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Table of contents
1. 2009: income down, poverty up, more uninsured......................................................................................... 1
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Document 1 of 1
2009: income down, poverty up, more uninsured
Author: Anonymous
ProQuest document link
Abstract (Abstract): Before proceeding, a few words on where the stats come from. They're drawn from a
special edition of the Bureau's monthly Current Population Survey (CPS). The regular survey, which covers
about 60,000 households, is what the monthly unemployment figures, among other things, are based on. This
special survey, done every March, covers 100,000 households. This is a very large sample, and though it's far
from perfect, it provides an excellent view of monetary well-being. It's different from the yearly American
Community Survey (ACS), whose results were released in late September, which covers many similar topics in
great detail, and is comparable to the decennial Census (the one done every ten years). The ACS's history
doesn't go back anywhere near as far as the CPS, making it difficult to analyze long-term trends consistently.
The right has it out for these surveys - ostensibly because, unlike the decennial Census, it's not specifically
authorized by the Constitution, but more likely because they're ignorant dopes who hate the truth.
(And also a few parenthetical words on racial terminology. As Adolph Reed argued in LBO #121, the entire
taxonomy of American racial difference is extremely problematic, conceptually and politically. If we were
poststructuralists, we might want to use the terms "under erasure": they have some meaning, but deeply
questionable ones. There's a certain kind of liberal that gets far more exercised about racial inequality than the
nonracialized kind. It's a disgrace that black people are three times as likely to be poor as whites, but there are
still more poor whites than poor blacks - and racializing poverty can obscure the breadth of the problem. We'd
be the last to argue that this is a post-racial society, but it's still important to make the point that racial
classification - not to mention the term "Hispanic," which, as officialdom always points out, is a category
unrelated to race - is a problem more complex than a parenthetical note, or even an entire newsletter article,
can untangle. It's not clear, for example, what purpose is served by lumping together a dark-skinned dishwasher
of Dominican origin in the Bronx with a light-skinned Cuban-American banker in Miami under the common rubric
"Hispanic" or even "Latino," but that's what the officially sanctioned name does.)
A few other notes on income. The average black household's income fell to just below 60% of the average white
household's, down nearly 2 percentage points from last year, and extending a downtrend that began when the
boom of the 1990s burst in 2001. At its 2000 peak, the average black household hit 65% of the white average.
The average Hispanic household's income was just below 70% of its white counterpart - down a couple of
points from a few years ago, but basically in the neighborhood it's been in for years. The average Asian
household's income was 120% of the white average last year, also more or less where it's been for several
years.
Full text: Every September brings the release of the Census Bureau's annual income, poverty, and health
insurance figures. Even in the best of times, they can make for sad reading - but 2009 was a real bust for the
American masses. Incomes were down, poverty was up, and millions fell off the insurance rolls. It's not the
worst performance surrounding a recession in modern history - that honor belongs to the downturn of the early
1980s. But that carnage was spread out over rive years, by the official Census count. We're only two years into
this mess, and while the recession is formally over (for now), there's little doubt that 2010 and 201 1 will be
miserable years.
Before proceeding, a few words on where the stats come from. They're drawn from a special edition of the
Bureau's monthly Current Population Survey (CPS). The regular survey, which covers about 60,000
households, is what the monthly unemployment figures, among other things, are based on. This special survey,
done every March, covers 100,000 households. This is a very large sample, and though it's far from perfect, it
05 March 2016 Page 1 of 6 ProQuest
provides an excellent view of monetary well-being. It's different from the yearly American Community Survey
(ACS), whose results were released in late September, which covers many similar topics in great detail, and is
comparable to the decennial Census (the one done every ten years). The ACS's history doesn't go back
anywhere near as far as the CPS, making it difficult to analyze long-term trends consistently. The right has it out
for these surveys - ostensibly because, unlike the decennial Census, it's not specifically authorized by the
Constitution, but more likely because they're ignorant dopes who hate the truth.
And now a closer look at 2009.
Incomes: flat to down. The median income of all households - the income level at middle of the distribution,
meaning that half the population is richer, and half, poorer - fell by almost 1% last year, but the move was
deemed not large enough to be statistically significant. That is, the likely error in the estimate is larger than the
change itself. But the overall number was helped considerably by a near-6% rise in incomes for households
headed by someone 65 or over. Under-65 households saw their income fall by 1.3%, and this did pass the test
of statistical significance. Especially hard hit were the young, foreign born non-citizens, and blacks. So-called
Hispanics held their own.
(A few parenthetical words on the "head of household" concept. Officially, the Census Bureau dropped it in
1980, in favor of "householder." The newer name reeks less of patriarchy, but it still has a lot in common with
the older one's meaning. The householder is typically the person's name on a lease or deed. In the case of
property jointly owned by a married couple, either may be the householder. Though the newer term has
dropped the assumption that the head is a man, it does assume at least some hierarchy within the family. But
given common age and racial/ethnic difference between spouses, not to mention the increasing diversity of
families with adopted children and the rising prominence of "blended" families, these classifications are more
than a little spongy. So when we talk about "black" or "over-65" households, there could be plenty of nonblacks
and under-65s in the mix.)
(And also a few parenthetical words on racial terminology. As Adolph Reed argued in LBO #121, the entire
taxonomy of American racial difference is extremely problematic, conceptually and politically. If we were
poststructuralists, we might want to use the terms "under erasure": they have some meaning, but deeply
questionable ones. There's a certain kind of liberal that gets far more exercised about racial inequality than the
nonracialized kind. It's a disgrace that black people are three times as likely to be poor as whites, but there are
still more poor whites than poor blacks - and racializing poverty can obscure the breadth of the problem. We'd
be the last to argue that this is a post-racial society, but it's still important to make the point that racial
classification - not to mention the term "Hispanic," which, as officialdom always points out, is a category
unrelated to race - is a problem more complex than a parenthetical note, or even an entire newsletter article,
can untangle. It's not clear, for example, what purpose is served by lumping together a dark-skinned dishwasher
of Dominican origin in the Bronx with a light-skinned Cuban-American banker in Miami under the common rubric
"Hispanic" or even "Latino," but that's what the officially sanctioned name does.)
(Ok, end of parentheses)
Taking a longer-term look, median household income in 2009 was just 2% above where it was in 1989, even
though real GDP was up 63% over the same period. Of course, population is up about 25% over the period, and
not all of GDP takes the form of personal income - some of it goes to corporations, some to government. But
real disposable income per capita - the total of income after taxes throughout the entire economy divided by the
population - is up 40% over the last twenty years. So, on paper, or its silicon equivalent, were things being
distributed equally, the average household would have gained about 20 times more income than it has in reality.
The reason for this huge disparity, of course, is that the rich have gotten most of the benefits of economic
growth over the last few decades. The top 5% of the population, according to the Census numbers (which badly
understate things, for technical reasons we'll go into in a moment) has gotten 25% of the growth in income over
05 March 2016 Page 2 of 6 ProQuest
the last twenty years - and the top 20% altogether has gotten 54%, nearly three times what would have been an
equal share.
A few other notes on income. The average black household's income fell to just below 60% of the average white
household's, down nearly 2 percentage points from last year, and extending a downtrend that began when the
boom of the 1990s burst in 2001. At its 2000 peak, the average black household hit 65% of the white average.
The average Hispanic household's income was just below 70% of its white counterpart - down a couple of
points from a few years ago, but basically in the neighborhood it's been in for years. The average Asian
household's income was 120% of the white average last year, also more or less where it's been for several
years.
Progress on gender gaps was mixed in 2009. More men lost their jobs than women, so the gap between male
and female earnings narrowed, with all women workers earning 71.6% as much as men - up 1.5 points on the
year. The narrowing of the gap is espedaily striking over the longer term, with women's earnings rising from
65.5% of men's in 2000, and 56.9% in 1990. The narrowing of the gap is a joint product of a fall in men's and a
rise in women's; since 2000, for example, women's real earnings are up 3.1% while men's were off 5.8%.
But, and this is a very important point, the narrowing of the gender gap has a lot to do with more women
working full time, and more gaining advanced degrees. The gender gaps for full-time, year-round workers
actually rose 0. 1 percentage point in 2009, and the narrowing of the gap since 2000 for these fully employed
workers was about half as impressive as the narrowing for all workers (including part-timers, that is). The gap is
narrowing within educational and occupational groupings, but less impressively so than the overall gap is.
Still, the male advantage in the labor market continues to erode - and the educational trends suggest that this is
almost certain to continue. The number of women with bachelor's degrees or higher surpassed that of men for
the first time in 2008, and women's lead widened in 2009. The number of women with master's degrees
surpassed that of men in 1998. Men still dominate doctoral and professional degrees, but their advantage is
narrowing. As a result of this, younger women's earnings are beginning to exceed men's, especially in major
metropolitan areas. That advantage erodes once women take time off to have kids, alas.
Overall, the U.S. income distribution, as measured by the Gini index (see graph, p. 1) rose in 2009 to within a
hair of its highest level since 1940, and to just about where it was in 1929. It's interesting that things got more
unequal during the early years of the Great Depression, with the Gini peaking in 1932 and then beginning a long
decline into its 1968 low. You have to wonder if the Great Recession is repeating that history in muted form. For
a detailed explanation of the Gini index, see the LBO website.
It's even worse. For several reasons, the Census numbers understate incomes at the top. One is that the very
rich can't be bothered answering questionnaires from pesky enumerators. And another is that the Census
Bureau treats all incomes over a certain amount - it rises over time, but it's around a million dollars now - as if
they were that amount. The stated reason for this is to protect confidentiality, since the records are available for
public use. Maybe. But the effect is seriously to understate how well the very rich have done. That limitation can
be overcome by looking at tax records (which also understate things, given the propensity of the rich to hide
their income). The economists Thomas Piketty and Emmanuel Saez have done that in great detail, putting
together a massive and wonderful history of income distribution in the U.S. going back to 1913.
The conclusion from comparing that work to the Census numbers: by missing the seriously rich, the Census
understates things by almost 2/3: Piketty and Saez have the top 5% gaining almost 75% from 1989 to 2007,
compared with 29% for the Census survey (Sadly, 2007 is as far as their data goes, but it probably wouldn't
change much if you took it out another couple of years.) The reason for the difference is the intense action at
the very high end. The top 1% was up more than 100% over those 18 years. Take them out of the top 5%, and
look just at the 95th to 99th percentiles, and they were up a mere 38% - still well above the Census measure,
but at least approaching life in the same universe.
Even within the top 1%, the real action was at the high end: the top 0.01% - our 12,000 richest households, with
05 March 2016 Page 3 of 6 ProQuest
incomes averaging $35 million a year - were up 215%. That almost 30 times the increase that Piketty and Saez
report for the bottom 90% of the population. In other words, an enormous portion of the gains of economic
growth have gone to just a few thousand hyper-rich.
All that said, the Census numbers are a good measure of broad trends, even if they miss life in the
stratosphere. The story they tell, supplemented with the Piketty-Saez numbers, is this. For the last two decades,
the very rich have really raked it in, the merely rich have done quite well, the upper middle class has done more
or less OK, the middle ranks have merely held their own, and the bottom 40% of the population has been lucky
to tread water, if that. And there's no sign that any of this is about to change.
Poverty: up. Before discussing official penury, it's important to say that the U.S. poverty line is an extremely
stingy thing. It's based on research done in the 1950s that showed that the average household spent a third of
its income on food. So, the Johnson administration, eager for metrics in its war on poverty, decided that a
poverty line would be three times the minimal food budget computed by the Agriculture Department. Never mind
that that food budget was considered an emergency measure taken when a family hit a crisis, not something to
live on indefinitely. No, they needed something in a hurry and went with that. And the Census Bureau just
adjusted that line for inflation ever since, with no notice paid to rising GDP or average incomes, or the changing
nature of household budgets (like the relentless rise in medical care and college tuition or a need for child care
that didn't exist in the days of the one-paycheck family).
So, conceptually, a poverty income today is exactly the same as it was almost 50 years ago, even though
average incomes risen. For example, the poverty line for a family of three was 43% of median family income in
1959, the year the poverty stats begin; it was 29% in 2009 - and that doesn't even adjust for the fact that
families are smaller now than they were 50 years ago. But since the average family's income has grown far
more slowly than GDP over the last fifty years, the gap between the poverty line and GDP is even sharper. In
1959, the poverty line for a family of three was 81% of per capita GDP; fifty years later, it was 37%. A more
honest poverty line - like the one used by many academic researchers, half the median household's income -
would produce numbers nearly twice what officialdom reports.
Yet despite these undemanding standards, nearly 44 million, or 14.3% of Americans, were officially poor in
2009, up from 13.2% in 2008, the highest level since the early 1990s. It's almost certainly up this year, since it
tracks the unemployment rate pretty closely, and this 2010's jobless rate is higher than 2009's. The rate among
white households was just over 9%; for black and Hispanic households, over 25%, or nearly three times the
white rate. It was almost that high for households of any race with children under 6 - yes, nearly one in four
young kids in the USA is officially poor.
As with income, the elderly have done better than the rest of the population. In 2009, 20. 1% of all people under
18 were officially poor, rising for the third consecutive year to a level at the high end of this demographic's
historical range. The poverty rate for those aged 18-64 rose for the second consecutive year to 12.9%, its
highest level since the early mid1960s. But the poverty rate for those over 65 fell sharply, to its lowest level in
the fifty-year history of the series.
That must not be read, however, as a furtive call to generational warfare. It's a very good thing that elderly
poverty continues to decline even in a crappy economy - though the Austerity Party, which has it out for Social
Security, wants you to believe otherwise. Austerians, as they say, love to cloak their meanness under a false
sense of generational equity, but they shouldn't be allowed to get away with it. Decent social policy could extend
this trend to the rest of the population, but this isn't on offer right now.
Health insurance. And the percentage of people without health insurance for the entire year - and not just a
spell, so these are lowball numbers - rose more than a percentage point, to 16.7% - or 51 million people. Since
people over 65 are covered by Medicare, giving them near-100% coverage, it's worth looking at the under-65
crowd: almost 19% of them were without insurance for the whole year. The share rises to 30% for young adults,
those under 35.
05 March 2016 Page 4 of 6 ProQuest
Much of the decline came, of course, from the ranks of those enjoying insurance from their jobs. Last year, only
a bit over half - 55.8% - of Americans were covered by employer-based insurance, down from 58.5% in 2008,
and 64.2% in 2000. The Medicaid share rose, from 14.1% of the population in 2008 to 15.7%, in 2009, as
people lost their jobs and slipped into poverty.
A few words about whether these are lowball numbers. Some researchers assert that this survey significantly
overstates the number of people without insurance for the entire year. Maybe. It is true that people cycle in an
out of insurance - employer to nothing to Medicaid - and they may not be reporting their status correctly. But it's
also likely that in a given year, half again as many people - meaning nearly a quarter of the nonelderly
population - spend at least a few months uncovered. Over the course of a decade, more than half the
population experiences some time without health insurance. (By the way, similar things are true of poverty.) Life
in America can be very volatile, and a mere snapshot can be misleading.
So, a bad year for the mass of the American population, following two decades of struggle, and it's likely that
2010 was equally bad or worse. And this news will be reported for a day or two, and then forgotten, as the TV
moans about the sufferings of the rich, who desperately need their tax breaks renewed.
Sidebar
Chart details, facing page: Fed funds and money supply: Fed data. The fed funds rate is the interest rate banks
charge each other for overnight loans; it is the most sensitive indicator of Fed policy. Dollar indexes are two of
the Fed's indexes of the dollar's value; "broad" is composed of 26 currencies, and the "major," of seven. Data
through 7/21/10.
Subject: Family income; Uninsured people; Personal income; Poverty;
Location: United States--US
Publication title: Left Business Observer
Issue: 129
Pages: 3-5,7
Number of pages: 4
Publication year: 2010
Publication date: 2010
Publisher: Left Business Observer
Place of publication: New York
Country of publication: United States
Publication subject: Business And Economics
ISSN: 10420134
Source type: Reports
Language of publication: English
Document type: Commentary
Document feature: Graphs
ProQuest document ID: 760014252
Document URL: http://search.proquest.com/docview/760014252?accountid=15143
Copyright: Copyright Left Business Observer 2010
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Last updated: 2011-10-04
Database: ProQuest Central
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