IMG18

Ernst Mach

human spccics. And Poincare declarcd for an acsthctic purposc. “The scientist does not study naturę bccausc it is uscful to do so. He studies it bccausc he takes plcasurc in it, and hc takes pleasurc in it bccausc it is bcautiful.”^fi2

Picrre Duhcm (1861-1916) was born in Paris but remained a “pro-vincial” professor. I le taught mathematics and physics at Lille and Rennes and from 1895 at Bordeaux. Duhcm madę significant contri-butions to thermodynamics, philosophy of science, and history of science. His interest in thermodynamics and opposition to “atomism’’ madę him rcccptivc to (Jstwalds "cncrgcticism.^,‘ I Ic also marvclcd at the rcsemblancc of “pure” thermodynamics to basie aspeets of Aristo-telian physics, and hoped that futurę physics would dcmonstratc morę of these “remarkable” similaritics.^C3 Hc cspecially disliked the usc of pictorial models in science. Hc fclt they gave the falsc impression that they could accurately represent a physical reality behind the appear-anccs, which hc bclievcd only religion could rcliably dclcnnine.

Picrre Duhcm was an open follower of Cardinal Bcllarmine in his defense of mcthodological phenomenalism against the vicws of Galilco.‘^w Only the church could detcrminc reality, and the purposc of science was mcrcly “to dcscribc and relate the appcaranccs in the simplcst way possiblc.”

Duhcm had a much better understanding of history than Mach. Hc fully rćalized that a presentationalist epistcmology and purposc of science, such as Mach, Hertz, Poincare, and hc himsclf held, rep-resented a return to a pre-Galilean, Scholastic point of yiew. Fur-thermore, while Comte and Mach tended to misunderstand and undcrvaluc medieval contributions to science, Duhcm helped pioneer historical research into the science of that period. Indced, this is probably what he is best known for today. Duhcm s aflinity for Scholastic philosophy of science is conspicuous in the following quoration:

Bcllarmine maintaincd the distinction familiar to the Scholaslics, bctwcen the physical method and the mctaphysical method, a distinction which to Galileo was no morę than a subterfuge.

The one who contributcd most to break down the barrier bctwcen physical method and mctaphysical method, and to confound their domains, so clcarly disiinguishcd in the Aristotelian philosophy, was surcly Descartcs."⁵

Ernst Mach influeneed Picrre Duhcm with rcspect to theory of 1 cconomy, bccoming science, arguments against atomism and mcchanis-lic cNpbnation, and possibly wiih rcspcct to ihc valuc of historical in I vesugation in science.⁶⁰

Duhcm, howcvcr_f was not aversc to making somc raihcr scvcrc altcr-ations. For cxample, hc drastically transformed the relation bctwcen “theories” and their “economical use.” For Mach, theories werc “pro-visional aids” to help dctcrminc and relatc marhcmatical laws, cqu3-tions, and functions. For Duhcm: “The rcduction of physical laws to theories thus contributes to that ‘intcllcctual cconomy’ in which Ernst Mach sccs the goal and dirccting principle of science.” ⁰⁷

On the other hand, Duhcm vcry courtcously acknowledged his eon siderable intellectual debt to Mach: “Bclicve, I beg you, in my pro-found rcspcct and permit mc to cali myself your disciplc.”⁰⁸

Duhcm madę no sccret of which hc placcd morę confidcnce and certainty in, science or religion:

For us the principle of the conservation of energy is by no means a certain and generał affirmation involving really cxistcnt objeets.⁰⁰

Of coursc, 1 bclicve with all my soul in the truths that Cod has revealcd to us and that Hc has taught us threugh His Church. . . .⁷⁰

Henri Bergson (1859-1941) brought the “positivistic" phase of French intcllcctual history to a close with his book Crcatiue Eoólution (1907). His neo-Lamarckian ćlan vital caught popular attention, but philosophically, his theory of “intuition” was morę important. The word “intuition” could bc used in harmlcss or pretentious ways. Bergson preiended that a judicious combination of inteiligence and ' intu ition” was ablc to reach truths and enlightenmcnt bcyond mcrc science. Duhcm and Le Roy subordinated science to religion. Bergson subor-dinated it to philosophy as wcll.

Both Maclt and Bergson hcld generally presentationalist views, but the Frenchman Firmly rejectcd Machs psychophysical paralleUsm. Both men were curious about the idcas of the other, but their contrary attitudes on the scopc and value of science were unbridgcablc.'¹

VI

How strange that just as the dominant trend in British and American philosophy was cscaping from śpeculative idealism in the dircction of “positivism” and becoming morę “scientific,” so French and Italian philosophy was rejecting “pbsitivism” and retreating inio "intuition-