SME Owner Involvement and Business Performance:
Financial Security Rather Than Growth
Ed Vos and Callum Roulston
Department of Finance, University of Waikato
Abstract
This paper examines how the level of owner involvement in Small and Medium Sized Enterprises (SMEs)
affects financial performance, as suggested by Jensen and Meckling (1976). We find significant relationships
between the degree of owner involvement and profi tability, leverage and liquidity, even when adjusted for
size. No significant relationship was found between the degree of owner involvement and growth. We conclude
that increased owner involvement creates a financially safer and more profitable firm with no relationship to
growth. This supports the financial contentment hypothesis of Vos, Yeh, Carter and Tagg (2007).
Key words: owner involvement; SME performance; contentment; growth
Introduction
One of the major differences between big businesses and small businesses is the distance between
owners and managers. In small businesses, the owner and the manager are often the same person. This
gives rise to a range of issues that inßuence several aspects of small businesses. The combination of the
roles of owner and manager means that the incentives that govern the operation of small businesses
differ from the incentives that govern big businesses. Because of this, it has been suggested that different
models need to be developed to analyse small businesses, as they are not simply Þ nancial clones of big
businesses. SpeciÞcally, Vos et al (2007) say that the connectedness of SMEs makes them theoretically
different from the commonly studied ÔseparateÕ structure of the publicly listed Þ rm. This paper tests
that view by focusing on the effect of increased owner involvement on the Þnancial behaviour of the
Þrm.
One of the main differences between small businesses and big businesses is the combination of the roles
of owner and manager. That connectedness may play a role in SMEsÕ Þnancial performance. Following
from Jensen and Meckling (1976), Vos and Smith (2003) suggest that the degree of owner involvement
in small businesses has a signiÞcant impact. This paper looks for signs of connectedness by focusing on
the degree of owner involvement on different aspects of small businesses in New Zealand using a large
data set of New Zealand small (private) businesses (n=10,162). We explore proÞtability, leverage,
liquidity and growth, with an eye on the degree to which owner involvement and / or overall Þrm size
makes a difference. We Þnd broad agreement with Vos et al (2007) who argue that SMEs do not seek
growth but rather gain utility from their involvement. Put differently: Our null hypothesis is that SME
owners, given the choice between more money and growth Ð but at the cost of control Ð will seek ÔpeaceÕ
and freedom above Þ nancial returns, and that this choice is evident in their Þ nancial behaviour. The
alternative hypothesis is that owner involvement does not matter either for performance nor growth. Put
another way; does the Ôwealth maximizationÕ paradigm describe the SME ownerÕs basic nature? Or,
alternatively, does Ôwealth maximisationÕ behaviour fail to describe SMEs who have Þnancial choices?
The remainder of this paper is structured as follows. We discuss some literature before presenting the
data and discussing some potential biases. We then sketch the approach used in the analysis. After the
results are shown and discussed, conclusions are offered.
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SME Owner Involvement and Business Performance: Financial Security Rather Than Growth
Literature Review
The degree of owner involvement in small businesses has been found to relate positively to performance.
Jensen and MecklingÕs (1977) agency theory has been well tested and veriÞed amongst publicly listed
Þrms. Ang, Cole and Lim (1998) extended agency theory to SMEs while Vos and Smith (2003)
measured SME owner involvement (connectedness) in terms of loans provided by shareholders and the
degree of owner involvement in the management of the business. Both measures were found to be
signiÞcantly related to performance. Similarly, Kozan, Oksoy and Ozsoy (2006) measure owner
involvement based on qualitative information about the degree of owner involvement in the business.
They too Þ nd a signiÞcant relationship between owner involvement (connected) and performance.
McKenna and Oritt (1988) also Þnd that small businesses perform best when the owner has control.
Walker and Brown (2004) discuss success factors for small business owners. They point out that small
business owners measure success in terms of Þnancial and non-Þ nancial (connected) measures. This
initially seems to suggest that a higher degree of owner involvement would not in fact result in increased
performance, due to the fact that performance is not always the primary objective. However, Walker
and Brown (2004) go on to discuss that personal satisfaction and achievement, along with lifestyle
ßexibility and independence, are considered most important. These objectives could be met by
improving the proÞtability of the business, suggesting that increased owner involvement would lead to
increased performance. Kotey and Meredith (1997) support this view. They tested the relationship
between values, strategy and performance and found that ownersÕ values and goals are indistinguishable
from those of the business.
Improved performance through increased owner involvement is not restricted to management. Cohen
and Quarrey (1986) assess the impact of employee ownership plans in small businesses, particularly in
the context of succession for retiring owners. They Þ nd that businesses that are owned by employees
perform considerably better than Þ rms that are not owned by employees in terms of growth and
proÞtability. This is consistent with the view that businesses whose workers are owners (connected) as
well, tend to perform better than those that are not (separate).
A reason for the increased performance of Þrms with higher levels of owner involvement is suggested by
Gutter and Salem (2005). They discuss the Þ nancial vulnerability of small business owners, which
refers to the extent to which income and wealth are derived from the same source. In the case of small
business owners, income and wealth tend to both be derived from the business. The business owner is
not as mobile in the labour force as other workers, and the business tends to comprise the bulk of
wealth. Given the reliance that the owner has on the business for both income and wealth, there is much
incentive to ensure that the business is performing well.
Finally, Vos et al (2007) argue that SMEs are a Þnancially satisÞed segment of the society and show that
most (90%) of them do not seek growth beyond their ability to fund it and those that do seek growth
use the capital markets more often to fund their growth. They call this the ÔSME contentment
hypothesesÕ. They show that older and more educated SME owners avoid external capital, even though
they do not fear loan denial and that owner characteristics such as age and education contribute to this
state of Þ nancial contentment, or ÔhappinessÕ. They point out that the connectedness Ð happiness
linkage (see Diner and Segilman 2004)), is evident in the approach taken by SMEs toward external
capital. This motivates us to further explore surrogates for ÔconnectednessÕ to see if it relates to Þrm
performance and growth.
Data
Data on New Zealand small to medium sized enterprises was acquired through the New Zealand
Business Benchmarking Survey. The survey is conducted annually by The University of WaikatoÕs
Management Research Centre.
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Small Enterprise Research 16: 1: 2008
This paper used the survey data from 2003-2005, which provided an initial sample of 14,586 small
businesses. The benchmarking survey is sent to chartered accounting practices throughout New
Zealand, who provide details about their clients. Several accounting variables are provided in the survey,
including income, detailed expenditure, current and non-current assets and liabilities, along with details
on the number of employees and the ÞrmÕs industry. Because the survey provided anonymity to the
businesses involved, it is possible many of the same Þrms appear in all three years.
Bias
A feature of the accounting data used is that it excludes remuneration paid to the owners. Thus, any
salaries that would have been paid to the owners as consideration for work undertaken for the business
are excluded from proÞt calculations. This must be considered before interpreting the results of the
analysis. The possible effects of this bias are discussed further in the conclusion.
The Þnancial accounts of small businesses are different from the Þnancial accounts of large businesses.
In many small businesses the boundary between the funds of the business and the funds of the owner
is irrelevant (Shailer, 1993). Personal Þnances ßow freely in and out of the business, and the ownerÕs
lifestyle can be reßected in the balance sheet (Levin and Travis, 2001). This is consistent with the idea
that motivation for small business ownership often centres on independence, and personal preferences
help to determine Þnancial policy. A problem with this, however, is that many common Þnancial ratios
can be unreliable when used to assess small businesses. The value of company assets and liabilities (and
therefore equity) can all be skewed as a result of transactions between the owner and the business. For
the same reason, proÞts can also be misleading as a measure of return. Thus, care needs to be taken
when using accounting ratios to assess small businesses (Levin and Travis, 2001).
Another potential bias is created by the way the sample is Þltered to enable analysis. Firms with negative
or zero equity were excluded from the sample as they impeded the calculation of many of the variables
used. This means that poor performing companies (whose losses transfer to equity causing it to be
negative) were not included in the analysis. This creates a survivorship bias and distorts the Þgures,
some of which appear unusually high as a result. We also Þ ltered outliers, eg where ROE>1000%,
which also has an effect on the reported results.
As is well known in the SME literature, the data are diverse. This sample is no exception, so several
adjustments were made to the initial sample. Firms that had data entry errors, such as negative Þgures,
were excluded. Where the calculations were incorrect (e.g. where revenue less expenses was materially
different to reported proÞt Þ gures), or where the Þgures appeared incorrect (e.g. where current assets
were greater than total assets), those Þrms were also excluded. Firms that had negative or no equity were
excluded as well, along with those that had less than one full-time equivalent worker. Finance companies
were also excluded. Initial calculations were performed to produce various Þ nancial ratios. Graphs of
these results enabled outliers to be identiÞed and excluded from further analysis. Initially, those Þrms
with ratios greater that three standard deviations above or below the mean were removed. Further
deletions were then made to adjust for further outliers in the return on equity calculation which resulted
in 117 Þ rms that had return on equity Þ
gures of greater than 1000% being removed from the sample
(called Outliers II). These Þrms were distributed evenly across the three years. Table 1 summarises the
deletions, illustrating how the Þnal sample of 10,162 Þrms was acquired.
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SME Owner Involvement and Business Performance: Financial Security Rather Than Growth
Table 1: Data deletions
Year 2005 2004 2003 Total
Initial Sample Deletions 4,355 4,867 5,364 14,586
Deletions
Negative Figures 22 69 84 175
Figures Incorrect 18 31 38 87
<1 FTE 24 176 40 240
Negative / Zero Equity 863 871 1,030 2,764
Insufficient Figures 271 289 205 765
Finance Companies 7 10 15 32
Outliers (3stdev) 78 71 95 244
Outliers II 35 36 46 117
Total Deletions 1,318 1,553 1,553 4,424
Final Sample 3,037 3,314 3,811 10,162
The distribution of these Þ rms by industry (Table 2) shows this is a well diversiÞed sample across
industries. Figure 1 shows the spread of the sample by number of employees and Figure 2 shows the
spread by total assets. Both these graphs indicate that there are more small Þrms than larger Þrms in the
sample.
Table 2: Distribution of sample by industry
%n
Retail 21.68% 2203
Mining 0.17% 17
Service (Contracting) 20.90% 2124
Service (Miscellaneous) 9.15% 930
Service (Health) 7.67% 779
Service (Education) 1.01% 103
Service (Hospitality) 4.74% 482
Service (Other Professionals) 9.83% 999
Service (Vehicle) 13.33% 1355
Wholesale 2.04% 207
Manufacturing 9.48% 963
Total 10162
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Small Enterprise Research 16: 1: 2008
Figure 1: Spread of sample by number of employers
Figure 2: Spread of sample by total assets
Methodology
Key Variable: Owner Involvement
Working Owner Ratio: The survey data included information about the number of working owners,
as well as the number of other staff, presented in full-time-equivalent (FTE) terms. This information
was used to gauge the degree of owner involvement in the Þ
rm. The number of FTE working owners
was divided by the total number of FTE workers to provide a Þgure between zero and one. This Þgure
represents the degree of owner involvement in the Þrm, and will hereafter be referred to as the working
owner ratio (WOR).
WOR = Owner FTEs
Total FTEs
A WOR of 1 means that all workers in the business are owners, while a Þgure of 0 means that no owners
work in the business. Figure 3 shows the spread of the sample by WOR. While the data tends to cluster
in the lower ratios, there are still sufÞcient observations in the higher ratios to conduct analysis. WOR
74
Observations
Observations
SME Owner Involvement and Business Performance: Financial Security Rather Than Growth
is used as the dependent variable in this paperÕs analysis.
Figure 3: Spread of sample by working owner ratio
Measures of proÞtability, leverage, liquidity and growth were calculated from the self-reported
accounting data for all Þrms in the sample. While it is acknowledged that there are limitations
surrounding the use of accounting variables in small businesses, these limitations could not be overcome
with the data that was available. The following variables were used:
Profitability
Ä„ Return on Equity was calculated as net proÞt divided by the closing value of book equity (which was
calculated as the difference between the book values of assets and liabilities)
Ä„ Return on Assets was calculated as net proÞt divided by total assets
Ä„ Net Profit Percentage was calculated as net proÞt divided by sales
Leverage/Liquidity
Ä„ Equity Ratio was calculated by dividing the book value of equity by total assets
Ä„ Current Ratio was calculated by dividing current assets by current liabilities
Size
Ä„ Ln(TA) refers to the natural log of total assets
Growth
Ä„ Sales Growth was calculated as the increase in sales from the previous year
Ä„ Sustainable Growth was approximated by estimating the amount of working capital that would be
required next year, relative to this yearÕs proÞts. A value of one or less suggests that the Þrm is growing
organically, rather than requiring external funds. The formula used was:
SG = (g)(WC)
NP
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Small Enterprise Research 16: 1: 2008
We Þ rst report summary statistics and correlations before a more detailed examination by decile of
WOR.
Results
Summary Statistics
It is important to recall that this represents the Þltered, not the entire, sample. Nevertheless, we see in
Table 3 that on average, owners are involved (WOR of .42) with proÞtable (about 20%) and Þnancially
safe (current ratio 3.3, and equity ratio of 49%) Þrms with low levels of growth, which they can afford
to pay for (median growth of 6% with median sustainable growth of .41).
Table 3: Central tendency and distribution of variables
Mean Median Standard Deviation
WOR 0.4154 0.3333 0.3182
Return on equity 2.5849 0.9055 7.2358
Return on assets 0.5587 0.3734 0.6249
net profit % 0.2135 0.1650 0.1974
Equity Ratio 0.4879 0.4885 0.2824
Current Ratio 3.3026 1.7037 10.5049
Growth 0.1282 0.0655 0.3913
Sust Growth 0.8800 0.4104 23.8886
Ln(TA) 12.5578 12.5694 1.2748
Results from the correlation tests are presented in Table 4. The most interesting point to note is the high
correlation (-0.5098) between WOR and size (as measured by the log of total assets). This Þ nding
makes intuitive sense as a bigger business has more employees, so the proportion of workers that are
owners decreases.
Table 4: Correlations
Return on Return on net profit Equity Current Sust
WOR Growth
equity assets % Ratio Ratio Growth
Return on equity 0.071497
Return on assets 0.266207 0.270591
net profit % 0.460789 0.140184 0.618694
Equity Ratio 0.17436 -0.34382 0.139859 0.273588
Current Ratio 0.094854 -0.04832 -0.0091 0.095313 0.206052
Growth -0.0117 0.047739 0.072216 0.051364 -0.06783 0.002479
Sust Growth -0.00539 -0.01377 -0.01808 -0.02022 0.01999 0.023142 -0.00106
Ln(TA) -0.5098 -0.17421 -0.52809 -0.31262 -0.11379 0.00386 0.017791 0.020097
There is also a high correlation between the net proÞt percentage and WOR. This implies that there is
a relationship between the degree of owner involvement and proÞtability in New Zealand small
businesses.
To get a better feel for the WOR and the size of the Þrms in the sample, we plot in Figures 4 and 5 the
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SME Owner Involvement and Business Performance: Financial Security Rather Than Growth
number of working owners against the total number of employees in the Þ rm in two graphs, one for
total working owners equal to or less than 10, and the other for those greater than 10.
Figure 4
Figure 5
Decile Analysis
The data was divided into deciles according to WOR categories. Then mean and 95% conÞdence
intervals were determined for several variables for each category. Finally, because of the strong
relationship found between size and WOR, we adjust for size by multiplying WOR by the log of total
assets then normalize by dividing by the highest calculated value, to once again give a Þgure between
zero and one. Figures 6-20 onward report the results of this analysis and Table 5 summarises the
important observations.
77
Working Owner Ratio
WOR
Small Enterprise Research 16: 1: 2008
Figure 6
Figure 7
Figure 8
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SME Owner Involvement and Business Performance: Financial Security Rather Than Growth
Figure 9
Figure 10
Figure 11
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Small Enterprise Research 16: 1: 2008
Figure 12
Figure 13
Figure 14
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SME Owner Involvement and Business Performance: Financial Security Rather Than Growth
Figure 15
Figure 16
Figure 17
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Small Enterprise Research 16: 1: 2008
Figure 18
Figure 19
Figure 20
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SME Owner Involvement and Business Performance: Financial Security Rather Than Growth
Table 5: Summary of findings
WOR Effect >WOR  .8-.9 WOR 1.0 WOR Ho?
>performance? >Variable? >Variable
ROA Lower Risk Yes to .6 '
ROA (S) Lower Risk Yes to .7 Yes '
ROE Lower Risk Yes to .4 Yes '
ROE (S) Lower Risk Yes to .4 Yes Yes '
Net Profit Improve Profit Yes to 1.0 '
NetProfit (S) Improve Profit Yes to .7 Yes(>,<Å›!) '
Equity Ratio No " ?
Equity Ratio (S) Safer Safer to .7 Yes '
Current Ratio No " Yes ?
Current Ratio (S) Safe at 1.0 No " but
1.0 V. Safe Yes, & Safe ? @1.0
Growth None! No " Yes '
Growth (S) None! No " Yes '
Sus. Growth None! No " Yes '
Sus. Growth (S) None! No " Yes Yes '
Story? 3 Categories: 1, Just Starting to Good Profit, safer,
.8-.9, <.6 Grow from a low no growth
base difference
Using WOR to segment Þ rms, three groups emerge as distinct. The most obvious group is where
WOR=1.0. In this group all workers are highly connected to each other as owners. We observe that
these Þ rms appear very different under the size adjustment and suggest that the marked difference
(increased variability, for example) is largely due to the very small number of Þ rms in this group (see
Figure 3). Otherwise, it is interesting to note that these Þ rms demonstrate ÔoptimumÕ performance in
terms of ROA, ROE, and NP while having safer leverage ratios and no different growth experiences.
These Þ ndings are all consistent with our hypothesis that owner involvement contributes toward
proÞtability and safety, but not growth.
The next WOR categories of interest are those at .8-.9. These Þrms are the riskiest Þrms if variability of
returns is the measure of risk. Their return experience for ROA, ROE and NP are more variable than
the rest of the sample. And, their growth experience is also more variable than lower WOR categories.
These are Þ rms that have relatively few external employees. These Þ rms appear to have chosen to go
down the ÔgrowthÕ path away from WOR=1, thus the large variability reßects the initial engagement
with agency issues or Ôthe initial cost of separation and this makes sense. Yet their returns are much
better than Þrms with lower WORs.
Finally, the Þrms from WOR = 0 to .6 or .7 can be viewed as a group. Within this group there is a clear
trend toward better performance with higher WOR for ROA, ROE and NP, even when size adjusted.
In this group we also notice higher WORs relate to lower leverage, and are thus Þnancially safer. And
we see that there is not much difference between the group categories when it comes to their growth
experience. This group also supports our hypothesis that owner involvement contributes to proÞtability
and Þnancial safety, but not growth.
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Small Enterprise Research 16: 1: 2008
Conclusion
The results presented above indicate that the degree of owner involvement in the business inßuences
proÞ tability, leverage, liquidity and is not related to growth. The overall theme seems to be that more
involvement implies less Þ nancial risk while also increasing returns. Reasons for higher involvement
leading to higher proÞtability could be due to the increased dependence that owners have on the business
for both income and wealth (Gutter and Salem, 2005).
This is consistent with the view that owner involvement is the best predictor of SME performance while
at the same time denying that Þnancial risk is important. Indeed, the SMEs with the more owner
involvement have the higher current ratios Ð even adjusted for size, and even after noting that they have
lower levels of Þ nancial leverage, they earn higher NP, ROE and ROA. This describes owners who
understand and seek Þnancial safety. This view is also conÞrmed in that no relationship between WOR
and growth is found. This agrees with the contentment hypothesis of Vos et al (2007).
We must at this point be reminded of the data bias that measures proÞts before any drawings of the
owners. It is possible that many of the signiÞcant differences seen in this analysis would disappear with
signiÞcant provision made for owner drawings before the proÞts were reported. Various scenarios we
have tried (not reported here) result in much less difference between deciles after making hypothetical
adjustments for ownersÕ drawings. Even so, such adjustments show that a) SME performance becomes
ß
at across WORs (say up to .7) and b) there is no differences growth experience across WORs. If, as
suggested by Vos et al (2007), growth does not describe typical SME Þ nancial behaviour, then it is
interesting to observe that the ÔrelaxedÕ approach to growth is not determined by the degree of owner
involvement, but rather a generic feature of the SME.
If there must be a ÔrationalÕ risk-return relationship, then the degree of ownership involvement could
proxy for risk in that a higher degree of owner involvement implies less risk. This paper suggests that in
this instance less risk (higher owner involvement) leads to more return (greater proÞtability), and vice
versa. Of course, this could also be seen as the Ôßip sideÕ of agency costs.
The Þnding that a higher WOR leads to a higher equity ratio is also consistent with the expectations of
this paper. Where independence and control are among the main motivators for small business owners
(e.g. Hankinson, Bartlet and Ducheneaut, 1997), it would be expected that a higher degree of owner
involvement would lead to less external debt being acquired. This is consistent with the theme that
SMEs seek Þ nancial contentment. Similarly, independence and control would be expected to give rise
to less risk. Where risk is represented by liquidity, this contention is supported by the Þ
ndings of this
paper. Another reason for liquidity to increase with owner involvement is that the closer the owner and
the business are to each other, the more likely the Þ nances of the two will be combined (Levin and
Travis, 2001; Shailer, 1993). Where the ownerÕs funds are included in the businessÕ funds, greater
liquidity would be expected.
This paperÕs Þndings about the relationship between growth and owner involvement suggest that there
is no signiÞcant relationship between WOR and growth. As discussed in detail by Vos et al (2007),
Þnancial growth is generally not the primary motivation of small business owners. Therefore, where
owner involvement is high, it is expected that growth would be considered less important.
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SME Owner Involvement and Business Performance: Financial Security Rather Than Growth
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