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Iirnst Mach

is neithcr thc atom nor what we are rcferiing to whcn we talk about atoms. From the common scnsc point of view rcfercntial phcnomcnal-ism has confuscd symboli, with what nrc symbolized, though to rcversc the situation, tlie referential phcnomenalist has claimed that common scnsc irics to rcfcr to things that in fact could not be refcrred to.

To be surę Mach “bclieved” in the rcality of atoms as idcas, but this was a trivial sense, and has hardly de$ervcd to be considered a bclicf in the rcality of atoms at all.

Machs occasional asscrrions that hc did not bclieve in the rcality of atoms has suggcstcd that hc was capable of understanding and using a nonphenomcnalisr rhcory of refercncc.²¹ The vcry act of denying thc rcality of atoms presupposcd thc legitimacy of refercncc to what did not cxist. For if lic could not rcfcr to atoms, then hc could not deny their cxistcnce. In short, in terms of Mach’s sccond dennition of atoms, that is, not as “ideas” but as what lay outsidc expcricncc_T we lack cvidcncc that Mach at any time bclicved in their rcality. And becausc this has long been the normal or customary use of thc word “atom," wc rnay rather flatly State that Mach did not believe in thc rcality of atoms. (Sec appcndix for a further discussion of Machs stand on thc rcality of atoms.)

On the other hand, there was a ditfercnce bctwccn bclieving in thc rcality of atoms and belicving in the valuc or utility of the atomie theory. Mach did bclieve that thc atomie theory as hc understood it, or rather misunderstood it, had “provisional value” in science, but cxccpt for the period between about 1860 and 1863 he denied that it had per-manent valuc or was indispcnsablc to science.²” His two major objections wcrc: First, thc atomie theory could not be succcssfully introduccd into all the Sciences, particularly psychology and the social Sciences; and sccond, it was not as “economical’’ in terms of describing thc ap-pearanccs as the usc of mathcmatical functions could be.^2:: But whilc wc rnust admit that Mach was an atomist to the cxtent of allowing that the atomie theory might havc transient valuc in science, noncthclcss, even this quasi-support could hardly mean much sińce Mach mcant one thing and most pcoplc another. Most pcople understood thc atomie theory as a group of idcas referring to entities outsidc expcricncc. Mach misunderstood it, as if thc theory both was, and merely referred to, a group of idcas. (Sec appcndix for further discussion of physical atom-ism.)

I havc now discusscd Mach’s idcas to thc cxtcnt that they could bc interpreted in terms of cpistcmological, ontological, immanent, and

rcfcrcntial phcnomcnalism, hut srill to be discusscd is thc most im-portant and influcntial typc of phcnomcnalism, namcly, thc phcnom-cnalistic conccption of thc purposc of scicnccGalifrn hcl^cd cstab-lish thc common scnsc purposc of scicncc as thc most reliablc and ^n-formativc undcrstanding of reality possiblc.« His opponcnt, Cardinal Robert Bcllarminc, presented thc phcnomcnalisiic conccption by argu-ing that thc purposc of science was mcrcly to dcscribc thc appcaranccs in thc simplcst way possiblc, and that qucstions of reality should bc Icft to thc church and theology.²⁸ The csscntials of Bcllarminc^ phc-nomenalistic position wcrc rcvivcd by Berkeley, Humc, and kantTand I wcrc introduced into thc social Sciences by thc founder of “Posiuvism,” • Augustę Comte.. and into physics primarily by Ernst Mach. The point of greatest significance has bccn that many scientists who rcjectcd thc other aspeets of Mach's phcnomcnalism luwc, nonctKclcsś, retaTned his phcnomcnalisiic conccption of thc purposc of science. Rcmarkably    f

fcw scientists, howcvcr, havc realized that this was mcrcly Mach’s    ¹

"intcrnal” purposc of scicncc, and that to understand it propcrly, it must bc subordinated to Mach’s “extcrnal” purposc, which was thc satisfaction of humąn "biologieą! nccds” in such a way as to help thc human spccics survive and prosper.²*⁵

m

We do not know exactly when Mach bccamc satisfied with his undcrstanding of thc relation bctwcen thc sclf or “ego” and thc rest of thc world of sensations. His reading of thc cightccnth-ccntury philosopher Georg Lichtęnberg, had thc most influence on him in this respect and this probably took place during thc carly t86os.²⁷ Lichtenbcrg sub-stituted the notion of “It thinks" for Dcscartcs’s "I think.” This stimu-latcd Mach to framc another double definition. In terms o: his common scnsc theory of rcfcrcncc thc "ego" did not c.\ist at all. Therc was no ‘ “I" or “sclf.” Therc wcrc mcrcly sensations related in difTerent ways. 1 This “definition” servcd as Mach‘s justification for denying that hc was an “idealist” or a followcr of George Berkeley. Much*s sccond definition, which was in terms of his rcfcrcntial phenomenalism. al-lowcd for two “egos,” a “narrow” one and an “mchi$»ve" one.²' The narrow ego consistcd of thosc sensations which phenomenalists idcniity with a particular person, while thc “large" or “inclusivc” ego mcant thc totality of all sensations. In other words, while therc wcrc many “narrow" egos therc was only one “inclusivc" ego. Also, hc did not think

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