IMG03

Ernst Mach

know about thc world is ncccssarily cxprc$sed in thc sensations, which can bc set £rcc from thc individual influence of thc obscrvcr in a prcciscly cJ_C-finablc manner. . . . Evcrything that \vc can want to know is givcn by thc solution of a problem in mathematical form, by thc asccrtainmcnt of thc iunctional dcpcndcncy of thc scnsational clcmcnts on one another. This knowlcdgc cxhausts thc knowlcdgc of "rcality.” ⁷

Atheists such as Mach sccm to havc bccn attractcd to positivism largcly from thc belief that cpistcmological phenomenalism could pro-vidc an absolutcly ccrtain foundation for science.⁸ Mach was undog-matic with rcspcct to scicntific theorics and the incomplctc naturę of i scientiHc accomplishmcnts, but if “dogmatism” wcrc understood in

Iits normal sense, as the belief that we could bc absolutcly or infallibiy ccrtain of something, then Mach was a dogmatist, at least with rcspcct to sensations. Furthcrmorc, hc compoundcd this dogmatism by rcstrict-ing thc scope of science to thc analysis of sensations, as if therc could bc no other legitimate definition or understanding of science.

Science has always rcquircd self-cvident propositions as a safc founda. tion upon which to build.⁹

For me cvcry scientific work is Iost which is not solidly grounded [festhal:] in thc immcdiatcly givcn.¹⁰

We arc immcdiatcly ccrtain of that which we arc pcrcciving, less of that which we attentivcly observcd and now remember, still less of that which we have expcrienced by analogy and construe as possiblc, and not at all thc uncxpcricnccd which has no conccivablc sense. . . .ⁿ

Mach did not want to be dogmatic, hcncc, he tried very hard to bc-licvc that it was possiblc to be both infallibiy ccrtain of sensations and a falliblc human bcing who always could bc dcceivcd or mistaken. “But in generał the assumption of constancics docs not include thc assumption of infallibility in individual cascs. On the contrary thc sci-entist must always allow for deception.” ¹² Ernst Mach thought that a positivistic approach could be applied advantageously to all thc Sciences and in such a way as to unitę the Sciences together. This has bccn thc drcam of positivists from Augustę Comte to Philipp Frank and thc latter s Institutc for thc Unity of Science at Harward Univcrsity and morc reccntly at thc Univcrsity of Minnesota.¹³ Unfortunatcly, particular Sciences have not only differed from one another in terms of subjcct matter, but historically, they have dcvclopcd different philosophical assumptions and mcthodologies, and while attempts have bccn madę rcpeatcdly to turn all of them into

“posilivistic*' Sciences, thc rcsults havc amountcd to little morę than lip scrvicc, wastcd timc, vast frustration, and a lot of formalistic, jargon-riddcn tcxtbooks.

In point of fact, contrary to thc vicws of Comtc and Mach, both narrow and broad dcfinition positivism wcrc philosophies, rcsting on particular cpistcmological foundations, and most scicntists havc cither rcjccted both forms of positivism, failcd to undcrstand thcm, or ap-plicd thcm in ways injurious to thc dcvclopmcnt of science. Wc havc alrcady givcn two cxamplcs of thc dctrimcntal effcct of positivisńc thinking, one was thc ninctccnth-century positivistic opposition to thc atomie theory and to thc reality of aioms and moleeules, and another was thc anti-Mendelism of Karl Pcarson and other English 'biometri-cians” at thc turn of thc ccntury. A third and vcrv fundamcntal cx-amplc from a period long bcforc positivism bccamc an organized “mcthodology” was Cardinal Bcllarminc’s phenomenalistie opposition to Gnlileo’s defense of thc Copcrnican theory as a representationalist theory of reality.

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Ernst Mach devcloped scvcral difTerejiL purposes of science, but cven though he exprcsscd thcm at different times and cach KacTa quitc sep-aratc origin (i.c., his “intcrnal” purpose rcsemblcd that of Bellarmine,. his “intermediate” purpose suggested thc influence of Heinrich Hertz. and his “cxtcrnal” purpose the idcas of Lamarck and Darwin), nonę* thclcss, they wcrc suflicicntly consistent with one another to suggest the outlines of a philosophical system, as follows:

A. Mach's "Intcrnal" Purpose oj Science

(The dcscription and relation o^sensations)

The adaptation of thoughts to facts accordingly is thc aim of all scicn-tifle rcscarch.¹⁴

For the invcstigator of naturę thcrc is nothing clsc to tind out but thc dependcncc of phenomena on one another.¹®

(Theory of cconomy)

The goal which (science) has set itsclf is the simples: and mon t\v nornical abstract cxprcssion of facts.¹⁰

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