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240 NEGI.IGENCE: CAUSATION AND CONTRIBUTORY NEGIJGENCE

"exceptional case" that the Liesbosch principle would be applicable a Similarly, "even the most soIvent of airlines buy their aircraft with the assistance of loan finance, rather than with cash in the bank, for a varietv of reasons," nonę of which is "impecuniosity"."⁸ On this basis there seein_s little left of the decision but certainty would be increased if there wer_e further consideration by the House of Lords.

(b) Interoening acłs or events

6.31    Everyone agrees tliat a consequence is too remote if it follows a "break in the chain of causa tion" or is due to a nova causa interueniens.'*’ This means that although the defendant's breach of duty is a cause of the claimant's damage in the sense that it satisfies the "but-for" test of causation in fact, nevertheless in the eyes of the law some other inter-vening event is regarded as the sole cause of that damage. Three classes of case fali to be considered, namely (1) where a natural event occurs independently of the act of any human being (2) where the event consists of the act or omission of a third party (3) where the event consists of the act or omission of the claimant himself. It should not be thought, how-ever, that in any of these cases the law will be particularly astute to attribute the claimant's damage to a single cause. There is no objection to a finding that the separate torts of two independent actors were both causes of the damage, and where this is so the claimant may recover in fuli from either of them.¹*⁷ Nor is there any objection to a finding that the defendant's breach of duty and the claimanfs own fault were both causes of the claimant's damage. On the contrary, such a finding is a condition precedent to the operation of the law of contributory negligence.⁹⁸

6.32    Intervening natural event. It is, of course, impossible for anything to happen in the physical world without the operation of natural forces, but sometimes the claimant suffers damage as the immediate result of a natural event which occurs independently of the defendanfs breach of duty but which would have caused the claimant no damage if the breach of duty had not occurred. In such a case, if the breach of duty has neither increased the likelihood that the claimant will suffer damage nor ren-dered him morę susceptible to damage, it will not be treated as a cause of the damage. Thus, in Carslogie Słeamship Co. Ltd v. Roi/al Nonoegian Goi¹-crnment⁹⁹ the claimant's ship was damaged in a collision for which the defendanfs ship was wholly responsible. After temporary repairs which restored the ship to a seaworthy condition she set out on a voyage to the United States, a voyage which she would not have madę had the collision not occurred. During her Crossing of the Atlantic she suffered extensive

**•Mattocks v. Mann (1993] K T.R 13. distinguishing Ramwade c. /.IV. Emson & Co. 119871 RT.R. 72

Kuimit Airways Córy v. Irmji Ainaiys Co. (Nos. 4 & 5) 12001] 3 W.L.R 1117 at 1277.

If a human act is involvcd notws act u$ is often substituted.

^See para. 6.7. above. For contribution between tortfeasors, see, Chap. 21. below.

Set* para. 6.39, below. ^w 119521 A.C 292.

damage due to heavy weather, and on her arrival in the United States the

jasion damage was permanently repaired at the same time that the kggyy weather damage was dealt with. It was held in the House of Lords that the daimants were not even entitled to damages for the loss of the yge of the ship while the collision damage was being repaired because that time was used also for the repair of the heavy weather damage. There was no question of the defendants being liable for the heavy weather damage itself: that damage “was not in any sense a consequence of the collision, and must be treated as a supervening event occurring in the course of a normal voyage".' It was true that with the benefit of hindsight jt was possible to say that if the collision had not taken place the storm damage also would not have taken place because the vessel would not have been there at that time, but no reasonable man would have said that such damage was within the likely or foreseeable risk created by the defendant's negligence.²

The effect of market falls in cases of negligent valuation has already been considered.¹

Intervening act of a third party. If the defendant's breach of duty has done no morę than provide the occasion for an entirely independent act by a third party and that act is the immediate cause of the claimant's damage, then it will amount to a nova causa intcroeniens and the defendant will not be liable.⁴ This, however, may not be the case if the act of the third party was not truły independent. In The Oropesa⁵ a collision occurred between the ship of that name and another ship, the Manchester Regiment, for which both ships were to blame. The Manchester Regiment was severely damaged and her master decided to cross to the Oropesa in one of the ship's boats to discuss salvage arrangements with the master of the Oropesa. The boat overturned in heavy seas before reaching the Oropesa and nine of the men on board, one of whom was the claimant's son, were drowned. The question was whether his death was caused by the negligence of the Oropesa,⁶ or whether the master's action in taking to the boat constituted a nova causa interucniens. It was held that action could not be severed from the circumstances affecting the two ships, that the “hand of thecasualty lay heavily" upon the Manchester Regiment, and so that it was caused by and flowed from the collision.⁷ “To break the chain of causation

11952) 1 Ali ER. 20. per Viscount Jowitt Not all of his Lordship's speech is reported in the Law Reports. It seems that if the supervening evcnt had been detention caused by an outbreak of war, the defendants ₂ ^w°uld have been liable Mottarch S.S. Co. v. KarIslturnus Oljifabrihrr |1949] A.C. 1%.

^istinguisb the situation where the eessel is rendered less able to ride out the storm because ot the ^ damage inflicted on it by the defendant.

See para. 6.23, above.

Wcld-Blumicll z\ Stephens |1920| A.C. 956; Hamelt v. Ikmd |1925] A.C. 669; S.S. Singleton Abbaj r. S.S. PaJudnui (19271 A.C. 16.

^ 119431 I*. 32. Weir, Cassbook on Tort (9th ed.). p. 230.

is irrelevant to this question that the negligence of the Mnnchester Regiment leading to the collision , also have been a cause of the death [1943] p 32 at 37, per Lord Wright.