AFGHANISTAN: FROM STABILISATION TO STATE-BUILDING

Douglas Alexander, Secretary of State for International Development

Published 17 Sep 2008 - 15:39

DEPARTMENT FOR INTERNATIONAL DEVELOPMENT

News Release issued by COI News Distribution Service 17 September 2008, speaking at The International Institute for Strategic Studies

17 September 2008

Thank you, John, for that kind introduction. It is an genuine honour to be here at the International Institute for Strategic Studies, which - I think it's fair to say - has provided such intellectual leadership in the field of international relations for the past 50 years.

That I speak to you today as the International Development Secretary, I believe reflects the changing trends in conflict over the last decade. Trends discussed at your Global Strategic Review in Geneva last week, where the keynote speech was given by my friend Bob Zoellick of the World Bank, who spoke of the challenge posed by fragile states - not just to the international community's interests, but also to the endeavour of tackling poverty.

That challenge - as he said - requires not security as usual, or development as usual, but an approach that brings both security and development together. And perhaps nowhere is it more important that we get this approach right than in Afghanistan.

An abiding memory from my last visit to Afghanistan, a little over two months ago, was the time I spent in the cookhouse in Lashkar Gah, talking with a small group of soldiers from my own constituency of Paisley.

As they told me how they coped with the danger and discomfort of the front line, I was struck by the incredible bravery and resilience shown by these young lads - and indeed by every member of our Armed Forces.

It was truly humbling to share that time with people who are prepared to make such sacrifice for the benefit of all of us here, and I would like to take this opportunity to extend my condolences to the family and friends of the three British soldiers who have lost their lives in the past week in Afghanistan.

I also want to echo UN Secretary General Ban Ki-moon's condemnation of the bombing attack on a UN convoy that on Sunday claimed the lives of two Afghan doctors and their driver, who were delivering polio vaccinations to children. Nothing - absolutely nothing - can excuse the deliberate and callous targeting of people providing the kind of assistance that has helped to improve the life expectancy of children in Afghanistan.

Such events are a terrible reminder of the risks shared by soldiers and civilians alike in Afghanistan. They take those risks in pursuit of one shared mission: to help Afghans to secure, govern and develop their country, for themselves.

To achieve that purpose will, I would suggest, require both short-term stabilisation - what the military calls 'delivering civil effect' - and long-term state-building. And it is on the transition from stabilisation to state-building that I intend to focus my remarks today, covering:

* The progress made so far and the challenge that remains;

* What we mean by stabilisation; and

* The priorities for the job of state-building Progress & Challenge The United Kingdom is both the second largest bilateral donor to Afghanistan, and - with some 8,000 troops - the second largest military contributor to the international community's efforts in that country. Our effort is contributing at national and local levels towards establishing a prosperous and peaceful Afghanistan, led by a government that represents and delivers for all Afghans.

And the last seven years have seen real progress towards that goal. Six out of ten Afghans exercised their democratic rights by voting in elections for the first time in more than 35 years. Five million refugees have been able to return home. Where just one in ten Afghans had access to basic healthcare, that figure is now up to eight in ten.

Women, of course, are now playing a more active part in society, in business, in politics. Seven years ago only a million boys were in school across the country - education was denied to all girls. Today, as I have witnessed myself, more than six million children - over a third of them girls - are now in school.

I visited a school just outside Kabul in July, and met girls who are raising their sights above the wildest dreams of their mothers - girls who aspire to be doctors, teachers, and policewomen.

So the task now is to build upon the progress made in the last seven years, to deliver our goal - to enable Afghans to secure their country for themselves, and to govern and develop it themselves.

Easy to say, but difficult to deliver in a country broken by thirty years of conflict. Afghanistan's impressive Minister for Education, Hanif Atmar, summed up the scale of the challenge when he told me that his country is trying to tackle simultaneously four great scourges that would individually trouble any country in the world: narcotics; poverty; insurgency and weak governance.

Afghanistan today remains the world's biggest supplier of heroin. It is the fifth poorest country on earth. The machinery of government has been broken by successive decades of in-fighting and graft. And the country faces an insurgency determined to block the progress we want to see.

Indeed, the day after visiting that school just outside Kabul I saw a very different school in Garmsir, in Helmand province. A school that had not seen children or teachers for many months, but instead stood pockmarked by bullets. The Taleban burns down schools and beheads teachers for allowing girls in the classroom - acts of brutality that make the British military presence in Helmand so necessary.

So in my remarks today I will address the challenge facing Afghanistan in a context where - for parts of the country - the job is not one of post-conflict reconstruction, but in-conflict stabilisation. And I will seek to address the ways in which the international community - through adopting a more comprehensive approach of military, diplomatic and development assistance - can best support the endeavours of the people of Afghanistan.

Stabilisation

In the years since it was established, the Afghan Government has begun to increase its presence and influence beyond Kabul. In the north and west of Afghanistan the development challenge is to increase the reach and effectiveness of the government, to bring law and order and access to justice, and to combat the corrosive influence of corruption.

In the south and east of the country, the seat of the insurgency, it is difficult for many Afghans to live and work in safety. So there remains an important role for international military forces in supporting the political objective of enabling the Afghan Government to extend its own authority.

Our counter-insurgency approach in Afghanistan is often characterised as 'clear, hold, build' - the strategy which was identified by General Petraeus and underpinned the US 'surge' in Iraq. The phrase itself - clear, hold, build - is of course designed to be a simple and straightforward label. But we should not fall into the trap of thinking that these activities are by definition separate or sequential, or that they should be interpreted literally.

Indeed, I would argue that 'clear, hold, build' fails to do justice to the sophistication of our politically-led counter insurgency effort across Afghanistan. I would like to suggest that perhaps a more useful description might be 'engage, stabilise, develop'. Let me endeavour to explain why.

Engage

'Engage' will of course require what the military describes as 'kinetic' engagement, to clear the threat from the Taleban insurgency. But this military force needs to be understood and executed as part of a broader civilian-led strategy that sees military force as a means to an end. That end is a secure environment in which stabilisation and development can take root.

Our troops have conducted a number of successful and dramatic strike operations this summer, not least those against two members of the Taleban leadership in Northern Helmand - Sadiqullah and Bishmullah. Yet their work is not only about engaging the enemy in pitched battles. As General Smith wrote in his book The Utility of Force, "if you are fighting for the will of the people, however many tactical successes you achieve, they will be as naught if the people do not believe you are winning".

Counter-insurgency is above all else a battle for popular support. This cannot be won by force alone. So 'engage' encompasses not only military force but also political engagement with tribes and elders to secure agreement to a Government and international presence, as the foundation for more wide-ranging stabilisation work.

Stabilise

The term 'stabilise' rather than 'hold', describes not only the use of force to hold an area, but also the rapid work with local leaders and the civilian population necessary to rebuild trust and confidence in the Government of Afghanistan.

A civilian presence is now an integral part of that stabilising effort. Political engagement with local leaders, in collaboration with provincial Governor Mangal, sets the overall framework for the activity of military and civilians alike. Since January, we have had civilians from the United Kingdom's Stabilisation Unit working right alongside the military in our Forward Operating Bases - as I saw for myself.

They have brought much-valued civilian skills to the job of mobilising and supporting a nascent Government presence in Helmand, identifying immediate priorities with the local population, and working with military engineers to get projects up and running. I pay tribute to their work and the resilience they are showing in these harsh environments.

Their military colleagues are not only providing reassurance for local communities by patrolling areas that have been subjected to attacks and criminality, but also working with civilians to train hundreds of Afghan soldiers and police to take charge of security themselves. These Afghan-led operations, acting on Afghan intelligence, are making real headway in improving security for local citizens.

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Develop

Such work is not only helping to stabilise the local area, but by helping Afghans to secure and govern their own communities, is contributing to lasting change. This is the 'develop' element of 'engage, stabilise, develop'.

Staff from my Department in Helmand and Kabul are working with the Afghan Government to provide such tangible benefits for the Afghan population - including around 50 km of new or repaired roads, and wells and latrines providing clean water and sanitation for over 300,000 people from Lashkar Gar to Gereshk, Sangin to Musa Qala and Garmsir. The civilian team in Helmand, working alongside the military, have funded the construction of a new building for the Helmand Provincial Council, providing space for offices, committees and meetings of up to 450 local elders.

Yet, while such reconstruction projects are gladly received, they are not on their own enough to win consent or rebuild for the future. The only way to do that is to support the legitimate Afghan authorities, in the shape of the local community groups, the democratically elected Provincial Council, and the Provincial Governor to take charge of their country's own development - and by doing so, create the certainty that it is they, not the Taleban, who are in charge, and there for the duration.

For that reason, international soldiers and civilians alike must resist the temptation to substitute for local capacity. This may run against the grain of the admirable 'can-do' attitude of the British military. I understand that there is frustration among military ranks at times, at what seems a slow pace of reconstruction, and often a sense that much more would happen, much more quickly, if we simply undertook all the work ourselves. But we must remember that our goal is not to run Afghanistan ourselves, but to help the Afghans to do so.

That message was unequivocally stressed by none other than General Petraeus - who will next month take strategic responsibility for US troops in Afghanistan in his role as the Commander of the US Central Command. In his fourteen observations from soldiering in Iraq, General Petraeus puts advice from TE Lawrence at the very top of his list - quoting the words: "Do not try to do too much with your own hands".

That message is as relevant in the twenty-first century as it was during the First World War, and General Petraeus goes on to describe the task of supporting Iraqi efforts rather than replacing them as: "the essence of our strategy".

State-building

I would like to be clear that I am not suggesting that the phrase 'engage, stabilise, develop' should, or is likely to replace 'clear, hold, build' - either in the military manual or the popular lexicon. Instead, I offer 'engage, stabilise, develop' to provide a fuller picture of what, in truth, the comprehensive approach is beginning to achieve in southern Afghanistan - namely engaging with Afghans to stabilise their country for themselves, and to govern and develop it themselves.

For we will gain little if we win the war today without helping Afghans to build the state for tomorrow. We must ask, with each of our actions - 'does this enable Afghans to take charge of their own destiny, or indeed hinder them?'.

And we must do so at both provincial and national levels - for though it is understandable that the public interest in the United Kingdom largely focuses on Helmand, where the majority of our troops are based, we must also remember that Helmand is one of 34 provinces. Helmand will not be a success if Afghanistan is not a success.

To help Afghanistan to move from stabilisation to state-building, we must of course support Afghans in Helmand and nationwide to create the effective 'deal' between state and citizens that Ashraf Ghani, former finance minister of Afghanistan, identifies as the key to creating a lasting state.

When states fail to meet their citizens' basic needs, they enter a downward spiral where people lose trust in government, institutions lose legitimacy, the economy becomes criminalised and the people are disenfranchised. Such states are breeding grounds for terror and violence.

Seven years after the fall of the Taleban, Ghani argues Afghanistan is still struggling to establish itself as a successful state, saying and I quote, that: "it is the weakness of the government, not the strength of the Taleban, that is the issue".

So our primary objective must be to support the establishment of an effective, enduring Afghan state. That is why the Department for International Development puts 80 per cent of our aid through the Afghan Government - in order to both improve its capacity to govern and to strengthen the connection between the citizen and the state.

In this way, we intend to support the people of Afghanistan in the three critical areas of state-building, namely:

* creating a lasting political settlement;

* delivering the basic functions that a state must carry out in order to survive; and

* engaging with the expectations and aspirations of citizens.

Political settlement

First, and of paramount importance, is creating a lasting political settlement. Beyond simply holding elections, a political settlement requires an understanding between competing groups about how power will be divided. Unless the citizens of a state feel themselves sufficiently bound into the political community, there can be no lasting settlement.

Of course at present that political community remains contested by the insurgency - and, let me be clear, terrorist groups belong outside the political community. We must be, and will remain, steadfast against the agents who would seek to destabilise the Afghan Government.

Yet there is also a sense of exclusion from the current political settlement amongst key tribal groups in southern Afghanistan - groups which must be brought into the wider political fold, and, in coming over, can further erode support for the insurgency. We are supporting the Government of Afghanistan's efforts to do exactly that.

This process has been facilitated by the changing face of the Taleban today. No longer a movement driven and defined by strong theocratic principles, the Taleban-led insurgency today is rather a loose alliance of those with a grievance against the government and an interest in lawlessness - be they drug traffickers, warlords or other criminals.

These looser ties that bind insurgents are more easily broken - as we have seen in Musa Qala, where we have helped the government to reconcile former insurgent leaders to the point where they are now actively working with the Governor and British Forces to bring peace and stability to Helmand.

At a national level, the international community needs to play a role in supporting the legitimate Afghan state's claim to power, helping it to deliver on the key core services that citizens expect, which will bring the state greater credibility in the eyes of its citizens.

Delivering basic functions

The second critical area of statebuilding is the capacity to perform the basic functions of security, raising funds and rule through laws. It was in the 9th century Islamic scholar Ibn Qutayba who said, and I quote: "There can be no government without an army, no army without money, no money without prosperity, and no prosperity without justice and good administration". Little has changed in a thousand years regarding that insight.

A key concern for the Afghan people and their Government is the ability for people to move around, to trade and conduct business, and for NGOs and others to deliver essential services. That is why the foundation of our support for Afghanistan - now and in the future - is destroying the Taleban-led insurgency and supporting the establishment of the rule of law.

Tackling criminality in Afghanistan will of course mean taking on the opium producers that make it the world's largest supplier of heroin. This year's UN survey shows that opium production has fallen by almost a fifth compared with last year, and that, as security and governance improve across the country, more areas are becoming poppy free - up from three provinces in 2004 to 18 today. That is more than half of the provinces in the country that are now poppy free.

Of course we are far from complacent, and we know that the majority of opium is produced in the south of Afghanistan - helping to fuel violence and lawlessness. That is why we are supporting the Governor of Helmand's new counter narcotics strategy and providing aid to farmers in the form of seed, fertilizer and expert advice to turn away from opium poppy and towards the cereals that can help to ease the current food shortages afflicting the country.

We know that Afghanistan will never be stable without the constructive engagement of its neighbours, principally Pakistan. Indeed it was significant that President Hamid Karzai was in Islamabad last week, the chief foreign guest at the inauguration of President Zardari. Both Presidents pledged to work together to solve their region's problems, with Karzai describing Afghanistan and Pakistan as 'twins joined'. This is a vitally important moment for the future of both Pakistan and Afghanistan. The United Kingdom is committed to supporting the people of both countries on the road to peace and prosperity.

In addition to providing security and the rule of law, the state must be able, of course, to raise funds through economic activity. There has been quick economic progress in Afghanistan from a very low base - average incomes have more than doubled since the fall of the Taleban, and the economy has grown on average by 15 per cent a year since 2002.

Yet four out of ten Afghans today remain unemployed. Four out of ten Afghans continue to live in chronic poverty; and four out of ten Afghan infants are underweight. Afghanistan urgently needs to provide economic opportunities for its people. That was why I was so keen to launch the Afghanistan Investment Climate Facility during my visit in July. That programme will help to stimulate the Afghan economy by, for example, cutting the red tape which means a grocer in Jalalabad needs 40 signatures and 60 days to export his fruit across the border - by which time almost half of it is no longer fit for sale.

Engaging with citizens

The third pillar of a lasting Afghan state must be the ability to engage with and meet the expectations of citizens, by providing essential services, tackling corruption and supporting press freedoms.

A poll of Afghans by the Asia Foundation last year found that eight out of ten felt the government was doing a good job, with people citing reconstruction as the single biggest reason for the country going in the right direction.

British aid has supported one of the Afghan Government's most high profile reconstruction initiatives - the National Solidarity Programme, launched by Ashraf Ghani. That programme has helped local communities across Afghanistan to set and meet their own reconstruction priorities, funding more than 37,000 projects to improve roads, schools and access to clean water. And, because it is an initiative of the Afghan Government rather than donors, it helps to strengthen the link between the people and their representatives.

Yet, while the poll results saw people giving the Afghan Government credit for such initiatives, they also showed that Afghans want their Government to do more to tackle corruption and bribery. The Government has recently authorised a new anti-corruption body reporting to the president, a special prosecutor for corruption and a dedicated court. These new bodies must show a resolve in tackling graft and produce results - in the form of prosecutions - if the Government is to gain the confidence both internationally and of its own population in this vital area.

Fundamental to holding government to account is the existence of a free media. Recent years have seen a steady growth of new and independent media outlets in Afghanistan, and we have supported many in strengthening their voice. Earlier this year the Prime Minister announced that the United Kingdom would support an independent radio station in Helmand, and our assistance has helped to train Afghan journalists through the BBC World Service Trust. This grass-roots work helps to give people the tools they need to become active and engaged citizens.

Beyond such long-term development projects and room for press freedoms, citizens look to the state for protection against shocks such as drought and natural disaster. Oxfam currently estimates that up to 5 million Afghans face severe food shortages. The Afghan government does not have the capacity or the resources to respond to this alone - instead it has launched an appeal, together with the World Food Programme, for international assistance.

The United Kingdom was among the first countries to pledge assistance to that appeal. Yet it is clear that the international response is falling short at a crucial and urgent time. As we approach the bitter Afghan winter, as many as half a million pregnant women and young mothers, and more than a million children under the age of five, are facing the threat of malnutrition.

That is why today, from this platform, I can announce that the United Kingdom will provide a further £5 million to support the World Food Programme - bringing our total commitment to £8 million. That support will help the World Food Programme assist some four and a half million Afghans to find the food that they and their families so desperately need.

The 'seamless garment'

In concluding, I would like to draw on a phrase used by Paddy Ashdown in his recent book, 'Swords and Ploughshares'. He contends that the three phases of conflict prevention, war fighting and post-conflict reconstruction must be seen not as separate events, but - as he describes it - as a 'seamless garment'.

He illustrates this contention by contrasting the nature of the end of two conflicts of the twentieth century. In the four years of the Allied administration of West Germany up until 1949, the entire state machinery had been constructed, elections held, a constitution written and an economic system created which would in the years ahead make Germany the most powerful manufacturing force in Europe.

In Afghanistan the war against the Soviet Union ended with a complete Soviet withdrawal on 2 February 1989, after nine years of protracted conflict. And the world turned away. The lawlessness that followed, the downward spiral of corruption, repression and state failure, resulted in the attack on the World Trade Centre that took place seven years and six days ago.

There is no greater security priority for the international community than supporting the Government of Afghanistan to rebuild a country that can protect and provide for its citizens. For in so doing, we support the people of Afghanistan to deny space to those who would do them, and us, great harm.

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