7928718793

Must Poland Yet Be Lost?

■»

By Camille Huysmans

T*HE developinent of the Polish ąuestion is causing considerable disturbance in all smali countries in Europę, and I belłeve as long as Democracy is not merely an empty phrase- we shonld speak frankly be~-forc it is too late.

Nonę of us Socialists who have for many decades advocated the inde-pendenco of Poland, fully understand the changc in the attitudc of the Hus-slan policy sińce 1917. We all re-member the leadership of the great I^enin on this ąuestion, and, ns we believe in prlnciples, we must recnll them.

The United Natlons light for Free-dom and Democracy, and it is Im-possible to connive at the challenge to this principlc which is so obviously planned according to the latest dęcia rations on the Polish issue. I am reallstic enough to see the ditference between 1918-1920. the time of the Treaty of Riga, and to-day.

1 am democratic enoagh to grunt tlić Bielo-Russians and Ukrainians what is due to them.

1 fully sympathise wdth the Rus-slan wish not to have an un-friendly natlon on the western border and I am a stubborn sup-porter of fuli co-operation be-twcen Russia and Poland.

Democracy, as I understand it. means the consultation of the people on all major decisions conccrnlng their country and thelr cxistence.

I am surę that all democratic people- and there is room for Right. Centre and Left in Democracy—agrcc with mc that giving up old and ac-ąuiring ncw territory is such a major decision.

A Government niay recommend such decisions to the people and to Parliament, but I must ask: Can lt without chnllenging dcmocrucy, act without the people? 1 do not believe so, and I venturc to say that to do so in the ąuestion of Poland is as detri-mental to the interests of Russia as to those of Poland itself.

Mr Churchill stated that Russia de-8erves the support of Great Britain for her security, and it is beyond any ąuestion that not only a Polish Gov-ernment, but also the llberated Polish Natlon will reeogniso the importance of Anglo-Kussian friendship for the beneflts of peace in the whole ol Europę.

But the Russians, seeking security, will also havc to recognise that the only fuli guarantec for a durable set-tlement on their western border is a friendly Poland—and that means the friendship of the Polish people. If the Polish people are convinced that Russia's demands do not challenge their independenco—even on rostrict-ed territory—and that they ure not to be dietated to, either how to livc or what men to choose to govern them—the basis for such friendship is given.

If. however, men who ratę their allegiancc to a polltlcal idea higher than their dcvotlon to their Father-land are to bo foreed upon them, wlth the conscąuence that the people will not be ablc to believe in the rightness of their decisions then friendship cannot exlst.

Kussia—Great Power

Russia to-day is a great Power. Whether some people like it or not. it is there, and this State with its organlsm so complctely alien to what the rest of Europę has adopted—has proved its stability in one of the greatest crises of mankind. The Russians know this too and just be-cause of that worldwide accepted position, many people are asking thcmselvcs; Why this prcssure, why this hyper-sensitivo agitation against a Government whose legitimatc exist-ence is chailenged on the same day on which its slgnature is asked for an act which must dctcrminc for a long time the facts and the life of the Polish Nution?

If the Polish Government, re-organiscd or not, wcrc to acccpt the Curzon and the Oder-Neisse Linę without consulting their people—how does Russia believe that they couid, on their return to Poland’s soil, cope with the nationalistic agitation which will be started. not immediately. per. haps. but aftor some years; what would happen if. on a democratic parllamentary basis. a nationalistic majority should bc- eloctod and should advocate correct bul not friendly re-lations with the Eastern neighbour? Would Russia demand the right to intcrvene? Would Britain. Europę und the United States Lhcn protect democracy which has spoken?

Merely to put this ąuestion shows the dungerous sltuatlon which mny be created and which must bc; avoldcd by everyone whose aim is set for peaee.

There is another aspect which must bc frankly discusscd. In 1939 Russia signed agreements with Germany dividing Poland between the two Powera. The frontier now suggested produces, as far as the eastern part of Poland is concerned, morę or less the same result.

Is it not tragic for a people who have fought so heroically on all fronts that their spirit and feelings should be hurt forevcr. by stating to them: You have in any casc lost the war with Germany.

Is it not realised what it means to the Polc3 to losc Lwów?

Is it so important for Russia or even the Ukrainians, to inslst on a sacrifice which the great rcalist Stalin not long ago, as 1 was told. had belicved in sparing to Poland?

Compensation

I know that 1 shall bc told that Poland will be compcnsated out of German territory, but I kave nlready stated tnat this is another problem whieh is not so easy to tleal with. Nobody will aecusc me of defending Gcrmany‘E case whatever sympa-thies I may have had. the Germans have taught mc to give up—but I say that Poland should not take moro of German territory than she can demand on strategical. national and economic reasona. What will beeome of the German population? If they are offered emlgration to Russia besides those whom Russia will demand for labour on reparation—there 8till remains the ąuestion of what the Poles can do with the acąulred territory, without having the population to settle in it.

One cannot movc a country like a travelllng coach and place lt either morę to the west or morę to the east.

Another ąuestion U the defence ot that newly ucąuired territory.

I know that Indepemlencc In the old sense is no longer po.sslble for the smallcr States": they must be part of, and take part In a gen-. erul security system—I nmintatn in a generał om:.

But if that is right, one should not create a situation wherc, by amputat-Ing one part antl addlng another In order to save the State, the State so set up will bc dependent for Its exist-ence on one power only, even if theoretically it can decide whether it

wanta to llve or to die.

Of this and the conscąuence of these methods, the smali nutions aro afrald: they bring back memories of the decision at Munich—previously so much defended In England and so much uttacked in Russia.

These methods recalled also the policy which I thought expcricnce had foreed us to outgrow. I. there-fore. utter this warning. If we be-lieve In Democracy -if we fight for Frcedom-let it be an indivisible faith and an indivisible slruggle. Then, but only then. the smali nations, and with them courageous but unhappy Poland, can foresee the bulkling up of a new home and all Poles the intransigent ones excluded —can agam thlnk: Poland is not yet lost.

IM. Camille Huysmans, one of the moKt mitKtnnding personalitles m International life, Prejddent of the Second International. Lubour Memher of the Belgian Parliament and Burgomaster of Anlwerp. wrota the preceding articlc which appeared In ‘‘Tłmo and Tidc" on November 18. 1914. J