IMG77

Ernst Mach

pcoplc rcfcr to, but rncrcly symboiize or impcrfcctly reprcscnt ihc object of rcference. In this way rcprcscntationalist theorics of rcfcrcncc diffcr drastically £rom prcscntationalist thcories of rcfcrcncc. Carnap, likc so many contcmporary philosophcrs, failed to master the philo-sophical assumptions of common sensc, and in particular the theory of rcfcrcncc which most practical pcoplc employ.

Givcn Carnap’s prcscntationalist theory of rcfcrencc it was only natural that hc would bc attractcd to Wittgcnstcins “verification theory of mcaning,” an approach that attempted to formalizc prcscntationalist refcrcncc and place it at the corc of scicntific mcthodology.

Ernst Mach attempted to help “unify science" by mcans of his mind-matter parallelism and belief in the applicability of physical methods to all the Sciences. Rudolf Carnap, howevcr, wanted to go bcyond this by eliminating all vestiges of pluralistic, mind-matter languages as wcll. In conjunction with Ncurath hc adopted “physicalism," which he originally understood as the thesis that “evcry concept of the lan-guage can be explicidy defined in terms of observables.” In his fust book (1928) he described those observab!cs in a unitary “phenomena-listic" languagc, and later, hc shifted to a “realistic” form of exprcs-sion.^J3 In this way he ‘‘abandoned" phenomenalism and “ovcrcamc" mind-matter dualism.

Otto Ncurath (1882-1945) had bccomc imbucd with Mach’s idcas as early as 1910 in his Vienna cofTcehousc convcrsations with Hans Ilalin and Philipp Frank.¹⁴ During the war he corrcspondcd with Mach and may havc becn allowed to read part of his manuscript on optics as a way of preparing himsclf for his own work on the same subject.¹³ Ncurath was a left-wing socialist who had briefly worked as a civil servant in the Bavarian Communist regime of I9i9.¹⁰ He was also decply interested in sociology.

Otto Ncurath not only wanted to abolish the distinction betwecn “mind” and "matter" but also that betwecn what the Germans cali the Gcistestoissenschajtcn and the Naturwissenschajten.¹⁷ In this rc-spcct, hc followcd directly in the tradition of Jacqucs Locb and the lattcr's pupil John Watson; indeed, hc cvcn callcd his approach “bc-havioristics.”

Mach had engaged in a unitary “physicalistic" languagc when hc callcd sensations "clcmcnts” and psychology “physiology," but warncd by Jacqucs Locb’s cpistcmological confusions he thercaftcr tried to avoid ordinary languagc ‘‘physicalism.” Indeed, it was preciscly for

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this reason that Mach was rcluctant to cali microsensations “atoms.” Hc fcarcd that this Identification would rcsult in attributing idcas to the sensations which propcrly bclongcd to the historical or physical use of rhe word “atom” and not to the sensations at all.¹⁸

On top of the above difficulty the notion of “physicalism" was plagucd by nmbiguity. Somctimcs it mcant rhe definition of concepts in terms of obscrvablcs, somctimcs the applicability of the methods of physics to all the Sciences, sometimes the rcduction of “mcntal" to “materialistic” rcality, somctimcs it referred to a “realistic" as opposed to an “idealistic,” "phenomenalistie,” or “dualistic” languagc, and in its normal undefmed use it vagucly suggested all the above by no mcans always compatiblc r.otions.¹⁹

It cannot be said that Ncurath fully solvcd the “physicalism" problem any morę than Locb or Watson had, buc Carnap’s decision to avoid everyday “physicalistic" languagc in favor of 3n ideał, symbolic “physicalistic” form of cxprcssion at least met Machs objcction.

IV

The wcak background of most members of Schlicks circle in the history of both science and philosophy and their prcscntationalist theory of rcfcrcnce hclpcd to confinc their thinking within narrow epistemo-logical limits, but within those limits rhcy also helped to hring about a continuing cvolution and sophistication as they gradually Icarned much that they should havc understood in the first place. This cvolu-tion has madę it increasingly difhcult to spell out their "system" in an unequivocal form which would do justicc to their movcmcnt as a wholc from 1922 to 1936 or in a larger sense until the present. W hen such attempts have noncthclcss bcen madę, howcvcr, they have usualb focuscd on the magnetic influence of Ludwig Wittgcnstcin and on somc of his better-known contributions. This approach of course has not done justicc cithcr to the variety of thinking in the circle, to its evolution, or to the fcw members who refused to be complctcly mes-merized by the inspired one, but it was correct in conccntradng on the single doctrine most doscly associated with the circle and most rcsponsible for arousing the majority of praaical scientists against the entire movemcnt, namcly, Wittgenstein’s notorious "verifiability theory of mcaning."

We have alrcady discussed Mach’s influence on Wittgcnstcin and

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