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Warsaw with cercain exceptions was “ rcunited to Russia ” and was to be “ irrevocably Iinked ” to Russia by iis “ Constitution.” These words were the subjcct of much subsequcnt controvcrsy, not a little of which settled on the point that “ Constitution ” was written with a Capital “ C”, In this controvcrsy, British statesmen took an actiye part and they thrcw the wcight of thcir influence on the sidc which took the view that Russia had under-taken to grant Poland a Constitution, and that a failure to govcrn Poland constitutionally deprivcd Russia of the right to the Polish territory which she had acquircd by the treaty.

This bccame an important question in the year 1831, after Poland had one of her pcriodical rcbellions against Tsarist autocracy and the Tsar on suppressing it proposcd to cxtinguish most of the country’s rights under the Constitution. The Poles appealed to Europę. It so happencd that the British Govern-ment was the great Reform Government headcd by Lord Grcy, with Palmerston at the Forcign Office, and a strong dispatch was sent to Russia. “ The Constitution once given bccame rhc link which under the treaty binds the Kingdom of Poland to the Empire of Russia ; and can that link rcmain unimpaired if the Constitution should not be maintaincd ? ” (Foundaiions of British Foreign Policy, by H. Temperlcy and L. M. Penson, p. 233.) It was madę elear that if Russia reduced Poland “ to the State and condiiion of a province ” Great Britain might refuse to recognise Russia’$ title to the Polish territories.

The ąuestion became acute again in 1848, the year o£jcvolu-tions, when Russell was Primc Minister. As Foreign Sccretary, Palmerston sent to St. Petersburg a dispatch in which hc was rightly interpreted as advising Russia to grant Home Rulc to Poland. “ It is not for Her Majcsty’s Govcrnment to suggest to His Imperial Majcsty any coursc of policy with rcfcrence to matters which morę pcculiarly conccrn the internal affairs of his own Dominions, although such affairs may by reason of

pcculiar circumstances havc a elose bcaring on the generał interests of Europę ; but His Imperial Majesty will no doubt in the exercisc of his own cnlightencd judgment well and maturcly consider whether it would not bc possible for him to dircct that somc arrangements might bc madę in regard to the Kingdom of Poland which might avert the danger of conflicts, the results of which rnust in any case, and howcver they may end, be lament-able and afilicting.” (Temperlcy and Penson, p. 161.)

Palmerston had the Polish question raised again ar the limę of the Congress of Paris, in 1856, when hc was Prime Minister and Clarcndon was at the Foreign Office. The Russians preventcd Clarendon from putting the matter offidally beforc rhc Congress by giving a promise that the Tsar intended forthwith to restorc

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