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ESSAYS IN SWEDISH HISTORY

⁵⁴    For the ‘leather gun’ and the regiment-piece, Hammarskióld, op. cit. pp. 33-4) I47-5⁰ >' ‘Om svenskt artilleri i aldre tider*, Historisk Tidskrift, II Series, iv, (1941), 45; Soeriges Krig, ii, 138-9; supplementary vol. ii, 180-3, 191-207, 235-41, 253, 270-2.

⁵⁵    On 21 July 1631, for instance, the king led a reconnaissance against TiUy’s forces and took with him six light guns: before his time this would hardiy have been possible. Soeriges Krig, iv, 396.

⁵⁶    It was manhandled light artillery of the Swedish type, in conjunction with cavalry, that mowed down the tercios at Rocroi: Weygand, Histoire de VArmie Jranęaise, p. 131; J. Golin and J. Reboul, Histoire militaire et nosale (Histoire de la nation franęaise, ed. G. Hanotaux, vii), Paris, 1925, i, 316-17.

⁵⁷    Compare the orders of batde illustrated in Barkman, op. cit., pp. 82-7, with that of Maurice, illustrated in Wijn, p. 478. For defensive tactics in Poland, G. Petri, Kungl. forsta Liogrenadjarregementets historia, Stockholm, 1926, ii, 105-7; C. Bennedich, Ur det garrda Gardets odeń, Stockholm, 1926, pp. 74-5; Barkman, ‘Gustaf II Adolf sasom harorganisatór och faltherre’, Kungl. Kńgsoetenskaps-Akademiens Handlingar och Tidskrift, ix, (1932), p. 25.

⁵⁸    For accounts of Breitenfeld see Soeriges Krig, iv, 487 ff* > Det ssenska soardet, ed. N. F. Holm, Stockholm, 1948 pp. 58-81; and G. Petri, op. cit., H, 127-14o: for a radically dissenting view, see Sven Lundkvist, ‘Slaget vid Breitenfeld 1631* (.Historisk Tidskrift [N.S.] i, (1963)), 1 ff. For the cavalry acrion at Burgstall, see Dagbok ford i det ssenska fdltkansliet, ed. E. Zeeh and N. Belfrage (Historiska Handlingar, 30:3), Stockholm, 1940, p. 21. For Koniecpolski^ influence on Pappenheim, see Laskowski, ‘Uwagi’, p. 48.

⁵⁹    Soeriges Krig, vi, 213-15.

⁶⁰    K. Deuticke, Die Schlacht bei Lut zen, 1632, Giessen, 1917, can no longer be considered satisfactory: the best accounts are now Soeriges Krig, vi; Kungl. Liv-Rustkammaren, Gustem II Adolf oid Lut zen, ed. R. Cederstróm, Stockholm, 1944; G. Nordstrom, Wallensteins stridsplan oid Lut zen, in Krigshistoriska studier tillagnade Olof Ribbing, Stockholm, 1950; and Josef Seidler, Untersuchungen Ober die Schlacht bei Liitzen, 1632, Memmingen, 1954. The łąck of pikes was felt as early as June, 1631: Schriftstiicke oon Gustaf Adolf, zjumeist an eoangelische Fursten Deutschlands, ed. G. Droysen, Stockholm, 1877, p. 134, which shows that it was not his rapid marches that took toll of pikemen, but rather that current military fashions were curtailing the supply of them.

⁶¹    Gausewitz wrote: ‘Ein kiihner Invasions- und Schlachtfeldherr war Gustav Adolf uberall nicht, ... er liebte mehr den kiinstlichen manóv-rirenden, systematischen Krieg’; and again, ‘Kurz war er ein gelehrter Feldherr voller vorsichtiger Kombinationen’: G. von Glausewitz, ‘Strate-gisehe Beleuchtung mehrerer Feldzuge’ in Hinterlassene Werke, Berlin, 1837, ix, 47, 29.

⁶²    Soeriges Krig, vi, 115-16.

•³For what follows, Lars Tingsten, ‘Nagra data ang&ende Gustav n Adolfe basering och operationsplaner i Tyskland 1630-1632’, Historisk Tidskrift, I Series, xlviii, 322-338; Soeriges Krig, v, 282-4, 3^X4, 330-8; vi 7> ^l6^ 33~4> ?79s 259.

⁹⁴ L. Fróhnhauser, Gustao Adolf und die Schweden in Mainz und am Rhein, Darmstadt, 1894, pp. 149-62.

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⁸⁶    The King wrote to Oxenstiema in 1628: ‘If we cannot say, bellum se ipsum alei, then I see no way out of what we have undertaken’: Styffe, p. 520; and he told his council in May, 1630: ‘the main thing is, that we should have sedem belli sparsam per totam GermanianC: Suenska Riksradets Protokoll, ed. N. A. Kullberg, Stockholm, 1878, ii, 8.

⁸⁹ A. Emstberger, ‘Wallensteins Heeressabotage und die Breitenfelder Schlacht*, Hist. /Jiitschrift, 142 (1930), passim.

⁸⁷    Good accounts of Wittstock in B. Steckzen, Johan Banir, Stockholm,

1939; L. Tingsten, Faltmarskalkama Johan Banżr och Lennart Torstensson sdsom hdrfórare, pp. 63-75; Det soenska soardet, pp. 106-27.

⁶⁸ Monro, ii, 180.

⁸⁹ The foot were only six deep, for instance, in the armies on both sides in the Civil Wars; Strafford’s cavalry was four deep, most later cavalry three.

But the French foot was still eight deep at the Dunes: G. H. Firth, Cromwell's Army (1905), pp. 94-5; Turner, Pallas Armata, pp. 215, 234; Weygand, p. 153; Colin and Reboul, p. 411.

to Wallenstein used salvoes as early as the Alte Feste, with powerful effect:

K. Spannagel, Konrad von Burgsdotff, Berlin, 1907, ąuoting Burgsdorff’s eye-witness account.

⁷¹    Even in Britain: at Newburn fight, Leslie had ‘some of his Swedish cannon’ placed on the steeple of Newburn church; and a variety of‘leather gun’ was also in use in the Scots army: C. S. Terry, The Life and Campaigns of Alexander Leslie, first Earl of Leoen (1899), pp. 116, 121 n. 1.

⁷²    Soeriges Krig, vi, 216. In the later years of the war the German cavalry in

Swedish service seems to have fought shy of l'arme blanche, but they did not revive the caracole (Alm, Eldhandoapen, i, 215); and Rupert and Cromwell in England, Conde and Turenne in France, used cavalry as it would have been impossible to use it, if the horsemen of Gustav Adolf had not killed the caracole for ever.    \

⁷³    Examples of this kind of battle were Breitenfeld II (1642) and Nórd-lingen II (1645). Breitenfeld I, indeed, has some claim to be the beginnings of this type of fight: the whole mass of the first linę of Swedish foot took virtually no part in the action. But the struggle on the Swedish left, which saved the day, was no mere cavalry fight. On the generał trend of tactics in the closing stages of the war, śe€ P. Sórensson, ‘Faltherrar, harorganisation och krigfóring under trettio&riga krigets senare skede. En orientering.’ Scandia, iii (1930), passim.

⁷⁴    G. F. R. Henderson, The Science of War (1906), p. 114.

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