ESSAYS IN SWEDISI-I IIISTORY
the Military Art, maintaining that (except Theology) it exeels all the other arts and Sciences, as well liberał as mechanical’, and insisting that 'thc Military Art ought to be taught in Academies, as Letters are\ And Davies writes (The Art of War and Englands Traynings, p. 29) that the military profession ‘being then morę perfect and aboue all other Arts, conseąuently it is necessarie we vse in the same greater Studie, and morę continuall exercise then is to be vsed in any other Art*.
72 Sjóstrand, pp. 177-83; Wijn, pp. 74-80; Heischmann, pp. 211-13.
78 Loewe, pp. 18-25.
74 Andrć, Le Tellier et Lomois, pp. 317—21; and (on the emergence of rank) Wijn, pp. 62-73; Frauenholz, Sóldnertum, i, 28-9; Sjóstrand, p. 71.
78 Edmond Silbemer, La Guerre dans la Pensie iconomique du XVIe au XVIIIe silcie, Paris, 1939.
76 Ibid., p. 99.
77 J.E. Elias, Het Voorspel van den eersten Engelschen oorlog, i, 141-2.
78 Bulstrode Whitelocke, Memońals of the English Affairs (1732), pp. 633 ff.
79 Elias, op. cit., i, 134-177, cspecially pp. 157, 167-8; Charles E.Hill, The Danish Sound Dues and the Command of the Baltic, Chapel Hill, 1926, P- *55-
80 For all this see F. Redlich, De praeda militari. Looting and Booty 1500-1815, Wiesbaden, 1956.
80a See, e.g., M.Ritter, ‘Das Kontributionssystem Wallensteins’, passim,
81 Pieri, ‘Formazione dottrinale’, p. 100.
88 Styffe, Gustaf u Adolfs skrifter, p. 520.
88 Axel Oxenstiemas skrifter och brefvexling, I, vii, 126.
84 For Vauban and the notion of the prl carri, see Makers of Modem Strategy, ed. E.M.Earle, Princeton, 1944, pp. 40-6.
85 The best early example of this is perhaps the close-action broadside; but the new linear tactics were not far behind.
86 ‘Les maisons n’ćtoient que de bois, comme dans la pluspart de 1’Allemagne, et en moins de six heures tout fut reduit en cendre: exemple terrible mais necessaire contrę des bourgeois insolents qui ne sachent ce que c’est que de faire la guerre, osent insulter de braves gens et les dćfier d’entrer dans leurs murs, lors-qu’ils n’ont ni 1’adresse ni le courage de s’y dćfendre*: G. Gualdo-Priorato, U Historie des dernieres campagnes et negociations de Gustaoe Adolphe en Allemagne. Avec des notes . .. par M, 1'Abbi de Francheuille, Berlin, 1772, p. 185. It is difficult to agree with Professor Nef [War and Humań Progress [1950], pp. 138) that Spinola’s courteous treatment of the enemy at the surrender of Breda (1625), as against the horrors of Magdeburg (1631), marks the beginning of a new chivalrousness and the age of limited warfare, though Oestrich (op. cit., p. 31) endorses Nef’s comment. Breda capitulated; Magdeburg was stormed: the two cases are not comparable.
87 Grimmelshausen, Simplicissimus, p. 32.
88 Francisco Suirez, De Triplici oirtute theologica, fide, spe, et charitate (1621) (new edn, Oxford, 1944), especially vii, p. 13—16; Alberico Gentili, De Jurę Belli Libri Tres (1612) (new edn, Oxford, 1933), II, iv, viii, xxi, xxiii; James Brown Scott, The Spanish Origin of International Law: Francisco de Yitoria and his Law of Nations, Oxford, 1934, especially p. 285,
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THE MILITARY REYOLUTION
89 Hugonis Grotii De Jurę Belli ac Pacis Libri Tres, cd. W. Whewcll, Cambridge, 1853, III, iv, 9 § 1, for this passagc; and see ibid., III, iv, 8-10, 15, 16; III, v, 1; III, viii, 1-4.
90 Bynkershoek is said to have remarked ‘dat de Groot zich steeds aan de bestaande gewoonten en gebruiken houdt, zoodat hij bij gebreke daarvan nauwelijks eenigen regel van jus gentium durft te stellen’: J.Kosters, ‘Het Jus gentium van Hugo de Groot en diens voorgangers’, Mededeelingen der Koninklijke Akademie van Wetenschappen, Afd. Letterkunde, 58 (1924). Series B., p. 13.
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