In this essay, I will examine Rene Descartes' skeptical argument and responses by
O.K. Bouwsma and Norman Malcolm.  I intend to prove that while both Bouwsma and
Malcolm make points that refute specific parts of Descartes' argument in their
criticisms, neither is sufficient in itself to refute the whole.  
     In order to understand Descartes' argument and its sometimes radical ideas, one
must have at least a general idea of his motives in undertaking the argument.  The
seventeenth century was a time of great scientific progress, and the blossoming
scientific community was concerned with setting up a consistent standard to define
what constituted science.  Their science was based on conjunction and empirical
affirmation, ideally without any preconceived notions to taint the results.  Descartes,
however, believed that the senses were unreliable and that science based solely on
information gained from the senses was uncertain.  He was concerned with finding a
point of certainty on which to base scientific thought.  Eventually he settled on
mathematics as a basis for science, because he believed mathematics and geometry to
be based on some inherent truths.  He believed that it was through mathematics that we
were able to make sense of our world, and that the ability to think mathematically was
an innate ability of all human beings.  This theory becomes important in Descartes'
Meditations because he is forced to explain where the mathematical ideas that he
believed we were born with came from.  Having discussed Descartes' background, I
will now explain the specifics of his argument.
     The basis of Descartes' entire argument is that the senses can not be trusted, and his
objective is to reach a point of certainty, one undeniable truth that fixes our existence. 
He said it best in his own words, "I will . . . apply myself earnestly and openly to the
general destruction of my former opinions."1  By opinions he meant all the facts and
notions about the world which he had previously held as truths.  Any point which had
even the slightest hint of doubt was discarded and considered completely false. 
Descartes decided that he would consider all things until he found that either nothing is
certain, which is itself a point of certainty, or he reached the one undeniable truth he
was searching for.  In order to accomplish this certainty, in the first Meditation he asks
the reader to assume that they are asleep and that all their sensory information is the
product of dreams.  More significantly, Descartes implies that all consciousness could
actually be a dream state, thus proving that the senses can be doubted.  The dream
argument has its intrinsic problems, however.  One, is that images in dreams can be
described as "painted images".2   In other words, a dream image is only a portrait of a
real-life object, place or person.  If we are dreaming then it is implied that at some point
we were conscious and able to perceive these things.  If we are able to perceive these
things then we must admit that we have senses and that our senses are, at least in part,
true.  This was exactly what Descartes was trying to disprove, and it was one reason he
abandoned the dream argument.  
     The second problem with this argument is that it points to mathematics as a point of
certainty.  I believe Descartes best explained this in his own words: "[W]hether I be
awake or asleep, two plus three equals five and a square does not have more than four
sides: nor does it seem possible that such obvious truths can fall under the suspicions of
falsity."3  Even when we are dreaming, the laws of mathematics and geometry hold
true, but they can not be Descartes' point of certainty for a simple reason;  these
abilities that Descartes believed were innate still had to come from somewhere.  If they
are in our heads when we are born, someone had to put them there.  Descartes'
question is who, and he comes up with two possibilities.
     One possibility is that our inherent mathematical abilities are the gift of a benign
creator, a gift of God.  As a supremely good being, he would not allow us to be
deceived, and mathematical processes would be a point of certain and undeniable truth. 
If this were the case, the idea of mathematics would meet Descartes' objectives as a
point of certainty.  The existence of God, however, can not be proven and so there is a
second possibility that Descartes proposed.  He asks the reader to imagine that instead
of a benign God, there is an "evil genius . . .who has directed his entire effort to
misleading [us] "4  In this case, all things in the physical world would have to be
thought of as deceptions, because all our sensory information, including ideas of sizes,
shapes and colors would be fed to us by the evil genius.  This is enough to prove that
mathematics can not be a point of certainty.  It is here that he concludes the first
Meditation.
     Having decided that we have no senses that are not deceptive, Descartes, in the
second Meditation, looks for something outside the world of sensation to find some
certainty.  What he discovers is that he knows he exists.  He knows he exists because
he is thinking he exists.  If there is an evil genius out there deceiving him at least he is
secure in his thoughts.  By thinking he exists, by knowing he is "something", not even
the evil genius can convince him he is "nothing".5  His point of certainty comes down
to the statement "I am, I exist"6 or more aptly translated "I think, therefore I am".  
     Descartes ideas sometimes seem radical or extreme and his argument has been
challenged many times.  Two particular criticisms that we discussed were "Descartes'
Evil Genius" by O.K. Bouwsma and "Knowledge Regained" by Normon Malcolm.   I
would like to examine the significant points each has made in their criticisms and then
discuss why I believe each argument is damaging but not sufficient to refute Descartes'
argument.  
     Bouwsma's criticism focuses on Descartes' idea of an evil genius creating an "illusory"
world.  His intent was to prove that Descartes' ideas of illusion and deception were
misleading.  First, Bouwsma set out to define "illusions" and to show how they are
detected.  In order to accomplish this goal, he gave the example of the evil genius turning
the world and everything in it into paper.  "An illusion," Bouwsma says, "is something that
looks like or sounds like, so much like, something else that you either mistake it for
something else, or you can easily understand how someone might come to do this."7  In
this first example, the reader watches "Tom" as he is exposed to and realizes the difference
between the real world and the genius' paper one.  Although the evil genius attempted to
create a realistic world out of paper, Tom saw through the illusion when he realized the
difference between the paper flowers and real flowers.  Tom was not really deceived by
the paper illusion since he saw through it rather quickly, but he did "experience" the
illusion.8  He experienced it and he detected it.  Bouwsma, with this example, is trying to
point out the importance of how people detect illusions.  For instance, Tom detects the
illusion because he knows the difference between flowers and paper.  If he did not know
the difference, he would not be able to detect the illusion and he would go on being
deceived.  Bouwsma also states that it is critical that the genius also understand the
difference between his illusion and reality even if Tom does not.
     Bouwsma then admits that Descartes had something slightly different in mind.  He asks
the reader what would happen if Descartes' ideas were true, if the genius' illusion were so
perfect that it would be impossible to tell the difference between the illusion and reality. 
Here Bouwsma sets up a second example, one in which the world has been destroyed but
Tom goes on believing that the world exists, just as Descartes had imagined.  Tom can not
detect this illusion, for it is completely unlike the paper illusion.  In this example, there is
no difference between the illusory world and the real one.  Tom continues living in what
he thinks is the real world; he goes on being deceived.  What Bouwsma wants the reader
to think about is this idea of deception.  Is Tom really being deceived if he can not tell the
difference between the real world that the genius destroyed, and the illusory one the
genius created for him?  Bouwsma does not believe that Tom is being deceived.  The evil
genius has a sense of the world that Tom can not comprehend, because the genius is the
only one who knows the difference between the real world and the illusion that he has
created.  The word "illusion" then, would mean something different to the evil genius than
it does to Tom.  In order for something to be an illusion, there must be a way to detect the
reality, like in the paper example.  Because there is no way for Tom to detect the
difference, there is no illusion.  For Tom, the "illusion" becomes the reality and the
existence of the evil genius does not alter his life.
     Malcolm comes up with a very different criticism of Descartes.  His argument focuses
on the simple premise that there is nothing more real to a person than their sensory
experience.  He begins by stating two points commonly associated with Descartes and
skepticism in order to challenge their validity.  First, that any sensory experience one has
now, can be refuted sometime in the future and second that any statement made based on
sensory experience is purely hypothetical.  Malcolm attempts to show that the opposite is
true; that sensory experience can not be refuted and that it is in fact the only certain
knowledge a person can have.  
     In order to prove his idea, Malcolm makes three propositions.  The first is what one
would call a factual statement.  The second is a type of belief, and the third is an
observation based on direct sensory experience.  Malcolm attempts to show the reader
that what one considers fact can be proven wrong by new evidence that is discovered in
the future, but that sensory experience can not be refuted.  For example, he used the
statement: "The sun is about ninety million miles from the earth."9  New evidence could
turn up in the future that could drastically alter that figure.  This statement that is
considered fact could be disputed.  But what about a statement of near certain belief, such
as Malcolm's example: "There is a heart in my body."10  This statement seems impossible
to deny, but what if one were presented with incontrovertible evidence to the contrary. 
Eventually, the person would come to believe the evidence presented to them and accept
that they had no heart.  From this example, one can gather that even statements of almost
absolute certainty can be proven wrong.  Malcolm then examines his final proposition:
"Here is an ink-bottle."11  This statement is an observation.  Malcolm sees the ink-bottle
on the desk before him.  This, Malcolm believes, is a certain, indisputable statement.  If at
that moment he sees the ink-bottle, no evidence can convince him he did not, at least at
that moment, see the ink-bottle.  Direct sensory experience, according to Malcolm, brings
certainty.  As in the example, a person has no direct sensory experience of the distance of
the sun from the earth.  This is the problem with statements of fact and belief and explains
why they can so easily be proven wrong.  
     Malcolm believed that people are psychologically impelled to believe in their immediate
sensory experiences.
          Bouwsma and Malcolm offer sound and reasonable arguments, but neither is able to
completely defeat skepticism.  They are damaging to Descartes, but not destructive to the
whole of skepticism.  For example, Bouwsma makes an excellent case against the evil
genius argument by suggesting that what the genius would consider illusion, people would
consider reality.  But it must be noted that while Bouwsma has made a valid suggestion, it
does not prove that the evil genius does not exist.  It is as impossible to prove that the evil
genius does not exist as it is to prove that God does exist.  Also Bouwsma's criticism
focused primarily on the evil genius example and did not take into account the rest of
Descartes' argument.  There is a lot more to Descartes' argument than that particular
point.  Descartes only brought up that extreme example in order to prove that we can not
trust our senses.  It is important to keep in mind that Descartes' purpose in undertaking the
skeptical argument was to find a point of certainty in our existence and not to prove that
the world is meaningless.
     Malcolm has made an admirable case for the validity of the senses, but upon careful
examination he says very much the same thing as Bouwsma.  Namely, that the senses are
real to us.  Bouwsma came to this point by examining the idea of the evil genius and the
idea of "illusions".  Malcolm came to it through examining the differences between fact,
belief and sensory information.  Despite the differences in how they discovered it, they
both came to the same conclusion.  The point is valid and their reasoning is sound, but it
does not prove that Descartes is wrong.  
     The strength of the skeptical argument lies in the fact that it can not be completely
disproved.  No one can prove or disprove the existence of an evil genius, they can only go
so far as to say that it does not matter.  This is essentially what Bouwsma and Malcolm
have done.  They tried to prove that the existence of the evil genius would not make a
difference in our lives.  For this reason, I believe that although Bouwsma and Malcolm
have made a valid point, they have only touched the surface of Descartes' argument.  They
have succeeded in proving that life is not meaningless, but that was not the purpose of
Descartes' argument to begin with.  











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