Argumenty bioetyki 2012

wykład 7

POTENCJALNOŚĆ

- B

(zarodki z ciężkimi wadami)

wady:

• A. wykluczające zarówno osobowy

rozwój, jak przynależność do gatunku
ludzkiego

• B. wykluczające osobowy rozwój, ale

nie przynależność do gatunku
ludzkiego

• C. nie wykluczające osobowego

rozwoju (ani przynależności do
gatunku ludzkiego)

ad B

• Turning to the case of humans, we

should perhaps take a gradual approach.

In the case of preimplantation loss, it is

probable that the genetic defects are

such that the eliminated embryos are

not only genetically defective, and hence

non-viable human embryos, but in most

cases not genetically human at all. In

such cases, the issue of inviolability is

moot. (Gómez-Lobo 2007 inviol, s. 318)

poziomy możliwości:

• I. możliwość logiczna (idealna)
• II. możliwość fizyczna
• III. możliwość realna

Covey, absolutne i aktualne

możliwości fizyczne

• hypothetical event or state of affairs, s, is

absolutely N-impossible iff. s would be
inconsistent with the most basic physical
laws of the actual world in all logically
possible worlds in which those laws operate.

• An event or state of affairs is actually N-

impossible iff. the actually-obtaining state of
affairs, s1, is such that s1’s being superseded
by s2 would be inconsistent with the physical
laws of the actual world. (Covey 1991, s. 240)

stopnie możliwości

fizycznej:

• istotowa możliwość fizyczna (rozwinięcia

jakiejś kwalifikacji) – przysługuje wszystkim

bytom, które posiadają odpowiednie cechy

istotne

• wewnętrzna możliwość fizyczna - przysługuje

wszystkim bytom, które posiadają odpowiednie

cechy wewnętrzne (istotne lub akcydentalne)

• pełna możliwość fizyczna - przysługuje

wszystkim bytom, które posiadają odpowiednie

cechy wewnętrzne, a także znajdują się w

sprzyjającym otoczeniu

koncepcje warunków

właściwej potencjalności

Wystarczającym warunkiem właściwej

potencjalności jest

• (1) istotowa możliwość fizyczna
• (2) absolutna wewnętrzna możliwość

fizyczna

• (3) aktualna wewnętrzna możliwość

fizyczna

• (4) aktualna pełna możliwość fizyczna

ad 1

• Human beings with brain damage still

have the basic constitution oriented to

developing the immediately exercisable

capacity for such acts, which is why

they are rightly recognised as human

beings and persons. An organic defect

may prevent them from ever (in this life)

developing the capacities they do have

in virtue of the kind of entity they are.

(Lee 2004, s. 262, przyp. 28)

ad 2

• consider a human being in a light coma that required a heart

transplant before we had the medical expertise to transplant

hearts (say, in 1800 CE): such a one also has no potential to be

rational or self-aware. However, today, because of practical

advances in medical expertise, such a one does have practical

potential to be a person again. But one thing that we can say about

someone with advanced Alzheimer’s, a severely autistic child, and

our patient in 1800 with the heart malady is the following: they all

had the natural (or active) potential of personhood all along.

Relative levels of medical expertise do not affect such a concept.

Indeed, if we were suddenly to find cures to Alzheimer’s and

autism, it certainly would not be the case that these patients would

suddenly become potential persons and regard a moral status they

had lost. Rather, they had the natural potential all along — and

with the new medical technology would have found a practical way

to realize it. 24 So, the very reason we extend personhood to the

severely mentally disabled is the same reason we should extend it

to fetuses and infants: the beings in question all have a natural

potential for personhood. (Camosy 2008, s. 590)

krytyka ad 2 - Lizza

• Consider, for example, an abnormal human embryo

that lacks the genes to develop a brain or heart.

Also, assume that we have no way of altering its

genetic structure to allow for such development.

Such an embryo would not be potentially a person,

since attributing such a potential to it would entail

relying on absolute possibilities, rather than actual

ones. (...). Moreover, because the abnormal embryo

lacks the actual possibility of becoming a person, it

lacks the potential for being a person. Finally, if the

potential to be a person were what garners an

embryo special moral status, then it would follow

that this abnormal embryo would fail to have this

status. (Lizza 2007, s. 382)

krytyka ad 2 - McMahan

• What reason is there to suppose that all human

beings are in fact internally directed or

programmed toward the development of a

rational nature? There are some human beings –

those who are congenitally and radically

cognitively impaired (henceforth the ‘‘radically

impaired’’) – who in at least one obvious sense

lack the potential for the development of a

rational nature. While most immature human

beings (embryos, fetuses, newborn infants) will,

given a favorable environment, develop a capacity

for rationality, those immature human beings that

are radically cognitively impaired cannot develop

this category, even with the most extensive forms

of assistance that we are currently able to

provide. (Jeff McMahan 2008, s. 88)

ad 3

• The potential to be F is, very roughly, the capacity a

thing, x, has, strictly in virtue of its current intrinsic

properties, to become F given suitable or standard

nurturing. Potential is, if you like, the contribution

intrinsic properties of x are capable of making to its

tendency to become F. The potential of x to become

F is its aptitude to become F. Clearly, the probability

that x will become F is a function both of its

potential to become F and of the likelihood that it

will receive the appropriate nurturing. Of two

people with exactly the same potential to become,

say, prime minister, one might be much more likely

to achieve the goal because he has much more

money and much better family connections than his

rival. (Burgess 2010, s. 141)

ad 4

• In all cases, whether a potential exists

depends on whether it can be actualized,
where “can be actualized” is dependent, not
only on the internal state of the substance,
but also on external conditions. Privation in
the internal state of the substance or external
conditions that cannot be rectified in any
realistic way is grounds for concluding that
the substance lacks certain potentials in this
more proximate or realistic sense. (Lizza
2005, s. 49)