kryzys bułgarski (2)

CHAPTRR 9

ir»uli front an orntual dissolution of the Ottoman Empire shall be regulated by a spc-ci*l and slmultancous convcntlon....

Hurst, 2:511-15; Sumner, Russie >wd the li.ilk.ins, 597-^,)^<)

h)

Additional Convention (18 Marcb 1877)ⁿ

Art 1 The twa High Contracting Parties, having as thdr ultlmate aim the amcHoratlon ot the lot of the Christiana, and wishing to diminatc any projcct of anncxation of a magnltude that mlght compromłse peace or the European cquilibrium, whlch Is nci-ther in their intentions nor in the interests of the two Empircs, have comc to an agree-ment to limit their evcntual annexations to the following territorles:

The Emperor of Austria, etc., and King of Hungary: to Bośnia and llcr/egovlna, with the esception of the portion compriscd betwcen Serbia and Montcncgro l - Sanjak of Novibazar],on the subjcct of which the two Govcrnmcnts rcscrvc the right to reach an agreement when the moment for disposing of it arrivcs;

The Emperor of Ali the Russias: in F.uropc to the regions of Bcssarabia which would rc-establish the old frontiers of the Empire bcforc 1856.

Art. 2: The High Contracting Parties engage to lend cach other mutual assistance in the diplomatic field, if the tcrritorial modifications resulting from a war or from the dissolution of the Ottoman Empire should glvc risc to a collectivc deliberation of the Great Po wers.

Art. 3‘ His Majesty the Emperor ofAustria,etc.,and King of Hungary, and His Majcsty the Emperor of Ali the Russias, in the intcrvicw which took place between them at Reichstadt, came to an agreement in principlc on the following polnts: In casc of a ter-ritorial modification or of a dissolution of the Ottoman Empire, the establishment of a great compact Slavic or other State is cxcludcd; in compcnsation, Bułgaria,Albania, and the rest of Rumelia might be constituted into independent States; Thcssaly, part of Epirus, and the island of Crete might be annexed to Grcece; Constantinople, with a ter-ritory of which the limit remains to be determined, might become a frcc city. Their said Majcsties record that they havc nothing to changc in these views, and declare anew that they wish to maintain them as bases of their subscqucnt political actlon.

Art. 4: The High Contracting Parties engage to keep secret the stlpulations of the present Convention.. ..

—Hurst, 2:511-15; Prlbram, 2:190-203

9.6

BISMARCK AND THE EASTERN CRISIS

Memorandum by Bismarck, 9 Nooember 1876 • Bismarck in the Keichstag,

5 December 1876 • Blsmarck's“Klsslngen Memorandum," 75 June 1877 • Bismarck tn the Relchstag, 19 February 1878 • Herbert Bismarck to Bernhard Ernst von BiUow, 2 Nooember 1878 • Bernhard Ernst von Billów to Friedrich Wilhelm, Nooember 1878

Bismarck'* Reichstag speeche* of 5 December 1876 and 19 February 1878 came to epitomi his attitude toward the Bałkan crisis. Their imagery has supplied would-be pundits with staf

'‘Antedated to 15 January 1877.

TUR SEARCH FORA NEW INTERNATIONA! STABILITY, t87t-i890    18 5

phrnscs to the prcscnf day. But Bismarcka stand also needs to be understood in the c:ontexf of the recent "war-in-sight" crisis (Document 9.2) and in llght of a spedficaUly Prussian nemesis that ho invokod—the mid-eighteonfh-cenlury "Kaunif/ c.oalition" of Austria, Franc e, and Kus sla, which brought Prussia to the brink of ruin in 1762.

Whether the memorandum developed by Bismarck at Kisslngen should be treated as a blueprint for his futurę policy or whether it Instead expressed the stray musings of a summer afternoon, ll does mark one of the rare momenfs when a statesman could look beyond the minuflae of the day to dęvelop a broader perspective. His instructions to the German foreign ministry of November 1878 reveal another and less benign component of his strategy. Be that as it may, the common feafure of bolh rJocuments is Bismarck^ sense of the precariousness of Germany's position.

&

•)    Memorandum by Bismarck, 9 Norember 1876

... The word “Europę" is always found on the Ups of (bose politicians who demami from other powers something which they do not dare ask of themselvcs: the western powers during the Crlmean war and the Poiisłi question of 186d;Thler$ in the fali of 1870; and Count Beust when hc deserłbed the fallurc of his attempta to forge a coali-tion against us with the words,“l ean’t sec Europę anymoref"¹⁶ In the present ca.se,

Russia and England are alternately trying to get us to puli the carriagc of their poU-cics—which, as they well know, we German* liave no Intercst In dolng. . . .

—CP, 2:25 6

i ^

Bismarck in the Reichstag, 5 December 1876

Ł .. I will advisc against taking an active role In thcsc maiters for as long as I lali to dc-fibet in this cntlre enterpri.se the German Intercst which would be—pardon the hlnnt mess of the cxprcssion—worth the hcalthy hones of a single Pomeranian grenadier I Want to make elear that we should be thrifty In the cxpcndlturc of the hlood ofour Jipatrloto and sokliers rather than squandcring It on heliaII of an urbitrary policy nated by no compclling intercst |bravof|. . . .

— Worut Kohl (ad.), nie polltlichon Redan den FUrstan Bismarck (SlutlHurt, 1692), 6:461

&

Bismarck's “Kissfngen Memorandum,” ISJune 1877

wtsh to cncourage the Bngflsh, without muklng It too obvlous, II they lmvc Inten W on Egypt, I think that it will suit our interests and hc brticr for our futurę to pro-Je a compromise between England and Russia, which may cstahllsh rclatlons

’*The Au»troMungarlan forelgn mlnlttar, FrledrU h von Heunt, hocI triad tu orssnlza a /cMgito ‘>1 nau-in the flrst pliasc ot tbo Franco PruttnUm war. Whtin It bot unie < lo.tr that Hustlu, oftor InnUsolIns tba L would not part/clpato, 0eu$t ox< lulrnod, "Ja na voh plus iFEuropal" HouSt to Chotak, IJ (h tobar Corrospondon/un des koliedlch-k&nlgllchen Mlnhterlumn don AaunaofoP, 1UMt- 7J (VlannB,

1672), 431.