kryzys bułgarski (7)

>00 CHAPTER 9

Gladstone in Eiiinburgb. 17 Matxb 1880

W Tut has that fcielgn policy of Austria been?... Austria has been ever unflindung toc of frecdom in every country of Europę [cheers]. Austria trampled derfbot. Austria resisted thc unity of Germany [cheers]. Russia, I am sorry to sayj been the fbe of freedom too; but in Russia there is an exception—Russia has been! triem! of Sławnie fnredom; but Austria has never been the friend even of Siara freedom Austria did all she could to prevent the creation of Belgium [cheers]. A¹ nevcr lifted a fmger for the regeneration and constitution of Greece [cheers]. Th; not an m stance—there is not a spot upon the whole map where you can lay your; ger and say.‘There Austria did good' [loud cheers],...

—The Times, 18 March 1

Tbree Emperors’ League, 18 June 1881

fburth Great Power, the two others shall maintain towards it a benevolent neu and shall devote their effbrts to the localization of the conflict. This stipulation apply likewise to a war between one of the three Powers and Turkey, but only in case where a previous agreement shall have been reached between the three C as to the results of this war....

Art. 2: Russia. in agreement with Germany, declares her firm resolution to res the interests arising from the new position assured to Austria-Hungary by theTreatV Berlin The three Gourts. desirous of avoiding all discord between them, engage take account of their respective interests in the Bałkan Peninsula. They fui ‘¹ promise one another that any new modifications in the territorial status quo Turkey in Europę can be accomplished only in virtue of a common agreement tween them ...

Art. 3'. The three Courts recognize the Euro pean and mutually obligatory ch ter of the principle of the closing of the Straits of the Bosporus and of the daneUes, founded on international law, confirmed by treaties, and summed up in deciaration of the second Plenipotentiaiy of Russia at the session of 12 July of Congress of Berlin (Protocol 19).” They will take care In common that Turkey s make no eaception to this rule in favour of the interests of any Govemment w ha' cvcr.by lending to warlike operations of a belligerent Power the portion of its Em; constituted by the Straits. In case of infringement, or to prevent it if such infrii ment shouid be in prospect, the three Courts will inform Turkey that they would gard her, in that e>ent, as putting herself in a State of war towards the injured Pr and as having depnved herself thenceforth of the benefits of the security assured her territorial status quo by tłie Treaty of Berlin.

Art. 4. The present Trean shall be in force during a period of three ycars, da from the day of the eachangc of ratińcaiions. . . .

“See Document 9.9.

THE SEARCH FORA NEW INTERNATIONAL STABILITY, 1871-1890

201

kArt 6: The secret Conventions concluded between Austria-Hungary and Russia Ibetween Germany and Russia in 1873 are replaced by the presentTreaty....³⁶ (Separate Protocol:] 1. Bośnia and Herzegovina: Austria-Hungary reserves the t to annex these provinces at whatever moment she shall deem opportune.... [4. Bułgaria: The three Powers will not oppose the eventual reunion of Bułgaria jEastern Rumelia within the territorial limits assigned to them by the Treaty of i,if this ąuestion should come up by the force of circumstances....

—Hurst, 2:603—7; Pribram, 136-49

THE AUSTRO-SERB TREATY, 16/28 JUNE 1881

Austro-Serb Treaty, 16/28 June 1881 •

AustroSerb Declaration, 13/25 October 1881

ighout the nineteenth century, Russia's cozy relationship with Serbia and Serb-speaking negro had been predicated on sentiment—the Serbs were a fellow Orthodox and Slavic nd by the uses of Serbia as a thorn in the Ottoman flank. Russian volunteers had to Serbia's side in the Serb-Ottoman war of 1876; one year later, Serbia benefited from ian exertions in the Russo-Turkish war.

Butat San Stefano and Berlin, Russia lavished its affection on Bułgaria rather than on its onal Bałkan ally. The beneficiary of the lingering resentment in Belgrade was Austria, in 1881 induced the Serb ruler, Milan Obrenovic, to conclude an alliance. The meas-of the Austrian coup lies not just in the fact that Austria stole a march on Russia, but in provisions of the treaty text: in article 2, Serbia undertook to curb Serb irredentism st the dual monarchy, while article 4 practically reduced it to the status of an Austrian ectorate.

The treaty was not without its inherent weaknesses. Milan had negotiated it over the jj of his horrified ministers, who secured a modification to article 4 in a subsequent fctro-Serb declaration. Bluntly put, Milan's stake in the treaty was that in return for his will-s to abide by its terms, he could expect Austrian subsidies to keep him solvent. But ia's largesse had its drawbacks, as Milan's and his son (and successor) Peter's eccentrici-Icould also backfire on their patron. The periodic embarrassments that sprang from being i closely associated with the Obrenovic dynasty help explain why, when the treaty' lapsed 1895, its passing was viewed with little regret in Vienna.

£

Austro-Serb Treaty, 16/28June 1881

*

Art. 2: Serbia will not tolerate political, religious, or other intrigues, which, tak-her territory as a point of departure, might be directed against the Austro-garian Monarchy, including therein Bośnia, Herzegovina, and the Sanjak of ivibazar. Austria-Hungary assumes the same obligation with regard to Serbia and dynasty, the maintenance and strengthening of which she will support with all influence. . .. ¹

1

See Document 9.1.