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THE CZECHGSLOVAK RP.PUlJLIC, 19I8-I9J8

Czechoslovak Land Reform was his. lt was to strengthen the class of smali and medium farmers by distribuling tlić land of the partitioncd estates among them. He aimed thus to retain the land in privalc owner-ship ratlicr than to transfer it to the collcctivc ownership of farm of co-opcrativcs, as the socialists would havc preferred to do. This gaincd the agrarian party the ovcrwhclming support of the countrysidc in the 1920’s and catapulted it, after the Social Democratic split in 1920-21, into the position of Czechoslovakia’s strongest political party. 5vchla’s influence remained uncqualcd until the onset of his fatal illncss in the late 1920’s. At times cven Masaryk submitted to the wise advicc of this practical and independent-minded parliamentary leader who never failed to throw his influence behind the president. Svehla realized that the stability of Czech-oslovakia, in which his own party played the leading role, dependcd to a large extent upon Masaryk.⁸®

Karci Kramdr had two successive carccrs, one before 1918 as the leading Czech representative in the Austrian Reichsrat, and one after 1918 as a CzechosIovak statesman. Paradoxically, his career in Austria, which hc did his best to tear down, was morc succcssful than his career in Czechoslovakia, which he strove to build up. World War I profoundly altered Czech society, and he was unwilling or unable to adjust to the new Czech outlook. Reluctant to face sąuarely the post-1918 shift in Czech public opinion from primarily national to primarily social issues, hc left in January, 1919, to represent Czcchoslovakia at the Paris Pcacc Conference, which he attended until after the signing of the Peace of St. Gcrmain in Septembcr, 1919. Hc did not conlcnt himsclf at the pcacc conference with fighting for Czechoslovak interests but involved himsclf in Allicd schemcs to intcrvcnc in Russia to ovcrthrow the BoIshevik gov-ern/nent. Kramdr bclicvcd—quile corrcctly, as the cvcnls of 1938-39 were to show—that Czcchoslovakia could not survivc German aggrcs-sion without Russian support. Thcrcfore, it was essential for Czcchoslo-vakia to have a friendly govcrnment in Russia. Since the Bolshcviks had repudiated Panslavism and had postulated World Revolution as the basis of Soviet forcign policy, Kramu? fclt that it was not only Czcchoslo-vakia’s duty but also in its national interest to help to rcscuc Russia from the clutches of the Bolshcviks—in the hope that a post-Soviet govcrn-ment would resume the Tsarist governmcnt’s role of protectc: of the SJavs.⁰⁷

⁶⁰ For perccplive appraisals of Svehla’s personality and policics, sce Peroutka, Dudovani stów, H, 890-904, and Anthony Palećck, “Antonin Svchla: Czech Peas-ant Statesman,” Slavic Review, xxi (December 1962), 699-708. For a highly critical communist view, sce Eduard Kućera and Zdcnka Kuccrova, O agrórnicky sfór [For an Agrarian State] (Prague, 1955), pp. 25-42. Lockhart, Retreat ]rom Glory, pp. 75-77, contains an engaging portrait of Svehla.

⁵⁷ Peroutka, Dudovdni stów, li, 1318-30.

DEMOCRACY AND 1TS PROBLEMS, 1918-1920

KramuFs rclations willi Masaryk wcrc at limes straincd before the war. Yet in 1918 Kramar rallicd wholchcartcdly to the movc to clcct Masaryk the first president of Czcchoslovakia. Howcvcr, the two men had dilTercnl pcrsonalitics and backgrounds. After the downfall of his cabinct in Junc, 1919, Kramar bclicvcd—quile unjustly—that Masaryk had uscd his (KramaFs) abscncc from Praguc to undcrminc his position. After that the two men wcrc ncver able to accommodatc their political and personal dillerenccs. Kramar declincd all ofTicial functions offered him and sulked, obdurately refusing to accept the reality of social change in Czechoslovakia or the pcrmanencc of the Soviet govcrnmcnt in Russia. Initially, he had a strong following among the Czech middle classes and he tried to stay elear of narrow party politics. Gradually, howcver, he bccamc the chief spokesman of the Czech conservative and nationalist opposition to Masaryk’s cndcavors to rcach a political scttlemcnt with the democratic left and the national minorities, and to Beneś’s efforts to establish diplomatic rclations with Soviet Russia. Hc sought to establish an independent center of power as a conservative alternate to Masaryk and Bcnes. By the timc of his dcath in 1937, howcvcr, his influence and following had dwindled to insignificance.

The survival of the ccnter-lcft coalition established by Tusar in Junc, 1919, depended largcly on the situation within the dissension-ridden Social Democratic party. Tusar was a respected moderatc, who had scrvcd in Vienna during the war as the liaison man of the Czech Social Democratic party with olher Social Democratic parties of the Habsburg empire. After the Russian Revolution in 1917 he cast his lot with the nationalist elcmcnts in the party leadership.⁰⁸ He naturally gravitated toward the pragmatic group of Rudolf Bechynć, Gustav Habrman, and Antonin Hampl, who in 1918 hastened to idenlify the Czech Social Dcm-ocratic party with the ncw Czcchoslovak State. As head of the cabinct, Tusar worked assiduously for a scttlcment of social issues. His program callcd for changc in the organization and ownership of industry, but in fact proved to be moderate; it referred only vaguely to the socialization of the coal mines and minerał deposits. The main demand of Tusar’s program conccrncd the preparation of the dcfinitive constitution, which demonstrated again the coiwiction of the Red-Grcen coalition that the best hopc for clTcctivc changc lay in rcprcscntativc dcntocracy and the ballot box rather than in the strcels.⁵⁰

Soon, however, troublcs began to pile up for the Tusar govcrnment. In particular, the emcrgence of Ute pro-Leninist left as a ncw power cen-

⁶⁸ For a discussion of Tusar’s personality and policies, sec ibid., m, 1989-2008; Karnik, Socialisle na rozcesti, passim; and Lockhart, Relreat from Glory, pp, 79-80.

⁶⁰ Kocman, Doj o smer, i, 70-72; and Peroutka, Biulovam slutu, u, 1140-61.

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