CYWILNO-WOJSKOWE

INTERAKCJE ISTOTĄ
KOMPLEKSOWEGO

PODEJŚCIA UE

Teodor TAGAREV Valeri RATCHEV

Bułgarska Akademia Nauk w Sofii szef gabinetu ministra spraw zagranicznych Bułgarii

Civil-Military Interaction at the Core
of the EU Comprehensive Approach

Abstract: The European Union is a unique and complex power, with a potential to act in the field of security that has been largely underutilized. The particular choices on future EU security roles will be shaped by the structural conditions for EU decision-making, as well as trends and factors that do and will drive the respective decisions. Towards that purpose, the first part of this article presents a study on dimensions, structural conditions, and drivers. It summarises the advances in the implementation of the comprehensive approach and outlines constraints impacting the definition of EU roles in this respect. The second part of the paper focuses on the evolution of civil-military interaction - the key ingredient in the evolution of the comprehensive approach. It looks into the origins of contemporary civil-military interaction in operations and presents the two main concepts of civil-military cooperation, or CIMIC, and civil-military coordination. It then presents current EU policies with major impact on the development and use of civilian and military assets in EU operations, including the interfaces between EU and NATO. The final section examines the civil-military dimension of future EU roles in the implementation of the comprehensive approach. It looks at potential developments in civil-military interaction in `external' and `internal' roles and identifies plausible EU roles in developing `mixed' civil-military capabilities.

Acknowledgement: This article reflects research results in work package 3 of the FOCUS project. FOCUS (“Foresight Security Scenarios - Mapping Research to a Comprehensive Approach to Exogenous EU Roles”) aims wide but with concrete policy guidance in mind: namely to define the most plausible threat scenarios that affect the “borderline” between the EU's external and internal dimensions to security - and to derive guidance for the Union's future possible security roles and decisions to plan research in support of those roles. “The research leading to these results has received funding from the European Union Seventh Framework Programme (FP7/2007-2013) under grant agreement nº 261633”. The FOCUS project is co-funded under the Security Research theme of the EU's 7th EU Framework Programme, for the period of April 2011 to March 2013. FOCUS brings together 13 partners from 8 countries, including universities, industry, think tanks and security information providers. For more information visit the project website at http://www.focusproject.eu.

Introduction

The European Union is a unique complex power. Its strength and weaknesses stem from the fact that the Union is more than an intergovernmental organization and, at the same time, a cluster of nation states. None of the other global players posses this quality. Therefore, the institutional place of the EU in global relations is a primary ingredient of the strategic challenges that the Union has to face.

EU has a responsibility and must play a crucial role for the security and stability in the area of its direct security interests. This role requires:

• full recognition of the realities in a variety of countries and regions,

• permanent screening of risk factors with technical and analytical/intelligence tools,

• clear decision making mechanism at various stages of the escalation of threats and risks, especially accounting for foresight and prevention strategies,

• diverse capacities for prevention and early action against threats,

• close communication with supporting players in the specific situation, with relevant international organizations and NGOs,

• an operational strategy based on the principle of approaching the crisis “as soon as possible, as far from the Union's borders as possible, as supportive/communal as possible, as peacefully as possible”.

In future comprehensive approaches to addressing variety of security threats and challenges, both internal and external, EU roles may vary. These roles are not limited strictly to using available capabilities and assets. The EU may trigger action and development of relevant strategies that facilitate the involvement of various players. While particular choices and decisions will be debated and reflected in specific policies and official documents, this analysis is intended to support the exploration of potential future role of the EU in the comprehensive approach and suggests for that purpose several principal dimensions:

• Actors both within and outside the Union that should be seen as perspective partners in a comprehensive approach to conflict prevention and crisis management;

• Operational instruments that the actors should be able to provide and EU should be able to manage;

• Achievable goals and objectives in supporting non-EU member states;

• Crisis Management Strategies;

• Mission roles.

The particular choices on future EU roles will be shaped by the structural conditions for EU decision-making, as well as trends and factors that do and will drive the respective decisions. Therefore, the first part of this presents a study on dimensions, structural conditions, and drivers. It summarises the advances in the implementation of the comprehensive approach and outlines constraints impacting the definition of EU roles in this respect. The second part of the paper focuses on the evolution of civil-military interaction - the key ingredient of any future shape of the comprehensive approach.

Dimensions of the exploratory space for future EU roles

D1. Actors

Actors in EU comprehensive approach to security are those official international, European, national and local authorities, international and national non-profit organisations and individuals, media and businesses, with which the EU would be able to establish partnership relations or cooperation in operations to reduce risks, prevent conflicts and manage crises.

Partnership is the relations between two or more actors based on formal agreement. These actors would share common goals within a comprehensive approach to risk reduction, conflict prevention, crisis management or stability and reconstruction activities and will conduct operations in a coordinated manner. Coordination is a form of synchronization of political or operational activities in terms of objectives, space, time, resources and rules of engagement; it could be formal or informal.

Typical actors

International actors are global or regional intergovernmental organisation with which EU may establish partnership or cooperation relations and act in coordinated manner in applying comprehensive approach to security such as UN, NATO, OSCE, Arab League, African Union, Organization Islamic Conference, Gulf Cooperation Council, etc.

Governmental actors are governments and governmental agencies of member and not-member states, as well as provincial, local, and community authorities that could be partners in solving particular security cases.

Humanitarian actors are non-profit civilian organisations, whether national or international, which have a commitment to humanitarian principles and have essential capabilities to perform humanitarian or development activities.

Military actors are those national or coalition official military that are provided to comprehensive approach operations by their governments or an intergovernmental political body.

Security actors are any lawful security actors other than the military, including both public entities, such as national and boarder police and other national and international security agencies, as well as private entities, such as commercial security contractors and guards.

D2. Instruments

Instruments are those political, diplomatic, economic, intelligence, military, security, judicial and non-governmental capabilities and resources, which EU may generate, mobilize, collect, or provide trough partnership and cooperation in order to apply the comprehensive approach to any particular security case.

Typical instruments

Political instruments are the related EU policies, consultations, summits, declarations, high-level visits and meetings, and other forms of political activities aimed to build political consensus on EU policy, to establish partnership relations, to intervene in international organisations or to contact the political or opposition authorities engaged in a conflict situation.

Diplomatic instruments are EU and member states representation, different forms of public and confidential demarches aimed to create a positive environment for a crisis resolution.

Economic instruments are those EU and member states policies that are focussed, from one side, to provide resources to achieve EU aims, and, from other, to limit the resources available to the opponent(s).

Intelligence instruments are national official sources of sharable information related to the issue, which could be supportive to the political and operational decision making.

Military, para-military, law enforcement, civil protection and other security instruments should be subject to a hierarchical chain of command, be they armed or unarmed, governmental or inter-governmental; they should be deployable to the area of concrete operation, trained under politically determined rules of engagement and (at least) minimal interoperability standards, accordingly equipped, and sustainable for the time of operation.

Judicial instruments could be different international and national justice institutions as courts, criminal investigation and prosecution services, customary and traditional justice systems and other legal institutions that work to ensure respect to constitutional arrangements, support to the rule of law supported and safeguarding human rights.

Non-profit organization, media and businesses also can provide powerful instruments, such as development, informational, etc., in partnering with EU as its member countries have the most vibrant civil society and host competitive businesses.

D3. Goals and Objectives in supporting non-EU member states

Goals and Objectives in supporting non-EU member states are those EU policies, programmes and measures that are aimed to improve the security, political, economic, social, humanitarian and administrative situation in particular country/ies or region(s), thus helping local people to alleviate a crisis and achieve sustainable self-development, while respecting human rights and political freedoms.

Typical objectives

In addition to the provision of basic security, EU may pursue other objectives such as support to economic development and the establishment of good governance.

Development policy of EU - Development and Cooperation (EuropeAid) is responsible for putting into motion the European Commission's worldwide concern for development, by bringing together policy design and policy implementation covering all development countries.

Good Governance is a concept of addressing the way power is exercised in the management of a country's affairs. Its core elements are public sector management, accountability, a legal framework for development, transparency, information, anti-corruption and the principle of participation.

Specifically, security sector governance (SSG) refers to the structures, processes, values and attitudes that shape decisions about security and their implementation. Security Sector Reform (SSR) aims to enhance SSG through the effective and efficient delivery of security under conditions of democratic oversight and control (DCAF, 2009).

As one example, the Stability Pact for South Eastern Europe can be examined as a model comprehensive conflict prevention strategy of the international community, aimed at strengthening the efforts of the countries of South Eastern Europe in fostering peace, democracy, respect for human rights and economic prosperity, that could be applied to other regions in need.

D4. Strategies

The EU may choose to pursue different strategies, or combination thereof, focusing on respectively on prevention, building resilience, pre-emption, deterrence, protection, defence, de-escalation, and consequence management.

Typical strategies

Prevention is a strategy based on the understanding that a crisis is inevitable, but not imminent, and there is time and opportunities to apply measures and take operation in order to de-escalate tensions.

Resilience reflects the capacity of states and societies to recover for crises from any type using mainly internal sources like political consensus, public confidence and support for reforms, national unity and creative behaviour.

Pre-emption is strategy of acting on the basis of incontrovertible evidence that an enemy terrorist, military, pirates attack or mass migration wave is imminent.

Deterrence is an element of conflict prevention strategy based on building sense within the opponent that any kind of attack will be more costly for him that eventual win.

Protection is a universal norm addressed to both national governments and international community and organisation as requirement to provide security and vital human rights for the ordinary people. Responsibility to protect for EU is also a valued and moral code of conduct in the face of massive violence against civilians.

Defence today is a comprehensive formula of guarding allied or national sovereignty using mainly military but also political, diplomatic, economic, informational, and other non-coercive instruments.

De-escalation is a strategy after the crisis has reached its peak. The main aims are first, to avoid the return to coercive operations and, secondly, to build supportive environment for stability and reconstruction.

Consequence management constitutes actions taken in the aftermath of effects of an attack from nuclear, chemical, biological weapons of mass destruction,
a natural disaster with massive consequences or an industrial catastrophe. From EU point view, it should also include more general definitions such as threat to life by destructive events.

D5. Mission roles

The potential roles of the EU in the comprehensive approach may be explored also along the possible roles it could play in a particular mission. In such cases the EU may decide to act alone, to take a lead role, to share the leadership, to provide support, to take responsibility for a particular operational area or a type of capability. Finally, at the extreme, the EU may decide not to get involved in a particular mission.

Conceptual advances and EU policies related to the Comprehensive Approach

The principal advantages of EU are in its collective values, socio-economic achievements, and sense of belonging to the most liberal and successful political alliance in history. The European Security Strategy (ESS) for example emphasises that “No single country is able to tackle today's complex problems on its own” (European Security Strategy, 2003:2). It examines conflicts abroad in their relation to development, as well as impact on European vulnerabilities. Conflict resolution and provision of security are examined in their links to confidence building and arms control regimes, spreading good governance, trade and development policies. The strategy calls for increased responsibility of the EU in preventive engagements, development of a wide spectrum of capabilities, and a strategic partnership with NATO in crisis management. Multilateral cooperation in international organisations and partnerships with key actors are seen as indispensable in the pursuit of EU objectives. Thus, although ESS does not explicitly use the term “comprehensive approach,” the ideal of comprehensiveness in terms of actors, instruments, and phases of conflict is certainly reflected in the document.

The EU has agreed with NATO on a comprehensive framework for EU-NATO permanent relations, known as Berlin Plus. It provides for crisis consultations and, iter alia, provides access to NATO assets in EU-led crisis management operations.

In addition to its more traditional military missions and efforts at developing defence capabilities, expressed most visibly through the 2010 Headline Goal and the concept of the EU Battle Groups, the Union invests in the civilian aspect of crisis management, focusing on four priority areas as defined by the Feira European Council in June 2000: police, strengthening of the rule of law, strengthening civilian administration and civil protection. In addition, the Council of the European Union prescribes roles of the EU and member states in using both civilian and military capabilities in emergency and crisis response.

The term “comprehensive approach” is getting traction also with the European Parliament in discussions on future defence developments. A study by Mölling and Brune (2011), published on behalf of EP's Directorate-General for External Policies of the Union, calls for “a more comprehensive approach to the defence sector” in order to overcome “the current piecemeal approach to the various problems” and “concentrate on the shape of an effective EU defence sector strategy during a period of austerity.” The authors of the report conclude that

[t]he character of crisis management is also drifting away from purely military tasks. Future engagements are likely to be more civilian and more geared towards managing the complex interaction of several actors to achieve an integrated or comprehensive approach. This poses also challenges to the development of capabilities, i.e. to link planning assumptions and deduce integrated or civil-military interoperable capabilities such as communication, maintenance or transport.

Recently, the concept of the “comprehensive approach” has been applied in shaping EU policy for internal security. The draft Internal Security Strategy (ISS), approved by the Council of the European Union in February 2010, calls for understanding the concept of internal security comprehensively. In addition, in its `Strategic Guidelines for Action' the Council mandates the application of a “wide and comprehensive approach to internal security” encompassing “a wide range of measures with both horizontal and vertical dimensions” as follows:

“horizontal dimension: to reach an adequate level of internal security in a complex global environment requires the involvement of law-enforcement and border-management authorities, with the support of judicial cooperation, civil protection agencies and also of the political, economic, financial, social and private sectors, including non-governmental organisations,” as well as “vertical dimension of security at various levels: international cooperation, EU-level security policies and initiatives, regional cooperation between Member States and Member States' own national, regional and local policies”.

In its November 2010 Communication to the European Parliament and the Council, the European Commission shied away from using the term “comprehensive approach.” Nevertheless, it referred to the cross-border and cross-sectoral nature of current security threats and challenges and the inability of individual member states to respond effectively on their own. Further, reflecting a broad understanding on security players, it came up with a shared agenda for member states, EU bodies, local authorities and civil society, supported by a solid EU security industry. The Agenda emphasises the need to ensure coherence and complementarity between the internal and external aspects of EU security and integration or security measures in “relevant strategic partnerships.” Finally, in the elaboration of the strategic objectives, the Commission examines the spectrum of preventive, protective and consequence management actions.

To summarize, in a very short time, the EU has built a solid crisis management capability and accumulated multiple practical experience, both civilian and military. Some suggest that the success of the mission is because of the small size and limited military risk. However, experience confirms that in case of spillover of
a crisis situation neither pure military nor pure civilian mission may be effective.

If this is mutually recognised, the EU capacity to perform integrated missions both inside and outside Europe should be completely established. EU engagements should surmount the fact that the Union's potential for integrated missions is hindered by internal EU politics. EU should establish policy of investing time and money in developing balanced, flexible, and effective civilian-military capabilities, adequate to foreseen requirements for crisis management, peacebuilding, reconstruction and stabilization missions.

As a preliminary conclusion, it can be stated that there is growing understanding and acceptance of the comprehensive approach in addressing various security threats and challenges, with account of the interplay between those with external origin and the ones originating within the EU. It is safe to predict that in the future the comprehensive approach will be applied in addressing additional challenges to the European security, and new ways will be explored that seek to make this application more effective and efficient. However, it less clear-and maybe impossible to predict-exactly what roles the European Union will undertake in terms of partnerships, mission roles, capabilities, and phases. Therefore, in a follow-up research the FOCUS project will explore alternatives of these roles of the European Union, that will be shaped by the structural conditions for EU decision-making and
a number factors and trends, described in the following sections.

Structural conditions for EU decision-making and strategies

There are several principal structural conditions for effective EU decision-making on crisis management.

The first is rooted into the principle of consensus-based decisions. As it is seen by the reality of recent crisis situations, achieving consensus is complicated, especially in cases of rapidly escalating crises. The principal issue here is the shared threat perception between the member states and the differing views on applicable strategies.

The other structural issue is the delimitation of competencies between EEAS and the European Commission. It is conditionally solved through compatibility with the positions of the High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy and the Vice President of the European Commission in one and same person. However, the issue continues to be partially opened in areas as financing of external actions, crisis management (EEAS) and crisis response (EC). Since its foundation, the European Community is involved in all phases of the crisis cycle: from preventive strategies to post-crisis rehabilitation and reconstruction. It manages substantial resources devoted to countries in political crisis through its country programmes and specific instruments such as the Instrument for stability. The Commission attaches great importance to a coherent EU approach to crisis situations, assuring that EC instruments and ESDP actions are complementary. Both local delegations and local partners are closely involved. The portfolio of the Commissioner for international cooperation, humanitarian aid and crisis response covers functions for response to crises, which is different from the classical understanding of crisis management.

Third structural issue is subsidiarity. For EU, this is a guiding principle of federalism stipulating that decisions should be taken at the lowest level consistent with effective action within a political system. Specifically, it is the principle whereby the European Union does not take action (except in the areas which fall within its exclusive competence) unless this is more effective than the action potentially taken at national, regional or local level.

In addition to solving structural decision-making issues, the implementation of comprehensive approach requires wide spectrum of strategies in order EU to be effective in any case and at any phase of escalation of risk factors or in the case of a natural disaster, pandemia or industrial catastrophe.

Since in general crises have more or less common phases of escalation and de-escalation, any decision on EU roles would be based on specific strategic approaches to each of them. Crisis management strategies are based on the continuum of conflict and should be applied in the right time, with right instruments, while maintaining focus of the limited use of coercion, avoidance of collateral damages of any type and the necessary consequence management.

Drivers

Drivers are those factors and developments that will affect the life of all European citizens, and in this way will shape the decisions on what roles EU will undertake in providing comprehensive security for the Europeans.

Drivers could be identified in practically every area of security. Since the EU is a unique complex institution for both member states and people, multiple drivers should be analyzed. The main argument comes from the trends of complexity, interdependence, and global nature of almost all aspects of security. The multiple drivers in turn create complicated decision-making environment, especially in the case of a rapidly escalating situation. The decomposition of drivers could make the analysis easier, but this will not serve our fundamental aim - to be maximum supportive to the security decision making in EU.

Drivers are basic instruments for building scenarios. Presenting them in a form of matrix format gives opportunity to explain scenarios trough drivers and, what is very useful, to appreciate the similarities and the dissimilarities across the scenarios on a number of important points.

Multiple drivers

Growth

Economic growth is one of the key advantages of the EU. The focus here is not on annual size of the growth only, but on its range, quality and capacity for innovation. Growth, considered in this way, determines the degree of freedom EU has to take or not decisions to engage in security case, to apply costly but effective comprehensive approach to security issues of different types or to engage with a supporting, minimal or symbolic role. The characteristics of economic development also will affect decisions on generating capabilities, selecting partnership actors and designing the strategy of engagement. It will also shape respect by friends and adversaries and will continue to feed the image of the EU as the most successful political alliance in history and will make EU attractive moderator in any conflict situation.

But maintaining economic growth is also one of the key challenges for EU. The current financial crisis shows a vital need of structural reforms and different political economy. Efforts and difficult decision are still to be taken and their scope will unavoidably influence the scope and intensity of any EU future security role.

Symmetrically, the quality of the economic growth, and especially the absence of growth or exploration of resources only based growth, will effect strongly also the behaviour of the countries whit in the area of immediate security interest of EU.

Governance

Principal characteristic of governance in EU, member states and outside is the connection between political powers and citizens. The level of maturity of governance in EU and any country is characterised by the factual engagement and influence of people on executive policy. If any executive power performs its business through participation and legitimacy, vision and strategy, effectiveness and efficiency, transparency, accountability and rule of law, we will witness a shift of policy-making towards effective governance. If not, the trend will be towards authoritarianism and dictatorship. Good governance principles certainly make the life of policy-makers more difficult but one of the outcomes is the increasing public support.

Governance at the global level is about the so-called world order - a division of labour, rights and obligations between countries with global reach. In the march of globalization, ambitions for taking global responsibilities flag down.

EU is a champion of democratic governance at both union and national levels. Maintaining this unique quality, EU would be able to take a lead role in security affairs beyond the area of immediate security interests based on stable qualitative growth, strong and wide public support.

Te level of governance strongly impacts the cohesion of the European Union.

Ideology

Ideology in terms of moral code, political principals and global vision based on well rooted values makes the difference in terms of human rights and prosperity. Ideology of national dominance and ignorance of political and individual values may set up a construction of “winners” and “losers.” Each “victory” and each “defeat” in this context would be a source for new conflicts within a spiral of violence.

Religion and religious issues are provocation to political ideology and especially to the liberal democracy. Strategically, it challenges most of all the European open societies and their ability to cope with aggressive penetration without wounding painfully achieved freedoms and rights.

Political and religious ideologies are representing probably the most complex and complicated challenge to EU decision-making on security policy. These are not perspectives but recent reality and their influence will grow at all three levels - internal, neighbourhood, and global.

Geopolitics

Geopolitics is about control. Control over space, not only borders. The modern states' geopolitics is equipped with variety of sophisticated instruments within the range from total information, transnational banks, intercontinental pipelines and control of maritime traffic, trough terrorist networks and hybrid armies to missile technologies and nuclear weapons. Geopolitics is deeply rooted in ideology, economic growth and history (Europe has been politically established around five geopolitical centres). It closes the circle of multiple security drivers and completes the spectrum of considerations that affect decisions on EU security issues.

The geopolitics of EU is not a issue often discussed, but in reality it does exist It relates the union with neighbours (Neighbourhood policy) and with strategic allies (transatlantic relations). Even the relations between EU and NATO fall into this category.

* * *

After examining trends, drivers, and structural conditions for decision making, the second part of the paper outlines plausible developments along a key interaction in the first dimension - that between civilians and military players in the implementation of the comprehensive approach. Towards this purpose it turns first to the origins of contemporary civil-military interaction in operations and presents the two main concepts of civil-military cooperation, or CIMIC, and civil-military coordination. Secondly, it presents current EU policies with major impact on the development and use of civilian and military assets in EU operations, including the interfaces between EU and NATO. The third and final section examines the civil-military dimension of future EU roles in the implementation of the comprehensive approach. It looks at potential developments in civil-military interaction in `external' and `internal' roles and identifies plausible EU roles in developing `mixed' civil-military capabilities.

Origins of contemporary civil-military interaction

While currently both civilian and defence authorities recognise the need for civil-military interaction in the provision of security, respective concepts and implementation approaches continue to evolve. To understand the prospects in that regard, one has to acknowledge the origin of main current concepts and civil-military arrangements that could be grouped under two headings: Civil-Military Cooperation, or CIMIC, and Civil-Military Coordination.

Civil-Military Cooperation (CIMIC)

Military operations after World War Two, such as the British experience during the Malayan Emergency from 1948 to 1960, put forward the questions of how armed forces have to be organised and trained to work with civil authorities, how roles of political and military leaders are defined, and how operations of military and security forces are organised (Hamby, 2002). The respective doctrinal aspects were developed under the heading of military operations other than war, or MOOTW (Joint Chiefs of Staff, 1995) and continue to evolve with consideration of irregular warfare, stabilisation and reconstruction, counterinsurgency operations, etc.

These operations, just like any other military operation, are driven by political considerations. However, MOOTW “are more sensitive to such considerations due to the overriding goal to prevent, preempt, or limit potential hostilities. In MOOTW, political considerations permeate all levels and the military may not be the primary player” (Ibid: I-1). One of the consequences is that these operations do not always follow well understood principles of war, e.g. having much more restrictive rules of engagement, just like in the full spectrum of peace operations, and serve as a testbed for interagency cooperation.

Having emerged ad-hoc in demanding circumstances, by now CIMIC is a well established military concept, codified in doctrinal document. One of the available definitions refers to CIMIC as the “co-ordination and co-operation, in support of the mission, between the Commander and civil actors, including national population and local authorities, as well as international, national and non-governmental organisations and agencies” (cf. Humanitarian Aid & Civil Protection, 2008; Tosun, Yildiran & Ozer, 2009).

The concept of CIMIC facilitates the establishment and maintenance of effective co-operation of the commander and the civilian authorities, organisations, agencies in theatre, local administration, businesses, community leader and population within a commander's area of operations in order to allow him/her to fulfil the assigned mission. This may also include direct support to the implementation of CIMIC activities.

Civil-Military Coordination (CM COORD)

The concept of Civil Military Coordination emerged on the civilian side. Dealing with complex emergencies, increased operational challenges, greater risks and threats, the humanitarian community often had to rely on support by the military. With the experience of utilising various forms of civil-military coordination, the humanitarian community felt it necessary to examine the broad spectrum of issues arising from the interaction between civilians and military. Thus it came up with specific guidelines on the use of military and civil defence assets (MCDA) in natural disasters and complex emergencies (Humanitarian Aid & Civil Protection, 2008). That includes the so-called Oslo Guidelines of foreign military and civil defence assets in natural disasters (OCHA, 2007) and MCDA Guidelines for complex emergencies, as well as the reference papers and guidelines on civil military relationship in complex emergencies and on the use of military or armed escorts prepared by the UN/OCHA Inter-Agency Standing Committee (IASC, 2008). In addition, the NGO-Military Contact Group (NMCG)-a forum in the UK chaired by the British Red Cross-facilitates information sharing, learning, and dialogue on relevant policy, technical, and operational issues of civil-military interaction in humanitarian response and reports on new developments in the field (NMCG, 2011).

In sum, CIMIC is a concept of supporting a military commander in certain operations, while civil-military coordination is clearly a humanitarian concept. The remaining part of this chapter will examine how these separate concepts have and continue to evolve.

Civil-military interaction in current EU policies

Interfaces among EU policies

Humanitarian and rescue missions, just as peacekeeping and peacemaking operations were part of the so called Petersberg tasks, and thus of the European Security and Defence Policy. The Lisbon Treaty defined it as a Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP), coming under the Common Foreign and Security Policy, adding to the original Petersberg tasks, among others, stabilisation in post-conflict situations and support to third countries in combating terrorism that also assume close civil-military interaction.

At the same time, the Lisbon Treaty elevated humanitarian aid as a separate policy of the EU (TFEU, Article 214). The magnitude and number of natural and man-made disasters have increased in the last decade, while the international context in which humanitarian aid takes place has become increasingly challenging. Respective operations are becoming more complex and protracted and often accompanied by blatant violations of the international humanitarian law and threats to the security of humanitarian workers (Caprile & Hakala, 2010). In this environment, a European Consensus on Humanitarian Aid between the European Parliament, Council and Commission, signed in December 2007, confirmed the use of armed forces, albeit as a last resort in meeting critical humanitarian needs.

EuropeAid  is another policy that calls for close coordination of various EU policies. Development and cooperation require promotion of a coherent and effective “Whole of EU” approach to crisis and fragile situations, for EU instruments and policies in synergy with CSDP, the European External Action Service (EEAS), Member States, and cooperation with outside bodies such as the United Nations and regional organizations. Further, EU development and cooperation bodies support interventions in fragile countries and crisis situations facilitating coordination with the Humanitarian Office of the European Commission, the Foreign Policy Instrument, and EEAS, including Crisis Management and Planning Department, Civilian Planning and Conduct Capability, EU Military Staff, Joint Situation Centre, CSDP actions, etc. Likewise, they support the organization of prevention and preparedness strategies as well as Response and Recovery, including Transition (DEVCO, 2011).

EU development programmes also support the establishment of democratic governance in recipient countries, including in the area of justice and security.

And finally, the security-development nexus involves coordination in a number of thematic policies, such as Counter-terrorism, Mine Action, Small Arms, Border co-operation, Organised Crime, Weapons of Mass Destruction/Chemical, Biological, Radiological, and Nuclear (WMD/CBRN) and related initiatives, as well as in Security Sector Reform, Disarmament, Demobilisation and Re-integration (Ibid:58).

Evolution of EU Military and Civilian Capabilities

In 1999 the European Council mandated the Helsinki Headline Goal, calling for the designation and preparation of military forces of up to 15 brigades (50-60,000 personnel) capable of implementing the full range of the original Petersberg task and the creation of respective planning and decision making bodies. In 2004 that goal was extended to 2010, adding also the creation of battlegroups and the maintenance of two of them at high level of readiness for deployment.

In parallel, the Brussels European Council in December 2004 approved the “Civilian Headline Goal 2008.” The ambition of the EU is to be able to deploy integrated civilian crisis management packages in ESDP concurrent civilian crisis management missions, at short notice and different levels of engagement, including in `in a non-benign environment.' Six priority sectors of civil crisis management were identified:

• police;

• rule of law;

• civil administration;

• civil protection;

• monitoring missions;

• support for EU special representatives.

Civilian capability packages can be deployed autonomously, jointly or in close cooperation with military operations. The Council mandated that close cooperation and co-ordination with the military efforts have to be ensured throughout all phases of the operation (Council of the European Union, 2004).

In April 2010 Poland, France and Germany launched the so-called “Weimar Initiative” to strengthen CSDP. It is focused on establishing permanent civil-military planning and command structures for EU operations. This integrated civil-military focus reflects the growing importance of the civilian dimension of EU operations and the desire to implement a comprehensive approach to crisis management. Practical steps such as the creation of Crisis Management and Planning Directorate in 2009 in EEAS from the merger of two former directorates-Defence Aspects and Civilian Crisis Management-do support this endeavour. The initiative may lead in time to the creation of appropriate internal EU structures allowing the Union to perform complex civil-military tasks in crisis management (Major, 2010).

Continuum of Actors

Civil and military players consistently act alongside in crisis management operations. On the other hand, with time new actors become involved in such operations, often in new forms of partnership between public and private organizations. While police and civil protection personnel form the backbone of Civilian Response Teams (CRTs) and rapidly-deployable police elements, additional players can also make a substantial contribution. Among them are:

• a variety of non-governmental organizations (NGOs);

• volunteers, in particular through the forthcoming establishment of a European Voluntary Humanitarian Aid Corps (TFEU, Article 214.5) and the systemic approach to identification and selection of volunteers, their training according to common standards and, possibly, modules, and deployment (Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament and the Council, 2010);

• private sector companies, with the so-called Private Security Companies (PSCs) featuring prominently among them;

• representatives from the affected communities, etc.

A number of new forms emerge on the continuum between public and private actors. A recent study by Ekström (2010) identified a number of public private business models that come in between the two extremes of public provision and outright privatization of security services. That includes public private partnership (PPP) models such as:

• Design and Construct (D&C);

• Sale and leaseback;

• Operate and Maintain (O&M);

• Operate, Maintain and Manage (OM&M);

• Build-Transfer-Operate (BTO);

• Build-Operate-Transfer (BOT);

• Build-Lease-Transfer (BLT);

• Build-Lease-Transfer-Maintain (BLTM);

• Build-Own-Operate-Remove (BOOR);

• Build-Own-Operate-Transfer (BOOT);

• Lease-Renovate-Operate-Transfer (LROT);

• Design-Build-Finance-Operate (DBFO);

• Design-Construct-Manage-Finance (DCMF);

• Design-Build-Finance-Operate-Manage (DBFOM); and

• Build-Own-Operate (BOO).

In addition to PPPs, the Swedish concept of Public Private Cooperation (PPC) includes outsourcing, contracting, franchising, concessions, and joint ventures. While most of these forms have been tried in national settings only, experience and empirical evidence (Hodge, Greve & Boardman, 2011; Georgiev, 2007) is of use in the consideration of future EU roles in CSDP and humanitarian aid operations.

In view of the current and foreseeable security environment, there is a considerable interest in “light military/heavy police” type of capabilities that do not readily fit into the civil-military dichotomy. Capabilities of this type are provided traditionally by national paramilitary organizations, such as the Dutch Royal Marechaussee, the French National Gendarmerie, the Italian Carabinieri, the Portuguese Guarda Nacional Republicana and the Spanish Guardia Civil (Shalamanov, Tagarev & Angelov, 2006). The presence of specialised police forces already facilitated the building of capacity for CSDP mission. The analysis of experience in implementing such capabilities in EU operations, albeit limited so far, also provides for a glimpse at future modes of civil-military interaction (Rodt, 2011).

The Civil-Military Perspective in EU-NATO Operational

Arrangements

The European Union has a significant number of partners in its operations, including international and regional organisations, nations, and NGOs. But of special significance are its relations with NATO both in operations and in the development of civil and military capabilities. In a number of CSDP operations EU has utilised NATO assets on the basis of the 2004 Berlin Plus agreement. Since the NATO Lisbon Summit in 2010 there is reciprocal arrangement in place which allows NATO access to EU capabilities.

Both EU and NATO are in the process of enhancing organisational structures and decision-making to implement successfully the comprehensive approach to conflict resolution, stabilisation and reconstruction. To this end, it has been suggested that nations establish and maintain an interconnected web of governmental agencies-law enforcement, border protection services, judiciaries and public health, etc.-complemented by a “NATO-EU framework for comprehensive planning and liaison with civilian actors, especially humanitarian relief organisations and NGOs” (ACT, 2009:61).

The EU has already well established mechanisms for calling on military assets, as well as for cooperating with NATO's Euro-Atlantic Disaster Response Coordination Centre (EARDCC). That includes, among others, the EU Civil Protection Mechanism and the 24/7 functioning of its Monitoring and Information Centre (Mazzara, 2011).

NATO on its side also invests in concepts, e.g. NEC/Web-2, that can enable interoperability between NATO and EU and facilitate integration and cost-effective use of their capabilities (Gabellone, in press).

And finally, the two organisations formally coordinate capability development through the NATO-EU Capability Group, meeting approximately every four to six weeks alternating between NATO HQ and EU Council Justus Lipsius in Brussels (Ibid.).

It can be stated as an interim conclusion that the understanding of civilian led, combined civil-military operations has been soundly established in EU security thinking, and the enhancement of related institutions proceeds in a practical manner, with two distinct tracks of capability development respectively for civilian and military capabilities. The next section examines how the civil-military interaction could evolve in next decades.

The civil-military dimension of future EU roles in the implementation of the comprehensive approach

Future modes of civil-military interaction in the implementation of the comprehensive approach by the EU will evolve depending on a number of major developments, including:

1. choices on EU roles as a global security actor;

2. the evolving nature of violent conflict and the respective crisis management operations, e.g. vis-à-vis emerging threats;

3. conceptual developments and decisions on the implementation of the solidarity clause (Article 222 of the Lisbon Treaty), in particular as related to prevention of terrorist threats in Member States' territory and the protection of democratic institutions from any terrorist attack;

4. the evolving balance between the Commission, in particular the High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy, and the Member States in influencing CSDP decisions that may lead, or not, to elements of supranational decision-making and the creation of commonly owned European capabilities ;

5. resource constraints;

6. rapid evolution of civilian capabilities of a comprehensive nature;

7. growing preference of using police and paramilitary forces instead of traditional military in order to reduce collateral damage and facilitate post-conflict reconstruction.

The remainder of this chapter examines potential evolution of civil-military interaction in view of the second, third and the common ownership aspect of the fourth of the listed factors.

Nature of conflict, future operations and civil-military interaction

Conflict in the coming decades will continue to be fraught with uncertainty, involving state and non-state actors combining conventional, irregular and asymmetric methods. It will go beyond traditional domains to encompass space and cyberspace. Shaping the opinion of a network-enabled audience will be just as important as targeting the opponent (Development, Concepts and Doctrine Centre, 2010:13). Problems related to proliferation of weapons of mass destruction will persist. Cyber threats will also proliferate and, possibly, opponents will acquire capabilities to organise a high-consequence attack against European critical infrastructures. Likewise, non-state and hybrid actors will continue to seek capabilities to stage major terrorist attacks on the territories of Member States.

The European Union, along with its partners, is likely to respond to such (and other) threats in a comprehensive manner that includes prevention, crisis management, stabilization, development assistance and so on. A decision to become involved in such conflicts would entail complex operations with close interaction of military and numerous civilian actors. These actors will not be part of strict hierarchical command arrangements; rather, they will act in a networked manner implementing advanced concepts of network-enabled (or `network-based') operations. In addition, they will seek the achievement of operational objectives with the application of tailored effects, minimising kinetic impact when possible. That will also require coherency of efforts of numerous actors within a concept like Effects Based Approach to Operations (EBAO).

Novel threats and resource constraint capability development frameworks will likely lead to the development of assets, such as satellite-based surveillance and communications and cyber security capabilities that, by design, are shared by civilian and military actors. To further complicate the issue, it is possible that some of these assets and capabilities are acquired in one or another form of public private cooperation.

Another plausible case is the development of “heavy police/ light military” type of forces designated to deal with high-end asymmetric threats, posed for example by hybrid armies. Thus, it may be anticipated that the boundaries between what constitutes `civil' and what `military' will become increasingly obscure.

The Solidarity Clause

The assistance to Member States in natural disasters, the prevention and protection from terrorist acts in line with the TFEU Solidarity Clause is also likely to impact future civil-military interaction. At current, there are many national specifics on the use of military forces for internal security purposes in EU member states. Hence, it is likely that the `horizontal dimension' of the comprehensive approach will remain in the prerogatives of Member States.

On the other hand, it is hard to imagine a scenario with the magnitude of the Fukushima Daiichi nuclear disaster in the spring of 2011 on the territory of
a Member State when specialized military capabilities, provided for example by CBRN units of other EU member states would not get involved in protecting the population and consequence management.

In addition to the use of both civilian and military assets in large scale natural disasters and industrial catastrophes, it is possible to envision the use of military assets under EU mandate in preventive and other operations of a Member State territory. There have been cases of using the military in international operations to secure VIP events and protect the population during mass events. Well known are the examples of using NATO assets, including the AWACS fleet, during the Olympic Games in Athens and the European Championship Football in Portugal, both in 2004, and the 2006 World Cup Football Championship. The use of this air surveillance and control capability has been requested also during meetings of Alliance heads of state, governmental and non-governmental meetings and NATO summits, as well as important meetings held by other international organisations (NATO Topics, 2011).

Towards common ownership of civil-military capabilities

The European Union is still in its infancy in terms of commonly owned capabilities, with major acquisitions still to come  given an adequate level on internal EU cohesion is maintained. Still further into the future is the possibility for acquiring capabilities that do not clearly fit into the civil-military dichotomy. Among such capabilities under certain security and technological developments might be those for provision of cyber security/ cyber defence, capabilities utilising space-based assets, capabilities for counter proliferation and CBRN protection, paramilitary capabilities, specialized capabilities for protection of energy supplies, etc.

In the search of efficiency, some of these capabilities may be developed in
a form of partnership between EU bodies and private actors.

In such cases the focus of civil-military interaction will move from the coordination of operational roles, procedures, supporting equipment and interoperability issues to the early stages of requirements definition and the development of technologies and concepts of operation.

Once such `mixed' civil-military capabilities are developed, the European Union might consider the creation of a pool of such capabilities in complementing what currently are the military and the civilian headline goals.

* * *

In sum, future security roles of the European Union will require ever closer interaction between civilian and military instruments to guarantee the coordination and cooperation of those involved in operations at national and international levels. With time, the interaction between civilians and military moved forward from coordination on an ad-hoc basis to a structured EU-wide process of development of military and civilian capabilities. This trend is likely to continue towards encompassing the early phases of defining future operational requirements and technology development, that would not only guarantee effective implementation of advanced concepts of operations and interoperability among military and main civilian actors, but may also lead to the creation of common civil-military assets owned in some form by the European Union.

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About the authors

Dr. Todor Tagarev is Head of the Centre for Security and Defence Management at the Bulgarian Academy of Sciences. Security and defence planner combining governmental experience with sound theoretical knowledge and background in cybernetics, complexity, and security studies; Specializing in security sector reform, primarily from organizational management perspective; Considerable expertise in leading and participating in national and international research teams. He is Editor-in-Chief of Information & Security: An International Journal, http://infosec.procon.bg, and the DCAF series in Security and Defence Management, member of the Editorial Boards of Connections: The Quarterly Journal and the Journal of Defense Management. A number of his publications have been translated and published in Arabic, Bahasa, Bosnian, Dari, French, Georgian, Hungarian, Pashto, Portuguese, Russian, Spanish, and Ukrainian languages. E-mail: [e-mail].

Ambassador Valeri Ratchev is currently Chief of the Cabinet of the Minister of Foreign Affairs of Bulgaria and Associate Senior Fellow of the Centre for Security and Defence Management. He was Ambassador Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary of the Republic of Bulgaria to the Republic of Iraq (2005-2009) and served as Deputy Commandant of the `G.S. Rakovski' Defence and Staff College and Dean of its National Security and Defence Faculty (2000-2005). His main research interests are in strategic and security studies with focus on scenario-based planning, crisis management and security sector reform.

S T R E S Z C Z E N I E

Cywilno-wojskowe interakcje istotą
kompleksowego podejścia UE

Unia Europejska to wyjątkowa i złożona organizacja, której potencjał działań w obszarze bezpieczeństwa w dużej mierze nie został jeszcze wykorzystany. Dokonywanie wyborów w zakresie przyszłych ról bezpieczeństwa UE będzie naznaczone uwarunkowaniami strukturalnymi, jak i również tendencjami oraz czynnikami determinującymi podejmowanie decyzji. Pierwsza część niniejszego artykułu stanowi studium na temat wymiarów, uwarunkowań strukturalnych oraz determinantów decyzyjnych (drivers). Podsumowuje ona postępy w realizacji kompleksowego podejścia i nakreśla ograniczenia mające wpływ na definicję ról unijnych. Zagadnienia poruszane w drugiej części artykułu skupiają się wokół ewolucji interakcji cywilno-
-wojskowej będącej kluczowym elementem w rozwoju kompleksowego podejścia, źródeł współczesnych cywilno-wojskowych interakcji w operacjach oraz dwóch głównych koncepcjach współpracy cywilno-wojskowej (określanej także jako
CIMIC lub koordynacja cywilno-wojskowa). Następne kwestie dotyczą obecnych polityk UE wraz z ich istotnym wpływem na rozwój oraz wykorzystanie zasobów cywilnych i wojskowych w operacjach UE z ujęciem obszarów wzajemnego oddziaływania UE i NATO. Ostatni rozdział zawiera rozważania na temat cywilno-
-wojskowego wymiaru przyszłych ról UE w realizacji kompleksowego podejścia. Prezentuje on również tematykę potencjalnego rozwoju interakcji cywilno-wojskowych w kontekście „zewnętrznych” i „wewnętrznych” ról oraz identyfikuje możliwe do przyjęcia role UE w rozwijaniu „mieszanych” zdolności cywilno-
-wojskowych.

 Adopted from Guidelines for the interaction and coordination of Humanitarian actors and military actors in Afghanistan, version 1.0 (20 May 2008), www.regjeringen.no/upload/UD/Temabilder/Tema%20sikkerhetspolitikk/Afghanistan/Guidelines_Afghanistan%5B1%5D.pdf and DCAF Backgrounders 2009, www.dcaf.ch/Publications/Publication-Detail?lng=en&id=99979.

 From the website of Development and Cooperation-EuropeAid at http://ec.europa.eu/europeaid/who/about/index_en.htm.

From http://www.stabilitypact.org/.

 See “Background EU-NATO: The Framework for Permanent Relations and Berlin Plus,” www.consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cmsUpload/03-11-11 Berlin Plus press note BL.pdf.

 See “Civilian Crisis Management” and the respective reference documents at www.consilium.europa.eu/eeas/security-defence/civilian-crisis-management/reference-documents.aspx?lang=en.

 “Reinforcing the European Union's emergency and crisis response capacities,” 10551/06, JAI 313 (Brussels, 15 June 2006), www.consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cmsUpload/st10551en06.pdf.

 Council of the European Union, Internal Security Strategy for the European Union “Towards
A European Security Model,” 5842/2/10, Rev. 2, JAI 90 (Brussels, 23 February 2010), <http://register.consilium.europa.eu/pdf/en/10/st05/st05842-re02.en10.pdf>.

 Ibid., 10.

 Ibid., pp. 10-11.

 The EU Internal Security Strategy in Action: Five steps towards a more secure Europe, COM(2010) 673 final (Brussels: European Commission, 22 November 2010), <http://ec.europa.eu/commission_2010-2014/malmstrom/archive/internal_security_strategy_in_action_en.pdf>.

 Gilles Bertrand (coord.), Anna Michalski and Lucio R. Pench, Scenarios Europe 2010 (EU Commission, 1999).

 This approach to drivers has been applied by the Strategic Foresight Group, www.strategicforesight.com.

 For the impact of the modalities of capability development see Christian Mölling and Sophie-Charlotte Brune, The Impact of the Financial Crisis on European Defence (Brussels: European Parliament, Directorate-General for External Policies of the Union, Policy Department, April 2011), www.swp-berlin.org/fileadmin/contents/products/fachpublikationen/PE433830_1_PARTIE_I_II_ STUDY_ANNEX_drei.pdf.

 NATO defines CIMIC in identical manner: “The co-ordination and co-operation, in support of the mission, between the NATO Commander and civil actors, including national population and local authorities, as well as international, national and non-governmental organisations and agencies” (NATO Standardization Agency, 2003; Military Committee, 2001).

 For updates and mission/country specific guidelines visit http://reliefweb.int/updates?search=mcda+guidelines.

 See the website of Development and Cooperation-EuropeAid at http://ec.europa.eu/europeaid/who/about/index_en.htm.

 For example, through increased coherence in the development of some capabilities in the Capability Development Plan, <www.eda.europa.eu/Capabilitiespriorities>, leading to cases of future acquisition by the EU similar to the project for the Galileo satellite navigation system. The EU ISS report (2004:116-124) compares this and other forms of filling in EU capability gaps.

See the example with the satellite navigation system above.

Teodor TAGAREV, VALERI RATCHEV

CIVIL-MILITARY INTERACTION AT THE CORE OF THE EU COMPREHENSIVE APPROACH

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Zeszyty Naukowe AON nr 2(59) 2005

ISSN 0867-2245

Zeszyty Naukowe AON nr 4(85) 2011

ISSN 0867-2245

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