While acquiring knowledge on the topics of Functionalism and 
Physicalism, I ran across many disagreement between the two.  Interestingly, 
those disagreements gave me an impression of different sides arguing with their 
own support from their own theories.  As if an Arabian and a Roman were arguing 
about whether the number eleven is an "Arabic" number or a "Roman" number.  
Though, as I read more and more of the readings (especially Putnam's), I started 
to see a pattern that led me to think that maybe Functionalism is compatible with 
Physicalism after all; that these two theories can coexist.

	The claim above is based on the information gathered in the two readings 
assigned and therefore, I should go step by step in order to arrive at my 
conclusion that they can indeed coexist.  First, I draw Ned Block's elaboration on 
Metaphysical Functionalism as a start of my argument.  As Block suggests, 
Metaphysical Functionalism is mainly concern about what mental states are; 
instead of a psychological explanation (Block, p. 172).  Moreover, they concern 
themselves with mental state type; not a specific token of the type.  As in the case 
of pain, they are concerned with a mental state called pain, and not of particular 
pains (i.e. stomach-ache, pin-pricks, etc.).  But, according to Putnam, if the 
Physicalists does indeed attributes the name "physical states" to the enormous 
number of mental states we humans have, then, I think it would be impossible for 
them to be concerned only with the type and not the tokens.  But once they started 
to consider each specific pain (token), they will have to ascribe a different 
physical-chemical state to each token-state.  Ultimately, the common thing "to all 
pains in virtue of which they are pains (Block, p. 172)" cannot be put in terms of a 
single physical state.  Recall that the same problem does not exist in the 
consideration of Functionalism because Functionalism concern itself basically 
with the causal relations between these tokens and not a particular one.  
Therefore, the common thing that exists in Functionalism "to all pains in virtue of 
which they are pains" is actually the function or the functional state that account 
for all mental states type; and not a particular mental state token.

	Therefore I conclude by suggesting that the disagreement (or the 
incompatibility) between the two theories is actually a misunderstanding on each 
side on their scope on studies.  And while they do not conflict each other in the 
same scope, I grant them their coexistence.  (At least this is what I can dig up in 
the readings!)