kryzysy marokańskie (10)

320 CUAITCR 1 1

advantagc tliat whilc affecting Frcnch intercsts, it docs not affect Frcnch pride, just as thc collective victorics of 1814 wcrc not so great an insult to thc Frcnch as thc German victory, gaincd alonc, in 1870. If France rcfuscs the confercncc, shc puts hcrseif in thc wrong, sliows tliat shc has a bad conscience and evil intcntions. If thc confcr-cncc is hdd, it will, whatcver thc rcsult, dcfmitcly not hand Morocco ovcr to thc Frcnch. These arc thc adraniagcs of thc confcrcncc idea, uniquc in charactcr. . . .

—HP, 4:002

ISiiloiu lo Slernburg, 30 May 1905

. . . The Morocean question is not an isolatcd one, but can become thc point of de-parture fer a realignment among tlić powers. . . . If France, at thc instigation of Eng-land, rcjccts a confcrcncc then wc face this altcrnativc: cithcr a war against France or an understanding with France, an understanding which thc Frcnch govcrnnicnt indi-catcd it would be willing to reach and which could then lead to thc crcation ot a large Europcan grouping. . . . [Wc] hopc not to havc to confront this alternative—it would howcvcr be imposcd on us if the confcrcncc wcrc rejectcd. As thc Frcnch govcrn-ment shows little inclination for a war and as Petersburg will probtibly influence it to be accommodating, it would probtibly propose separate bilatcral negotiations and conditions which would make possiblc ti separate dcal. Wc howevcr bclicvc Chat it is in thc interest of Germany and America if wc continuc to maintain our independent stance. Whether wc arc ablc to do so or not depends on President Rooscvclt, bccausc whether thc confcrcncc will become ti rcality depends on him. Ali hc nceds to do is to uncquivocalIy support thc confcrcncc.... Leave the president in no doubt tliat thc crcation of a powcrful Europcan group of States which would include Germany is for us a last resort which would become attraciivc only if English opposition and American indifference wrcckcd our selflcss program of upholding the status quo, thc Open Door, and thc eąuality of all signatorics. . . .

—GP, 20ii:6668 ,

n.2 THE SCOPE OF THE ANGLO-FRENCH ENTENTE, 1905

Umsdowna lo Paul CcwiOuii, 25 May 1905 • Metternich lei the German Porcigu Minislry, 28Jwtc 1905

To Ilia German governmcnt and to many of his own colleagues in the Frcnch cabinet, Dclcassć personified an anti-German policy. But in the context of April and May 1905, a hard-line approach—tliat is, a confrontational or even evasive response to the German de-mand for an International conferencc on Morocco—harbored the risk of a Franco-Gernian war tliat France could ill aflord without effective help from its allies. Delcassć argued that un-der these circumslances Uritain would be found on the side of France. The credibility of this claini was. however, open to rjueslion, as Delcassć was not able to secure a formuł alliance iroin llie British cabinet. His colleagues nuw fully appreciated the dangers lo which France

would be exposed if Delcassć werc allowed lo pcrsist in his course, and he was conscquenily dropped from llie ministry on 6 June.'¹

Any assessment as to whclher Dclcassć's sang-froid was justified or whether his col-leagucs panicked prematurely depends on one's interpretation of the assurances that Delcassć did manage lo elicit from the British foreign secretary, Lord Lansdowne. These were spelled out in a letter that Lansdowne gave Paul Cambon, the French ambassador in London, on 25 May. According to one student of this episode, "the precise import of the letter of 25 May depended on the preoccupations of the reader."¹'¹ Certainly the meaning of the letter hinges on the reader's interpretation of the phrase "discuss any contingencies by which we might in the course of events find ourselvos confronted."

a)    Lansdowne to Paid Cambon, 25 May 1905

.. . [T]hc morał of all these incidents scemed to be tliat the French and British Gov(crnmen]ts should continue to treat one another with the most absolutc confi-dcnce, that we should keep one another fully informed of everything which camc to our knowledgc, and so far as possible discuss any contingencies by which wc might in thc course of evcnts find oursclvcs confronted, and I cited as showing our readi-ness to enter into such timcly discussion the communication recently madę to thc Frcnch Gov[crnmen]t by Sir F. Bcrtie¹⁵ at a moment when the idea prevailed that Germany might be aboul to put pressure on France in order to obtain the cession of a Moorish port.

I do not know that this account differs from that which you havc given to M. Delcassć, but I am not surę that I succccdcd in making quite elear to you our desire that literę should be fuli and conlidential discussion between the two Gov|emmen]ts,not so much in consequence of sonie acts of unprovokcd aggression on thc part of another Power, as in anticipation of any complications to be apprehendcd during the somewhat ;inxious period through which we arc at present passing.

—SD. 3:45

£

b)    Mełlernicb to the German Foreign Ministry, 28 June 1905

. . . Lord Lansdowne replied that 1 surcly knew that the French govcrnment had bcen assured diplomatic support within thc limits of the Anglo-French agreement.. .. But the ąuestion of an alliance with France was nevcr discussed in the cabinet, nor had an

”lt was corwenienl for holh Delcassć and his prime minister, Maurice Rouvier, lo blame Delcasse's dismissal on German pressure. This rendition flattcred the German leadership into believing that Germany had scored a triumph of the first order by its ability to dictate to the French government who should be its foreign minister: it established Delcasse's reputation as an injured innocent who had become a vic-tim of German brutality; and it obscured Delcasse's blistering fight with Rouvier on whether to adeance any morę money to Russia before a pcacc setllemcnl had bcen reached in Easl Asia.

“Gcorge Mongcr, The End uf kol.ition. Dritifh Forcinn Policy, 1900-1907 (London, 19631, 198.

'■Sir Francis Ucrtic (18-14-1919). Urilish ambassador in Patis, 1905-1918.