish cases required
some background information to cover the developing situation in the two
old NATO states. Second, the Hungarian model case of scrutinising only
one aspect of the SSR – the transformation of the intelligence system and
what changes are required for the DEMCON of that particular sector.
Third, the Romanian case, which concentrates on the priority security
threat and interest – the fight on terrorism, and on the particular measures
of responding to the requirements of having adequate DEMCON over the
security sector while this fight continues.

The most ambitious methodological novelty of the study was to try to

outline the general regional picture of CMR, DEMCON and SSR in the pe-
riod of fighting terrorism, basing the analysis, assessments and conclusions
on all South East European countries’ experience without exception and in
one and the same theoretic framework of study. We consider this approach

4 Pantev

both theoretically and politically correct. The process of homogenising the
security attitudes, culture and standards of the ‘security community’ of
South East Europe, which is in the process of progressively shaping itself,
requires all national cases to be included. This is also politically correct
since most Balkan countries are getting closer and closer to NATO and the
EU: they are either NATO and EU members or aiming to be NATO, PfP
and EU members. In a NATO and EU organisational setting, South East
European countries need to speak the same language on security and de-
fense issues, they need to share a common vision, regulative and behav-
ioural culture on CMR, DEMCON and SSR. The very agreement of all na-
tional-case writers to be part of the same team under a single methodology,
known by all in advance is a conceptual and intellectual breakthrough in
the security studies of and in the Balkans. This is a strong reflection of the
expectations by the South East Europeans of our common Euro-Atlantic
future, which encourages various changes in specific ways in each of the
countries towards common values, standards, norms and attitudes on
CMR, DEMCON and the security sector relationships in general. The par-
ticipation in the study of our Greek friends is especially valuable since
Greece was until 2004 the only EU and NATO member country of the re-
gion and bears an incomparable experience. The participation of our Turk-
ish colleagues is invaluable: Turkey is the most powerful state in South
East Europe, a staunch NATO member and the enlargement of EU to the
East would be incomplete without this country since we all need to get
closer together on key strategic issues. The participation of our Slovenian
colleagues gives another promise for the developments in the fields of
CMR, DEMCON and SSR: Slovenia is a post-Communist and post-
Yugoslav country, which proved that both legacies can be overcome and
that membership in NATO and EU is possible for all the other countries of
South East Europe with similar historical, social, economic, political and
cultural experience. The participation of an expert writer from Bosnia and
Herzegovina proves that even the hardest of all national cases bears both
critical self-assessment and optimism potential of being an equal partner in
the family of Balkan and European nations. The closure of the gaps in the
fields of CMR, DEMCON and SSR bears a special meaning for the pro-
gress of Bosnia and Herzegovina and the whole region towards Euro-
Atlantic integration.

The theoretic developments which influenced this study deserve men-

tion, as they are different from the previous one in 1999–2001.

In the beginning of 2002 Anthony Forster outlined three major chal-

lenges of CMR which dramatically redefined our understanding of how the
armed services interact with civilian authorities and more generally with
civil society: epistemological, ontological and practitioner- and policy

Introduction

maker- led challenges, moving scholars towards a new research agenda

Dr. Forster argues that there are increased possibilities of applying new
knowledge to CMR issues; enhanced opportunities for interdisciplinary re-
search, and, to root the study of CMR in approaches which have stronger
theoretic foundations

In late 2002 Gerhard Kümmel proposed to distinguish six interdepend-

ent and interpenetrated dimensions in an attempt to cover the full scope of
CMR: economy, finance, technology, culture, society, and politics

. He

adds an important aspect of the issue: CMR may look differently depend-
ing on the moment in time that they are observed. CMR should be differ-
entiated, according to Kümmel in peacetime, crisis situations, traditional
military operations (defense, deterrence, attack), and non-traditional mili-
tary operations (peacekeeping, humanitarian intervention, etc.)

. Kümmel

highlights another key perspective on the issue of CMR: different dimen-
sions have both a national/domestic and an international context

Theodor Winkler

, Dylan Hendrickson, Andrzej Karkoszka

, and Heiko

Borchert

develop the concept of the security sector reform – a far broader

concept than the traditional CMR, for addressing security problems.
According to Th. Winkler the security sector reform is composed of five
elements:

(1)

The reforms are guided by the political leadership, according to de-
mocratic principles and the needs of state and society,

(2)

The starting point is a broad view of the term ‘security’, including
military, societal, economic and environmental security risks,

Anthony Forster, ‘New Civil-Military Relations and Its Research Agenda’, Connec-
tions: The Quarterly Journal, I:2 (April 2002), 71.

Ibid.

Gerhard Kümmel, ‘The Military and its Civilian Environment: Reflections on a Theory
of Civil-Military Relations’, Connections: The Quarterly Journal, I:4 (December
2002), 67.

Ibid.

Theodor H. Winkler, Managing Change: The Reform and Democratic Control of the
Security Sector and International Order, Occasional Paper – No. 1 (Geneva: Centre for
the Democratic Control of Armed Forces, DCAF, October 2002) 40.

Dylan Hendrickson and Andrzej Karkoszka, ‘The challenges of security sector reform’,
in: SIPRI Yearbook 2002: Armaments, Disarmament and International Security (Ox-
ford: Oxford University Press, 2002) 175–201.

Heiko Borchert, Security Sector Reform Initiative (SSRI): How to Advance Security
Sector Reforms with the Help of a New Assessment and Development Framework, Pa-
per of the WG on SSR (Berlin: PfP Consortium of Defense Academies and Security
Studies Institutes, 6

Annual Conference, 15–17 June 2003) 23.

6 Pantev

(3)

The reforms include all services: military, police, intelligence agen-
cies, state security, paramilitary organisations, and border guards,

(4)

Security sector reform is not a one-off event, but a continuous proc-
ess; it is not a goal in itself, but aims at providing security both to
the state and to its citizens,

(5)

The reforms concern both the organisation of the security sector (le-
gal framework, structure of institutions, division of labour) and the
human dimension of the security sector services, that is creating ser-
vices staffed with professionals

Heiko Borchert, borrowing from Timothy Edmonds’ ideas of the first and
second generations of reforms in the sector of CMR and DEMCON

, out-

lines the parameters of a third generation of SSR: provision of adequate
capabilities and improvement of co-operability among Security sector
actors

All these and other contributions to the theory of CMR, DEMCON and

SSR allowed the authors of this region-encompassing study to upgrade the
applied theoretic framework. There are five specific features of the re-
search framework that comprise the five main theoretical accents:

First, the issues of CMR, DEMCON and SSR continue to be key prob-

lems of the transition of most of the societies and states in South East
Europe from totalitarianism to democracy, from wars to post-war rehabili-
tation and from post-war reconstruction to normalcy. Without reforming
the security sector the security institutions of the old regimes may continue
to have a ‘say’ in the life of the new, democratic societies. The fight
against organised criminality becomes more difficult or even impossible
without the SSR as the example of Serbia and Montenegro showed most
vividly, but examples of that kind could be noticed in all post-totalitarian
societies and states with no exception. Lack of stability, dependence on
criminal structures keeps foreign investors away from South East Europe
and without substantial investments, the economic and infrastructure retar-
dation of the region cannot be overcome.

Second, CMR, DEMCON and SSR continue to experience the influence

of ethnic pressures of the post-Yugoslav wars of the 1990s and of
ethnic clashes of 2000/01 in Southern Serbia and FYROM/Macedonia.

Theodor H. Winkler, Managing Change... 10–11.

Timothy Edmonds, Security Sector Reform: Concepts and Implementation, Report for
the Geneva Centre for Democratic Control of Armed Forces (Geneva: DCAF website at
http://www.dcaf.ch/publications/E-packages/ws_criteria221101/DCAFSSRReport1.pdf,
2001).

Heiko Borchert, Security Sector Reform Initiative… 4.

Introduction

Notwithstanding, CMR, DEMCON and SSR in South East Europe in gen-
eral become more characteristic of the ‘regional security community’ that
is emerging in the Balkans. Thanks to domestic stabilising effects, the
growing transparency in the security sector of each country is perceived by
neighbours as a de facto confidence and security-building measure. The
general security situation in the Balkans is improving and efforts to pre-
vent conflicts become more effective. The region becomes more predict-
able from a security point of view and the chances of diverting public at-
tention and energy on economic and other constructive areas increase for
the good of the people of South East Europe and the whole Euro-Atlantic
zone.

Third, on the conditionality of sound CMR, DEMCON and SSR poli-

cies, which are to be followed by NATO and EU accession, produces mul-
tiple effects. It improves the domestic and the broader regional security
situation of the Balkans and increases the likelihood that current non-
NATO and non-EU members will be integrated in the Alliance and the
Union. PfP, the Stability Pact for South East Europe and OSCE also play
driving roles in the evolution of the security sector towards integration in
both major European and Euro-Atlantic institutions. Without covering the
requirements in the area of CMR, DEMCON and SSR, integration in
NATO and EU becomes virtually impossible and this has been well under-
stood by the leading elites of the Balkan countries.

Fourth, a basic need of implementing the third generation of SSR,

though in many individual cases fundamental, first or second-generation
reform deficiencies are still to be observed, stems from the fight against
terrorism. This would be impossible if on a domestic, regional and broader
international level the different components of the security sector did not
work cooperatively in identifying and neutralising terrorist groups. Of
course, SSR should not be identified with anti-terrorism activities, but
surely, it is a main motivation for reform of the security sector. The reform
is also needed because of the obligation of new democratic societies (and
older ones) in South East Europe to preserve the balance between the secu-
rity interests and the support for democracy and human rights while the
fight on terrorism still goes on.

Fifth, the SSR focus of the countries of South East Europe is needed for

plain good governance purposes of the security sector. People understand
how important security is for their everyday life. What they understand in
parallel is that the more economic the ‘security commodity’ is, the better
their economy and standard of living is going to be. That is why state
budgets and professionalism in the security sector are turning more and
more into topics of public discussion and the interest on these topics will
grow.

8 Pantev

Finally in this introductory part it could be shared that the present study

bears features of more maturity in the perception and assessment of CMR,
DEMCON and SSR issues in the Balkans, compared to the first one. A
generally higher level of education and knowledge of indigenous experts
on these topics, a general improvement of the domestic and regional secu-
rity situation in South East Europe provide the opportunity the critical
analysis and assessments of the individual authors to be translated in a
logical and principled way into working practical recommendations for
policy-making. The ‘spill-over effect’ of the intensified theoretic research
in the field of CMR, DEMCON and SSR in the last years is paying back in
a very practical way in South East Europe. The participation of scholars
from Austria, Canada and Switzerland alongside with their colleagues
from South East Europe in carrying out this study confirms this assess-
ment.

Part 1:
Old and New Security Risks and
Instability in the Balkans

Theoretic Preconditions of Fighting Terrorism:
The View from South East Europe

Plamen I. Pantev

1 Introduction

Intellectual investment in the fight against terrorism comprises the widest
spectrum of perspectives, issues, methods, approaches, instruments, etc.
Definitely the new evil of the 21

century will induce reactions and pre-

emptive acts by the developed world that may make more likely dealing
away with terrorism or at least – strongly limit its potential.

If we do not downgrade our level of analysis and responsibilities as stu-

dents and doers of security, we shall avoid two mistakes: first, start believ-
ing that everything about terrorism is learned or written and that we should
just implement what we know, and, second, ignore the possibility that ter-
rorists may manipulate or influence structural trends of the international
system to improve their chances of reaching ‘their ends’.

There are “bodies of knowledge” that need to be constantly treated and

developed – no matter how far we have come in our understanding of ter-
rorism with the purpose of reaching success against it in the very, very
long struggle ahead of us. One such ‘body of knowledge’ is about the deep
philosophy and logic of the motivational model of terrorism. What makes
terrorists prone to suicide acts? Which social systems and situations trigger
the psychological mechanisms that create the phenomenon of terrorism
with its specific motivations, aims, targets, instruments and methods? The
answer to these questions may help go deeper into the motivational nature
of terrorism.

Another important ‘body of knowledge’ that needs to be further studied

and improved is about the roots of terrorism as one form of psychological
warfare. Modern, religious-motivated and large-scale deadly terrorism
seeks particular effects on a target public so that its ends are reached more
easily: “Re-establish the Muslim state throughout the world; overthrow re-
gimes it deems ‘non-Islamic’; remove Westerners from Muslim countries;

12 Pantev

kill US citizens, civilian or military, and their allies everywhere; Jihad”.

Fear, insecurity, panic, irrational reactions are just instrumental in influ-
encing the people who can agree with the final ends of the terrorists.

Many other such ‘bodies of knowledge’ need to be continuously studied

and developed to enable us to fully grasp the phenomenon. In this study
the possibility of terrorists influencing and/or manipulating international
relations and individual countries’ foreign political behaviour is of special
interest. Creating chaos in the most powerful country of the world is a pri-
ority of terrorists. Their dream, however, is the re-ordering of international
development, and of individual countries, thus creating a more effective
and instrumental environment to reach the goal of re-establishing the Mus-
lim state throughout the world. Interest is further driven by the character
and level of perception of terrorism in the individual Balkan countries and
in the region in general. The differences in perceiving and reacting to the
threat, the insufficient predictive power of evolving tendencies in global
and regional international relations and of the potential utilization of these
tendencies by terrorists may lead to negative consequences for South East
Europe and for the broader international system. This is a development
that should be prevented.

There is another pressing reason to deal with these questions: the quest

by some states for short-term financial, economic or geopolitical advan-
tages because of the global character of terrorism and the mounted pres-
sure on the United States to be the leader in reacting to the threat. We must
be clear on this issue: the fight against terrorism does not mean utilizing
the side-effects of the struggle of the active anti-terrorist states by some
other countries. The fight against terrorism rather means a comprehensive
national investment by all states into this struggle, since terrorists attack
and aim at disrupting the very core of statehood and the trust of people in
their elected governments.

The aim of this chapter is to outline the scope and magnitude of the im-

pact of terrorism on the present system of international relations and how
this is reflected in the regional development of South East Europe. A criti-
cal assessment of the present anti-terrorism and counter-terrorism activities
in the Balkans is made on this basis and some improvements of the strate-
gic thinking to better cope with the challenge.

Ronald G. Bowdish, ‘Global Terrorism, Strategy, and Naval Forces’, in Sam J. Tan-
gredi (ed.), Globalization and Maritime Power (Washington, D. C.: INSS, ND Univer-
sity, 2002) 84.

Theoretic Preconditions of Fighting Terrorism

Modern Terrorism: Specific Challenges for the
Structure and Functioning of the International
System and for the Individual States

2.1 Main Features of Modern Terrorism

There is no formally recognized international legal definition of terrorism

The US National Security Strategy for Combating Terrorism (February
2003) defines terrorism as: “premeditated, politically motivated violence
perpetrated against non-combatant targets by sub-national groups or clan-
destine agents”

. Magnus Norell, a Swedish expert on counter-terrorism,

provides the following working definition:

the “systemic use of illegitimate violence by non-state or sub-state actors,
specifically aimed at non-combatants and/or civilians to achieve specific
objectives. These objectives could be political, social or religious depend-
ing on the group in question. Terrorism becomes international when it is
carried out beyond the borders that define a specific group’s country of ori-
gin, or when it is targeting foreign nationals within a specific group’s coun-
try of origin”

In addition it could be said that terrorism today is really global: terrorists
are organised in networks and can operate from every corner of the world.
The neutralisation of one segment of the organisation would not mean the
end of the whole network. Next, we face terrorists who have religious mo-
tivation to strike, making them fanatical and ready to act in an indiscrimi-
nate manner. ‘Burning’ all infidels, including by nuclear and/or other
WMD is a very significant part of the thinking of the new terrorists. The
deep satisfaction of the leaders of Al Qaeda from the large casualties in the

At the Berne, Switzerland meeting of the PfPC ESSG on 22 April 2002 Col. Nick Pratt,
USMC (Ret.) said there are 109 academic definitions of ‘terrorism’. On 2 April 2002
Islamic nations failed to come up with a common definition of ‘terrorism’ at a meeting
of the Organisation of Islamic Conference (OIC) in Malaysia. The obstacle was the di-
verging views on the nature of the Palestinian struggle against Israel – ‘freedom-
fighting’ or ‘terrorism’ (FT, 3 April 2002, 2). Prof. Dr. Kemal Beyoghlow, a US
counter-intelligence expert underlined on 16 September 2002 at a lecture to the Atlantic
Club in Sofia that the best short definition of terrorism is ‘a politically motivated attack
on civilian non-combatants’. Chris Donnelly of NATO focuses on terrorism as a ‘tactic’
(Donnelly/CND/2002/090/Spain/26.04.2002, 5).

‘National Strategy for Combating Terrorism’ (Sofia: Wireless Files, US Embassy, 18
February 2003) 2.

Magnus Norrel, ‘The Role of the Military and Intelligence in Combating Terrorism’,
Romanian Journal of International Affairs, VIII:4 (2002) 42.

14 Pantev

WTC in New York was recorded and distributed over the globe by the ter-
rorists themselves.

For the working purposes of this study it will draw arguments from the

following key features and perspectives to the phenomenon of terrorism:

a) It causes death to innocents and people removed from the conflict,
b) It is an instrument/tactic of waging military activity,
c) It has an unclear territorial and legal subject identification,
d) It is becoming more lethal,
e) It demonstrates a large-scale ‘suicide power’, compromising the tra-

ditional rational approaches in applying military violence,

f) It is global in magnitude,
g) It is fanatical and religiously motivated,
h) It is becoming more indiscriminate towards its victims,
i) The use of WMD is an irrational and yet direct purpose of terrorists.

2.2 The System of International Relations Under the Pressure

of Terrorism

First, the main features of modern terrorism underline the increased role of
non-state actors in global affairs, causing definite changes in the very mor-
phology of the system of international relations. Non-state actors, even if
they are just small groups, even if possessing powerful technological in-
struments, can cause damage that traditionally only national armed forces
could inflict. Such small non-state actors operate in one third of the coun-
tries of the world (or maybe more). Even state actors may submit to the
powerful network of terrorist non-governmental groups.

Second, terrorism interacts also with the socio-economic environment of

the system of international relations. Underlying conditions of poverty,
economic backwardness, low level of health care and education create re-
sentment for terrorists to exploit. This has been registered by the G-7/8
summits in the last two years and for sure will remain their major focus in
the years to come. Ellen Laipson correctly highlights the inadequate ex-
planatory power of poverty and humiliation as sources of terrorism

. Futile

or failed attempts to interact with and adapt to the West are even stronger
causes of becoming susceptible to recruiting as a terrorist. The interac-
tion of terrorism with the socio-economic environment of the interna-

Ellen Laipson, ‘While America Slept: Understanding Terrorism and Counterterrorism’,
Foreign Affairs, 82:1, January/February (2003) 143–144.

Theoretic Preconditions of Fighting Terrorism

tional system has another aspect too: billions of dollars and millions of
jobs were lost only in the United States after the terrorist acts of 11 Sep-
tember 2001. Many financial relationships had to be rebuilt and many
manufacture and trade activities reorganized. This is a serious reminder of
the consequences of terrorism on the international system and individual
state actors.

Third, terrorism provoked the stability of the fluid configuration of cen-

tres-of-power relationships. Al Qaeda took the risk of polarizing further
the natural differences of interests of the major power centres in the begin-
ning of the new century. The expectations of the terrorist network are of
sharpening those differences and portraying the role of the organization as
an influential global political player. The instinctive reaction of the great
powers to the terrorist provocation was taking anti- and counter-terrorism
positions. This is a valid assessment almost three years after the tragic
events of 11 September. As the crisis around Iraq proved, however, anti-
Americanism is continuously exploited by global terrorism, and various in-
ternational actors go on using hatred towards the USA as a political expe-
dient. Neither the great and big, nor the small and less powerful states
should be blind to the fact that the United States is openly targeted by ter-
rorism as the world’s hegemonic and lone superpower. Any opportunistic
exploitation of this targeting for balance of power (multi-polar vs. uni-
polar) purposes is counter-productive for the civilized progress of global-
ization and serves petty, short-term and narrow purposes. This is not a call
for the launch of a global pro-US ‘PR-campaign’ by all anti-terrorist
forces, but a reminder how blind anti-Americanism is pragmatically ex-
ploited for the ends of terrorism. The centres of power of the 21

century

world bear a special responsibility to find a more stable and lasting state of
interrelationships for the sake of depriving global terrorist networks from
global destabilization potential.

Fourth, the terrorist acts of 11 September had regional ripple effects.

They polarized the Middle East, Chechen and other conflicts in Asia and
Africa further. Another structural level of the system of international rela-
tions – the regional and local conflicting knots – also experienced the pres-
sure of the new terrorist activity. South East Europe was no exception.
However, the region was already on the way to its stabilisation and the
negative effects of this pressure were rather limited. The regional destabili-
sation by global terrorism is neither cancelled, nor slowed down. Hence,
South East Europe will continue to be susceptible to terrorist pressures and
activity as long as it is not firmly anchored to the EU and NATO.

Fifth, terrorism after 11 September caused re-conceptualisation and

reformation of one of the priority sub-systems of international relations
– security. The traditional ‘containment’ and ‘deterrence’ conceptual

16 Pantev

frameworks could no longer provide explanation and adequate response to
such acts. The high probability of terrorists getting hold of WMD already
puts global strategic stability under great risk. Because of the changed fo-
cus of terrorism, states neglect other grave global security threats: envi-
ronmental, socio-economic, humanitarian, etc. Understanding and internal-
izing these effects is an indicator of the maturity of SEE countries, and
their readiness to be effective partners in building-up cooperative security
in the 21

century.

Sixth, mass-scale terrorism had an impact on the regulatory system of

international relations. Regulatory measures of coercion assumed new and
sharper forms. The civilized existence of human society was jeopardized.
A very drastic effort has been made in eliminating negotiation as a means
of solving problems and reaching non-violent ends. The role of military
force and, if needed – violence – have regained preeminence as a means of
social stability and orderly existence. This is considered a legitimate reac-
tion to the application of indiscriminate violence by terrorists.

2.3 The Risks and Challenges for the Democratic Society and

State

The democratic and freedom-loving part of the world can hardly accept the
situation described in the preceding paragraph but as a temporary one. No
country with a democratic or democratizing society should stay aside of
the effort of depriving terrorism from its blackmail and society-
degradation capacity. People expect that the fight against terrorism will
end with a victory and they will resume their way of democratic and free
life as it was before 11 September 2001.

However, this is only one of the concepts on how democracies must re-

act to terrorism. Other- also quite sober- views reflect another thinking,
which seek to to have society adjust to the phenomenon of terrorism rather
than attempt at rooting it out, being part of social life as it is nowadays.
The core of that thinking is that democratic countries with their open so-
cieties, freedoms and civil liberties are always going to be vulnerable to
terrorism. These societies will never be able to protect all targets, all the
time, against all possible attacks, which means that terrorism will always
be attractive to foes of democracy. Though public and individual vigilance
is constantly mobilized by the democratic state, fighting against terrorism,
and the expectations from that fight should remain realistic while seeking
to diminish the vulnerabilities of democratic open societies.

Both concepts have legitimate arguments and a possible resolution of

the dilemma seems to be in following two parallel tracks of behaviour:

Theoretic Preconditions of Fighting Terrorism

First, despite the necessary limitations of certain rights and liberties in-

herent to democratic society during its fight on terrorism, protecting the
foundations of democracy and keeping all measures against terrorism
within the confines of established- though more sophisticated democratic
procedures- is mandatory for any democratic state. Balancing principles
with interests is not an easy job, but it is the only way to overcome ten-
sions or crisis of a democratic society in fight with itself while targeting
and struggling against terrorism. US Secretary of State Colin Powell
warned on 1 August 2002 in Brunei against “using the campaign against
terrorism as a way to suppress legitimate dissent or as a way to suppress
people presenting their views to government”

. Then he added that “if we

are going to prevail over terrorism, really going to prevail over this plague
on the face of mankind, then we have to do it in a way that respects human
dignity and the rights of men and women”

. An area in which democratic

governments and societies risk failing is an eventual excessive accumula-
tion of power in any one too centralized institution. Ellen Laipson asks a
very legitimate question, concerning US democracy: “Should terrorism
push the United States to revise its core belief in checks and balances?”

Second, efforts should be exerted to democratize Islam and prevent Is-

lamic clerics from hindering the process. A bottom-line of discussing the
issue is that Muslims are not the problem – radical Muslims are. Radwan
Masmoudi, President of the Center for the Study of Islam and Democracy
(CSID), a US-based think-tank, was quoted by the ‘Christian Science
Monitor’ saying that “the key to a viable future is a coalition of moderate
Islamists and non-Islamists committed to representative government”

Nadcem Kazmi of the Al-Khoei Foundation in London supports this claim
by saying that there is a “need for a diplomatic process to develop a ‘cohe-
sive authoritative fatwa’ for delegitimizing terrorism”

Of course, embarking, working on and fulfilling these ambitious goals

would require the creation of civil societies with due respect to pluralism
in Muslim countries. Muslims who study the integration of democracy into
Muslim societies underline the key role of Muslim intelligentsia in

Colin Powell, ‘Rights Must Be Protected in Anti-Terrorism Fight’ (Sofia: Wireless
Files, US Embassy, August 5, 2002) 10.

Ibid.

Ellen Laipson, ‘While America...’ 146.

Christian Science Monitor, May 29, 2003, ‘Easing into Islamic Democracy (Convinced
by their experience in the US, American Muslims are helping form democratic coali-
tions in the Muslim world and are building their case on Islamic principles)’, by Jane
Lampman, staff writer to the CSM.

Ibid.

18 Pantev

changing public attitudes and in logically discarding medieval models
preached by some Islamic clerics. It would be in the interest of Islam and
all other faiths if it improves its internal religion’s organization by estab-
lishing and strengthening supra-national leadership and control structures.

A fundamental strategic goal, however, of both Muslim and non-

Muslim intellectuals should be de-politicising the difficulties of the adapta-
tion of Islamic fundamentalism to the requirements of globalisation. In the
last decade adapting to the needs of the global international environment
became the main focus of policy of the majority of states. Other states and
non-state actors, however, perceived the new developments towards a
global world as a danger for their existence. Hiding behind the existing dif-
ferences of the religion and culture of the Middle East, which is also pre-
dominantly poor while the Western developed world is mostly rich, the
proponents of radical Islam decided to attack. The terrorist acts of 11 Sep-
tember aimed at defining politically the format of the clash of radical Is-
lamic religion and the approaching economic, political and cultural global-
ization. The advantageous form of the clash was ‘suffering Islam’ against
the ‘Americanization of the world’. The ‘clash of civilization’ mentality,
poverty in the Muslim world, failed states – especially Muslim ones are
trends that terrorism tries to exploit. A major frustration of radical Islam is
the readiness of individual Muslims all over the world to embrace global-
isation as an opportunity to improve their living standards and to have a
better life – with more and better chances to have a choice. This readiness
of Muslims to embrace globalisation and to discard conservative Islamic
fundamentalist habits and relations very probably unbalances all who
profit from manipulating the souls of the believers.

The success of globalization and democracy is the result of the victory

of the struggle for democratic rights in the non-Western world and of the
fact that state boundaries and sovereignty cannot save those who oppose
social, political and technological progress. Another reason is the creation
of more and more effective forms and institutions of global governance.
Attacks against proponents of these tendencies and on global centres gov-
erning these processes is seen as the right way to save Islamic fundamen-
talism in its extremist and aggressive interpretation. Killing anything that
is ‘global’ remains the only option for the ‘ultimate guardians’ of the fun-
damentalist traditions – a very radical interpretation of social and religious
life indeed.

Theoretic Preconditions of Fighting Terrorism

Threat Perception of Terrorism in South East
Europe: Lessons Learned and Lessons Yet to Be
Learned

Contradictory tendencies and processes characterize the real magnitude of
the terrorist threat and its perception in South East Europe. On the one
hand, terrorism has interests in the Balkans. SFOR and KFOR, NATO
member countries and candidates for membership in the Alliance being al-
lies of the United States are targets of terrorists. South East Europe bears
the geopolitical potential to be a barrier to Islamic extremism and terror-
ism. Bulgaria’s ethno-religious model is an obstacle to the expansion of
radical Islam of another type – cultural. The ‘clash-of-civilization’ phi-
losophy of Al Qaeda simply evaporates on Bulgarian territory. This is due
both to the specific interpretation of Islam by Bulgarian Muslims and to
the well-developed political model of inter-ethnic relationships.

The Balkans’ links with terrorism stem from the general criminological

situation in a region torn of conflicts for more than 12 years. Mafia-like
structures in the Western Balkans particularly could be motivated for more
instrumental (political) purposes. Fighting organised crime, cutting the
links of criminals with nationalist parties and separatist movements is a
major step forward in preventing activation of terrorist cells.

Balkan countries are involved in the global coalition against terrorism.

Even Bosnia and Herzegovina is preparing to participate in peacekeeping
operations as part of the counter-terrorist struggle and post-conflict recon-
struction efforts – a development hard to imagine in the middle of the
1990s. Managing domestic affairs through the Western Balkan countries’
own institutions will be an important contribution by the region of South
East Europe to the anti-terror campaign.

External support in limiting Balkan terrorist activities came in the form

of the US Administration’s designation on 3 December 2001 of two groups
in the region – the Albanian National Army (ANA) and the National
Committee for the Liberation and Defense of Albanian Lands
(KKCMTSH) as extremist, thus permitting the US Treasury Department to
block their US assets and stop them from conducting financial transactions
with people in the USA. This measure was important, because the two
groups’ violent tactics aimed at undermining democracy and threatened ef-
forts to secure peace and stability in FYROM/Macedonia, Kosovo, south-
ern Serbia and the region. The meaning of ‘extremist violence’ in the US
Administration’s terminology includes inciting ethnic conflict or other ob-
structionist acts to promote irredentist or criminal agendas that threaten
peace, stability and security. It is interesting to note that counter-terrorist
forces in Afghanistan found Kosovo Albanian participation on the side of

20 Pantev

Al Qaeda and the Talibans. However, it would be a mistake to accept un-
critically allegations in the Western Balkans of continuing Albanian links
to bin Laden. Extremism and violence must be fought internationally, but
educating and living in ethnic tolerance is an immanent element of civi-
lised political order.

On 2 July 2002 the US State Department blocked the assets of three in-

dividuals – Gafur Adili, Nevzat Halili, and Kastriot Haxhirexha for provid-
ing leadership or material support to armed insurgents in the Western Bal-
kans. This activity threatened international stabilization efforts in the
region. Armed insurgency is a most suitable milieu for terrorist activity in
the Western Balkans. Special studies have proved this correlation of armed
conflict and terrorism in Bosnia and Herzegovina

. There is evidence that

peaceful resolution of regional conflicts, establishing decent inter-ethnic
dialogue, and longer-lasting relationships are crucial to prevent terrorism.
Tempering ethnic disputes or religious differences is a significant preven-
tive aspect of the fight on terrorism in South East Europe.

On the other hand, terrorism has not focused specifically on South East

Europe. The developed democratic countries of the world, especially the
USA continue to be more significant targets of terrorist networks. This
tendency induces feelings of isolation from the evil of terrorism in some
countries’ elites and broader publics of South East Europe. In Slovenia and
Croatia, for example, the threats are perceived as and the dangers of terror-
ism do not have their rightful place. A similar perception to Al Qaeda ter-
rorism could be noticed in a lesser degree in most of the other Balkan
countries.

It could be reasonable to claim that there is some pause of higher terror-

ist activity in South East Europe. It is equally incorrect to consider South
East Europe and the individual countries of the region as exempt from the
structural and functional influences of interactions in the system of interna-
tional relations and the phenomenon of terrorism. A keen approach and
study of the effects of terrorism on the international system by the deci-
sion-making elites in the security area of South East European countries is
a practical necessity. The concept of political and military pre-emption to-
wards terrorism will be accepted and applied in all South East European
states as soon as the broader interactions of terrorism with the international
system are understood well.

There are other ‘incentives’ to take a better hold of the parameters of

terrorism and reacting to it in South East Europe: the record of ‘failed

Alfred C. Lugert, Preventing and Combating Terrorism in Bosnia and Herzegovina
(Vienna and Sarajevo: PfPC CMSEE SG, December 2002) 157.

Theoretic Preconditions of Fighting Terrorism

states’ in the region; the persistent ethnic strife and religious differences;
and the fact that more Balkan countries become US allies – through NATO
or directly. NATO itself is becoming more counter-terrorism oriented as an
institution. Furthermore, evolving democracy in South East Europe and the
enlargement of the EU to the region will inevitably lead to further integra-
tion of Muslim societies into a democratic mainstream. This development
fully contradicts the aspirations of Muslim radicals and their terrorist in-
strument which is to close off the Muslim world from integration and
globalization. Muslim people live almost everywhere in South East
Europe. Dissident groups, formed within the Muslim communities of the
Balkan countries, could easily attract terrorists’ attention. Disrupting con-
nections between such groups and terrorist networks should be a priority of
societies and state institutions in South East Europe.

It would also be instructive to recall a study by Rohan Gunaratna about

Al Qaeda’s agenda (for 2003)

: 1) Al Qaeda is increasingly seeking tar-

gets that can be attacked with least effort and least cost. Suicide terrorism
is turning more against soft targets (the region of South East Europe falls
into this spectrum) 2) Economic targets, especially the tourist and hotel in-
dustries, will suffer from terrorism. Churches, synagogues, and other non-
Islamic institutions, as well as trade and investment will remain particu-
larly vulnerable. Commercial maritime targets will be of special terrorists’
interest (the tourist industry in most of the Balkan countries is a real na-
tional economic asset) 3) Western targets in the countries with less security
is an opportunity for terrorists (in South East Europe there are both West-
ern targets and insufficient security) 4) Al Qaeda will generate support
from low-level crime, organized crime, infiltrated charities, and from poli-
ticized and radicalized segments of their migrant communities (South East
Europe has all these prerequisites.)

The security threat perceptual system of South East European countries

should take all these developments into consideration and overcome con-
tradictory signals from the environment. Forward thinking, predicting,
preventing and pre-empting are becoming key categories and catch words
of the intellectual treatment of the issue of terrorism.

Rohan Gunaratna, ‘Al-Qaeda’s Agenda for 2003’, INTERSEC, 13:2 (February 2003),
58–60.

22 Pantev

4 Conclusion

Three concentric and simultaneous ‘strategic circles’ of dealing away with
terrorism may be suggested.

First, the long-term and broadest one: 1) Winning the hearts and minds

of the potential victims of globalisation. 2) Proving them that terrorism is
not their way out of the difficulties and negative consequences of human
progress. 3) Depriving terrorist networks from impoverished, desperate
and hopeless people. 4) Proving clearly that globalisation provides
the civilised outcome from the hard situation, created during the adap-
tation to the needs of the new economic, technological and information
environment.

Second, in the mid-term: 1) Helping failed states become prosperous.

The region of South East Europe is a particularly important case, whose
success will stimulate similar positive processes in the Black Sea-Caspian
Sea area. 2) Involving Islam in civil society, secularism and democracy
building, influencing religious reforms that would deprive fanatic terrorism
from confessional motivation. 3) Improving the cooperation and coordina-
tion of the leading centres of power of the world in their anti-terrorism and
counter-terrorism activity.

Third, the short-term, direct one: 1) Preventing the performance of

WMD-capable terrorism. 2) Creating the instruments, institutions and in-
dividuals who can effectively carry out all operational aspects of the anti-
terrorist and counter-terrorist struggle.

The successful fight against terrorism will inevitably accelerate the con-

structive tendencies of the international system, boost globalisation and its
positive social and economic effects. The successes of the fight will pro-
vide opportunities for the religions of the world to interact in a more crea-
tive and humane way than now.

The peoples and states of South East Europe are already involved in the

‘three-circles’ strategy. Getting rid of the region’s conflicts, stabilizing the
security and economy of the Balkans, developing civil-military relations of
modern democratic type, carrying out security sector reform, adequate to
the needs of fighting terrorism – these are significant milestones of the
broader contribution to coping with South East Europe’s own deficiencies
and with the global evil of terrorism.

State Violence, State Weakness – Explaining the
Plethora of Security Risks and Instability in South
East Europe

Henriette Riegler

In introducing and outlining the context of insecurity and instability in the
region I shall point out that: 1) threats to security and stability are manifold
in the region due to dramatic changes in the international system and the
break-up of the Former Yugoslavia; 2) – regional and domestic heteroge-
neity make it difficult to present a regionally coherent South East Euro-
pean perspective at all; 3) that the history of war and organized violence in
the region enables a critical view on the academic and political debate on
terrorism and organized crime and last but not least, 4) that by analysing
global terrorism we look at a global and globalizing phenomenon. It has to
be considered and acted upon as such in South East Europe while being
mindful of possible local effects.

The Context of Insecurity and Instability in South
East Europe

Security risks and instability in the region have a specific context and a
history. The violent and purposeful destruction of Former Yugoslavia is
only the last chapter of a long story of conflicting and late nation state
building efforts in the area. It is due to the Yugoslav wars that this area
was and to a certain and a very unequal degree still is one of immense in-
security and instability. Not only did the Yugoslav wars bring with them
“conventional” war-induced security problems i.e. (para-) military-induced
death and destruction, movements of civilians we came to know as ethnic
cleansing, the break-down of the state’s authority and public order in the
war afflicted regions etc.

Beyond these immediate and directly war-linked “results”, a deep trans-

formation of the political power structure took place: a reshuffle from ci-
vilian to military power took place, a general dispersion of the state’s
power that was transferred from the monopoly of power to regional and
local ‘war-lordism’ as well as a substitution of formal political activities
and procedures by mafia activities in many forms and variations. One
could not say that this was a mere outcome of the war; this was rather the

24 Riegler

result of transformation activities carried out in the “form” of war. Or to
put it even more bluntly: these wars have to be seen as organized political
efforts to devaluate legitimate political structures, state sovereignty and na-
tional security and to eventually break and rearrange them on a new basis.

These efforts were in some cases more successful than in others depend-

ing on the pre-war status and ethno-national structure of the former federal
republics: in the case of Slovenia nobody (not even the JNA) could easily
break the political make up of the state. The territorial defense/TO (teri-
torijalna obrana) was in the hands of the Slovene political elite and could
act as a counter-force to the Yugoslav military. In addition there was no
Serb minority that could act as agent provocateur to call in the military. In
the case of Croatia the situation was much more delicate: the self-defense
capacities had to be delivered to the army before the war, leaving Croatia
without much material means to realize its sovereignty and act against ef-
forts orchestrated from Belgrade to mobilize and arm the rural Serb mi-
norities of the Krajina regions. Although this did not lead to the intended
total breakdown of the political make-up of Croatia’s political structure,
the control over the state’s territory – a central element of effective sover-
eignty- was deeply questioned. At the height of the war, about one third of
Croatia’s territory was occupied by a mixture of autonomous local Serb
forces and the federal Yugoslav (but in fact Serb-Montenegrin) forces.

Much of the ethno-national question was only a pretext under which as

much as possible strategically or otherwise important territory could be
annexed and incorporated into Serbia making also cities that could not be
“claimed” from an ethnic point of view (like Dubrovnik) war targets. For
quite a period of time it was not at all clear if Croatia would survive this
assault on its sovereignty. An even more extreme case was the survival of
Bosnia and Herzegovina. Having the most complex ethno-national struc-
ture as well as the most intermingled settling structures of all the Yugoslav
federal republics much more violence and ethnical cleansing as in the
Croatian case was necessary to carve up Bosnia and Herzegovina in such a
way that mono-ethnic chunks could easily be swallowed by the greedy
“mother states”: Serbia and Croatia. Once again it was as in the case of
Croatia impossible without the local help of the majority of the Bosnian
Serb political elite that in the first instance helped to de-legitimise the mul-
tiethnic Bosnian leadership by leaving the multi-ethnic government that
led Bosnia into independence and in a second phase to bring in those parts
of the Yugoslav army that could be easily turned into the Bosnian Serb
army thereby drastically changing the material basis of Bosnian politics.
This move left Bosnia practically without any military that could have de-
fended the country’s sovereignty and the civilian population that became
the explicit target of manoeuvres of ethnic cleansing on an ever larger

State Violence, State Weakness

scale. So what was clearly dangerous in the Croatian case really became a
question of outright survival in the Bosnian: in the first stage of the con-
flict (1992) and even more so in the second one when Bosnian Croats
joined by Croatian forces left the Bosnian coalition (1993/94), Bosnia
stood on the edge of collapse of sovereignty and state extinction with Bos-
niaks on the edge of physical extinction. What saved both the state and the
people in the last minute was not international peacekeeping or humanitar-
ian assistance – I would go so far to argue quite on the contrary – but ex-
ternal elements: American pressure on the Croatian side to (re)join a coali-
tion with the Bosniaks and international intervention efforts in a twofold
way: in the form of an embargo against Belgrade that led Milosevic to let
down his Bosnian Serb allies and finally air raids against any agreement
opposing Bosnian Serbs’ Republika Srpska. The results of the massive on-
slaught on Bosnia as a (multi)nation(al) state left two hundred thousand
dead, millions uprooted and either internally displace or exiled and the
state and its infrastructure as well as its society in shambles.

Although in the Kosovo case many argued that as it did not share the

federal status with the other republics it could not be included in a state se-
curity- and sovereignty-related analysis of the Yugoslav wars, there is an
important reason why one should: Kosovo’s status of an autonomous prov-
ince, as somewhat lesser than a federal republic, was in itself the result of
sovereignty withheld and then granted but only up to a provincial degree
within the Yugoslav state. The Kosovars were suspected to show too small
a share of loyalty to the Yugoslav state and had a hidden agenda to secede.
It is exactly because of its minor degree of sovereignty the operation of
breaking-up Yugoslavia could start in Kosovo in the late 1980s. Kosovo
functioned in a way as a training ground for the wars to come: open war-
fare to reach the goal of destroying the political and territorial make-up of
Kosovo was not a necessary step up until the last phase of Milosevic’s
reign in Belgrade. The destruction of Kosovo’s political system and its an-
nexation by Serbia, as well as its military occupation by the Yugoslav
army could well stay beyond under the threshold of war, because federal
boundaries are unprotected and because there was greater room for ma-
noeuvre as in the cases to follow. That all the federal republics understood
quite well what was being done before their eyes and alarmed by it is illus-
trated by the strong criticism voiced by Slovenia and Croatia on the eve of
the crackdown of Kosovo’s autonomy. The Belgrade regime had every in-
terest to keep the Kosovo conflict at a low level especially during the other
wars it instigated. So it was no coincidence that ethnic cleansing in Kosovo
comparable to those in Croatia and Bosnia only started after other parts of
Former Yugoslavia reached a stage of internationally recognized inde-
pendence defended in war. Not only was Belgrade left with no political

26 Riegler

resources to fight anywhere else nor could it make legitimate claims for
any other territory (an exception might have been Montenegro). The Kos-
ovar Albanians saw their last chance for achieving sovereignty fading
away since the Dayton peace agreement in its regional (Former Yugoslavia
encompassing) dimension did not include any political solution for them.

So the Yugoslav wars in Croatia, Bosnia and Kosovo could be under-

stood as centralizing Belgrade-led fights against the federal republics and
autonomous provinces demands for more sovereignty. The moment when
Slovenia, Croatia and Bosnia demanded their independence, the result was
to localize these conflicts and to present them as internal civil wars. Never-
theless, the internationalisation of the wars took place in more than one re-
spect (i.e. by international recognition of their sovereignty), but also by the
stationing of international peacekeepers and later by NATO troops and in-
ternational peace implementation forces.

Having this in mind we should track down the phenomenon that we

think is the most important, the central one in explaining insecurity and in-
stability in the region. Is it a lack of sovereignty, state failure, or simply a
legacy of wars that made for a lasting security vacuum? And is it really a
vacuum? Maybe it is the opposite: too much sovereignty or rather a com-
petition of colliding and conflicting demands for sovereignty at work in the
region?

In the post-war phase efforts made to rebuild have been slow. Even

slower was the reconstruction of the political and social fabric of societies.
This is happening within a system of manifold and parallel systems of sov-
ereignty or rather sovereignties. Going beyond being a mere wartime phe-
nomenon, they have a lasting effect on post-war reconstruction efforts and
are reproduced (although in a much more civil and well-intended way) by
the national-international division of power especially in places under in-
ternational protection like Bosnia, Kosovo and, to a much lesser degree,
Macedonia. We often see a rather unclear and fluid divide responding to
the national-international division of power and authority. This divide is
due to the fact that the formal political structure is often powerless unless it
responds to the informal and hidden power base that was built during the
war. That norms like accountability and trust in public offices could not
develop and take root has therefore a domestic war time dimension to it as
well as one that has to do with the fact that position- and office-holders are
‘internationals’ who neither owe their positions to the local electorate nor
who have to legitimize their actions and policies before them.

State Violence, State Weakness

Is There a South East European Pattern of Insecurity
and Instability?

As I have tried to show in the first part of the article the break-up or rather
the demolition of Former Yugoslavia and the consequent wars did nothing
but produce an even more heterogeneous picture. As the various federal
units in the Former Yugoslavia had all a different fate with regard to their
individual state structure and corresponding make up of the various na-
tion(s) majority-minority relation in each of the republics, the wider South
East European region is all the more heterogeneous including such war-
unaffected states like Bulgaria and Romania that had on the other hand a
more complicated transformation projects which had to start from Soviet-
type Communist legacies both in the economic as well as in the political
sphere. Even Albania has still to recover from decades of autarchic isola-
tion and short-lived tactical international alliances

. So one could extract

what all states have in common : they were non-Western, i.e. non-pluralist
in political terms, and non-market orientated to varying degrees. Some of
the Former Yugoslav republics were more Western than the others and
more Western than the non-Yugoslav ones. Whereas there is not much
analytical value in constructing a coherent regional approach, a compara-
tive approach should have some. Although one could read it differently
and describe the Yugoslav wars and the ideology they were built on as at
least partly being built upon transformation-overload, I would clearly
make a distinction and concentrate on war-inherent and in a wider sense
break-up-induced security and stability problems in the cases of the Yugo-
slav successor states and transformation-induced security and stability
problems in the post-Soviet-type cases and Albania. This would leave
enough ground to talk about similar security and stability problems but not
about identical ones. What distinguishes them from one another is simple:
the post-Communist cases only had no additional problems with nation
state building because they simply had ones in whose institutional frame-
work they could inscribe their new political and economic projects. The
Yugoslav case (i.e. all the Yugoslav successor states project encompassed)
differs: during and after the destruction of the multinational and federal po-
litical project, all the former federal republics had to overcome the Yugo-
slav structural nation-state building gap and to “reinvent” themselves on a
nation state basis which is as a matter of principle a politically ambitious,
resource-demanding and long-term project. In addition, some of them had

Ivan Krastev comes to a similar conclusion, see Ivan Krastev, Facing the Political Risk
in South-Eastern Europe, in Südosteuropa-Mitteilungen 39 (1999) 2.

28 Riegler

their sovereignty simultaneously challenged. So from my point of view,
incomplete and colliding nation-state-building are both reasons for wars as
well as for the quasi-state building projects that arose within Croatia, Bos-
nia, Kosovo, and to a much lesser degree in Macedonia. Though with the
notable exception of Republika Srpska none of them succeeded, they
were the visible signs of the political and spatial vacuum the break-up
instigated.

Comparatively-speaking we might come up with the example of Alba-

nia and its internal turmoil, that was also accompanied by the emergence
of local territorially- based political rivalries in the late 1990s, which had
their roots in the unfinished Albanian nation-state building project. But be-
yond that almost no questioning of ethno-political boundaries took place in
South East Europe. Does this give us any insight when it comes to the is-
sues of security and stability risks? It might, as one of the implicit hy-
potheses is, that only state violence or state weakness can be the source of
insecurity and instability in the region.

Terrorism, Organized Violence and Organized Crime

After September 11

, the all-too-fashionable debate on terrorism and or-

ganized crime finally reached SEE and the region changed labels from be-
ing perceived as a region of eternal and inexplicable conflicts, to one
equally stigmatised as a hotbed of criminal activities and terrorist net-
works. This led to an inadequate understanding why and in which ways the
region might indeed be a re(source) for international terrorism and trans-
national criminal activities.

It is the break-up of Yugoslavia and the resulting wars that could be

identified as large scale state-instigated criminal manoeuvres and analysed
accordingly. Not only this, but the wars and the way they were led funda-
mentally changed what was legal and illegal. What was part of civil poli-
tics and what were (para)military affairs became blurred. The wars and the
various forms of organized violence surrounding them could be read and
interpreted as acts of state and (para-)military terrorism against a largely
unprotected civilian population. What could the ethnic cleansing cam-
paigns be but orchestrated criminal efforts? What else could the sieges of
Vukovar and Sarajevo be but well planned and carefully executed acts of
terrorism? In which other way could Srebrenica be described more ade-
quately? But it was always the others that were declared terrorists – e.g.
the UÇK in Kosovo – and the international community validated Bel-
grade’s evaluation of Kosovar terrorism far too long and far too willingly.
A move to officially acknowledge the UÇK came only after Milosevic did

State Violence, State Weakness

not compromise on any political solution for Kosovo in 1999. A similar at-
tempt vis-a-vis Albanian guerrilla fighters-turned-politicians in the wake
of the events of 11 September by Macedonian politicians, interestingly
enough, did not work ou

in the expected way but earned Western

criticism.

It is due to the Yugoslav wars that this area was and to a very unequal

degree still is one of immense insecurity. Not only did the Yugoslav wars
bring with them “conventional” war-induced security problems (i.e. death,
destruction, flight movements etc.) It also brought about the breakdown of
the state’s authority and public order not only in the war-afflicted regions,
but to varying degrees in all the successor states directly or indirectly en-
gaged in war. It even set a bad example by demonstrating how far the de-
struction of state and society could go without triggering any major inter-
national outcry.

It was on the road to war that the established norms and forms of legiti-

macy were purposefully destroyed. They were erased by highly skilful bu-
reaucratic and organizational means and were for a time almost non-
existent. These manoeuvres were to a large degree successful and had a
devastating effect on the norms of legality, the rule of law and accountabil-
ity. The most criminal actors – that many are now in The Hague should be
considered a huge progress and a success in fighting organized crime –
were for years the ones that were legitimised internally by election results
and externally by international diplomacy. How could the citizenry even
fully understand that they were criminals? The leading paramilitaries that
were responsible for the most atrocious crimes against civilians could at
the same time be deputies in national Parliaments (like Seselj and Arkan)
and thereby embody and symbolise the highest authority. Or even worse:
exactly because they were in charge of ethnic cleansing operations they
were officially honoured with the most prestigious posts in the political
system. If this is a phenomenon and a process in which the political system
has turned into a criminal one, or in which the criminals overtook the po-
litical sphere is nearly irrelevant and for both aspects evidence could be
found easily. Arkan and his political master Milosevic are an illustrative
example of the mechanism at work: to make his way to the top, Milosevic
needed to destroy the old system and get rid of competing politicians, an
honest police force and a working judiciary. Instead he used criminals as a
cheap political labour force. They were already outside any form of legal-
ity, had nothing to lose but everything to win by serving their political
master. The politician is the one who gives him credit and in addition le-
galizes him. When the criminal’s services are no more needed and his ac-
tions or even more importantly his knowledge become a threat to the mas-
ter, he gets laid off – and that is exactly what happened to Arkan and

30 Riegler

several others that operated in the tightly-knit net between politics and
criminality. That this network is not yet destroyed and criminals and Mafi-
osi acquired a lot of power, all and foremost, in the police and the military
is best illustrated by the recent murder of Serb Prime Minister Zoran
Djindjic.

An additional transformation of the political power structure occurred

when the war effort almost totally succeeded, Bosnia being the most
prominent case. A reshuffle from civilian to military power took place that
made control over the means of violence and not legality the most crucial
precondition for getting and holding on to power. A general dispersion of
the state’s power saw a transfer of the monopoly of power from central to
regional and local war-lords as well as a substitution of formal political ac-
tivities and procedures by mafia activities in many forms and variations.
One could not say that this was a sheer outcome of the war; rather these
transformation activities were carried out in the “form” of war. Or to put it
even more bluntly: these wars have to be seen as organized political efforts
to devaluate legitimacy, legitimate political structures, state sovereignty,
national security and to eventually break them.

Having this in mind we should track down the phenomenon that we

think is the most important, the central one in explaining insecurity in the
region and the most hindering fact in order to cut back criminality and
other illegal activities. I argue that it is a lack of state and institution build-
ing – primarily a legacy of the wars but to a minor degree also a legacy of
totalitarian party control over the state – that made for a lasting security
vacuum. The main dilemma of credibility at work here is that on the one
hand the international community asks for legitimacy and the rule of law,
on the other it recognized and legitimised warlords and their success (e.g.
with the Dayton peace accord and the recognition of Republika Srpska or
with the decade long support for the Milosevic regime). And, one might
add, by neglecting to take a close look at the region once other more inter-
esting or burning issues are thought to be at stake

In the post-war phase some efforts were made to repair war damages,

even a modest reconstruction of the political and social fabric of war-
ridden and almost destroyed societies takes place. This is done, however,
within a system of a many-fold and parallel system of sovereignty or rather

This negligence vis-à-vis the periphery was also the main failure to stop the Yugoslav
wars in the first place, see Richard H. Ullman (ed.), The World and Yugoslavia’s Wars,
New York (1996) and James Gow, Triumph of the Lack of Will: International Diplo-
macy and the Yugoslav War, New York (1997).

State Violence, State Weakness

sovereignties

Going beyond to be mere war time phenomena they have a

lasting effect on post-war reconstruction efforts and are re-produced al-
though in a much more civil and well-intended way by the national-
international division of power especially in those places that are under in-
ternational protection like Bosnia, Kosovo or Macedonia. Not only do we
see at times a rather unclear and fluid divide responding to the national-
international division of power and authority but also one due to the fact
that the formal political structure often is rather powerless unless it re-
sponds to the informal and hidden power base that was built during the
war. That norms like accountability and trust in public offices could not
develop and take root has therefore a domestic war time dimension to it as
well as one that has to do with the fact that the owners of positions and of-
fices are internationals that neither owe their positions to the local elector-
ate nor do they have to legitimise their actions and policies before them
and in this way contribute to a sovereignty dilemma.

Global Terrorism, Local Bases

The main argument of this article is that state violence and state weakness
alike account for insecurity and instability in the region and incomplete
and colliding nation-state-building are at its core. The chances and hin-
drances for global terrorism taking root in the region have to be analysed
within this context. In general terrorism is a rather fluid concept it could be
organized by (para)state actors, political groups and/or individuals. Or-
ganizations like Al-Qaeda think in global terms and act globally. Although
organized on a network basis they are in need of local territorial bases of
various kinds. One sort of territorial bases is comprised by the weak, often
rather internationally-isolated states that they can easily and almost offi-
cially infiltrate and regularly retreat to, like Afghanistan. The circum-
stances of the Yugoslav wars and especially Bosnia could have made for a
similar European basis

but only as long as no one in the West was espe-

cially worried about Bosnia’s fate. Islamic fighters from all over the world
joined the Bosniak side during the Bosnian war with motives other than

See Attila Agh, Processes of democratization in the East Central European and Balkan
states: sovereignty-related conflict in the context of Europeanization, in Communist and
Post-Communist Studies 32 (September 1999) 3.

It is worth noting from a comparative perspective that there were also rumours that Al-
bania under Sali Berisha was involved in accepting Islamic support from rather dubious
sources in the 90s, see Stephan Lipsius, Politik und Islam in Albanien – Instrumentalis-
ierung und Abhängigkeiten, in Südosteuropa 47 (1998) 3–4. As in Bosnia in Albania a
few Arabs with the countries citrizenship were arrested and exiled.

32 Riegler

the survival of Bosnian statehood. They rather had the idea of participating
in a global jihad in (local) Bosnia. Not that the Bosniaks and even almost
all of the Bosniak political elite itself thought in these terms, on the con-
trary, they were with some exceptions orientated towards a European secu-
lar idea of state and society. They looked for the help of Islamic states,
welcomed Islamic welfare organizations and accepted even armed
Islamists because of sheer despair at being a weak and nearly destroyed
state. As a result Bosnian leadership had some difficulties to control them
efficiently. After the war some of these individuals, bearing Bosnian pass-
ports, were arrested for their involvement in criminal and what might be
terrorist-related activities in Europe.A lively public debate started in Bos-
nia over the political influence of the Mujaheddin . In addition the accep-
tance of Islamist ideas by some Bosniak politicians was questioned and
criticized by many. After 11 September most of these fighters were exiled
primarily due to American pressure but also because Bosnia wanted to get
rid of them once and for all. So what the Bosnian case clearly demon-
strates is that weak states and war-ridden areas might be temporary bases
for infiltrating the European continent and a last resort for submerged ter-
rorists. But as we saw in this and other forms of terrorist activities in
Europe, such groups make use of well-organized European centres for
their activities in a much more comprehensive way. Thus, South East
Europe is not a particularly terror-prone region, on the contrary. It is rather
a European periphery in this field with rather fewer than more people in-
terested in Islamic fundamentalist ideas and terrorist practice than in the
rest of Europe.

What is much more likely is that the events of 11 September and the

way they were interpreted might have made it easier or to trigger a local
reaction in South East Europe of a different sort. In this part more than in
other parts of Europe an autochthonous thread of Muslimophobia and
Islamophobia has been woven into the political and social fabric of these
societies in accordance with the high time of nationalism and later phases
of nation state building. It was a defensive reaction directed against the
successor states of the Muslim Ottoman Empire, but did not die out as an
ideology with the founding of nation-states in the region. On the contrary
Muslimophobia was used extensively to justify the Bosnian war. It did not
fall on deaf ears in the wider region but also in Europe. If these local sen-
timents join with fears about global Islamist terrorism they, might result in

State Violence, State Weakness

holding the Muslim minorities of South East Europe responsible for it, in
this way opening up new sites of insecurity and instability

A very good book on the relationship of Islam and politics in South East Europe that
deals with all the Muslim nations and nationalisties of the Former Yugoslavia too is
Xavier Bougarel/Nathalie Clayer (ed.), Le nouvel Islam balkanique, Les Musulmans,
acteurs du post-communisme 1990–2000, Paris (2001).

Part 2:
Civil-Military Relations, Democratic Control of the
Armed Forces and Security Sector Reform During
the Fight Against Terrorism

Civil-Military Relations: Continuity and Change in
an Age of Terror

Richard Cohen

1 Introduction

Many of the domestic and international security measures adopted after the
shock of 11 September 2001 pose new and unwelcome risks to both the
old and the new democratic systems. The relationship between the armed
forces, the security services and the society they are designed to serve and
protect requires renewed attention and vigilance.

Achieving the right relationship between soldiers and the elected politi-

cians and their civil servants has posed a dilemma for policymakers, civil-
ian bureaucrats and the professional soldiers of the state since the birth of
democracy. The existence of an armed, disciplined group governed by
their own, often-secretive hierarchy within the framework of a state, is in
many ways the antithesis of the democratic ideal. For much of the past
century, however, the issue of the subordination of the military to its
elected civilian masters did not find a place at the top of the list of con-
cerns in western democracies.

Still, there have been disturbing instances of a breakdown of the often-

uneasy truce between soldiers and their civilian masters even within the
relatively solid framework of the established democracies. These events,
especially when they became public, have cast a harsh and unwelcome
light on this sensitive and sometimes prickly issue.

The well-known attempt by General Douglas McArthur, during the Ko-

rean War, to decisively influence the major strategic decisions of the U.S.
Government regarding the conduct of the conflict brought him into direct
confrontation with President Harry Truman. Even in a well-established
democracy like the United States, it was not immediately clear that Tru-
man would prevail given the huge popularity and respect enjoyed by
McArthur amongst the general public and many of the politicians of the
day. This event rekindled concern over the issue of the coexistence of a
powerful, ‘parallel’ and clearly undemocratic element within a free and
democratic society. It was a reminder that all was not necessarily well in
the area of civil and democratic control of armed forces even in those

38 Cohen

countries with a long history of relatively successful civil-military relation-
ships and democratic institutions.

Instances such as this notwithstanding, during the long years of the Cold

War most western countries had become pretty complacent about the state
of civil-military relations within their societies. It was an issue that rarely
registered as a concern amongst the general public or the media.

The sudden end of the apparent stability of the Cold War, in 1989–91,

forced a refocus of thinking on civil-military relations by western govern-
ments and their armed forces. The new cooperation between the West and
the newly established democracies of the former Soviet bloc highlighted
the issue in stark terms. The problem of the correct relationship between
armies, security services and their civilian leaders became evident even to
those in western countries who had not previously paid much attention
to it.

It became clear that an essential priority in helping former Communist

states move toward western-style democracy was to ensure that newly
elected democratic leaders had both the will and the tools to guide and
control the uniformed services in accordance with their mandate from their
voters. This realisation spurred a re-examination of the civil-military
‘models’ in the ‘old’ western democracies engaged in the process of help-
ing their new friends in the east.

It became obvious that the West had no single model to offer. Each of

the old democracies had its distinct approach to the issue of civil-military
relations and very few of them had formally codified it. Most western
models had proved relatively successful but all had evolved from long and
unique political and historical experience.

A major difficulty in introducing democratic and civilian control of the

armed forces in the emerging democracies lay in the fact that many of
these countries had no recent tradition to fall back upon. To make matters
more complicated, the out-going Communist system had blurred the divid-
ing line between generations of military officers and the party officials and
bureaucrats that ran the state apparatus.

From ‘Civil Control’ to ‘Civil-Military Relations’

It became clear to the western officials and military officers working with
their counterparts in the defense establishments of the former East bloc
countries that a major change of attitude amongst the soldiers and their ci-
vilian leaders was an immediate priority. But acceptance by both sides of a
system of ‘civil’ control developed only haltingly.

Civil-Military

Relations

Part of the difficulty lay in the definition of the terms. The expression

used by most early western advisers was ‘civil’ control. To most western-
ers ‘civil’ and ‘democratic’ control of armed forces seemed synonymous.
Elected politicians in the old democracies are almost without exception,
civilians. However, for our new partners from the former Socialist bloc,
the terms ‘civil’ control and ‘democratic’ control were not self-evidently
the same thing. Indeed, rigid and intrusive civil control by the party appa-
ratus was part and parcel of the Communist system. This problem of the
definition of terms became a cause of some confusion on both sides. It be-
came responsible for difficulties in the transition process.

The term ‘democratic control’ to describe the relationship between sol-

diers and government seemed a better way to approach the issue. The sub-
ordination of the military to a democratically elected government was
more easily understood by the armed forces, in particular, as a key element
of the democratic process. ‘Civil control’ was not as self-evident.

It was also clear that ‘control’ itself was only part of the issue. There

were many elements aside from control, which are no less important to the
relationship between the armed forces and the security services and society
at large. The broader term, ‘civil-military relations’, encompasses a more
inclusive approach to what is in fact a very complex and subtle relation-
ship. This term gradually replaced ‘civil’ control and ‘democratic’ control
as a more accurate and ultimately more acceptable description of the rela-
tionship and the process.

3 The

Transition

To make sense of the evolution of civil-military relations in the countries
of Central, Eastern and South East Europe and the former Soviet Union, a
simple 3-stage model can be used to describe the evolution from total inte-
gration of the state and the security apparatus inside a closed and secretive
bureaucracy into a more open system of democratic separation and control.
These stages overlap but one can only begin following significant progress
in the preceding stage or stages:

Disentanglement

Integration

Modernisation

40 Cohen

3.1 Disentanglement

Dominance by the Party. As we have seen, the armed forces and the secu-
rity agencies of the former Soviet bloc were both military and political
structures. A form of ‘civil’ control existed but it was distorted and super-
ficial. The most senior military officers, including the Minister of Defense
and the Chief of the General Staff, were at once uniformed commanders
and senior political figures within the Communist party and the govern-
ment. In this way, the army and the state were inextricably bound together.

At the lower levels, membership of the Communist party amongst mili-

tary officers varied from state to state. But almost without exception, the
reach of the party, often represented by ‘political officers’, who operated
largely independently of the military chain of command, extended deep
into the structure of the armed forces. Any officer who wished to have a
successful career in the military or the security services had to become,
sooner or later, a member of the Party. Many officers with no real belief in
the tenants of Marx or Lenin joined a political system, which would enable
them to exist comfortably within their profession and within a society
ruled and dominated by the Communist party.

Monopoly of Resources. One important result of the blurring of the line

between the state and the armed forces was an assumption that whatever
state resources military commanders demanded were provided, almost
without question. In the command economies that formed the basis of the
socialist state, the actual economic value of these resources, both in terms
of capital and of manpower, were not and could not be accurately deter-
mined. Until the twilight years of the Communist system, most govern-
ments did not even try to calculate the true cost of their armed forces. The
result was a militarised society in which the demands of the population at
large on the wealth of the state took a distant second place to the real or
imagined requirements of military and of state security.

The immense long-term burden of a ‘war economy’ on the relatively

slender resources of inefficient state economies was perhaps the most im-
portant factor in the eventual demise of the Communist system.

An Intellectual Vacuum. Another example of entanglement and depend-

ence was the almost total concentration of control of defense policy and
military doctrine in Moscow. Nominally independent states like Poland,
Hungary, Czechoslovakia and Bulgaria had no decisive say in how their
armed forces were structured and equipped. As satellite states they had no
independent foreign and defense policies and their armed forces’ opera-
tional plans were formulated and coordinated in the Kremlin. This situa-
tion left a huge intellectual gap. After the demise of the Soviet Union,
there was virtually no defense and security policy planning expertise

Civil-Military

Relations

within the ranks of the military and the governments of the former Warsaw
Pact states.

Secrecy. In the Soviet Union and its satellite states, military and state

security matters were the almost exclusive preserve of the general staffs
and the security services. Civilians, outside of a few selected senior party
officials, were not trusted to participate in this highly compartmentalised
and secretive world. Thus knowledge and discussion of military and secu-
rity affairs was limited to the military and to a handful of the most senior
members of government and the party. The media, academics and mem-
bers of Parliament were not privy to this sensitive domain, which was jeal-
ously guarded by the generals and their staffs.

Military Entanglement. The Communist system left a legacy of senior

military officers hopelessly entangled in a discredited political/military/
economic embrace. Even those ‘progressive’ professional officers who had
no real interest in politics or ideology were locked within a rigid frame-
work of Soviet doctrines and ideas. Many of them found it impossible to
break out. Prominent among these attitudes was a deep-seated reluctance
on the part of military officers to share knowledge and opinions with the
newly elected civilian politicians and the small number of government of-
ficials who attempted to penetrate the closed world of defense and
security.

Identification with the Old Regime. Another barrier in the way of a satis-

factory relationship between military officers and their civilian colleagues
was that the armed forces and the security services were perceived by soci-
ety in most of the newly democratic states as being closely connected with
the now discredited Communist and Soviet system. This identification
with the ‘old regime’ alienated them from the public, most politicians and
the newly independent media.

Unpopularity and Lack of Resources. Many young people shunned the

military and did their best to avoid national service. The brightest and the
best would not seriously consider becoming career officers in an institution
that society saw as a relic of a deeply discredited system. New democratic
governments and their Parliaments understood and cared little for the mili-
tary and this was reflected in an ever-diminishing allocation of money for
defense.

Dealing with the Legacy. The new democratic and independent govern-

ments tackled this unsatisfactory situation in a variety of ways. On the one
hand most Central European governments took radical steps to clear out
officers most closely identified with the old political apparatus. On the
other, Russia and the most of other states of the former Soviet Union, took
a much slower, softer approach. Actions ranged from ruthless ‘lustration’
of thousands of officers associated with the old regime in Czechoslovakia

42 Cohen

to a largely ‘business as usual’ approach in Russia, Central Asia and the
south Caucasian states. In most of these countries, senior party officials
continued to govern, having transformed themselves overnight into ‘social
democratic’ politicians. Soviet era officers continued to lead the armed
forces and the security services.

Newly created or reborn states with no national armies such as the Bal-

tic States, Georgia, Armenia and Azerbaijan and the Central Asian coun-
tries faced fewer problems with disentanglement than those with existing
Soviet style armies like Poland, Czechoslovakia, Hungary, Romania and
Bulgaria. These new independent states formed armed forces, which im-
mediately became symbols of national pride and regained sovereignty. But
even here many of the officers in the new national armies came from the
ranks of the Red Army. In almost all the former East bloc countries, there-
fore, the Soviet legacy continued to create barriers for the new political
parties trying to build new apolitical armed forces and security structures.

Constitutional Factors. For many countries it took a decade, at least, be-

fore the old thinking began to give way to the ideals of wholly professional
forces untainted by the legacy of the Soviet past. Democratic control was
won only gradually and not without considerable pain. In Poland, Hungary
and other countries, the vagaries of hastily drafted post-Communist consti-
tutions allowed the army to play off the President and the government
against each other and so to remain largely independent of civil or democ-
ratic control.

Despite the many difficulties, by the end of the 1990s, military ‘Disen-

tanglement’ from the old political order had been, with some notable ex-
ceptions, generally successful in countries of the former Soviet bloc, from
Estonia to Kazakhstan.

3.2 Integration

‘Integration’ of the armed forces and the security services into the society
of the state is a slower and even more difficult step than Disentanglement.
This stage of the civil-military transition has been more successful in some
states than in others. History, culture as well as political and economic fac-
tors have affected progress.

Integration of the armed forces in states like Poland and Romania has

been promising. They are countries with no obvious military threats. They
have long military traditions, which are seen as closely tied to a national
pride and identity. In Tajikistan, Moldova, Azerbaijan, Armenia and Geor-
gia, states with little recent military tradition, but which are engaged in
civil conflicts or wars with their neighbours, the army has become a source

Civil-Military

Relations

of national pride and a guarantor of territorial sovereignty and individual
security making integration a speedier process.

Integration has not been as successful in a wide spectrum of other states.

The Czech Republic and Hungary have few security threats. They also
have a history of deep suspicion of the military stemming from disap-
pointment with recent historical failures to preserve their national inde-
pendence. In Russia, the on-going war in Chechnya and the failure to pre-
vent high profile terrorist attacks inside Russia itself has helped to erode
public support for the armed forces and the other internal security bodies.
In these countries, integration has been less successful.

As we have seen, a further important obstacle to integration is that very

few people outside the armed forces and the security apparatus had even
the faintest understanding of their structure and policies. Military officers
also had little or no appreciation of how the armed forces fitted politically
or strategically into the overall framework of a democratically formulated
foreign and defense policy. And neither civilians nor soldiers had a clear
perception of the place of the armed forces, a major consumer of resources,
in the economic structure of their country.

This lack of understanding helped to maintain a significant gap between

the military and the politicians, the media and the public. The armed forces
were seen as tools of the old establishment and unreasonable and insatiable
consumers of the nation’s wealth. Newly elected governments and Parlia-
ments were reluctant to devote scarce money to armed forces and security
services, which they neither trusted nor considered necessary. Large, unre-
formed Soviet-style armies were perceived as making huge and wasteful
demands on state resources.

In most countries, hugely redundant military manpower and infrastruc-

ture reinforced the attitude amongst the public and the politicians that the
armed forces must be cut and reformed as quickly and radically as possi-
ble. Universal conscription was viewed as a waste of time and an unneces-
sary burden on young people. This heightened the alienation. This alien-
ation in turn meant less public money devoted to armed forces struggling
to come to terms with the new realities of democracy, a transformed stra-
tegic situation, new thinking and a requirement for drastic reduction and
restructuring.

All these factors have made integration of the armed forces into the life

of many of the transition states a difficult process.

External Factors. A welcome external stimulus to reform and integra-

tion has been the prospect of NATO and EU membership for many of the
new democracies. In many countries these realities and pressures have
helped to change attitudes on both ‘sides’. The events of 11 September and

44 Cohen

its aftermath have highlighted the imperative for a quick transition to
smaller, more flexible armed forces and security services.

The integration process has been given a boost by considerable overt

pressure from allies and future allies, which has forced defense and secu-
rity establishments to radically revise old doctrines and to develop rational
security and defense policies. In addition, military officers, politicians, of-
ficials and members of the media trained and educated in western institu-
tions have come home with a new level of understanding of the place of
defense and security in democratic societies. The gap in mutual knowledge
and understanding is gradually narrowing.

Universities in many of the transition countries have begun to offer

courses in security and strategic studies and defense-related issues. Mili-
tary educational establishments have also made considerable efforts to
reach out to civilians, politicians, officials and members of the media by
providing courses and seminars on security issues. Many younger journal-
ists now take a lively interest in defense and security sector issues.

3.3 Modernisation

The third phase in the civil-military relations transformation is modernisa-
tion. Modernisation of the armed forces and the security services is a con-
tinuing process even in the long-established systems of the ‘old’ democra-
cies. It is, however, a more difficult and more necessary part of the civil-
military relations equation in the transition countries. Not only is the need
for modernisation more radical here, but it is also immensely more diffi-
cult as it encompasses a real revolution in thinking.

The simultaneous demands of democratisation, development of a free

market economy and reform of the military and the security services has
placed considerable strain on the management of security sector reform
and civil-military relations. This multiple transition has resulted in an acute
lack of resources for armed forces reform and modernisation.

Modernisation is not solely a question of money. It requires a sea

change of thinking. As the old generation of military and security services
leaders gradually disappear from the scene, younger, more open and in-
creasingly western-trained and oriented officers move into positions of
command. Simultaneously, an increasing number of knowledgeable civil-
ian officials, academics and politicians are gaining positions of influence
and power within the defense and security establishments.

The fast changing strategic developments in Europe and beyond have

made the process of ‘intellectual’ and structural modernisation even more
complex. New security threats require new responses, new doctrines,
new structures and new weapons and equipment of almost every kind.

Civil-Military

Relations

Modernization is an uphill struggle. Its success will require teamwork and
mutual understanding between civilian politicians and bureaucrats and a
new generation of military and security officers.

Civil-Military Relations in a New Era

The quickly changing demands by old and new allies in Europe and North
America on their armed forces and security services in the fight against
terrorism and defense against weapons of mass destruction has increased
the pressure for reform and modernisation. At the same time it has made
the ultimate goals of reform less certain and the process more complex.

How can and should military forces contribute to the anti-terrorist cam-

paign? How should they interact with the other security services? Should
armed forces have a role in internal security? How should they be struc-
tured and equipped to face the new challenges? What is the future for con-
scription in a world of increasing professional and technical demands on
soldiers at every level? What effect will the new security concerns have on
transparency and civil-military relations? There are no easy answers to
these questions.

The armed forces of the new democracies and their political leaders

have few clearly defined models of reform to choose from. Western coun-
tries are struggling with a bewildering array of new policies and structures.
There are common themes but modernisation in each country is taking
place at varying speeds and directions in accordance with unique political,
economic, historical, and geographic factors. The new democracies and
their civilian and military leaders therefore face a puzzling landscape.
They know that modernisation must take place but are often unsure in
which direction to move.

Tight budgets and the continuing legacy of high manpower levels and

redundant infrastructure make meaningful reform in many countries often
appear insurmountable. This is a source of continuing friction both within
defense establishments and between the soldiers and their political mas-
ters. Conflicts in and around countries like Russia and the South Caucasian
and the Central Asian states compound the difficulties. In these countries,
longer-term reform and modernisation are understandably subordinated to
the immediate demands of the crises at hand. These governments and their
armed forces have little time to think about radical doctrinal and structural
reform. The real and perceived demands of secrecy in the name of the su-
preme interests of the state have further increased the strain on civil-
military relations.

46 Cohen

The War on Terror: Its Effect on Civil-Military
Relations

The longer-term effect of the war on terror on civil-military relations in
both the old and the new democracies is not yet clear. As nations react to
threats and perceived threats to their national security, society seems more
ready to accept constraints on traditional freedoms. In many countries,
people are submitting to increasing secrecy and inconvenience in exchange
for better security for themselves and their families.

The activities of security services are becoming more intrusive and

widespread especially in societies such as the U.S., France, Germany, Brit-
ain and other western European countries, which have grown increasingly
uneasy about their large Muslim immigrant populations. As the armed
forces are drawn into the ‘war’ on the home front, openness and transpar-
ency may be in danger of being clouded by the perceived needs for secu-
rity and secrecy.

The war on terrorism may also begin to blur the traditional division of

responsibilities between the military and the security and intelligence ser-
vices. The effect of this development is not clear but it certainly will pre-
sent new challenges to good civil-military relations in many countries.

At the moment, few of the new democracies appear to face the same

threat from terrorists as do the United States and Western European coun-
tries. So the implications of the ‘war on terror’ for the progress of civil-
military relations in these countries is perhaps less ominous. Whether this
continues to be the case is impossible to predict. But it does give most
transition states the opportunity to concentrate on the many ‘traditional’ is-
sues of the civil-military relationship outlined above.

A worrying development, however, in the months following the attacks

on 11 September, is that some governments, especially in Central Asia,
have used the ‘war against terror’ to tighten constraints on fledgling de-
mocratic freedoms. The security services and in some cases the armed
forces are being used to enforce restrictions on individual and group liber-
ties. This trend could endanger the delicate progress made so far in re-
building trust between the security forces and society. Disentanglement
and integration of the security forces could be seriously set back. Moderni-
sation will also suffer if armed forces are once more encouraged to turn
their efforts toward the preservation of the political power of the regime
rather than to the security of the state as a whole and the protection of its
citizens.

Civil-Military

Relations

6 Conclusion

Encouraging progress in civil-military relations has been made during the
past decade in the new democracies. The three essential steps, disentan-
glement, integration and modernisation are useful measures of progress in
this area. These stages overlap but their sequence of implementation and
their dependence on each other probably cannot be changed.

The armed forces and the security services in many of the new de-

mocracies, especially in Central Europe, have successfully disentangled
themselves from the legacy of the past and they are well placed to
achieve successful integration and increasing modernisation. However,
other countries, especially those further east, are still struggling with
disentanglement.

The war on terror poses a potential problem for satisfactory civil-

military relations in all democratic countries. In the new democracies in
particular, however, curtailment of freedoms in the name of security must
not be allowed to damage the growing ties between the soldier and the so-
ciety that he or she is entrusted to protect.

Untying the Gordian Noose: Humanitarian Law,
Democratic Control and the New Security
Environment

Jean-Jacques de Dardel

What Seems to Be the Problem?

‘International humanitarian law’, ‘democratic control of the armed forces’,
as well as the ‘new security environment’ are all notions that encompass
multifarious elements and sub-elements. Each has given rise to an abun-
dant literature, and their precise definitions and contours are still a matter
of study and controversies. Hence, binding them all together to come up
with a clear consequential line establishing their operational interrelations
is no easy task. Moreover, none of our main subject matters is inert enough
to allow for simple intellectual constructs around established certainties.
However different the pace of evolution may be between the slow ad-
vancement of a body of law and the haphazard turmoil of new security
threats, all are today in a state of flux. In times of accelerated transforma-
tions, a functional balance between different societal dimensions requires a
wide set of – at best – simultaneous adjustments. Finding a smooth path in
the maze of contradictory trends and value-systems is a challenging en-
deavour indeed.

The views expressed in this article are of the author in his personal capacity and do not
necessarily represent his government’s.

The problem we aspire to solve has, quite obviously, legal aspects. We

must look at international humanitarian law and closely related bodies of
law, such as human rights law, and examine their relevance in different
situations, as well as the evolving nature of their interrelations. Our puzzle
has, furthermore, political overtones, as the drive towards democratic con-
trol and legal supremacy necessitates steadfast decision making and role
model setting, conducive to changes in paradigms and ‘better educated’ in-
stincts. It has, finally, a wide set of practical implications, as it must trans-
late into applicable and clearly understandable rules and guidelines. As a
matter of fact, security sector reform, that wider scope of thought and
action linking the democratic control of the armed forces and the answers

50 de

Dardel

to the new security threats cannot be left to the upper crust of theoreticians
and high level decision makers. It must also effectively trickle down, so as
to be understood and applied – indeed embodied – by the wider whole of
individuals who play a part in our societies’ answers to looming threats.

In the following pages, we propose to delve shortly into the intricacies

of humanitarian law requirements for the transitional and post-conflict so-
cieties of South East Europe by examining in turn these three sets of as-
pects. In so doing, we will make special reference to the fight against ter-
rorism as well as the wars in Afghanistan and Iraq. We will thus come to
list a set of simple and operable humanitarian law requirements that should
serve as a rule of thumb for all endeavours striving towards a more ethical
and humane institutional security environment.

International Humanitarian Law and Human Rights
Law

International humanitarian law – jus in bello – regulates the conduct of
hostilities and protects persons particularly affected by armed conflict. Its
objective is to prevent and alleviate human suffering during armed con-
flicts. Its rules apply equally to all parties to a conflict, regardless of the
lawfulness of the resort to force. The laws of war date back many centuries
and owe much to the European Enlightenment and intellectuals such as
Emmer de Vattel, Hugo Grotius and Jean-Jacques Rousseau, not to speak
of the founder of the Red Cross, Henry Dunant, whose vision fathered the
very first Geneva Convention of 1863, as well as the Hague Convention
adopted in 1907. But whatever the historical importance of such stepping
stones, we can admit, for all practical purposes, that the main body of pre-
sent day international humanitarian law (as the law of war has come to be
better known) is made up of the four Geneva Conventions of 1949. As a
response to the horrors of the Second World War, these conventions estab-
lished humanitarian laws that applied to all aspects of truly international
conflicts. Even though article 3 common to all Geneva Conventions did re-
fer to non-international conflicts, it was soon overtaken by the multiplica-
tion, in the following years, of internal conflicts and the emergence of a
wide variety of non-state actors. That led to the adoption, in 1977, of two
Additional Protocols codifying humanitarian law applicable in non-
international armed conflicts.

Then, as a result of the acceleration of history after the fall of the Berlin

Wall, new developments in humanitarian law bolstered the Geneva Con-
ventions. New laws on chemical and laser weapons, as well as land mines
were adopted, UN Tribunals for Rwanda and Former Yugoslavia, as well

Untying the Gordian Noose

as a Special Court for Sierra Leone were set up, and a ground-breaking
Rome Statute for the newly-created International Criminal Court has been
ratified, by the end of July 2003, by 91 states. Beyond these new laws and
institutions, jurisprudence also set in to strengthen the widened scope of
application of humanitarian law. For instance, following the juxtaposition
of international and intra-state conflicts in the former Yugoslavia, the In-
ternational Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia clearly ruled that
humanitarian law also applies to non-international armed conflict, as it
asked:

“Why protect civilians from belligerent violence, or ban rape, torture or the
wanton destruction of hospitals, churches, museums or private property, as
well as proscribe weapons causing unnecessary suffering when two sover-
eign States are engaged in war, and yet refrain from enacting the same bans
or providing the same protection when armed violence has erupted ‘only’
within the territory of a [single] sovereign State?”

Thus international humanitarian law expanded at a slowly accelerating
pace. It came to encompass different kinds of situations: international
armed conflicts, non-international armed conflicts as well as internal strife.
After having avoided the entrapment of legal immobility, it extended to
new categories of combatants

, weapons and means to wage war. How-

ever, it has remained true to its initial purpose, which is to regulate armed
conflicts in the name of humanity, and do not apply in peacetime.

Parallel to the evolution of humanitarian law, human rights law was

codified at the international level with the adoption of the UN Charter and
the 1948 Universal Declaration of Human Rights. The last decades wit-
nessed a multiplication of treaties dealing with various human rights is-
sues, at the UN level (such as, among others, the Convention against Tor-
ture), or within regional frameworks, such as the Council of Europe. But
these two bodies of international law have different goals and different are-
as of applicability.

Human rights law safeguards the fundamental rights of individuals

against abuse of power by the State or by whichever authority exercises de
facto power over individuals. Its provisions are generally applicable in all
circumstances. However, in case of particular emergency or exceptional

The Prosecutor v. Tadic, Decision on the Defense Motion for Interlocutory Appeal on
Jurisdiction, 2 October 1995, ILR, vol 105, 506.

For a thorough analysis of humanitarian law’s extension to freedom fighters, see: M.
Veuthey, Guérilla et Droit Humanitaire (Genève, Comité International de la Croix-
Rouge 1983).

52 de

Dardel

circumstances, certain rights can be abrogated for a limited time, and pro-
tection reduced or made subject to strict procedural requirements.

International humanitarian law, for its part, applies to international and

non-international armed conflict. None of its provisions may ever be sus-
pended in precisely those circumstances in which it is meant to apply. On
the other hand, it is not applicable in peacetime, an aspect at times over-
looked, particularly in the ongoing discussion on the response of interna-
tional law to terrorism.

Does this mean that there is a clash between humanitarian and human

rights law? Or that there could be a set of loopholes between them that
would entail voids in the protection of those victims they aim at guarding?
Common sense readily indicates that this could not have been the intention
of the lawmakers, and that there can be no legal exceptions to human dig-
nity and basic human rights. As H.-P. Gasser recalls, the longstanding
“principle of humanity” is the common denominator of both bodies of law.
Hence – an ongoing rapprochement between the two is a fact, conducing
not to an unnecessary merger, but to a full coverage of different situations,
whatever the type of crisis. And indeed, in recent years, advances have
been made in linking together humanitarian and human rights law, in the
quest to achieve a universal guarantee of elementary human rights in both
times of peace and times of war.

In particular, the complementary role of both sets of laws allows for ex-

tensive applicability to asymmetric wars and terrorism, whatever the defi-
nition of the terrorist and the terrorist act. By all tokens, existing norms of
humanitarian law are appropriate and sufficient when the war on terror
amounts to armed conflict

– and remains applicable in the aftermath of

such a conflict to prisoners made during operations. Domestic and interna-
tional laws and institutions of crime and punishment, on the other hand,
usually suffice when terror and counter-measures do not rise to the level of
armed conflict.

H.-P. Gasser, ‘International Humanitarian Law and Human Rights Law in Non-
international Armed Conflict: Joint Venture or Mutual Exclusion?’, in: German Year-
book of International Law (Berlin, Duncker&Humblot, 2002) 150.

H.-J. Heintze, ‘The European Court of Human Rights and the Implementation of Hu-
man Rights Standards During Armed Conflicts’, in German Yearbook of International
Law (2002) 61.

G. Rona, ‘Interesting Times for International Humanitarian Law: Challenges from
the ‘War on Terror’, The Fletcher Forum on World Affairs, Vol. 27:2 (Summer/Fall
2003) 57.

Untying the Gordian Noose

The Transformation of the Security Sector and Its
Effects on Humanitarian Law

Democratic control over all armed forces has become, throughout the post-
Berlin Wall decade, an avowed priority of most transitional societies. Lib-
erated from despotic rule, freed from the widespread abuse by formerly
omnipotent military, paramilitary and police forces, most of these born-
again countries have adopted democratic ideals, which they strive to im-
plement institutionally. Not so slowly and surely, the common truth is
sinking in: that established democracies are unlikely to experience civil
war – and that less rooted democracies are still better able than authoritar-
ian regimes to cope with political unrest. Why? Probably because democ-
racies, unlike dictatorships, offer non-violent ways of resolving political
conflicts, and opposition groups have reason to hope that their turn will
come

. Thus, the democratic control of the armed forces is not put into

question anymore, as at least a working objective of all South East Euro-
pean countries. As the UNDP ascertains:

“Since the early 1990s many Central and Eastern European countries – the
Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, Slovenia and
to a lesser extent Bulgaria and Romania – have been democratizing civil-
military relations. With few exceptions, there is little threat of direct mili-
tary intervention in domestic politics. New legal and institutional mecha-
nisms for civilian oversight of military affairs have created opportunities
for greater transparency and for participation in security policy by Parlia-
ments, media, academics and civil society organizations. In forging a more
holistic approach to civil-military relations, these democratic reforms have
buttressed steps in many countries to establish civilian mechanisms for
making defense policy and managing the security sector.”

If a number of South East European countries do not yet qualify for UNDP
recognition, the trend, at least, is set throughout the area.

The notion itself of democratic control of the armed forces is not yet

passé, for sure. But the order of the day in Europe, as elsewhere, is rather
more that of security sector reform, which goes a number of steps further
than mere democratic control. It is as much topical in an old democracy
such as Switzerland as it is in transitional societies. Security sector reform
implies a myriad of small and big changes. It too, is well underway, and

‘Democratizing security to prevent conflict and build peace’, in Human Development
Report (UNDP, New York 2002) 85.

UNDP, Human Development Report (2002) 92.

54 de

Dardel

even in such troubled countries as Bosnia and Herzegovina, not since the
end of World War II has the international community committed such re-
sources to reform a country’s security sector

As the necessity for reform sets in, as adjustments take hold, as change

becomes the more obvious path, the perception of ongoing transformations
widens. A form of ‘new think’ becomes prevalent, as a burden for some
and as a welcome evolution for others. This development, a bit paradoxi-
cally perhaps, may be fraught with dangers for humanitarian law. Indeed,
in this widening sea of change, a tendency may well settle in to put into
question a larger set of rules and landmarks than need be. We may come to
witness an uncanny leniency towards reshuffling all cards, not only the
badly trumped ones. That is why under the fallacious pretext of new im-
plementation of security sector reform, international humanitarian law may
start being questioned. The temptation may come about to embark on its
redrawing, not to widen its grasp on behaviour in times of crisis, but, quite
to the contrary, to limit its effects, or tamper with its requirements and
deeper meaning.

Such a pernicious erosion of humanitarian law is nothing new. There

have been, traditionally, different types of reasoning that have brought the
military – not to speak of less disciplined armed groups – to attempt to put
limits on the applicability of international humanitarian law. Hugo Slim
has described five main strands of the ‘long and gruesome tradition of re-
jecting the civilian idea’

: the trumping of the notion of civilian identity

with a single, absolute and death-justifying identity that people cannot ne-
gotiate in any way (paramount to racist, genocidal or totalitarian ideology);
the deliberate choice of terror as an effective political and military strat-
egy; the ‘blurring’ of the identity of the civilian, perceived to come from
the civilian person’s moral, political or material relationship with the en-
emy war effort. ‘Rejectionism’ may further derive from wayward passions
and hatred, the frustrations of injustice and loss, sheer fear or the excite-
ment of murderous power and the thirst for revenge. Finally and particu-
larly relevant to our train of thought, there are the more practical concerns
of technical impossibility and military necessity, the claim that, in practice,
protecting civilians is often neither possible nor desirable in the urgent
pursuit of legitimate war aims. Ideas of military necessity or collateral
damage are recognized as valid and acceptable. Of course, such views do
not imply a rejection of humanitarian law requirements in principle. But,

UNDP, Human Development Report (2002) 95.

H. Slim, ‘Why protect civilians? Innocence, immunity and enmity in war’, International
Affairs, Vol. 79, no. 3 (May 2003) 481–501.

Untying the Gordian Noose

as Slim puts it: there is often a slippery slope from a pragmatic position of
regrettable accident to an incremental if suppressed anti-civilian policy.

Today, these various excuses for rejection of the obligations of humani-

tarian law on grounds of relativism are compounded by at least three
damning factors of particular relevance in South East Europe.

The first hinges on the new theories and experiences related to ‘humani-

tarian intervention’. Indeed, ever since the interventions in Kosovo, Bosnia
and Herzegovina and Albania – not to mention similar actions from Soma-
lia to Haiti, from Rwanda to Sierra Leone – it has become rather widely
accepted that when egregious breaches of human rights amounting to
crimes against humanity are committed

, force may have to be used to end

the offending behaviour

. This may lead to unwarranted interrogations as

to the scope and purpose of humanitarian law, perceived by some as it may
come to be as a mere excuse for intervention or aggression.

The second relates to the overall trauma of the Balkans, where the in-

numerable and indescribable horrors of recent wars have carried as many
violations of all rules of humanitarian law. As a matter of consequence,
humanitarian law has perhaps become irrelevant to many who deep down
inside, seek revenge, or would be ready to exert it at the next occasion in-
stead of reasoning and appeasing their anger. The former Yugoslavia, it
must be recalled, had ratified both the Geneva Conventions and their Addi-
tional Protocols, and both Bosnia and Croatia announced their adherence
to these rules at the beginning of their wars. But what was left of these
commitments at the end of the disaster?

The third factor is linked to the policies and actions taken by the United

States since the September eleven attacks. As of the military actions taken
against the Taliban and al-Qaeda in Afghanistan, and more recently in
Iraq, the USA has contributed to a certain regression of humanitarian law.
In effect, the pendulum is now swinging away from the protection of
the rights of the individual towards the protection of the safety of the
community

A. Cassese, ‘Ex iniuria ius oritur: Are we Moving towards International Legitimation
of Forcible Humanitarian Countermeasures in the World Community?’, and B. Simma,
‘NATO, the UN and the Use of Force: Legal Aspects’, European Journal of Interna-
tional Law website, at: http://www.ejil.org/journal/Vol10/No1/com.html.

A. Roberts, ‘Law and the Use of Force After Iraq’, Survival, The International Institute
for Strategic Studies, vol. 45, no. 2 (Summer 2003) 31–56.

T. Winkler, Managing Change. The Reform and Democratic Control of the Security
Sector and International Order, Occasional Paper No. 1 (Geneva: Geneva Centre for
the Democratic Control of the Armed Forces, October 2002) 29.

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Granted, all is not black and white, the American psyche has not thrown

legalism overboard overnight, and the great weight of American opinion
does take the view that the U.S. should act unilaterally if necessary, but
multilaterally if possible – and it remains understood that multilateral ac-
tion should almost always be possible

. However, in effect, the opposite

rules the day

. Current U.S. policies often contradict established rules of

law, as there seems to be a tacit assumption shared by many American de-
cision-makers and scholars that while international ethics and morality
does count to a certain extent in international relations, international law
does not

, as exemplified by the fuzzy status afforded to the Guantanamo

detainees

. Even strong supporters of the United States initial efforts at

combating the scourge of terrorism are put off by some of its attitudes,
deemed ‘illiberal, unjust and likely to be counter-productive for the war
against terrorism’

. Hence the official rejection of advances in humanitar-

ian law, such as the Ottawa Convention on landmines. The epitome of this
unilateralist attitude is to be found in Washington’s treatment of the Inter-
national Criminal Court established by the Rome Treaty. In rejecting the
ICC and in pressuring its allies and friends so as to corner them into sign-
ing bilateral agreements providing for the immunity of its own soldiers, the
USA does nothing to strengthen the international jurisdiction over war
criminals and to establish the universal validity of all aspects of humanitar-
ian and human rights laws.

W. B. Slocombe, ‘Force, Pre-emption and Legitimacy’, Survival, IISS, vol. 45, no. 1
(Spring 2003) 117–130.

Ethics do play a part in mustering support for use of force, but they do not drive the de-
cision-makers as they would like to portray it: “Even if, in the end, a U.S.-led war effort
serves to strengthen American power in the region more than anything else, the use of
ethical rhetoric will have been a necessary ingredient in furthering that national secu-
rity agenda.” L. H. Gelb and J. A. Rosenthal, ‘The Rise of Ethics in Foreign Policy’,
Foreign Affairs, (May/June 2003) 5.

Y. Onuma, ‘International Law in and with International Politics: The Functions of In-
ternational Law in International Society’, European Journal of International Law, EJIL
14 (2003) 113.

“The strangeness of the U.S. position, under current international law, thus is plain. It
claims that the United States is at war with al Qaeda, giving U.S. soldiers the freedom
to attack al Qaeda fighters anywhere it finds them. Yet it claims that al Qaeda members
are as a collective group and by definition ‘unlawful combatants’, with no right to use
force against members of the U.S. military.” A. Dwarkin, Revising the Laws of War to
Account for Terrorism: The Case Against Updating the Geneva conventions, On the
Ground That Changes Are Likely Only to Damage Human Rights,
http://www.findlaw.com (February 2003).

Unjust, unwise, un-American, The Economist (July 10, 2003).

Untying the Gordian Noose

Well, it just so happens that the USA exerts great pressure on South East

European countries, and ‘new Europe’ as a whole, to meet its goals in this
respect. The combined effect of these simultaneous factors is to possibly
facilitate a change of hearts and minds about the essence and the applica-
bility of international law, and more particularly international humanitarian
law. Why respect this law, why consider it intangible and universal, many
may ask, when your main partner and role model of sorts acts in such a de-
fiant and self-serving manner?

Add to that the fact that international humanitarian law, as we have es-

tablished previously, is in a process of expansion and bridge-building to
human rights law, and it readily appears that the danger is real to see re-
form endeavours in the security sector bring about a turn away, not to-
wards, the rigor of international humanitarian law, and its role as a bul-
wark against barbarity.

In the face of a possible corrosion of ideals, it is worth stressing that

everything must be undertaken to prevent reforms and reformists from fal-
ling into a trap. As the Director of the Geneva Centre for the Democratic
Control of the Armed Forces puts it: Particularly

“in the fight against terrorism and barbarism, the ends do not justify all
means, if we do not want to jeopardise, and eventually lose, the very core of
our value-system: democracy, justice and human dignity. For how could we
otherwise convince the young democracies of what used to be Eastern
Europe and the successor states to the former Soviet Union to move for-
ward in their difficult transition towards democracy and the rule of law?
(…) How could we maintain the moral high ground, indispensable for forg-
ing a genuinely global coalition, and strategy, against terror?”

Certain truths borne out of civilisation must indeed be reaffirmed. As so
many before him, the French Foreign Minister, Dominique de Villepin,
was right when he reaffirmed in London the primacy of law over force:
‘La force n’est pas le privilège des uns, le droit l’alibi des autres’

. In the

particular case of international humanitarian law, the ICRC has stressed
that it is ready to engage in an ongoing analysis of how to improve this
body of law further and how to contribute to the clarification of certain of

T. Winkler, Managing Change. The Reform and Democratic Control of the Security
Sector and International Order, 30.

D. de Villepin, Le droit, la force et la justice, Conference at the IISS, London, 27
March 2003. He went on to say:

“

Il n’y a pas d’un côté le choix de la force, de l’autre

le choix du droit. (…) La primauté du droit n’est pas un aveu de faiblesse, ni un facteur
d’impuissance. Elle est une exigence morale et politique, la condition de la justice,
mais aussi de l’efficacité. Seule la justice en effet garantit une sécurité durable.”

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its key concepts

. But it has also made clear that any attempt to re-evaluate

its adequacy can only take place after it has been determined that it really
is the law which is lacking and not, in fact, the political will to apply it. It
has also underlined that it will not engage in a development of the law if
this is an excuse to reduce existing standards

. Most specialists of interna-

tional humanitarian law share this attitude and ponder over its adequacy
and disavow attempts at bending it to fleeting political circumstances. In
February 2003, a number of government and independent experts gathered
at Harvard to address the issue of adequacy of international humanitarian
law. Most concluded that the law is satisfactory, and does not need mend-
ing. They established, among other conclusions, that there is a danger that
reopening the debate on re-evaluating the Geneva Conventions would en-
able groups to push for other changes in the law, such as allowing the mili-
tary to attack some civilian targets, that could set back humanitarian val-
ues. The question of when, if ever, civilians could legitimately be attacked,
and the related question of how much care must be taken to avoid civilian
casualties, would likely be intensely controversial.

Thus, as security sector reform unfolds in South East Europe, just as

elsewhere, the permanence and lasting validity of international humanitar-
ian law must go on looming large over all temptations to justify, in retro-
spect, the ghastly violations of the past, as it remains axiomatically true
that no amount of wrongs makes a right.

Practical Steps to Ensure Understanding of and
Compliance with Humanitarian Law

Security sector reform hinges on the oversight and control of all security
forces by the institutions of the democratic state, the government, Parlia-
ment and the judiciary, and in a wider sense the democratic mechanisms of

The doctrine on Humanitarian and Human Rights law is the subject of constant research
and international specialized meetings, such as the ‘Report of the International Com-
mission on Intervention and State Sovereignty’, The Responsibility to Protect, of De-
cember 2001, the Symposium in Kiel (Germany) on ‘The Fusion or Co-existence of In-
ternational Human Rights Law and International Humanitarian Law’, held in
September 2002, or the Harvard ‘Informal High-Level Expert Meeting on the Reaf-
firmation and Development of International Humanitarian Law’, held in February 2003.

Statement by the President of the ICRC, J. Kellenberger, at the 59

Annual Session of

the United Nations Commission on Human Rights, Geneva, 18 March 2003.

Revising the Laws of War to Account for Terrorism: The Case Against Updating the
Geneva Conventions, On the Ground That Changes Are Likely Only to Damage Hu-
man Rights.

Untying the Gordian Noose

civil society at large

. It also aims at improving and strengthening interac-

tion between the armed forces, the various police corps and other internal
security agencies, as well as border guards and the intelligence commu-
nity. What is strived for is better cooperation between different forces with
different expertise and training, so as to tackle various security threats in a
concerted and comprehensive manner. As is already often the case, such
concerted action implies use of synergies and cross development of sup-
portive roles. For instance, Army logistics come in support of border
guards and police, or police forces supplement Army contingents not
geared for law and order or crowd control work. Anti-terrorist units of dif-
ferent armed services may join forces, just as intelligence services of both
the police and the military may come to exchange information within the
relevant legal framework allowing for such cooperation.

As cooperative habits develop, the overall efficiency of the security sec-

tor should gain strength, and the benefits of Army, police and border guard
collaboration will become more obvious to all. However, as more detailed
divisions of labour set in, special attention will also have to be given to
what rules of humanitarian law, human rights or other bodies of law apply.
This is most likely to be the case in peacekeeping operations abroad, an ac-
tivity which is definitely on the rise: the UN, for instance, has embarked on
more peacekeeping missions since the early 1990s than in all the previous
decades since its inception

. In view of this trend, South East Europe is

likely to be not only the locus of foreign involvement in peace support, but
also a net provider of peace support units and personnel for multilateral
operations. Even in Bosnia, a newly created Peace Support Operations
Training Centre aims at enabling that multinational country to develop a
peacekeeping capability tasked with missions abroad.

Such developments automatically imply a widening set of civil-military

interactions, with particular overtones as to the application of humanitarian
and human rights rules. As the complexity of integrated operations rises,
so must develop rule-setting and the appropriate training. However

It may not be superfluous to underline in this context that the main responsibility for ef-
fective control rests with the civilian actors, who must develop the necessary savvy to
live up to their task. Indeed, Effective accountability in security matters will never ma-
terialize if oversight institutions lack the capacity to assess security activities. Without
that capacity, a cycle of ignorance will persist. UNDP, Human Development Report
(2002) 89.

It is worth noting that the applicability of humanitarian law to forces conducting opera-
tions under United Nations command and control was reaffirmed in the Bulletin of the
UN Secretary-General issued on 6 August 1999 to mark the 50

anniversary of the

adoption of the Geneva Conventions of 1949.

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complex the situation, expediency, military or police necessity must not be
used as a convenient excuse to renege humanitarian obligations. The ap-
parent innocuousness of mere ‘collateral damage’ cannot be allowed to
distract from the central obligations of the rule of law, lest the conduct of
peace support operations, police actions or counter-terrorism measures add
incrementally to a tendency to throw humanitarian law overboard as cum-
bersome and impractical. In other words, however complex the environ-
ment or the combined operations, prioritisation of duties and mission
goals, as well as all relevant training must not be conducted to the disad-
vantage of humanitarian law.

The first challenge in this field is often to not overdo legal perfection-

ism. Theoretical debating and fine-tuning will go on being as vivid and vi-
tal to legal advancements as juridical dissertations and rulings. However,
what is more needed than ever in a changing world with moving bearings
and evolving security threats is the ability of experts and legal advisers to
reach out to laymen, soldiers, policemen and border guards, to the foot
soldiers as it were, to teach them simply but comprehensively the relevant
provisions of humanitarian and human rights law. Above all, the recipients
should come out of all training convinced of the merits of humanitarian
law, so as to develop proper instincts and attitudes.

To achieve this goal, trainers should rely on tried and tested methods of

training and teaching – IHL manuals and courses are quite widespread, if
not all up to date. But they should also develop new arguments derived
from recent conflict experience and case studies. Indeed, morals, ethics
and a sense of humanity will in most instances readily remain at the core
of starting explanations and argumentation. But there is abundant proof
that this cannot suffice. The sad truth laid out about civilians holds true in
the wider context of all humanitarian concerns:

“even when people start by believing in the idea, they may not be able to
hold on to such a belief in the face of the threat posed against them, the cha-
risma of their leaders, and the sheer force of the systems of power, ideology
and indoctrination constructed around them.”

The best way to counteract at all levels the quicksand of purpose alienation
is to put the accent on a new understanding of the general, political, strate-
gic and individual benefits of the observance of humanitarian and human
rights law. Isn’t it uncanny that essays upon essays and books upon books
tread on the more legal and intellectual points about these bodies of law,

H. Slim, Why protect civilians? Innocence, immunity and enmity in war, 484.

Untying the Gordian Noose

but that only the odd sentence will refer to the fact that abiding by humani-
tarian law is best to avoid acts of revenge? A feeling of obviousness as to
the merit of humanitarian law permeates the relevant literature to the point
that its actual concrete benefits are seldom discussed. Yet that is precisely
the level at which training and teaching should concentrate on instilling a
deeply rooted personal understanding of the advantages of humanitarian
rules, whatever the scope of responsibilities of the individual grappling
with the notion. Added to that, it must be said that ongoing developments
around and beyond international humanitarian law proper have increased,
rather than diminished the difficulty for the layman to grasp once simple
and one-dimensional rules

As a matter of fact, today’s wars are different from the ones of yore.

They often lack continuity, times of active hostilities coming to alternate
unpredictably with quieter phases. Those phases of open fire are more of-
ten than not relatively short, though not always less bloody. As exempli-
fied by the latest war on Iraq, or previous to that by the military actions
undertaken by coalition forces in Kosovo or Afghanistan, modern conflicts
tend to be protracted, with rather short outbursts of open military cam-
paigns, followed by very long stabilisation and reconstruction phases.
There are exceptions, naturally, as exemplified by the dire Chechen situa-
tion. But as more and more wars are fought by coalitions purporting to
save a population through humanitarian intervention, or to re-establish
democracy so as to lastingly pacify a region, the post-conflict era repre-
sents a challenge more daunting than the conduct of war operations them-
selves. More and more reference is made these days to the fact that win-
ning the peace in Iraq is going to be more difficult than winning the war

As it becomes ever more obvious that no pacification and reconstruction

can succeed rapidly without the active cooperation of the local civilian
population, perceptions widen as to the backlash of all humanitarian law
abuses during the conduct of war operations. The level of civilian consent
and acceptance of foreign forces, of cooperation in peace-building efforts
and of institution re-creating is directly dependant on the level of resent-
ment of the local population and its deep-seated hatred of the perceived
enemy. Basil Liddell Hart’s said that ‘the object of war is a better peace –

W. Heintschel von Heinegg, ‘Fusion or Co-existence of International Human Rights
Law and International Humanitarian Law’, Symposium held in Kiel (Germany) 19–22
September 2002. Introductory Remarks’ in German Yearbook of International Law
(2002) 55–59.

F. Barton and B. Crocker, ‘Winning the Peace in Iraq’, The Washington Quarterly, 26
(2003) 10–11; A. Wenger, ‘Krieg und Frieden im Irak: Internationale Sicherheitspolitik
im Wandel’, Bulletin 2003 zur schweizerischen Sicherheitspolitik, 25.

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even if only from your own point of view. Hence it is essential to conduct
war with constant regard to the peace you desire

is as relevant as ever.

Conversely, ideological and indoctrinated hatred is more likely to subside
in the face of restraint and humane treatment. So, for the civilian or mili-
tary administrator of a region, a town or a neighbourhood, for the squadron
leader, the private, the military or civil policeman the track record of hu-
manitarian law observance by his own forces directly affects his personal
security and his ability to go on with his task. This is just as true in length-
ier conflicts, such as those that ravaged the Former Yugoslavia, where spi-
ralling into barbarism was a direct result of the unabated resort to the law
of the talion to counter atrocities. Although this may be commonly sensed,
it may be best to insist on factual examples so as to drive humanitarian
concepts into the deepest levels of consciousness of individuals.

As for the fight against terrorism and its apparently necessary rules of

exception, it must be stressed that any crackdown and outright frontal
counter measure will be short lived if the feeding grounds of terrorism do
not subside. Whatever the measures taken, popular support for terrorist or-
ganisations is unlikely to dwindle at a fast pace if serious breaches of hu-
manitarian rules and ideals feed general resentment in those communities
from which the terrorists originate. All the more so that terrorists usually
seek not so much destruction in itself, but rather to demonstrate the inher-
ent weakness of the opponent

, a flaw paradoxically exposed when the re-

action to the attack is more medieval than measured. In this context, the
benefits of a certain form of restraint and the upholding of higher values
will always outweigh those of unruly coercion, especially when it comes to
fighting an ideological battle for the soul of the social and political next-
of-kin of terrorists.

A Set of Humanitarian Law Requirements to Be
Computed into any Security Sector Reform

To conclude, we can outline a set of humanitarian law requirements of
universal relevance, to be reckoned with at all times, but most particularly
when defining and operating security sector reform to meet today’s secu-
rity challenges.

Quoted by: BG. R. Lane, The 3-Block war: Challenges of Command in Afghanistan
2002, Speech at the 6

Annual Conference of the Consortium of Defense Academies

and Security Studies Institutes, Berlin, 17 June 2003.

J. Baud, La guerre asymétrique, ou la défaite du vainqueur (Monaco: Editions du Ro-
cher 2003) 199.

Untying the Gordian Noose

First, humanitarian law must be upheld under all circumstances. It may

seem to some opportune and convenient, or trendy and forward-looking to
press for an aggiornamento of international humanitarian law to suit the
needs of policies defined in a particular context. This must not be allowed
to happen. International humanitarian law (IHL), and its human rights
counterpart applicable in non-armed conflict situations, cannot be made to
bend and flex to the point of compromising on their substance.

Second, IHL training should be adapted to include references to the ex-

panding body of humanitarian law. If the core rules remain the same, we
have seen that the body of humanitarian law does expand. New bans on
weapons, new international tribunals, evolving jurisprudence and custom-
ary international humanitarian law must all be taken into account. IHL
teaching material should be adapted correspondingly, lest an apparent in-
adequacy of the material raises doubts as to the present validity of the rules
it describes.

Third, IHL and Human Rights Law must be considered part of basic

military, police and otherwise security-related activities training. Rules
and references should be explained in a simple and logical manner, which
is all the easier since notions such as unnecessary suffering, protection of
the sick and wounded or the detained, among others, are universally and
cross-culturally understandable. In the long run, there is no substitute for
training and education to teach soldiers and policemen the respect of hu-
man rights and abide by principles of democratic governance. That must
be accompanied by a clear demarcation between military duties and police
tasks, however closely these different institutions come to cooperate.

Fourth, understanding should be developed both at the legal and practi-

cal, goal-oriented level. IHL observance is a must, legally and above all
morally. Its true basis is the individual’s conscience, and his institution’s
ethics. However, when that conscience is lacking or ideals seem too lofty
for the realities of armed conflict, IHL should be understood as remaining
relevant not so much to avoid prosecution, but because it makes military,
political and social sense, particularly in view of the long-term objectives
of the armed conflict and the reconstruction period. There always is a stra-
tegic interest to remain on the moral high ground in an armed conflict so as
to win the ensuing peace.

Fifth, IHL must be part of the whole chain of procurement and com-

mand. Humanitarian law must be of concern in the drawing rooms of
weapons systems and in munitions factories, as much as in the headquar-
ters of the general staff and parliamentary cenacles. It does not only apply
to the soldier in the field or the policeman in action. It is referential to all
levels of responsibility.

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Sixth, breaches of humanitarian law must be prosecuted. However diffi-

cult it may be at times to pursue the due process of law to its full comple-
tion, prosecution and accountability are as necessary to the instinctive re-
spect for humanitarian law as are the rules themselves, lest they be seen as
second-rate or superfluous. That, for instance, is the ultimate objective of
Milosevic’s trial: demonstrating that administering justice can contribute
to reconciliation by shaming the perpetrators and soothing the victims

Seventh, the efficacy of international humanitarian law is to be meas-

ured in terms of lives saved and injuries not suffered, not by the number of
prosecutions and convictions

. Humanitarian law may go on being tram-

pled on and discarded, horror will not disappear. But each time humanitar-
ian law is observed, every time an unnecessary suffering is avoided, it is
that law’s full purpose that is met, as are vindicated all efforts that go into
promoting it.

More requirements can be added to this list, to accommodate special

cases or operational concerns. But, for a start, the ones listed above may
serve as seven humane pillars of wisdom that no democratic society should
do without.

G. J. Bass, ‘Milosevic in the Hague’, Foreign Affairs, (May/June 2003) 84.

W. Fenrick, ‘The Law Applicable to Targeting and Proportionality After Operation Al-
lied Force: A View from the Outside’, in Yearbook of International Humanitarian Law,
vol 3 (2000) 79–80.

Part 3:
The Process of Reform of Civil-Military Relations,
the Democratic Control of the Armed Forces and
the Security Sector in South East Europe and the
Impact of the Launch of the Counter-Terrorist
Campaign: The National Perspectives

Process of Reform of Civil-Military Relations, the
Democratic Control of Armed Forces and the
Security Sector in Albania

Blendi Kajsiu

1 Introduction

The process of civil-military relations and security sector reform is very
complex since it takes place at different levels and within the context of
political, social and economic developments in Albania. The reform proc-
ess cannot and should be not analyzed in isolation from the larger social
context. Of particular importance in the Albanian case is the element of
state weakness that reflects itself in every step of the reform process. An-
other important factor that has conditioned reforms both in the civil-
military and the security area is the legacy of the past. This legacy will be
dealt with in both cases.

It is important to emphasize that civil-military relations and democratic

control of armed forces are an area that is quite separate from the security
sector in the case of Albania. The Albanian Constitution of 1998 intro-
duced a new concept to the definition of armed forces. According to this
concept the armed forces no longer include the security services and police
forces. This step was taken in order to enhance the civil control of the se-
curity sector. Therefore, for the purpose of clarity in this paper they will be
analyzed separately, although they have many problems in common.

Reform of the Military

At the core of the military reform is the establishment of a force with
western orientation that is based on professionalism. This means that the
peacetime active military units will be mostly based on a professional
force, and only a few of them will be completed by the conscript service.
The aim is to build a force with an increased operational capability than
the actual forces to defend the country’s interests, and capable to partici-
pate in international operations. A special importance will be given to the
joint operations of two or three forces/services, based on ‘The Joint Doc-
trine of the Armed Forces’, which has already been prepared but awaits
approval. Special units and segments of the armed forces will be able to

68 Kajsiu

participate in joint operations with other NATO and partner forces. In or-
der to achieve the above the government would increase the defense
budget by 0.1 percent every year so that by 2010 the military budget would
reach 2 percent of GDP.

All these measures and the reform itself will be implemented by keeping

in mind the requirements for NATO membership. In addition to political,
economic and legal aspects, reform of the armed forces is crucial for
membership in NATO. Professional armed forces will be organized and
trained to fully operate according to NATO standards by 2006. The goal is
to achieve interoperability in terms of organizational structures, work pro-
cedures in the military headquarters, military doctrine and training, opera-
tional level proficiency of the English language, and in the long term to
acquire equipment and systems that NATO countries have.

Despite a multitude of problems the Albanian armed forces have made

considerable progress. In fact one could argue that the process of reform in
the Albanian armed forces has been more successful than in most, if not
all, other areas. First of all, the armed forces have been increasingly adapt-
ing themselves to the new circumstances and NATO requirements, despite
the pronounced lack of financial and logistical resources. Besides their
more traditional role of securing the territorial integrity and sovereignty of
the country, according to the new Defense Policy Document of Albania,
the mission of Albanian Armed Forces is also to contribute to regional sta-
bility through participation in crisis management missions and in peace
support operations mandated by UN, OSCE, NATO or EU.

For this purpose a special commando unit has been created and prepares

to undertake difficult tasks and special missions, including peacekeeping
missions. This unit is trained and equipped also with the contribution of
the partner armies of NATO through PfP programs and joint exercises.
They have participated in peacekeeping missions in Bosnia-Herzegovina,
in SFOR, as part of the German contingent near Sarajevo. Also during
2002 a special commando unit of 30 soldiers was dispatched to Afghani-
stan for a period of 6 months as part of the Turkish mission unit attached to
the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF). This marked the first
time in which Albanian armed forces were deployed outside South East
Europe. Finally, an Albanian commando unit has joined the Coalition
Forces engaged in Iraq led by the U.S. as a combat support force.

As the above measures indicate the process of military reform has been

one of the most

successful reform processes in Albania. Part of the reason

I. Totozani: The Military Strategy of the Republic of Albania, DCAF Papers.

Gj. Gace: Peace Keeping and Regional Security, DCAF Papers

Albania

is the fact that clear goals are set and NATO membership conditionality
provides a good road map in this aspect. Another important factor that has
contributed to the relative success of the military reform is the very nature
of the military. First of all it has a clear hierarchical nature and clear line of
command, which has facilitated reforms since part of the institutional be-
havior of the military is to follow and obey orders. In this respect the mili-
tary are very different and a lot more efficient than the civil sector where
the implementation of the reforms presents more challenges. This is not to
say that there have not been shortcomings in the reform process of the
military. Yet these shortcomings are mostly a result of limited financial re-
sources and they originate mostly from the civilian sector rather than from
the military themselves. It is for this reason why we now turn to the civil-
military relations.

3 Civil-Military

Relations

The military was one of the most important institutions of the Albanian
Communist regime. However, in order to complete their control on society
at large the Communist elites were careful not to allow too much auton-
omy to the military. Nothing was outside the control of the Communist
party. This was especially the case with an institution as important as the
military which, given too much independence, could of course threaten
Communist rule. In order to realize such a control, the Communists made
sure that the recruits from reliable families would fill key positions. To fur-
ther enhance its control over the military, the Communist Party also util-
ized the institution of the kommissars who were party representative and
co-commanders with the commanding officers of the army units. The re-
gime also frequently purged the military in order to subordinate it. Thus,
only from 1965 until 1980, 2500 trials were set up for military personnel.

It goes without saying that all these measures were taken within a frame-
work of constant indoctrination.

It is important to emphasize that these measures resulted in the subordi-

nation of the army to political control, a legacy that is still with us. On the
positive side this has meant that throughout transition the army has not in-
terfered in civilian matters, while the reverse has been a constant concern.
The army has been deeply politicized which in turn has undermined
its professionalism and the process of reform itself. Therefore, in the

E. Leci, Eleminimi I Lidershipit Ushtarak, Instituti I Sigurimit dhe Mbrojtjes. Tiranë,
2002, p 185.

70 Kajsiu

Albanian scenario we are faced with a challenge that is almost the opposite
of the one many other countries, and especially those of Latin America, are
being faced with. This challenge is twofold. On the one hand the military
has to create its own institutional autonomy, away from political control
and intervention and once this has been achieved, or simultaneously, the
military should remain within the scrutiny of democratic civilian control.

3.1 Legal Framework for Civil-Military Relations

However, before we begin to analyze civil-military relation and the proc-
ess of reform, it is necessary to have an outline of the legal framework
within which such a relationship takes place. This legal framework regu-
lates civil military relations and is found in the new constitution approved
in November 1998. The Constitution and the legal acts on civil-military re-
lations provide a clear delineation of authority and a system of subordina-
tion of control and command of defense structures in times of war and
peace. However, a certain period of time would be necessary in order to
identify loopholes or contradictions that might exist in the legislation re-
garding civil-military relations. In this section we will briefly look at the
hierarchy of authority with regard to the armed forces. According to law
8671, dated 26 October 2000, ‘On the powers and command authority and
strategic direction of the armed forces of the Republic of Albania’, these
powers and authorities have the following hierarchical order: the Parlia-
ment, President, the Council of Ministers, Prime Minister, Minister of De-
fense, general staff, Chief of Staff, and the commanders of the Army,
Navy, and Air Force.

As the above hierarchical order shows, the Parliament is the main insti-

tution of oversight and control of the military. Its role has been further en-
hanced in the new Constitution. The Parliament approves strategic docu-
ments on national security and documents on defense policy and other
laws in the field of defense; approves the budget; exerts parliamentary con-
trol over activities connected with the armed forces; decides on expedi-
tionary missions; allows the passage or stationing of foreign troops and
their status; ratifies or annuls treaties and international agreements that are
connected to the territory, alliances, political and military matters, and
membership in international organizations in cases of threats or interna-
tional requirements for collective action. It may, upon the proposal of the
President, declare a state of war, and issue mobilization orders; and declare
the end hostilities.

Unlike in the case of the Parliament, the new Constitution has reduced

the powers of the President, who no longer enjoys law-making authority,
and has few appointment competencies. The President is Commander-in-

Albania

Chief of the armed forces, and in peacetime the President exercises its au-
thority over the armed forces through the Prime Minister and the Minister
of Defense, while in wartime the President leads the armed forces directly
or through the Commander of the Armed Forces. The main advisory organ
to the President of the Republic according to article 1683 is the National
Security Council. The advisory concept is new in comparison to the previ-
ous constitutional framework, where the National Security Council was
foreseen to be a decision-making body. While the general tendency in the
Constitution is to reduce the competencies of the President on military af-
fairs, the National Security Council, due to its advisory role does not limit
the President.

The Council of Ministers and the Prime Minister also exert considerable

control over the armed forces. Among other things the duties of the Coun-
cil of Ministers and the Prime Minister are to prepare the legal framework
and documents on Defense policy; to propose the budget, salaries and
other financial elements, policies toward recruitment and conscription,
propose extraordinary measures on part of or the whole territory in emer-
gency situations. The Council of Ministers and the Prime Minister also ex-
ert their control over armed forces through the Minister of Defense who is
a civilian and represents the highest official in peacetime of all military
and civilian personnel of the armed forces. He is responsible to the Parlia-
ment, the President, and Prime Minister for implementing Defense policy.

In his daily work, the Minister of Defense cooperates with the Chief of

General Staff who is elected to a three-year mandate with an extension op-
tion. The President appoints the Chief of General Staff, who should have
the rank of ‘General’ and the necessary experience, upon the proposal of
the Prime Minister. The Parliament has no role in this process, as it is in
general the case with high-ranking officials. In times of war, the Chief of
General Staff may be elected as Commander of the Armed Forces. The
Chief of General Staff is responsible to the President, the Prime Minister,
and the Defense Minister. This relationship assures the neutrality of the
Chief of General Staff that might have not been the case had he been re-
sponsible to only one authority.

3.2 Transparency and Accountability

As the brief outline of the military hierarchical and legal framework
shows, the Parliament is the main body of control and oversight of the

M. Nazarko: The Relationship Between the Armed Forces and the New Institutions in
Albania – a Model in the Making of Civil and Democratic Control, DCAF Papers.

72 Kajsiu

military. It usually exercises its oversight functions through parliamentary
committees, one of which is also the Defense Committee. Although there
is a legal framework in place, a variety of shortcomings can be identified
in the parliamentary oversight of armed forces. They are an outcome of
weak state institutions, and absent parliamentary and democratic traditions.
In order to explore them we will take a brief look at the parliamentary
oversight of armed forces and especially the defense committee that bears
primary responsibility for such oversight.

The powers of the Albanian Parliament and the Defense Committee

have been modeled after some of the best practices of the parliamentary
oversight of the security sector. First of all the Defense Committee func-
tions according to rules of procedure sanctioned by law, which is one of
the basic requirements of parliamentary oversight. Judging from the pow-
ers and competencies of the Parliament we should not rush to the conclu-
sion that transparency and accountability have been guaranteed by law.
Thus, while the Defense Ministry has the obligation to provide an annual
budget and report to the defense committee and Parliament, there are no
laws or regulations that require the Defense Ministry to do so periodically.
The Defense Ministry has not yet begun to provide periodic reports, the so-
called “Defense White Papers” on short, medium- and long-term resources
management. This has direct bearing on the level of accountability as well
as on the level of transparency as far as the budget and the policy making
process is concerned. There exists a legislative or procedural vacuum in
this respect.

Information is not provided regularly, except for the yearly report and

budget, but when the Defense Ministry is asked to do so. This is not to say
that there is no exchange of information between the Defense Ministry and
Parliament. Yet, a better regulated periodical exchange of information be-
tween the Executive and Parliament would certainly enhance the level of
transparency and accountability. A regulated periodical exchange would
not only increase the amount of information but also improve it qualita-
tively. This in turn would make it easier to trace funds and the execution of
government policies, which in turn would improve the level of account-
ability and transparency.

Legislative and procedural deficiencies also exist with regard to coop-

eration between different committees. Such cooperation and coordination
happens, if at all, only on an ad hoc basis and it is not regulated by rules of
procedure beyond very general principle such as the right that committees
have to cooperate, or the right of one MP to participate in more than one
committee. The absence of legislation in this respect is even more acute in
the Albanian case given the lack of parliamentary tradition. To enforce
transparency and accountability, not only on budgetary issues, there has to

Albania

be consistent inter-committee coordination relevant to the security sector:
such as defense committee, home affairs committee, budget committee, fi-
nance committee as well as foreign affairs committee. When such coordi-
nation is absent by tradition, it might be advisable to guarantee and enforce
it through rules of procedures.

Yet the absence of rules of procedure and the presence of legal loop-

holes are only part of the problem. Even in the hypothetical situation
where all the necessary legislation, rules of procedures and tradition were
in place, the Albanian Parliament would still not be capable to successfully
perform its oversight on the executive as a whole and on the security sector
in particular. Although the reasons for this are numerous and interrelated, I
will classify them into two categories: resource-related deficiencies and
political deficiencies. Although none of these is unique to the Albanian
case, of the two categories the first one is more characteristic of the Alba-
nian setting.

As far as resources-related deficiencies are concerned, the most acute is

the lack of both required and qualified staff. Parliament and especially its
committees cannot yet afford the necessary numbers of personnel and even
less the needed quality. Although there has been improvements recently,
the trade off is between quality and quantity. Practically both are needed if
a given committee is to perform oversight and ensure transparency and ac-
countability. For example, in the case of the committee on defense there is
only one adviser to the committee and one secretary. In the given case
there is more expertise among the MPs, some of which have a long experi-
ence with the military, than among the “hired experts”.

With such a limited staff it is impossible for this committee to challenge

the expertise of the Ministry of Defense, which has numerous staff, and
experts who have had most of their career on defense and military matters.
There exists a disturbing asymmetry since even when the defense commit-
tee reviews the budget or reports of the defense or security sector, they rely
on government expertise; the very expertise they have to pass judgment
upon. This is not to say that there is no oversight of the defense policy or
budget but that under these circumstances it becomes difficult to ensure
transparency and even more challenging to secure accountability.

Limited staff implies that parliamentary committees do not perform

some of their central duties, to which they owe part of their existence.
Thus, the reader should remember that one of the duties of the parliamen-
tary committees – and the defense committee is no exception in this case –
is to prepare draft laws. Such duty, or competency, remains in the realm of
the theoretical dimension only, since practically, and this has been the ex-
perience of the defense committee, all the draft laws or draft acts were and
still are prepared by the Ministry of Defense. Even when performing its

74 Kajsiu

duties, it has been the case that in the defense committee, the budget has
passed after only three meetings, while on average there is a two-week pe-
riod for the budget (which is not much given that committees usually meet
only three times a week).

Therefore, a better-regulated timeframe is nec-

essary to avoid this practical deficiency.

Given the limited resources of the defense committee even in important

matters such as the defense budget the final word belongs to the committee
of finance. ‘Verdicts’ on budgets are given by this committee, especially
due to its political composition and leverage. Here too there is a very lim-
ited and unregulated timeframe. Thus, so far budgets have been approved
within a two to three week period on average, while in more consolidated
functioning western democracies the budget approval period would take
two to three months on average. Furthermore, the budget is approved en
bloc, which makes transparency very difficult to enforce. Quite often there
are discrepancies between the fiscal package and the government program,
yet there is neither the time nor the resources, or the political will to ex-
plore them.

In the case of the military reform process this has meant that

objectives have not been backed by financial resources, which in turn has
produced more rhetoric than concrete results.

Due to scarcity of resources there is as yet no expert on national security

in the Albanian Parliament, thus government policy has to be judged
through government experts, and again transparency and accountability
remain rhetorical. Lack of resources also means that many of those powers
that are vested upon MPs, committees and subcommittees through legisla-
tive acts, rarely, if ever, materialize. Thus, although an MP may take or
propose a certain initiative which entails a certain cost, the MP or group of
MPs should also suggest the budget change, i.e., reallocation of funds
within the given budget items. Of course this would entail research and
expertise, which of course is not available, which is why budgets rarely go
through radical revisions or amendments.

Even the Government, despite a larger staff and greater expertise at its

disposal, does not have all the necessary information and administrative
capacities to prepare accurate budget and/or short-, medium- and long-term
strategies. A lot of guesswork goes into preparing draft budgets and calcu-
lating economic growth. Many estimates are calculated based on unreliable
information that are rarely updated and seldom disseminated properly.

Personal interview with Eranda Fejzullahu, Secretary to the Committee of Defense. 5
November 2002.

Personal interview with Genti Arapi. Adviser to the Committee of Finance. 8 Novem-
ber 2002.

Albania

Thus, even if the Parliament and its committees had the necessary staff,
expertise, time and political will to ensure transparency, they would have
to face further structural challenges that reflect Albanian transition
realities.

The scarcity of reliable and accurate information is important to empha-

size since transparency is that state of affairs where the Parliament has the
necessary information at its disposal to make sound policy decisions. The
absence of such information, combined with administrative deficiencies,
not only makes the decision-making process less transparent but also pro-
duces mismanagement and waste of resources, which in turn feeds percep-
tions of corruption way beyond actual corruption levels. At the same time
mismanagement might also create more room and incentives for corrup-
tion, especially as in the absence of transparency, accountability remains
nothing more than rhetoric.

Lack of resources means that independent expertise – much needed

given the political context – cannot be brought in. This is even more so in
the case of the defense and security sector. While there are few well-
functioning independent think tanks in Albania in general, for a variety of
reasons, there are even fewer on defense or security matters. This is due to
the fact that think-tanks and NGOs in Albania are donor-driven and there
is not much funding for NGOs by foreign donors, especially in the area of
defense since in the case of Albania it is not perceived to be one of the top
priorities.

4 Secret

Service

While the armed forces do not constitute a priority or concern for the Al-
banian society at large, the secret and security services attract a lot more
attention due to a variety of reasons. First of all it is important to empha-
size the legacy of the past as far as secret services are concerned. During
the Communist dictatorship the secret police (Sigurimi) was the most im-
portant instrument of control. It permeated society at an unprecedented de-
gree and instilled fear and terror in the population at large. At the time, the
workings of the intelligence service had very little in common with those
of democratic countries. Therefore, notwithstanding efforts to place this
service under democratic control, certain institutional traditions and atti-
tudes still persist. Democratic control of intelligence services is challeng-
ing in a country with a long democratic tradition, let alone a country that
has recently emerged from totalitarianism. Throughout the Albanian transi-
tion, opposition parties have accused government of using the intelligence
services in order to control and restrict their activity. It is an unfortunate

76 Kajsiu

fact that given the lack of a democratic tradition in this sector the govern-
ment often views intelligence services as an instrument of control.

Many of the problems that exist with the civilian control of the military

can also be found with the secret services. However in this area the prob-
lems are even more acute due to the very nature of this sector. Neverthe-
less some considerable progress has been made so far both from the legis-
lative perspective as well as regarding the actual degree of parliamentary
oversight of the security sector. This is even more so if we consider the
problematic legacy of the Communist past where secret services were the
major instrument of control and not at all open to the general public. While
some of the old mentalities persist the process of reform has considerably
changed although there is much room for improvement.

From the legislative standpoint, the Parliament has the necessary com-

petencies to perform oversight. Besides the ordinary forms in which par-
liamentary oversight is exercised, specific instruments are used of to moni-
tor the security services. As it is foreseen in law no. 8391 mentioned
above, the Parliament establishes a special sub-committee in order to over-
sight the State Intelligence Service (SIS). The Permanent Parliamentary
sub-committee of SIS is made up of five members and a chairman and a
deputy chairman is elected out of the five. Parliamentary groups are repre-
sented in the sub-committee in accordance with the general principle,
while preserving the proportion they have in the Parliament. Three out of
the five members belong to the opposition, and two of them represent the
majority.

Besides the permanent sub-committee of SIS another important instru-

ment of parliamentary oversight are committees of inquiry. In early May
2002, the Parliament of Albania passed the law on the organisation and
functioning of the Parliament’s committees of inquiry.

The investigative

parliamentary committees are important instruments to conduct parliamen-
tary oversight of the Government, and collect information on important is-
sues of public interest so as to reach particular political conclusions. Their
constitutional basis lies in Article 77 of the Constitution of the Republic of
Albania, which stipulates for “the Assembly has the right and, upon the re-
quest of one-fourth of its members, is obliged to designate investigative
parliamentary committees to review a particular issue. Its conclusions are

S. Berberi: Civil Control of Intelligence Services in Albania, DCAF Papers.

Law no. 8891, dated 2 May 2002 “On the Organization and Functioning of the Parlia-
ment’s Investigatory Committees”.

Albania

not binding in a court of law, but they may be made known to the office of
the prosecutor, which evaluates them according to legal procedures.”

Committees of inquiry are a relatively new way of parliamentary over-

sight. Recently an committee of inquiry was set up by the opposition in or-
der to investigate the activity of the SIS regarding alleged abuses with
funds and hostile activity against the opposition. No matter how one inter-
prets the work of such committee, which received some diametrically op-
posed evaluation, the fact remains that it did set a precedent. One could ar-
gue that it did also serve as a preventive measure against the use/abuse of
the SIS against the opposition or for political ends, a practice that has been
far too common in the past.

The Fight Against Terrorism and the Process of
Reform

The events of September 11

had a major impact in rethinking global secu-

rity threats. These events immediately affected the Albanian security sec-
tor in general and the armed forces in particular. Soon after the attacks the
Center for Strategic and Historic Studies a small think tank of the Defense
Ministry organized an international conference entitled “Terrorism a Chal-
lenge of Our Times: A Major Threat to the Security Environment”. This
conference was the first step in a variety of initiatives that were undertaken
by the Albanian armed forces, or in which the armed forces personnel and
representatives participated, in order to explore the new dimensions of ter-
rorism and the way in which this major security threat could be handled.
Such initiatives were necessary in order to better understand security
threats posed by terrorist attacks and adapt the security forces to this
phenomenon.

Partly as a result of these initiatives, the General Staff of the Command

of the Albanian Armed Forces redefined and updated the concept of terror-
ism in its military doctrine. In all the academic programs of the Military
Academy, terrorism was introduced as a major security threat and method-
ologies of military exercises based on terrorist threats were developed.
Based on the findings that resulted from these initial efforts to explore the
new dimensions of terrorism the Albanian military organized a number of
military exercises based on terrorist attack simulation. The training of the
special military and commando units was intensified while emphasizing

Personal interview with Pajtim Ribaj director of Center for Strategic and Historic Stud-
ies, Ministry of Defense, 10 May 2003.

78 Kajsiu

more terrorist attack scenarios. On that ground the fight against terrorism
was reflected in tightening security measures in army depots.

Reconnais-

sance and counter-espionage personnel were trained in order to improve
their efficiency. In this framework, attempts were also made in order to
better coordinate efforts both at the national and regional level.

At the national level armed forces began to cooperate and coordinate

their work and information with other security actors such as the State Se-
cret Services and the Ministry of Public Order. Training was also organ-
ized with the assistance of U.S. government agencies in which representa-
tives from different security institutions took part. At the regional level
joint military exercises were organized with the Macedonian Armed
Forces focusing on possible terrorist activity. Furthermore, Albania con-
tributed quite directly to the war on terrorism by sending some of its com-
mando troops in Afghanistan.

However, despite the above-mentioned efforts it is important to empha-

size that the war against terrorism in Albania has produced a lot more
rhetoric than concrete results. Many of the shortcomings reflect the chal-
lenges that the reform process of armed forces and security sector is facing
in Albania. At the risk of repeating some of these problems I would like to
mention just a few that are more exemplary. First of all both the armed
forces and the security sector lack the necessary expertise and resources
needed to employ think tanks or other similar research institutes in order to
perform professional analysis of security threats. This problem is further
compounded by the fact that defense and security structures still sustain an
institutional culture of closed decision-making dynamics. A good example
here is the National Security Strategy. This fundamental document was
produced through a closed decision-making process without the participa-
tion of relevant actors and experts from the so-called civil society. This
was not only due to closed decision-making dynamics, but also because
security matters are still perceived in the narrow sense of defense meas-
ures, and are better left to the Ministry of Defense and its structures.

Another important factor is limited financial resources. In the frame-

work of the war against terrorism and in the reform process in general, the
Government and politicians set lofty objectives. However the necessary fi-
nancial resources did not back such objectives, which is why they added
to the existing rhetoric. The importance of budgetary restriction can
hardly be exaggerated. Thus, according to the Military Strategy document,

Ribaj, Pajtim. ‘Terrorism a Challenge of Our times, its impact on security environment
and policies’. Defense: A Theoretical and Cultural Publication of the Ministry of De-
fense, Nr 1, 2002. p 37, Tirana, Albania.

Albania

expenditure on the Albanian armed forces will increase by 0.1% of GDP
every year for ten years until it reaches a more acceptable 2% of GDP.
This limited budgetary increase, combined with limited analytical capabili-
ties in order to better evaluate security threats, make it impossible for the
armed forces, especially given their present situation, to adapt to new secu-
rity threats appropriately.

Besides the armed forces, the Ministry of Public Order was one of the

institutions that was most directly affected by the changed security climate
due to the rise of terrorism. Although Albania is not yet on the list of ter-
rorist attacks it is still a potential target. Partly for this reason, but mainly
due to the international security climate and donor initiatives, many train-
ing projects were organized and carried out through U.S. Government pro-
grams such as ICITAP and PAMEKA under the focus area of terrorism.
The idea was to increase police force capacity in fighting terrorism. In this
framework the Anti-Terror Department in the Ministry of Public Order
was strengthened both in terms of improved human capacities but also lo-
gistically. Furthermore this department is working to prepare a national
Action Plan and a draft law on terrorism.

Some of the measures taken in the framework of the campaign against

terrorism reflect very well the overall dynamic of the reform process in
Albania. As the above-mentioned examples indicate, the major drive be-
hind the reform process is the promise of membership into Euro-Atlantic
structures. The measures taken by the Albanian armed forces and security
sector are above all an indication of willingness to be part of western coali-
tions, more than a reflection of the security threat posed by terrorism for
Albania. Although Albania actively participates in anti-terrorist coalitions
it can be hardly argued that terrorism is one of the major security threats
Albania is being faced with. Such a willful participation is expected to
bring benefits for Albanian society, the armed forces and security sector in
general, especially given the important geo-strategic position of the coun-
try. It is expected that Albania will receive more support in its efforts to
join NATO due to its stand in the war against terrorism. This was also
shown by the visit of Secretary of State Colin Powell in Tirana in order to
sign the Adriatic Initiative.

Although the challenge does remain for Albania to redefine its priorities

in the new security environment, the war against terrorism provides
an opportunity especially for the armed forces in order to raise public
awareness, on the necessity of armed forces and security services. This

Ylli Dylgjeri, Secretary General of the Ministry of Public Order. Personal Interview, 12
May 2003.

80 Kajsiu

awareness is necessary especially with regard to the integration into Euro-
Atlantic structures in general and NATO membership in particular. The
latter is mistakenly understood as simply a military matter. Although there
is a wide public support for NATO membership the process is strictly un-
derstood in terms of military reforms and separate from other crucial social
and institutional reforms

. In the absence of such awareness, the reform

process will be difficult since the sector will remain at the bottom of the
priority list while it will be increasingly difficult to justify spending in the
defense sector as security threats from neighboring countries are negligible
and the country faces a multitude of immediate problems.

The war against terrorism is also a good opportunity to involve civil so-

ciety to a greater extent in defense and security issues. This has not been
the case so far partly because the Albanian civil society does not have the
expertise necessary to deal with military matters. Local Albanian NGOs
are donor-driven and deal with issues that are closer to donor programs
such as democratization, gender issues, corruption, and economic devel-
opment. Donors do not usually fund projects that deal with the military
matters. Thus, as of now there are no, or very few NGOs or think tanks
that deal with military issues. The media on the other hand, an important
part of civil society does not have a sufficient level of competence and
analytical capability to deal with defense and security issues. Combined
with the lack of public interest, this results in the very low – not to say in-
existent – role of civil society in security and defense matters.

The fact remains that partly due to the legacy of the past and also due to

present developments the military is not an important actor on the Alba-
nian political scene. Recent developments on the global scene could pro-
vide a good opportunity for this to change so as the reform process in the
defense and security sector can receive more attention. Yet for this to hap-
pen developments on the international scene are not sufficient. These sec-
tors have yet to better define Albania’s national security threats and adapt
themselves accordingly. As developments have indicated, such threats are
not international but internal in nature, which makes the challenge at hand
even more daunting.

Civil-Military Relations in Bosnia and
Herzegovina

Bisera Turkovi

Reforms in Civil-Military Relations: A General
Assessment

In every state the military and its control is of special significance. In de-
mocratic societies the role of the state can be split into two categories: rela-
tions with civil authorities, and relations with the whole population. Estab-
lishment of civil-military relations should aim at creating a firm demo-
cratic control over the military force. Such control can be realised by way
of exercising authority of the sate on the whole security sector. The civil
authorities in Bosnia and Herzegovina are aware of this, although they still
have not managed to establish full democratic control, nor ‘healthy’ civil-
military relations in the country.

Bosnia and Herzegovina emerged from a four-year war as a destroyed

and a poor country. The war damage is estimated to amount to over 200
billion US dollars.

No segment of society has been left untouched by war.

Reconstruction thus had to encompass not only material goods but also all
aspects of the functioning of a state. Due to the multiplicity of important
issues that required immediate attention (reconstruction of houses, return
of refugees, infrastructure in the country), the civil-military relations were
left on the margins. Bosnia and Herzegovina, as a state, hence did not
keep-up with the trends in Eastern Europe in respect to civil military
relations.

State influence on the creation and development of civil-military rela-

tions is reflected in the normative basis and institutions, which regulate
this complex issue. In the normative field, Bosnia and Herzegovina was
from the very beginning hampered from regulating the civil-military rela-
tions, for it did not adopt its own Constitution – rather the Constitution
of Bosnia and Herzegovina is a result of the peace negotiations held in

Estimate given by Dujko Hasic, Institute for War Crimes, in an interview to Radio Free
Europe, 19 November 2002. See www.danas.org/programi/haaska.

82 Turkovi

Dayton in November 1995

. As shown below, no special attention during

the negotiations was paid to the civil-military relationship. Hence, Annex
IV of the Dayton Peace Agreement (the Constitution) does not clearly de-
fine this relationship.

The situation is similar in respect to the establishment of institutions,

which are tasked with the realization of civil-military relations. After the
war, the Parliamentary Assembly of Bosnia and Herzegovina was estab-
lished, but it did not include a Committee for Defense and Security. The
executive government was composed of only five ministries, which had
nothing to do with the military. At the state level, the most significant in-
stitution, which deals with military issues, is the Standing Committee on
Military Matters (SCMM), but this institution also paid no attention to the
establishment of civil-military relations.

As a result of war, weak economy, multiplicity of overlapping legal

provisions and non-existence of state military institutions the State of Bos-
nia and Herzegovina could not exert significant influence on the creation
of civil-military institutions.

Internal Political and Ethnic Tensions

In addition to legally and institutionally regulating civil-military relations,
the state is also responsible for creating an atmosphere, which would de-
termine the best possible model for democratic control of the security sec-
tor. Let me point out that the aim of democratic control is the democratic
and not only civil control of armed forces. However, control by civil au-
thorities in itself is not enough. There are many countries in which civil
structures are in the position of authority with armed forces subjugated to
them while the society, as a whole is not democratic. Here I am particu-
larly referring to the European states, which were formerly to the east of
the ‘iron curtain’.

General Framework Agreement for Peace in Bosnia and Herzegovina was officially
signed on 14 December 1995 in Paris, France.

As a sovereign and an independent country, Bosnia and Herzegovina

freed itself of the Communist heritage and introduced a multi-party sys-
tem. Today, the armies of Bosnia and Herzegovina no longer have to guar-
antee the political monopoly of the Communists. However, by no account
have the interior relations in Bosnia and Herzegovina been sorted out.
Weak economy directly effects civil-military relations. Funds put aside for
the armies of Bosnia and Herzegovina do not cover all the expenditures of

Bosnia

and

Herzegovina

the military apparatus. Inadequate salaries of officers and soldiers and in-
adequate work conditions have all contributed to a generally ill feeling of
soldiers. The primary concern of soldiers was to maintain their status and
have an income; civil-military relations were thereby put into second plan.
Till now, the civil authorities or for that matter the Parliament has never
called on any military official to explain their activities. It seems that the
defense budgetary discussions are the only time when civil authorities in-
ter-relate with the military. It is almost as if both the military and civil au-
thorities are satisfied with such interaction. As shown below, however,
these relations have begun improving and intensifying.

The second factor impeding the development of civil-military relations

are ethnic tensions both within the military and civil structures of govern-
ment. Bosnia and Herzegovina has two armies: Army of Republika Srpska,
which is a mono-national army, and Army of the Federation of Bosnia and
Herzegovina, which is composed of two components (Army of Bosnia and
Herzegovina and Croatian Defense Forces). These armed forces, without a
common command, function on the basis of national key and on the prin-
ciple of ‘non intervention in the affairs of the other’. It is therefore ques-
tionable whether in say a foreign attack on Sarajevo (today a city with ma-
jority Bosniak population), the Army of Republika Srpska would defend
this capital city.

Such situation and ethnic exclusivity does not however seem to worry

the civil authorities. The justification frequently given for such a situation
is that war wounds still have not healed and that mixing of soldiers of dif-
ferent nationalities would be counter-productive. Hence we have the situa-
tion where the politicians of Serb nationality control the Army of Repub-
lika Srpska, the Bosniaks control the Army of Bosnia and Herzegovina, as
one component of the Army of the Federation, and the Croats control the
other component, i.e., the Croatian Defense Council.

Through these civil-military relations there is limited control over the

armed forces in Bosnia and Herzegovina, but it is clearly not democratic.
To illustrate the functioning of civil-military relations according to the
ethnic key and the non-existence of democratic control, let me give an ex-
ample of an event that occurred in March 2001, at the time of the procla-
mation of the so-called “Croatian self-rule”. At that time the leaders of the
Croatian Democratic Union (the strongest Croatian political party in Bos-
nia and Herzegovina) called on the officers and soldiers of Croatian na-
tionality in the Army of the Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina to dis-
obey the orders and not to report to their barracks. The soldiers of Croatian
nationality responded by obeying the instructions of the Croatian Democ-
ratic Union (HDZ).

84 Turkovi

With concerted efforts of SFOR, strong international pressure and active

engagement of the Minister of Defense (who at the time was a Croat but
was not a HDZ member), this part of the Armed Forces of the Federation
was however put under control of legal authorities.

Weakness of the Central State and Government
Institutions

Bosnia and Herzegovina has a very complex state-legal system. The au-
thority is realized on five levels: municipality, city, canton, entity and
state. The civil-military relations are however mainly realised at the level
of entities. This is understandable given that the armed forces of Bosnia
and Herzegovina have been formed at entity level and that it is the entity
Parliaments, which are to conduct control over them.

A crisis often provides the momentum for change, and Bosnia and Her-

zegovina is no exception. The “Orao” crisis forced the authorities in Bos-
nia and Herzegovina to better understand the civil-military relations in the
country.

Following SFOR’s inspection of the aircraft company “Orao”, on 12

October 2002, in Bijelina, which resulted in the finding of documents
which confirmed the indications that this company had sold motors and re-
serve parts for aircraft to Iraq, it became clear that Bosnia and Herzegovina
shall have to undergo reform of civil-military relations. The arms trade to
Iraq took place by way of Jugoimport-SDPR company, which is under
state control of Serbia and Montenegro. Thus Bosnia and Herzegovina was
involved in breaching sanctions against Iraq, established by UN Security
Council Resolution 661.

Following the “Orao” affair, the international community requested that

an inquiry be conducted into this illegal arms trade and that those respon-
sible for it be brought before justice or the country itself would face sanc-
tions. Republika Srpska tried for a couple of months to calm the effects
and minimise the inquiry of “Orao” affair by various quasi-reports.

In addition, the international institutions also requested that reform in

the defense sector be begun. This inter alia involves the re-definition of
civil-military relations.

What seemed to be impossible a couple of months ago became a reality

after the “Orao” affair. All, Bosnians, Croats and Serbs

agreed about

the necessity to have a common command at the level of Bosnia and Her-
zegovina and to have democratic control over armed forces by the state
Parliament. The President of Republika Srpska, Dragan Covic, on be-
half of this entity, also expressed his support for the efforts of Bosnia and

Bosnia

and

Herzegovina

Herzegovina to become a Partnership for Peace (PfP) member, while add-
ing that the two conditions for Bosnia and Herzegovina membership in the
PfP are: joint command, civil democratic control, and creation of armed
forces which would correspond to the financial possibilities of the country.
According to Covic, Republika Srpska shall fulfil its obligations by mid
2004 in respect to the conditions for PfP membership.

In the next couple of months we shall see how sincere are the authorities

of Republika Srpska in respect to the establishment of civil-military rela-
tions at state level. These relations shall without doubt be established, es-
pecially if we bear in mind that the international community has made it
clear that there can be no returning back to status quo, and that the Defense
Committee has been formed.

The Defense Committee is tasked with the correction of serious defi-

ciencies in the civil and state control, as well as in the command over the
armed forces in Bosnia and Herzegovina. This Committee is to identify the
constitutional and legal barriers to state level control and command, and
will suggest amendments. It has to complete its work by 1 January 2004.
An American, James Loher III chairs the Committee and it includes three
Secretary Generals of the SCMM, entity defense ministers, and two other
entity representatives. EU, OSCE and SFOR are also represented in the
Committee.

Armed Forces Formations and State Control over
Them

Since the signing of the Dayton Agreement in 1995 the defense issue was a
particularly sensitive one. The Peace Agreement provides for the existence
of two separate armies, one in each entity, within the state of Bosnia and
Herzegovina – one of these armies is in Republika Srpska (Army of Re-
publika Srpska) while the other is in the Federation of Bosnia and Herze-
govina (Army of the Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina). The situation
is further complicated in the Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina, where
the Army is divided into two “components” based on ethnic belonging to
Bosnian or Croat people. While the Presidency of Bosnia and Herzegovina
has the authority to act as a Supreme Commander of the Armed Forces of
Bosnia and Herzegovina, the entities are in control of their components of
the armed forces by way of the entity Ministries of Defense.

These armies are organized in a way, which provides for the defense of

each of the three constituent people – and not for the defense from an ag-
gressor outside Bosnia and Herzegovina. The constituent armies – jointly
referred to as the Armed Forces of Bosnia and Herzegovina, at the end of

86 Turkovi

the war in 1995 have had 46,000 professional soldiers, with sufficient
heavy weapons to arm substantially larger armed forces. Given that arms
control measures were not imposed in the country, the OSCE Mission in
Bosnia and Herzegovina supported voluntary measures in that respect, un-
der the Confidence and Security Building Measures programme. The
Armed Forces and their political leaders were prepared to consider some
moderate measures in respect to arms control and reduction of soldiers.
However, following lengthy negotiations both entity governments took on
the obligation in 1998 to demobilize 30 per cent of the soldiers. The total
number of demobilized soldiers during 1999 and the first half of 2001
were almost 13,000. At the end of 2001 the Armed Forces of Bosnia and
Herzegovina were comprised of some 33,000 professional soldiers.

Over time, the established dialogue has contributed to the creation of

greater confidence and trust. During 2001, the entity governments agreed
that Armed Forces of Bosnia and Herzegovina comprised of 20,000 pro-
fessional soldiers, would be sufficient for legitimate security needs. The
entity governments agreed that the armed forces should be reduced to this
figure by 2005. However, compared to countries with the same population
even this number of professional soldiers is too high. Countries with simi-
lar population have armies of around 10,000 soldiers.

The OSCE Mission in Bosnia and Herzegovina is currently working on

developing a plan for a further reduction of armed forces in Bosnia and
Herzegovina. The Mission has prepared an analysis based on an assump-
tion that the defense budget will remain at the 2002 level and that 60 per
cent of the budget will be allocated towards personnel costs, based on the
goals of the defense policy. This analysis shows that Bosnia and Herzego-
vina can at maximum have 12,000 soldiers. Some have argued that the op-
timal number of soldiers that Bosnia and Herzegovina can finance is 9,500.
Should this be the case, 60 per cent of allocated budget for the Armed
Forces would go towards the personnel costs, such as is the case, for ex-
ample, in Slovenia.

According to the Joint Military Committee, these forces should be

commanded by the Main Command of the Armed Forces of Bosnia and
Herzegovina. Two names for this Command have been suggested: Joint
Headquarters of the Armed Forces of Bosnia and Herzegovina, or Main
Headquarters of the Armed Forces in Bosnia and Herzegovina.

SFOR Commander, William Ward has suggested that the Armed Forces

in Bosnia and Herzegovina be reorganised, so as to include the following:

Command and control at state level, with a single chain of com-
mand by the Presidency of Bosnia and Herzegovina,

Through the Secretary General of the SCMM,

Bosnia

and

Herzegovina

To the Committee of Headquarters of the Armed Forces.

As can be noticed, the state of Bosnia and Herzegovina has neither legal,
nor factual basis for conducting control over the Armed Forces of Bosnia
and Herzegovina. However, the mentioned reform of the defense sector
provides for the intensive inclusion of the state (in the control and com-
mand of the armed forces), beginning in 2004, through the mentioned
reforms.

Legal and Institutional Aspects of the Democratic
Control over the Defense and Security Sector

The usage of the term “control by state bodies” presupposes democratic
control by the Parliament and the government over the Armed Forces. In
reality this control can be further subdivided into parliamentary oversight
and control of executive bodies, and judicial control.

We shall first look at the control of executive bodies. Supremacy of

politics over the Armed Forces is reflected in the oversight of Armed
Forces by the government and the Minister of Defense. The significance of
the authority of the executive bodies is all the more evident in the case of
war when the Parliament is not able to operate as an oversight body.

The executive government in Bosnia and Herzegovina is composed

of the Presidency of Bosnia and Herzegovina and the Council of Ministers
of Bosnia and Herzegovina, while the entity executive government is
composed of the President and the Vice-President of the entity and entity
governments.

1) Presidency of Bosnia and Herzegovina

In democratic countries the President (or the Presidency) of the state have
the following authority over the armed forces:

Chief commander of the armed forces,

Chairs the National Security Council,

Appoints and promotes officers,

Proclaims the state of war,

Is authorised to proclaim a state of war on the basis of a parlia-
mentary decision.

In respect to this authority, the Presidency of Bosnia and Herzegovina can
be compared to the Queen of Great Britain. Although, according to the

88 Turkovi

Constitution, the Presidency of Bosnia and Herzegovina is the civil com-
mander of armed forces, real command is realised at the entity level given
that the two armies are entity armies. Furthermore, the Constitution of
Bosnia and Herzegovina does not authorise the Presidency to appoint or
promote officers, neither does it authorise it to proclaim a state of war.
This is done by the entity Presidents.

Moves towards the strengthening of the Presidency were made while in

Office were the ‘Alliance for Change’. During this period Presidency
members were not members of national parties, which contributed to the
adoption of two documents. In the first document is expressed the com-
mitment of Bosnia and Herzegovina to become a member of NATO Part-
nership for Peace programme. According to the second document, ‘De-
fense Policy of Bosnia and Herzegovina’, the Presidency of Bosnia and
Herzegovina considers and determines activities related to the prepared-
ness, mobilization and use of armed forces in Bosnia and Herzegovina
with an aim of protecting sovereignty and territorial integrity.

Presidency members are also members of the Standing Committee on

Military Matters (SCMM) in Bosnia and Herzegovina, which according to
the Constitution of Bosnia and Herzegovina co-ordinates the activities of
the armed forces of Bosnia and Herzegovina.

2) SCMM in Bosnia and Herzegovina

The Constitution of Bosnia and Herzegovina specifies the establishment of
the Standing Committee on Military Matters. It was established by way of
an agreement of politicians of Bosnia and Herzegovina, Croatia and the
Federal Republic of Yugoslavia in 1995, in Dayton. Given the difficulty of
reaching a compromise on defense issues, it was decided that the SCMM
would be established as a co-ordinating body within the Presidency of
Bosnia and Herzegovina. The role and function of the SCMM was not
fully agreed upon.

Till mid-2002, the SCMM had no real authority. A decision on the or-

ganization and the functioning of the defense institution, adopted by the
Presidency of Bosnia and Herzegovina on 26 August 2002, grants the
SCMM an important place. This decision specifies that the SCMM is the
highest authority for the co-ordination of defense issues within Bosnia and
Herzegovina, as well as in respect to international institutions.

Given that Bosnia and Herzegovina does not have a Ministry of De-

fense, the SCMM is a body, which closely resembles a state ministry of
defense. SCMM is obliged to:

Bosnia

and

Herzegovina

x Co-ordinate the work of armed forces for the purpose of protecting

the sovereignty and territorial integrity of Bosnia and Herzegovina,

x Conduct the re-structuring of armed forces of Bosnia and Herzego-

vina,

x Maintain relations with defense-security organizations abroad

(NATO, OSCE, etc.),

x Maintain dialogue between the armed forces in Bosnia and Herze-

govina (announces projects and training),

x Secure transparency of budgets and foreign assistance,
x Conduct public relations.

In the framework of defense reform in Bosnia and Herzegovina, it is ex-
pected that the SCMM shall be transformed into a Ministry of Defense.
Currently (and in accordance with the decision of the High Representa-
tive), the SCMM Secretary General participates in the sessions of the
Council of Minister. He does not however have a right to vote.

3) Entity Ministries of Defense

According to the Constitution of Bosnia and Herzegovina, the defense of
the country is regulated by entity laws. The Constitutions of the Federation
of Bosnia and Herzegovina and of Republika Srpska task the entities with
the organization and conduct of defense of the entities. It is for this pur-
pose that the two entity Ministries of Defense have been formed. Before
we look at the authority and responsibilities of these entity Ministries, it
should be mentioned that the entity Presidents are commanders-in-chief of
the armies.

The Federation Ministry of Defense is responsible for the legal and ad-

ministrative tasks in the field of defense, as is specified in the Defense
Law, and other Federal laws. It is comprised of the Office of the Minister,
eleven departments, Verification Centre and the Joint Command of the
Army of the Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina. The Defense Law of
the Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina was adopted in July 2002. The
Law makes reference neither to civil-military relations, nor to the democ-
ratic control of the armed forces. If we take into consideration that till
2001 the Ministry of Defense of the Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina
functioned as two different ministries, and that the salaries of the employ-
ees are a couple of months late, we can safely say that civil-military rela-
tions were at a very low level.

The situation is not much different in the other Bosnian entity, i.e., in

Republika Srpska. According to the latest information the number of

90 Turkovi

employees in the Ministry of Defense of Republika Srpska will have to be
reduced to 500 persons. This speaks of the magnitude of the financial dif-
ficulties that the Ministries of Defense face.

As government members, the Ministers of Defense are responsible for

the democratic control of the armed forces. However, in the face of small
budgets and large expenditures they are by-and-large preoccupied with ex-
istential problems of members of the armed forces, rather than with the de-
velopment of civil-military relations.

Constitutional and Practical Role of the Parliament

In democratic societies Parliament is the body with central role in the state.
There is no governmental institution that can be exempted from parliamen-
tary control. The parliamentary control of the security sector also includes
control of the armed forces. The essence of parliamentary control is in a
just division of authority between the lawmaking and the executive authority.

1) Parliamentary Assembly of Bosnia and Herzegovina

The Parliament of Bosnia and Herzegovina has two Houses: House of
Representatives and the House of Peoples. Although members of Parlia-
ment are frequent guests at NATO headquarters in Brussels and are parties
in talks with representatives of Euro-Atlantic security organizations, it is
impossible to define their role in the civil-military relations in Bosnia and
Herzegovina. The defense policy of Bosnia and Herzegovina, as part of the
security policy of Bosnia and Herzegovina, tasks the Presidency of Bosnia
and Herzegovina with civil command over the armed forces, while the Par-
liaments, Council of Ministers and other bodies of government are tasked
with political oversight, in accordance with the constitutional and legal
provisions.

A member of the Presidency of Bosnia and Herzegovina does not have a

right to question an entity Minister of Defense, just as the Parliamentary
Assembly of Bosnia and Herzegovina cannot discuss elements of the
budget of the Army of Federation Bosnia and Herzegovina and of the
Army of Republika Srpska (RS).

In such a state-legal set-up, the only occasion on which the Parliamen-

tary Assembly discussed issues related to armed forces was during the
adoption of the Law on Export of Arms and Military Equipment, in De-
cember 2002. It is unlikely that this discussion would have taken place
even then were it not for the ‘Orao’ affair and threat of sanctions by the
international community. It is evident hence, that the Parliamentary

Bosnia

and

Herzegovina

Assembly does not have any role, or only has a minor role, in the democ-
ratic control of armed forces.

Of all the elements that the Parliament has at its disposal, the Parliamen-

tary Assembly of Bosnia and Herzegovina does not utilise any one of
them. It has not adopted any law related to the armed forces in Bosnia and
Herzegovina, it does not discuss the defense budget, it does not deal with
the issue of the size of the armed forces during peace, nor does it appoint
or dismiss commanders of the armed forces. Only in the case of sending
military forces in international peacekeeping operations does the Parlia-
mentary Assembly approve their participation.

Since the election and constitution of the Parliamentary Assembly of

Bosnia and Herzegovina the Committee for Defense and Security has not
yet been formed. The media, together with security experts have frequently
questioned the Parliament about the formation of a Committee for Defense
and Security, but the response always amounts to a conclusion that such a
Committee is necessary, but that it has not yet been discussed by the Par-
liamentary Assembly.

Therefore, it can be concluded that the Bosnia and Herzegovina Parlia-

ment does not have an effective democratic control over the armed forces,
which prevents Bosnia and Herzegovina from membership in the Euro-
Atlantic institutions. Things are improving, however, as the two entities
have recently agreed upon the establishment of democratic control at state
level.

2) Entity Parliaments

Unlike the Parliamentary Assembly of Bosnia and Herzegovina, the entity
Parliaments are legally responsible for democratic control of the armed
forces. Civil-military relations in the entities are established in accordance
with the democratic principles. In this segment the entities posses elements
of statehood, for they have their own armed forces, as well as Parliaments,
which are responsible for control over them. But the entities are not states,
nor are they subjects with which representatives of the Euro-Atlantic struc-
tures want to negotiate with.

When in question is the democratic control of the armed forces by law-

making bodies, both the Parliament of the Federation of Bosnia and Her-
zegovina and the National Assembly of RS have two means at their dis-
posal: they adopt laws related to the armies and defense, and they adopt
the budget for the defense forces. Both Parliaments have a Committee for
Defense and Security, which conduct oversight over the security sector.
The Parliament of the Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina is responsible
for giving an agreement for the use of military force, should military use

92 Turkovi

be justified by international law. According to the Constitution of RS the
National Assembly of RS can proclaim a state of war, in the case of an
armed attack on RS.

Transparency and Accountability as a Key Factor

Public officials are responsible to the public for their decisions and actions,
and they are subject to appropriate control. Also, they must be transparent
in making decisions, as well as in their activities. Since the coming of the
international institutions in Bosnia and Herzegovina a lot of time and funds
have been invested in educating government and non-governmental sector
about responsibility and transparency. The Office for Human Rights
(OHR) produced a document titled ‘7 principles of public functioning’ in
which responsibility and transparency are emphasised. In order to achieve
transparency, the citizens must be in a position to have access to govern-
ment information.

When talking about the transparency of the Parliaments and govern-

ments in Bosnia and Herzegovina as a key element of democratic control,
it must be kept in mind that the country is in the process of learning about
transparency. For many years we have lived under the conviction that we
are threatened from abroad and that secrecy is a priority, on which security
is based.

Bosnia and Herzegovina is a country in transition, which must learn that

many topics should not be kept secret. In a democracy, armed forces need
active consensus of public opinion. It is difficult to achieve this in a system
such as the one in Bosnia and Herzegovina, in which the very defense
structures are possible adversaries. For these reasons, following the end of
the war in 1995, the armed forces in Bosnia and Herzegovina were keeping
secret the assistance received from their ‘political’ friends. The Parlia-
ments were not willing to inform the public about the defense budgets. It
was a public secret that the Army of Republika Srpska was receiving assis-
tance from Belgrade, Croatian Defense Council from Zagreb and Army of
Bosnia and Herzegovina from Islamic countries.

Transparency did, however, improve during the past year and a half.

Since May 2002, Belgrade stopped the practice of non-transparent assis-
tance, while assistance provided by the Republic of Croatia to the Croat
component of the Army of the Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina, be-
came transparent with the coming into office of President Stipe Mesic. As-
sistance provided to the Bosniac component of the Army of the Federation
of Bosnia and Herzegovina is also transparent today.

Bosnia

and

Herzegovina

Institutions of the Parliament and the armies have departments for pub-

lic information, by which the public is informed of their activities. It is un-
fortunate, however, that these departments conduct selection of informa-
tion they issue and they do not have regular press conferences.

The authorities in Bosnia and Herzegovina are still far from transparent

and do not adequately inform the public about their activities. For exam-
ple, it is indicative that Bosnia and Herzegovina as an OSCE participating
state, once a year participates in the exchange of military information

which is published in foreign literature, while the citizens of Bosnia and
Herzegovina are not provided with this information.

The government is not solely responsible for this. The media can also be

blamed for inadequately developed transparency. The reasons for this are:
insufficiently educated journalists, only partial reporting on security issues,
closeness of particular media with a particular political circle, etc. For ex-
ample, the media today most frequently writes about the need of Bosnia
and Herzegovina to participate in the PfP programme. All political parties
agree about the necessity to participate in this programme. Given the dis-
persion of political parties in Bosnia and Herzegovina, and their ideologi-
cal, programme and all other differences, it is impossible that all are sin-
cere in expressing this view. However, given that journalists in Bosnia and
Herzegovina support these views, an atmosphere has been created, in
which journalists with different ideological perspectives are pushing for
PfP membership. At the same time, the media are not critically considering
how the country could attain this goal. Moreover, during the past year no
daily newspaper critically considered PfP membership, nor did they con-
sider how honest were the claims of politicians about preparedness and the
wish for membership in the PfP programme. The weekly magazines are
somewhat better in this respect.

When in question are the media and security, assistance of the interna-

tional community is needed. Technical and theoretical assistance, espe-
cially by NATO, is needed.

Intelligence and Security Agencies

The current organization of security and intelligence agencies in Bosnia
and Herzegovina symbolises the deep distrust and insecurity of people to-
wards one another. Security and intelligence agencies are organized at

This is an obligation from the OSCE Vienna Document from 1999 on Confidence and
Security Building Measures (CSBMs).

94 Turkovi

entity level. So we have the Federal Security and Intelligence Agency and
the Security and Intelligence Agency of Republika Srpska. These two se-
curity and intelligence agencies have no common points and consider one
another as adversaries. These Agencies have not been de-politicised and
they still have not fully apprehended that they are to serve the people of
Bosnia and Herzegovina. It is also well known that certain members of se-
curity institutions are taking part in criminal activities. Both the former and
the current Head of the Federal Security and Intelligence Agency have ac-
cused one another of wrongful doing in the media. Also, against the cur-
rent Head of the Federal Security and intelligence Agency a court proce-
dure has been initiated in respect to the events that took place in
Hercegovacka Bank when a conflict broke out between SFOR and Croats.

The Security and Intelligence Agency of Republika Srpska is not in any

better situation. One representative of the international community in Bos-
nia and Herzegovina has accused it of being an organization that is assist-
ing with the hiding of Radovan Karadzic, who has been charged with war
crimes in Bosnia and Herzegovina and is on the most wanted list by the In-
ternational Criminal Court for former Yugoslavia (ICTY). The military in-
teligence of the Army of Republia Srpska has recently been closed, after it
was confirmed that it had spied on the political, diplomatic and military ac-
tivities of USA, NATO member countries and EU representation in Bosnia
and Herzegovina. Documents confiscated in the 410

Information Centre

of the Army of Republika Srpska show the intent of this security organiza-
tion to spy on NATO troops in Bosnia and Herzegovina, with an emphasis
on the air component and the quick response forces. The documents con-
fiscated by SFOR also indicate that the Army of Republika Srpska spied
on the investigation on crime and corruption in Bosnia and Herzegovina,
conducted by the Office of the Hugh Representative.

At the state level there is no democratic control, while at the entity level

it is conducted by the Defense and Security Committee. Recently, the Par-
liament of the Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina formed a Committee
for oversight of the Federation Security and Intelligence Agency. This
Committee is comprised of five members of Parliament. Whereas Foreign
Affairs Committee and the Defense Committees have attained a degree of
success, the intelligence sector is still rarely discussed. Intelligence agen-
cies still have their ‘political friends’ in the parliamentary committees.
While in developed democracies the Chairman of these Committees are
always members of the opposition, in Bosnia and Herzegovina this is not
the case.

An indication of the overall improvement however, is the fact that ongo-

ing are reforms of both the defense and intelligence sector. In early May
2003, the High Representative, Paddy Ashdown, announced that a Central

Bosnia

and

Herzegovina

Intelligence Agency should be formed, which could also contribute to the
regional struggle against organised crime. In accordance with that, at the
end of May 2003, a Committee on the Reform of Intelligence Agencies in
Bosnia and Herzegovina has been established, which is tasked with the in-
troduction of a legal base for a single intelligence agency in the country. A
Hungarian diplomat, Kalman Kocis chairs the Committee (he was earlier
involved in the reform of the Hungarian intelligence agency). The Com-
mittee shall have six members appointed by the Heads of the existing intel-
ligence agencies: Intelligence Agency of the Federation of Bosnia and
Herzegovina and the Intelligence Agency of Republika Srpska. The High
Representative pointed a deadline of 1 January 2004 to the Parliaments in
Bosnia and Herzegovina, at which they are to adopt the recommendations
of the Committee. Hence, we can expect that in 2004 Bosnia and Herzego-
vina will have a unified/single de-politicised intelligence agency, over
which the state Parliament shall have democratic control. That will provide
the state with a mechanism necessary for gathering information for the
prevention of crime and will enable it to provide an effective response to
new security threats.

It is clear that the existing organization of intelligence agencies in Bos-

nia and Herzegovina cannot meet the challenge of new times and that it
cannot successfully confront organized crime, terrorism and trans-national
crime, unless it is restructured.

Defense and Security Sector Planning Processes

If the process of planning of activities in the defense and security sector is
understood as a path from military doctrine through security policy to se-
curity strategy, then we can say that Bosnia and Herzegovina does not
have a process of planning. Till June 2003 there was no discussion at sate
level about the process of defense planning and security. At the end of
June, SCMM adopted a plan for the membership of Bosnia and Herzego-
vina in the PfP programme. Only then did the members of the SCMM re-
ceive a document titled ‘Military doctrine of armed forces’ which was pre-
sented to the Presidency for adoption. In addition to this document, the
Presidency was also provided with a document titled ‘Bosnia and Herze-
govina Security Policy’ in mid-June 2003. The Presidency initially
adopted this document, as one of the conditions of Bosnian membership in
the PfP. The document is to be passed on for Parliamentary procedure.
However, much more remains to be done before we can have a Bosnian
security strategy. All plans, related to the defense and security, are made at
entity level, and by and large are opposed to one another. The doctrine of

96 Turkovi

the defense sector in the Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina is based on
NATO standards, while in RS it is based on the principles of the former
Yugoslav National Army.

Co-operation of military and civil experts in the preparation of defense

and security documents is not at a sufficient level. First, in Bosnia and
Herzegovina there are still remnants of the former Communist system, in
which the military was a closed group. However, not much has been dis-
cussed on this topic. The consequences of such thinking are still present in
the military forces, therefore the ‘military experts’ are not willing to accept
civilian expertise and at the same time they do not have adequate knowl-
edge for the development of modern security documents. In addition, they
lack knowledge of foreign languages and hence they are not able to follow
developments in the security field in the other countries of the Euro-
Atlantic region. Lately the situation has improved by way of additional
education for the military, particularly in the field of democratic control of
the military force and civil military relations, such as workshops in the
NATO School in Oberamergau in Germany. On the other hand, Bosnia
and Herzegovina has civil experts for defense and security, but they are
acting individually and are not institutionally organized. Currently, there is
only one non-governmental body dealing with security issues, the Centre
for Security Studies in Sarajevo.

Reform of the Civil and Defense Services

Parliamentary personnel have to have adequate knowledge in order to per-
form oversight over the military force. Military personnel and the Ministry
of Defense (MoD) personnel often have a feeling that politicians do not
have sufficient knowledge about the topics they are discussing. As a con-
sequence the military and Ministry of Defense personnel are not willing to
supply them with additional information.

Bosnia and Herzegovina still does not have sufficiently educated par-

liamentary staff, able to communicate with the military sector. In order to
overcome this the OSCE Mission in Bosnia and Herzegovina is regularly
organizing seminars with the goal of educating military personnel. The
Centre for European Security Studies from Groningen, together with the
Centre of Security Studies from Bosnia and Herzegovina and other partner
institutes from other countries of South East Europe carried out a two-year
project ‘DEMCON’, with the goal of educating members of Parliaments
and parliamentary staff of South East Europe in security issues. The Centre
for Democratic Control of the Armed Forces (DCAF) from Switzerland
has through the OSCE initiated engagement of security experts in the

Bosnia

and

Herzegovina

entity Parliaments in order to provide assistance to Parliamentarians in
dealing with military topics.

In the pre-war system, democratic control, transparency and openness

were unknown to members of the Parliament. Today additional efforts are
made at educating parliamentary personnel and it is necessary that in the
coming period it will be institutionalised at the academic level (at
universities).

Role of Civil Society in Security and Defense Areas

By civil society we primarily think about the media, NGOs and academic
institutions. In addition to civilian oversight, the aim of these institutions is
to integrate military forces into society. This segment in Bosnia and Her-
zegovina is underdeveloped. There exists only one non-government or-
ganization that deals with security issues – the Centre for Security Studies
in Sarajevo. The Centre for Security Studies has organised many seminars
with the purpose of educating Parliamentarians and governmental officials
in the security field. Although non-governmental experts so far are not en-
gaged in any advisory capacity by the government, they are supported by
international organizations, such as the OSCE, NATO and OHR, and they
are effective in providing training in the security sector. The establishment
of departments at universities, which deal with this problematic, is at an
early stage.

When discussing media involvement there are military journals, which

address military and security issues. The journals are ‘entity journals’, and
there is neither co-operation nor competition between them. The daily
newspapers only report on issues without analysing them. The weekly and
fortnightly magazines from time to time provide some analysis, primarily
about demobilised soldiers, and problems they face, while no newspaper is
analysing democratic control of armed forces. The electronic media do not
have specialized programme on security, defense or the military. When in
question are affairs (such as the ‘Orao’ affair and the ‘smuggling of arms
to Kosovo’) then the media report it with sensational titles, but at the same
time no media house is reporting about the Bosnian involvement in peace-
keeping missions in Ethiopia and Eritrea, as well as in Congo.

The there are two main reasons for such an attitude: lack of education of

journalists and poor funding of media houses in Bosnia and Herzegovina,
which is reflected on the inadequate reporting on these issues.

98 Turkovi

Organisation of National Crisis-Management System

Military operations and crisis systems provide a fertile ground for the crea-
tion of animosities between the politicians and the military. The govern-
ment, i.e., the Defense Minister or the President of the Government (de-
pending on the type of organization of the state) has the right to take on
operative command over military operations.

Bosnia and Herzegovina as a state does not have that problem since

there is simply no authority at state level empowered to proclaim a state of
war. The entities have the exclusive right in this respect. Entity Parlia-
ments have the power to authorise their armies to use military force, given
that the entity Presidents are Commanders-in-Chief of their military.

Formation of Peacekeeping Contingents and
Participation in Multi-National Peacekeeping
Formations

So far, Bosnia and Herzegovina has participated in two UN peacekeeping
missions: Mission in Ethiopia and Eritrea, and the Mission in Congo. The
decision on participation of Bosnian forces in peacekeeping operations has
been taken by the Presidency of Bosnia and Herzegovina. However, all
other decisions such as decisions related to command, control, including
democratic control, even emblems on uniform, have not been fully regu-
lated due to the afore mentioned Constitutional arrangements.

Co-operation with EU, NATO, Stability Pact and individual states, in-

fluencing the establishment of standards in the defense and security sector
and democratic civil oversight of that sector are difficult and dynamic. Due
to constitutional arrangements in the security field it is difficult to create a
single security space in Bosnia and Herzegovina. The attempts of creating
a single security space are not always welcome by different political play-
ers in the country. Representatives of the military and the Parliaments have
participated in many NATO organised workshops and are familiar with
civil-military relations in other countries.

OSCE has also been involved in the development of democratic control

over the armed forces in the country. The Department for Security and Co-
operation of the OSCE Mission in Bosnia and Herzegovina is developing
projects and organizing seminars for the purpose of familiarizing the Par-
liamentarians with models of democratic control. Also, the Parliamentary
Assembly has developed contacts and co-operation with Parliaments of
other European countries. This communication channel is also used for

Bosnia

and

Herzegovina

the transfer of knowledge and best practices in the field of civil-military
relations.

Bosnia and Herzegovina is, certainly a very complicated state concern-

ing constitutional arrangements, which are clearly reflected in the security
field. That is why reforms in the security sector are taking much longer
than in other states of South- East Europe.

However, a number of positive changes have happened during the re-

cent period and future reforms are promising too.

Bosnia and Herzegovina is on its way to joining other South East Euro-

pean countries on the path of integration into the Euro-Atlantic security
structures.

Bulgaria: Completing Requirements for NATO
Membership, Accelerating the Security Sector
Reform and Adapting to the Counter-Terrorism
Era

Plamen I. Pantev, Valeri Ratchev, Todor Tagarev

1 Introduction

The evolution of Bulgaria’s civil-military relations towards an effective
democratic control of the armed forces and the rest of the security institu-
tions very much reflected the general progress of the country’s society and
political institutions’ development. An efficient driving factor continued to
be the attraction of NATO and EU membership and the standard require-
ments of both organisations on civil-military relations. The moral respon-
sibility of being a positive example for other Balkan as well as Black Sea
and Caucasian nations in that field additionally influenced progress. The
remaining tasks to fulfil before being fully integrated in NATO had also
some elements of civil-military relations in addition to other broader re-
quirements of social and institutional evolution in this country.

Bulgaria was dynamically re-considering its achievements and deficien-

cies in the light of the broadening of the concept from democratic control
over the armed forces to a needed encompassing security sector reform and
good governance of the security sector in general. The task was not an
easy one, but accumulated experience in the democratic control of the
armed forces and a more vibrant civil society with its expert institutes and
centres and international networking on the topic provided opportunities
for undertaking the tasks and implementing them in an efficient way.

The shock of 9/11 and the need of a total and global fight against the

‘new evil’ of the 21

century necessitated a general review of all achieve-

ments in the area of democratic control of the armed forces and the started
security sector reform. Everyone had to think about and balance funda-
mental values and principles with the demands of efficient counter-
terrorism. The new reality obliged every participant in these relations
to deliver new and timely solutions of complex issues. The re-concep-
tualisation had to reflect the persistent need of furthering the regional
stability in a democratic context and the requirements of an effective
global fight with terrorism without compromising fundamental democratic

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Pantev, Ratchev, Tagarev

values and norms. A special aspect was introduced with the launch of the
fight to disarm the Iraqi regime from weapons of mass destruction (WMD)
and/or weapons of mass casualties (WMC) by a ‘coalition of willing
states’, part of which was Bulgaria. The perception in Bulgaria was that
there is a link between the fight against terrorism and the fight against pro-
liferation of WMD/WMC. This brought Bulgarian society closer to the in-
volvement of the ‘pre-emptive strike’ strategy of the leader of the ‘Coali-
tion for Immediate Disarmament of Iraq’ – the United States – and to its
practical implementation. The issue remained for some time contentious
within Bulgarian society: it was difficult to fully realise the danger that the
dictatorial regime in Baghdad posed to the international community. How-
ever, the official decision of the Bulgarian Government and Parliament
were in favour of participating in the preventive activity against terrorism.
In this situation civil society think-tank representatives provided important
expertise and arguments about the evolving crisis, confronting leading-to-
nowhere pacifist demands.

Close to its full and effective membership in NATO, Bulgaria continues

to critically approach and treat unfulfilled tasks in the area of civil-military
relations and its security sector reform while finding proportionately tai-
lored formulae of carrying its counter-terrorist fight. The following article
will consider these tasks and the longer-term balancing of the security sec-
tor reform and the effective fight against terrorism. For this reason three
inter-connected issues are discussed further on: first, completing the tasks
of an effective membership in the Alliance after the country was invited in
November 2002 in Prague; second, speeding- security sector reform as a
necessary pre-condition for an encompassing evolution of society, econ-
omy and the state institutions, and third, adapting to the requirements of a
counter-terrorism and counter-WMD proliferation era.

Completing the Remaining Civil-Military Relations
Reform Tasks for Full-Fledged Membership in NATO

Full-fledged membership of Bulgaria in NATO would add guarantees to
the stability in South East Europe and a strengthened capacity of the Alli-
ance to implement its new tasks and missions. A list of reform issues,
however, ‘hangs’ in the minds of both official and non-governmental insti-
tutions in Bulgaria throughout the ratification process and later on, until
fully adapted to an effective participation in the Alliance. This task is per-
ceived both for reasons of military effectiveness of the armed forces and of
effectiveness of democracy in the country.

Bulgaria

103

The realisation of the criterion for NATO membership – democratic

civil-military relations– means the achievement of a reliable functional in-
ter-relationship between the democratic society, state and its armed forces
as well as the other security institutions in such a way that at any stage of
this interaction the principles of pluralistic democracy, market economy
and the rule of law are implemented while national security is guaranteed.
In the last months before being integrated in NATO and soon after joining,
the process of establishing democratic control of the armed forces in Bul-
garia continues to be a dynamic one with all features of remaining a fun-
damental task in a future, more mature membership. As a matter of fact
there is already a philosophic transition towards the understanding that se-
curity and defense are more effectively guaranteed in the conditions of
democratic civilian control of the armed forces together with allies who
have regulated these relations in a similar way. Bulgarian armed forces
preserve their quality of a strong symbol of national pride, but in parallel
with political and legal norms, they are neutral servants of democratically-
elected institutions. Bulgaria also underwent a conceptual re-thinking of
the role of civil society and its representatives in the field of civil-military
relations: together with the official institutions, empowered to take respon-
sibility of the security and defense of the country society itself creates its
own sources of expertise and information on these same issues, independ-
ently from the constitutionally- and legally-established ones, though this
potential is still to evolve and find realisation in the actual process of state
governance.

For more than four years now Bulgaria has dwelt on “second genera-

tion” reforms in the sphere of civil-military relations, accentuating the be-
havioural aspects of the relationship: the effective activity of already-
established institutions and procedures, on the realisation of shared norms
and values for both civilians and military, etc. A deep-rooted motivation of
“second generation” reforms is the understanding that with the evolution
of democracy, democratic control of the military also develops, and the
very concept of the democratic control spills over into the broader security
sector. This control is an indispensable prerequisite for transparency, ac-
countability, effectiveness and efficiency in the sphere of national security
and defense. A dominating motivation in Bulgaria’s “second generation”
reforms turned to be not just the belief that fulfilling NATO’s criteria for
membership matters, but the interest and perspective to improve the rela-
tions of society with the whole security sector.

Despite the fact that Bulgaria has matured on these issues and legiti-

mately contends for full-fledged membership, the ‘pending list’ of tasks con-
tinues to weigh in the minds of governmental and non-governmental ex-
perts. Not strangely for local analysts, the list is topped by two substantial

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Pantev, Ratchev, Tagarev

requirements of transition to market economy and the rule of law. The in-
effective functioning of the judicial system and incomplete control of the
country’s arms exports have been signs of an inadequate transition. While
Bulgaria is making steps in curbing its corruption practices, the judicial
system (investigation, prosecution and courts) continues to create obstacles
to the harmonious functioning of the separate powers in the democratic
state. The legislative and the executive powers are also far from perfect,
but definitely the continuous crisis in the judicial system leads to unsatis-
factory guarantees of a presumably adequate system of democratic control
of security institutions. The net effect of the harmonious and synchronised
functioning of democratic legislative, executive and judicial powers is ac-
tually the backbone of an effective democratic oversight of the armed
forces and the rest of the security institutions. A critical mass has al-
ready accumulated pertaining to this issue and society expects results to be
delivered.

In a similar way the criminal bypassing of state control of arms exports

has fallen in the already-concentrated focus of governmental and social
scrutiny. A scandalous illegal deal by a Bulgarian MOD-run weapons-
production company, ‘Terem’, with a country under UN arms-import sanc-
tions regime a few months before the start of the war on Iraq led to major
governmental measures. A severely strict control over the implementation
of the Law on Control of Foreign Trade Activity in Arms and Dual-Use
Goods and Technologies (1995; amended in 2002) by the government
should improve the state of implementation of the law. The applied in-
struments are increasing penalties in case of violation; reducing bureau-
cratic obstacles when extending the term of licenses; better regulation for
identifying the end-user; improved control of intermediaries; broader pow-
ers for counter-intelligence and police services. Though the government
produces an Annual Report on arms exports for Parliament, it is not
obliged to publish it – a fact that makes the issue less transparent and out
of practical reach for control by society. Improving societal insight on
arms export will generate adequate NGO and expert control mechanisms
of this activity in Bulgaria. It is a key question for inducing confidence
with Bulgaria’s NATO and EU partners as well as confidence in the OSCE
and the UN context on these issues.

The effectiveness of democratic civilian control depends to a great ex-

tent on the particular model of defense and force planning. Though Bul-
garia has a modern defense planning process in place and it has substan-
tially improved civilian-military cooperation in this area, it continues to
face certain challenges. The most important challenges are to improve
civil-military interaction in planning and implementation, to improve

Bulgaria

105

acquisition planning, to introduce risk management and cost-benefit analy-
ses techniques and to build a cadre of defense planners.

Currently, civil-military interaction in defense planning decision-

making is achieved mostly through the work of the Programming Council
and the Defense Council. In particular, the establishment of the Program-
ming Council proved to be instrumental in promoting cooperative deci-
sion-making, role-sharing and distribution of responsibilities between ci-
vilians and the military. Civil-military interaction has been further
facilitated by the culture of cooperation among experts in various director-
ates in the Ministry of Defense and the General Staff. It is expected that
the transition to a fully integrated model of the Ministry of Defense, incor-
porating a Defense Staff, will advance the efficient and effective interac-
tion of civilian and military defense planners.

The second important challenge is to provide for coordinated develop-

ment of organisational structures and procurement of new weapon systems
and equipment. Although acquisition programmes are part of the pro-
gramming schedule, the Ministry of Defense finds it difficult to elaborate
adequate acquisition objectives and priorities, to cost procurement, espe-
cially accounting for life-cycle cost of new weapon systems, and to sched-
ule procurements so that there is minimal risk for the whole programme.
To meet this challenge the Ministry of Defense works on the elaboration
and the implementation of a new NATO-compatible acquisition system
and procurement programmes. Key in terms of clarifying roles of civilians
and military in the process was the establishment of a modernisation
Council in 2001, combined with the introduction of a Defense/Operational
Capabilities Council that is still pending. There are a number of addi-
tional expert councils and committees, where civilians and military already
work together using their specific expertise to prepare adequate acquisition
decisions.

A particular challenge is related to the introduction of risk assessment

methodologies, techniques and tools. Proper assessment of the risk associ-
ated with each policy option and the related force structure proved to be
crucial in making every important decision in the defense planning proc-
ess. Debate should be based not only on what a defense planner feels but
rather on a rigorous and structured approach to risk assessment, using the
respective expertise of civilian and military planners.

Similarly, it is very important to introduce a more rigorous approach

towards cost benefit analysis both in the Ministry of Defense and outside
organisation such as the National Audit Office or non-governmental think
tanks. The capability of the Audit Office to perform ‘value for money’
analyses in defense, in a way similar to the UK National Audit Office and
the US Government Accounting Office or Congressional Budget Office,

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Pantev, Ratchev, Tagarev

may be improved through temporary assignments of a few experienced
military personnel. Alternatively, non-governmental think tanks with
proper expertise may be tasked by Parliament and/or Government to pro-
vide independent assessments on specific issues, i.e., proposed defense
budgets; major procurement cases; specific plans and programmes, as well
as to assess reports for their implementation. Some form of competition
among the Ministry of Defense, other governmental or parliamentarian
agencies, and NGOs in assessing defense planning options may be quite
healthy for the promotion of transparency, accountability and, as a result,
more effective defense planning.

The final challenge in this analysis relates to education of civilian and

military defense planners. Short-term training courses proved to be useful
to prepare Ministry of Defense personnel to implement particular proce-
dures and planning requirements, i.e., how to draft a Programme Memo-
randum. However, a more formal education is required both for the mili-
tary and the civilians involved in defense planning. As the war over Iraq
demonstrated it is not sufficient to be part of the coalition of the willing,
but to be a capable one. Key in this respect is the building of a civilian
cadre of defense planners. This model of cooperation between civilians
and military may serve as an example in elaborating planning procedures
throughout the security sector.

Another problem of the ‘accession list’ is the quality of parliamentary

oversight of the security sector. First, there continues to persist – despite
the avalanche of national and international education efforts – a relative
lack of interest by members of Parliament in defense and security issues in
combination with a lack of expertise among parliamentarians. An inade-
quate number of MPs are really devoted to oversight. Rather it is politi-
cal/party considerations that bring them from time to time to the topic of
their respective commissions. Second, parliamentary control of the secu-
rity sector is limited also by inadequate access to information rules and by
reluctance on parts of the executive, the bureaucracy and/or the security insti-
tutions to provide that information. The government in a democratic coun-
try is ‘open’ and the MPs and the public should be informed how the gov-
ernment does its work. This holds true for the activity that precedes and
prepares the decision-making, including the general concepts on fundamen-
tal issues; for the very decision-making, and for the implementation of the
decisions that have been taken. The executive in the democratic society
must be fully committed to transparency in the areas of national security,
foreign policy and defense. This means that the executive branch of power
in a democratic society and state has to acknowledge that MPs, to whom
the people have vested their sovereign power, have the right to know eve-
rything which is to be known about the work of the administration,

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107

including in the security sector. MPs are entitled to information and this
right is derived from the right of the people to know what has been done in
the name of the people. For this reason the executive branch, including in
the area of national security, foreign and defense policy actors have the ob-
ligation to reveal and explain actions and decisions publically. In a similar
way, the obligation of the executive is to declare and justify expenditures
for the purposes of defense and security. Though in Bulgaria one can wit-
ness communication between the executive and the legislative branches on
the issues of defense and security, there is no hard evidence about the ef-
fectiveness of these communications save in the cases of satisfied budget-
ary claims by the Defense or Interior Ministries. Ministers and State Secre-
taries reveal the contents of the discussions to the public, while Chairmen
of the respective parliamentary commissions and their members keep si-
lent. Low expertise and low professional self-confidence are often the rea-
son for such performance that backfires on the authority of the Parliament.
For example, the Parliament has not kept its pledge to hear and interrogate
nominees for high-ranking officers and for Ambassadors. It is fair to add
that Parliament lacks adequate resources to support the oversight function
of the legislature. But this is indicative, as well, of inadequate organisa-
tional capacity to fulfil its oversight power.

Speeding-Up Bulgarian Security Sector Reform

The progress in implementing “second generation” reforms in Bulgaria
logically imposed new and broader tasks, stemming from the need to link
the evolution of the security sector (armed forces, police, gendarme forma-
tions, border police, coast guard service, customs service and intelli-
gence/counter-intelligence services) with the development of Bulgarian
society and economy. The high standards of membership in NATO and the
EU required a comprehensive and as economic as possible approach to the
management of the security sector: the continuing need to sustain stability
in the Balkans; to maintain the percentage of GDP for military expenses;
to participate in the formation of the EU and NATO response forces and to
define national “niche capabilities”; to preserve an effective participation
in multinational peacekeeping operations; to be an efficient member in the
counter-terrorist coalition and in the war on Iraq; to tailor classified infor-
mation and intelligence services organization to the requirements of NATO
membership; to complete the psychological and conceptual integration of
the Bulgarian security services in the Euro-Atlantic system and shape new
personal characteristics of the servicemen and servicewomen in the sector
of national security, including neutralising corruption in this system. All

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Pantev, Ratchev, Tagarev

these needs called for a broad, perspective and top-state run security sector
management and reform.

The conceptual formulation of the SSR, the drafting of its political, legal

and sub-legal normative basis, and its practical realisation has already
turned into a fundamental task of all national security institutions in Bul-
garia, including the Parliament, the Council of Ministers and the President.
As during the whole period of the transition in Bulgaria, stimulating and
absorbing non-governmental expertise remains a key factor for success.
Expert NGOs have proved they are actors, partners and correctives factors
of official institutions. Such a relationship is a measure of both the democ-
ratic functioning of the respective society and of management effective-
ness. Two aspects beg discussion in particular. First, the need to reconcile
the Bulgarian system of classified information with SSR, and second, the
need to reorganise the Bulgarian intelligence service.

Bulgarian society and the media discussed for months the preparation,

adoption and implementation of The Law for Classified Information
(2002). However, the problem of classified information in Bulgaria was
narrowed just to the topics of the restricted access to files of the security
services of the totalitarian era and of classification procedures. Both these
issues are important for the democratisation of Bulgarian society and guar-
antee the country’s national security. Domestic political debates strongly
shifted the discussion from professional to personal influence and manipu-
lation. Part of the old files have been liquidated, copied and taken away or
directly stolen from the archives, becoming part of everyday political dis-
course. This could not do anything else but compromise the national secu-
rity system. It also turns into a mockery the calls for coming to terms with
the past on a real democratic basis and fairness.

Actually the most topical aspect of the ‘classified information’ issue has

been diminished in the public debate: how will Bulgaria guarantee that of-
ficials, dealing with NATO secrets and in NATO institutions, will be
cleared adequately for these jobs? This has been a real issue as the experi-
ence of the newly accepted countries in the Alliance in 1999 shows that.
Bringing in English speaking civilian personnel and officers who are eligi-
ble for a security ‘clearance’ test is Bulgaria’s challenge. Imperfect na-
tional legislation may also become a problem when secrets have to be pro-
tected in the NATO context.

Unfortunately, a negative side effect of this aspect of the debate is the

opacity of public information on tasks, structure, personnel levels and
budgets of security sector organisations.

Another intellectual, but also direct political challenge continues to

be the reform of the intelligence services and the implementation of ade-
quate democratic civil control over them. A clear reflection of persisting

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109

problems in this field was the answer of Prime Minister Simeon
Saxkoburggotsky to a question from the press on 26 February 2003 after
his meeting with the Bulgarian President and the change of the old and
new Director of the National Intelligence Service. The answer of the Prime
Minister to a question concerning the tasks of the Director of Intelligence
was: “Do you think that in a normal country the recommendations given to
the country’s intelligence are pronounced openly?” For sure in any normal
country no head of government or state will tell the press what particular
task and objective has been given to the chief of intelligence, but it is abso-
lutely guaranteed that the general tasks of the national intelligence will be
formulated in a law or/and national security strategy or concept. Unfortu-
nately, this is not yet the case with Bulgaria.

There exists factors complicating civil democratic control of the intelli-

gence services. First is the mix of problems and changing roles of intelli-
gence with the issue of overcoming the legacies of the past. Second is the
persisting presence of contradictory theoretic assumptions about democ-
ratic oversight and control over the security sector. Third is lack of consul-
tation with NATO, the EU and other Western partners in comparison to the
clear and extensive support by established democracies on the issues of the
civil democratic control of the armed forces. Fourth is the complexity of
intelligence issue. This complex nature is reflected in the definition of the
balance and the borderline of the intelligence activity and the scope of con-
trol mechanisms of the respective agencies. Fifth, the “academic body of
knowledge” on the topic is very modest in Bulgaria. And, sixth, in the af-
termath of the 9/11 events and the new security needs of the global war on
terror complicate oversight and control.

Bulgarian society needs an educated debate on the issues of intelligence

and this debate may include the treatment of the following questions: First,
the issue of clandestine collection of information and what should be the
subject of democratic civil oversight. Second, the issue of counterintelli-
gence and to what extent a democratic government can target or turn its
own citizens or residents into an object of surveillance. Third comes the is-
sue of analysis and estimates and what are the parameters of involving
academics, institutes and the media for classified work. Fourth, the issue of
covert action and what are the permissible and appropriate limits for the
executive power to use its own citizens and private organisations without
their knowledge to exert influence abroad. The ‘right to know’ in the de-
mocratic society, applied to the intelligence service has an additional as-
pect, encompassing all four elements of the debate: the right to know if
demanding professional criteria of joining the service are observed and
implemented. A self-critical and educated public must also ask itself the
following question: Are the efforts to control the intelligence services

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improving their performance or not? Are the new legislative proposals, in-
stitutions for implementing the oversight, the NGO-controlling ‘eye’ not
causing also drawbacks on the creativity and efficiency of the intelligence
service, especially in the light of higher requirements in the fight against
terrorism?

It is no secret that a fundamental problem of any country’s intelligence

service is preventing them turning into toys of their political masters – by
tradition an effort with doubtful success. Furthermore, the effectiveness of
legal and institutional formulae to exercise oversight of the intelligence
agencies is largely dependent on the democratic maturity of respective so-
cieties and states. The Bulgarian experience shows that in the last 14 years
there have been efforts to preserve political neutrality, to use opportunisti-
cally the intelligence services for narrow political purposes and to evolve
gradually a democratic ethos in the services. Until the spring of 2003 these
contending pressures have led to the curious situation that constitutionally,
the national intelligence service is linked to the head of state who remains
responsible for any single failure of the intelligence institution, while the
Prime Minister who bears the responsibility for the country’s domestic and
foreign policy is not the master of the national intelligence. At the end of
the day, it appeared that the executive cannot be controlled adequately by
the Parliament since intelligence is isolated from this control

That is why a new law on national intelligence should give clear an-

swers to the following demands: first, national intelligence should be trans-
ferred to the domain of the Prime Minister; second, the process of plan-
ning, programming and budgeting of the intelligence activity should be
accountable to the Parliament and transparent enough to society; third,
adequate organisation and process should provide the Parliament with the
capability to investigate and assess the intelligence service’s activity and
effectiveness; fourth, how the national intelligence service can propose
draft laws that would facilitate the functioning of the intelligence system.
Lastly, the new law should give an answer how Bulgarian intelligence will
operate and cooperate internationally during the long-term fight against
terrorism.

The President of Bulgaria is elected in a direct vote and he is not answerable to the leg-
islative body.

Bulgaria

111

Effective Oversight and Effective Capabilities

The horrendous scenes of crumbling WTC towers and smoking Pentagon
on 11 September 2001 left a deep mark on the conscience of the Bulgari-
ans. The threat perception of a new, invisible and ominous enemy added to
a sensitive perceptual system already distressed by the long wars and con-
flicts in the Balkans and the Black Sea region and by a hard social and
economic transition in the preceding decade. An inherent understanding of
rising dangers helped Bulgarian society grasp that a shadowy enemy was
trying to attack, destroy or paralyse the civilised state system of the world
while blocking the progressive tendencies towards globalisation. No Bul-
garian died in the tragic events of that day, but one year later already three
were killed in three separate terrorist ambushes around the world: one on
the French tanker “Limburg” in the Eastern Mediterranean by the extrem-
ist Muslim organisation Aden-Abyan Army, linked to Al Qaeda; a second
in a blast in downtown Tel Aviv by an extremist Palestinian group, also
linked to the terrorist network, and the third one – in the October 2002
Moscow theatre hostage taking. The few in Bulgaria who, on 11 Septem-
ber, doubted Bulgaria’s participation in the global anti-terrorist coalition
now admit this has been a responsible act by the government. In February
2003 Bulgaria joined the coalition of states to disarm Iraq – a logical con-
tinuation of the counter-terrorist fight against terrorism on a global scale.

The sound counter-terrorist feeling in Bulgarian society was further

moulded by the keen understanding that possession of a nuclear plant
makes the country even more vulnerable to terrorist intimidation. Having a
big ethnic minority, differing from the majority by its religious confession
too – the Bulgarian Turks and Moslems – further focused social attention
on the issue of reacting to the threat and preserving the Bulgarian ‘ethnic
and religious model’ of the past decade. Pockets of ethno-religious based
links with Al Qaeda in Bosnia and Herzegovina additionally alerted Bul-
garians to the problem. The high level of organised criminality in South
East Europe, including domestic gangs with their international links, the
crossroads of drug-trafficking in the region and the knowledge of this ille-
gal trade pressure facilitated Bulgaria’s choice to preserve the state and
security.

The domestic political, legal and institutional reactions to the terrorist

threat were various. An adaptation of the National Security Concept is in a
drafting phase. At the end of 2001 the Parliament adopted the Law for the
Protection of Personal Data. It provides the opportunity to regulate access to
and processing of personal data by special laws for defense, national secu-
rity and public order as well as to facilitate the effective functioning of ex-
ecutive and judicial institutions in criminal law implementation processes.

112

Pantev, Ratchev, Tagarev

In the autumn of 2002 the Bulgarian Parliament adopted the Law of the
Measures Against Financing Terrorism. This legislative step was in re-
sponse to UN Security Council recommendations to improve the national
legal measures against terrorists by providing conditions for freezing bank
accounts of suspicious individuals and juridical persons, included in the
special list published by the State Gazette. The law also provided the terms
to update this list.

The domestic reactions to the terrorist threat included as well a stronger

cooperation and coordination among the institutional elements of the secu-
rity sector in the state’s fight against terrorism. The laws that were men-
tioned extend certain powers to such institutions. The border police and
customs service also extended their powers in the direction of law
enforcement.

A very significant aspect of the adequate reaction to the terrorist threat

was the joining of forces with foreign and international partners and allies.
UN Security Council resolution 1373 made the fight against terrorism a
mandatory obligation for UN member states. UN Security Council resolu-
tion 1441 added another element to the effective fight on terrorism. The
participation in ISAF in Afghanistan and the support for Anti-Saddam coa-
lition by Bulgaria are major aspects of the country’s counter-terrorist
stance. Furthermore, national law enforcement and intelligence institutions
significantly increased cooperation with counterparts from other countries.
A special accent was put on cooperation with the respective partners from
the neighbouring countries and the countries from the broader region, but
also with US, UK, German, French and Russian counterparts.

The challenges facing Bulgaria as any other democratic country of the

counter-terrorist coalition may be shortly formulated in this way: how to
protect civil liberties, rights and individual privacy while fighting success-
fully the terrorist threat. The democratic ‘antidote’ to this challenge was
found partly or fully, or is yet in search in Bulgaria in the following direc-
tions of improving accountability and transparency:

First, an intensive public debate in Bulgarian society. Fighting a shad-

owy foe such as terrorism requires nothing else but an open and transpar-
ent approach. However, winning public support for the long-term fight
against terrorism remains a fundamental task of all state institutions.

Second, to meet the challenges by legislative instruments predomi-

nantly. The adoption of any law in that area, especially those concerning
security sector reform, should be accompanied by intensive public discus-
sions. Any temporary limitation by law of liberties and rights must be pre-
ceded by this kind of debate too.

Bulgaria

113

Third, more is expected from two tracks to improve accountability of

counter-terrorism fight to the public: how is the ‘internal accountability’ in
security sector institutions functioning, and what forms of scrutiny and ac-
countability is provided for international and extra-territorial activities of
Bulgarian counter-terrorist missions.

Fourth, Parliament is supposed to embark on a comprehensive pro-

gramme to tackle the issue of oversight of the fight against terrorism so as
to preserve it within the confines of democratic society and philosophy.
There are legitimate calls for parliamentary commissions, dealing with se-
curity, defense, foreign policy and domestic public order to improve their
organisation and structure. Parliament is the backbone of the democratic
control of the security sector and it is expected to start living according to
this demanding standard.

5 Conclusion

Bulgaria finishes its preparations for full NATO membership, but the hard
work must continue in the post-accession period too. Society and institu-
tions in Bulgaria are in the phase of implementing security sector reform
and a lot of work to improve governance of this sector lies ahead. In addi-
tion, the fight against terrorism has called for new standards of efficiency
of national security activity while preserving political civil liberties and
rights. Bulgaria has gained some experience of its own, but further interna-
tional cooperation in this area remains crucial for the future of the coun-
try’s security and regional stability.

The Evolution of Civil-Military Relations in South

East Europe: The Case of Croatia

Mladen Staniþiü

1 Introduction

When considering civil-military relations in Croatia we approach the issue
from a democratic development or democracy building point of view. This
kind of relations may not necessarily be built in democratic surroundings,
as it was the case during the period of Communism in Croatia. Civilian
Communist oversight of armed forces was not democratic at all, which is a
lesson that should not be forgotten in liberal democracies. Consequently,
when talking about civil-military relations, we are not talking about the
mutual balance in this matching. Civilians should be given the right of
oversight of the military by sticking to the principles of liberal democracy,
but the military should not be in an equal position towards civilians; they
should not be given the possibility to control civilians. In general, that is
what the reform of security sector is about: the area of security should be a
part of democratic development in every given country. It should not be
given an exclusive position. The people working in the security sector –
whether civilians or the military – should act as ordinary civil servants.
They should not be allowed to interfere in the politics and they should not
be allowed to be members of any political party. On the other hand, they
should be qualified to protect values of liberal democracy, which should be
their optimal contribution in exercising soft security.

In Croatia, this process is occurring under special circumstances due to

the recent armed conflict experience on its territory. Nevertheless, it
should not be an excuse for neglecting this process. Some problems will
occur along this path and they should be overcome sensitively, paying at-
tention to the unique state of affairs. Some delays might be tolerated, but
having always in mind a clear vision of placing the area of security into the
whole conglomerate of the community of values compatible with the EU
and NATO.

According to the Constitution, which legitimises our parliamentary po-

litical system, the main agents for implementing legal and institutional
democratic oversight of defense and security in Croatia, as a substantial
element of civil-military relations, are legislative institutions, which means

116 Staniþiü

Parliament, and political and executive institutions, which means Office of
the President and the Government. Although the role of civil society is not
particularly mentioned in the Constitution, it is in the very nature of de-
mocracy building that this segment of society should have a relevant role,
depending of its ability and capability.

2 Legislative

The Croatian Parliament, being the highest legislative authority of power,
enjoys a number of privileges in the field of national defense and security.
In accordance with the Constitution, the Croatian Parliament decides on
war and peace and adopts the Strategy of National Security and the Strat-
egy of Defense. Other responsibilities which are given to the Parliament
are being worked out in detail in acts concerning national security, which
are more or less considered within the frame of defense activities. Based
on such a classification, the Parliament is authorised to ‘supervise the work
of the Government of the Republic of Croatia and other holders of public
authority responsible to the Croatian Parliament, in conformity with the
Constitution and Law’. This illustrates that the Croatian Parliament has
significant authorities in the field of national defense and security. The
Committee for Interior Policy and National Security is primarily supposed
to deal, within its mandate, with this issue. As this issue also has foreign
affairs aspect, the Committee for Foreign Affairs is also to be involved, as
well as the Committee for Finance and Budget.

The responsibilities of the Croatian Parliament in the field of national

defense and security are determined by the two basic documents: the De-
fense Act and the Security Services Act. According to the Defense Act, the
Parliament decides on the main issue of defense and according to the Secu-
rity Services Act, enjoys the most extensive supervisory authority over se-
curity services through the Parliamentary Council. Apart from that, the
Committee for Interior Policy and National Security is authorised to hold a
hearing of the head and officials of the security services to discuss the le-
gitimacy of financial and material transactions of the security services.
This Act regulates civil control over the work of the security services

While performing its duties, the Council is entitled to have access to
reports and other documents of the security services, conduct interviews
with the heads and officials of the security services when it is considered

V. Cvrtila, The Parliament, paper prepared for ‘Stock-Taking Study of Security Sector
Reform in Croatia’, DCAF-IMO, Geneva-Zagreb, 2003.

Croatia

117

necessary in order to establish facts crucial for evaluation of the legitimacy
of the services’ performance. The competent parliamentary committee is
empowered at any time to demand from the Government and the President
of the Republic of Croatia, or certain head of a security service, a report on
performance. This Council has not yet been established, although the legal
provisions for its establishment have existed for two years already. This is
one of the numerous examples of discrepancies between legal provisions
and their implementation.

This is also a very good example of the fact that, for the time being, the

legislative still does not exercise mandated authority to a full extent. The
main rationale for such a state of affairs is that members of given commit-
tees are currently not very much aware of how to exercise this function.
The 4-year mandate is too short for mastering the problem. One of the ex-
planations is Croatia’s very recent and painful legacy of defending its terri-
tory against the armed aggression from the neighbouring country. Most
citizens still consider the government/state responsible for solving defense
and security problems. This particularly refers to the military area because
there is still some kind of exclusivity to this sector. That might be ex-
plained by the credibility and merit attributed to the Croatian army during
the Homeland War by the vast majority of people. In other words, the
Croatian army has a special position in Croatian society and state, given
the fact that its activities contributed substantially to state independence.

That is why the defense community, and consequently MPs, are very re-

luctant to accept all the implications arising from the need of democratic
oversight of the Armed Forces. That is why most Croatian MPs have not
gained a chance to enhance their skills on democratic security sector re-
forms. This inconsistency negatively contributes to the security sector re-
form as a whole, because it prevents a successful exchange and compati-
bility between civilians and the military. Therefore, military as well as
civilian personnel are required to gain new skills in the political, manage-
rial and international areas. Besides previously mentioned facts, the civil
sector and the military need to strengthen their ties of cooperation. Closer
and improved working relations between civilians and the military con-
tribute to better integration of the Armed Forces into democratic govern-
mental functions.

On the other hand, some of the military are likely to remain opaque in

dealing with this issue. There are still a lot of examples of superfluous and
very extensive interpretation of confidential and classified information on
defense and security issues on the side of MOD, but also of the lack of
knowledge and expertise of such sensitive relations and problems, on
the side of civilians. Broad interpretation of classified documents is com-
monplace, which is sometimes due to the ambition of some high-ranking

118 Staniþiü

military staff member to keep his position at any rate by applying informa-
tion rent, as a sort of guarantee to maintain position and privileges. The
same cannot be said for MPs, but they may be manipulated if they are not
prepared or competent enough. In order to prepare them to master this very
new and complicated area, the Parliament should use the services of so-
called staffers, who are supposed to be specialized in specific problems,
such as sensitivity in civil-military relations as a part of the security and
defense sector reform. They should be employed as experts in given Par-
liament’s committees, providing the members with expertise, and their as-
sociation with MP’s should not be limited to their mandates. They should
be non-party experts and their work should be focussed more to the expert
and less to the political aspect of the problem.

3 Executive

The Law on Defense (March 2002) enumerates the duties of the Head of
State, based upon his constitutional role. This Law recognizes the Presi-
dent of the Republic as the Commander-in-Chief and lists 22 specific tasks
of the President of the Republic. This list is very extensive and gives the
President many specific duties, for example: submitting proposal for estab-
lishing the situation of direct threat and the state of war with the counter-
signature of the Prime Minister, authorising all relevant documents in the
fields of security and defense, as well as structure of command, military
units and institutions of the Armed Forces. While executing these tasks,
the Supreme Commander, alias the President, issues commands, orders, di-
rectives, warrants, decisions, regulations and other acts. The Supreme
Commander may confer to the Minister of Defense certain tasks from the
range of his competence, with the exception of the deployment of the
Armed Forces.

As the Law foresees, the Government has also a wide range of compe-

tencies. These competencies comprise the proposal of all relevant strategic
and planning documents, including the Defense Budget, proposal of the
general mobilization to the President of the Republic, as well as the intro-
duction of alert measures and mobilization of Armed Forces and ensures
the implementation of state of emergency on the territory of the Republic
of Croatia

D. Grubisa, ‘Security Cooperation in South-Eastern Europe’, Croatian International
Relations Review, IMO, Zagreb, No. 28/29, 2002.

Croatia

119

The main problem of the executive is opaque jurisdiction between the

Office of the President and the Government, i.e. the Prime Minister. The
coalition Government decided to change the system into parliamentary
democracy, with more authority and power in the security sector given to
the Cabinet, at the same time enforcing the oversight authority of the Par-
liament. On the other side of the executive branch, the President of the Re-
public was not willing to give up all of his prerogatives, especially in de-
fense and security sector, and a long and bitter struggle for control ensued.

The rivalry between the offices of the Prime Minister and the President,

a constant fight for predominance, became evident through some important
political decisions. Exercising the power between offices, the first post
electoral (after the coalition Government entered the office) conflict
emerged as a fight for control over intelligence. The division of labour and
competency over military issues is clear; the President of the Republic has
final say over the armed forces, and the Government (through the institu-
tion of civilian minister) is controlling military institutions – budget, plan-
ning etc. So with the two sided and opposite controlling partners there are
no possibilities for any misuse of the military as a basis of personal or po-
litical power. At the same time, this provokes difficulties because deci-
sions have to be mutual and signed by both of them.

If this kind of confusion happens during a national emergency, Croatia’s

defense capability would be weakened to an extent which would seriously
affect national security. This is additional evidence of a very close affilia-
tion between defense and security in times of war. Nowadays, as Croatia
is, although informally, a part of collective security in the sub-region of
South Eastern Europe, territorial security is not threatened. Yet, due to the
confusion in competencies, the security community, including the intelli-
gence, is not under effective democratic control. The establishment of the
Parliamentary Council for control over the work of security services is
supposed to foster this oversight, but how it will work and within what
mandate, remains to be seen

4 Civil

Society

Croatia has never had a strong tradition of NGOs and civil society. Citi-
zen’s civil engagement for solving both individual and community prob-
lems has not been a common practice among the vast majority of citizens

O. Zunec, Sapere Aude: Democratic Oversight and Control over Intelligence and Secu-
rity Agencies in Croatia, paper prepared for ‘Stock-Taking Study of Security Sector
Reform in Croatia’, DCAF-IMO, Geneve-Zagreb, 2003.

120 Staniþiü

in Croatia. However, prevailing NGO structures were able to pay attention
to activities of the intelligence and security structures.

Most NGOs have been established after the political shift in the year

1990. It is assumed that Croatia currently maintains about 20,000 NGOs,
of which 18,000 operate at a local level. Nonetheless, no statistics have
been conducted on the number of active NGOs, but this number is esti-
mated to be significantly lower. According to surveys, the work of NGOs
only has a minimal effect in the public policy agenda

. It especially refers

to the military area although government representatives have, slowly but
surely, begun to emphasise the significance of civil society in their public
appearances. In the government’s Strategy for Croatia’s Development, the
importance of civil society, the principle of subsidiarity and partnerships
with NGOs have been recognised as important hallmarks of modernisation
and civil society development in Croatia. In the National Security Strategy,
a document prepared by independent experts, the relevance of the in-
volvement of NGOs in civil-military relations has been underlined, but this
version of Strategy was not discussed and accepted in Parliament. Instead,
the Parliament has accepted a text prepared instantly, by a very small
group of people without involvement of any agencies except the Ministry
of Defense, without input of independent institutions and analysts and
without the knowledge of the media or the general public

. In this docu-

ment, the role of NGOs is significantly reduced to the proclamation on the
need of “synergic functioning of the military and civil component within
the national defense doctrine”. Even the term “civil society” evades men-
tion. Only the role of the media has been mentioned in the context of de-
mocratic oversight of security and military sector, but very generally.

As far as other NGO segments are concerned, there are approximately

30 public institutes in Croatia and none is really specialized for security
and military subjects, especially civil-military relations. Because civil and
democratic criteria are gaining relevance in the accession process to
NATO, which is Croatia’s strategic goal, some scientific institutes dealing
with social studies got going to analyse these questions as well. The good
example is the Institute for International Relations (IMO) in Zagreb, which
develops and recruits analysts, from aspirants to experts, who are dealing
with security and military issues, but mainly within research on various
segments of international relations and the role of Croatia in this matter.

Main information on the NGOs’ activities in Croatia are put forward by CIVICUS

(World Alliance for Citizen Participation), CERANEO (The Center for Development of
Non-Profit Organizations), Zagreb and SPAI (Stability Pact Anti-Corruption Initiative).

Portfolio of Country Transparency Profiles, draft paper issued by the Center for Euro-
pean Security Studies, Groningen, September 2002.

Croatia

121

IMO develops substantial cooperation in this field with most prominent
European institutions, such as the Geneva Centre for Democratic Control
of Armed Forces (DCAF), the Centre for European Security Studies
(CESS) from Groningen, George C. Marshall Centre from Garmisch
Partenkirchen, the International Institute for Security Studies from London
(IISS), etc. This cooperation focuses on carrying out joint projects, orga-
nizing conferences, seminars and workshops especially in the field of civil-
military relations.

The Centre for Strategic Studies from time to time organizes confer-

ences on some strategic issues, mainly from the point of view of the posi-
tion of Croatia and Croatian diaspora in international relations as an infor-
mal unit of the Institute for Applied Social Research of the University of
Zagreb. Such events are mostly financed with contributions from the Croa-
tian diaspora or Catholic Church.

There are some experts dealing with security issues and civil military re-

lations at the Faculty of Political Science of the University of Zagreb also.
Within the Faculty, some centres were organized that might be considered
as component of civil society. These are the Defendological Association,
the Croatian Association for International Studies and the Croatian Atlan-
tic Council. Although all these experts and professors belong to the Fac-
ulty, they can be regarded as independent experts. In the broader sense,
one can also say that the security aspect is analysed within some other
Faculties dealing with social sciences. All of that could be considered as
part of NGOs, dealing with security and military issues and on criteria and
standards of NATO membership.

The influence of independent institutions and analysts is, at the moment,

being felt more in the informal preparatory phase of the decision-making
process, than formally. Although there are some positive signs, one can
say that public policy institutes, academicians and independent experts are
informally accepted as provisional advisors in security and military issues,
but there is no feasible system of permanent consultations. There are no
hearings by Parliament or relevant committees, no request for special in-
dependent reports.

The Government, mostly the Ministry of Science and Technology, gives

partial financial support to public institutes on a contract basis. Three-year
tenders, which define conditions for applications for all concerned insti-
tutes, but for independent experts as well. On the other hand, institutes are
allowed to apply for projects and activities, which are offered by business,
companies, and foundations within the country and abroad. Other govern-
ment bodies can also apply. There are no restrictions in applying to foreign
foundations or any other international or multilateral organizations. There
are no restrictions in cooperating with them by working out joint projects

122 Staniþiü

or any kind of joint activities. This kind of support, especially financial, is
very important and according to some public institutes, it might equate to
the half of their total budget. The total activity of some of these institutions
might almost entirely depend on this kind of funding. With this kind of
support these institutions are enabled to co-organise domestic events or
events abroad, e.g. conferences, seminars, they can issue publications,
even in foreign languages.

Regarding the funding of NGOs, several problems persist. Most Croa-

tian civil society organizations depend on foreign financial support and
lack any state donations. Therefore, only bigger organizations tend to re-
ceive foreign funding, whereas smaller ones are neglected. In the long run,
civil society organizations will have to find financial institutions inside the
country in order to remain active over time. Possible financial sources
include “donations, subventions and income generated from their own
services”.

As far as the role of the media is concerned, the Croatian government

generally respects the protection of press and media by the Constitution.
Further protected are free speech, public expression and the establishment
of institutions of public communication. At the beginning of 2003, the new
Law on State TV was adopted by the Parliament. From then on, public
television is controlled by a Council, which consists of representatives of
NGOs, but also of some MPs and is validated by Parliament. As a result,
transparency on political control over state television was enhanced and
more publicity on the identities of major media shareholders was gained.

Though the Croatian media is free, diverse media segments lack ade-

quate experts. This is especially the case in the field of security and de-
fense sectors reform and moreover in the matter of civil-military relations.
Generally, each media segment is assigned only one reporter. Further, the
media neglects serious and quality research, as well as reports and remains
at the tabloid level. An imbalance exists with regard to the dissemination
into English and local languages. Information is predominantly dissemi-
nated into English rather than local languages. The distribution of informa-
tion is further limited, especially regarding the electronic press. All this re-
fers a lot to media coverage of civil-military relations as well. Although
previous tensions between the media and military seem to decrease slowly,
mainly through increased levels of cooperation, the problem of profes-
sional treatment, concerning sensitive issues of civil-military relations re-
mains. Improvements have been achieved through press conferences,
the attendance of media representatives at seminars, public debates and
open discussions organized by the Ministry of Defense. The Ministry of
Defense has acknowledged the media as a means to emphasize problem-
atic issues related to the security community and has agreed to cooperate

Croatia

123

more intensively to strive for overall satisfaction. The MOD still controls
and interprets too huge amounts of classified and confidential information
without any counter-interpretation from the civil sector, such as the media.
On the other hand, the media lacks knowledge and the number of experts
to consider appropriately such sensitive topics. Greater educational effort
should be done. This is a fine-tuning problem; journalists who are very
competent in analysing military issues are not competent enough to ana-
lyse very sensitive civil-military relations especially in terms of democratic
oversight of armed forces.

Further, the MOD possesses all crucial information but seldom organ-

izes press conferences or individual meetings with journalists to increase
the quality and quantity of the information being released. However, the
press itself does not always attend meetings offered by the MOD, which
puts the blame to the lack of communication and cooperation on both
sides. The few press releases tend not to include any information on civil-
military relations or democratic oversight of armed forces

Transparency and Accountability

A constitutional and statutory framework for policy accountability is in
place in Croatia. The Constitution says that the legislative branch accepts
responsibility for national security and defense strategy. The Defense Law
says that elected representatives must give approval to the Armed Forces
Development Plan. That would mean that there is a procedure in which the
lawmakers establish guidelines for the development and execution of key
strategic documents, and subsequently discuss and comment on the
worked out text. The elaboration of the material itself, as well as the policy
implementation, would be the task of all relevant offices of the executive
branch.

As far as financial accountability is concerned, the defense and security

sector is still addressed as a common concept, because the security or intel-
ligence budgets are still a part of the military budget. Legislators must ap-
prove the budget and every deputy has the right to propose amendments to
it. The military budget receives particular attention from the specialist
security sector oversight committee (The Committee for Interior Policy
and National Security), which is also authorised to control intelligence.
However, due to reasons explained above, the intelligence sector is,

There are some improvements recently – there are more frequent press conferences than
before and the MOD web site is regularly updated.

124 Staniþiü

according to some expert’s and civil society’s estimations, out of democ-
ratic control.

The main instrument of accountability is the State Audit Office, which

must report to the legislature at least once a year. It is concerned with the
legality and appropriateness of defense spending. According to some ana-
lysts, financial accountability is fragile as well, although there are regula-
tions which provide instruments for more substantive democratic over-
sight

. It is a general perception that the Government, but also elected MPs,

fulfil their oversight function mostly in a proforma manner. Many MPs
appear either unable or unwilling to subject spending bids to in-depth scru-
tiny. Overall, the legislative tends to give the impression of using its pow-
ers actively and decisively, but the reality is different. Another evidence of
their hesitation is in the fact that the legislative does not want to be too
much involved in a sector, which they perceive still has an exclusive posi-
tion in society. Subsequently, this additionally indicates the inability or
unwillingness of legislatives to recognize the importance and much
broader scope of the new security concept in terms of reform and effective
promotion of democratic oversight in this area.

The Impact of Good Governance

Croatia is currently a weak state with a weak coalition in power. That
badly affects the security and defense sectors reform effort on a general
scale, and particularly in implementing a new concept of civil-military re-
lations. For the first time in history Croatia must rely on its own sovereign
democratic institutions rather than on some alien constitutional entities,
such as was the former Yugoslavia or various age-old kingdoms which
controlled its territory. No more can strong leaders, whether local or for-
eign, arbitrate in the case where decision-making process comes to a halt.
By their very nature, democratic institutions, acting in a coalition and con-
text of like-mindedness, are weak and are not likely to be effective enough.
Confusion in competency can happen, as in the case of the intelligence
oversight and the whole process of democratic oversight and are likely to
be based on “trial and error”, frustrating practice.

An appreciation that “knowledge is power” clearly prevails over recog-

nition of the people’s “right to know” about security and military “busi-
ness”. On the other hand, there is no proper legislation covering the protec-
tion of state and official data and the limits of secrecy in terms of the

The ESCADA Report, CESS, Groningen, 2003.

Croatia

125

national interest. Under the previous government, which encouraged such
an approach, given the fact that the army was highly politicised and exclu-
sively under control of the ruling party, this was considered as a kind of
natural way of thinking. However, when the coalition gained power there
were no big changes in the mindset of politicians. There are some opinions
that in the governing coalition each partner calls for more transparency
only in those areas where its counterparts are in charge. At the same time,
all information considered as potentially useful in political competition are
kept secret or confidential.

This kind of situation might be attributed to the fact that the governing

coalition is facing many problems and a lot of sometimes unfair opposition
coming from the MPs who belonged to the previous government and from
civil servants and bureaucrats who remained in office even after their party
lost power. They are still in position to sabotage any steps taken towards
the accomplishment of the new concept of civil-military relations. In other
circumstances, perhaps other countries not encumbered with such legacy,
or non-governmental interest groups – NGOs or some other institutions of
civil society – can provide some mediation support. The assistance of bet-
ter-educated journalists can also be beneficial. As it was illustrated before-
hand, such a possibility is rather meek given the present inappropriate role
of civil society in Croatia.

A remarkable problem is the economic situation. Although Croatia is

much better off compared to other countries in the region, there are many
problems which affect badly the reform path in this particular sector. The
most difficult problem is unemployment, which is the highest of almost all
transition countries. In this context, managing armed forces downsizing in
challenging. Therefore, reform in defense and security sector is very often
reduced to downsizing, although downsizing in Croatian army and in the
security sector community is not, at least officially, the main component of
the reform. However, it is the unavoidable first step of reform. In the cur-
rent congested and overcrowded defense and security sectors, any kind of
reform aiming to attain an appropriate level of efficacy, transparency and,
particularly, democratic oversight is not likely to be successfully com-
pleted. Consequently, such a situation would make any progress impossi-
ble along the process of adjustment of the civil-military relations to the
NATO democratic standards and criteria. To avoid this trap downsizing
should not only mean reducing the force structure, but to restructure it in a
transparent way which should be controlled and guided by the civilians
and which should fit economic and financial resources.

126 Staniþiü

The Challenge of Downsizing

The general public is not particularly interested in the type of weapons and
equipment the military requires, but they do want to be assured that their
taxes are being properly spent. This refers also to such actions as the im-
pending force reductions. They can understand the need to adjust and the
downward force structure in light of both a reduced threat environment,
and the need to decrease defense spending in order to address the demands
of a struggling economy. However, there is also apprehension over the
way in which these reductions take place. Parents, relatives, and friends of
servicemen and women, many of whom fought for national independence,
expect the defense and military leaders to have a plan that addresses the
transition of military members into the civilian sector

The credibility of the defense establishment will suffer if ill-considered

policies or plans, or poor execution, places those servicemen and women
who are released, onto already bulging unemployment roles. In Croatia,
there are currently around 360,000 unemployed persons. Out of them
34,500 are demilitarised Croatian soldiers from the recent war. Beyond
moral obligations, the MOD and the military hardly need thousands of re-
leased service members, scattered across the land, unemployed, and bit-
terly complaining of a failure of the system to reward their sacrifice.

To cope with this immense problem, the Croatian MOD has developed a

very detailed and thoughtful Transition Training Program called
SPECTRA, that seeks to retrain excess service members in order to pre-
pare them as adequately as possible to find employment, even considering
the challenges in the current job market. The program is an interagency
process that combines labour, education, veterans, regional governments,
and other agencies in an effort to do their best to ensure for the post-
military future of the personnel.

Although the MOD is the main actor in the implementation of the pro-

gramme, many civilian ministries are involved, which illustrates the amal-
gamation of civil-military relations in such a sensitive situation. The pro-
gramme will be very substantially supported, for example, by the
Ministries for Labour and Social Care, for Science and Technology, for
economy, education and sport, small and medium enterprises and of course
of finance. NATO’s Economic Council, as a very important step in the
process of accession, authorizes the Programme. The time span of the

J. Petri, ‘Harmonizing Security Sector Reform & Defense Agreements Security Sector
Reform in Croatia’, Croatian International Relations Review, IMO, Zagreb, No. 25/26,
2001.

Croatia

127

programme will be three years (2002–2004) and its total costs will be more
than 221 million Euros. The launching costs alone will exceed 2 million
Euros.

The main goal of the programme is to cut by half military and civil per-

sonnel working currently in defense and security sector. If downsizing
proceeds along NATO standards and criteria in due time, then the share of
defense and security costs in the total Croatian budget will decline from
2.3% (2002) down to 2.2% in the period up to the year 2010.

International Assistance and Conditionality

In the context of the civil-military relations, this segment could be ad-
dressed from the political and technical aspects, the first being relevant be-
cause of conditionality, and the second important for operational reasons.

Defense and security sector reform should be discussed more broadly

keeping in mind the international assistance and conditionality of all the
kinds of reforms that Croatia is now undertaking, with the aim to become a
full-fledged member of the community of values, represented by Euro-
Atlantic structures. Croatia’s main interest by applying to NATO and EU
is to get international assistance for adjustment to standards and criteria of
liberal democracies, to become a part of a collective security scheme and
to become producer and not only consumer of regional and global security.

The Croatian public generally considers NATO as a military organiza-

tion or alliance, not being very familiar with its civilian or democratic as-
pect, which requires that each candidate country must meet not only mili-
tary criteria, but also more and more democratic ones, which are common
to the criteria of the EU. The consistencies of these criteria are based on
the standards of liberal democracy, which are prerequisites for successful
development and transformation from the old systems – first the commu-
nist, and then the authoritarian to the democratic one. International assis-
tance including the conditionality and even gentle pressure would facilitate
the accomplishment of reforms in various sectors including the security
sector as well. Although the adjustment to common standards and values
embodied by NATO and the EU is the prerequisite for benefiting interna-
tional assistance, they should not be considered as commanding condi-
tions, but as a process that is of essential interest to Croatia. Accordingly,
the virtual “self-imposed quasi-membership” in Euro-Atlantic structures,
which will be reached by meeting these “conditions”, is far more important
than formal full-fledged membership. All technical and operational assis-
tance schemes, which will be provided for implementation of security sec-
tor reform, should be based on these assumptions.

128 Staniþiü

Regarding Croatia’s membership in international organizations such as

NATO, both the military and the civilian sector are required to improve
their knowledge of “international organizations, service in multinational
headquarters, interoperability, interagency structures, and multinational ci-
vilian-military bureaucratic procedures”. As a consequence, military as
well as civilian professionals need to replace current skills with abilities
that meet today’s standards and allow them to fulfil their tasks profession-
ally and successfully. Therefore, the educational system of the security and
defense environment needs to provide well-educated and trained people
with the ability to adapt appropriately to changes and challenges of today’s
security environment. Education, training and autonomous will to learn are
the main indicators that should help to evaluate the quality of the individu-
als and create basis to further upgrade their skills.

To enhance education and training among high-ranking officers, an in-

ter-disciplinary/multidisciplinary national security study program should
be established. Courses and seminars should be open to everyone – includ-
ing civil servants, journalists, politicians, military commentators, etc. Spe-
cial attention needs to be paid to the education of military personnel re-
garding their duties, and to international headquarters, including NATO
and SHAPE. The future demand of such personnel will certainly rise re-
quiring a solid investment in this specific sector of education. The system
further faces the obligation to educate high-ranking officers at a different
level than lower-ranked personnel. High-ranking officers have to be pro-
vided with advanced lectures in operational and managerial skills. Overall,
the current Croatian military profession is inadequate compared to western
standards and begs for major reforms in the years to come. Specific re-
forms should be directed towards the following areas: intensive education
and training, increase the level of expertise in procurement/acquisition of
new equipment and weapons, with an aim to better understand relations
between the civil society and the armed forces, and the requirements im-
posed by the civil institutions to their members, including soldiers.

The military itself should focus on hard security aspects. In addition to

this basic defense mission, the military should also focus on new aspects of
security: peacekeeping operations, regional arms control activities, de-
mining, cooperation with neighbours and participation in PfP and MAP
exercises

Z. Mahecic, Croatian Defense Reform: Capability Building – Good Governance in Se-
curity and Defense Reform, paper presented at the DCAF-IISS workshop on security
sector reform in Croatia and Yugoslavia, London, October 2002.

Croatia

129

9 Conclusion

An appropriate understanding of the distinction between the concept of de-
fense and the new concept of security has a crucial relevance in imple-
menting civil-military relations along the lines of the war against terrorism.
The notion of defense has the meaning of defending something (i.e. terri-
tory). In the case of Croatia, given the Serbian aggression, the notion of
territorial defense is what the military stands for. This understanding was
purposely accentuated during the ten years of HDZ isolationist-
nationalistic rule, extending the paranoid perception of threat to Croatian
sovereignty, which should be encountered at any rate. This perception re-
quired a special type of officers who were supposed to respect the ethnic or
“blood and soil” type of Croatian development, even in peacetime. This
completely neglects the new concept of security, which gives quite a new
role and functions to the military and to civil-military relations. These in-
clude a desire to train for and participate in peacekeeping operations, in re-
gional arms control verification activities, in de-mining, in cooperating
with neighbours and participating in PfP and MAP exercises, and espe-
cially in the war against terrorism. The precondition for success in these
new roles is a full acceptance of civil leadership which transforms the se-
curity and defense community from an exclusive club to a normal compo-
nent of democratic and civil society. That is what the new concept of civil-
military relations really is about. All the security issues, like terrorism, il-
legal traffic of drugs and people, WMDs, organised crime etc., are a very
important part of democratic institution-building, or democratic capacity-
building including an appropriate notion of civil-military relations. This
ties together and fosters democracy and security very closely. Accordingly,
when we talk about the new concept of civil-military relations, we are very
much talking about democracy-building in a given country, therefore in
Croatia as well.

Indeed, the Croatian military strategy provides some elements for the

fight against terrorism, by pointing out “support in the anti-terrorist fight
and asymmetric threats as a part of the global activities of suppressing the
terrorist activities”. Along these lines, the Croatian government opened its
air space for American jet aeroplanes in the Iraqi campaign, providing also
some services on the ground. The international relations strategy of Croa-
tia, prepared by independent experts and academicians, has recommended
“true and unambiguous support to the USA in the global antiterrorist coali-
tion, along with the active involvement in it (i.e., unconditional opening of
its airspace, exchange of information, intelligence co-operation, etc.)”. The
Strategy was prepared before the Iraqi crisis, and was accepted by the Min-
istry of Foreign Affairs, but not yet by the Croatian government. In the

130 Staniþiü

meantime, the Military Strategy, which was prepared by the military with
no involvement of civilian experts, was accepted, providing more or less
general proclamations while neglecting concrete details and activities.

These proclamations proffer “support in the case of natural, technologi-

cal and humanitarian emergencies and catastrophes, in de-mining and
cleaning of the unexploded military warheads of all kinds, in the case of
the nuclear, chemical and biological accidents, search and rescue opera-
tions, participation in peacekeeping and humanitarian activities”.

None of the officially-approved strategic documents provide the basis

for establishing bilateral or multilateral military units of any kind with
neighbouring countries. There were discussions on organising regional co-
operation, within the civilian or intelligence framework, for the fight
against terrorism, but until now no concrete outcome has taken place. Ob-
viously, the fight against terrorism is still more attached to the military and
defense concept of the civil-military relations than to the security concept.

Having in mind all these, there are four main features, which label the

present stage of civil-military relations in Croatia:

x Lack of awareness and understanding of the distinction between the

concepts of defense and security,

x Discrepancy of legal provisions and their implementations,
x Lack of the competence on both sides in exercising the new concept

of civil-military relations,

x A confused economic situation, which slows down the pace of ap-

propriate implementation of the concept.

The Evolution of Civil-Military Relations in South
East Europe: The Case of Greece

Thanos P. Dokos

The Evolution of Greece’s National Security Concept

Given its strategic location in the Mediterranean and the Balkans, Greece
throughout the 20

century had been subject to the competing bids for

great power penetration

. Its near total exposure by sea, placed the country

under the direct influence of whatever Great Power exercised naval control
in the Mediterranean (Great Britain before 1947 and the United States after
that time). In the area of Greek-Great Power relations, political scientists
classified Greece among those states with penetrated (dependent) political
systems

The year 1974 is the gate connecting two different eras in the history of

century Greece. In the period 1903–74 the small and strategically lo-

cated country experienced considerable turbulence in its external and in-
ternal relations. Economically, it was classified in the category of poor,
agrarian, raw material producing, trade-dependent and externally indebted,
in short, underdeveloped. Politically, it was polarized, functioning with
personalistic and clientelistic political parties whose main purpose was to
distribute the largesse controlled by a hypertrophic state-sector. Deep
schisms – pitting Royalists against Republicans and Communists against
Nationalists – marked the years from 1915 to 1974, resulting in frequent
military interventions in politics. Accordingly, dictatorial rule was im-
posed in 1925/26, 1936–41 and 1967–74. A bloody, destructive and so-
cially traumatic civil war, in 1946–49, deeply scarred the body politic of
the country. Given the instability and fragility of its democratic institutions
– constantly challenged by competing models of monarchical authoritari-
anism and communist totalitarianism – Greece was classified by political
scientists in the “praetorian zone” during this long period together with

See, for example, T. A. Couloumbis, J. A. Petropoulos, H. J. Psomiades, Foreign Inter-
ference in Greek Politics: An Historical Perspective, New York, Pella Publishing
Company, 1976.

See, for example, Adamandia Pollis, ‘United States Foreign Policy Toward Authoritar-
ian Regimes in the Mediterranean’, Millenium, vol. 4, no. 1, Spring 1975, pp. 28–51.

132 Dokos

states such as Spain, Portugal and Turkey as well as countries in Central
and South America.

Upon his return from exile in 1974, Constantinos Karamanlis presided

over a remarkably smooth transition process that led to the establishment
and consolidation of durable and, with the passage of time, adequately
tested democratic institutions. ȉhe handling of “dejuntification” in

1974/75, confined primarily to coup leaders and those responsible for the
ordering and the practice of torture, prevented the upsurge of a new schism
between the “ins” and the “outs”, thus putting an end to the long cycles of
mutual revenge in the Greek political arena, while reducing the opportuni-
ties (as well as removing the causes) of patron-client relationships between
warring political parties (or coalitions) within Greece and competing for
influence through local clients Great Powers.

In order for Greece to qualify for entry into the Community, she (like

France, Germany and others) had to abandon concepts and policies such as
ultra-nationalism, irredentism or other forms of territorial revisionism and
to accept instead the challenges of functional integration and economic in-
ter-dependence which were at the heart of the grand European experiment.
Despite the spirited debate that had preceded Greece’s entry into the EC in
the years 1976–79 (PASOK, the Greek Socialist Party, had been at that
time heavily opposed to Greek membership), in the fourteen years that
have elapsed since formal accession in January of 1981, the EU (European
Union) has become nearly universally accepted by the full range of politi-
cal parties as the centerpiece of Greece’s external relationships. It is well
beyond the scope of this article to assess the deep impact of EC member-
ship on nearly every aspect of Greek economic, political and social expres-
sion. In the long term, it is safe to assume that the comprehensive impact
will probably prove to be of monumental proportions in nearly every walk
of Greek life, including civil-military relations.

Membership in NATO

also had a certain “modernizing” impact on the officer corps, especially af-
ter 1974.

The literature on “praetorian states” was sparked by the book of Samuel Huntington,
Political Order in Changing Societies, New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1968.

On the subject of consolidation of democratic institutions in Greece since 1974, see P.
Nikiforos Diamandouros, ‘Regime Change and the Prospects for Democracy in Greece:
1974–1983’, in Guillermo O’ Donnell, Philippe C. Schmitter and Laurence Whitehead,
eds., Transitions from Authoritarian Rule, Southern Europe (Baltimore and London:
The Johns Hopkins Univ. Press, 1986), pp. 138–164; see also Theodore A. Couloumbis
and Prodromos M. Yannas, ‘The Stability Quotient of Greece’s Post-1974 Democratic
Institutions’, Journal of Modern Greek Studies, vol. 1, no. 2, 1983, pp. 359–372.

See for example, Panos Kazakos and Panayotis Ioakimidis (eds.), Greece and EC
Membership Evaluated, London, Pinter, 1994.

Greece

133

Simultaneously, the EU has functioned also as a restraining instrument.

Membership in an elaborate structure that is highly institutionalized re-
quired the abandonment of some of the trappings of undiluted sovereignty
and national independence. Both with respect to Turkey (as we suggested
above) and also in its relations with its northern neighbors (especially
FYROM), Greece has found itself, like Odysseus, tied to a European Un-
ion mast permitting it to resist the attraction of atavistic nationalism and ir-
redentism.

Greek Security Policy During the Cold War

During the late 1940s and early 1950s, the difference between conserva-
tives and liberals (the communists had been outlawed as a result of the
Greek Civil War) on security issues and NATO was one of emphasis. Both
groupings basically believed that Greece’s main security threat emanated
from its northern borders and that Communism (external and domestic)
threatened mutually cherished values. NATO was viewed, therefore, as in-
dispensable for the defense of the country and the United States was
treated as Greece’s natural ally and guarantor. Greek governments, given
the dependence on the US for their survival, yielded on most issues in the
field of national defense. Since the years of the Civil War (1946–49) Greek
security arrangements were closely identified with American defense pol-
icy. The Greek armed forces were exclusively equipped with American
arms and the hundreds of officers who received graduate military training
in the US welcomed the continuity of their host country’s influence on the
Greek armed forces.

The orientation of Greece’s defense until the mid-1960s was based on

the U.S. credo that the main security concern was one of internal rather
than external nature. The Greek Army (in contrast with the Turkish one)
was primarily supplied and organized to face a domestic communist threat.
According to NATO planning, Greece was only expected “through certain
limited accessories to cause some delay to Soviet and satellite forces in
case of global war”.

With the relaxation of international tension in the late

1960s, perceptions of a domestic communist threat, supported by Greece’s
Communist neighbors (except Yugoslavia) diminished considerably, while
a confrontation between the two Balkan NATO allies became more likely

In this section, the author benefited greatly from the insight of Prof. Theodore Cou-
loumbis, Director-General of ELIAMEP.

Thanos Veremis, Greek Security Considerations: A Historical Perspective, Athens, Pa-
pazissis Publishers, 1980, p. 79.

134 Dokos

(especially after the 1964 and 1967 Cyprus crises). Greek security plan-
ning could no longer rely on the dogma of internal danger and NATO de-
fense prescriptions.

The restoration of democratic rule in 1974 was, indeed, a major turning

point in Greek security policy. Greece now began to place more emphasis
on internal balancing (through the strengthening of its Armed Forces) and
less on membership in NATO and the bilateral relationship with the United
States (mainly as a result of Turkey’s membership to the former and
“privileged” relationship with the latter). This new period of Greek politi-
cal history, lasting from 1974 to the present, has been characterized by the
diversification of Greece’s external relationships, including a relative
weakening of its ties with the U.S. in favor of closer economic and politi-
cal integration into Western Europe and improved relations with Eastern
Europe. In the last decade or so, Greece placed increased importance on its
“European card” (membership to the European Community/Union and the
WEU).

The end of the Cold War, the peaceful (in most instances) East Euro-

pean revolutions and the collapse of the USSR have led, rather paradoxi-
cally, to a darkening of Greece’s security horizons. The end of the East-
West confrontation and Yugoslavia’s disintegration and civil war have re-
leased a variety of explosive ethnic, political, social and economic tensions
with serious destabilizing implications for Greece’s northern neighbor-
hood. The escalation and widening of such conflicts could seriously affect
Greece, through refugee flows, regional instability and, under certain
rather extreme circumstances, engage the country in open warfare. New
and more nationalistic approaches to foreign policy among governments in
the Balkans have also resulted in considerable unpredictability and fluidity
in political developments.

Today global structures are in a state of flux. Analysts and policy mak-

ers in small countries are attempting to identify and to predict trends as

Greece’s security policy has been a search of a synthesis of “internal” and “external
balancing”. These are the two policies that states (especially small ones) can follow in
order to effectively deter (balancing against) external threats to their sovereignty and
independence: internal balancing and external balancing. The former policy regards
the strengthening of a state’s internal front (mobilization of a state’s internal resources,
mainly the strengthening of its Armed Forces) and the latter a state’s strengthening of
its external front (the expectation of allied reinforcement by its participation in interna-
tional politico-military alliances and coalitions) [See the classic work of Kenneth
Waltz, Theories of International Politics, Reading, Mass., Addison Wesley, 1979, p.
168].

Greece

135

well as to recommend policies of adjustment to emerging global patterns.

In the post-Cold War era, Greece is faced with what she considers as a ma-
jor security threat and a number of risks: the threat is perceived to emanate
from her eastern neighbour (Turkey) and the risks are seen as resulting
from Balkan and Mediterranean instability, including some of the so-called
transnational threats. Indeed, after the tragic events of September 11, 2001,
Greek officials have being re-assessing to a certain extent their security
priorities and upgrading the significance of the so-called “new asymmetric
threats”. Issues of high concern include the proliferation of weapons of
mass destruction, theater and “national” missile defense, terrorism (both
conventional and new forms: NBC and cyber-terrorism) and the resulting
need for increased bilateral and multilateral intelligence and police coop-
eration, transnational organized crime, with special emphasis on drug
trafficking religious extremism, pollution of the environment and illegal
migration.

The National Defense Establishment

The current system is designed to guarantee the civilian control of the
armed forces, an issue of great importance after the 1967 coup d’état and
the seven-year military dictatorship that followed. According to the Greek
Constitution (which was partially revised in 1985), the President of the
Republic is the Supreme Commander of the Armed Forces, but his powers
have a largely symbolic character. Decisions are taken by the Prime Minis-
ter and the government. The Government Council on Foreign Affairs and
Defense (KYSEA), which convenes on an ad hoc basis, appoints the Chief
of HNDGS and the Chiefs of Staff. The Chief of HNDGS is the Supreme
Military Commander of the Armed Forces in times of crisis or war. In

According to a recent RAND Corporation study, Greek strategic space is wide encom-
passing Europe, Eurasia, the Middle East and the Mediterranean, as well as transatlantic
relations. At the broadest level, Greece will also be affected by the complex of trends
described as “globalization”. The contemporary strategic environment is characterized
by a series of functional issues that cut across traditional geographic lines, leading to a
greater degree of regional interdependence (although this is true more for the Mediter-
ranean than for the Balkans). It is also argued that the strategic environment around
Greece is being shaped by the development of new lines of communication for energy,
and other non-energy infrastructure projects. (Ian Lesser, ‘Greece’s New Strategic En-
vironment’, in Lesser et al. Greece’s New Geopolitics, RAND-Kokkalis Foundation,
Santa Monica 2001, p. 2).

Thanos Dokos, ‘Greece in a Changing Strategic Setting’ in T. Couloumbis, T. Kariotis
& F. Bellou (eds.), Greece in the 20

Century. Lessons and Challenges, Frank Cass

Publishers, London 2003.

136 Dokos

peacetime, the Chiefs of Staff of the three branches report directly to the
Minister of Defense. The post of the Chief of Hellenic National Defense
General Staff alternates (on an almost regular basis) between officers of
the three branches every two years. The Chiefs of Staff of the three
branches serve for a two-year term, although this can be extended if
deemed necessary.

Fig. 1. Chain of Command

The role and influence of the officer corps had traditionally been quite sig-
nificant. One could hardly disagree with the conclusions of Peter Kassan-
der that “officers have enjoyed a unique status in Greek society”, to a cer-
tain extent forming a separate caste. After the restoration of democracy and
the trial and incarceration of the leaders of the 1967 coup d’état, officers
have consistently refrained from intervening in political life. It is also ac-
curate to state that the officer corps, especially before 1967, had viewed it-
self as “embodying the national ideals of Greece and equated the goals of
the armed forces with those of the nation”. Furthermore, “the self-
perception of the military as an indispensable instrument of progress and
modernization stemmed in part from the variety of social programs and

HELLENIC NATIONAL DEFENSE ESTABLISHMENT

GOVERNMENT COUNCIL ON FOREIGN

POLICY & DEFENSE (KYSEA)

CHIEF, HELLENIC NATIONAL

DEFENSE GENERAL STAFF

CHIEF, HELLENIC ARMY

GENERAL STAFF

PRESIDENT OF

THE REPUBLIC

PRIME MINISTER

CHIEF, HELLENIC NAVY

GENERAL STAFF

CHIEF, HELLENIC AIR

FORCE GENERAL STAFF

MINISTER OF DEFENSE

Greece

137

economic development projects in which the armed forces had been em-
ployed since 1945”.

As a consequence of the suffering of many officers and their families

during the Civil War, the political attitude of the armed forces has been
strongly anti-Communist and pro-conservative. Time and the process of
national reconciliation have altered to a large extent the strong pro-
conservative attitude of the military. Kassander

argued that “civil control

over the military has not advanced at a pace similar to that of the West
European democratic states” and that “generally the Greek military tends
to reflect a historical development that has more in common with the other
Balkan and Eastern Mediterranean states than it does with its West Euro-
pean allies”. It appears that the above conclusions are no longer applicable,
especially in reference to the post-1974 period. After the restoration of
democratic rule in 1974 and the limited purge in the Hellenic Armed
Forces, civil control over the military has never been in question. The role
of the military has been scrupulously limited to defense matters and all
significant decisions concerning national security issues are made by the
government. Today, it would be inaccurate to compare the Hellenic Armed
Forces with those of any of their neighbors. By virtue of their organization
(based mainly on U.S. standards), strict non-interference in politics and
civil control and professionalism they have very much in common with the
armed forces of its Western European partners and allies.

Civil-Military Relations in 20

Century Greece

The current system is designed to guarantee civilian control over the armed
forces, an issue of great significance following the 1967 coup d’état and
the ensuing seven-year military dictatorship. After the restoration of de-
mocratic rule in 1974 and the limited purge in the Hellenic Armed Forces,
civil control over the military has never been in question. The role of the

For an illuminating analysis of the social and geographical background of the Greek of-
ficer corps, see Peter Kassander, ‘National Security’, in Greece: A Country Study, Con-
gressional Research Service, Washington DC, 1989, pp. 292–293. However, according
to Thanos Veremis, “The vital task of modernization – a major source of pride for the
military in certain developing societies – was not one for which the Greek military was
well suited. Greek officers have more often been identified with political turmoil than
with orderly change and social innovation, while their declining position in the social
order generated a sense of isolation which before 1967 contributed to their hostility to-
wards the ruling political elite, and reinforced their desire for social acceptance”. (Ve-
remis, p. 169).

Kassander, p. 293.

138 Dokos

military has been scrupulously limited to defense matters and all signifi-
cant decisions concerning national security issues are made by the gov-
ernment.

However, there still is some distrust of the officer corps by

some older politicians. According to Thanos Veremis, “during the years of
conservative rule (1974–81) the officer corps was treated with caution by
the press while an effort was made by the state to re-educate young offi-
cers... Furthermore, ever since 1974, governments have made a conscious
effort to extract the military from their institutional isolation and incorpo-
rate them in civil society. Because entrance examinations for military
academies do not differ from university examinations, some deplore the
loss of the ‘heroic’ element in the selection and education of officers. But
others point out that the bureaucrat-officer can also improve his skills as a
technocrat once he transcends the barrack mentality. Be that as it may, the
‘civilianisation’ of officers, made them more prone to involvement in party
politics to improve their career opportunities.”

According to the Greek Constitution, the President of the Republic is the

Supreme Commander of the Armed Forces, but his powers have a largely
symbolic character. The Prime Minister and the government take deci-
sions. The Government Council on Foreign Affairs and Defense
(KYSEA),

which usually convenes on an ad hoc basis, appoints the Chief

of Hellenic National Defense General Staff (HNDGS) and the Chiefs of
Staff and makes important decisions on procurement.

The Chief of HNDGS is the Supreme Military Commander of the

Armed Forces and the post rotates on a 2-1-1 basis between Army, Navy
and Air Force. The Chiefs of Staff of the HNDGS and the three branches

The transformation of civil-military relations in Greece during the last decades cannot
be explained wholly by political factors. Since the 1960s the social fabric has changed
rapidly. The rise of per capita income, the widening of professional options, the incorpo-
ration of the military academies into the system of university entrance examinations and
finally the prodigious growth of urban centres have changed the social background and
the value system of the officer corps between 1974 and today. (Thanos Veremis, The
Military in Greek Politics. From Independence to Democracy, Hurst & Company, Lon-
don, 1997, p. 185).

There was a limited tradition of appointing retired officers to ministerial positions,
which is no longer the case. Furthermore, from 34 deputies with military background in
the Parliament in 1952, the number had fallen to eight in 1993. (Veremis, p. 179 & 181).

Composition of the Government Council on Foreign Affairs and Defense (KYSEA):
Prime Minister, Ministers of Foreign Affairs, Defense, National Economy, Finance, In-
terior, Environment, Energy, Public Order and the Chief of the General Staff. Other
Ministers may participate on an ad hoc basis.

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139

serve for a two-year term, although this can be extended for another year.

Law 660 of August 1977, reshaping the command structure in the armed
forces, did away with the experiments of the junta. By this law the gov-
ernment (the civilian authority) was alone responsible for national defense.
Eighteen years after the 1977 law, which gave the army, navy and air force
latitude in special fields of decision-making and allowed them a measure
of autonomy in relation to the HNDGS, the latter resumed some of its old
authority. The 1995 law, however, gave the Minister of Defense final say
on all military matters. Not only is the entire chain of command account-
able to him, but he has also acquired his own civilian advisers on questions
that cover the whole spectrum from procurement to strategy (the Minis-
ter’s Staff/ EPYETHA).

The government (and more specifically the Governmental Council on

Foreign Affairs and Defense-KYSEA) has the ultimate responsibility for
preparing the threat assessment and national security policy. On the basis
of those, the Ministry of National Defense (mainly through the proposals
of the military leadership) prepares the annual defense budget and the five-
year procurement plan (EMPAE) that are then submitted to KYSEA for
approval. Implementation of EMPAE is the responsibility of the Ministry
of National Defense (General Secretariat for Economic Planning and Ar-
maments and General Staffs for the three Services). The final decision for
awarding a major contract to a specific company is made by KYSEA on
the basis of the recommendations of technical committees that evaluate the
offers of various candidates. The priorities of the government are mainly
the cost/limitations on the defense budget and the military capabilities of
weapon systems.

The accountability and transparency in the procurement

Thanos Dokos and Panayotis Tsakonas, ‘The Formation of Greek Procurement Policy:
Problems and Prospects’, Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI),
mimeo, 1998.

Veremis, p. 180. See also: Nikos Alivizatos, The Constitutional Position of the Armed
Forces (2 vols), Athens, 1987 & 1992; Gerassimos Karambelias, The Role of the Armed
Forces in the Political Life of Turkey and Greece, Athens, 1998; Theodoros Stathis, Na-
tional Defense, Athens, 1992.

It is worth-mentioning, however, that although consensus exists among major political
parties and the Greek people that this “sacrifice” is necessary for national defense, mili-
tary expenditures constitute a heavy burden for the Greek economy. Thus, a new prob-
lematique currently exists with reference to the fact that defense expenditures contribute
to the country’s budget/financial deficits as well as for Greece’s low level of social ser-
vices. In consequence, there are different views and approaches among the various ac-
tors involved in the formation of Greece’s security policy with regard to the so-called
“guns-butter dilemma”. The latter refers to Greece’s ability to match the need for imme-
diate and considerable defense expenditures with its medium and long-term foreign pol-
icy objectives (i.e. economic development by joining the next phase of the European

140 Dokos

process are also taken into consideration (as demonstrated by public ten-
ders, evaluation committees composed of uniformed and – occasionally –
civilian experts, oral briefings and written reports to the Parliament, etc.),
but do not weigh as heavily as the former criteria.

The military plays a significant role in the procurement process, as it is

the agency that heavily influences threat assessment and, on the basis of
this assessment, defines national defense needs and requirements while
also making suggestions for the acquisition of necessary weapon systems.
It is not surprising that the military’s priorities are the military capabilities
of weapon systems and the fastest possible delivery. Particular criteria,
such as the limited size of the defense budget and the accountability and
transparency in the procurement process are also taken into consideration,
but do not weigh as heavily as the former issues. Although military offi-
cers understand the need for greater accountability and transparency, they
consider this a responsibility mainly for politicians. Because of strict po-
litical control after 1974, military bureaucracies have had an important role
in allocating the budget’s share for each branch of the Armed Forces, but
little involvement in political decisions.

In democratic regimes, parliamentary oversight of the security and de-

fense sector is quite important in the general context of checks and bal-
ances. The role of politicians (opposition parties) is rather limited, mainly
because of the relative consensus between major Greek political parties
(with the exception of the Communist Party) in defining and assessing the
national security threats and the basic directions of national defense policy.
In addition, the role and authority of the parliamentary Committee on For-
eign Affairs and Defense is very limited. Although parliamentary commit-
tees generally do not possess any real power, the specific Committee lacks
any real authority. Its activities are limited to briefings by the Foreign and
Defense Ministers and the holding of hearings on various defense and for-
eign policy issues. However, it lacks any decision-making authority). The
effectiveness of the inquiry, hearings and questions procedures is at best
limited and, as already mentioned, highly symbolic. The blame for this

monetary union). In other words, how can both deterrence and economic development
be achieved? In April 2001, the Greek government announced its decision to reduce de-
fense expenditures by approximately $5 billion over the next 3–4 years. As a result, a
number of acquisition programs will be delayed. Greece’s decision was based on the
need to maintain its economic indicators and performance at the levels required by the
country’s participation to the Euro-zone (and was somewhat facilitated by the economic
crisis in Turkey which forced the Turkish government – under the pressure of interna-
tional financial institutions – to reduce its own defense expenditures, albeit at a smaller
scale than declared).

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141

should be put on the general tendency of the executive branch in Greek
politics to “allocate” a “ratifying/legitimizing” – and to a large extent –
highly symbolic role to the legislative branch, thus limiting its authority
and power.

Consequently, it is an imperative need to upgrade the role of

this Committee – and the Parliament in general, by providing specialized
support staff and giving it a more substantial role in the decision-making
process on issues of defense and procurement.

The democratic oversight and control of the intelligence and security

agencies in Greece has been an important issue for Greece during most of
the post-World War II era. Greece suffered the catastrophic political, eco-
nomic and social impact of a civil war in 1946–49. As a result, the police
was, for more than three decades, more of a tool for the close surveillance
and occasional oppression of rival political ideologies than an institution
for maintaining public order. An extensive reform programme was neces-
sary after the restoration of democratic rule in 1974. As a result of its past
record, the police’s image in the eyes of Greek public opinion has only re-
cently begun to be restored and its popularity has been slowly increasing.

Greece’s intelligence agency played a similar role as that of the police

as a result of both the civil war and subsequently the military dictatorship,
spending more resources on domestic activities rather than the protection
of Greece’s national security from threats originating abroad. The same
process of reform for democratic control, transparency and accountability
described in previous paragraphs for the Police and the Armed Forces was
necessary in this case too. In the 1980s and 1990s, the National Intelli-
gence Agency was an inward-looking, rather inefficient bureaucracy, ex-
posed to partisan interference. It was pretty capable in the collection and
assessment of military information, but weak in the “civilian” intelligence
sector (terrorism, organized crime, etc.). After the Ocalan “fiasco” of
March 1999, the Greek government finally realized that reform was ur-
gently needed in the intelligence sector.

An [active duty] Ambassador was appointed as the new Director, break-

ing a tradition of retired military officers at this post. The Agency’s range
of responsibilities has been recently expanded to include financial crime,
terrorism, organized crime and illegal migration. There will be less empha-
sis on military information. New Directorates for International Terrorism
and Organized Crime and for International Cooperation (with foreign
agencies) have been established. There is increased emphasis on training

To be approved, security and defense budgets have to be voted by a majority in the Par-
liament, a rather symbolic process in which all political parties, with the exception of the
Greek Communist Party, vote in favour of the defense budget.

142 Dokos

and an ongoing effort to upgrade existing equipment (both hardware and
software), although there are serious budgetary constraints (the annual
budget is approximately 35 million Euros, 90% of which are personnel ex-
penses). The Agency is reducing the number of military personnel and in-
creasing the number of civilian employees, including the recruitment of
highly qualified personnel on various fields, with special emphasis on the
knowledge of foreign languages (currently the Agency’s personnel in-
cludes 1,200 civilians, 300–350 police officers and 40–50 military offi-
cers). An Analysis Centre and Scientific Council are about to be created. It
remains to be seen, however, whether the “new spirit” at the top of the
agency will manage to overcome the considerable bureaucratic inertia and
transform this agency to a much more efficient mechanism to address the
security challenges of the 21

century.

Another issue that needs to be examined is the role of civil society and

the security sector and the relationship of NGO experts as policy advisers
to the government and to the Parliament of Greece. Civil society initiatives
are increasing in Greece, although the country lacks behind most of its EU
partners. Think tanks, other NGOs or independent analysts are neither a
sizable, nor an influential pressure group in Greece. The role and influence
of analysts (in most cases university professors) and thinktanks (such as
the Hellenic Foundation for European and Foreign Policy/ELIAMEP, the
Defense Analysis Institute/IAA, the Institute of International Rela-
tions/IDIS, etc.) is usually limited to the publication of monographs or op-
ed articles in various newspapers or appearing on television or radio
shows.

The role and capability of the media to analyse security and defense is-

sues should also be addressed. The Greek mass media may occasionally
play a role in promoting transparency and accountability by “revealing”
possible wrongdoing and by criticizing specific procurement decisions.
However, such criticisms are seldom based on a sound knowledge of the
military capabilities of specific weapon systems. Such analyses can be
found in specialized defense journals, which are, however, addressed to a
rather small audience.

The general public’s role and influence in defense decision-making and

procurement is very limited. Because of the relative consensus between
major Greek political parties (with the exception of the Communist Party)
in defining and assessing the national security threats and the basic direc-
tions of national defense policy, the average citizen cannot express his per-
sonal views on those issues by voting against the governing party, as the
opposition is following more or less the same line in defense issues. As for
other professional pressure groups, there are several “middlemen”, repre-
senting large foreign defense firms, who are exerting some pressure (on

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143

occasion using their connections, as well offering bribes to key people) in
order to win various tenders. However, their influence should not be over-
stated. Because the majority of Greek defense firms are state-owned their
role as pressure groups is quite limited.

The requirements of accountability and transparency only became an is-

sue in Greece in the last few years (roughly from 1987–88, with the pro-
curement of 80 third-generation fighter aircraft, 40 F-16s and 40 Mirage
2000). The actors that have a strong interest in promoting more account-
ability and transparency are the politicians, the media and, of course, the
general public. However, only the former two are playing a more active
role in seeking more accountability and transparency in defense procure-
ment. As mentioned above, the general public’s role and influence in de-
fense decision-making and procurement, as well as accountability and
transparency, is quite limited. As for the mass media, they may occasion-
ally play a role in promoting transparency and accountability by “reveal-
ing” possible wrongdoing and by criticising specific procurement deci-
sions. For the military, accountability and transparency are not
insignificant but clearly constitute a lower priority than the military capa-
bilities of weapon systems and the fastest possible delivery.

Although it will be argued in this study that there is only room for mod-

est improvements in the field of transparency in the Greek arms procure-
ment system, this is not necessarily the case with accountability. Specific
measures for increasing accountability include the annual publication of
“The White Book” by the Ministry of Defense (the White Book was first
published in May 1996 and again in 1997, 1999 and 2001) which aims at
informing both decision makers (especially members of Parliament), the
mass media and the general public and the Annual Defense Report to Par-
liament (prepared annually by the Ministry of Defense since 1996). An-
other suggestion would be the upgrading of the Parliamentary Committee
on Defense and Foreign Affairs – and the Parliament in general – by pro-
viding specialized supporting staff and giving it a more substantial role in
the decision-making process on issues of defense procurement (and possi-
bly a veto-power on specific decisions).

Greece and Regional Security

Challenges for regional security and stability, the role of the EU and
NATO and the need for crisis management and peacekeeping constitute
important issues for Greek security policy. The view in Athens is that the
greatest challenge for Western institutions in the 21

century is to expand

the region of stability. More specifically for NATO, the main task for the

144 Dokos

Alliance in various crisis regions (such as the Mediterranean, the Balkans,
etc.) is to provide a framework of regional stability by “containing” mili-
tary conflicts, thus creating a suitable environment for other organisations
(mainly the EU) to address economic, social and other problems and chal-
lenges. In this context, the West must also deal in a preventive manner
with the – not new but newly discovered – problem of failed or failing
states, which constitute a black hole in the international security system.

Greece perceives the need for increased transparency in the context of

regional confidence and security. It seems that when procurement deci-
sions are made by the states of South Eastern Europe, the strengthening of
regional confidence is not an issue of great concern. Greece and Turkey
(allies in NATO yet arch-rivals), as well as the other states of the region
are participants and co-signatories of a series of international organizations
and agreements which account for the enhancement of transparency in re-
lations among the states. Undoubtedly, transparency could actually be en-
hanced through OSCE verification and notification procedures (in the
framework of CFE) and UN Register on Conventional Arms. As a conse-
quence, the strict application of such measures in the area of South East
Europe would further enhance regional security.

So far there are a number of CSBMs agreements signed between certain

states of the region.

They range from high-level treaties which

complement existing confidence-building measures agreed in the conxtext
of the OSCE, to agreements involving academic exchange between
military academies and the sharing of information for training. However,
the confidence-building nature of those accords and agreements is
seriously undermined by a lack of transparency. Needless to say, the
accession of all Southeast European states to the Open Skies Treaty would
be an additional confidence-building measure of great importance. Greece
would very likely welcome and offer strong support to an expansion of the
UN Register on Conventional Arms to include holdings and defense
production.

For example, Greece and Bulgaria have signed the “Athens Document” which
complements the 1992 Vienna Document on CSBMs. There are also agreements on
military cooperation between Bulgaria and Turkey (“Sofia Document” & “Adrianople
Document”), Albania and Turkey (“Tirana Document”), FYROM and Turkey (“Skopje
Document”), Albania and Bulgaria and Bulgaria and Romania (“Veliko Tirnovo
Document”).

Greece

145

Table 1.

Greek Participation in Peace-Support Operations (Numbers at peak
strength)

PSO

SIZE OF CONTRIBUTION

YEAR

UNOSOM (Somalia)

106

1992–95

IFOR/SFOR (Bosnia-
Herzegovina)

100

1996–

ALBA (Albania)

803

1997–99

KFOR (Kosovo)

1,489

1999–

Essential Harvest/Amber Fox
(FYROM)

330

2001–

ISAF (Afghanistan)

220

2002–

Members of EU and NATO have a special responsibility in influencing the
establishment of standards in the security sector in the region of South East
Europe. In the “post-Dayton” era, Greece is attempting to play a stabilising
role in the Balkan and Black Sea regions by formulating a comprehensive
and cooperative approach to the region’s problems. In this context, Greece
could serve as a guide and facilitator for the eventual entry of Serbia,
FYROM and Albania to NATO and, especially, the EU. Furthermore, in
the context of North-South relations, Greece is slowly becoming more ac-
tively involved in the shaping of EU’s Mediterranean policy on the basis
of its traditionally good relations with Arab countries and its recently – if
belated – improved relations with Israel (and has played a minor role in the
peace process by hosting meetings between Israelis and Palestinians).

Greece is in a good position to contribute to efforts of SEE countries to

reform their security sectors because of its historical experience.

In an effort to contribute to regional stabilization efforts, the Hellenic

MOD has in the past five years concluded several agreements for military
cooperation with countries in Greece’s neighborhood (Balkans, Black Sea,
Caucasus, Eastern Mediterranean, North Africa), including Egypt, Israel,
Tunisia, Azerbaijan, Georgia, Armenia, Bulgaria, FYROM, Albania, etc.
In some cases, cooperation has been rather symbolic and of limited practi-
cal value. In other cases (Albania, FYROM, Armenia, Egypt, Israel and
Georgia) cooperation included, among other, the exchange of students for
military academies, joint exercises, military assistance, etc. Military assis-
tance has been extended to Albania, FYROM, Georgia and Armenia. It
should be mentioned that no equipment is being exported to states of con-
cern. Currently Greece is promoting the creation of a satellite link of mili-
tary hospitals, a system that would eventually connect a significant number
of hospitals in South East European countries. The Greek Ministry of

146 Dokos

Foreign Affairs has recently concluded agreements with Serbia, Bosnia-
Herzegovina and, soon, with FYROM for the provision of development
aid (approximately $580 million for the next 3–4 years).

Prospects for the Future

In the 1980s, the perception of many western governments and foreign
analysts was that “reactionary” policies, unreliability and unpredictability
were the dominant characteristics of Greek foreign policy. Since the mid-
1990s, as Greece has moved considerably closer to the core of European
integration (both politically and economically), its views and positions on
a number of foreign policy and security issues have converged considera-
bly with those of its EU partners. Greece has moved towards the “centre”
on a number of other issues, fully normalizing relations with Israel, as well
as considerably improving its relations with Turkey. In the 1990s and early
21

century there is little doubt that the pattern has been for a more prag-

matic, reliable, rational, multidimensional foreign policy, placing emphasis
on multilateral diplomacy.

As for civil-military relations in Greece, no serious problems of “good

governance” of the security and defense sectors appear in Greece. By the
end of 1975 the parliamentary regime was safe from military challenges –
a state of affairs that persists till today.

The democratic oversight and

control of the armed forces and the security agencies is at a satisfactory
level. There is a gradually increasing supervisory role for the Parliament
regarding the security and intelligence services, which are also coming un-
der regular scrutiny from independent authorities for the protection of
personal information. Of course, there is always room for improvement.

The most pressing need would be the upgrading of the Parliamentary

The other side of the re-integration of the military in civil society was the gradual in-
volvement of party politics in promotions and retirements. (Veremis, p. 178).

New challenges stem from the fact that security in the 21

century requires the coordina-

tion of the ‘external’ ministries [i.e. MOD and MFA] and their agencies [armed forces,
intelligence services] with those of the ‘interior’ ministries: internal affairs; education;
finance; overseas development; transport; environment; health; etc., with their agencies
[policing forces, security services, disaster relief agencies, etc.]. Security today takes in
social development and it demands the involvement of all elements of society in a way
which security in the Cold War days did not. Meeting these new security requirements
demands fundamental reform of national structures, patterns of investment, systems of
government. Likewise it demands the evolution of international institutions on a truly
radical scale. This concept draws heavily on the presentaion delivered by a senior
NATO official, Chris Donnelly, in a conference organized by the Western Policy Center
and the Center for Eurasian Strategic Studies (ASAM) in Ankara, 26–28 October 2002.

Greece

147

Committee on Foreign Affairs and Defense, whose role and authority
should be expanded and its support mechanism significantly strengthened.
Finally, Greece is no exception to the rule that in democratic societies
there is a continuing competition between national security requirements
and transparency. Although the former is of extreme importance, a func-
tioning system of checks and balances guarantees that there is a relative
balance between national security requirements on the one hand and de-
mocratic procedures and civil rights on the other.

Regulating the Intelligence System and Oversight
in the Hungarian Constitutional Democracy

Tibor Babos, Linda Royer

“This is not the end.

It is not even the beginning of the end.

But it is, perhaps, the end of the beginning”

(Churchill)

1 Introduction

“Hungary has come a long way. The National Assembly has effectively
developed oversight of the military through budget, approval of the Basic
Principles of National Defense and the Defense Bill, and deployment of
the Armed Forces. The Constitutional Court has effectively addressed the
problems caused by the October 1989 Constitution and 1 December 1989
Defense Reform; and its decisions have been respected. The military has
evidenced significant reform; it has been restructured to accommodate
NATO, but force modernization continues to be greatly restrained by
scarce resources. But Hungary still has a number of tasks to achieve effec-
tive civilian oversight…”

Simon Jeffrey, Central European Civil-Military Relations and NATO Expansion,
(INSS, Washington D.C., USA, 1995) 104.

Every country that works to reform its defense and intelligence system

must decide on the mechanisms and structure that are best suited for its
needs. The end of the Cold War and the subsequent collapse of Commu-
nism in Europe brought enormous change to Hungary’s society. Its defense
and security service system have also gone through a tremendous trans-
formation. Despite the relatively strong success in implementing a democ-
ratic system, market economy and civilian control of the military since
1989, the transformation of its intelligence agencies is not yet complete. It
holds fast to the heritage of the old concept of the oversized, hyper-
bureaucratic intelligence system that still lacks the appropriate, Western-
type civil control and oversight. The system itself has been changing but
not at the adequate speed and to some extent, it has kept the baggage from
its past. The recent events of international terrorism bring with it an

150 Babos,

Royer

opportunity to examine the Hungarian Intelligence architecture, evaluating
it for deficiencies and further develop what is working in the Hungarian
Security Services.

This analysis describes national intelligence organizations and examines

intelligence oversight in the Hungarian constitutional democracy with rec-
ommendations for the possible guidelines for a new Hungarian intelligence
system. The first section summarizes the current situation concerning de-
mocratic control and oversight and will lay down a thorough background
that is important for an understanding of the ongoing situation in Hungary.
Using the available sources of relevant legal and academic works on po-
litical science, the next part of this essay will be an objective overview of
the current framework of the Hungarian intelligence system, its oversight,
and highlights its remaining obstacles. In particular, it seeks to focus on
the interaction between the intelligence establishment and the civil authori-
ties and public. The next part suggests that the current system should be
reviewed and adjusted according to the new security challenges and inter-
national environment. Finally, since civil-military relations and civilian
oversight are a way of testing the genuineness and stability of the strategic
re-orientation of Central Europe, it will attempt to prove that even with the
new and democratic legal framework, the existing rules and structures are
still deeply rooted in its history and need to be transformed and “euro-
formised” based on the requirements of the collective security and Western
doctrines.

Metamorphosis of the Oversight and Democratic
Control

“The change of system has offered us a unique and irreproducible oppor-
tunity to reintegrate once and for all into the community of developed and
democratic states which are bound together by their commitment to the ba-
sic values typical of all them: democracy, the rule of law – with its institu-
tional frameworks and substance, respect for human rights including mi-
nority rights and an economy based on private property and free initiative.
Not to miss such a historic opportunity this time must be the task and guid-
ing principle of action of all responsible politicians, political parties and
the government.”

Martonyi, Zs. Németh, Hungarian Foreign Policy and Euro-Atlantic Integration, in:

R. Joó, Hungary: A member of NATO, Budapest 1999, p. 13.

Hungary

151

Yet, despite such political statements democracy and especially democ-

ratic oversight of the defense and intelligence establishment is not auto-
matically guaranteed and cannot be changed overnight. In the case of the
Western democratic states, the military and security system have been de-
veloped parallel to the political and societal institutions for centuries.
Where the new and transitional democracies of the former Warsaw Pact
countries are concerned, the reorganization of such of institutions is a more
complex challenge, since the reforms are being made while the new politi-
cal structure is also undergoing vast and rapid changes.

The Hungarian experience serves as a unique example of the problems

encountered when transitioning to democratic control of a nation’s military
and a shift in civil-military relations, which emerged right after the col-
lapse of Communism. “Hungary is one of the four central European states
(...) in which democracy may be said to have been consolidated. Post-
communist Hungarian politics have been characterized by a level of stabil-
ity uncommon in the region; indeed, it is the only central or eastern Euro-
pean state where, as of early 1999, each of two freely elected governments
has served out its full term without a constitutional crisis.”

In 1989/90, the new political elite suffered from many handicaps in their

effort to establish civilian oversight and re-orient their countries foreign
and security policies. They did not possess the necessary specialized
knowledge of military and security affairs, neutral and efficient adminis-
trative structures, expert advice, etc. The one advantage they did enjoy vis-
a-vis the military was their significantly larger exposure to democratic
principles and practices prior to 1989. Knowledge of Western political
thinking, practice and connections were important assets in their trying to
gain acceptance and some genuine respect in the eyes of the military.

“The existence of a constitutional and legal framework has resulted from
Constitutional Court decisions that have effectively addressed the prob-
lems caused by the October 1989 Constitution and 1 December 1989 De-
fense Reform; the Court’s decisions have been respected and been incor-
porated in the 1993 National Defense Act as subsequent legislation.
Continued wrangling over the constitutional draft since 1994 and the de-
laying of its acceptance is worrisome. Work to re-write the Constitution

Andrew A. Michta, America’s New Allies, Poland, Hungary and the Czech Republic in
NATO, Zoltan Barany, Hungary, An Outpost on the Troubled Periphery, University of
Washington Press, 1999, p. 78.

Ministry of Defense and Ministry of Foreign Affairs Hungary: Conference on Civil-
Military Relations in the Context of an Evolving NATO, Réka Szemerkényi: Western
Policies and Civilian Control of the Military in Central Europe, Budapest, 1997, p. 53.

152 Babos,

Royer

was initially intended to be completed in 1995, but it is taking much
longer.”

Although the political system is profoundly new and has discarded its

previous baggage, the transformation of the defense and security organiza-
tions continue to resist more change. “The level of civilian involvement in
security and defense policy-making is an important indicator of the stabil-
ity and democratization in the consolidating democracies.”

Post-

communist transitions are generally more traumatic for armed forces than
for other occupational strata.

“There will be many obstacles to master, ranging from issues of interop-

erability to language acquisition. The infusion of considerable NATO re-
sources, know-how, and political support is likely to transform Hungary
and its armed forces into a valuable asset for the alliance.”

Historical Background of the Intelligence

Hungary has had its own independent security service since the collapse of
the Austro-Hungarian Empire in 1918. Until the end of the WWII the 2

Directorate of the General Staff was responsible for military intelligence,
which had purely military interests as in the particular political atmosphere
was heavily tensioned by military violence. As events unfolded in Europe
after WWII, and the Iron Curtain fell, the Communist regime took control.
The realm of intelligence was extended. In addition to military intelli-
gence, civilian services, to include foreign and domestic intelligence were
established under the direction of the Ministry of Interior. During the Cold
War, the Hungarian Security Services worked closely together with their
Soviet counterparts (KGB, GRU, STASI or SECURITATE) without laws
or oversight to prove a real and clear framework for their activities. “There
were many reasons for Western policymakers to be concerned about civil

Ministry of Defense and Ministry of Foreign Affairs Hungary: Conference on Civil-
military Relations in the Context of an Evolving NATO, Jeffrey Simon: New Challenges
in Hungarian Civil-military Relations, Budapest, 1997, p. 169.

Ministry of Defense and Ministry of Foreign Affairs Hungary: Conference on Civil-
military Relations in the Context of an Evolving NATO, Réka Szemerkényi: Western
Policies and Civilian Control of the Military in Central Europe, Budapest, 1997, p. 47.

Andrew A. Michta, America’s New Allies, Poland, Hungary and the Czech Republic in
NATO, Zoltan Barany, Hungary, An Outpost on the Troubled Periphery, University of
Washington Press, 1999, p. 94.

Andrew A. Michta, America’s New Allies, Poland, Hungary and the Czech Republic in
NATO, Zoltan Barany, Hungary, An Outpost on the Troubled Periphery, University of
Washington Press, 1999, p. 107.

Hungary

153

military relations in Central Europe after the break-up of the Warsaw Pact.
Primarily, it was of importance how the Soviet-trained officer corps was
going to react to the political changes in Central Europe, and whether they
represented any challenge to democratization and to the establishment of
new institutions. (…) The survival of the Warsaw Pact-type political and
military mentality among officer corps was perceived as a major risk both
by the Western and Central European policy-makers.”

During the political transformation, the former state security system

ceased to exist and a new security structure was established. The change of
the political system was accompanied and accelerated by several state se-
curity scandals such as the case of Belovai, Conrad or Carlos. In addition,
in 1990, then-opposition political parties publicized facts revealing illegal
political activities of the state security service, which at that time func-
tioned within the structure of the police.

As a consequence of the scandals and their investigation, police and the

state security service were separated, and intelligence agencies were reor-
ganized into four independent offices under the supervision of civilian
Ministers. At the same time, Parliament passed a temporary Act granting
approval by the Minister of Justice for the use of intelligence methods by
the new security services and the police. Organizational aspects of the ser-
vice were regulated by governmental decrees. The secret services worked
by temporary rules until 1995 when Act no. CXXV was introduced.

Structure of the National Security Services

The actual composition, role and function of the intelligence services were
the result of much debate among the political parties involved in the new
political architecture. The major departure point was Act no. CXXV of
1995 concerning the National Security Services (further as Act). Accord-
ing to it, the general mission of the security services is to protect the na-
tional security interests of the Hungarian Republic by performing tasks
provided by the law.

The services are charged with contributing to the national security by

using both open and confidential means of gathering information. More
precisely, under the law, the term “national security” refers both to the
defense of the sovereignty of the country and also to the protection of
the constitutional order. Protection of the national security in Hungary

154 Babos,

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involves specifically: the detection of efforts to attack the independence
and territorial integrity of the country; the detection and prevention of
clandestine efforts which may injure or threaten the political, economic
and military or defense interests of the country; the acquisition of informa-
tion about foreign countries or of foreign origin that are important for gov-
ernmental decisions; the detection and prevention of clandestine efforts to
change or disturb through unlawful means the constitutional order ensuring
basic human rights, the multi-party representative democracy and function-
ing of constitutional institutions; and, finally, detecting and preventing ter-
rorist acts, illegal weapon and drug trafficking, and illegal traffic in inter-
nationally controlled goods and technologies.

According to the Act, five security services exist in Hungary

(Figure 1):

x the Intelligence Bureau (IB),
x the National Security Bureau (NSB),
x the Military Intelligence Bureau (MIB),
x the Military Security Bureau (MSB),
x the Special Service for National Security (SSNS).

Three of these agencies – the Intelligence Bureau, the National Security
Bureau and the Special Services for National Security – are grouped under
the term “civil national security services”. The other two – the Military In-
telligence Bureau and the Military Security Bureau – are referred to as the
“military national security services”.

Act no. CXXV of 1995 on the National Security Services, § 3–8.

Act no. CXXV of 1995 on the National Security Services, § 1.

Hungary

155

Fig. 1.

Structure of the National Security Services

PRIME MINISTER

THE NATIONAL SECRET SERVICE OF

THE REPUBLIC OF HUNGARY

MINISTER IN DIRECTION

OF THE CIVILIAN

NATIONAL SECURITY

SERVICES

NATIONAL

SECURITY

BUREAU

NATIONAL

SECURITY

SPECIAL SERVICE

INFORMATION

BUREAU

MINISTER

DEFENSE

MILITARY

SECURITY

BUREAU

MILITARY

INTELLIGENCE

BUREAU

CIVILIAN

SECURITY
SERVICES

MILITARY

SECURITY
SERVICES

INTERNAL
SECURITY
SERVICES

EXTERNAL

SECURITY
SERVICES

156 Babos,

Royer

Supervision, Direction and Oversight

1. Ministerial Control

The Act provides that the Government controls the civil national security
services through a designated Minister and the military security services
through the Minister of Defense. The responsible minister determines the
particular tasks of the services, oversees their activities, and regulates their
functions and organization. The Ministers are also responsible for the Ba-
sic Principles of National Security and are empowered to regulate the exe-
cution of such tasks in the form of ministerial decrees. They also have the
authority to carry out the direct control of the National Security Services in
accordance with the governmental decisions and the National Security
plans. Each minister is empowered to issue general and concrete instruc-
tions without depriving the heads of the services of their powers and with-
out obstructing the exercise of their competence.

The Minister has the power to task the security services and to give the

services orders. He also supervises the budgetary management of the ser-
vices as well as their legal operation, and also authorized to make recom-
mendations to the Prime Minister as to the appointment and dismissal of
the General Directors and their deputies. Within the framework of the rules
of law and other binding guidelines of the government, the Director Gen-
erals are independently responsible for the activities of the services.

2. Parliamentary Oversight

The Parliament defines the Basic Principles of National Security and De-
fense and makes decisions concerning the long-term development of the
defense and security organizations. The Parliament also allocates financial
resources for carrying out security and defense tasks on an annual basis.
The Parliament exercises parliamentary oversight over the national secu-
rity services through its Committee on National Security.

The president of the Committee must be a Member of Parliament (MP)

from one of the opposition parties.

The responsible Minister is required to

inform the Committee about the general activities of the national security
services regularly but at the minimum twice a year. The Government also
must inform the Committee about its decisions regarding matters brought
to its attention by the Minister.

Act no. CXXV of 1995 on the National Security Services, § 10

Act no. CXXV of 1995 on the National Security Services, §11.

Act no. CXXV of 1995 on the National Security Services, §19 (2).

Hungary

157

Fig. 2. Oversight of the Civilian National Security Services

Fig. 3. Oversight of the Military National Security Services

MINISTER IN DIRECTION

OF CIVILIAN NATIONAL SECRET

SERVICES

NATIONAL SECURITY

COMMITTEE OF THE

PARLIAMENT

STATE AUDIT

OFFICE, GOVERNMENT

SUPERVISORY

OFFICE

OMBUDSMAN FOR DATA

PROTECTION, OMBUDSMAN FOR CIVIL

RIGHTS, OMBUDSMAN FOR NATIONAL

AND ETHNIC RIGHTS

CIVILIAN NATIONAL

SECURITY SERVICE

DEFENSE MINISTER

NATIONAL SECURITY

COMMITTEE OF THE

PARLIAMENT

STATE AUDIT

OFFICE, GOVERNMENT

SUPERVISORY

OFFICE

OMBUDSMAN FOR DATA

PROTECTION, OMBUDSMAN FOR CIVIL

RIGHTS, OMBUDSMAN FOR NATIONAL

AND ETHNIC RIGHTS

MILITARY NATIONAL

SECURITY SERVICE

158 Babos,

Royer

The Committee has the right to request information from the Minister and
the General Directors of the services about the national security situation
of the country and the operation and activities of national security services.
It can request information from the Minister of Justice and the Minister
supervising civil national security services and inquire the Defense Minis-
ter and the General Directors about specific uses of secret technical de-
vices and methods. Also, it examines individual complaints against unlaw-
ful activities of the national security services. In cases when the
complainant does not accept the results of an investigation carried out by
the Minister supervising the national security services, the Committee in-
forms the complainant about its findings. If the Committee feels that one
of the security services is carrying out unlawful or improper activities, it
can ask the Minister to conduct an investigation into the matter and he will
inform the Committee about the findings of the investigation.

The Committee has many prevailing functions. It gives its opinion on

the detailed draft budget of the national security services. It also conducts
nomination hearings for those appointed as general directors of the na-
tional security services. The Committee has the right to examine any files
or information reports prepared for the Government by the national secu-
rity services. If the NSB launches an investigation and secret collection of
information against an MP or against one of his or her family members,
the Minister will have to report it to the Committee. The MP in question,
in this case, will not be informed about the activity. The Defense Commit-
tee (DC) in the Parliament, among other tasks, exercises oversight of mili-
tary security services. The NSC and DC hold closed sessions when exer-
cising their oversight authorities.

6 Remaining

Obstacles

While the military establishment could intensify its reform by NATO’s
guidelines there still remains a few obstacles for the intelligence system.
The most significant obstacle to the transition was to establish and create a
strong legal, institutional budget and organizational foundation for the ci-
vilian control and oversight, while changing personnel and simultaneously
maintaining professionalism and “combat readiness”. In other words it is a
serious challenge to maintain a credible defense and intelligence system
while the entire political, societal and economic system is in the midst of

Act no. CXXV of 1995 on the National Security Services, §14 (4) a–h.

Act no. CXXV of 1995 on the National Security Services, §16–17.

Hungary

159

transition. “Insofar as the Hungarian military is concerned, successful de-
mocratic consolidation includes the following: (1) placing the military un-
der the authority and supervision of the elected government; (2) unambi-
guous constitutional codification of the chains of command and areas of
responsibility over armed forces between institutions and within the mili-
tary establishment; (3) termination and prohibition of the activities and po-
litical parties within armed forces as well as an effective ban on partisan
political activities by military personnel: (4) establishing the government’s
fiscal responsibility over defense expenditures an the executive branch’s
accountability to the legislature over military affairs; (5) democratizing the
military establishment itself with special attention inculcating military per-
sonnel with fundamental democratic values (...) Despite some shortcom-
ings, during the 1990’s Hungary successfully democratized its armed
forces and established democratic civil-military relations.”

Assessing the state of intelligence’s oversight in Hungary has become a

more difficult task over the passed decade because issues are now more
complex. The progress of intelligence reform in Hungary has been con-
firmed by the commitment shown by intelligence leaders and political el-
ites to democratic political structures and developments. Many of the con-
stitutional, legal and administrative requests for civil control or supremacy
over the intelligence have been implemented while Hungary is still fine-
tuning some specific mechanisms of intelligence management.

Examining obstacles to the nature of the Hungarian intelligence and

oversight it is also obvious that tensions between the civil bureaucracy and
intelligence staff is a natural phenomenon, where the professionalism and
issue of expertise are key words. “The relevant question in the transition-
ing states, then, is not whether the officer corps is professional, but
whether it possesses a brand of professionalism, appropriate to the type of
state that it serves.”

Democratic or political supremacy over the intelli-

gence is defined as the subordination of the secret services to the democ-
ratically elected civilian leaders of the government. The presence of a well-
trained and experienced professional military corps that is respected,
funded by a civilian authority and a strong non-governmental component
within the defense community is crucial

Brigitte Sauerwein, Defense Adequacy: The Hungarian Defense Forces, Jane’s Intelli-
gence Review 6, no. 10 (October 1994), p. 90.

Marybeth Peterson Ulrich, Democratizing Communist Militaries, The University of
Michigan Press, 1999, p. 110.

Rudolf Joó, The Democratic Control of the Armed Forces, The Experience of Hungary,
Challiot Paper 23, February 1996, Institute for Security Studies of Western European
Union, p. 6.

160 Babos,

Royer

It is also obvious that tensions between the government, civil bureauc-

racy and intelligence establishment is a natural phenomenon therefore it
also must be addressed. “The effect of intelligence (...) depends on its in-
stitutional reputation and the personal chemistry between practitioners and
users.”

In the Western system, the security services enjoy a delicate rela-

tionship with government officials, where the intelligence is responsible
for providing professional (technical) expertise to civilian politicians. The
lack of intelligence professionalism may lead to some sectors of the intel-
ligence community to mislead or intervene in politics. Without clear politi-
cal guidance the intelligence may feel themselves as the servants of the
state or the regime rather than the democratically elected government in
power, and develop their own not necessarily democratic notions. Fur-
thermore, when intelligence is independent in creation of its own size,
structure, organization, recruiting and equipment, they may resist total
subordination to the government.

No doubt, Hungary has a great deficit in civilian security expertise.

Therefore, one of the priorities of the country is to take responsibility for
the creation of civilian security communities, which can provide skilled
personnel to secret services, Parliament committees, research institutes and
other NGOs. This should be a significant objective when they restructure
or implement the intelligence system.

Another question is that how to match legal, institutional, organizational

and personnel changes with the new and still transforming political
framework. Although a balance should be kept between the “peaceful”
transition of the military and intelligence institutions, and the introduction
of necessary oversight and control, the last issue is the priority. Regarding
the new democracies such as Hungary, one has to take into account the na-
tion-specific circumstances in which the transition is developing and the
nation’s history and heritage. As far as the national conditions are con-
cerned, the actual political character, the economic conditions, the societal
framework, the media, and the international environment contribute to the
unique character of each nation’s experience.

The other key issue is the change in the global the security environment

and with it, the change of the priorities and focus of intelligence. “Since
1990, defense officials and politicians have been quick to point out that
Hungary has no specific enemy and is under no direct threat. Still there are
a number of potential challenges they must take seriously, particularly be-
cause of Hungary’s unfavorable geo-strategic position. It has no natural

Michael Herman, Intelligence Power in Peace and War, Cambridge University Press,
1996, p. 142.

Hungary

161

borders intimidating to land forces; it is relatively easy to overrun, as a
number of armies have demonstrated throughout the past millennium; and
its military establishment has weakened considerably since 1989.”

In the past, Hungary’s strategic responsibility was the first line of de-

fense as the most important country of the Warsaw Pact’s south theater. It
was responsible for the south German Plain and the Po Plain in Italy. The
main target countries therefore, were Western Germany and Italy as well
as the UK and USA. With the new internal and international environment
the whole previous defense and intelligence strategy collapsed from over-
night. The previous doctrines became irrelevant: the target countries, the
enemies, the controlling authorities, the driving ideas and methods, the fi-
nancial resources, external and internal relations, and the goals of these or-
ganizations as well. The new security services emerged as a consequence
of the new circumstances. Though new services were created, they were
still based on the previous system. Most people did not realize that the
Hungarian military and intelligence, under the Warsaw Pact had virtually
the same doctrine as the USSR, which had no real consideration for Hun-
garian security and defense. And because of the fundamental nature of the
intelligence, and antagonistic relationship of the East-West intelligence
services the Hungarian services were interested in keeping maintaining
their secrecy, while the Western services did not trust in their Eastern
counterparts.

The new security environment, in particular the post September 11 era,

and the security institutions anticipate the need for various types of alli-
ances, multinational intelligence reaction capabilities to fulfill missions
needs for low-intensity (other than war) conflicts, often overseas or out of
area. Therefore, the transitional democracies have found their need to de-
velop more technically skilled and more flexible professional intelligence
capabilities, which can operate in a variety of challenges and at different
levels of intensity. “The cold war quickly shifted from a struggle for pre-
dominance in postwar Europe to a global struggle in which virtually any
nation or region could be a pawn between the two sides. Although some
areas remained more important than others, none could be written off
entirely.”

The trend of declining mass information gathering reveals a transforma-

tion in the relationship between secret services and society, that which

Andrew A. Michta, America’s New Allies, Poland, Hungary and the Czech Republic in
NATO, Zoltan Barany, Hungary, An Outpost on the Troubled Periphery, University of
Washington Press, 1999, p. 74.

Mark M. Lowenthal, Intelligence, From Secrets to Policy, A Division of Congressional
Quarterly Inc., Washington D.C., pp. 11–12.

162 Babos,

Royer

reaches beyond an institutional evolution of intelligence to influence the
attitude of society. In the Cold War, the intelligence’s role was tradition-
ally mass espionage. Residual roles in emergency response, aid to civilian
power, counter terrorism, and sovereignty protection have now been high-
lighted. Concomitantly, the global role of intelligence in the more complex
international environment and multinational (UN, NATO, OSCE and
other) operations has expanded. Such potential deployments are by virtue
of their low national significance, more politically sensitive for the do-
mestic public, a phenomenon reinforcing the move towards professional
intelligence.

The transition process is more complicated for intelligence since NATO

has no common intelligence system. Hungary was left without a model to
readily copy and therefore had to create a hybrid system combining what
they already knew, the old Soviet style, and what they were learning about
the new Western system. Due to the sensitive nature of classified informa-
tion and compartmentalized data that is common to intelligence, informa-
tion sharing is very cumbersome and more difficult compared with other
services. This delicate and complex situation allowed for some in leader-
ship to resist moving forward and make the transition complete to a de-
mocratically controlled service. To add to the burden, the post communist
politicians chosen to lead the defense establishment were naïve about de-
fense matters and easily duped. The bulwark of the old style senior officers
were able to keep them “out of the loop”. The lack of trained civilian ex-
perts on military matters who can advise politicians was another factor in
preventing a truly complete transition to a full democratization of the Intel-
ligence service and civil-military relations.

As described, Hungarian intelligence oversight operates in a democratic

environment, where the executive and legislature powers are separated,
well established, and the tools of the civil societal control (such as the me-
dia) is strong. However, due to the special operating environment of Intel-
ligence, some of the leadership, who can’t lose their former mindset, create
obstacles to civilian control and are slowing down the transition between
the presented democratic framework and the real practice. Perhaps this just
takes some time for the next generation to come in and fill in these gaps.
“In sum, while the institutional structure of parliamentary civilian control
over the armed forces in Hungary is adequate, the internal control mecha-
nisms of the MOD are in need of further development. In large measure

Hungary

163

the problems have been due to general inexperience and the negligence
and oversight of some high-ranking military officers.”

No doubt that the success or failure in stabilizing and reinforcing effec-

tive democratic oversight and downsizing of the Hungarian intelligence,
have a direct influence on the outcome of Hungary’s further European in-
tegration and prosperity. Failure of developing a new, smaller, more cost
effective and more rapid reactive intelligence system, would at least indi-
rectly risk the internal political stability and democratic structure. Conse-
quently, an ‘euroformized’ national intelligence must be the interest of all
the Hungarian political and experimental actors.

7 Recommendations

“Experience has shown that without a robust system of independent over-
sight, the system is wide open to abuse. Security services are unable to re-
sist the temptation to indulge in activities that have no place in a democ-
racy. The cure can be as dangerous as the disease.”

The creation of new intelligence system offers the opportunity to the

Hungarian National Intelligence Agencies to become more effective and
rationalized through pragmatic synergies. The proliferation of weapon
mass destruction, terrorism, organized crime, drug trafficking, ecological
threats, policing the cyber space are not exclusively concerns of a single
security service, but serious concern to all of them. Accepting the argu-
ment “it is important to consider first the nature of the threats to the state
and society rather than starting with some preexisting institutional frame-
work” the creation of a new intelligence system should begin with the
threat(s), then take into consideration the current framework and cost ef-
fectiveness when organizing its operational structure.

Regarding the actual national intelligence community there are two ma-

jor considerations that must be mastered in the Hungarian Intelligence
Community. The first is the different configuration of the five national
services in the functional dimension, since two of them are subordinate to
the military and three of them are under civil management. The second
consideration is the role of the intelligence in government policy, both in
foreign affairs and domestic activities.

Andrew A. Michta, America’s New Allies, Poland, Hungary and the Czech Republic in
NATO, Zoltan Barany, Hungary, An Outpost on the Troubled Periphery, University of
Washington Press, 1999, p. 92.

Richard Norton-Taylor, In Defense of the Realm, Civil Liberties Trust, London,
1990, p. 129.

164 Babos,

Royer

When reviewing the current framework of oversight, the intelligence

system of the Hungarian constitutional democracy should be enhanced by
implementing the following principles:

x Primary authority of the democratic institutions of society,
x Separation of the intelligence from policy-making,
x Political neutrality of the intelligence services,
x Accountability and parliamentary oversight over the services,
x Subordination of the services to the rule of law in practice,
x Maintaining a fair balance between the secrecy and transparency.

Since the current intelligence system has still not gone through the major
changes, and the new intelligence services are likely to be essentially the
same as old ones, it is necessary and high time to develop a program to
systemically and courageously replace all the unwanted aspects of the old
system with a new apparatus. The driving ideas of that new system should
be the following:

x Redefine Hungary’s security vision and framework in a new law,
x Point out the main elements of the new security dispensation to the

civil society,

x Deepen parliamentary and Governmental oversight to support im-

plementation of the defined changes through special ad hoc commit-
tees,

x Providing a clearer and stronger guidance regarding the intelligence

priorities by the legislative and executive committees,

x Strengthen cooperation between the planning, budgetary and intelli-

gence services in order to maintain the further fluent transition and
interdependence,

x Comprehensively review internal procedures to be in line with the

new legislation and ministerial directives,

x Develop and strengthen managerial ability that will enable the ser-

vices to overcome difficulties of further transformation,

x Erase or phase out individuals at managerial levels who are working

against the goals or outside the perimeters of the new dispensation.

To ensure that the national intelligence capabilities are meeting the
up-mentioned challenges, the new system should follow functional ori-
ented principles, which emphasizes clear and strong civilian control via

Hungary

165

intelligence oversight and cost effectiveness.

Meeting these requirements,

the new model also gives a better structure for the flow of information
from the collectors through the analysts to the consumers. It eliminates and
cuts out the superfluous sub-organizations in the chain of report.

To reinforce Hungary’s judicial, executive and legislative oversight as

well as to expedite Hungary’s future integration into the European Union,
some more aspects of the Western especially the British system should be
incorporated. Gill has pointed out: “There are two extreme possibilities
with respect to ministerial control, both which pose considerable dangers:
either a complete lack of control or ministerial direction in the partisan in-
terests of the governing party.”

But the U.K. has managed to create a sys-

tem of ministerial responsibility for security intelligence that “can achieve
both goals of effective ministerial direction and adequate oversight of
those agencies.”

As far as the Hungarian case is concerned, ministerial

supervision and control should be based primarily on national political
specifications. Since the current political parties have not recruited and de-
veloped appropriate experts on that field, Hungarian Supervision is rather
just theoretical than practical. On the other hand “the question of recruit-
ment to security intelligence agencies is particularly important because, if
it merely reflects the political dominance of certain classes of groups, par-
tisan direction by ministers will not be a problem since it will usually be
unnecessary.”

“A central feature of modern states is that recruitment to its

administrative apparatuses becomes based on patronage and more on im-
personal and competitive educational criteria.”

Consequently, building up

a new generation of professional expertise is a key responsibility both for
the political parties and the actual intelligence community.

Just as the British ensure Executive Oversight via the position of Direc-

tor General and the Ministerial Committee on Intelligence Services, the
Hungarian system utilizes a Director General who reports to appropriate
ministers. As previously stated, Hungary has a Committee on National Se-
curity Affairs similar to the UK’s Ministerial Committee. But Hungary can
improve its parliamentary oversight by adding another working group,
similar to the Permanent Secretaries Committee on Intelligence to assist in
reviewing and reporting to the Prime Minister. Also, one must remember

Mark M. Lowenthal, Intelligence, From secrets to Policy, A Division of Congressional
Quarterly Inc., Washington D.C., pp. 34–38.

Peter Gill, Policing Politics, Security Intelligence and the Liberal Democratic State,
Frank Cass, 1994, p. 217.

Ibid, p. 259.

Ibid, p. 230.

C. Dandeker, Surveillance, Power and Modernity, Cambridge Polity Press, 1990, p. 53.

166 Babos,

Royer

that who ever controls the “purse strings” wields control over the entity, so
as the UK has Intelligence and Security Committee to examine expendi-
ture of the agencies, so too, should Hungary centralize its monitoring of
both civilian and military intelligence expenditure.

Based on the new security challenges and more sophisticated technol-

ogy, a more flexible, “rapid reaction capabilities” and panel system, should
be introduced in the fields of HUMINT, SIGINT and Analysis. This com-
bination of functionary and budget conscious scheme would allow for a
shift in operational concentration with the constantly changing national se-
curity concerns. Shifting the attention to the “combat elements” the new
system should also contribute to the decrease of the redundant supply units
and better utilize the human resources and properties of these organiza-
tions. The proposed structure focuses on three pillars: clear and strong ci-
vilian control; efficient professional activity and cost effectiveness. The
unified scenario also tries to give a better model for the information flow
process from the collectors through the analysts to the consumers, elimi-
nating and cutting out the superfluous sub-organizations in the chain of re-
port. Based on the new security challenges and increased technology a
more flexible, “rapid reaction capabilities” and panel system will be intro-
duced in the fields of HUMINT, SIGINT and Analysis. Shifting the atten-
tion to the “combat elements” the new system would also eliminate the re-
dundant supply units and better utilize the human resources and equipment
of these organizations.

8 Conclusion

Change is never easy, but it is inevitable. In the case of Hungary, since the
fall of Communism in Europe, it has done a great deal to fill the void cre-
ated by the post-Warsaw Pact security vacuum. It has shifted its military
doctrine to Western ideology and principles while transitioning its gov-
ernment and economy to a democracy and free trade. But there is still
much work to do.

It must also address the problem of redirecting a whole intelligence

mechanism from a repressive agenda to one upholding new democratic
ideals and methods. Hungary could manage the transition of its intelli-
gence without any significant problems. But in the case of such a special
and complex system like intelligence, the transition always takes long
time.

If the old management, methods and structure will be totally replaced

by the new generation of professional intelligence officers and civil ex-
perts, Hungary can state: The first phase of the creation of an intelligence

Hungary

167

apparatus that is founded on democratic principles is complete. But defi-
nitely this “is not the end. It is not even the beginning of the end. But it is,
perhaps, the end of the beginning”.

“The challenges facing the Intelligence Community are formidable.

Continual budget and manpower cuts degrade managerial continuity, ex-
perience levels, and the technical expertise. Yet the international arena and
issues that we monitor are becoming more complex. Learning to work
smarter has become imperative.”

This is especially true for Hungary.

Churchill.

illiam S. Brei, Getting Intelligence Right: The Power of Logical Procedure, Occa-

sional Paper Number Two, Joint Military Intelligence College, January 1996, 1.

Macedonian Reform Perspectives

Petar Atanasov

1 General

View

In 2003, the Republic of Macedonia was still challenged with domestic, as
well as regional security threats. The stabilization process after the conflict
in 2001 is progressing and the implementation of the ‘Framework Agree-
ment’ is speeding up due to efforts of the new government. Despite many
difficulties the situation in the country is stable, including security, and life
continues with its normal ups and downs. Macedonia these days does not
differ significantly from the other countries in the region. The priorities of
the governments in the neighboring countries are economic problems,
fighting against organized crime and corruption and struggling with NATO
and EU integration challenges. Fighting against regional terrorism is just
an additional headache connected to the events of the last few years.

Macedonian security issues can be divided in two periods, pre- and post-

Ohrid Agreement. While the general characteristics of the first period
(1991–2001) are rather poor concerning security sector reform and democ-
ratic control over military, the first three months of 2003 the Macedonian
agenda in the area of security was overcrowded. It seems that things are
‘moving’ forward. Expectations for the announced, but not yet channeled
‘National Conception for Security and Defense of the Republic’ and re-
vised ‘Defense Strategy’ are high. The Ministry of Defense is loudly pre-
senting the reforms in the defense sector, and the policing implemented by
the Ministry of Interior and the international facilitators in the former cri-
ses regions was progressing. At the end of March 2003 the European Un-
ion officially started the first military mission in its history, named ‘Con-
cordia’, which replaced the NATO mission in Macedonia. The
Macedonian Prime Minister, Branko Crvenkovski, stated that this would
be the first military mission for the European Union, but the last for Mace-
donia. The mission is projected for six months.

Concerning the public civil-military sphere, some polls have been show-

ing significant numbers and attitudes. Let me quote two of them. Both
were conducted by the Institute for Sociological Political and Juridical

170 Atanasov

Research in Skopje. The first one is about the confidence in the institutions
of the system.

The Macedonians have the highest score, namely 31% con-

fidence in the Army, but the Albanians have greater confidence in the me-
dia, 33%, and 4% confidence in the Army. The general conclusion would
be that the Macedonians are interested in more security and Albanians in
more information. Of course, this is a very simple conclusion. One cannot
say that the Albanians are not interested in more security or the Macedoni-
ans in more information. This result also shows the close relation between
the ‘nation’ and the Army among the perceptions of the Macedonians. In
the second research, on the question ‘would you like Macedonia to become
member of NATO’, the general attitude is that 64% of the citizens have re-
sponded positively

. The answers of the Albanians are slightly higher than

the answers of the Macedonians. These are just to show the differences in
perceptions among Macedonians and Albanians concerning important se-
curity issues.

In these polls, differences among attitudes of the two groups of voters

for the largest Macedonian parties, the Social Democratic Alliance of Ma-
cedonia (SDSM)

and the Internal Macedonian Revolutionary Organiza-

tion – Democratic Party for Macedonian National Unity (VMRO-
DPMNE)

are minimal. In this co-relation, the political factions between

the two largest Macedonian parties, SDSM and VMRO-DPMNE, are more
about the question of who will be in power, and not too many differences
were recorded for the questions on security sector reform. Both parties
have led Macedonia in the last 12 years, and have had majority in the As-
sembly, but without any substantial results in security reforms and legisla-
tive oversight.

‘The confidence in the Government and the political institutions’, public opinion poll
conducted by the Institute for Sociological Political and Juridical Research in Skopje,
Center for security and ethnic issues, February 2003.

‘The defense reform processes and attitude toward NATO’, a survey conducted by the
Institute for Sociological Political and Juridical Research in Skopje sponsored by the
Ministry of Defense of the Republic of Macedonia, March 2003.

SDSM is a left-wing political party that held Government Cabinet 1992–1998, and was
re-elected in November 2002, led by Prime Minister Branko Crvenkovski. Most of the
statements made come from successors of the previous Macedonian Communist party.

VMRO-DPMNE is a right-wing political party that held Government Cabinet 1998–
2002, led by Ljubcho Georgievski, former Prime Minister. The party was established in
1990, but their founders claim that they are successors of the Ilinden revolutionary or-
ganizations that organized the Uprising in 1903 against the Ottoman Empire.

Currently, the situation in the country about the willingness and the ca-

pacity to go through reforms has matured and is moving ahead. Never-
theless, the number one topic, fighting against terrorism, would surely

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171

influence Macedonian reform processes in many respect. If we add that in
the northwestern regions in Macedonia there are still some Albanian ex-
tremist criminal groups initiating sporadic incidents, the will to contribute
to the global fight against terrorism on the local level is even higher. One
can say that the country is determined enough to reform its security sector,
to strengthen the democratic control over the security sector and to im-
prove civil-military relations.

2 Some

Institutional

Aspects

The basic pillars of national security in Macedonia should be democratic
institutions in a plural political system: the Assembly, the President, the
Government and competent ministries have to fulfill their duties in com-
pliance with the Constitution and the laws that determine the manner of
leadership and management in the field of security. The national security
policy by law should ensure execution of the country’s national interests
such as: development of democratic political institutions, a stable envi-
ronment for development of the economic system based on market econ-
omy principles, the organization of appropriate defense systems, the eco-
nomic and political integration with the European Union and political
(military) integration with NATO. Still, after 12 years of independence
Macedonia has not prepared the ‘National Conception for Security and De-
fense of the Republic’, which, according to Article 17 of the Law on De-
fense, should be adopted by the Assembly. Finally, the Assembly did this
in April 2003. What can be said about the current national security policy,
including the management and oversight aspects, is that the institutions of
the political system in the Republic of Macedonia and their legal and nor-
mative setting in relation to the country’s safety exist, but it seems that the
national security policy has not been completely rounded up.

There are

some gray zones in the legislation, even in practice, and vertical and hori-
zontal coordination of greater quality should be ensured at all levels. Ac-
cording to the current legal solutions it is difficult to see possibilities for
exercising unity of the whole national security system, namely, the vertical
setting is less disputable than the horizontal coordination of the system
elements. Knowing that many of these elements are new, and that Mace-
donia started to build its security system from scratch in 1992, one can un-
derstand some of the problems, but the progress has been slow and with a

P. Lazarevski, P. Atanasov, The setting and exercising of the policy of national security
in the Republic of Macedonia (Institute for Sociological Political and Juridical Re-
search, Skopje 2002) 130.

172 Atanasov

lot of disparities. Strategic determinations of the national security should
be defined in the ‘National Conception for Security and Defense of the
Republic’ and the ‘Defense Strategy’ (signed by the President 1998), as
well as the specific documents related to national security such as the dip-
lomatic, political, economic and military strategy, which were never pro-
moted or made public.

The security structures in the country are not acting as a unique concep-

tual system, but as separate sub-systems for national defense and internal
security. At the same time, better-structured sub-systems for civil defense,
crisis management and more efficient civil protection are missing. Hence,
we can conclude that unity of the national security can be established only
through the development of more specialized sub-systems and their firm
interconnectedness. Some of the deficiencies were corrected with the
Amendments of the Law on Defense (2002). Yet, the Republic of Mace-
donia does not have a crisis management system; only some directions on
how one should be established. To overcome this gap, during 2001 conflict
Macedonia established two different bodies: the Coordinating Body for
Dealing with Crises and the Centre for Crisis Management. The Coordinat-
ing Body was established within the Government, while the Centre for
Crises Management was established and stationed in the Ministry of De-
fense. These newly-established structures were an attempt to: establish co-
ordination between the two sub-systems, the system for national defense
and the system for internal security; coordinate and cover the absence, or
inefficiency of the civil defense sub-system (civil protection); coordinate
and provide the material resources necessary for the security forces; and
manage the activities to implement the President’s plan for the eradication
of the crisis.

The need for leadership and management during the crisis in 2001 was

obvious, as well as the coordination between the elements and structures of
the sub-systems. The crisis-management sub-system is necessary in peace-
time as well as in state of emergency. Needless to say there are ideas for
establishing a regional crisis-management system.

The Assembly of the Republic of Macedonia, as a representative body

of the citizens and bearer of legislative power, should determine and im-
plement the security and defense policy of the country, execute oversight
on Government competencies in defense and review the readiness for de-
fense of the Republic. Within the Assembly, there are different commit-
tees, among which the Committee on Defense and Security consisting of
14 MPs, that should take part in the preparation of all legal acts and

P. Lazarevski, P. Atanasov, The setting and exercising… 105–106.

Macedonia

173

oversee the legality of constitutional provisions for defense, as well as the
provisions of the Law on Defense. It must be emphasized that the story of
civil-military relations was not one of the country’s priorities while state
authorities were establishing the political structures of the country. The
theoretical concepts concerning civil-military relations, democratic control
over the security sector, parliamentary oversight of security structures and
others, were never pointed out as a problem in the past, and this is a feature
common to all countries in the region. From today’s perspective, the intro-
duction of the concept of parliamentary oversight on security sector was
the biggest novelty.

The Assembly, after a couple of change of admini-

strations, has started to make efforts about the issue, and the Committee it-
self is trying to be proactive in matters of defense and security. The spe-
cific role of Parliament in civil-military relations is central where issues of
democratic control are concerned, since Parliament should provide scru-
tiny not only of the military, but also of the executive and defense policy
as a whole.

This lesson has not been completely applied yet. In this re-

spect, it must also be said that the biggest problem in the work of the As-
sembly and the Committee on Defense and Security is the lack of experi-
enced staff in security matters to help them in exercising their
constitutional authority. The committees have no staff at all except for one
secretary. To overcome this, some efforts have been made to improve co-
operation with the domestic and international non-governmental bodies,
but this cooperation has still far to go. The general feeling is that the As-
sembly and especially the Committee on Defense and Security are making
steps toward a more efficient control over the security sectors.

In early 2003 the Minister of Defense reported twice to the Committee

on Defense and Security on the reform process. The MPs were also active
on issues connected with the defense budget discussions for 2003. One of
the problematic issue was rationalization of the budget. 45 million Denars
(1 Euro = 61 Denars) less were allotted than the previous year. The total
defense budget for 2003 will be 6.3 billions Denars. During the debate
over the defense budget the opposition asked the government whether the
reduction of the defense budget would influence the combat readiness of
the Army. Another issue of interest was also the question of the Ministry
of Interior’s budget increasing by 602 million Denars, for a total amount of

B. Vankovska, ‘The Academic Community among historical hypothecs and promises of
the future’, Contemporary Macedonian Defense, III: 6 (2002) 8.

A. Cottey, T. Edmunds, A. Forster, Democratic Control of the Armed forces in Central
and Eastern Europe: A Framework for Understanding Civil Military Relations, CMR
Network Website, A Quarterly Electronic Newsletter, at:
http://civil-military.dsd.kcl.ac.uk/TCMR%20Papers (September 1999).

174 Atanasov

6 billion Denars. Both the Ministry of Defense and the Ministry of Interior
have increased the salaries for the new employees, namely 890 in Defense
and 600 in Interior. The new hirings result from the implementation of the
‘Framework Agreement’ and reflect adequate representation of the non-
Macedonian ethnic communities in the security structures. This is an at-
tempt to include more non-

Ɇacedonians in the mainstream institutions,

especially some security structures that were dominated by Macedonians
(officers, intelligence, special forces, etc.).

Bad and Good Examples of Democratic Control
(Demcon)

Three very indicative events happened in the last couple of months that
raise questions over procedures in relation with state institutions and de-
mocratic control over the security sector. The first two are in the area of
cohabitation between the President and the Government under the current
circumstances where both institutions are representatives from different
political affiliations. About the first event, the quoted statements are from
the beginning of March 2003. The quarrel started with a public confronta-
tion between the advisers of the President and the Ministry of Defense
over the competencies and constitutional authority for certain defense pro-
visions. One of the advisers of the President accused the ministers (the
Minister of Defense) for taking over the jurisdiction of the President due to
some overlapping of authority in the defense legislation. It was said that
‘the cohabitation between the President and the Government is not in crisis
but obviously starts to squeak’. Actually, the accusations were about not
informing the Cabinet of the President about some solutions and decisions
by the Ministry of Defense, regarding the formation of units of the Army,
that the Ministry of Defense should not discuss changes in the formation of
units without the signature of the President, and that the Ministry of De-
fense cannot, without the consultations with the President – the Supreme
Commander of the armed forces – propose reductions of the defense
budget for 2003. And the main point, ‘that the Government cannot behave
towards the President as he is one of the agencies of the Government’. To
make this clearer, some of the missing links in the legislation between the
President and the Government can easily produce tensions and misunder-
standings between institutions in the country. And the issues that were the
core of the quarrel werethe decreasing the number of officers by 700, in-
tention of donating the T-55 tanks to Afghanistan, decreasing conscripts’
service time from 9 to 6 months, and some other ‘minor’ questions. The
situation is now normalized, but the scars remain.

Macedonia

175

The second event was again between the President and the Government.

Because the ‘National Conception for Security and Defense’ was never
prepared and accepted by the Assembly in the last 12 years, the President’s
Cabinet held a series of panels and round tables in 2002 in order to move
forward on preparing the document. This resulted in benign by the Gov-
ernment. People from the presidential Cabinet stated that the President is
feeling threatened in his functions in the sphere of defense where his initia-
tive for producing national strategy has failed. On the contrary, the Gov-
ernment thought that there is no ground that the President should propose
such document to the Assembly. Because the Government has enough
‘power’, it decided to establish a team that consists of experts from various
ministries, led by the Prime Minister’s counselor for national security, who
rapidly made significant progress in preparing the document. After the first
draft was ready, it was given to the President’s cabinet for opinion. And as
I said, the document was adopted in the Assembly and made public in
April 2003. Again, where is the problem? Who is right and who is wrong?
The main problem is that the legislation is not clear about the legal proce-
dure for producing the ‘National Conception for Security and Defense’. In
this case the ‘stronger’ institution, the Government, is taking over and run-
ning the business. If we add that the Government always has a majority in
the Assembly, then there are no obstacles about the Government’s suprem-
acy in the parliamentary procedures. There is no easy way out of this. The
Committee on Defense and Security has also majority of the government
coalition and the MPs belonging to the ruling party do not always feel
‘comfortable’ criticizing the Government’s proposals and decisions.

The third event is rather more complicated. It concerns the now-

dismantled police unit named the ‘Lions’. This police unit was highly con-
troversial to Albanian leaders and many Macedonians alike. Instead of es-
tablishing a new unit in compliance with the provisions of the document
for establishing rapid reaction police battalion enacted by a government
decision in June 2001,in the wake of the clashes, the Minister of Interior
decided to use his executive power to increase the number of existing spe-
cial police forces. The problem was that most of the new ‘fighters’ were
members or sympathizers of the ruling party VMRO-DPMNE, some with
criminal records and most unemployed. Actually, the new unit was not
clearly under the control of the broader security system structures of the
state. It was almost a one-party formation that could be misused in differ-
ent ways. After the new government took office in January 2003, it de-
cided to transform the unit. The Prime Minister stated that this unit is le-
gally problematic, for the way it was established and its functioning do not
match the needs of the country and so must be abolished. The ‘Lions’
blockaded one of the main roads between Skopje and Kosovo, protesting

176 Atanasov

against the governmental decision and asking for some concessions. While
the Minister of Interior sent the regular and special police to break the
blockade, the ‘Lions’ pointed their guns towards their own colleagues.
Fortunately nothing happened, but still bitterness remains. The Govern-
ment decided to transform the unit and to absorb the members of the ‘Li-
ons’ into regular security units, the Army and Police, except for the indi-
viduals with thick criminal records. This serves as a good example of why
the Macedonian authorities should be very careful in their decisions about
establishing security and defense structures under supreme civilian and
democratic control.

We can also mention some good examples, especially from the conflict

of 2001. For instance, the Army was constantly under sound civilian and
democratic control during the fight against paramilitary Albanian extrem-
ists. Despite the fact that, in compliance with the Constitution, the Mace-
donian Army has only an external mission (protecting sovereignty and ter-
ritorial integrity from outside), its involvement in the conflict was very
sensitive. Still, the Army did not go over firm orders issued by the Presi-
dent, as the supreme commander and the only institution that can legally
order the use of military forces, and the supplementary Government deci-
sions. Most of the time the Army had a supporting role of preventing spill-
over of the fight to the wider region. The use of force by the military units
did not exceed international measure of the so-called ‘proportional use of
force’. The conflict was under constant monitoring and casualties were
kept to a minimum thanks to the Army’s behavior and respect for the or-
ders of high command. The Army even swallowed some of the ‘losses’ in
order to stabilize the situation and avoid a civil war. The important thing is
that after the changes in the Law on in 2002, Article 23 states that the
Army is ‘organized, prepared and trained for armed conflict, combat and
other actions for exercising its constitutional function to defend the Repub-
lic’. The legislation thus filled the gap that used to allow the Army to act
only in state of war. The ruling parties, at the time of enacting the earlier
provisions, were not aware that the state would confront aggressive terror-
ist paramilitary formations, and now they have eradicated the norms for
use of the Army only in state of war.

Given the likelihood of military in-

volvement to deal with internal threats, new democracies cannot be satis-
fied with simply identifying external defense as the military’s primary
mission. In order not to leave the door open for use of the military on an
unregulated basis, civilians, and not the military, should decide when and

T. Risteski, ‘The legal status of ARM (Army of the Republic of Macedonia)’, Defense
Magazine (Odbrana), XI: 73 (2002), 11.

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177

how the armed forces will be used, specifying what can and cannot be
done, the time frame to begin and cease action, and the allocation of re-
sponsibility among civilians and officers in command and control of the
mission.

The theory is clear on this.

About Transparency and Accountability

Issues of transparency and accountability came with the transition process
and the promotion of the ‘good governance’ paradigm, including a civil
society as a factor in the whole network of citizens and interest groups and
society as a whole. The control exercised over the military through institu-
tions of civil society represents the ‘other side of the coin’ and is probably
the central element of the new type of the civil-military relations in post-
communist societies.

Yet, the Macedonian public has heard the words

transparency and accountability too often. Unfortunately, they have only
been heard, and not seen, in general. The lessons learned in Macedonia,
and maybe elsewhere, are that transparency and accountability are not a
state of mind, or subjective attitude towards respect for the rule of law.
This is, as it should be, a sound link with the rule of law and democratic
style of governance. An area where there is always room for more pro-
gress, especially in the security area.

I argue that the supremacy of the executive over the legislative power

was a pattern of Macedonian political scene for a decade. Due to a fact that
the majority of the Assembly is part of the ruling party, and the Prime
Minister’s office is held by their party leader is of big importance for MPs’
behavior. Another problem in the leadership-opposition relation is that
there is a high ‘personal’ political division between two largest parties,
SDSM and VMRO-DPMNE. And this is a crucial argument as to why
there is no proper cooperation between the Assembly plenary sessions and
committee’s debates. The majority of MPs are just acting as advocates of
the government’s wishes and decisions. The opposition in this context is a
‘weaker side’. In these circumstances obviously we have less accountabil-
ity and even lesser transparency.

High official turnover following electoral defeats is a recurring problem.

The results of this are slowing down the reforms, wasting most of the time

J. K. Giraldo, Democratizing Civil-Military relations: what do countries legislate,
CCMR Website, Naval Postgraduate School, Monterey, California, at:
http://www.ccmr.org/public/library (June 2001).

B. Vankovska, ‘Democratization of Civil-Military Relations in Post-communist Balkan
States’, Contemporary Macedonian Defense, I: 1 (2001), 66.

178 Atanasov

on personnel replacements. This is one of the Macedonian nightmares of
civilian-civilian relations and democratic oversight on the security sector.
Feeling each other as hard political enemies, VMRO-DPMNE even stated
in 1998, after winning the parliamentary elections, that they will produce a
new Strategy for Defense and White Paper on Defense even though the
first one had just been published in September 1998. However, it never
happened. More importantly, both parties made enormous damage in many
areas of the society, particularly in the field of security. This antagonism is
even more complicated with the ethnic division between Macedonian and
Albanian political parties. If we stress that civil society is also divided ac-
cording to ethnic cleavages, the story gets quite complex. Most of the time,
politicians are protecting their party interests, their ethnic leaders’ strate-
gies, and not the ‘real’ interests of the people who voted for them. We
must emphasize that this weakness is a serious obstacle in the management
of different fields, and mostly in the security sector.

In this area many questions can be raised, but the most important one for

the Macedonian case seems to be the plan to incorporate ethnic communi-
ties in the security structures in a way that is part of the implementation
process deriving from the constitutional changes. On this issue, relations
between society and the military can be transformed into relations between
ethnic communities (ethnic groups or minorities after the Framework
Agreement were named ‘ethnic communities’) and the military. A lot has
already been done in this area, for instance, police training was held for
new members and multiethnic police control was established on the
ground. The plans for including officers, non-commissioned officers and
professional soldiers in the Army are on their way. The Ministry of De-
fense has reported since 2002, the amount of Albanian NCOs being trained
has increased. Still, there are a lot of differences in perceptions among eth-
nic communities of what the security situation in the country is, what
should be done and how to enhance the stabilization process.

The best word to describe the influence of state institutions on civil so-

ciety is centralization. The Macedonian state is too centralized both politi-
cally and in matters of allocation of resources. According to constitutional
changes it should be decentralized in many aspects. Local democracy
should provide new patterns for resolving peoples’ needs. So, one can
speak of centralization as a systematic obstacle more than ‘weakness’ of
the state structures. What can be concluded about the weakness of the cen-
tral state/government institutions and their effectiveness is that levels of
control and responsibility among different subjects in the security struc-
tures are not clearly separated. It seems that controlling, supervising
and inspection functions are not developed enough as important elements
to implement laws. What is needed is a more direct cooperation with

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179

institutions such as Auditors, possibly creating classical auditing bodies
(such as those that exist in Western countries) as specialized government
inspection bodies, but also independent expert institutions and commis-
sions. Although there are certain possibilities for control by the civil soci-
ety, it seems that these links and relations are very passive and have little
influence.

There is another ‘weak side’ concerning civil society in the area of secu-

rity. Prominent experts in the civil society, i.e. research institutes, NGOs
and media, are rare. For instance, not even one serious NGO dealing with
security issues exclusively has appeared. That is why the outside expertise
thus far found has little place in the cooperation process with policy mak-
ers. About the media, there are more critiques than positive remarks in the
overall society. They are reflective, operating day-to-day, and a little pol-
icy advice can be found in their commentaries. What is new in Macedonia
is that ‘security’ and ‘defense’ communities are developing relations with
representatives of University and research institutes. Attempts to establish
some ‘serious’ non-governmental organizations to close the gap between
state institutions and civil society are made. It is a promising process and a
lot of activities have been undertaken. Things are moving forward and
maybe the best would be to create a regional ‘security community’, a chal-
lenge of its own.

Civilians and the Military

It seems that the new NATO members have entered a ‘second generation’
phase of civil-military reform, in which democratic control of armed forces
must be consolidated, and appropriate civil-military balance found within
this framework. The civilian sector must strive to better understand and
address the needs of the military; the military must further accept that there
is a core role for civilians in the formulation of defense policy.

In Mace-

donia the process of transforming civil-military relations is stuck in the
middle of the two phases, something has been achieved and something re-
mains to be achieved. Civil-military relations in Macedonia have been
strongly influenced by the legacy of the Yugoslav federation. Domestic
conditions also have a significant impact on civil-military relations ranging
from economic disaster to ethnic tensions. Macedonia almost does not

P. Lazarevski, P. Atanasov, The setting and exercising… 134.

T. Edmunds, Civil-Military Relations in NATOs New Member States: Consolidating Re-
form, CMR Network Website, A Quarterly Electronic Newsletter, at: http://civil-
military.dsd.kcl.ac.uk/TCMR%20Papers (June 2000).

180 Atanasov

have its own experience in establishing civil-military relations, or more
precisely, does not have experience with military intervention in internal
political relations. In the transformation process the problem of civil-
military relations was neglected not only as a part of the political reform,
but also as a significant factor of national and regional security.

The Ministry of Defense is currently the core element in democratic

civil-military relations. Some of the most important issues in civil-military
relations in the contemporary era of democratic consolidation are ad-
dressed in the form and functions of the Ministry of Defense.

In this re-

spect, establishing the new Ministry of Defense in the Republic of Mace-
donia in 1992 was not an easy job. Even today the military is calling the
civilians ‘civil persons’ (graganski lica), which means civilians who just
have some duties that are of no crucial importance. During the process of
building new relations the civilians conquered management places in the
Ministry of Defense. Having Western training and education, many of the
civilians are the actors with most weight in the defense decision-making
and planning processes. That was a shock for many military. With the re-
placement of the old cadre of the military, things are now smoothly going
back to, if I may say, normal civil-military track. In due time, civilians also
accepted the military experts as valued counterparts. The opposite process
is under way of ‘allowing’ the military to use their expertise and knowl-
edge in the planning process and drafting documents for the defense re-
forms. Labour is divided so that the civilians take care of national strategy
of security, democratic control, resources for security, personal manage-
ment, political goals and engaging the forces and the military take care of
military doctrine and tactics, training, military goals and operations. Their
mutual tasks are defense strategy, management of defense, some legisla-
tive acts and military mission. There is still some overlapping but relations
are improving. The lesson learned, from a civilian perspective, should be
that if one political party wants to run the Ministry of Defense and the se-
curity agencies, it should train and educate its people that should run the
security and defense system, teach them to be loyal to the security and de-
fense structures of the state and not to the political party itself.

Recruitment, selection and promotion for civilians and military differ.

The civilians are subject to the Labor Relations Law, Law on Organization
and Work of State Agencies and Law of Civil Servants. In mid-July 2002
for the first time after the foundation of the Army, the Assembly passed

B. Vankovska, ‘Democratization of Civil-Military Relations…’ 59–60.

T. C. Bruneau, Ministries of Defense and Democratic Civil-Military Relations,
http://www.ccmr.org/public/library (August 2001).

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the Law on Service in the Army, which prescribes numerous rights for
members of the Army deriving from the specifics of the military service
and is a base for many regulations. But these days more interest surrounds
the questions about numbers reduction to accommodate a new reform con-
cept for 2007. The number of the officers should be reduced by 700, that
of civilians employed in the Army by 950, conscripts by 1,163, and civil-
ians in the Ministry of Defense by 690. The peace formation of the Army
is transformed to 12,858 personnel. The plans are focused on increasing
the number of professional soldiers and non-commissioned officers while
reducing the number of officers, conscripts and civilians in the Army. The
main body of the armed forces will consist of two active brigades, two pri-
ority reserve brigades and six territorial reserve brigades. The infantry will
consist of rapid reaction forces, reserve strategic forces and supporting
forces. There will be special forces, two tanks battalions etc. The reform
process will also modernize the equipment by 2007. This is the most im-
portant defense reform done so Macedonia could get closer to NATO
membership. Also, among the reform tasks are strengthening the democ-
ratic control and enhancing plans for training civilian experts for defense.

6 International

Influence

Due to the crisis of 2001 the fight against terrorism became one of basic
tasks of Macedonian security forces. In this respect the revised Defense
Strategy will evaluate new risks related to terrorism, proliferation, organ-
ized crime and extremism. The emphasis will be on the domestic terrorism
that destabilized Macedonia in 2001 and is still producing incidents by ex-
tremist groups that are connected with organized crime, namely illegal
trafficking of arms, drugs and human beings. According to estimates there
are approximately 500,000 illegal pieces of small arms and light weapons
in Macedonia. This is a heavy task for the Macedonian security services
and demands a lot of efforts to keep under control. The Law for the Volun-
tary Collecting of the Weapons entered into force and a assistance is ex-
pected from international actors, even from within the region. The issue of
organized crime (strategic crime) is so acute that in many areas it is nega-
tively influencing the efficiency of state structures and security. The assas-
sination of Serbian Prime Minister Zoran Dzindzic is a clear example of
this. The Macedonian government has started discussions on changing
some constitutional provisions in order to give more mechanisms and re-
sources to security structures for fight against organized crime and terror-
ism. The first is constitutional Article 17 related to guarantees on freedom
and confidentiality of letters and all other means of communication that

182 Atanasov

will allow security structures to apply special technical means. The debate
rages on.

The Republic of Macedonia supported the coalition led by USA in fight-

ing against terrorism in Iraq. The decision of the Macedonian support for
anti-terrorist coalition against Iraq was not publicly supported. In a poll of
the Institute for Sociological Political and Juridical Research in Skopje
done one month before the attack, 80% of the respondents did not agree
with any engagement of Macedonia in the attacks on Iraq. The Macedo-
nian public is against the war in general, but they are also against the ter-
rorism from which they suffered in 2001 and up to date. Macedonia joined
the international fight against terrorism knowing how easy it is for some
extremist groups to use terrorism and harm national security. The events of
9/11 showed the extent of the range and consequences of the terrorist at-
tacks. Macedonia, in accordance with NATO initiatives, Membership Ac-
tion Plan and Planning and Review Process, declared the forces and ca-
pacities that should be engaged in humanitarian and peace keeping
missions. Macedonia has already sent four officers in ISAF-2 in Afghani-
stan, and ten professional soldiers in ISAF-3. The decisions were legal
only after the approval of the Assembly. Macedonian soldiers will also be
a part of the post-conflict reconstruction mission in Iraq.

International standards greatly influenced the Macedonian reform proc-

esses, democratic control standards and civil-military relations. Participat-
ing in many training, debates, seminars, education courses, Macedonian
experts became a part of a wider ‘security community’. Security sector re-
form is definitely connected with achieving international standards. These
apply to defense policy, resource and personnel management, planning and
budgeting processes and interoperability with multinational forces. Mace-
donia is also participating in Southeast European multinational peace bri-
gade stationed in Plovdiv, Bulgaria, together with other countries in the re-
gion. The civilian and democratic control process is progressing. But,
civil-military relations are something that are purely domestic. In this re-
gard, there is still ground for many improvements and upgrading.

7 Final

Word

The national security system of the Republic of Macedonia was estab-
lished from the top. What does that mean? That means that if we imagine
the national security system as a body which is producing light from some
high point, then there is a risk that the light will not cover all the spots in
the society, but there is also a risk that that light will not cover even
the bigger parts of the society. In that case the system is not fulfilling its

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183

function entirely.

If we stress that the conflict of 2001 suffered from this

perspective then the reforms in the security sector should overcome this
approach establishing bottom up security and producing a stable and inte-
grated society. This can also be done through democratic style of civil-
military relations. A bottom-up approach is needed for better human secu-
rity, for reducing ethnic tensions and eliminating rampant organized crime.
All of this together will open the door for more security and prosperity.

P. Atanasov, ‘The setting of the National Security System’, Defense Magazine (Od-
brana), XI: 75 (2002).

Romania’s Participation in the Fight Against
International Terrorism: Implications for Civil-
Military Relations and the Security Sector Reform

Claudiu Degeratu

1 Immediate

Reactions

As many states in the world, Romania became aware of the imperative to
better articulate national institutions’ responsibilities in terrorism preven-
tion and countering. This realization is meant to sustain Romania’s own
security objectives and its international cooperation démarche.

Romania’s “National Security Strategy”, a fundamental document, also

sets one of the main lines of action, the consolidation of the institutional
system to ensure national security, in order to respond efficiently to a
whole range of risks and threats, including terrorism

Romania’s fundamental interests

imposed an integrated approach in or-

der to attain a superior organizational stage: designing an inter-institutional
mechanism meant to prevent and counter terrorism, that could respond to
the specific challenges of the current security context, by national proce-
dures and international cooperation. This integrated approach covers the
following:

x Interests and necessities for Romania’s internal security, which call

for the strengthening of its self-protection mechanisms against trans-
border threats, terrorism included,

x Enacting the principle of solidarity and engaging Romania in a po-

litical attitude against international terrorism by means of concrete
measures meant to ensure the increase of the Romanian national
contribution to the fight against international terrorism within bi-
and multi-lateral cooperation.

Taking into consideration the fundamental interests and objectives of Ro-
mania, the Supreme Council for National Defense appointed the Romanian

National Security Strategy, Bucharest, 2001, p. 19.

Op. cit., p. 8–9.

186 Degeratu

Intelligence Service as “national authority” in the area of preventing and
countering terrorism (Decision 00140/ October 2001). According to this
decision, a “National Strategy for Preventing and Combating Terrorism”
was to be drawn by the representatives of the 24 institutions that form the
“National Antiterrorist System”

. This document was presented to the Su-

preme Council for National Defense, which approved it in April 2001, and
it refers to legal regulations and the implementation framework; aspects
concerning an integrated approach to the terrorist phenomenon; objectives,
organizational structure, principles and directions for preventing and com-
bating terrorism and implementation of the national system for preventing
and combating terrorism.

Romania’s Participation in the International Coalition
Against Terrorism

Following the terrorist attacks against the United States, Romania has been
firmly combating terrorism, fully aware of its responsibilities. The Roma-
nian government and Parliament swiftly defined their stand and decided on
concrete contributions Romania could pledge as a strategic partner of the
United States and as a de facto NATO ally.

Immediately after the terrorist attacks of 11 September 2001, the Presi-

dent of Romania convened the Supreme Council of National Defense
(SCND) in emergency session

. During the meeting, the SCND adopted

the Resolution on Romania’s participation alongside NATO member states
aimed at combating international terrorism.

On 13 September 2001, Romania presented its offer to make available a

Search-and-Rescue Team to the Euro-Atlantic Disaster Response Center.

On 27 September 2001, the Romanian Prime Minister decided to set up

the Inter-ministerial Committee for Crises Situations in order to identify
and implement UN Security Council Resolution no. 1333/2000 regarding
the situation in Afghanistan. Working groups have been set up within the
ministries concerned in order to address topical issues related to their spe-
cific areas. The working groups co-operate with experts from the Roma-
nian intelligence services

See also www.sri.ro for the National Strategy for Preventing and Combating Terrorism
and related aspects.

Message of the Presidential Administration in Jeffrey Simon and Mihail Ionescu, eds.,
Combating Terrorism – NATO and Transatlantic Dimension, Bucharest, 2002, Institute
for Political Studies of Defense and Military History, p. 22.

See also www.snspa.ro.

The Evolution of Civil-Military Relations in
FRY/the State Union of Serbia and Montenegro

Dragan Simi

1 Introduction

Theoretical speculations and researches on the relations between the civil
and the military sectors of society, as well as, between the political and
military decision-makers, in a narrow sense, almost regularly appeared as a
consequence of the demand of ‘real reality’. Actually, there are few exam-
ples of such stipulation of theoretic thinking with concrete reality. On the
other hand, there are few subjects of research overlapping to such an extent
with other phenomenon, relations, processes and situations, as is the case
of the military factor: the army represents, almost without exception, the
concise expression of one society’s condition and relations. Therefore,
elaboration of this topic, which assumes prior “sociologically broad” in-
formation about society, whose civil-military relations reached a level of
democratic civil control over the army and the police, as well as a reform
pattern of the security sector are taken under consideration.

The “case” of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia/ the State Union of

Serbia and Montenegro is sui generis in full meaning of this term; starting
from the middle of the 20

century, the former “second Yugoslavia” cre-

ated very unusual social relations, till civil wars in 1990s, which delayed
the so-called transition processes that were already taking place in East and
Southeast Europe for more than a decade. Therefore, for a thorough com-
prehension of the evolution of civil-military relations in Serbia and Mon-
tenegro, is especially important to research roots and reasons, which ap-
parently have an influence on today’s situation.

Using this approach, with respect to concrete particularities it would be

possible to evaluate the actual condition, in order to integrate our society
into existing broader security and economic structures through necessary
and inevitable changes. In the case of Serbia and Montenegro, the almost
fully isolated evolution of civil-military relations in the past decade must
be pointed out in relation to changes which in Western liberal democratic
societies led to a redefinition of system and functions of modern security.
To be clearer, it is related to a way of thinking and to the overall security

198 Simi

culture connected to the pre-modern, partially modern, versus the forth-
coming postmodern approach. This naturally should not question the ne-
cessity of homogenization and adjustment of Southeast European coun-
tries’ existing national security systems in order torespond successfully to
new security challenges and threats for practical rather than theoretical
needs. On the contrary!

The rise of so called complex terrorism

– a serious enough threat, along

with all the old and the new security challenges and threats, with its effects
on national, collective and global levels made the issue even more deserv-
ing of a special research focus.

Historical-Traditional Fulcrum: Position and Role of
the Army in the Social Life of Serbia and Montenegro

One peculiarity is related to background influences of this sensitive and
complex field. The present situation has significantly deeper historical and
traditional roots, which is the case with the majority of other nations in
Southeast Europe. The point is that during history, and even at present,
there exists a purposeful mythology of the army, whose proportion makes
it an almost untouchable social/national institution.

In the mind of the

people and also normatively-institutionally, the army, along with the
Church made a crucial contribution in creating and maintaining the na-
tional state – and not only in the narrow sense – but more precisely in the
biological and political survival of the nation on this geo-politically trou-
bled territory. Such real or imagined roles have piled layers of irrational
mythological attitude towards the army, which was considered an unmis-
takable interpreter and defender of national interests. An “ontological en-
tity”

, the army has become, and very much remains, the unquestionable

factor of identification of Serbian national entity.

Homer-Dixon, Thomas, The Rise of Complex Terrorism, Foreign Policy, January/
February, 2002.

Hadzic, Miroslav, Manjak pretpostavki za demokratsku kontrolu Vojske Jugoslavije, u
Demokratska kontrola vojske i policije, CCVO, Beograd, 2001, pp. 63–69.

Ibidem, p. 63.

Aware of the position and role of the army as part of social organization,

there are grounds on which could be questioned the possible misuses of
such an eminent and privileged position – this is especially true of military
elites – which often claimed or fully identified with the given role of sub
social rectifier of national, political and social processes. Maybe because

Serbia and Montenegro

199

of that it is not hard to understand why in our case the Platonic question
“who guards the guardians?” has never been seriously posed.

Even though communist power-holders did everything to destroy previ-

ous institutions and relations, the army’s role and place in the national
ethos did not change significantly. Using the classical defense function,
acting within traditional security patterns which considered only military
deterrence and military responses, this institution was also given consider-
able space in the Constitutions and can interfere in internal social relations
using the right and duty to “spread social and political order”.

During the second Yugoslavia the ‘exceptional’ social position of the

party army manifested itself in its ‘exception’ from democratic civil con-
trol. The normative organization of the army’s position and role in society,
which is very important for this review, is a case of continuity and relative
stability of the initial relations. For example, article 134 of the Constitution
from 1946 prescribes for the Yugoslav army, along with other functions to
“serve to maintain peace and security”. Furthermore, by constitutional law
from 1953, the Federation and consequently its army were given a duty to
“protect social and political order” along with the defense of the country.
In the article no. 114 of the Constitution from 1963, such an order was de-
fined also as “the sociological, social and political system” which un-
equivocally shows to which extent the military was an instrument in pur-
pose of defending socialist ideology. This study is made to show that there
was no aberration from the principle of ideological assortment of the army
de iure and even more de facto, until the proclamation of the Constitu-
tional Charter of Serbia and Montenegro Union, in February 2003. If we
continue to follow constitutional and legal development of second Yugo-
slavia, we will realize that with article 3.XLI of the amendment on the
Constitution from 1971, the armed forces consisted of JNA and TO,
along with other tasks had a task to defend the constitutional order. Fi-
nally, the article 240 from the last Constitution of Tito’s Yugoslavia obli-
gates the armed forces to “protect social order of SFRY established by this
Constitution”

Protection of the constitutional order as a value, whose threatening is

being defended by the army cannot be problematic in principle. The prob-
lem arises from an inadmissible imprecision in defining the content and
factors of the concept of constitutional order which is being defended. In
order to use the army in the interest of the political community, it is impor-
tant to specify in detail the possible forms in which the constitutional order
can be endangered as well as to determine, unequivocally the procedures

Hadzic, Miroslav, Manjak pretpostavki… op. cit., p. 64.

200 Simi

and means to be undertaken to defend it. Since there have not been such
precise explanation, Communist power-holders were left enough space to
misuse the army for personal benefit, often against the interest of the citi-
zens. In the absence of democratic civil control, under a “facade democ-
racy”, the army had a client status in relation to arbitrary and unlimited po-
litical will.

Civil-Military Relations in FRY (1992–2000)

While the other Central and Eastern European countries managed a suc-
cessful transition to democratic leadership of the armed forces, police and
secret services in a redefined security context, the former Yugoslavia sank
in civil war. The JNA was divided according to national pattern, guided by
narrow-minded interests and ideological blindness of the top generals and
its parts were subordinated to the nationalist republican political elites. The
ideology of socialism, prevailing till then, was replaced by the ideology of
nationalism – long standing social discontent was changed into discontent
because of the position of the nation, using “alchemical propaganda”. All
these peoples saw the possibility for social improvement in creating inde-
pendent, if possible, mono-ethnic state.

Paying no attention to the environment and the changes that occurred in

that framework, the elite of the former Yugoslav republics were occupied
only with the national security, which they reduced to the level of their
own existence in power as the highest national goal. Defense of interests of
the national collectivity by the creation of independent states was just a
wider framework to cover special goals. Without exception all these socie-
ties kept the inherited civil-military relations model of second Yugoslavia:
an undemocratic civil control over military and police services.

Conceptually, systemically and functionally, security which in the last

decades of the 20

century broadened in its numerous non-military forms

was reduced to national territorial defense. The object and subject of secu-
rity were seen in this state in a narrow sense while the threats and re-
sponses were considered and practiced almost exclusively in a military
aspect.

See in: Gartner, Heinz, Hyde-Price, Adrian, and Reiter, Erich (eds.), Europe’s New Se-
curity Challenges, London, Boulder, CO., 2001; Buzan, Barry, Weaver, Ole, and de
Wilde, Jaap, A New Framework for Analysis, Lynne Rienner Publisher, London, 1998;
Simic, Dragan, Nauka o bezbednosti – savremeni pristupi bezbednosti, Sluzbeni List
SRJ/FPN, Beograd, 2002.

Serbia and Montenegro

201

The case of former Yugoslavia convincingly backs previous statements.

Moreover, the absence of democratic and civil control over the army and
police here is a direct consequence of the nature of the political system and
form of governance in the newly created state, and also of the way the state
was created. If the influences of the ideological and traditionally mytho-
logical factors are to be added, we get a situation in which democratic in-
stitutions and processes are not possible. Even before the new state was
proclaimed, Milosevic had achieved complete personal control over the
army. “Democratic” procedure and feigned pluralism were just a cover for
unlimited power. Actually, the decisions previously taken by one man
were legalized afterwards just in such a system. When everything said is
taken under consideration then normative solutions are not of great impor-
tance for sociological-political analysis. However, even that new state was
created in a non-constitutional way. For example, the Constitutions of Ser-
bia and FRY are not in concordance, which has led to the interaction of
two opposite legal orders from which numerous unpunished violations of
the Serbian Constitution were derived. Furthermore, the adoption of un-
constitutional laws fully derogated the rule of law opening the door for
mass violations of human, minority and civil rights. Former Yugoslavia in
ten years of existence, a transitory and unstable creation, had only the
army as a federal institution which operated on the territory of both repub-
lics, if we exclude the territory of Kosovo and Metohija that became in
1999 an international protectorate.

Civil non-democratic control over the army and police as Milosevic’s

regime had, additionally came from the gaps in the Constitution of FRY

The Yugoslav army was also given the role of “defender of the constitu-
tional order” by the Constitution (article 133, paragraph 1), but narrowing
the definition, allowing for misuse. Along with the lack of clarity and
overlapping of certain rights and obligations on issues of defense and secu-
rity between the federal state and the republics

, our attention is especially

deserved in connection with the organization of the leadership of the army.
In article 135 of the Constitution it is written that: “The Yugoslav army in
war and peace is led by President of the Republic, in accordance with the
decisions of the Supreme Council of Defense”, which consisted of “the
President of the Republic and Presidents of the member Republics”, while
the President of the Republic is “the President of Supreme Council of De-
fense”. The President of FRY explicitly and personally was given the right
to independently “place, promote and release officers of the Yugoslav

Hadzic, Miroslav, Manjak pretpostavki… op. cit., p. 76.

Ibidem, p. 76–79.

202 Simi

army determined by federal law, to place and release presidents, judges
and court juries of the military courts and military prosecutors”. Even this
lack of clarity is not visible at first glance, because the relations between
the President of FRY and the Council respect the principle of unity of
command and subordination of the decisions of the Council was a respon-
sibility of the President of FRY, by which was avoided simultaneously
non-harmonized command. Despite that, the concept of collective com-
mand of the army was not consistently and fully carried out.

Considering that the Constitution does not determine the decision-

making procedure in the Supreme Council for Defense (VSO), it is uncer-
tain whether decisions are taken by consensus or by majority vote. Nor
does it specify whether quorum needs to be achieved to reach decisions.
All that can produce serious consequences in practice: to endanger the
principle of equality of the member republics and/or to make possible the
misuse of the army.

There was also neither a procedure to coordinate between the command

of the President of FRY and the VSO decisions, nor of the ability to verify
the legality of his undertakings and their possible recall. On the other hand
there were provided no procedures whereby responsibility of the Council
and its members would be set, though in the broader interpretation of the
Constitution the Assembly could control this body. To this are added teh
opaque requirements for imposing a state of emergency, leaving a strong
political will with the door wide open to potentially use the army outside
the constitutional framework. Particular dangers are hidden in insuffi-
ciently defined legal possibilities. The one who imposes state of emer-
gency may limit the rights and liberties of the citizens. Therefore, in cases
of extreme danger for state and society, when restrictive measures are in-
evitable to defend democratic institutions and processes, political powers
have too great a space for abuse.

When the relation between the Ministry of Defense and Headquarters of

Yugoslav army is at stake, their wartime and peacetime responsibilities are
not detached and also the supervision of the Ministry of Defense over the
Headquarters is not consistently determined, which is one of the main
premises of democratic civil control over the military sector. The fact that
a civilian occasionally acted as Minister of Defense, in the situation where
the Ministry of Defense is mainly composed of military persons, is not suf-
ficient enough to set “the chain of command” properly in a democratic or-
der. It is hard to talk about the existence of civil control over the army
when the main inspection, security service, and intelligence service are in
the composition of the Headquarters and not in the Ministry of Defense.

Until the changes in October 2000, in spite of its unfinished ideological

as well as moral formation under the burden of the heritage of defeat in the

Serbia and Montenegro

203

secessionist wars the Yugoslav army showed indisputable proficiency –
though it was actually misused on the behalf of the regime at that time.
The security sector was non-systemic, mainly on the territory of the Re-
public of Serbia, reacting post factum and ad hoc against certain security
challenges and threats in that period. It is a collection rather than a system
of institutions devoid of national security strategy, defense doctrine and le-
gal elaboration which met the new millennium.

Directly confronted with terrorist acts lasting several years in Kosovo

and Metohija, as well as correctly foreseeing similar possible security en-
dangerments, at the beginning of the 1990s, the state formed the “Cobras”
special elite unit precisely with such this intention.

Civil-Military Relations in Serbia and Montenegro
(2000–2003)

The period marks the beginning of the security sector reforms and the es-
tablishment of democratic civil control over the army and the police.

Two phases should be distinguished; from October 2000 till the adop-

tion of the Constitutional Charter of Serbia and Montenegro in February
2003; and immediately after that following the murder of Prime Minister
Djindjic and the state of emergency in Serbia.

The democratic opposition of Serbia, composed of parties which until

recently were mainly giving legitimacy and legality to extortion policies,
came to power on the wave of unprecedented and magnificent civil protest
in October 2000. Confrontations within the political coalition in power,
mainly because of short-term considerations of being in power through
repressing coalition partners, the conflict of two leading parties, but also
objective and non-conceptual big challenges of reconstruction, almost de-
stroyed the social, and above all economic tissue, obstructed DOS deci-
sion-makers in involving in the reforms of inherited institutions and rela-
tions. Consequently, many wrong moves were made, which is hard to be
explained and justified. All these failures culminated in the murder of
Prime Minister Djindjic and the imposition of emergency measures.

Apparently, the ruling coalition did not prepare a plan for security sector

reform which they could start realizing immediately after they came to
power. Furthermore, the leaders of this coalition left an impression that
they did not realize that the reform of this sector is a precondition for suc-

204 Simi

cessful reform of all social institutions and relations.

This is of specific

importance for the societies which are from top to bottom enveloped in or-
ganized crime.

Instead of starting the security sector reform in conditions most favour-

able for such a thing, immediately after taking power using radical per-
sonnel changes, almost all from the old regime got the required time to
consolidate and continue of their activities in accordance with old patterns
of behaviour. The process of starting radical security sector reforms has
been replaced by mixed and unusual individual compromises by some
leaders of the ruling coalition with eminent military and police persons,
trying to influence these centers of power.

Apparently considering that they should be grateful to the army and po-

lice generals, especially to the commanders of the special units for not
provoking violent incidents, and in that way made possible a velvet revolu-
tion, political leaders of DOS naïvely thought that these forces could be
placed in client relation, in order to achieve personal party, collective, even
individual interests, just as it was done during decades until the crash of
the Milosevic regime. Therefore, it was possible that the new authority did
not comprehend seriously enough the rebellion of the special unit “Red
Berets”, as well as almost daily killings on the streets of Serbian cities, in-
cluding the assassination of police general Bosko Buha.

Still without the necessary systemic and normative prerequisites, secu-

rity sector reform and democratic civil control over the army and the po-
lice has been delayed even though occasional statements by ruling coali-
tion officials hinted at Serbian integration in Euro-Atlantic security and
economic institutions. This is an objective obstacle that led to the “imita-
tion of security sector reform” from the very start. It is hard, if not impos-
sible, to reform something that actually does not exist. To be more precise,
reform of the, security system could not be adequately discussed in a situa-
tion of parallel existence of two authorities, while legally elected Monte-
negro authority does not recognize the federal state and does not respect its
regulations, and part of territory of the Republic of Serbia, province Kos-
ovo and Metohija is under the protectorate of the international community.
Maybe the beginning of desirable profound changes in the security sector
occurred after the successful resolution of the national conflict in South-
east Serbia (2000/01), when in cooperation and crucial assistance of the in-
ternational community, the crisis was overcome in the interest of peace
and stability not only in our country but also in region as a whole.

Edmunds, Timothy, Reforma sektora bezbednosti: koncepcije i realizacija, Vojno delo,
1/2003, Beograd, p. 37.

Serbia and Montenegro

205

For example, the Federal government’s decision to rename the Ministry

of Defense into the Ministry of the Yugoslav army (October 2000–January
2001) gives evidence about the ignorance of what is actually going on in
this field. Not only did this move contradict the real needs of our society
concerning defense and security, but also it led to a redefinition of the se-
curity concept, which was reduced only to its military factor and territorial
defense, not to mention economic, political, cultural, social and ecological
security dimensions and international, global and above all, individual se-
curity levels. It has neglected an important distinction of collective defense
and collective security, the importance of cooperation in achieving, main-
taining and improving security; it was in conflict with overcoming the se-
curity dilemma model.

In such an environment, the so-called non-governmental sector and civil

society had their influence on political processes disabled. With the excep-
tion of some specialized non-governmental organizations

, the “third sec-

tor” barely interfered in the security domain. In addition, the civil non-
governmental experts had a very weak effect on the security discussion.
The modified security concept, new ideas and theoretical approaches, sim-
ply the new security thinking are at stake here above all. Educational insti-
tutions and institutes, which recently had exclusive right to study and teach
security issues, are at the same time deeply influenced by the old, tradi-
tional – realistic – pattern of national territory defense, with emphasis on
the place and the role of military factor. Recently expert training in the
field of global and national security in its wider sense, started at Belgrade
University. In civil scientific institutions it is understood that training of
new approaches in the field of security, with the purpose of achieving a
higher security culture, are necessary preconditions for the successful re-
form of the security sector and of achieving democratic and civil control
over the army and police. Only in that way can military and civil experts
be engaged competently in the processes of planning in the field of secu-
rity and defense, in a common concern of preparing a national security
strategy, and concept for defense policy. For the time being this kind of
cooperation is still insufficient.

Some normative moves and political steps, however, were achieved and

undertaken, before the adoption of the Constitutional Charter of Serbia and
Montenegro. Among others, according to their significance, the following
should be pointed out:

Cohen, Richard, and Mihalka, Michael, Cooperative Security: New Horizons for Inter-
national Order, European Center for Security Studies – George C. Marshall, 2001.

This is field of Research of The Center for Civil – Military relations, CCMO, Beograd.

206 Simi

x The Federal Government launched the procedure for joining the

Partnership for Peace of NATO,

x The Headquarters of the Yugoslav Army, in the spring of 2002 an-

nounced the reduction of the number of soldiers and officers in two
phases up to 65,000,

x At the end of 2000 and 2001 the Federal Assembly adopted reduced

military budgets,

x The Federal Assembly adopted the Law on Security Services of

FRY, by which military security service, military intelligence,
documentation service of the Federal Ministry of Foreign Affairs its
security service were put under the control of the Federal Assembly
and Federal Government,

x Separate commands of the army, navy, air force and air defense

were canceled by decision of the Supreme Council of Defense. In-
stead nine corps were formed under the command of Headquarters
of Yugoslav Army,

x Military service was reduced to nine months, and civil service to

thirteen months,

x Army inspection was put under the command of Supreme Council

of Defense, and was renamed into inspection of defense,

x A number of generals were sent into retirement while others were

promoted, gradually changing the personnel composition of com-
mand and management.

The Constitutional Charter of Serbia and Montenegro was finally adopted
under the decisive pressure of the international community in February
2003. The Charter does not provide the necessary normative framework
for security sector reform and realization of democratic civil control over
the army and the police. The status of the army regulated in chapter VIII of
the Constitutional Charter reflects a compromise hence the text is too gen-
eral and legally weak. This indicates that it would be very difficult to turn
them into particular laws and practice.

In spite of that, some substantial moves in relation to previous norma-

tive solutions were completed. This specifically refers to article 54 of the
Constitutional Charter, which defines that “Serbia and Montenegro has
army under democratic and civil control”. The Charter doesn’t include the
necessary instruments to realize democratic and civil control, because it
doesn’t contain legally guaranteed executive power authorization to carry
out such a procedure developed in detail. The Federal Assembly of Serbia
and Montenegro, for example proclaims the defense strategy, but not the

Serbia and Montenegro

207

national security strategy; we have already discussed how security reduced
to its narrow sense is dangerous. Especially alarming is the normative as-
surance of key individual security and inherent human dignity premises are
being neglected

. Therefore such an opinion is underestimating the secu-

rity in the Euro-Atlantic region in which we aspire to integrate. It is also
important to say that the original power relations between the two mem-
bers of the Union are being rated in this way and it is not possible to form
a common security system which would provide unity of action in the
army, the Republics’ police forces, and of the military and civil secret ser-
vices. Article 53 of the Constitutional Charter is maybe the best example
of the solutions reached by the Constitution drafters, following, above all,
the particular interests of the political representatives of the two state
community members. Defining “the task of the army is defense of Serbia
and Montenegro, in accordance with this Constitutional Charter and the
principles of international law regulating the use of force”. But without
specifying the common values defended (territorial integrity, sovereignty,
independence) the Constitution drafters have succeeded in validating every
doubt that our state community resembles a state, and in that way they
have opened the space for additional interpretation of this article according
to the will, interests and needs of the power-holders.

At the end, if by introducing consensus as a decision-making rule in the

work of SCD as a supreme commander of the army is removed the possi-
bility of over-voting power the question of a group command of the insti-
tution and not the unity of command leaves the issue unsolved. Concerning
the question of command, some vagueness remains in the Charter between
command and leadership, that is between the Supreme Council of Defense
and Ministry of Defense that provide the possibility for dual command of
the army. In the Constitutional Charter, according to our opinion, some
regulations on the external use of the army are missing, especially when
engagement in the international struggle against terrorism and in participa-
tion in UN and NATO peace operations is at stake.

The Charter doesn’t contain precise enough provisions on relations be-

tween the Assemblies of Serbia and Montenegro, the Supreme Council of
Defense and the Ministry of Defense, so that different interpretations are
possible in practice. It especially refers to division of responsibilities in de-
fense and security matters among these bodies. The Charter doesn’t even
provide the explicit right of control and supervision over the army and the
police to responsible chambers of the Assembly, but such a right can be

‘Champion Aspirations for Human Dignity’, President George Bush, West Point Mili-
tary Academy, New York, NY, June 1, 2002.

208 Simi

derived from other authorizations of this highest legal body of our state
community.

Since the adoption of Constitutional Charter, some encouraging steps

have been undertaken. Above all this refers to the Headquarters of the Ser-
bian/ Montenegrin Army, which was put under the subordination of the
Ministry of Defense, as well as the relocation of the military intelligence
and military security service in the domain of the Ministry of Defense. In
this way conditions for operational supervision were created. Furthermore,
cooperation with The Hague International Criminal Tribunal for former
Yugoslavia (ICTY) was intensified. Lastly, a meeting recently of the Min-
ister of Defense in Brussels confirmed the determination of the State Un-
ion of Serbia and Montenegro to continue approaching and later joining
PfP and NATO.

5 Conclusions

The evolution of civil-military relations in the past decade has shown
among other things numerous peculiarities and some similarities of the
case of FRY/State Union of Serbia and Montenegro in relation to other
Southeast European countries. In our case, for example, not until the
events in October 2000 were the necessary preconditions for democratic
and social changes provided. With regard to the security sector, old pat-
terns of thinking and acting remained until the adoption of the Constitu-
tional Charter and the assassination of Prime Minister Zoran Djindjic. To
be more precise, the Constitutional Charter has proclaimed an important,
but still insufficient normative framework changes for security sector
reform.

With regard to the security conditions in our country in the period in

question what has changed are the challenges and threats, but not the de-
gree of security endangerment. The most troubling are organized crime,
corruption and the violence of the terrorist acts of the so-called Liberation
Army of Presevo, Bujanovac and Medvedja in the period after October
2000.

The country cannot be a regional pillar of security because of normative

deficiencies such as the recent ineffective jurisdiction in Montenegro, and
international protection of Kosovo and Metohija. This prevents compre-
hensive security sector reform. Beside these objective obstacles, the lead-
ers of DOS, guided by short-term personal and party interests, neglected
security sector reform, which is typical to societies in transition and a pre-
condition for a complete reform of society. The biggest speaker in favor of

Serbia and Montenegro

209

reforms in Serbia, Zoran Djindjic, paid with his life precisely because of
these mistakes.
One encouraging example of national conflict resolution with terrorist
elements in Southeast Europe should be pointed out, when with crucial as-
sistance of international community (NATO, the EU and UNMIK) ten-
sions which could have spilled over to neighboring countries and the re-
gion were successfully overcome.

It is not possible to conduct security sector reforms and to achieve de-

mocratic civil control over the army and the police, without the adoption of
a national security strategy from which should derive defense and military
doctrines, and adequate laws and regulation. The Constitutional Charter
Serbia and Montenegro doesn’t provide the necessary normative premises
for such an inevitable and complex undertaking.

Ignorance towards a redefined security concept as well as the new

global challenges and threats complicates and delays security sector re-
form. For Serbia and Montenegro, it is essential to change the way of
thinking on security and to urgently abandon focusing on national territo-
rial defense and embark on a broader security paradigm.

This can be achieved only through cooperation and integration into

mainstream security communities (PfP, NATO, EU). This is at the same
time important for politicians, members of the army and police but also to
the media, experts and the public. Such a strategic turn was initiated at the
Faculty of Political Sciences at Belgrade University by founding a De-
partment for Global and National Security Studies.

Although valid normative and institutional premises are yet unfulfilled,

there is a growing awareness by politicians, experts and the public that our
country should take part in an indivisible European and global security.
Our participation is strengthened through cooperation in common security
undertakings, peace operations, crisis management and above all in the
struggle against global terrorism, the proliferation of WMDs and organized
crime.

Towards Civilian Supremacy: Civil-Military

Relations in Slovenia

Marjan Malešiþ, Ljubica Jelušiþ

1 Introduction

Slovenia, like the rest of the central-European formerly communist countries,
has made enormous progress in the sphere of the democratisation of civil-
military relations after the end of the Cold War, i.e. in the period, which was,
in Slovenia’s case, marked also by newly established state sovereignty in
1991. Therefore, it was not only the end of the historic period, influencing the
way of introducing new patterns of behaviour in the security sector

of Slove-

nia, but also the fact that a newly independent state had to establish nearly all
institutions of political life and governance from scratch. The political elite
tried to enforce those features of defense policy, which would clearly show
democratic relations within the security sector to the citizens of the state. It
was needed to regain legitimacy of defense system, which lost most of its
prestige in disputes between former Yugoslav army and Slovenian civil soci-
ety in the 1980s. There was also a new phraseology deployed in order to label
the processes. For example, there were broad public discussions on de-
politicisation and ‘de-partisanisation’ of the armed forces, on the appreciation
of the human rights within the military sphere, civilian/democratic control of
the military, and on the transparency of defense policy and defense budget.
All these, and many other issues have shown tendency towards civilian su-
premacy in all crucial defense policy questions. However, the introduction of
a multiparty system, reformed or new political institutions, and modern phra-
seology, did not eo ipso result in democratic civil-military relations, neither in
democratic relations between the security sector and the civil society.

The term “security sector” is used to approach the security more holistically, and not to
narrow it to questions of military involvement in politics, or civilian control over the
armed forces. The first usage of the term security sector is concerned with militarised
formations authorised by the state to utilise force to protect the state itself and its citi-
zens. The second approach defines security sector as organisations and activities con-
cerned with provision of security. See: T. Edmunds, ‘Security Sector Reform: Concepts
and Implementation’, in W. Germann, T. Edmunds, Towards security sector reform in
Post Cold War Europe: A Framework for Assessment (Bonn: BICC, DCAF, in print).

212 Malešiþ, Jelušiþ

There are certain complications of a constitutional, legislative and political

nature within the civil-military relations sphere which underline civil-military
relations as a sophisticated phenomenon and emphasise the need for tolerance
as they are taking shape on the one hand, and on the other hand, the civil-
military relations in society that is being democratised are presented as ex-
tremely fragile. And it is within this context that the strengthening of civil so-
ciety and the part played by the public in general can be understood as the
conditio sine qua non for the development of civil-military relations.

Some analyses of Slovenian civil-military relations show deviations from

the normal pattern, as established in a developed democratic society. Interest-
ingly, there are no deviations originating in an interventionist posture of the
military, but in the other, civilian side of the military-civil spectrum. Slovenia
shares the non-interventionist posture of its military

with other Central and

Eastern European post-communist states.

However, civilian political elites have a tendency to abuse the military to

fight their own political disputes.

Civilian control over the armed forces is in

many cases narrowed to the clashes between civilian elites on who is going to
guard the guards. The understanding of control over the armed forces as
fights within the political elite for the predominance and influence on the
armed forces is very near to Huntington’s notion of subjective civilian control
of the military.

In other words, the armed forces were the victim of politici-

sation, i.e., an instrument for political clashes. Civil society (and the public
with it) was merely cast in the role of a badly informed onlooker, and a pup-
pet manipulated by the fighting political elite. The rationalising of civil-
military relations has often taken place at the level of affiliation to the parties
of “the Slovenian national awakening” as opposed to the parties of the ex-
communist provenance.

C. Danopoulos, D. Zirker, ‘Civil-Military Relations Theory in the Post-Communist
World: The Role of Religion’, in H. Born et al., Security Sector Reform and Democracy
in Transitional States (Baden-Baden: Nomos, 2002) 117–140.

In 1993, a dispute between the President of the Republic, the supreme commander of
the armed forces, and the defense minister occurred. The dispute had constitutional and
legal basis, however, it was primarily politically and ideologically motivated. Although
it was a struggle between two civilians, the dispute had some impact on civil-military
relations due to the fact that the officer corps were taking sides in the dispute and be-
came very politicised despite the fact that the military is requested by the law to refrain
from political struggle (see M. Malešiþ, ‘Problems in democratic control of the armed

forces (two Slovenian cases)’, in K. Haltiner, M. Caparini, H. Born and J. Kuhlmann
(eds), Democratic control of the armed forces – How it really works (in print).

S. Huntington, The Soldier and The State, The Theory and Politics of Civil-Military Re-
lations (Cambridge: The Belknap Press of Harvard University Press 1995).

Slovenia

213

The general survey of the Slovenian case of civil-military relations has

brought us to the assumption that Slovenia is to build its civil-military rela-
tions in line with its own tradition, political culture and needs, taking into
consideration general standards belonging to the model of civil-military re-
lations of the liberal-democratic states.

Democratic Oversight of Defense and Security –
Legal and Constitutional Issues

Cottey, Edmunds, and Forster argued that forming core institutions for the
political control of armed forces belongs to the first-generation problems
of civil-military relations.

The second-generation problems of establishing

effective structures for the democratic governance of the defence and secu-
rity sector are becoming more important when the institutions are formed
according to legal prescriptions but they lack substance.

Various countries establish civil-military relations and democratic po-

litical control over armed forces according to their historical experience,
cultural traditions and political culture. However, there are some less
common denominators, which could be summarized as follows:

x a solid constitutional and legal framework,
x accountability of the armed forces to the Government through a ci-

vilian defence minister,

x co-operation of military representatives with qualified civilians in

the process of defining defence requirements, policy and budget;

x division of professional responsibility between the civilian and the

military sphere,

x supremacy and scrutiny of the Parliament over armed forces and de-

fence matters in general and

x internal and external (international) transparency of security and de-

fence matters.

In Slovenia, the key legal solutions of civilian oversight over the defence
and security sector are embodied in the Constitution, Defence Act and
other acts of the Republic of Slovenia.

The legal framework is important

A. Cottey, T. Edmunds, and A. Forster, ‘The Second Generation Problematic: Rethink-
ing Democracy and Civil-Military Relations’, Armed Forces and Society, 29:1 (Fall
2002) 31–56.

The Constitution of the Republic of Slovenia of December 1991 and The Defense Act
of January 1995.

214 Malešiþ, Jelušiþ

for understanding the way in which the country establishes civil-military
relations according to its own legal and historic tradition. Previously men-
tioned common denominators of democratic control over the armed forces
are embodied in the Slovenian legal framework of civil-military relations.

The Constitution of the Republic of Slovenia provides a general legal

framework regulating:

x the adoption of multi-party parliamentary democracy,
x the division of power between the legislative, executive and judicial

branches,

x the adoption of national security policy by the National Assembly

and

x the embodiment of all executive defence activities in a single body –

a Ministry of Defence led by a civilian.

The Constitution, Defence Act and other acts provide a sound legal basis
for the development of democratic civil-military relations with the follow-
ing characteristics:

x the division between civil and military power, the latter being sub-

ordinated to the former,

x the leadership of the armed forces is with the President of the Re-

public,

x all crucial national security related decisions are made by the Na-

tional Assembly,

x The role of the military in the decision-making process is profes-

sional only and not political and

x the military is strictly depoliticised and limited to professional mili-

tary roles.

According to the Constitution, the citizens have the right to conscientious
objection (Article 46), for religious, philosophical and humanitarian rea-
sons (Article 123). If they are not ready to co-operate in military activities,
they should be enabled to co-operate in the defence of the country in some
other way.

Any encouraging of national, racial, religious or other inequality and

inflaming national, racial, religious or other hatred and intolerance in

We could designate this phenomenon as ‘total political sterility of the military’.

Slovenia

215

contrary to the Constitution. Any encouraging of violence and war is also
anti-constitutional (Article 63).

A state of emergency is declared when major and general danger threat-

ens the existence of the state. The National Assembly, upon the proposal
of the Government takes the decision to declare war or a state of emer-
gency, the introduction of precautions and their abolishment. The National
Assembly decides on the use of defence forces. In case the National As-
sembly cannot meet the President of the Republic performs the above-
mentioned obligations and is obliged to seek the confirmation of the Na-
tional Assembly as soon as the latter is able to act (Article 92). The Presi-
dent of the Republic represents the Republic of Slovenia, and he/she is a
Supreme Commander of the defence forces (Article 102).

The sort, scope and organization of defence, intangibility and integrity

of state territory are defined by the Defence Act, which is adopted by a two
third majority in the National Assembly. The National Assembly exer-
cises control over defence. While assuring its security, the state emanates
above all from a pacifist policy and a culture of peace and non-violence
(Article 124).

The Defence Act forbids the use of armed forces for any kind of politi-

cal and party activity, and does not allow professional officers to be mem-
bers of political parties. The armed forces are apolitical and their tasks are
purely professional. Military courts were abolished and the members of
armed forces are subjected to civil legislation and courts.

The Slovenian army could be referred to as apolitical, and as such hardly

exerts an influence upon political decisions, even when the issue in question
is of military corporate interests

. Or, according to Segal and Huntington

, the

relation between the army and society could be said to be professional; how-
ever, in Slovenia, the harmony between the two is sometimes relatively low.

The National Assembly, as the highest legislative body, defines the na-

tional security policy of the state and exercises the control over the armed
forces, especially through committees on Defence, on Budget and Finance,
Control of the Intelligence Services and on Control of the Realisation of
National Security Resolution. Through the allocation of defence funds, the
National Assembly supervises the development and equipping of the
armed forces.

One case of that kind was the passing of law regulating the length of service for officers;
the latter are expected to sign ten-year collaboration contracts that may be extended for
5 years. The officers hardly said anything for their own benefit: they were forced to ac-
cept what the Government decided.

S. Huntington, The soldier and the State … 746.

216 Malešiþ, Jelušiþ

The Government has the executive role in the defence sphere, and it is

accountable for keeping unity and concordance of the defence forces in
line with the national security and defence policy. The Government is also
responsible for putting defence measures in place, on the basis of the deci-
sions made by the National Assembly. The President of the Republic, as
outlined earlier, is Supreme Commander of the defence forces, i.e. of the
Slovenian Army.

Parliamentary Oversight of the Security Sector

The National Assembly exercises its control over the security sector by
passing laws, adopting the budget and through many other financial chan-
nels. The Defence Committee is supposed to be the most powerful and
professional body of parliamentary oversight. However, it is comprised of
deputies with very modest defence expertise and knowledge, and many of
them have no direct experience with the Slovenian military. If they experi-
enced any military training, it was due to their military service in the for-
mer Yugoslav People’s Army and not in the Slovenian Army. Therefore,
many judge Slovenian military according to their experience in the former
Yugoslav military, and they are not aware of the fact that the Slovenian
military is very different, smaller in size, with shorter compulsory military
service and with a growing number of all-volunteer units for international
cooperation. The Defence Committee is mostly engaged in occasional in-
cidents provoked by the Defence Ministry and not so much in the regular
difficulties and problems in the development of the Slovenian military.

It sometimes happened between 1990–1995, that the Defence Minister

effectively deprived the President of the Republic and Supreme Com-
mander-in-Chief of relevant confidential information on the preparedness
of the armed forces. The Constitution made it possible, because when it
was introduced, there was no detailed legislation on the control of the
armed forces. Besides that, some Defence Ministers were the source of po-
litical tensions and sometimes scandals. Although they were civilians, they
stimulated party politics within the army, contributed to the lowering pro-
fessionalism of the Slovenian military establishment, and reflected the in-
sufficiently developed democratic political culture in the area of defence.

The National Assembly would need more defence knowledge to decide

on defence issues, and even more urgently, to exercise professional control
over the armed forces. In such a situation, the National Assembly benefits
from the low professionalism of the military establishment. The latter is
unable to fight for its professional interests and is no serious partner in
control issues. As a consequence, professional autonomy is in many cases

Slovenia

217

a subject of control (politicians deal with professional military issues), in-
stead of executing effective control over issues that are supposed to be ci-
vilian-controlled, for example – defence policy, decision-making process,
military and defence budget, the balance of defence budget, etc.

In 1997, the Slovenian Armed Forces and the Slovenian Police began to

cooperate in international peacekeeping. This fact brought many new as-
pects and issues of democratic control. Who would guard the professional
all-volunteer units in their foreign missions? If the answer is clear, adding
this task to the National Assembly and to the Government, the more so-
phisticated question on “how” to exercise the control remains open.

Transparency and Division of Power

According to Slovenia’s Constitution, the President of the Republic does
not have a very powerful position. He (or she) is non-executive president
and titular Commander-in-Chief. Although the Prime Minister chairs the
National Security Council, he (or she) has no specific power in the defence
area. Even more, the National Security Council has only an advisory func-
tion. In practice, the key defence official in peacetime is the Defence Min-
ister, who is a civilian politician from one of the parties that constitute the
current ruling coalition. The Prime Minister can overrule the Defence Min-
ister’s actions. The General Staff of the Slovenian Armed Forces is part of
the Ministry of Defence. Therefore, the Commander-in-Chief is not di-
rectly subordinated to the President of the Republic. Once a year, the Com-
mander-in-Chief reports directly to the President, in the presence of the
Defence Minister.

The defence sector was from the very beginning of Slovenian independ-

ence an extremely difficult governmental sector. There were some powerful

There were significant legal consequences of the above-mentioned dispute between the
President and Defense Minister to prevent further misunderstanding and misuse of a
constitutional and legal basis that regulate the relationship between the President of the
Republic, Government and Defense Minister. The Defense Act of January 1995 reiter-
ates after the Constitution that the Supreme Commander of the Slovenian Army is the
President of the Republic. Military command with subordinated commands, units and
institutions is the authority of the Chief of Staff and other commanders. With the con-
sent of the President of the Republic, the Defense Minister determines in detail the con-
ditions and procedures of informing the Supreme Commander about the combat readi-
ness of the army and about other matters important for the defense of the country, the
provision of accommodation, protection, protocol matters, sentry and other conditions
for exercising the role of supreme commander in peace and war. It is also important to
stress that the Chief of General Staff is thereafter appointed by the Government upon the
proposal submitted by the Defense Minister (Defense Act of January 1995).

218 Malešiþ, Jelušiþ

personalities as Defence Ministers between 1990 (first multiparty elections
and government) and 2003, but many were replaced or were forced to re-
sign due to incidents at the Ministry. In this period, seven different minis-
ters held the post, coming from three different political parties. The last
one, currently holding the post, began his career as non-partisan, and he,
later on during the job, joined the strongest political party, expecting more
political support from the ruling coalition for his professional decisions, by
being member of one of them.

The Defence Minister’s actions are exposed to the scrutiny and pressure

from the Defence Committee of the National Assembly or from the Na-
tional Assembly as a whole. The Defence Committee is always chaired by
a member of the Parliament from the opposition party, usually from more
powerful parties. Actions of the Defence Minister and the activities of the
Defence Ministry are exposed to the public scrutiny as well. Public criti-
cism on defence issues has been openly expressed and published in printed
and electronic media, which in several occasions served as the basic in-
formation for the Defence Committee from the National Assembly to be-
gin its parliamentary procedure of the critical oversight. It happened that
the media were in many cases better informed, or informed in greater de-
tail on issues that should be subjected to the parliamentary, i.e. political ci-
vilian control, sector.

Oversight of the Intelligence and Security Agencies

Parliamentary oversight of the intelligence and security agencies was es-
tablished as a part of the newly defined parliamentary control over the se-
curity sector after 1990. Although the constitutional and legal framework
has set more or less clear channels of control, it happened that these agen-
cies did not work very professionally. In some cases, they were under the
strong influence of one of the ministers, be it Defence Minister or Minister
of Interior, and they used their data to support the ambitions of these per-
sonalities. In other cases, they have given their information to the powerful
personalities of the Slovenian Independence Movement from 1991. It hap-
pened also that the data from the Secret Archives of the State were copied
and stored in unknown places (also in foreign countries) in order to put the
Government or leading personalities under pressure. In 2003, the secret
data of the Police Archives from Former Yugoslavia were put on the Web
site of the private company owner from Australia, Dušan Lajovic. He is of
Slovenian origin and served as Honorary Consul of Slovenia to Australia
and New Zealand. The secret data on thousands of Slovenian citizens were
made public, despite the fact that they should be protected as confidential.

Slovenia

219

Ipso facto, the incident has shown how fragile is the human right to expect
from the government to store personal data in a safe place, and especially,
how quickly destroyed is governmental ability to impartially care for its
citizens. The case shows that the oversight of intelligence services must
include expectations and imperatives for the professional work of these
services.

Civilians and the Military in Defence Planning

The Slovenian Defence Ministry is predominantly staffed by civilians.
This is in contrast to the practices at the federal defence level of the former
Yugoslavia, whose structures were criticised over the years, and clearly
neglected in the basic structure of the newly independent state of Slovenia.
Many practices, although good, were abolished and forbidden, just because
they emerged from the system of former Yugoslavia, now unacceptable.
The way in which the professional military was placed under firm and sev-
eral layers of overwhelming civilian control was the result of criticism to-
wards former Yugoslavia’s defence sector instruments. Bebler argues that
one of the most important reasons for the exceedingly high degree of civil-
ian domination in defence sector of Slovenia lies in the numerical and in-
tellectual weakness of military professionals.

Prior to independence in 1991, Slovenia had military professionals in

the former Yugoslav army, and many of them returned from their posts in
the Yugoslav military to Slovenia immediately after the war for independ-
ence in June–July 1991. These were predominantly officers of lower ranks
and non-commissioned officers, very few among them were senior officers
or of the rank of general. The officers from lower ranks were commis-
sioned in the Slovenian military. The nationality of the officer was not im-
portant, if he had or obtained Slovenian citizenship, left the Yugoslav mili-
tary during the armed conflicts or after them in a very limited period of
time. It happened that many non-Slovenian officers who previously
worked in the Yugoslav units within Slovenia, knew the procedure of
changing the sides and accepted it, whereas many Slovenian officers work-
ing in other parts of former Yugoslavia, stayed in their regions, within the
former Yugoslav military until its total disintegration in 1992. Thereafter,
they were not accepted into Slovenian military anymore, no matter how
professional they would be. Many of them are still looking for jobs in

A. Bebler, ‘Democratic Control of Armed Forces in Slovenia’, in: A. Cottey et al., De-
mocratic Control of the Military in Post-communist Europe: Guarding the Guards.
(Hampshire: Palgrave 2002), 159–173.

220 Malešiþ, Jelušiþ

Slovenia with very low chances to get something that corresponds to the
level of their education. Their degrees from Yugoslav military academies
gave them the Bachelor of Military Science, and an occupation as “officer
of Yugoslav Army”. With such degree they are fully uncompetitive on the
Slovenian labour market.

The only Slovenian general who previously worked for the Yugoslav

military, and who found work after independence was general Milovan
Zorc. He was the only general of the former military, who was in some
way commissioned for the Slovenian defence needs after 1991. He advised
the President of the Republic of Slovenia on military issues. He asked for
demobilization and retirement from the Yugoslav military before the
clashes between Slovenian defence forces and Yugoslav army units in
1991 began. He realised very soon in 1990 that the aggressive Serbian pol-
icy, empowered by the appetites of the Yugoslav army, being put under
control of the Serbian politicians, would cause the disintegration and
bloody destabilisation of the federal state. But, as already said, he was the
only general, and he worked for the President of Slovenia. Other military
professionals were placed in different ranks within the Territorial Defence
Units of Slovenia, but for some years they were under the constant scrutiny
of other Slovenian military professionals, coming from reserve units and
from the newly-established system of officer training.

Military professionals from the former Yugoslav Army were frequently

controlled and stopped in promotion, and they were not very influential on
issues of professional military activities. Instead of educated military offi-
cers, the reserve officers and other civilians hastily filled in the officers’
ranks to develop the Slovenian military. They often had neither proper
military qualification (if they had it, it has been gained in short officers’
courses), nor professional experience, except the experience gained from
the ten-day Slovenian War for Independence. Slovenian officers were nu-
merous, but professionally very weak, with an underdeveloped corporate
identity and low political profile, therefore they were not influential in
military decision-making. Distrust and discrimination against former offi-
cers of the Federal army were overruled in the last three years, when many
of them took the highest places in the General Staff.

A very high degree of civilian domination over the Slovenian military

stems from the rejection of the militarist and praetorian tendencies of the
autonomous military experienced in former Yugoslavia. The parliamentary
system of civilian oversight over the small military establishment gave this
civilian domination its Constitutional and legal foundation. A political
culture without elaborate military traditions and with a high degree of pub-
lic interest in defence matters add another dimension to the civilian

Slovenia

221

supremacy: over-civilianisation of the defence sector and especially of the
military establishment.

The reduced level of military professionalism and over-civilianisation of

the defence sector have radically changed the substance of usual civil-
military relations. In many areas of defence policy the civil-military inter-
face has been supplanted by de facto civil-civil relations.

Most defence-

related issues are decided by the civilian officials or by people who entered
the military as civilian workers, losing job opportunities elsewhere, but
holding their civilian corporate identity instead of getting a new military
identity and culture. The professional military can only partly influence the
formulation of Slovenia’s defence policy. The strategic areas of defence
planning are out of their purview.

7 Good

Governance

Case

The Slovenian Government decided in 2002 to abolish conscription and to
introduce all-volunteer force. The general data in 2001 revealed that the in-
stitution of conscription was in deep crisis: demographic trends in Slovenia
were unfavourable, the level of conscientious objection was very high and
increasing, and the number of conscripts who were not medically fit was
increasing, as well. We should also mention the functional dimension of
the issue: new missions of the armed forces carried out mainly abroad,
more complex and demanding military tasks, a rather short military term
of service, and modest training and equipping of reserve units. From a
broader perspective, one should not ignore the importance of the social and
vocational characteristics of post-industrial societies, such as pluralism and
individualization, specialization and professionalism, when discussing the
need to reform the Slovenian Armed Forces.

At this point we are not in a position to explore the specific factors that

influenced the decision on the shift in manning the armed forces

, rather,

we are interested in the procedure itself, which seems to be a good govern-
ance case in the security sector. Namely, there were some sporadic incen-
tives coming from political parties to introduce an all-volunteer force. The
Government wanted to explore thoroughly all factors that influence such
an important decision, estimating that there was a lack of scientific and
professional expertise required for the discussion, which was often politi-
cally motivated. As a consequence, the first comprehensive survey on the

Bebler, ‘Democratic Control…’ 168.

See M. Maleši

þ (ed). Conscription vs. All-Volunteer Forces in Europe (Baden-Baden:

Nomos 2003, in print).

222 Malešiþ, Jelušiþ

matter was completed at the end of 2001. It consisted of two parts; the first
one was carried out by a research team of the Defence Research Centre at
the Faculty of Social Sciences, University of Ljubljana, entitled “Conscript
Army or All-Volunteer Force: The Case of Slovenia”. The second study
was done by an international research team, and was entitled “Comparative
Analysis of Manning the Armed Forces in Europe.” Concurrently, there
was an internal survey accomplished by the Centre for Strategic Studies at
the Ministry of Defence.

The empirical results of both surveys were a basis for a discussion in the

Government, National Security Council, the political parties and in mass
media. Finally, the Government brought about a decision that Slovenia
should abolish conscription and introduce all volunteer force by mid-2004.
Although professional suggestions were not fully accepted by the Gov-
ernment (especially as far as the time needed to accomplish the reform was
concerned), we could say that the cooperation between different security
sector actors and civil society was rather good in this particular case. No
doubt, the introduction of all-volunteer force will bring new challenges to
civil-military relations: modern ways of democratic control of the armed
forces, the question of its legitimacy, socialization role and cooperation
with civilian surroundings.

The Role of Civil Society in the Security Sector

Reform

8.1 The Civil Society

In times of the former Yugoslavia, and particularly in the second half of the
1980s, Slovenian civil society showed an explicit sensitivity to the interfer-
ence of the armed forces in the civil sphere, and to attempts to militarise soci-
ety. Yet, one can notice a certain public yielding to the army in the civil soci-
ety, now that the armed forces are considered ‘ours’. A part of the intelligent-
sia has grown quite non-critical of the armed forces as an institution within
the independent state, though in former times used to be extremely critical of
the former Yugoslav army. It has to be reiterated that the Slovenian armed
forces had none of the ‘praetorian’ ambitions of the former Yugoslav armed
forces and its relationship with society is from a legal point of view of an en-
tirely different nature. Standards and criteria to assess the role of the army
within civil society are fundamentally more sophisticated. Civil society
should preserve its criticism of the army as an institutional body on the one

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223

hand, and it should never forget that the army, too, has a state-forming role,
on the other hand.

A substantial part of the members of the civil society associations who op-

posed the former Yugoslav military incentives to militarise society, strong
and influential when Slovenia was developing the pluralistic political system
and becoming independent, ‘went over’ to the governmental and parliamen-
tary authoritative bodies (accordingly, former political dissidents were in
power) of the political system of Slovenia. We labelled this process as ‘etati-
sation’ of civil society. It shows that even the most ambitious members of
civil society have to gain the state power in order to put their ideas into being.
Usually, they alone turn into routine governmental officials and provoke new
waves of public criticism, and new civil society associations as well. It hap-
pened in Slovenia, where many old peace activists from the 1980s, being in
the forefront of the clashes with former Yugoslav army, became high offi-
cials in the new independent political system, where they were expected to
form the new defence sector of Slovenia. They had realised that a lot of their
peace activism had to remain outdoor when state interests had to be protected
by all means.

8.2 Public

Opinion

It goes without saying that the military elite in Slovenia is interested in public
appreciation, acceptance and support, which means a certain degree of le-
gitimacy necessary for its normal existence and operating.

The last public

opinion poll

showed that the public expects the armed forces to carry out its

functional and societal imperative.

The former is the public’s expectation of

the army to effectively deter aggression, and should that occur, to success-
fully defend the state. The societal imperative is about the public’s expecta-
tion of the army to appreciate the fundamental social values, norms and rules
of behaviour. In short, the army is not to form its own subculture alienated
from society. Furthermore, the army is expected to participate in various “so-
cial programmes”. With regard to functional and societal imperatives, the

See also J. Burk, ‘The Public and the Military’, The Public 1:4 (1994) 13–25.

The research was carried out by the Defense Research Centre, University of Ljubljana,
in November 2001, on a representative sample of grown-up citizens of Slovenia
(N=1095).

See S. Huntington, The Soldier and the State: The Theory and Politics of Civil-Military
Relations (Cambridge: Harvard University Press 1957) 2; ‘Civil-Military Relations II’,
in: J. Reichart and S. Sturm, American Defense Policy (Fifth Edition), (Baltimore: The
Johns Hopkins University Press 1982) 738; M. Edmonds, Armed Services and Society,
(Leicester: Leicester University Press 1988) 79.

224 Malešiþ, Jelušiþ

Slovenian public’s expectations, as to the armed forces’ tasks, are quite
unique in terms of giving priority to help during natural disasters before the
defence of the homeland!

Indications are that the Slovenian public attributes a rather high level of

socialisation and socio-economic role to the armed forces, yet strongly disap-
proves of its interference with political affairs. Concerning the process of po-
litical decision-making, the armed forces are supposed to participate only in
military-defence related decisions. Furthermore, the majority of the public is
in favour of the reduction of armed forces as well as of the military budget;
the armed forces should be mostly professional, and the officers should not
be partisans of any political party.

According to the public, the Slovenian army should participate in peace

support operations abroad, especially with its professional forces, mainly in
humanitarian operations rather than in combat ones, and should be engaged
not too far away from home.

8.3 The Role of (Security) Studies

Sociological and security studies play a particularly important role in control-
ling the armed forces, and accordingly in the development of a suitable model
for civil-military relations. In Slovenia, there is one educational and one secu-
rity studies research institution. They are part of the University of Ljubljana.
The Defence Studies Division is an educational branch placed within the Po-
litical Science Department of the Faculty of Social Sciences. The Defence
Research Centre is a research branch, placed within the Institute of Social
Sciences. They both are an important segment of civil society (some might
say a segment of the ‘security community or strategic community’), and
taken from the sociological and political science aspects. They research and
analyse national and international security issues, and especially the defence
system. Since Slovenia has become independent, there is a noticeable dis-
crepancy between the development of the defence establishment on the one
hand and the security studies on the other. The defence establishment has in
the last decade grown in quality and size, but the size of the staff has not kept
up with the research and analysis requirements. The institutional needs for
expertise, surveys and other academic activities have grown enormously.
Other academic disciplines do not take a sufficient part in studies concerning

As opposed to the majority of European and North American publics, the Slovenian
public does not perceive terrorism as a serious threat to the security of the country. Out
of nineteen different threats, terrorism appears to be one of the least important (seven-
teenth). In this respect, the phenomenon of terrorism hardly influences security sector
reform in Slovenia.

Slovenia

225

national security. If they did, they would complement the security studies
theory covering specific areas, such as political economy of the national secu-
rity, international war and humanitarian law, crisis management, psychologi-
cal and social aspects of disasters, etc.

When defence institutions, especially the higher echelons of the Ministry

of Defence, were first formed, technical aspects and professionalism were
neglected and recruitment was carried out on the principle ‘it is not important
what and how much a candidate knows, as long as he is ours’. Consequently,
people were employed, if certain criteria were met, such as the right political
affiliation, or an absolute loyalty to Defence Ministry leadership (other minis-
tries followed the same pattern). Still it has to be emphasised that the rele-
vance and consideration of the security studies have lately become quite no-
ticeable. Some time ago, everybody seemed “to become an authority for
whatever the problem”; also, complex questions of national security turned to
be somewhat simple, not in themselves, of course, but merely due to being
simplified by some people out of ignorance. The present day situation can be
said to have changed; security studies have been gaining ground. And if some
time ago the discussion about questions on (national) security was quite gen-
eral, since the concept, doctrine and the security system were to change, to-
day the discussion deals with specialities and individual cases.

Issues of Security Sector Reform: Crisis
Management, Peacekeeping, Regional Security

Since 1997, Slovenia contributes its military units and civilian policemen
to the peacekeeping operations in the turbulent neighbourhood of South
East Europe. The civilian policemen are taking part in UN led mission
UNMIK in Kosovo and in Macedonia, as also in EU police mission in
Bosnia and Herzegovina. The soldiers are part of the KFOR mission in
Kosovo and SFOR mission in Bosnia and Herzegovina. Some 200 soldiers
are currently deployed in operations abroad. In the past six years, the de-
ployment of soldiers and policemen was predominantly part of the foreign
policy, and to a lower extent also part of the security policy. The deploy-
ment of troops abroad was one of the prerequisites of the rapprochement
policy towards the EU and NATO. Therefore, Slovenian political elite
sometimes decided to send units into peacekeeping to fulfil its promises
regarding EU and NATO membership. Many of these promises were not
in concordance with Slovenian security policy and sometimes they overes-
timated the capacities of Slovenian army to train, send and maintain nu-
merous peacekeepers abroad.

226 Malešiþ, Jelušiþ

10 NATO, EU and the Stability Pact in the Process of

Standardization in the Security Sector Reform

In the process of achieving solid solutions in civil-military relations, inter-
national security co-operation plays an important role as well. The desired
compliance with EU and NATO countries’ standards in that field and the
co-operation within OSCE increase transparency in defence matters.
Transparency in the field of security and military affairs becomes a crucial
element of co-operation and partnership between states, and an important
link in democratic parliamentary control of the armed forces that fosters
constitutionality and legality in the security field.

The fact that Slovenia wanted to join NATO and EU had a significant

impact on the development of civil-military relations and security sector
reform. This impact was exercised through the accession criteria that
needed to be fulfilled in the process. Establishing conditions for a plural-
istic political system, market economy, the rule of law, freedom of the
press and media became a ‘must’ for democratic control of the armed
forces. More specific criteria referring to the development of the armed
forces had a tremendous impact on raising the quality and efficiency of the
Slovenian Army. Bilateral cooperation in different military-related pro-
grammes and the active participation of Slovenian military in peace sup-
port operations abroad was very influential in this process.

However, these general benefits of international cooperation could not

prevent some peculiar and specific difficulties, nor could they prevent
problems within the political elite to comprehend the role of the military in
a democratic society. Some of these difficulties and problems were ad-
dressed in this paper.

As far as the Stability Pact and its influence in security sector reform are

concerned, one should stress that Slovenia was not very keen to join it. All
initiatives that wanted to ‘integrate’ the South East European countries
were at the very beginning rejected by part of the political elite and the
public. Slovenia joined the Stability Pact, but emphasized at the same time
that the country should be observed as ‘a part of the solution and not part
of the problem’. Slovenia finally joined the project and was very active in
running three different round tables: on small and mid-size enterprises, on
national minorities and on de-mining the region of Kosovo through the In-
ternational Fund run by Slovenia. In such circumstances, the Stability Pact
could not have a significant impact on security sector reform in Slovenia.

Slovenia

227

11 Conclusion

Slovenian civil-military relations originate from the last few years of for-
mer Yugoslavia’s existence. In the period between 1988 and 1991 the mili-
tary dominated public issues and coloured the political debates. High po-
litical and civil society interest in defence issues was diminished after the
successful armed victory of the Slovenian Defence Forces in the ten-day
War for Independence in 1991. After independence, the social prestige of
defence matters and military occupation has decreased significantly. The
indifference among the general public and especially among the young
population towards the military and defence issues in general resulted in
decreasing willingness of young men to enter the military service, increas-
ing number of draftees asking for the status of conscientious objector, and
in an increasing refusal of the compulsory military service in public. The
Government and the National Assembly recognised public feelings in the
regulations that led to the abolishment of the obligatory military service in
2004. It alone will bring new challenges of the civilian oversight of the
armed forces, since after 2004 the Slovenian Parliament and public will
have to exercise democratic control over all-volunteer armed forces only.
In addition, the armed forces will be more and more involved in interna-
tional missions abroad where the possibility of direct democratic control of
the military is rather limited. For this challenge to be successfully fulfilled,
civilian controllers will have to learn a lot about security, defence and mili-
tary issues.

Civil-Military Relations in Turkey

Nilüfer Narli

1 Introduction

Democratization and the role of the military in Turkish politics have re-
ceived much attention in the literature and in international forums. Since
the early 1990s European Union member states, whose military and civil
authorities are legally separated, have required Turkey to reform its legal
system and political institutions in line with democratic standards in West-
ern Europe. Turkey’s integration into the European Union, a process that
would not be smooth and swift

, also requires an abated role of the military

in politics. The peculiarities of civil-military relations in Turkey are very
important when studying a Turkey that would be a European partner and a
regional power in the 21

century.

What is the nature of civil-military relations in Turkey? Which theory

best explains civil-military relations? Why and how does the military have
a political influence? How do civil-military relations affect Turkey’s allo-
cation of resources for the reform of the armed forces?

An earlier version of this paper had been first presented at International Conference
“Balkan Security and Reform of the Armed Forces-Economic Aspects”, University of
National and World Economy, in Sofia (29–30 October 1998). Then an edited version
was published in Journal for Turkish Studies. See Nilufer Narli: “Civil-Military Rela-
tions in Turkey”, Journal for Turkish Studies. Vol. 1, No. 1 (Spring 2000), pp. 107–
127. London. This updated version of the paper was presented at the International Con-
ference, “Taking Stock of Civil-Military Relations”, Co-organised by the Centre for
European Security Studies, The Netherlands, the Centre for Security and Defense, Can-
ada, and the Geneva Centre for Democratic Control of Armed Forces, Switzerland. 10–
12 May 2001, The Hague, The Netherlands.

Eric Rouleau thinks that the negotiations between ‘Ankara and Brussels will be diffi-
cult, painful, and most likely last for many years to come’ due to Ankara’s misconcep-
tion that, owing to Turkey’s strategic and economic importance, the EU will let Turkey
into the union after cosmetic reforms. See Eric Rouleau: ‘Turkey’s dream of Democ-
racy’ Foreign Affairs, November/December 2000, p. 113.

Two factors regarding Turkey’s historical and political conditions are

essential to answer these questions: the role of the army as the defender of
Kemalism and the Ottoman legacy of a vertically organized society. From
imperial collapse, partition, and occupation in 1920, the republic of Turkey

230 Narli

emerged three years later as an internationally recognized, independent,
nation-state. Modern Turkey, therefore, began its existence stripped of an
empire, but conscious of imperial greatness and defined by a strong na-
tional identity.

Unlike western European states, where society developed along func-

tional, horizontal lines with socioeconomic classes developing common
identities and mores, Ottoman society was hierarchical. The sharp cleavage
between the Ottoman elite and subject peoples prevented the masses from
organizing themselves to seek power when the elite was weak.

Ottoman society was divided into two categories: the sultan, the mili-

tary, and the ulema at the top, and subjects (reaya), comprising a large
proportion of peasants, at the bottom. The civil and military bureaucracies
acted as intermediaries between the two classes. This political organization
and culture survived under the Republic, and the position of the bureau-
cratic-military elite at the higher echelon remained very important.

De-

spite introducing a law early on decreeing the equality of all citizens re-
gardless of ethnicity, religion or region, the government did not narrow the
gap between the elite and the masses during the Republic’s first three dec-
ades. Consequently, the elite – military officers, senior bureaucrats, nota-
bles, and industrialists – geared its policies to maintain this gap. The con-
flict between the elite and the rest of the population emerged as a result of
the state-endorsed efforts to create a local business class, and played a role
in the organization of the Islamist and separatist movements that gained
momentum in the 1970s and peaked in the 1980s.

The Ottoman tradition of close military-state ties

continued into the

Republican era, giving the armed forces a preeminent role in society ex-
tending into the civil sphere. The military became not only the republic’s
defenders, but also the guardians of secularism and the six principles of
Kemalism: nationalism (synonymous with the narrow definition of Turk-
ism, rejecting both irredentist Ottoman inclinations and expansionists pan-
Turanist ambitions), secularism, republicanism, populism, statism, and

For the center-periphery conflict, see Serif Mardin. 1973. ‘Center-Periphery Conflict: A
Key to Turkish Politics’ Deadalus, Vol. 102, pp. 169–190.

Metin Heper. 1985. The State Tradition in Turkey. Hul: Eothen Press, p. 64. Heper
gives insight into the enduring nature of the division between state and politics in Tur-
key and the unique position of the Turkish military in the political process and democ-
ratization.

The military had a prominent role during the Ottoman period. For example, the Yeni
Ceri had a dominant position at the pinnacle of the imperial system. It was not broken
until 1826, and it was only after this that Sultan Mahmut II was able to pursue his mod-
ernization program, which included military reforms.

Turkey

231

reformism. The army’s heroic status as guardian, the perception of external
military threats from the region, the Sèvres

syndrome that feeds a fear of

losing territorial integrity, and favorable portrayals in the media and in
schools have facilitated the army’s strong presence in society.

The army has played a prominent role in Turkey’s political moderniza-

tion

leading the country “along a western path“

, by endorsing the dy-

namic transformation of the Turkish state and society, in line with
Ataturk’s ideological commitment to the West. It also intervened politi-
cally to counter forces blocking this transformation and to preserve democ-
racy, secularism, and national unity in the face of Islamist, separatist, and
sectarian challenges. Its privileged position has guaranteed it a gener-
ous budget

earmarked for reforms, modernization

, and technological

The Treaty of Sèvres (1920), which, though never ratified and subsequently superseded
by the 1923 Treaty of Lausanne, foresaw the allocation of large tracts of modern Tur-
key to Greece, Armenia, Italy and France (the latter two in the form of mandates), and
the eventual creation of an independent Kurdish state, has had a traumatic impact in the
minds of the Turks. Many still believe that the Westerners are willing to revive the
Sèvres Treaty.

See Lucian Pye. 1962. ‘Armies in the Process of Political modernization’, in The Role
of the Military in Underdeveloped Countries, J. J. Johnson (ed.): New Haven: Princeton
University Press, pp. 69–89; Morris Janowitz. 1964. The Military in the Political De-
velopment of New Nations. Chicago: University of Chicago Press; and Samuel Hunting-
ton. 1968. Political Order in Changing Societies. New Haven: Yale University Press.
For the role of the army in Turkey’s modernization, see Daniel Lerner and Richard O.
Robinson. 1960–1961. ‘Swords and Ploughshares: The Turkish Army as a Modernizing
Force’ World Politics, p. 13.

Umit Cizre Sakallioglu. 1997. ‘The Anatomy of the Turkish Military’s Political Auton-
omy’, Comparative Politics. Vol. 29, No. 2, p.154.

Broadly speaking, the Turkish General Staff always received the budget allocation they
requested. In the 1990s, according to official figures, defense normally accounted for
12 percent of the national budget, 2 percent of GNP, and 4.5 percent of GDP. Taken
from a draft copy of the 1995 Turkish Defense Statement, pp. 83–86. This information
is quoted in Simon. V. Mayall. 1997. Turkey: Thwarted Ambition. Washington, DC: In-
stitute for National Strategic Studies. MacNair Paper 56, p. 87. However, according to
Senesen, Turkey’s military expenditures constituted approximately 5 percent of its
gross domestic product in the mid-1990s. This ratio did not include all of the expendi-
tures incurred due to military and paramilitary operations in the southeastern regions.
See Gulay Gunluk Senesen. 1995. ‘Some Economic Aspects of Turkish Armaments
Spending’, New Perspectives on Turkey, Vol. 13, fall: 75–91, p. 75. According to the
figures given by the International Institute for Strategic Studies (IISS), the defense
budget for 1997 was US $ 6.8 billion. See IISS. 1996–97. The Military Balance. Lon-
don, p. 70.

In the period 1985–1990 modernization costs were nearly US $ 15 billion, of which
about US $ 5 billion came from the United States and Germany, as reported in Simon.
V. Mayall. 1997, p. 78. The Turkish General Staff (TGS) demanded further moderniza-
tion in the army as a response to the performance of the coalition forces in the Gulf

232 Narli

advancement. Indeed, governmental opposition to funds requested by the
armed forces, particularly when there is a perceived threat either from out-
side or from “anti-state” domestic forces, is met with consternation not
only in military circles but also in public opinion.

Theories of Civil-Military Relations

2.1 The Concordance Model

The current civil-military theory

that prevails in Western Europe and the

United States highlights the separation of civil and military institutions and
the authority of the civil sphere over the military to prevent domestic mili-
tary intervention. Turkey operates under a different system. The concor-
dance model, as it is called, envisions a civil-military partnership that ac-
complishes two goals. “First, it explains which institutional and cultural
conditions – involving separation, integration, or some alternative – pre-
vent or promote domestic military intervention. Second, it predicts that
when agreement prevails among the three partners (the military, the politi-
cal elite and the society), domestic military intervention is less likely to
occur. The central argument, therefore, is that if the military, the political
elite, and the society achieve concordance on four indicators (explained
below) then domestic intervention is less probable.” (Parentheses from the
author)

. Co-operation and agreement on these four indicators – the com-

position of the officer corps, the political decision-making process, re-
cruitment method, and military style – may result in a range of civil-
military patterns, including separation, the removal of civil-military
boundaries, and other variations.

War. The threat from the southeastern neighbors and combating the PKK terrorism mo-
tivated the TGS to be more insistent on the modernization of the armed forces.

The recent example of this was the Welfare Party-True Path Party (RP-DYP) coali-
tion’s withholding the funds demanded by the military for the operation against the
PKK in May 1997. On 14 May 1997, the Turkish military launched its largest ever-
cross-border operation against the suspected PKK bases in northern Iraq. On June 6, the
day after a highly emotional mass funeral for 11 soldiers killed by the PKK, the TGS
publicly accused the RP-DYP coalition of withholding the funds. The government im-
mediately denied the allegations and promised to provide whatever funds needed.

For the current civil-military theory see, Rebecca L. Schiff. 1995. ‘Civil-Military Rela-
tions Reconsidered: A Theory of Concordance’. Armed Forces and Society. Vol. 22
(Fall). No. 1, p. 7–24.

ibid. p. 12.

Turkey

233

The three actors in the concordance model are: the military, which en-

compasses the armed forces and army personnel; the political leadership,
which refers to government officials and those with direct influence over
the composition and funding of the armed forces. The governmental elite
can include the President, Prime Minister, cabinet ministers, party leaders,
Parliament members, and royal families; and the citizenry, which is de-
fined by its function in the concordance model (as opposed to other theo-
ries that rely on political institutions as the main “civil” components of
analysis.) The concordance model examines the function of the citizenry
by analyzing the way the government and the citizenry affect the military’s
role in a nation. This requires an understanding of the society’s perception
of the military that is shaped by political socialization and history.

The first of the four indicators in the model is the composition of the of-

ficer corps. In societies that feature separate civil and military domains,
militaries have an officer corps that is in charge of the broad, institutional
day-to-day functioning of the armed forces. These officers are career sol-
diers (or “professional soldiers” in the political scientist Amos Perlmutter’s
classification) who dedicate their lives to developing the military and de-
fining its relationship to the rest of society. In democratic societies, “the
officer corps represents the various constituencies of the nation”. Broad
representation, however, is not a must for concordance, “since it is con-
ceivable that the society and the military could agree on a less broadly rep-
resentative corps”

The second indicator is the political decision-making process, that “in-

volves the institutional organs of society that determine important factors
for the military: materials, budget, size, and structure”

. To fulfil its needs,

the military generally turns to a governmental channel that weighs both
military and societal resources and needs. This channels debates, whether
in open Parliaments, closed cabinets, or special committees, estimates the
military’s needs, and devises a compromise that often secures the citizens’
support. However, concordance requires an agreement among the political
elite, the military, and the citizenry over the political process that best
meets the requirements of the armed forces.

ibid. p. 14. Schiff gives an example to illustrate a particular composition of the army in
less modern societies. During the British Indian colonial period the army was drawn
from particular castes and classes sets these classes well apart from the ‘mass of Indian
peasantry’. Rebecca L. Schiff. 1995, p. 14. Also see Stephen P. Cohen. 1971. The Indian
Army. Berkeley: University of California Press.

ibid. p. 14.

ibid. p. 15.

234 Narli

Recruitment method, the third indicator in Rebecca L. Schiff’s model is

the enlistment of citizens into the armed forces, which can be coercive or
persuasive. The former refers to the forcible conscription of men and sup-
plies for military purposes. Persuasive recruitment, however, is based on
beliefs and values. The population may believe that “the sacrifice of mili-
tary service is worthwhile for the sake of security, patriotism, or any other
national cause”

, and a military career may be an honourable profession.

Persuasive recruitment implies a consensus among the political leadership,
military, and citizenry over the requirements and composition of the armed
forces.

Military style, the final indicator, refers to “the external manifestations

of the military and the inner mental constructions associated with it: what
it looks like, what ethos drives it, and what people think about it”

. Ac-

cording to Schiff, style is important because it determines social bounda-
ries, or lack thereof. “It is the mode by which members of a particular elite
associate with each other as peers and differentiate themselves from the
members of other elite and the members of non-elite groups.”

For the

military, it is important because it reflects how something appear; and ap-
pearance is a symbol that can, by the nature and force it conveys, connote
a type of power or authority. Military style manifests itself among the
other variables. It is usually part of the historical development and political
culture associated with military traditions and symbols that include uni-
forms, parades and marches, music, social traditions, and customs.

Here

political culture is defined as a specialized part of a whole culture, refer-
ring to the dominant or typical attitudes, values, assumptions, and beliefs
that affect the political action and attitudes of individuals composing the
society.

ibid. p. 15.

ibid. p. 15–16.

ibid. p. 16.

This definition is formulated by getting inspirations from the Macridis’ definition. Roy
Macridis, 1987. Modern Political Systems: Europe. New Jersey: Prentice-Hall Interna-
tional.

Turkey

235

2.2 Civil-Military

Continuum

Richard Dekmejian

, who made studies on the civil-military relations in

Turkey and Egypt, presents a revised version of Claude E. Welch’s scheme
where “civilian rule” and “military rule” are seen as the two opposite ends
of the spectrum of civil-military relations. (See: Figure 1 in appendix) In
neither case is the power of any one actor “pure”, for there is always some
degree of military influence on civilian regimes and vice versa. Hence,
moving toward the centre of the continuum, there might be two intermedi-
ate categories of civilian-military partnership, where either the civilians or
the military might be predominant. Aiming to sharpen conceptually the na-
ture of the military’s roles in Welch’s schema, Dekmejian employs
Perlmutter’s

three-fold classification of military officers based on their

different orientations toward civilian authority.

Perlmutter’s “professional soldier”, possessing a strong sense of corpo-

ratism and clientelism, considers himself subservient to civilian authority,
and thereby characterizes civilian-military relations in the left-of-centre
categories of the continuum (‘the civilian rule/military influence’ phase in
Figure 1). The opposite end is the case with the ‘praetorian soldier’ who
seeks to identify the military’s corporate aspirations with the national in-
terest and becomes its own client. Praetorian rule is characteristic of re-
gimes belonging to the right-of-centre sectors of the civilian-military con-
tinuum (the ‘military rule/civilian influence’ phase in Figure 1).
(Parentheses from the author).

The Turkish case deviates from this model in that the “professional sol-

dier” is found not merely in the civilian rule/military influence’ phase, but
also in other phases depicted in Figure 1. As will be seen below, the in-
creased professionalism of the army associated with greater military influ-
ence in the Turkish case deters rather than increases subordination of the
military to the civil authority.

Richard H. Dekmejian. 1982. ‘Egypt and Turkey: The Military in the Background’, in
Soldiers, Peasants, and Bureaucrats: Civil-Military Relations in Modernizing Societies.
Kolkowitcz, Roman and Andrzej Korbonski (eds.), Boston and Sydney: George Allen
and Unwin Ltd., p. 28–51.

Amos Perlmutter. 1977. The Military and Politics in Modern Times. New Haven, Conn,
and London: Yale University Press, p. 11–13.

Richard H. Dekmejian. 1982. p. 30. It is worth mentioning that Perlmutter’s third type of
military officer, the “revolutionary soldier”, does not fit into Welch’s four categories de-
lineated in Figure 1. Indeed, in revolutionary situations, the civilian and military spheres
are tightly integrated into a single vanguard party, whereby the military losses its corpo-
rate autonomy and professional integrity. Ibid. p. 30.

236 Narli

The Civil-Military Partnership: Fluctuating and
Fragile

3.1 An Uneasy Partnership

Dekmejian examined the dynamics of civil-military interaction in Turkey
during the years of 1923–1979 and ended his analysis by predicting a coup
in the late 1980s, which took place in September 1980, sooner than ex-
pected. Dekmejian argues that Turkey moved from “civilian control and
military partnership”, a situation (phase 2 in Figure 1) that characterized
the early Ataturk period, to “civilian rule and military influence” (phase 1)
in the 1930s. The Ataturk-initiated process of civilianization continued as
Turkey evolved toward a multiparty system after 1945. During the Democ-
rat party’s rule (1950–1960) the government took the form of civilian rule-
military influence. A number of factors,

however, induced a military

coup in May 1960. Subsequently, a purely military body, the National
Unity Committee, became a legislative organ, and its chairman, General
Cemal Gursel, presided over a Cabinet of civilian technocrats and two of-
ficers. Ironically, during this period of military rule, Turkey drafted its
most liberal Constitution. At the same time, the Constitution established
the National Security Council (NSC), an advisory body through which the
military discharges the responsibilities of defending the state and the na-
ture of the regime.

Following the October 1961 elections, which resulted in victory for the

Republican People’s Party (RPP), the RPP and the Justice Party that re-
placed the Democratic Party formed a coalition government. Dekmejian
characterizes Turkish politics of the mid- and late 1960s as a “silent part-
nership” in which the military enjoyed full autonomy from the government

In contrast to the Republican People’s Party, which ruled Turkey from 1923 until 1950,

the Democratic Party of Prime Minister Adnan Menderes lacked strong historical ties to
the military and the legitimizing influence of Ataturk’s charisma. More seriously, the
Democrats progressively departed from the principles of Ataturkism and started an “Is-
lamic restoration”. Moreover, the government of Adnan Menderes increasingly re-
stricted political freedom by purging judges and university professors, curtailing politi-
cal parties, confining the press, and using the police to suppress popular protest. See C.
H. Dodd. 1969. Politics and Government in Turkey. Berkeley, CA: University of Cali-
fornia Press. pp. 26–8. For the Democrats’ “Islamic restoration” and their alliance with
the Islamic brotherhoods, see Nilufer Narli. ‘The Rise of the Islamist Movement in Tur-
key’ MERIA Journal. Vol. 3, No. 3 (September 1999).

www.biu.ac.il/SOC/besa/meria.html/<besa@mail.biu.ac.il//BESA.

Turkey

237

while keeping a watchful eye over the parameters of civilian political life

(phase 3 in Figure 1). Military moderates, firmly committed to parliamen-
tary democracy, defended the civilian governments of the 1960s against at-
tempted coups by various radical military officers.

Relations between the

military and the government became tense in the late 1960s when growing
student demonstrations, labor union strikes, political discontent caused by
deepened cleavages, violent manifestations of anti-Americanism, and par-
liamentary stalemate over reform measures

challenged the internally split

government of Prime Minister Suleyman Demirel (the civilian-military
stalemate phase of 1965–1971 in Figure 1). Demirel resigned after an army
ultimatum of 12 March 1971 stating a stern warning from the military
chiefs to the Grand National Assembly which threatened military interven-
tion if a ‘strong and credible government’ capable of passing reform meas-
ures could not deal with the severe domestic instability and “fratricidal
strife”. The army, however, refrained from assuming power outright and
permitted a succession of non-partisan cabinets to impose martial law,

suppress the media, outlaw strikes, arrest hundreds of leftist activists, and
dissolve the leftist Turkish Workers’ party and the pro-Islamist National
Order party. With the 1971 intervention, Turkey moved to a “military con-
trol/civilian partnership” (phase 3) situation. Martial law ended by Sep-
tember 1973 and the following October, elections brought victory to the
People’s Republican party (RPP) led by Bulent Ecevit who had moved the

Richard H. Dekmejian. 1982. p. 43. For the role of the military in the 1960s, see Ergun

Ozbudun. 1966. The Role of the Turkish Military in Recent Turkish Politics. Cambridge,
Mass: Center for International Affairs. Harvard University.

Some middle-ranking “radical” officers had little confidence in competitive party poli-
tics, but they believed that rapid developments and reforms are possible only under the
strong leadership of the military. Fourteen such radicals were expelled from the ruling
junta, the National Unity Committee, after the 1960 coup. See Roger P. Nye. 1977.
‘Civil-Military Confrontation in Turkey: The 1973 Presidential Elections’, International
Journal of Middle East Studies. Vol. 8, p. 212.

After winning clear majorities in the national elections of 1965 and 1969, the Demirel-
led Justice Party (JP), with its backing in the peasantry and religiously conservative
town people, felt no need to rapidly push the many reform measures that the military
moderates considered top priorities. The armed forces became restless when the JP sus-
pended measures dealing with tax, education, land reform, electoral law reform, the ex-
ploitation of oil and mineral deposits, welfare legislation, and after 1968, law-and-order
measures. The armed forces considered these measures to be essential to create a pros-
perous, stable and modern country idealized by Ataturk. Roger P. Nye. 1977, p. 212.

On 27 April 1997, martial law was declared in the eleven provinces of Adana, Ankara,
Eskisehir, Istanbul, Izmir, Kocaeli, Sakarya, Zonguldak, Diyarbakır, Hatay, Siirt. Kurd-
ish separatist activities were reported in the last three cities named. The rest contain
Turkey’s largest cities and the greatest university students, urban workers, and urban
guerrilla population. See Roger P. Nye. 1977, p. 209.

238 Narli

party to the left to gain support from the electorate of the outlawed Turkish
Labor party.

The 1973–1980 period was perplexing for Turkish politics (the deadlock

phase in Figure 1) as factors promoting instability were manifold. Turkish
politics was polarized by the issues of Cyprus and European Community
membership, education and economic policies, martial law and corruption.
Instability in the form of clashes between ultra-nationalist militants and
radical-leftists, urban guerrilla terrorism, sectarian antagonism, union
strikes, and a deteriorating economy in the midst of global and domestic
economic crises increased political tensions. During this period Turkey
was ruled by internally divided coalition governments

that included ultra-

nationalist and Islamist parties. Throughout the mid-1970s, the military
was highly critical of successive civilian governments due to their inability
to cope with economic problems and promote stability.

In the late 1970s,

civil-military relations, in Dekmejian’s terms, tended toward uneasy coex-
istence. According to Dekmejian, both camps were divided along at least
three competing ideological lines: Islamism, pan-Turkism, and socialism.

However, Ataturkist principles were the most prominent army ideals. This
explains why the military distanced itself from far right and radical left

First, the People’s Republican Party formed a coalition government with the Islamist
National Salvation Party (NSP). The coalition collapsed following Turkey’s July 1974
military operation in Cyprus to protect the Turkish-Cypriot community. Then, on 31
March 1975, the NSP became a coalition partner in the first “National Front” govern-
ment (1975, 1977) formed under the premiership of the center-of-right Justice Party (JP)
led by Suleyman Demirel. This coalition also included the ultra-nationalist National Ac-
tion Party (NAP) led by Alpaslan Turkes. Then after the June 1977 elections, the second
National Front Government formed under the leadership of Demirel. In July 1977
Demirel resigned, but he returned to power in August, at the head of an almost identical
coalition including the NSP, NAP and JP. However, Demirel was forced to resign fol-
lowing defections from the JP in December. Ecevit formed a coalition government in
January 1978, promising to deal with the economic problems and the political violence
that was increasing as a result of the clashes between left wing and right-wing groups as
well as between the Sunnis and Alevis (e.g., Corum and Kahraman Maras incidents).
But JP’s victory at by-elections in October 1979 deprived Ecevit of his working major-
ity, and he resigned. In November 1979, Demirel formed an all-JP minority government
with the backing of the NAP and NSP.

For example, in January 1975, Chief of Staff General Semih Sancar warned that “the
Army will not stay away from the nation’s problems”. Moreover, General Irfan Ozay-
dinli sent a “letter of protest” to Prime Minister Demirel and charged the government
with “mismanagement”. See Richard H. Dekmejian. 1982, p. 45.

Richard H. Dekmejian. 1982, pp. 46–47.

Turkey

239

ideologies after the coup of 12 September 1980. The army declared that
the coup’s aim was to “re-establish democracy”

After the coup, Turkey moved to a “military rule/civilian influence”

phase, evidenced by the military government of 1980–1983. During those
years, political and military restructuring efforts left the military with a
growing influence on Turkey’s political process. The Turkish General
Staff (TGS) initiated the REMO (Reorganization-Modernization) project

in order to help the army recover from the impact of the 1975 U.S. arms
embargo imposed in the wake of the Cyprus intervention the previous
year. The project, coupled with the impact of internal security concerns,
elevated the professional skills of the military, which in turn enlarged its
influence in political matters.

The most important political event of the 1980–1983 period was the

drafting of a new Constitution in 1982, restricting formerly granted civil
liberties and enhancing the military’s political influence.

It has enhanced

the constitutional guarantees that enable the military to have high influence
on parliamentary decisions. For example, according to the 1982 Constitu-
tion, Turkey’s Council of Ministers must consider, “with priority, the deci-
sions of the National Security Council concerning necessary measures for
the protection and independence of the state, the unity and indivisibility of
the country, and the peace and security of society” (1982 Constitution, Ar-
ticle 118).

The Constitution was backed by an overwhelming majority in

On the morning of the coup the army issued a statement setting out the reasons for inter-
vention: “The aim of the operation is to safeguard the integrity of the country… to re-
establish the existence and authority of the state, and to eliminate the factors that hinder
the smooth working of the democratic order.” Quoted in Metin Heper. 1985. The State
Tradition in Turkey. Hull: Eothen Press, p. 131.

For REMO project, see Simon V. Mayall. 1997, p. 29.

On the relationship between the increased professionalism of the military and its grow-
ing political influence in Turkey, see Sakallioglu, 1997, p. 152. Sakallioglu notes that
similar developments were observed in the Middle East and Latin America.

For the role of the military in decision-making in the 1980s, see George Harris. 1988.
‘The Role of the Military in Turkey in the 1980s: Guardians or Decision-Makers’ in
State, Democracy and the Military in Turkey in the 1980s, Metin Heper and Ahmet
Evin, (eds.). Berlin: De Gruyter, p. 177–200.

As mentioned above the NSC is a Constitutional body that had been created by the 1961
Constitution and its status was enhanced by the 1982 Constitution. Article 118 of the
1982 Constitution establishes the NSC as a body evenly divided between five civilians
(the President, Prime Minister, and ministers of defense, internal affairs, and foreign af-
fairs), and five military officials (the chief of the general staff, the commanders of the
army, navy, and air force, and the general commander of the gendarmerie). After mak-
ing Constitutional changes in the composition and functions of NSC in order to meet
Copenhagen criteria, in 2001 and in 2003, this was changed. See the discussion in sec-
tion, ‘Turkey’s Accession to the European Union and Civil-Military Partnership’.

240 Narli

a referendum, as was the election of General Kenan Evren as President.
Article 118 was given effect by National Security Council Law No 2945

that extended the concept of “national security” on which the NSC could
issue “decisions” to include the protection of the state against any foreign
or domestic to its interest in the international sphere, including political,
social, cultural and economic.

The military regime folded in 1983 but the army limited elections that

year to three parties. Its favored candidate, the Nationalist Democracy
Party (NDP), led by a retired general, lost to the Motherland Party, which
obtained 41 percent of the vote and 53 percent of the seats in Parliament.

Nonetheless, the military accepted the election results, preventing Turkey
from remaining in a long military rule/civilian influence phase.

In terms of the civil-military continuum, the post-coup period was a hy-

brid between civilian rule/military influence and civilian rule/military
partnership. During the Turgut Ozal government (1983–1989) civilian
dominance was higher, but declined after 1991 (see below). Ozal’s attempt
to reorder security policy, to stop relying on territorial security – which
maintained the state’s dominance over society – and start relying on eco-
nomic strength, played a role in enhancing civilian leverage. Ozal’s suc-
cessful economic reforms, initiated in 1980, enabled him to challenge the
military’s primacy in the state, and to broaden the domain of the civilian
government. By 1987 Ozal felt confident enough to recommend changes to
the 1982 Constitution, in 1990–1991, he talked about the “Kurdish real-
ity”, and in 1991, he took the unprecedented step of rejecting the army’s
nominee for Chief of the General Staff and appointed his own candidate.

“National security means the defense and protection of the state against every kind of
external and internal threat to the Constitutional order, national existence, unity, and to
all its interests and contractual rights in the international arena including in the political,
social, cultural and economic spheres.” (Article 2a, National Security Council Law No
2945, Justice Ministry web site, http://www.adalet.gov.tr).

Turgut Sunalp founded the MDP in 1983. The MDP presented a party platform empha-
sizing security, political stability and traditional social values. While it lost the 1983
elections, it did “the best in eastern Turkey, obtaining 30 per cent of the vote in 15 prov-
inces which rank near the bottom of the Turkish economic scale”. John H. Fadden.
1985. ‘Civil-Military Relations in the Third Republic’, The Middle East Journal, Vol.
39 (Winter), No. 1, p. 81.

Commenting on his decision to appoint General Necip Toruntay to be the general chief
of staff, Ozal said: “Since 1960, no civilian government has appointed the general chief
of staff itself. The position has been filled by automatic succession. From now on, this is
going to be normalized. Governments should appoint the general chief of staff them-
selves according to merit” quoted in Sakallioglu. 1997, p. 162.

Turkey

241

Gradually, Ozal took the lead in a growing number of decisions in security
and foreign affairs.

Soon after the October 1991 elections,

civilian leverage shrunk when

conservative elements in the state consolidated to thwart Ozal’s bold initia-
tives and gradually restored the higher military control and influence
phase. Despite Ozal’s personal charisma and his authority as President,
new Prime Minister Demirel and Foreign Minister Hikmet Cetin allied
with the military to dominate the NSC.

When Demirel assumed the presi-

dency in 1993, new Prime Minister Tansu Ciller joined the political-
military alliance, replacing her initial revolutionary ideas with conservative
policies

strengthening the military’s domestic hand.

In the mid-1990s the civilian government’s failure to check the growing

influence of Islamists and Kurdish separatists gave the military an oppor-
tunity to justify and even expand its dominant role in Turkey’s internal af-
fairs. From the mid-1990s onward, the political influence of the military
high command progressively increased as a response to the electoral gains
made by the Islamists in local government (after the 1994 local elections)
and in Parliament (following the 1995 general elections).

The military’s power is best evidenced by its 1997 unseating of Tur-

key’s first ever Islamist government led by Necmettim Erbakan’s Welfare
party. At a 28 February 1997 meeting of the NSC, the military issued an
18-point list of policy recommendations for the True Path-Welfare party
coalition government. The list focused on extending compulsory education

In the 1991 general elections Suleyman Demirel led True Path Party won the elections
and formed a coalition government with the Social Democratic People’s Party (SHP).

For the attitude of the Demirel government towards the military, see Simon V. Mayall.
1997, p. 70–71.

According to Henri Barkey and Graham Fuller, Ciller’s initial reaction to the PKK prob-
lem and discussions on the “Kurdish reality” was to seek the means for quick reconcilia-
tion. “She floated a number of ideas: The First was a suggestion to create a civilian and
parliamentary-based National Security Council that could investigate the Kurdish issue;
second, she proposed Kurdish broadcasts on state-owned television as well as optional
classes in Kurdish. All of these ideas including the ‘Basque model’ as a potential for-
mula for resolving Turkey’s ethnic problem – a suggestion made following a meeting in
Vienna with Spanish Prime Minister Felipe Gonzales – were shot down. Demirel, by ar-
guing that concessions could not be made while terrorism rampant, and the chief of the
general staff, Dogan Gures, by pointing out that the proper place to discuss these issues
was the National Security Council, put an end to these discussions … Yet, faced with
these criticisms, Ciller rapidly backed off further personal interests in the problem and
turned over the conduct of the Kurdish policy to the military.” See Henri J. Barkey and
Graham Fuller. 1998. Turkey’s Kurdish Question. Carnegie Commission on Preventing
Deadly Conflict, Carnegie Corporation of New York. New York: Rowman and Little-
field Publishers, p. 137.

242 Narli

from five to eight years and restricting the activities of religious schools
and private Quran courses, which the military believed were fostering anti-
secular values.

Erbakan, already under pressure from radical elements

within his party for not implementing his election manifesto, refused to
carry out the NSC recommendations and was ousted in June 1997. His
party was banned shortly thereafter.

The subsequent coalition govern-

ment, led by Mesut Yılmaz, formed in July 1997 and implemented a num-
ber of the NSC recommendations, passing the education bill, closing the
junior sections of the imam-hatip schools, restricting the informally organ-
ized Quran courses, and enforcing the ban on head-covering in educational
institutions at all levels.

Tensions, however, arose between the government and the military after

a military poll revealed that the Virtue party, successor to the banned Wel-
fare party, was the most popular political bloc in Turkey.

Intending to as-

sert the government’s primacy in containing the Islamists, Prime Minister
Yilmaz twice accused the army of meddling in party politics and twice was
forced to retract his statements as the General Staff declared that the
army is the ultimate defender of secular democracy and is above party
politics. According to the Chief of the General Staff: “It is an obligation im-
posed upon us by the law to protect with the same sensitivity the existing

The National Security Council meeting on February 28, 1997 formulated a list of 18
measures to curb the Islamist activities and presented them to the cabinet of the then
Prime Minister Necmettin Erbakan. Then on April 29, officers of the Turkish General
Staff gave a media briefing at which, for the first time, the threat of Islamism and sepa-
ratism within the country was rated by the military as a greater danger to Turkey than
any external factors. In May and June 1997 military elaborated on the danger of Islam-
ism by pointing out the infiltration of the Islamists into professional life and public ad-
ministration, the high percent of imam-hatip graduates at the universities, the prolifera-
tion of the Islamist publications, etc.

As the Welfare Party (Refah) equivocated, the military began to increase the pressure,
holding a series of briefings for the press and judiciary on the dangers of the Islamists,
while working to persuade members of the True Path Party to withdraw their support for
the government. On 21 May 1997, the Public Prosecutor applied to the Constitutional
Court for Refah’s closure on the grounds that it had attempted to incite the violation of
the Constitutions’ provisions on secularism. On 18 June 1997, Erbakan’s parliamentary
majority steadily eroded by defections from the True Path Party (DYP), Erbakan re-
signed as Prime Minister. On 16 January 1998, the Constitutional Court announced Re-
fah’s closure. While the military’s role in toppling the Refah’ government created ques-
tions about Turkey’s commitment to the democratic process, the move was well
received by a much larger proportion of the society.

For the results of the poll, see Turkish Daily News, 1 July 1998, A1–A3. Later it was re-
ported that the public opinion poll conducted by a leading government agency revealed
that the Virtue Party and the True Path Party share the lead in popularity with 24 percent
each. Turkish Daily News, 2 July 1998, A1–A2.

Turkey

243

constitutional system, to which we feel absolutely attached.”

Soon, rela-

tions between the Yilmaz government and the military improved until the
government’s demise at the end of 1998.

Bulent Ecevit, leader of the Democratic Left party, formed a minority

government on 12 January 1999 that lasted until 18 April when Turkey
went to the polls for local and general elections, handing Ecevit’s party a
victory. Ecevit formed a coalition government with the Motherland and ul-
tra-nationalist National Action party that won a decisive vote of confi-
dence on 9 June 1999. The Ecevit-led coalition’s policies have been har-
monized with those of the NSC, and there has since been broad societal
agreement on the military’s influence in the domestic political affairs.
Criticism, however, was leveled at the government and the military follow-
ing the devastating August 1999 earthquake

, which led to a public reas-

sessment of its confidence in the military-civilian balance.

A majority of Turks accept the military as the guardian of democracy,

secularism, and national unity and approve of the military’s involvement in
politics. One explanatory factor for the army’s rising prominence through-
out the 1990s is the decline in support for Turkey’s center-oriented parties
since the late 1980s

and its consequent decreased public trust in the

On 4 July 1998 the Chief of the General Staff Karadayı made this statement at a press
conference. In response to this, Yilmaz said that he had no disagreement with what the
Chief of the General Staff had said and that he would put his signature to it if so asked.
For the statements made by Yılmaz, General Cevik Bir and the Chief of the Staff Kara-
dayı and the tension between the military and the government, see Hürriyet, Milliyet,
Yeni Yüzyıl (5–8 July 1998).

People had confidence in some state institutions, such as the army, and kept it out of any
debate. But the confidence in the state seemed to be shattered after the quake when the
state was too slow to reach the devastated areas. For two days the rescue and relief
teams could not get to the stricken zones, thus causing a public outcry. Added to the
public concern was the fact that military units, which usually rush to earthquake zones
within a short period of time, according to past experiences, were missing this time.
There were claims that the military concentrated too much on the rescue work at its de-
stroyed Golcuk Naval Base and was unable to pay enough attention to the civilian set-
tlements in the area. See Turkish Probe, 29 August 1998, p. 2.

The sign of declining confidence in these parties was the progressive decrease in their
votes. For the decrease in their votes from 1987 to 1995, see Nilufer Narli and Sinan
Dirlik. 1996. ‘Türkiye’nin Siyasi Haritası’ (‘the Political Map of Turkey’), Yeni Turkiye
Dergisi, No. 9, May–June, p. 125–151. In the April 1999 general elections the most
dramatic loser was the center-of-left People’s Republican Party. With just 8.9% of the
vote, it fell below the national 10% threshold. The center-of-right parties were also
among the biggest losers. The True Path Party obtained only 12.1% of the votes and the
Motherland Party polled 13.3% of the total votes.

244 Narli

politicians and the Parliament.

With that decline, votes have shifted to the

peripheral Islamist and ultra-nationalist parties, resulting in government in-
stability. For example, Turkey had three coalition governments following
the 1995 elections.

At the same time, the military enjoyed further support

from the general population and civil society (i.e., trade unions, women’s
groups, and other organizations with liberal tendencies and even those with
left-leaning orientation

) to suppress the anti-secularist currents in the

rhetoric and activities of the Welfare party and its Islamist supporters dur-
ing the Welfare-True Path government (July 1996–June 1997).

Support

for the military’s watchdog rule continues today because the military and a
larger segment of the society believe that unless the civilians are not strong

The opinion polls demonstrate a declining public confidence in the politicians, but an
overwhelming public trust in the country’s armed forces, which consistently top the lists
of most trusted institutions. A December 1996 survey revealed that only 16.6% of those
questioned said that they trusted politicians, falling to 14.4% in January 1998 and then
rising to 21.6% in June 1999 before sliding to 15.0% in September 1999. The same sur-
veys showed that in December 1996 81.3% of those questioned said that they trusted the
armed forces, compared with 78.8% in January 1997 and 78.9% in June 1999. For re-
sults of the opinion polls conducted by Piar-Gallup, see Milliyet, 8 November 1999.

After the short-lived Motherland-True Path (DYP) government collapsed in 1996, the
Welfare Party (RP) formed a coalition government with Tansu Ciller’s True Path Party.
The RP-DYP coalition broke down due to a dispute over the passage of an eight-year
compulsory education law recommended by the National Security Council (NSC) on 28
February 1997 meeting. Later in July 1997 the Motherland Party, led by Mesut Yılmaz
formed a coalition government with the Democratic Left Party and the Democratic Tur-
key Party.

Along with the big business and liberal groups many former hard-line leftists (members
of the Revolutionary Worker’s Union, DISK), who had borne the brunt of military pres-
sure following the 1980 coup, supported the 1997 military-led drive to oust the Islamist-
led coalition.

Along with the dispute over the eight-year compulsory education, the former crisis cre-
ated by the Welfare Party mayors and deputies, whose anti-secular rhetoric and activi-
ties agitated secular public opinion, played a role in provoking the military. These de-
velopments exacerbated tension between the military and the Welfare Party. It had been
building due to: a disagreement over the expulsion of the Islamist officers from the army
in December 1996; the Welfare Party’s attempt to sign a defense co-operation agree-
ment with Iran in 1997; Welfare’s call for lifting the ban on head-covering for female
university students and the civil servants; the dispute over building a mosque at Istan-
bul’s Taksim Square; the Iranian-inspired Jerusalem Night (31 January 1997) in the Wel-
fare-controlled Sincan district of Ankara (where anti-regime slogans were shouted); and
Erbakan’s reluctance to sign NSC’s recommendations (formulated at the 28 February
1997 meeting). Moreover, RP’s anti-democratic position on a number of developments
disappointed the secular public opinion. The problem came out when Refah’s support
for the constitutional arrangements of the state looked ambiguous. Its interest to main-
tain Turkey as a secular state was not clearly stated. This alarmed the public opinion,
which welcomed the military’s involvement to maintain the secular structure in Turkey.

Turkey

245

enough to defend a democratic secular state, the military has the legiti-
macy to exercise political influence.

3.2 Fragile Concordance

The tenacious climate of terrorism created by the ultra-left and the right in
the 1970s and the threat posed by the PKK

since the early 1980s, com-

bined with the unstable environment in the Middle East, have shaped the
relationship between the Turkish Armed Forces (TAF), political institu-
tions, and society. The TAF’s influence on government, industry, and the
ethos of the Turkish people illustrates how integrated the civil and military
spheres in Turkey are. However, not every sector of society supports the
military’s interventionist role in Turkish politics. Whereas there is broad
political and social agreement on the military’s involvement when the na-
tion is threatened from foreign forces or domestic radicals, a sizeable mi-
nority including Islamist and pro-Kurdish groups, as well as liberals and
leftists, have become increasingly vocal in challenging the armed forces.
Thus, concordance among the military, the government,

and society is

fragile and fluctuating. Turkey experienced military interventions in 1960,
1971, 1980, and 1997. These interventions largely came in times of crisis
when civil-military relations were strained and the army command per-
ceived that the country was in mortal danger due to anti-state activities,

The military’s conviction that the civilians are weak to defend the system is docu-
mented. According to one high-ranking officer: “Once the Turkish people begin to use
the democratic system, then we won’t want to intervene. Nor would we be able to inter-
vene even if we wanted to.” Quoted by Gareth Jenkins. 2001. Context and Circum-
stance: The Turkish Military and Politics, Adelphi Paper 337. Published by Oxford
University press for International Institute for Strategic Studies, February 2001, p.19.

The PKK (the outlawed Kurdish Worker’s Party) was founded in 1978 under the leader-
ship of Abdullah Ocalan and launched a guerrilla war against the Turkish state in Au-
gust 1984 and since then the state has mobilized its resources to suppress the PKK ter-
rorism. See Ismet Imset. 1992. The PKK: A Report on Separatist Violence in Turkey
1979–1992. Istanbul: Turkish Daily News Publications; and Nader Enterssar. 1992.
Kurdish Ethnonationalism. London. Lynne Reinner Publisher. Ocalan was captured in
February 1999. This had ended a period of flight for the PKK chief who began in Octo-
ber 1998, when he had been flushed out of his base in Damascus following heavy Turk-
ish pressure on Syria. On 31 May 1999 Ocalan faced the State security Court and he was
given death sentence (on 28 June 1999). The verdict now goes to the High Court of Ap-
peals. Following that, if this court upholds the decision, Parliament must then approve it
before the final word goes to the presidency.

Other scholars also observed a type of agreement or the harmony between the military
and the governments since 1983. See Sakallioglu, 1997, p. 151.

246 Narli

which government could not control. After each coup, concordance among
the three main actors was restored.

With regard to the first of Schiff’s four indicators of concordance, the

composition of the officer corps, Turkey differs from Western Europe and
the United States. The army brass’ professionalism is distinguished by an
intimate and informal Turkish culture; the corps is not a separate and ex-
clusionary institution. Rather, it is comprised of a group of elite soldiers
who sustain a citizens’ army largely by maintaining the respect and trust of
the citizen soldiers. The officer corps does not exclude any group, but it
largely consists of urban men from Central Anatolia and the Aegean and
Marmara regions.

These officers are modern and secular, and are com-

mitted to Ataturkist ideals.

Most citizens have not demonstrated any op-

position to this composition, nor have they favored expelling anti-
Ataturkist officers from the army.

The consensus over the corps’ composition can be explained by analyz-

ing Shiff’s second indicator, recruitment method. In Turkey, the military is
not seen as a separate institution within society, despite the highly selec-
tive recruitment

of the officer corps. Rather, it is seen as a home, a

“Prophet’s hearth” (Peygamber ocagı) or soldiers’ hearth (asker ocagı).
Military service, though compulsory for all Turkish men since 1927, is
seen as a national duty and heroic mission because citizens have been so-
cialized with values promoting the army’s role as protector of the state.
The army also engages in public relations work by promoting its “national

James Brown’s study on the demographic background of the officer corps (in 1982–84)
showed that a large proportion of the War Colleges’ cadets and War Academy officers’
origins were urban areas and they often came from the following regions: Central Ana-
tolia (29.2%), Marmara and Aegean Sea (29.1%), Black Sea (12.7 per cent) and Medi-
terranean (12.4%). While they were fairly represented, officers from Eastern (10.4 per-
cent) and Southeastern region (6.3%) were relatively under-represented. See James
Brown. 1989, p. 394–395, Table 3 and Table 4.

The military developed an identity and mission inspired by the achievements of Ataturk
and dedicated to their maintenance. Mehmet Ali Birand, 1991. Shirts of Steel, An Anat-
omy of the Turkish Armed Forces. London and New York: I. B. Tauris, is particularly
good at describing the philosophy of the Turkish military. It provides a keen insight into
how Turkey’s armed forces, particularly the strong corps, view Ataturk, the state, the
military, politics, and civilians.

The Supreme Military Council takes the decision of expelling the officers who have
Islamist and separatist or extremist tendencies.

The military is very selective in the recruitment and education of the officer corps. Can-
didates for military careers, selected according to strict social, political and intellectual
criteria undergo intensive training in special schools that are beyond the jurisdiction of
the ministry of national education. Along with military training, they follow university-
level courses in history, sociology, political science, and economics.

Turkey

247

security concept” to raise citizens’ consciousness about internal and exter-
nal threats that it identifies. It does not differentiate internal and external
treats or between threats to the country’s territorial integrity and to the
Ataturkist principles enshrined in the Turkish Constitution.

Both the sol-

diers and the citizens firmly believe that it is their duty to protect the
motherland and do not let any enemy grasp a piece of it.

Conscription has become a major rite of passage for young males and a

source of identity construction.

Typically, young men postpone marriage

until after they’ve served their two years in the army and often have a hard
time finding jobs before their term of service. The glorification of the mili-
tary is inculcated through the primary and secondary socialization. The
school system teaches: “Every Turkish citizen is a willing, fearless soldier
in our army which protects the independence and integrity of the country.
Our army is the symbol of our national unity and the guarantee of our fu-
ture, which fulfils its duty to the letter.”

Of course, not every conscript

shares this glorified perception of the military. Initiation into the army is
celebrated, with farewell ceremonies organized by new soldiers’ friends
and nationalist groups (ulkucu). While soldiers are motivated by patriot-
ism, officers have additional rewards such as monetary remuneration and
quality living conditions. Turkey’s past military successes and its interna-
tionally recognized contribution to peacekeeping forces from Somalia to
Bosnia have given the armed forces added prestige in Turkish society, as
has its modern and secular worldview. The army, and hence recruits,
represents and guards the nation’s Ataturkist ideals and soldiers are edu-
cated and socialized to internalize these secular values.

With respect to political decision-making, a third indicator, Turkey’s

history is split between civilian and military rule. Members of Parliament
are popularly elected civilians, though in some cases, a legislative decision
is a compromise between the military and the civilian government. As
mentioned above, the semi-military National Security Council is a consti-
tutional body and its recommendations are given priority in the legislative

For example, see Chief of staff, Gen. Kivrikoglu, TGS Press Office, Announcement No.
30, March 17, 2000. Turkish Armed Forces web site, http://www.tsk.mil.tr; and Chief of
Staff Gen. Huseyin Kivrikoglu’s message on 76

anniversary of the foundation of the

Turkish republic. Author’s translation. Anadolu Ajans, 29 October 1999.

See Ayse Gul Altinay Karayazgan. 1999. ‘Making Citizens and Citizen Soldiers: Mili-
tary Service and National Education in Turkey’, American Ethnological Society Meet-
ings, March 1998, Portland, OR, USA; Ayse Gul Altinay. 1999. ‘Mehmetin Kitabi:
Challenging Narratives of War and Nationalism’, New Perspectives on Turkey, 21
(Fall), p. 125–145.

For example, see Ilkogretim Soysal Bilgiler 5 (Istanbul: Turkish Ministry of Education,
1999), p. 16.

248 Narli

process. Its role in policy-making is very much accepted by a society that
largely supports the military’s watchdog role.

The influence of the Turkish military on the political decision-making is

partly related to its high degree of autonomy vis-à-vis civilian control.

The Chief of Staff (COS), who acts as Commander in Chief during war-
time,

does not fall under the aegis of the minister of defence

, and he

conducts military affairs independent of the cabinet. His office is responsi-
ble for drawing up all programs, principles, and priorities related to per-
sonnel, operations, intelligence, training, education and logistic services,
preparing the armed forces for war, and coordinating among the ground,
naval, and air force commands, as well as other institutions attached to the
general staff. The office also presents its views on the military aspects of
international treaties and agreements, and if necessary, participates in
meetings regarding such agreements.

The armed forces also enjoy auton-

omy in the judicial domain, having their own laws, courts, and judges to
deal with matters concerning military personnel including cases where ci-
vilians

are involved. Considerable economic and financial independence

and means (e.g., military owned companies

) reinforce its political and

Also see Sakallioglu, 1997 for the autonomy of the military in Turkey.

Article 117 of the Constitution stipulates that the office of the Commander-in-Chief is
inseparable from the Turkish Grand National Assembly and that the President of the Re-
public holds it. According to the same article of the Constitution, the Council of Minis-
ters are responsible to the Turkish Grand National Assembly for national security and
for the preparation of the Armed Forces for the defense of the country. The article says,
“The Chief of the General Staff is the commander of the Armed Forces, and, in time of
war, exercises the duties of the Commander-in-Chief on behalf of the President of the
Republic.” See www.mfa.gov.tr/b6.htm.

The Turkish General Staff is not subordinate to the Ministry of Defense, but to the
Prime Ministry as under the current Constitution. Article 117 of the 1982 Constitution,
which closely resembles Articles 40 and 110 of the 1924 and 1961 Constitutions respec-
tively, states that the Chief of the General Staff is “appointed by the President of the Re-
public on the proposal of the Council of Ministers” and “responsible to the Prime Minis-
ter in the exercise of his duties and powers”.

The General Directorate of Press and Information. 1990. Turkey: An Official Handbook,
p. 60.

Any public criticism of the military found to be “belittling and defaming” (Turkish Pe-
nal Code, Article 159) can result in being sentenced up to six years in the prison. Such
cases are civil criminal courts. Secondly, under Turkish Penal Code Article 155, a public
speech or written text found to be containing an aim of “alienating the people from the
military” is a crime and tried in General Staff Criminal Court. Crimes of opinion are of-
ten tried in state security courts that were presided over by high-ranking officers until
the Ocalan case in 2000.

For example, the main one OYAK is a vast composite “comprising some 30 enterprises
in sectors as diverse as automobile manufacturing, cement work, food processing,

Turkey

249

judicial autonomy. It is the COS, not the Prime Minister, Cabinet, or Par-
liament, who overseas arms production and procurement. It is the General
Staff that draws up the annual budget of the armed forces that absorbed
almost 18%

of the state budget before the February 21 economic crisis.

The crisis, which raised inflation, the rate of unemployment, and the num-
ber of small business going bankrupt and made the labor and business sec-
tor restless – and required the military to revise its budget and to adopt a
policy of transparency at a time when public opinion was more concerned
with public expenses.

Some groups, ironically including the Islamists

and a segment of the

liberals, opposing the military’s independent power and autonomy advo-
cate amending the Constitution to curtail the military’s influence in the
NSC and to subordinate the Chief of the General Staff to the Ministry of
Defense. It is also one of Brussels’ targets

to reconsider Article 118 that

establishes the NSC as a coordinating body shaping the legislation and its
implementation. The subordination of the General Staff to the Ministry of
Defense rather than to the Prime Ministry as under the current Constitution
is often cited as one of the main criteria for civilian control of the military.
The Turkish military has traditionally resisted such a change, arguing that,
“given the way in which the political system operates in Turkey, politi-
cians would then attempt to exercise patronage and interfere in the day-to-
day running of the armed forces.”

pesticides, petroleum, tourism, insurance, banking, real estates, supermarkets and high
technology.” See Eric Rouleau. 2000, p. 109.

The Turkish General Staff declared to the public that it planed to revise its budget with
an aim of reducing the expenses. It also planed to adopt a policy of transparency and
aims to explain the share some information with the public while considering the impor-
tance of confidentiality. The General Secretary of the General Stuff issued a press re-
lease explaining that the military expenses were to be reduced and the projects that have
“no priority” would be postponed or canceled. It also underlined that the military ex-
penses that had been 18 percent of the total state budget (almost 3.5% of GNP) since
1984 (when the PKK launched guerrilla war against the state) is to be the 10.6% of the
budget in 2001. The military decided to postpone 32 projects in order to save US $ 19.5
billion. See Radikal, 12 April 2001.

For example, the Islamists and the Welfare Party mentioned this attempt a number of
times in 1997.

Eric Rouleau argued that Brussels target a change in the Constitution and “transforma-
tion of the NSC into an informal and extra-constitutional consultative body with a civil-
ian majority”. Eric Rouleau. 2000, p. 106.

For the opinion of the military on this, see Gareth Jenkins. 2001. Context and Circum-
stance: The Turkish Military and Politics. Adelphi Paper, 337. Published by Oxford
University press for International Institute for Strategic Studies, February 2001, Chapter
III, footnotes 10 and 11, p. 44.

250 Narli

The last indicator, military style, reflects the military’s preeminent role

in Turkish society and its function as a modernizing agent in a country that
was largely a peasant society just 50 years ago. External appearance is of
extreme importance. A military uniform is supposed to be neat and be-
speak quality, and an officer in uniform must give the impression that he is
prompt, well mannered, a man of authority and a role model. Additionally,
an officer’s wife and children are also required to be well dressed and
adopt a modern way of life. Officers’ clubs offering all types of sports and
social activities are important socializing agents for elite soldiers, who are
at once distant from society, yet are perceived to be an organic part of it.

3.3 Turkey’s Accession to the European Union and Civil-

Military Partnership

Constitutionally, the army’s role in politics was profoundly affected by
Turkey’s bid to become a full member of the European Union. After be-
coming a candidate for eventual accession at the EU Summit in Helsinki in
1999, the European Commission added details to the broad principles out-
lined in the “Copenhagen criteria” by issuing an Accession Partnership
Document for Turkey detailing the reforms Turkey would need to imple-
ment before the start of accession negotiations. Besides improvements in
the human right regime and the treatment of minorities and expanding the
civil liberties, they required the government to “align the constitutional
role of the National Security Council as an advisory body to the govern-
ment in accordance with the practice of EU member states”.

The Docu-

ment did not spell out precisely what the “practice of EU member states”
was. However, the Democratic Left Party-led coalition government pre-
sumed that the NSC’s functions would need to be reduced to advising
rather than acting as a coordinating body influencing legislative-decision-
making process and that its scope of advising need to be limited to ques-
tions affecting national defence and security. In order to change its func-
tions, it was decided to reform the composition of the NSC, so as to give
civilian members a majority. Accordingly, after an internal debate, the Par-
liament altered Article 118 of the Constitution (on 17 October 2001) so as
to make the Deputy Prime Minister(s)

and the Minister of Justice mem-

bers of the Council. As a result, the civilian members of the NSC are
in a majority. More significantly, the mandatory nature of the Council’s

Turkey: 2000 Accession Partnership (Annex to Proposal for a Council Decision, Com-
mission of the European Communities, Brussels, 8 November 2000): text from website
of the EU Commission Representation in Turkey (www.deltur.cec.eu.int).

In the current AKP government there are three Deputy Prime Ministers.

Turkey

251

decisions for the government provided for in the previous version of Arti-
cle 118 (see above) was significantly reduced. According to the new text
of the Article:

The National Security Council shall submit to the Council of Ministers

its views on the advisory decisions that are taken and ensuring the neces-
sary conditions with regard to the formulation, establishment and imple-
mentation of the national security policy of the state. The Council of Min-
isters shall evaluate decisions of the National Security Council concerning
the measures that it deems necessary for the preservation of the existence
and independence of the state, the integrity and indivisibility of the country
and the peace and security of society.

Following the electoral victory of the AKP in the November 2002 gen-

eral elections, a law giving effect to the new version of Article 118 was
passed by Parliament on 15 January 2003. It gave a far more restricted
definition of the fields on which the NSC was entitled to make decisions
by altering the former National Security Council Law of 1983 (Law No.
2945) that defined national security in such broad terms that it could, if
necessary, be interpreted as covering almost every policy area. The new
law states that the National Security Council “takes advisory decisions re-
garding the determination, establishment and execution of the national se-
curity policy of the state” and provided that it “informs the Council of
Ministers of these views, measures and principles and the advisory deci-
sions which it has determined, and carried out its other duties provided for
by law”.

The AKP government has given priority to the reforms targeting trans-

formation of the functions of the NSC and expansion of civil liberties in
order to start accession talks with the EU as soon as possible. This is
changing civil-military relations in the direction of increased governmental
control and less military influence in political decision-making process.
This has created tension between the AKP government and the military
that is discussed below.

1982 Constitution, as amended on 17 October 2001.

Law regarding the change in the Law of National Security Council and National Secu-
rity Council Secretariat (‘Milli Guvenlik Kurulu ve Milli Guvenlik Kurulu Genel Sek-
reterligi Kanununda Degisiklik Yapilmasina Dair Kanun’), No. 4789, of 15 January
2002, Article 2: text from website of Grand National Assembly of Turkey
(www.tbmm.gov.tr/kanunlar).

252 Narli

3.4 The AKP Government: A Turning Point in the

Partnership?

Before it gained a landslide victory in 2002 November’s parliamentary
elections, the Islamic roots of the Justice and Development Party (AKP)
prompted suspicion in military circles. And despite repeated AKP insis-
tence that its political approach is moderate, and that it should not be com-
pared to the Islamist government pushed out of power in February 1997,
there has been tension in the AKP government-military relations. The ten-
sion is related to three main issues. The first issue is the Foreign Ministry
circular advising embassies to improve links with Milli Gorus, a conserva-
tive Islamic group with a wide following in Europe’s massive Turkish Di-
aspora and to support Fettullah Gulen Schools.

Secondly, Turkish mili-

tary leaders are increasingly concerned by government moves to replace
senior bureaucrats with “AKP-loyalists”.

The AKP-military tension burst into the open on 23 April when top gen-

erals, along with President Ahmet Necdet Sezer and opposition politicians,
declined to attend a reception hosted by parliamentary speaker Bulent
Arinc to celebrate the anniversary of the Parliament’s foundation. The
cause of the boycott was an announcement that Arinc’s head-scarfed wife
would attend the reception. Those staying away from the reception viewed
the announcement as a political challenge to Turkish secularism. Ulti-
mately, Arinc backed down, saying his wife would not attend.

Amidst the uneasiness in the government-military relations, the military

came under heavy criticism from top US officials for not assuming a
“strong leadership role” to support the deployment of the US troops.

indicator of the challenges confronting the Turkish military was the length
of the April 30 meeting of the National Security Council (NSC), which
provides a monthly opportunity for Turkey’s top brass to discuss policy
with civilian political leaders. That NSC session lasted seven-and-a-half
hours, the longest such meeting in several years. In sharp contrast, the

On April 20, 2003 Radikal daily reported: ‘On April 16, 2003, Gul sent two circulars to
the embassies abroad. Circular No. 3847 states: Milli Gorus is not a harmful organisa-
tion. Its activities shall be supported by the embassies. Ambassadors and diplomats
should attend its functions organised by Milli Gorus. Its members should be given repre-
sentation in the official delegations.’ The second one, Circular 3848 orders supporting
the Fettullah Gulen schools. Quoted in Radikal, ‘Gul: Milli Gorus Genelgesi Normal’
(National View Circular is Normal). April 20, 2003.

In March, one third of the 365 AK Party lawmakers voted against the motion to allow
the deployment of foreign troops in Turkey and to send Turkish troops abroad. This cre-
ated tension in the US-Turkishrelations.

Turkey

253

statement released following the meeting was startlingly brief: one sen-
tence reaffirming that “secularism must be meticulously protected”.

The third issue is related to the reform packages prepared by the AKP

government to meet the Copenhagen criteria and move forward to the ac-
cession talks. Since last November, the government has stepped back from
plans to introduce an appeal system to State Security Courts, retracted
criticism of the army’s right to expel soldiers suspected of religious ex-
tremism, and failed to persuade the bureaucracy of the need to grant
greater cultural rights to the Kurdish people. In May, the AKP introduced a
new reform package aiming at a change in the anti-terror law; to declare
general amnesty to the PKK militants, provided that they surrender; and to
expand cultural rights to the Kurds.

The tension was further deepened by an article

which hinted that

young officers are unhappy with AKP policies. This became a hot topic of
debate in the press. In responding to the debate, on May 25, Prime Minis-
ter Recep Tayip Erdogan said: “It is a lie … there is harmony between our
military and the government.”

The next day, on May 26, the Chief of

General Staff, General Hilmi Ozkok made a press conference. General Oz-
kok clarified the situation by saying: “there is no specific group or ranks in
the military whose members feel unease with the policies. But there is a
shared concern over the appointment of extremist bureaucrats by the gov-
ernment.” On question of the EU membership, Ozkok said: “The military
supports Turkey’s membership of the EU, as reaching contemporary civi-
lization envisaged by Ataturk. When we (the military) have concerns, we
tell them to the government.”

It seems that the issues identified above

created discordance in the civil-military relations.

4 Conclusions

Cultural and institutional factors, such as Schiff’s four indicators, offer a
clear explanation of civil-military relations in Turkey. Despite their formal
separation, military and civilian authorities have forged a partnership
based on an imperfect concordance among the military, political elites, and
the citizenry. This ruling style is the product of Turkey’s specific cultural,
social, and institutional context, featuring a stratified society and political

Mustafa Balbay: ‘Genç subaylar tedirgin’ in Cumhuriyet Daily, 23 May 2003.

For the discussion on the young officers and Erdogan’s reply, see ‘Genc Subaylar
Sikintisi Yok’ (‘There is no Unease of Young Officers’) in

www.havadis.net/haberdevami.asp?id=10244.

See Turkish dailies on 26 and 27 May 2003.

254 Narli

culture as well as historic conflicts with neighboring states and the con-
stant fear of losing territory synonymous with national integrity. Such con-
ditions significantly influence the military’s role in the nation. Ataturk’s
victorious army was initially divorced from politics in the name of creating
a democratic republic. But, the military has gradually gained a stronger
presence in politics, with broad public support. Throughout the period of
1980–95 the military continued to a have a strong influence in Turkish
politics. Although the international environment favoured the establish-
ment of democratic systems and the then Prime Minister Ozal tried to cur-
tail the political power of the officer corps, the military was able to sustain
its political influence because of the separatist Kurdish insurgency and the
inability of the politicians to function as an autonomous socio-political
group. The military did not only succeed in maintaining its political influ-
ence but even increased its economic and political power in the second
half of the 1990s. The military’s political role has entered a new era in the
late 1990s and would be carried much into the 21

century.

Despite the concordance between the military and the citizenry regard-

ing the army’s involvement in politics, tension has emerged between the
military and certain groups which either challenge the secular nature of the
state (i.e. the Islamists), or its unitary character (i.e. Kurdish nationalists
and separatists). During crises, when the government is incapable of acting
effectively, the military has intervened to settle domestic political affairs.

Since 1960, the military has staged four coups in order to protect na-

tional unity, democracy, and secularism. In each takeover, most citizens
accepted the military’s political involvement because of society’s deep
confidence in the army and its role as an organic part of the society. Al-
though Turkey’s civilian sector is more prominent, the military has consti-
tutional tools at its disposal and an endorsing political culture, should it
choose to play a behind-the-scenes role in the political process. For exam-
ple, there is an institutionalized, consultative relationship at the very top
echelons between the government and the military. When a civilian gov-
ernment is efficient, capable of maintaining political stability, and does not
have strong disagreement with the military, the military’s influence on de-
cision-making is lesser. It exercises more authority in circumstances of po-
litical instability and when there is a growing unease in the civil/military
partnership. Such freedom of action for the army worries some liberals
who desire the progress of democratization without military intervention,
but most citizens are comfortable with the military’s role as guardian of
democracy and secularism. This concordance between the military and the
citizenry is key to understanding civil-military relations in Turkey.

The concordance model also explains the correlation between the

army’s increased professionalism and its enhanced political influence. Po-

Turkey

255

litical scientist Samuel Huntington’s theory,

which assumes the separa-

tion of military and civil authorities, objectives, and activities, suggests
that the higher the professionalism of the military, the lower the military’s
influence in the political domain. Concordance theory, on the other hand,
assumes accommodation and shared objectives among the military, politi-
cal elite, and the citizenry. Enhanced professionalism has better enabled
the military to meet shared objectives in Turkey. Further, its technological
advancement and strength demonstrated successfully against PKK terror-
ism and in international peacekeeping operations, has increased its prestige
in the public’s eye at a time when the people have dramatically lost their
trust in the political parties and Parliament. Its sophistication has also en-
abled it to grasp the complexities of social issues and the needs of the citi-
zenry, and hence, to increase the military’s standing in the public domain.
Moreover, working toward shared objectives with the citizenry may lead to
the erosion of civil-military boundaries, an assumption of the concordance
model. This erosion has seemingly been taking place in Turkey since early
1997. Military officers, for example, joined civilians in celebrating the 75

anniversary of the republic. Military officers in uniform held hands with
civilians and marched in Ankara, Istanbul, and Izmir on October 25, 1998,
symbolically manifesting the removal of civil-military boundaries.

The military’s historic role in building the nation and functioning as an

agent of change to realize the goals of Ataturk’s reforms have given it a re-
spected position in society. Therefore, the government often meets the
military’s stated requirements for modernization and technological ad-
vancement. The public supports such allocations because the army, as
guardian of democracy, is Turkey’s most trusted national institution. Is this
trust subject to challenges? There are very likely challenges because there
is a conflict between the military and radical groups that have a discord
with the larger segment of the society also. They are ungratified by the
military influence in political process and a small number of leftist liberals
endorse their discontent. Among them the Islamists developed an interest
in magnifying the people’s disappointment with the late response of the
army to the disaster caused by the 17 August 1999 earthquake. The army,
however, was quick in responding to the 12 November Duzce quake. This
was significant in re-establishing the public confidence in the army.

Samuel Huntington. 1957. The Soldier and the State: The Theory and Politics of Civil-
Military Relations. Cambridge: Harvard University Press.

Soon after the collapse in public confidence during the national trauma of the August
1999 earthquake, in September 1999 the armed forces still headed the list of trusted in-
stitutions with 65.1%. See Milliyet, 8 November 1999.

256 Narli

The high public faith in the army is not only related to its heroic image,

but also to the fact that it has remained relatively free of the corruption that
has become endemic in both the government and the civil services. Consid-
ering the importance of public trust in the military, the army is highly sen-
sitive to the social and political developments that have consequences for
its image in the public. For example, the military rapidly responded to the
February 21 economic crisis and played down the card of those who were
planning to discredit the military by pointing out its huge budget share
(18%) since 1984 (when the PKK launched guerrilla war against the state).
Efforts to discredit the military would lead to political turmoil rather than
pave the way to further democratization at a time of political instability.

Most important for Turkey’s future stability is the capacity of the civil-

ian governments to maintain harmonious relations with the military. It de-
pends to what extent a civilian government is capable of resolving two ma-
jor conflicts: the political tension created by the cleavages and the unease
between the military and the AKP government. With increased democrati-
zation, higher prospect for the European Union membership and enhanced
political stability, the military would reduce its influence in the political
arena since the higher echelons of the military has evinced anything other
than a strong desire to restore to Turkey a functioning democracy. A con-
viction on part of the military that there is a strong civilian force to protect
the unitary secular state is important to transform the NSC, in all respects,
into an advisory organ rather than a coordinating body. This is one of the
mid-term changes aimed at meeting the “Copenhagen criteria”, as stated in
the Accession Partnership Document issued by the EU Commission and in
the National Program

prepared by the Democratic Left Party-led coalition

government that lasted until November 2002.

Beginning during the former DSP-led Coalition government (1999–

2002) and stepped up by the AKP government, a number of constitutional
reforms and changes in statutes defining the functions and the composition
of the National Security Council have increased civilian influence on the
political decision-making process since 2001. In 2003, civil-military rela-
tions have moved to “the civilian rule/military influence” phase. The AKP
government is highly enthusiastic to make far-reaching reforms in the
functions of the military and in expanding civil liberties in order to start
accession talks with the EU. This enthusiasm is well received by liberal
circles, but some circles are worried about a “secret agenda” that targets
the emasculation of the military’s influence in Turkish politics in order to
Islamize the state.

For the national Program, see http://www.abgs.gov.tr/.

Turkey

257

Appendix

1950 – 1960

1925

1923

1960 – 1961

1961 – 1965

1980 – 1963

1984 – 1991

1991 – 1996 July*

1971 – 1973

1997 Feb*

1965 - 1971

1973 - 1980

1996 July - 1997

Feb*

< – 2002 – 2003

Civilian Rule/

Military Influence

Civilian Control/

Military Partnership

Military Control/
Military Partner-

ship

Military Rule/

Civilian Influence

1 2 3 4

Professionalism

Civilian/Military

Stalemate (or deadlock)

Praetorianism

Fig. 1. Dekmejian’s Civilian-Military Continuum

Note: The following periods are the categorization of the author based on the con-
ceptual scheme developed by Dekmejian:
Turkey 1984 – 1991*
Turkey 1997 – *
Turkey 1991 – 1997*
Turkey 1996 July – 1997 February*
Turkey 2002 November – 2003.

* This is the result of two developments: First,

the amendments in the Constitution and the change in National Security Council
Law to meet the EU criteria that require reducing the role of NSC to advisory
body. Secondly, the urge of the AKP to reduce the military’s control over po-
litical affairs.

James Brown categories the 1983–1989 period to be civilian/military partnership. See
James Brown. 1989. p. 392, Figure 1.

Analysis and Conclusions

Plamen I. Pantev

The authors of the national-case studies provide enough arguments that
confirm the validity of the six major accents of this book.

First, the issue of the evolution of civil-military relations is central for

the transition countries of South East Europe, but of priority value to
Greece and Turkey, too. The democratic control of the security sector is
perceived as one of the pillars of the developing democratic systems in the
individual countries of the region. Maturity of democracies is more clearly
perceived and assessed in connection with the state of the democratic con-
trol over the security sector in the individual countries: a welcome devel-
opment after the many post-Yugoslav wars in the Western Balkans.

Second, though disparities in the levels of evolution of democratic civil-

military relations still exist in the individual countries of South East
Europe, the tendencies and directions of the developing issue indicate a
value of homogeneity in that area that has never existed before. This is a
solid guarantee that forming a regional security community has passed a
philosophic turning point that can be hardly reversed. This does not mean
that the security threats and instability are overcome and that stability in
the Western Balkans is irreversible. Henriette Riegler gives solid indica-
tors of the real difficulties on the road ahead, especially with the legacies
of the post-Yugoslav wars. It is due to these wars, writes the Austrian
scholar that “this area was and to a degree without equal still is one of im-
mense insecurity”. The legacy of totalitarian party control in the Balkan
countries is also reflected negatively on the state institution building in the
region.

Third, the national evolution of civil-military relations in South East

Europe in the beginning of the 21

century proves the validity of an older

tendency towards integration of the region into NATO and the EU. Mem-
bership in NATO and the EU, whether close or distant, remains the chief
motivator for security sector reform. Maturity on issues of civil-military
relations in the individual countries is achieved very much by the induce-
ment stemming from the opportunity and promise of future NATO and EU
membership.

260 Pantev

Fourth, third-generation reform of the issues in the area of democratic

control of the security sector has been launched in parallel to the ongoing
first and/or second-generation reforms. This strange situation stems from
the need to fight terrorism and to reach more effective democracy by coun-
tering in an international cooperative manner security problems and chal-
lenges. The slower pace of evolution of the issues in some of the countries
of South East Europe pertain to incomplete or unfinished first and/or sec-
ond-generation reforms.

Fifth, the national case studies reflect a growing awareness by the peo-

ple of the individual states about the importance of security and stability
for the improvement of their standard of living. This is a fundamental pre-
requisite for the further deepening of the security sector reform and the
evolution of democratic control. Understanding the meaning of good gov-
ernance of the security sector in the individual Balkan countries may be-
come a major vehicle of the broader reform process of the societies in the
region, especially of the transition countries.

Sixth, the fight on terrorism and the national and regional contribution

to that fight is well realized by the people of South East Europe, though the
urgency of that issue is not yet reflected well in the opinion polls of some
of the countries. There is a link between the stability of the states and the
activities of organised crime and terrorism. Some of the West Balkan
countries bear that dangerous potential. The author of the chapter on the
theoretic preconditions of fighting terrorism notes the need to take ade-
quate measures through democratic procedures to legally narrow the room
for manoeuvre of the terrorist groups that would choose the Balkans in
their schemes. Protecting democratic liberties and rights of the people,
notes Richard Cohen, is another major challenge for the Balkan people.
Though the author concentrates on the effects of 9/11 on both the old and
new democracies, and on the respective risks for their societies, he points
to the specific opportunities for the countries of South East Europe to
complete the started changes of their defence establishments despite the
pressure of the terrorist threat. At this point he considers the pressure of
terrorism on the USA and Western Europe more ominous than on South
East Europe. “It would be a grave mistake writes Cohen, if the war on ter-
ror is used to tighten constraints on fledgling democratic freedoms. Cur-
tailment of freedoms in the name of security in the new democracies must
not be allowed to damage the growing ties between the soldier and the so-
ciety that he or she is entrusted to protect.”

A new perspective of measuring the maturity of civil-military relations

is introduced in the regional discourse on the topic by the contribution
of Jean-Jacques de Dardel. He studies the legal, political and practical as-
pects of the operational interrelations of international humanitarian law,

Analysis

and

Conclusions

261

democratic control of the security sector and the security sector reform in a
new strategic environment. The author notes that as more detailed divi-
sions of labour are set in the security sector special attention will have to
be given to what rules of humanitarian law, human rights, or other bodies
of law will apply. This is most likely to be the case in peacekeeping opera-
tions abroad – an activity which is definitely on the rise. South East
Europe is likely to be not only the locus of foreign involvement in peace
support, but also a net provider of peace support units and personnel for
multilateral operations. The question becomes even more important due to
the process of expansion of international humanitarian law and its bridge-
building to human rights law. The author underlines danger of abandoning
the rigour of international humanitarian law and its role as a bulwark
against barbarity during the period of the security sector reform. A specific
warning by the author, concerning the peculiarities of South East Europe is
formulated in this way:

As security sector reform unfolds in South East Europe, just as else-

where, the performance and lasting validity of international humanitarian
law must go on looming large over all temptations to justify, in retrospect,
the ghastly violations of the past, as it remains axiomatically true that no
amount of wrong makes a right.

As for the fight against terrorism and its apparently necessary rule of

exception, writes the author, it must be stressed that any crackdown and
outright frontal counter-measure will be short lived, if the feeding grounds
of terrorism do not subside. Whatever the measures taken, popular support
for terrorist organisations is likely to dwindle at a fast pace if serious
breaches of humanitarian rules and ideals feed general resentment in those
communities, from which the terrorists originate…

The benefits of a certain form of restraint and the upholding of higher

values will always outweigh those of unruly coercion, especially when it
comes to fighting an ideological battle for the soul of the social and politi-
cal next-of-kin-terrorists. J.-J. de Dardel proposes a set of humanitarian
law requirements when defining and operating security sector reform in
the effort to meet today’s security challenges. He calls them the initial
‘seven humane pillars of wisdom’ that no democratic society should do
without. One can hardly disagree with the conclusion of this author, who
prefers to continue thinking not only humanely, but also strategically and
with a long-term perspective in dealing with the terrorist threat.

The articles on the general prerequisites of fighting terrorism, the secu-

rity threat situation in South East Europe, continuity and change in the
field after the launch of the fight on terrorism and the international hu-
manitarian law/human rights law provide additional background to the na-
tional-case studies. Any draft of typology or classification of the countries

262 Pantev

of South East Europe on the basis of “civil-military relations evolution and
state of the democratic control and reform of the security sector” is only
conditional: the aim is just to highlight peculiarities of a process, which
encompasses the whole region and all states without exceptions. All three
generations of civil-military relations reforms are present in the region and
develop, though at different velocities and levels of maturity, towards a
common target: covering the requirements of being NATO, PfP and EU
members. This constitutes a great change, compared to the state of affairs
some three years ago. The region of South East Europe is becoming more
stable thanks to a democratic progress of the individual societies in the
area of civil-military relations too. A level of common culture on the issues
of democratic control and security sector reform has already been reached
by the countries of South East Europe that would caution and deter any
more ambitious effort to reverse the evolution or impose standards that
would deviate substantially from the generally agreed and accepted
Europe-wide and NATO-wide. It is a fact that the third generation of re-
form in this sector, stemming from the need to fight terrorism and build-up
national democracy more effectively is also a part of the current thinking
in the countries of South East Europe and an instrument to close the gaps
between the states of the regions, concerning the level of realization of
the first, the second and the third generations of reform of civil-military
relations.

Having said that, and realizing the commonality of the objectives in that

area, we still need to be fair and objective in pointing the problems and dif-
ficulties for each case. They are reasons for the different assessments, what
road the countries have passed and what remains to be covered.

Greece is a special case of highly developed country that has succeeded

to borrow effectively from the experience of its NATO and EU member-
ship and to focus on the most urgent issues of security sector reform that
many developed countries faced in the post-Cold War era and after 9/11.
According to Thanos Dokos Greece still needs to match the best experi-
ence of some other EU members in utilizing civilian expertise and the po-
tential of the media. Coping with the “Ocalan” and “17 November” cases
show mature civil-military relations can overcome real hard issues within
the confines of democracy.

Slovenia is a positive example of a country with progressing civil-

military relations from another perspective: it is one of the post-
Communist and of the post-Yugoslav countries that shows the way for the
other ex-Yugoslav states how to achieve maturity in civil-military relations
and reach the goals of membership in both NATO and EU. Marijan Male-
sic and Ljubica Jelusic have provided a fair and balanced picture of the ex-
isting problems and negative tendencies. A dubious assessment is given on

Analysis

and

Conclusions

263

the way terrorism is perceived in an increasingly indifferent Slovenian so-
ciety – as 17

in importance out of 19 threats. This leaves room for further

study of a generally highly successful case. Hungary is very much in the
same grouping of successful cases. Tibor Babos and Linda Roger have
highlighted in detail the remaining deficiencies in one of the reforming in-
stitutions of the security sector – intelligence. This young NATO and EU
member, according to the authors still needs to improve its intelligence to
match the requirements of fighting terrorism. The Hungarian case study
may serve as a useful model in going into more details on the topic of de-
mocratic oversight of the intelligence services of the other countries of
South East Europe. The Bulgarian and the Romanian cases fall into this
same grouping. The self-critical Bulgarian case study presents the prob-
lems linked with completing the tasks of adaptation to NATO membership,
with the start of the security sector reform and with the adaptation to fight-
ing terrorism (and organised criminality) while staying in the framework
of democratic attitudes. The Romanian case gives a detailed picture of the
accomplishments in preparing and starting the fight on terrorism. It would
be correct to notice that Romania continues to work on an agenda of cover-
ing the requirements of the defence reform that did not finish with its for-
mal integration into the Alliance.

One of the most interesting and important cases of the evolving South

East European democratic societies and regional security community is
Turkey. Nilufer Narli’s paper addresses the peculiarities of the relationship
between the military and the civilian authorities by explaining the histori-
cal role of the army in Turkish politics and society. This paper adds sub-
stantially to the richness of individual cases in South East Europe. The au-
thor explains the factors that have enabled the military to influence Turkish
politics in the name of protecting national unity, democracy and secular-
ism. In order to understand Turkey’s complex civil-military relations at a
time when the international actors and pro-EU national circles assess
whether its domestic policies comply with the Copenhagen criteria for EU
membership, one needs to be aware of the composition of the Turkish offi-
cer corps, the military conscription method, and military style in conjunc-
tion with the way the military influences the political decision-making
process. Yet a major perceptual problem remains unsolved: apart from un-
derstanding the complex nature of Turkish civil-military by outsiders, Tur-
key needs to understand the pressing nature of democratic control over the
armed forces and the broader security sector in the democratic society. The
EU will hardly compromise the fundamental geo-political advantages of
having Turkey in the Union. The EU and other democratic nations and
friends of Turkey expect Turkish society to evolve and generate the institu-
tions and mechanisms up to a level when the ultimate defender of secular

264 Pantev

democracy will be Turkish society itself, not the country’s military. This is
not an easy job, but Turkey has the potential to solve this issue, as well as
the understanding by neighbours and friends – NATO, EU and prospective
EU members. This study is an important stepping stone on this road.

The studies of the Albanian, Croatian and Macedonian national cases

allow us to propose another grouping of countries developing their civil-
military relations and democratic societies. The criteria are the similarities
in the positive developments and the persistence of major, though differing
in quality and magnitude in the individual cases, deficiencies in Albania,
Croatia and FYROM. All three countries have clear perspectives of work-
ing to join NATO by implementing their respective MAP programmes. All
three states have made the strategic decision to cooperate in their efforts to
join the Alliance. All three Western Balkan countries have clarity of pur-
pose: to contribute to regional stability. The perspective of integrating in
the EU is of a more short-to-mid term probability for Croatia, of a mid-to-
longer term perspective for FYROM, and of a longer-term perspective for
Albania. Croatia needs to cope with four distinct problems, according to
Mladen Stanicic: lack of awareness and understanding of the differences
between the concepts of defence and security; discrepancy of legal provi-
sions and their implementation; lack of competence of both civilian and
military in exercising the new concept of civil-military relations, and, the
difficult general economic situation that slows down the process of imple-
mentation of the concept.

Blendi Kajsiu has pointed at the continuing influence of negative fac-

tors, pulling the country back in its efforts to build-up modern civil-
military relations: economic and social deficiencies; state weakness, and
the legacy of the past. According to him several features are specific of the
inadequacies in that sector: legislative and procedural vacuum in military
resources management and defence budget formulation; inadequate ex-
change between the Executive and the Parliament; inadequate communica-
tion among the parliamentary committees; under- and unqualified staff of
the parliamentary committees responsible for democratic oversight of the
security sector; asymmetry of expertise of the Ministry of Defence and the
Parliament disturbingly in favour of the executive branch; inadequate secu-
rity think-tank activity, and inadequate resources for organising the fight
against terrorism.

Petar Atanasov is rather optimistic that the state of civil-military rela-

tions in Macedonia does not differ significantly from other countries
in the region. However, the author soberly adds that despite the efforts of
the various state and non-governmental players in the field of security, de-
spite the closer involvement of both the EU and NATO, Macedonia con-
tinues to be at a very immature level of its civil-military relations because

Analysis

and

Conclusions

265

of persisting instability caused by the continuing ethnic conflict and the ex-
istence and violence inflicted by armed units of illegal organisations. In
this situation Macedonia is bogged down in “first-generation” reforms and
is ineffective in the efforts of implementing the “second-generation” re-
forms. Atanasov further notes the impact of the absence of experienced
staff in security matters in Parliament to help it exercise its constitutional
authority; the inadequate representation of the non-Macedonian ethnic
communities in the security structures; the inter-institutional legal inade-
quacies, mainly between the President and the government, etc. He writes
that the Macedonian public has heard the words transparency and account-
ability too often, but unfortunately they have not been made manifest. The
author argues that the supremacy of the Executive over the Legislative
power was a pattern of the Macedonian political scene for a decade. An-
other negative tendency is the will of the state to centralise civil society. At
the same time he underlines that no single serious NGO that would deal
exclusively with security issues has yet appeared. Little expertise could be
found in the Macedonian media on security affairs too. The nascent ambi-
tions to create an expert non-governmental security and defence commu-
nity by representatives of universities and research institutes should be
encouraged.

There are strong indicators that unless the individual countries cope in a

decisive way with their specific problems in the area of civil-military rela-
tions the tendency to differentiation among them may prevail and each
case would be judged according to its own merits on the way to NATO
and EU membership. Croatia seems to be closer to attaining this goal,
though none of the three countries is excluded from the ‘open doors’ pol-
icy of the two institutions. The natural competition of the three countries is
developing simultaneously in generally cooperative and positive trilateral
context. Furthermore, the positive impact of the other countries from the
region and from the Alliance and the Union stimulate the processes of evo-
lution in the area of civil-military relations in the three countries.

Two other specific cases of the evolution of civil-military relations in

South East Europe deserve special attention: Bosnia and Herzegovina and
Serbia and Montenegro. Both states and societies have registered substan-
tial progress, compared to 1995 (in the case of Bosnia and Herzegovina),
and to 2000 (in the case of Serbia and Montenegro). Politically both are
applicants for membership in the PfP programme of NATO. They are in-
volved in various development programmes and are prospective EU mem-
bers in the longer-term. They, however, can be hardly classified into one
conditional, separate grouping of states in South East Europe. Yet both
bear the characteristic of retardation, though with different potential of get-
ting out of the present status and embarking on new and better prospects of

266 Pantev

development from the point of view of the state of their CMR, DEMCON
and SSR.

We do not see often national or other analysis of the state of these social

sectors in Bosnia and Herzegovina. Bisera Turkovic gives an answer to a
question asked often by experts: why is that country so retarded in that
area compared to other Central, Eastern and South East European transi-
tion states, and after the huge post-conflict rehabilitation investments and
efforts? First, it is due to the multiplicity of issues that required attention
(reconstruction of houses, return of refugees, rebuilding the infrastructure
of the country). So CMR were left on the margins and Bosnia and Herze-
govina did not keep up with the trends in the other transition countries.
Second, the Constitution of Bosnia and Herzegovina is a reflection of
peace negotiations and agreement that did not pay a specific attention to
CMR. In a similar way the respective institutions which should be tasked
with the realisation of CMR and DEMCON were not established. Third,
due to the war, the weak economy, the multiplicity of overlapping legal
provisions and the non-existence of state military institutions, Bosnia and
Herzegovina could not induce civil-military relations that would pay back
in the near future. Low salaries of the officers and soldiers were another
traumatizing factor of CMR. A fourth factor, hampering the development
of CMR was the ethnic tensions within the military and civil aspects of the
government. There are three ethnic components within two organisational
structures in the armed forces of Bosnia and Herzegovina, but with no
common command, and functioning on the basis of ‘national key’ and the
principle of ‘non-intervention in the affairs of the other’. Therefore Bisera
Turkovic doubts the army of Republika Srpska would be ready to defend a
mostly Bosnian city as Sarajevo – a really sad and bitter assessment of the
present state of CMR in the country. Even more troublesome is, however,
another judgement – the situation of ethnic division and exclusivity does
not worry much the civil authorities of the country. While she believes
some form of control over the unhealthy CMR does exist, she is sure it is
not democratic. A specific feature of the CMR in Bosnia and Herzegovina
is they are not state-based, but ethnic-based. International pressure more
than EU or NATO membership motivates civil-military relations and secu-
rity sector reforms. Facing the threat of punishment by sanctions for the
state and well perceiving the promise of joining the PfP programme the
three ethnic components of the country and of the armed forces agreed on
the necessity of having democratic control by the Parliament and of having
common command at central level. The Defence Committee – a new gov-
ernmental body with national and foreign participants chaired by an
American – was tasked to introduce the needed elements of central com-
mand of the armed forces and of democratic CMR. Another aspect of

Analysis

and

Conclusions

267

retardation is the low level of public awareness about the need for trans-
parency of the Legislative and Executive powers. The traditional stereo-
type was the expectation of the outside threat and the belief security was
based on secrecy. The three entities in Bosnia and Herzegovina and their
military establishments continued to perceive each other after the mid-
1990s as enemies. Transparency was a logical victim. Support for each of
the entities by Serbia, Croatia and Muslim countries further limited the ap-
plication of the principle of transparency over the security sector. The ap-
plication of the principle started improving after 2002–2003 when Bel-
grade stopped its practice of non-transparent assistance, and also after the
President of Croatia, Stipe Mesic, ceased the practice of non-transparent
Croat support for the army of the Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina.
The Bosnian component of the army also started receiving assistance al-
ready in a transparent way. Media are still inadequate to the requirements
of transparency in the country. Overcoming the decentralization and ethni-
cally dispersed authority of the democratic control over intelligence is an-
other venue of improvement in the area. The establishment in May 2003 of
the Committee on the Reform of the Intelligence Agencies in Bosnia and
Herzegovina at the initiative of the High Representative aims at the estab-
lishment of a single, unified, depoliticised and legally-based intelligence
agency by the end of 2004. In this setting Parliament is expected to have a
functioning democratic control over intelligence. A major deficiency that
needs to be overcome is in the defence planning sector: the conceptual
homogeneity of the defence plans of the Federation of Bosnia and Herze-
govina, on the one side, and of Republika Srpska, on the other would re-
quire getting rid of the principles of the former Yugoslav National Army
(JNA). This is already a fact for the Bosnian-Croat part of the country, but
awaits realisation in the Serbian one. The author also highlights the need
for more and functioning think tanks on security issues as well as more ac-
tive and educated media. It is a pity that few people know about, for ex-
ample, the participation of contingents from Bosnia and Herzegovina in
the UN peacekeeping missions in Ethiopia, Eritrea and Congo. Bisera
Turkovic correctly points to the significance of the support, provided by
NATO, the EU, the Stability Pact for South East Europe and the OSCE for
the further evolution of the CMR, DEMCON and the SSR in a country
with such a complicated domestic situation.

The last of the national cases – that of Serbia and Montenegro – is also

of specific character and only conditionally grouped together with the
other especially retarded one, of Bosnia and Herzegovina. In a critical as-
sessment of the development of civil-military relations in FRY/Serbia and
Montenegro Dragan Simic provides evidence that in his country first gen-
eration democratisation of civil-military relations has not yet occurred and

268 Pantev

that these reforms have been slowed-down very much because of the
weakening of the state, its dependence on organised crime, culminating in
the assassination of Prime Minister Zoran Djindjic. At the same time he
describes the indicators of the conceptual rethinking of security on the na-
tional, regional and global levels. This re-conceptualisation process would
inevitably influence institution-building and practical behaviour of this
country in the future, giving way to a more effective democratic civil con-
trol and security sector reform. Dragan Simic particularly highlights the
fact that instead of starting the security sector reform in the conditions
most favourable for such a thing immediately after taking power and by
using radical personnel changes, almost all personnel of the old regime got
the needed time to consolidate and continue their activity in accordance to
old patterns of behaviour. The author underlines that apart from objective
obstacles, the leaders of DOS (the Democratic Opposition of Serbia),
guided by short-term personnel and party interests, neglected security sec-
tor reform, which is obligatory for societies in transition, and a major pre-
condition for a complete reform of society. “The biggest speaker in favour
of reform in Serbia, Zoran Djindjic, paid with his life precisely because of
these mistakes”, writes the author. Dragan Simic formulates the direction
of the development of civil-military relations and of the security sector re-
form in his country: integration into the security communities of PfP,
NATO and EU countries. This is the way for Serbia and Montenegro to re-
ceive the support needed to make the necessary corrections. It would be
correct to add “in cooperation and through the support of neighbouring
countries of Serbia and Montenegro, by contributing to the regional stabil-
ity and progress”. A most effective instrument that Serbia and Montenegro
could utilise is a vibrant “third sector” – the NGOs – especially the non-
partisan security expert academic and non-governmental think-tanks. Their
effective pressure may accelerate reforms and help in catching-up with the
forerunners in the region. The state and society of this country should real-
ise that this is not a contest with adversaries, or a zero-sum game: the suc-
cess of each of the countries from the region magnifies the successes of the
others on their way to integration in NATO and the EU.

Lastly, the countries and societies of South East Europe are ‘doomed’ to

carry out and complete successfully the reforms of their CMR and the se-
curity sector, if they are to progress as vibrant and equal nations of Europe
in the 21

century. As Richard Cohen has pointed in his article “now is the

window of opportunity for the South East European nations to focus on
transition reforms and shape effective democratic system of civil-military
relations while terrorism has not concentrated on the countries of this re-
gion, but on the developed West”. He is right, but knowing the lessons of
the past in the troubled region of the Balkans, those who do not adapt on

Analysis

and

Conclusions

269

time, including on the issue of effectively fighting terrorism in cooperation
with the civilised world, stay behind the others and we, in South East
Europe will be again new-comers in the next round of history, rather con-
sumers and not contributors to security. That is why persisting with civil-
military relations and security sector reforms within a democratic frame-
work while adapting to the fight on terrorism, preserving our democratic
values and principles, despite the various pressures on us during this fight,
seems the only valid strategic option for the peoples and states of South
East Europe. A very important advantage in this situation gives us more
assurance these goals can be attained: a mature, versatile and motivated
expert security community in South East Europe and on the region. It has
the potential to be a meaningful pressure group on the governments in the
area, influencing the national and regional developments on CMR,
DEMCON and SSR – for the betterment of this part of Europe and of
the world. Future common research endeavours would prove again this
statement.

List of Abbreviations

AKP

Justice and Development Party

ALBA

(Peacekeeping Operation in) Albania

ANA

Albanian National Army

CFE

Conventional Forces in Europe (Treaty)

CMR

Civil-Military

Relations

CSBMs

Confidence and Security-Building Measures

CSID

Center for the Study of Islam and Democracy

Defence

Committee

DCAF

Democratic Control of the Armed Forces

DEMCON Democratic

Control

DOS

Democratic Opposition of Serbia

European

Community

European

Union

EMPAE

Five-year Procurement Plan (in Greece)

FRY

Federal Republic of Yugoslavia

FYROM

Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia

GDP

Gross Domestic Product

HDZ

Croatian

Democratic

Union

HNDGS

Hellenic National Defence General Staff

HUMINT Human

Intelligence

ICC

International

Criminal

Court

ICTY

International Criminal Court for former Yugoslavia

IFOR

Implementation Force (in Bosnia and Herzegovina)

IHL

International

Humanitarian

Law

ISAF

International Security Assistance Force

JNA

Yugoslav People’s Army

KFOR

Kosovo

Force

KKCMTSH

National Committee for the Liberation and Defence of Albanian
Lands

KYSEA

Government Council on Foreign Affairs and Defence (in
Greece)

MAP

Membership Action Plan

MOD/MoD

Ministry of Defence

Member of Parliament

NAC

North Atlantic Council

NATO

North Atlantic Treaty Organisation

NBC

Nuclear, Biological and Chemical (weapons)

NDP

National

Democratic

Party

272

List of Abbreviations

NGO

Non-Governmental

Organisation

NSC

National Security Council

OHR

Office for Human Rights

OSCE

Organisation for Security and Cooperation in Europe

PASOK Greek

Socialist

Party

PfP

Partnership for Peace

PKK

Kurdish Workers’ Party

Public

Relations

RPP

Republican

People’s

Party

Republic of Serbia (Republica Srpska)

SCD

Supreme Council of Defence

SCMM

Standing Committee on Military Matters

SCND

Supreme Council on National Defence

SDSM

Social-Democratic Alliance of Macedonia

SECI

South East European Cooperative Initiative

SEDM

South East European Defence Ministerial

SEE

South

East

Europe

SFOR

Stabilisation

Force

SFRY

Socialist Federative Republic of Yugoslavia

SIGINT Signal

Intelligence

SIS

State Intelligence Service

SSR

Security Sector Reform

TAF

Turkish

Armed

Forces

TGS

Turkish General Staff

UCK

Kosovo Liberation Army

United

Kingdom

United

Nations

UNDP

United Nations Development Programme

UNMIK

United Nations Mission in Kosovo

UNSOM

United Nations Mission in Somalia

USA

United States of America

USSR

Union of Soviet Socialist Republics

VMRO-DPMNE Internal Macedonian Revolutionary Organisation-Democratic

Party of Macedonian National Unity

WEU

Western European Union

WMC

Weapons of Mass Casualties

WMD

Weapons of Mass Destruction

WTC World

Trade

Centre

Editors and Authors

Petar ATANASOV, Research Fellow, Ph.D. in Sociological Sciences.
Expert in ethnic relations, multiculturalism and societal security. Working
at the Institute for Sociological Political and Juridical Research in Skopje,
lecturing in Contemporary Sociological Theories.

Tibor BABOS, Major is the Deputy Head of the NATO Cooperation Di-
vision, Ministry of Defence, Hungary. He earned his M.A. in Intelligence
Studies at the National Defence University, Budapest, Hungary and is
presently enrolled in the Naval Postgraduate School’s National Security
and Civil-Military Relations Program, Monterey, California. He is also a
Ph.D. candidate in Security Studies. His research field is the European Se-
curity, particularly European Security Institutions and Integration as well
as Civil-Military Relations.

Richard COHEN, Colonel, is President of “RSC Strategic Connections”,
an independent company, based in Ottawa, Canada, advising on a broad
range of security-related issues. From 1994–2002, he was Professor of
NATO and European Security Studies at the George C. Marshall Center, in
Garmisch-Partenkirchen, Germany. He founded and directed the Senior
Executive Seminar programme at the Marshall Center from 1998–2001.
Richard Cohen served in both the Canadian and the British Armies as an
infantry and parachute officer. He served in many parts of the world, in-
cluding Germany, Northern Ireland, the Falkland Islands, Hong Kong,
Borneo, Zimbabwe, the United Kingdom, Belgium, Canada and the United
States. He directed NATO’s Military Cooperation Programme with Partner
countries from 1991 to 1994.

Jean-Jacques de DARDEL, Ambassador, heads the Centre for Interna-
tional Security Policy of the Swiss MFA. He holds a Ph.D. in Political Sci-
ence of the Graduate Institute of International Studies, Geneva. He func-
tioned as Secretary Jurist at the ICRC and the International Conference on
the Development of Humanitarian Law in 1976/77, before joining the
Swiss Foreign Service in 1981 and serving in Bern, Vienna, Washington,
Canberra and Paris. He authored a number of books, essays and articles on
cultural and international affairs.

274

Editors and Authors

Claudiu DEGERATU is currently Program Director for Security Studies
at the Institute for Political Studies of Defence and Military History, and
Lecturer at the University of Bucharest, teaching International Relations.
In his previous position Claudiu Degeratu was Deputy Director at the Di-
rectorate for Political-Military Analysis of the Romanian Ministry of De-
fence. Fields of research interest are geopolitics, sociology, and European
integration.

Thanos DOKOS, Ph.D. has held research posts at the Hessische Stiftung
Friedens- und Konfliktforschung, in Frankfurt and the Center for Science
and International Affairs (CSIA) at Harvard University. He served as the
Director for Research, Strategic Studies Division, Hellenic Ministry of Na-
tional Defence. He was also a NATO research fellow for 1996–1998. He is
currently the Director for Studies at the Hellenic Foundation for European
and Foreign Policy (ELIAMEP). He is the author of several books and ar-
ticles on arms control, international security, Greek-Turkish relations and
Mediterranean security.

Philipp H. FLURI, Dr. studied Philosophy, History and Social Anthro-
pology at the Universities of Fribourg and Bern (doctorates 1987 and
1990) and East European Studies at the Osteuropa-Institut at Fribourg
University. He became a defence analyst with the Swiss General Staff in
1991 with a focus on post-communist societies. He joined the OSCE AG
to Chechnya as an Expert on Human Rights and Democratisation in 1995
and was appointed Acting Personal Representative of the OSCE Chair-
man-in-Office on the Question dealt with by the Minsk Group (Nagorno-
Karabakh) in 1996. He became the Coordinator for Civil-Military Rela-
tions at the Secretariate General of the Swiss MoD in 1998 and as such the
project leader on what is now DCAF.

Gustav E. GUSTENAU, BG Mag. is Deputy Director of the Directorate
General for Security Policy at the Federal Ministry of Defence in Vienna,
Austria. In 2002, he was appointed Liasion officer of the Federal Ministry
of Defence to the National Security Council. He is advisor to the Austrian
Defence minister in matters of Security Politics. Additionally, BG Gus-
tenau has published numerous articles and publications in the field of Aus-
trian and European security policy with a special focus on South East
Europe.

Editors and Authors

275

Ljubica JELUŠI

ý, Ph.D. is an Associate Professor at the Faculty of So-

cial Sciences, University of Ljubljana and a Head of the Defence Studies
Department. Her recent teaching and research areas are civil-military rela-
tions, armed conflicts, peace operations, women in armed forces. Her
courses include Polemology, Military Sociology, Peace Studies, Theories
of Civil-Military Relations.

Blendi KAJSIU is a researcher at the Albanian Institute for International
Studies (AIIS) as well as lecturer at the University of Tirana where he
teaches “Introduction to Political Science”. He double majored in Applied
Economics and Political Science from the American University in Bulgaria
(AUBG) in 2000. In 2001 he received his MA in International Peace Stud-
ies from the University of Notre Dame, Indiana.

Marjan MALEŠI

ý, Ph.D. is an Associate Professor at the Faculty of So-

cial Sciences, University of Ljubljana and Head of Defence Research Cen-
tre at the Institute of Social Sciences. His recent teaching and research ar-
eas are security policy, civil-military relations, crisis management,
propaganda and public opinion.

Nilüfer NARLI, Prof. Dr. is Chair of the Sociology Department at Mar-
mara University, Istanbul. Her major research interests are comparative
studies in Islamic movements in Turkey, the Middle East and Southeast
Asia; civil-military relations in Turkey; illegal migration of workforce and
human smuggling in South East Europe.

Plamen I. PANTEV, Ph.D. is an Associate Professor in International Re-
lations and International Law at the Law School, Department of Interna-
tional Relations and International Law of Sofia University “St. Kliment
Ohridsky”, Sofia. He is founder and Director of the Institute for Security
and International Studies (ISIS), Sofia, Bulgaria.

Valeri RATCHEV is Colonel in the Bulgarian Armed Forces. Currently
he is Deputy Commandant of the “G. S. Rakovski” Defence College in
Sofia and Dean of its National Security and Defence Faculty. He is also a
Senior Research Associate of the Institute for Security and International
Studies (ISIS), Sofia, Bulgaria.

Henriette RIEGLER, Dr. is a senior research fellow at the Austrian Insti-
tute for International Affairs, Vienna. Her research focus is on South East
Europe with a special focus on the Former Yugoslavia. She is a lecturer at
the Universities of Vienna and Innsbruck, Austria.

276

Editors and Authors

Linda ROYER, Major, is the Senior Intelligence Officer for the 179

AW, Ohio Air National Guard. She has earned a M.A. in History at Cleve-
land State University and is presently enrolled in the Naval Post Graduate
School’s Civil-Military Relations Program, Monterey, USA. Her research
field is transatlantic relations particularly the PfP and State Partnership
Program and Intelligence Studies.

Dragan R. SIMI

û, Ph.D. in Political Science; Associate Professor at the

Faculty of Political Sciences – Department of International Studies, Bel-
grade University. He teaches International Relations and Global and Na-
tional Security. Main areas of research are: security studies, international
relations, foreign policy theory and political philosophy.

Mladen STANI

ýIû is Director of the Institute for International Relations

(IMO) in Zagreb, Croatia. He is also Head of Department for Macroeco-
nomic Analysis; editor-in-chief of the journal “Croatian International Rela-
tions Review”. He is Professor at the Faculty of Political Science, Zagreb,
Croatia at the M.A. study “EU – Political, Economic and Legal Aspects”.

Todor TAGAREV, Ph.D. is Director Programmes of the Centre for Na-
tional Security and Defence Research, Bulgarian Academy of Sciences. He
was the first Director of the Defence Planning Directorate of the Ministry
of Defence of Bulgaria (1999–2001) and served as Director of Armaments
Policy and National Armaments Director in 2001. He is a Senior Associate
of the Institute for Security and International Studies (ISIS), Sofia,
Bulgaria.

Bisera TURKOVI

û is Executive Director of the Centre for Security Stud-

ies (CSS) in Sarajevo. She holds a Ph.D. in International Relations and is
lecturer at the University of Sarajevo. In 1996–2000 she served as Ambas-
sador of her country to the OSCE and in June 2000 till February 2001 as
Minister for European Integration of Bosnia and Herzegovina.

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