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ESSAYS IN SWEDISH HISTORY

²²    S’ik voulaient faire les mćchants, on trouverait bien le moyen de fair rentrer dans leurs tanieres’: Andrć, p. 113; cf. Recueil des Instructions donnies aux Ajnbassadeurs de France; Suede (1885), i, 41, 44, 132, 137.

²³    Andre, pp. 133-4; Fahlborg, HT 1935, p. 368 n. 3. And cf. Colbert de Croissy’s view in Sven Grauers, Bidrag till kannedomen om det karolińska enoaldets uppkomst, Góteborg, 1906, p. 76.

⁸⁴    Ake Stille, Bcngt Oxenstiemas poliłiska system, p. 136.

²⁵    On the tactical importance of the special type of sword favoured by Charles xi see Heribert Seitz. ‘Den karolińska vaijans taktiska betydelse for kavalleriet⁵ Ny Militdr Tidskrift, 1944, passim.

²⁶    A good biography of him is Alf Aberg, Rutger von Ascheberg, Fdltmar-skalk och General-guuemor, Malmó, 1950.

²⁷    Goran Rystad, Johan Gyllenstiema, radet och kungamakten, Lund, 1955, pp. 126 ff.

²⁸    Georg Landberg, Johan Gyllenstiemas nordiska forbundspolitik, Uppsala 1931, passim; id., ‘Nordisk 1600-talspolitik under debatt’ (Historisk Tid-skrift 1939), pp. 328, 339-40; id., Soenska utrikespolitiska historia, 1648-1697, for a good survey of the foreign policy of the reign.

*• Landberg, Johan Gyllenstiemas nordiska forbundspolitik, p. 131.

³⁰ Karl XI:s bref til Mis Bielke, p. 48 (16 October 1688). As Dr. John Robinson remarked, ‘In Reladon to Foreign Affairs, it is apparently the interest of Sueden to avoid all offensive War, as being already in the quiet Possession of as many conquer’d Provinces on all sides as it can well defend ..[John Robinson] An Account of Sueden as it was in the Year 1688 (1738), p. 272.    •

²¹ Ingel Waden, ‘Historisk censur under det karolińska envaldet’ (Karolińska Fórbundets Arsbok [KFA\, 1959, p. 65.

³²This did not prevent Oxenstienia from occasionally evoking such antiąue bogeys as the danger of a Habsburg tyranny in Germany, or the existence of a sinister international conspiracy fostered by the Jesuits: Ake Stille, ‘Bengt Oxenstiemas memoriał varen 1690’ (Historiska studier tilldgnade Mis Ahnlund), Stockholm, 1947, p. 208.

⁸³ See, e.g., Karl XI:s bref till Mis Bielke, pp. 77, 84.

³⁴ F.F.Carlson, Soeriges historia under konungame af det pfalziska huset, Stockholm, 1879, v, 45.

⁸⁵    S.E. Astrom, From Stockholm to St. Petersburg, Helsinki, 1962, p. 47.

³⁶ Ake Stille, Bengt Ozenstiemas politiska system, pp. 29, 44—7, 103-5,

⁸⁷ Max Hein, ‘Christoph von Brandts relationer om den svenska staten under Karl xi’ (KFA, 1920), p. 60. For the long debate among the nobility as to whether a reduktion was preferable to paying taxes, see Sven A. Nilsson, ‘Reduktion eller kontribudon? Altemativ inom 1600-talets svenska finanspolitik’, Scandia, 1958, especially pp. 108-14; and R. Swed-lund, ‘Krister Bonde och redukdonsbeslutet 1655' (KFA, 1937), pp. 66-9.

³⁸    For indelningsserket, see K.Agren, Karl XI:s indelningsuerk for armen, Uppsala, 1922, pp. 1-84: a good English account in Robinson, An Account of Sueden, pp. 256-61.

³⁹    Agren, pp. 93 ff.

⁴⁰    Denmark, with similar financial difficulties, adopted a less radical and

less satisfactory solution. In 1689 Christian v put 7,000 men at the disposal of William m for use in Ireland, on condition they be sent back if Denmark were attacked: Ake Stille, op. cit., p. 93.

⁴¹ See M. Roberts, Gustaous Adolphus (1958), ii, 63—79.

⁴¹ Folke Wemstedt, ‘Bidrag till kannedomen om den karolińska armens tillkomst’ (KFA, 1954), pp. 60—2; Alf Aberg, ‘Rutger von Ascheberg och tillkomsten av den karolińska armen (KFA, 1951), pp. 190—2.

⁴⁵ As the author of Les Anecdotes de Suicie predicted already in Charles xi’s dme: Les Anecdotes de Suide, The Hague, 1716, p. 164.

⁴⁴ Eli Heckscher, Soeriges ekonomiska historia fran Gustao Vasa, Stockholm, 1936, i, 288 ff. In a later volume Heckscher did howeverwrite that‘it can in some ways be said that Charles xi*s reduktion, with all the consequences it en taił ed, presupposed [my italics] the end of the Age of Greatness’: id., Soenskt arbete och liv, Stockholm, 1941, p. 161.

⁴⁸ Les Anecdotes de Suide, p. 162.

⁴⁴ Gustav Jonasson, Karl XII och hans radgioare, Uppsala, 1960, pp. 227—8, 262-3. And cf. Nils Reuterholms joumal (Historiska Handlingar, 36: 2), Stockholm, 1957, p. 66, where he quotes Lillieroot*s views, and adds: ‘All reasonable and maturę men who were not blinded by ambition and their own success were of the same opinion.*

⁴⁷    See Alvin Isberg, Karl XI och den lioldndska adeln 1684—1695, Lund, 1953, pp. 14, 74, 86. In Livonia between 45 and 48 per cent. of the total area had been in the hands of the high nobility, besides that held by the less er nobility: its loss was ‘a transference of wealth without parallel before or sińce*: Heckscher, Sueriges ekonomiska historia fran Gustao Vasa, i, 317.

⁴⁸    Ola Lindqvist, Jakob Gylleńborg och reduktionen, Lund, 1956, p. 167.

⁴⁸ This was not Landberg*s opinion: see Georg Landberg, ‘Nordisk 16oo-talspolitik under debatt* (Historisk Tidskrift, 1939), p. 332, where he writes of Swedish policy after 1680 as being only ‘superficially* defensive, and considers that the Swedish aristocracy still desired a policy of aggression.

⁸⁰ K. Fabricius, Kongelooen, Copenhagen, 1920, p. 323.

“E.Ingers, Erik Lindschold. Biograf sk studie, Lund, 1908, i, 143, 231.

⁸⁸ Georg Wittrock, ‘Riksskattmastaren Gustaf Bondes politiska program 1661* (Historisk Tidskrift, 1913), p. 48.

⁸⁸ Goran Rystad, Johan Gyllenstierna, r&det och kungamakten, Lund, 1955, pp. 57-8.

⁸⁴ Ibid., p. 28.

⁸⁸ For these disputes see Severin Bergh, ‘Rangstridema inom adeln under 1600-talet* (Historisk Tidskrift, 1896), passim', [W.Benson], A Letter to Sir J— B—, By Birth a S—, . . . Conceming the late Alinehead Doctrine (etc.) (1711). Already in 1674 a shrewd Italian observer saw what might happen: ‘it is therefore to be feared that with the help of the new nobility the king of Sweden may succeed in doing what the king of Denmark did with the help of the Burghers, who hated the nobility and therefore served as his instrument to free him from dependence on the Estates, and become absolute. The same can happen in Sweden, where it may easily fali out that the new nobility, which hates the old (from which as a rule members of the ród are reeruited), will unitę with the king (upon whom it mainly depends)

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