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Foreword

e essential content of history is legend, but the form of history is founded on

myth.

Stefan Czarnowski

Many years ago, I was going over the papers of my late great-grandmother. Born in
Mazowsze near Warsaw, she had married an older man who had come from the
former northeastern borderlands of historic Poland. I was only a small child, and
had no conception of Polish politics or the symbols which have, to such a striking
degree, explained them. However, I found amongst these papers a picture of an old
man in a simple uniform taking a walk. He was, I later discovered, Józef Piłsudski:
a controversial ﬁ gure in the modern history of our ancestral homeland. It was the
only picture with a Polish theme that my grandmother kept.

Years later, I noticed that my mother, a pianist, would occasionally play an odd

song on her piano, which I later learned was called My, Pierwsza Brygada [We, the
First Brigade]. She would always burst into song—she had a very weak voice—and
become very emotional. What this meant, I had no idea, but my family was always
moved by it. It was the anthem of Piłsudski’s loyalists.

It seems I was born into a Piłsudskiite family. What this meant had no signiﬁ -

cance for me. Later I discovered it meant a great deal, but exactly what I have never
decided. Th

e purpose of writing this book is to explore the meaning of the symbols

and characters of my childhood to ﬁ nd answers that satisfy me and, I trust, will
prove of value to others for whom the history of Poland is a fascination.

is book is a radically revised version of a lecture presented at the Institute on

East Central Europe at Columbia University on November 18th, 2002. It is based,
in part, on research carried out—for a far diﬀ erent project—during 1998–99 as an
External Fellow of the Open Society Archives of the Central European University
in Budapest.

My research assistant then was Izabella Main of the Jagiellonian

University in Kraków. She has gone on to make her own contributions to a ﬁ eld
not far distant from the questions which intrigue me.

I should like to thank John Mićgiel of Columbia University for whom I ﬁ rst

prepared a draft of the original project; Piotr S. Wandycz of Yale; Anna M. Cienciała
of the University of Kansas; my colleague Jay Bergman, the younger brother I never
had, who read the manuscript and oﬀ ered his always sage comments, correcting
many minor slips and, more importantly, raising insightful questions about the
arguments. Among others, I should single out John P. Bermon who has provided

Quoted in Wanda Nowakowska, “3 Maja w lararskiej legendzie,” in Alina Barszczewska-Krupa,

ed., Konstytucja 3 maja w tradycji i kulturze polskiej (Łódź: Wydawnictwo łódzkie, 1991), 572 .

All references to material from this collection will henceforth be designated as OSA, CEU.

Preface

Independence Day: A Conﬂ icted History

November 11th, 1918, Polish Independence Day, is a curious anniversary whose
commemoration has been observed only intermittently in the last century. In fact,
the day—and the several symbols that rightly or wrongly have became associated
with it––have a rather convoluted history, ﬁ lled with tradition and myth, which
deserve our attention.

For, as Kazimiera Iłłakowiczówna lectured her countrymen,

a Pole must learn his “list of symbols.”

Between 1918 and 1939—during the Polish Second Republic—the 11th was

increasingly regarded as the principal patriotic anniversary in Poland, marking the
return of the country to the ranks of independent states after more than a century of
non-existence—the partition era, 1771–95, when Poland was occupied by Russia,
Austria, and Prussia-Germany. Only the observance of May 3rd, the day the abortive
constitution of 1791 was signed, was its rival. Th

at day, redolent with paradoxical

memories of a momentary ﬂ ash of victory in a sky of darkness, always had something
November 11th has never had: its own anthem, a lilting and nostalgic paean to lost
hopes.

Nonetheless, the importance of May 3rd, so symbolically important in the

nineteenth century, visibly faded after the re-establishment of independence.

In 1939, World War II interrupted this observation, and after 1945, the com-

munist authorities preferred to ignore the occasion. Indeed, they found the date
most unpleasant. Only since the re-establishment of a truly sovereign government

Some have speculated that national holidays in Poland have a diﬀ erent psycho-social function

than is the case in the West. In the latter case such days are truly national celebrations and hence joy-
ful; in Poland they are really remembrances of national martyrology and hence restrained, even
somber. See “11 listopada, czyli zapomniana duma,” Gazeta Krakowska , November 11, 2008. “Brakuje
nam radośnych świat,” Rzeczpospolita , November 10, 2006. Th

ere is also the speculation that Novem-

ber 11th has traditionally lacked an enthusiastic following in Poland because the weather in that
month is often unpleasant; c.f. the comments of the cultural anthropologist Mariola Flis in “Smutni
w święto?,” Dziennik Polski , November 12, 1998; a meteorological exegesis is provided in Zdzisław
Kościelak, “Smuta narodowa,” Wprost , 1042, November 17, 2002.

Danuta Zamojska-Hutchins, “Kazimiera Iłłakowiczówna: Th

e Poet as a Witness of History, and

of Double National Allegiance,” in Celia Hawkesworth, ed., Literature and Politics in Eastern Europe
(New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1992), 103 .

Witaj, majowa jutrzenko was written by Rajnold Sucholdolski in April 1831. Everything about

the song was—and is—sentimental. It appeared in the midst of an ill-fated uprising against the Rus-
sians (the November Rising, 1830–1831), it recalled the promise of the 1791 Constitution, and
whispered about the glories of old Poland, and the trials of the subsequent years.

See for example, Jerzy Kowecki, “Wstęp,” in his Sejm czteroletni i jego tradycje (Warsaw: Państwowe

Wydawnictwo Naukowe, 1991) , 5ﬀ . Even during the war, the Legion camp would note May 3rd in the
context of celebrating the Legions; see Barbara Wachowska, “Uroczystości trzeci majowe w sporach o
drogę do niepodległości w okresie I wojny światowej,” in Barszczewska-Krupa, Konstytucja 3 maja , 173.
May 3rd was already fading by 1918; see ibid., 178. For a devastating criticism of why the constitution
was a “conspicuous failure of imagination”, see Andrzej Walicki, “Intellectual Elites and the Vicissitudes
of “Imagined Nation” in Poland ,” East European Politics and Societies , 11 (1997), 239 .

Preface

in Warsaw in 1989 has November 11th regained its pre-1939 importance. Indeed,
the restoration of November 11th, 1918 is part of a larger phenomenon of resus-
citating and reconceptualizing the Polish Second Republic that was born on that
day, or at least so it was assumed. Th

is project goes hand in hand with how the

Polish People’s Republic (PRL)—communist Poland—can be integrated into the
national narrative. Contemporary Poland is not the Second Republic reincarnated,
and November 11th is not what it was more than ﬁ fty years earlier. What the func-
tion of November 11th is in today’s Poland is the question we shall consider in our
concluding remarks.

Indeed, Independence Day is really a history of responses to evolving historical

dilemmas confronting the modern Polish nation. In the initial years, 1918–26, it
provided an answer—but a controversial one—to the question of exactly when
and how Poland was re-created; which really asks which forces were responsible for
the state’s reappearance on the map and how they accomplished it. It is an inquiry
about whom or what deserves credit. Here Józef Piłsudski’s acolytes insisted that it
was their hero, and the legions he created and led, which were solely responsible
for the resurrection of the homeland. Others may have played a role, but they were
dispensable or at best incidental.

is interpretation was not without its rivals in the ﬁ rst years of independence.

Indeed, the political right oﬀ ered counter-narratives which competed with the
Piłsudski-legion symbol. Th

e success of these projects reﬂ ected the power Piłsudski

exercised in the new Poland. When Piłsudski retired from an active role in public
aﬀ airs after 1922, the celebration of November 11th became less important and
received no promotion from the government.

After 1926, however, Piłsudski returned to power, and in a far more dominating

way than ever before. As a result, Independence Day became synonymous with the
attempt to construct a new Poland—a project associated with Piłsudski and his
entourage, the so-called sanacja . Th

eir story was simple. Th

e authors of Poland were

Piłsudski and his followers in the World War I legions. It was this small but dedi-
cated group which, through sacriﬁ ce and in the face of obstacle and derision, had
brought Poland back to life. Th

ey represented a re-animation of forces in Polish

history—long dormant, yet very powerful—which galvanized the nation. No out-
side agencies deserved credit for Poland’s rebirth; it was an entirely national project.
Indeed, there was an eﬀ ort to invent a modern Poland in 1926 complete with new
symbols and values, a project which proved radically challenging to conservative
forces—a phenomenon Eva Plach has referred to as the “clash of moral nations.”

November 11th was the initiation ritual of modern Poland. Th

e years following

1926 saw Independence Day become ever larger, and more ancillary projects were
associated with it. Greater credit was invested in Piłsudski, and the Piłsudskiite
explanation of how Poland was reborn crowded out all other narratives. New symbols,
or perhaps, charitably, newly discovered symbols, multiplied to broaden and deepen
the nexus between November 11th and Piłsudski. Th

ere was another process at

Eva Plach, Th

e Clash of Moral Nations: Cultural Politics in Piłsudski’s Poland, 1926–1935 (Athens:

Ohio University Press, 2006) .

xii

Preface

work: November 11th meant a retrospective reconstruction of what Poland was,
and a projection of what it should be. It was a national philosophy.

During World War II, Independence Day served a dual function. In occupied

Poland, it was substantially a symbol of hope and deﬁ ance rather than a partisan
interpretation. To mark Independence Day meant to demonstrate the continued
existence of Poland despite German or Soviet domination. It was not necessarily a
celebration of the Piłsudski tradition—though the Piłsudskiites were its principal
acolytes—it was an assertion that the pre-invasion Poland endured. Hence, it was
a gesture of national unity.

However, amongst the Poles in exile, the day was radically divisive. To the

sanacja, in power when Poland was defeated in 1939, and now scattered about in
powerless and despondent exile, Independence Day meant the project they had
represented since 1918: it was Piłsudski and his faithful that had created and
shaped Poland.

is understanding was resented by the Polish government-in-exile, espe-

cially its dominating ﬁ gure, General Władysław Sikorski. It was they and not
the pre-1939 sanacja that created and led the exile government. Th

ey were

Poland’s future. Th

e Piłsudskiites were marginalized except in the army, where

they were a powerful force. To Sikorski, November 11th was unpleasantly,
unfortunately, and inextricably associated with his hated rival Piłsudski. It
could not be eliminated because that would leave Poland without a day to
celebrate its reappearance on the map. But the occasion could be ignored, or at
least obfuscated, and as far as possible purged of its Piłsudskiite connotations.
November 11th was a day of controversy: a nostalgic reminiscence for some,
an awkward problem for others.

No version of the pre-war or exile government returned to post-war Poland.

A new regime closely associated with the Soviet Union appeared instead. For them,
November 11th was a serious problem. It was indubitable that November 1918
marked the return of the Polish state to the map. But, in their eyes, the September
defeat inculpated the 1918–39 regime. It was a radically ﬂ awed Poland, which
really gained a hollow victory in 1918 and failed to re-create itself as a socialist state
with the correct geopolitical orientation. At worst, it was a fascist opponent of the
Soviet Union, and therefore the enemy of the Polish people. For this new regime—
the PRL—November 11th was a birthday best forgotten, and its symbol, Piłsudski,
was an opponent of communism in Poland and a foe of the Soviets. He was thus
opposed to the true interests of the Polish people. He, too, was to be consigned to
the category of the unremembered.

During the long years of communist rule, November 11th and its associated

symbols—Piłsudski, his legions, members of his entourage, his victory over the
Russians in 1920—were used by the anti-communist opposition to remind the
population of another, former free Poland. November 11th was a project designed
to oppose the regime. It was not a blueprint for how to rebuild Poland. It was a
symbol of opposition.

When Poland regained its independence in 1989, it quickly replaced July 22nd,

1944—when the so-called Lublin government was created at the behest of the

List of Abbreviations

Armia Krajowa (Polish Underground Army)

BBWR

Bezpartyjny Blok Współpracy z Rządem (Non-Partisan Bloc for
Support of the Government)

BDMP

Biuletyn Dzienny Ministerswtwa Publicznego (Daily Bulletins of the
Ministry of Public Security)

DZS

Dokumenty Życia Społecznego

endecja

Narodowa Demokracja (National Democrats)

FJN

Front Jedności Narodowej (National Unity Front)

GGC

Grudzińska Gross Collection

IKC

Illustrowany Kurjer Codzienny (Illustrated Daily Courier)

KIK

Klub(y) Inteligencji Polskiej (Club(s) of the Catholic Intelligentsia)

KNP

Komitet Narodowy Polski (Polish NationalCommittee)

KOR

Komitet Obrony Robotników (Workers’ Defense Committee)

KOS

Komitet Oporu Społecznego (Committee of Social Resistance)

KPN

Konfederacja Polski Niepodległej (Confederation of Independent Poland)

KRN

Krajowa Rada Narodowa (National Home Council)

KTSSN

Komisja Tymczasowa Skonfederowanych Stronnictw
Niepodległościowych (Temporary Coordinating Commission of
Confederated Independence Parties)

LPR

Liga Polskich Rodzin (League of Polish Families)

NKN

Naczelny Komitet Narodowny (Supreme National Committee)

OWP

Obóz Wielkiej Polski (Camp of Great Poland)

OZON

Obóz Zjednoczenia Narodowego (Camp of National Unity)

PDP

Polish Dissident Publications

PDP

Polish Dissident Publications

PDS

Polskie Drużyny Strzeleckie (Polish Riﬂ e Brigades)

PiS

Prawo i Sprawiedliwość (Law and Justice)

PKWN

Polski Komitet Wyzwolenia Narodowego (Committee of National
Liberation)

POW

Polska Organizacja Wojskowa (Polish Military Organization)

PPS

Polska Partia Socjalistyczna (Polish Socialist Party)

PRL

Polska Rzeczpospolita Ludowa (Polish People’s Republic)

PUP

Polish Underground Publications

ROPCiO

Ruch Obrony Praw Człowieka i Obywatela (Movement for the
Defense of Human and Civic Rights)

Stronnictwo Demokratyczne (Alliance of Democrats)

ZBOWiD Związek Bojowników o Wolność i Demokrację (Society of Fighters

for Freedom and Democracy)

ZPP

Związek Patriotów Polskich (Union of Polish Patriots)

ZSL

Zjednoczone Stronnictwo Ludowe (United Peasant Party)

ZWC

Związek Walki Czynnej (Union of Armed Struggle)

Introduction: Th

e Myths and Symbols

of Independence Day

S O L D I E R S A N D M A RT Y R S

Henryk Abczyński trekked through the steamy jungles of Paraná in Brazil, often
lost, perpetually confused. Day laborers from Brooklyn gamboled about the
farmland of the Hudson valley wearing preposterously mismatched uniforms;
children of Siberian exiles, eking out a marginal existence in Manchuria, assem-
bled in Harbin; superannuated romantics brandishing antique swords paraded
through provincial towns in Russia. All were responding to the inchoate yet
almost universal conviction of Polish patriots in 1914 that the formation of armed
units was an eﬃ

cacious, indeed necessary, means to the restoration of national

independence.

By the eve of World War I, this mania for military preparation, what we shall

call the legion movement, was so widespread that parties associated with both
the political Left and the nationalist Right, Poles supporting the war aims of the
Entente—England, France, and Russia—and those enrolling in the service of
the Central Powers, all regarded an army as a major element in their political
strategy. Several trends had coalesced to create this phenomenon, which had
deep roots in Polish political thought. Indeed, Tomasz Nałęcz has argued that
the basic division among Poles then was between those who accepted a reality
without a free Poland and those contemplating armed opposition, and that this
dichotomy had been implicit since the partition era of the late eighteenth cen-
tury when Poland was obliterated.

e Poles had a famous precedent for the later legion movement in the anti-

Russian Kościuszko Rising of 1794 (which sought to oppose the ﬁ nal annihilating
partition) and the immediately following Napoleonic era during which several
thousand Poles formed legions and joined the Corsican’s ranks—playing a distin-
guished, albeit minor, role in several of Napoleon’s military exploits. Of course,
Napoleon was defeated, and Polish eﬀ orts tied to him suﬀ ered accordingly. Th

military heroics of the Napoleonic years, along with the vain attempts to resist
the partitions associated with Kościuszko, and even the bloody and bitter failure of

is chapter is, in part, a radically modiﬁ ed version of my essay “Th

e Militarization of the Dis-

course of Polish Politics and the Legion Movement of the First World War,” in David Stefancic, ed.,
Armies in Exile (New York: Columbia University Press, 2005), 71–101.

See Tomasz Nałęcz, Irredenta polska (Warsaw: Książka i Wiedza, 1992), 10ﬀ .

Independence Day

the November Rising of 1830–31 composed a chapter of paradoxical signiﬁ cance
to the Poles. Th

e military eﬀ orts failed, despite great devotion and sacriﬁ ce, and

brought the country no gain and much loss. However, since this generation of
martial bravado coincided with or immediately preceded the Polish Romantic
movement, with its exaltation of patriotic devotion, the result was the creation of
a cult of Polish patriotism that sanctiﬁ ed such sacriﬁ ces. Th

e military exploits of

1794–1831 were quickly mythologized into a deﬁ ning component of a national
tradition. Th

e fact that the Polish national anthem is essentially a song of the

legion movement of the Napoleonic era is only the best known reﬂ ection of this.
It associates national liberation with legions, and equates patriotism with military
volunteerism.

“As history teaches,” notes a contemporary historian, “it is not dif-

ﬁ cult to raise cavalry in Poland.”

e Romantic tradition, in which things military bulked so large, produced no

solution to Poland’s dilemma and, in the course of the nineteenth century, was
abandoned. After the abortive risings in 1846, the seeming ineﬃ

cacy of the wide-

spread revolutionary eﬀ orts of 1848, and especially following the failure of the
1863–64 January Insurrection against Russia, Polish political speculation came to
regard martial shibboleths as inappropriate if not suicidal. Th

e gradual integration

of Polish lands into the partitioning states, the revolutionary transformation of
Polish society with the rise of industry, the end of serfdom, the rapid growth of
urbanization, and the emergence of clamorous nationalisms among the minority
populations of the pre-partition Polish Commonwealth, all combined to make the
Romantic military tradition appear irrelevant to Polish realities. Whereas images
and motifs of Polish martial eﬀ orts remained in the national memory, they had
become the stuﬀ of lore and sentiment, not the basis for thought about Polish pos-
sibilities. In their stead, we see more practical programs, eschewing armed struggle,
or even politics altogether, in favor of prosaic socioeconomic improvement: what is
known as the “organic work” movement—a Polish version of positivism, a kind of
preservation of the national energy in the face of challenges. Th

is “Realism” speciﬁ -

cally rejected the military-insurrectionary tradition as a pre-modern distraction.

However, late in the nineteenth century we may note a transformation: the mili-

tarization of the discourse of Polish politics.

Gradually, Polish political thought

began to adopt a number of characteristics of which the following are particularly
noteworthy: an emphasis on the possibility of armed action which, in turn, reﬂ ected
the increasing conviction that war was likely in Europe and the Poles must antici-
pate its consequences; a reconsideration of the January Insurrection, not as a

e “legion myth” in Polish political and literary discourse begins with the national anthem; see

Jacek Kolbuszewski, “Rola literatury w kształtowaniu polskich mitów politycznych XIX i XX wieku,”
in Wojciech Wrzesiński, ed., Polskie mity polityczne XIX i XX wieku ( Wrocław: Ossolineum, 1994), 54
n. 62.

Witold Dworzyński, Wieniawa: Poeta, żołnierz, dyplomata (Warsaw: Wydawnictwa szkolne i

pedagogiczne, 1993), 91.

I have argued for this terminology in “Th

e Militarization of the Discourse.” Stanisław Czerep claims

that the ﬁ rst re-appearance of the military-insurrectionist motif in Polish politics after the failed Janu-
ary Rising was in the 1886 work by Zygmunt Miłkowski, Rzecz o obronie czynnej i skarbie narodowym;
see Stanislaw Czerep’s II Brygada Legionów Polskich (Warsaw: Bellona, 1991), 11.

Introduction: Myths and Symbols

national disaster but as a source for practical lessons in mass mobilization and mili-
tary tactics; and a conscious eﬀ ort to ﬁ nd a solution to the disintegrating eﬀ ect of
modern political programs whose class basis stressed themes that split Poles along
socioeconomic lines.

ese changes in theme and emphasis reﬂ ected—and were stimulated by—the

larger changes in Polish culture, the late-nineteenth-century’s “neo-Romanticism,”
including the renewed emphasis on Poland’s martial glories. Th

e latter can be seen

in everything from the battle canvases of Jan Matejko— Batory at Psków, Prussian
Homage, Kościuszko’s Oath —to Wojciech Kossak, Józef Chełmoński, Jan Styka, and
the mystical Jan Grottger. In belles-lettres , positivism was in decline, being eclipsed
by the derring-do of the Sienkiewicz “Trilogy,” the stories of Wacław Gąsiorowski,
the deﬁ ant chant-like Rota of Maria Konopnicka, and the revival of interest in the
poet Juliusz Słowacki. Th

ere were also manifestations of popular culture, such as

the widespread circulation of the “Polish Catechism” which, in childish language,
encouraged Polish youth to regard sacriﬁ ce and death in the Polish cause as enno-
bling. Even in historiography, the “optimistic” Warsaw school of Polish historical
analysis emerged in opposition to the Kraków school’s critical pessimism.

Inextricably associated with the military tradition is the martyrological under-

standing of Polish history: Poland as victim of the cruelty of history and Polish
patriots as sacriﬁ cial suﬀ erers. Poland became a perfect lost cause, and its propo-
nents martyrs. Th

is conception is best illustrated by the canvases of Jacek Malczewski

with his many representations of Polish soldiers juxtaposed with religious symbol-
ism.

In one canvas, historic ﬁ gures and symbols in Polish history are drawn into a

consuming vortex. Th

e military tradition thus was to be understood as a legion of

martyrs: always appearing, always suﬀ ering defeat, yet reappearing once again. Th

solution to this pathos is a providential ﬁ gure that will restore Poland to its rightful
place by ending the tragic circle of sacriﬁ ce. Th

is hero legend introduces an ele-

ment of charisma into the lexicon of Polish politics: a ﬁ gure that will transcend the
present and represent tradition, a messianic politics that Tadeusz Biernat refers to
as “mythic sacralization” [sakralizacja mityczna].

rough legend, paraphrasing

Biernat, that ﬁ gure is rendered into concrete form, “personalized.” In the form of
political leadership, it is sacralized, separating it from reality which, by comparison,
is “profane.”

Particularly signiﬁ cant is the commemoration movement in which great ﬁ gures

and events in Polish history served as moments of national celebration and solidarity.

Of these perhaps the most signiﬁ cant is the appearance of the Kościuszko cult,

Roman Wapiński, Pokolenia Drugiej Rzeczypospolitej (Wroclaw: Ossolineum, 1991), 101.

An example is “Nike Legionów,” which Małczewski painted in 1916. It portrays a Legionnaire

dead at the feet of Nike whose wings appear to resemble those of the Polish eagle. Her expression is
beneﬁ cent. Th

is work hangs in the National Museum [Muzeum narodowe] in Kraków. Nike is the

goddess of victory, and death in the Polish cause is portrayed as triumph.

e charismatic element in Polish politics is discussed in Tadeusz Biernat, Józef Piłsudski–Lech

Wałęsa: Paradoks charyzmaycznego przywodztwa . (Toruń: Adam Marszałek, 2000), 103 et passim.

Ibid. , 119.

A valuable discussion of this theme is Patrice M. Dabrowski, Commemorations and the Shaping

of Modern Poland (Bloomington: University of Indiana Press, 2004).

Independence Day

which many regarded as a symbol of the very notion of armed insurrection, a kind
of insurrectionary talisman, which began to appear in the late nineteenth century.
Kościuszko, whose military exploits were closely associated with a radical demo-
cratic program, was an ideal symbol of a new—or rather re-emergent—political
tradition which combines the mobilization of the masses and the emphasis on
armed action. In other words, Kościuszko became the perfect symbol for a new
military politics, a charismatic ﬁ gure.

J Ó Z E F P I Ł S U D S K I A N D T H E M I L I TA R I Z AT I O N

O F P O L I S H P O L I T I C S

For reasons both symbolic and practical, we may consider the evolution of the
career of Józef Piłsudski (1867–1935) in this context. Indeed, Piłsudski so epito-
mized the militarization of Polish politics in the era that it is tempting to regard
him as having caused the process rather than merely reﬂ ecting it: he “personally
revived the insurrectionary myth.”

Piłsudski, one of the founders of the Polish

Socialist Party [ Polska Partia Socjalistyczna , PPS, spent his early life as a publicist,
labor agitator, and conspirator. However, in the early years of the twentieth cen-
tury, he began a transformation into an essentially military ﬁ gure, stressing organ-
ization and careful preparation for what were insurrectionary goals. With this shift
from underground socialist to military politics, Piłsudski perforce adopted a diﬀ er-
ent set of referents in his political writings. Because of the centrality of the gentry
[ szlachta ] to the Polish military tradition—Piłsudski himself was a nobleman—his
evocation of Poland’s military past increasingly dropped the theme of class antago-
nism characteristic of socialist discourse, and emphasized supra-class, all-national
goals. He essentially appropriated the gentry tradition of acting for the nation,
along with its martial features. Th

e military replaced the working classes as the

engine of history, the battle replaced the strike, the trained oﬃ

cer the conspirator,

and eventually the Polish legions replaced the Polish Socialist Party as the fulcrum
to reassert Poland’s case for independence.

Piłsudski became fascinated with military problems, particularly the January

Rising, which he studied intensively and to which he devoted a number of works.
He regarded the insurgents of 1863 as the “last soldiers of Poland,” whose sacriﬁ ce
and devotion, in impossible circumstances, he regarded as the ideal model for the
Polish army.

By his own words, Piłsudski became a self-taught soldier. Th

at he

Andrew A. Michta credits Piłsudski’s “military vision” with the very creation of a free Poland in

1918; see his Th

e Soldier-Citizen: Th

e Politics of the Polish Army after Communism (New York: Palgrave

Macmillan, 1997), 24–5.

Piłsudski in fact reverted to his origins in this transformation. He was the scion of a gentry family

deeply involved in the insurrectionary tradition. His youthful socialism substituted the proletariat for
the gentry, and the strike for the battle. By the end of the nineteenth century Piłsudski essentially
reverted to the traditional nomenclature.

See Piłsudski’s order to the army on January 21st, 1919 in Z. Zygmuntowicz, ed., Józef Piłsudski

o sobie (Warsaw-Lwów: Panteon Polski, [1929] 1989), 107.

Introduction: Myths and Symbols

increasingly viewed Polish politics in military terms is clear, but why he did so
requires closer consideration.

Piłsudski had always been sensitive to the divisive nature of socialism, which

pitted the Polish proletariat against other classes. Th

e eﬀ ort, by the so-called patri-

otic wing of the socialist movement to which Piłsudski belonged, to combine
national independence as a co-equal goal with socialist transformation was ideo-
logically awkward—a fact underscored by their more logically consistent rivals on
the Marxist Left. Hence, Piłsudski was long in search of a solution to his dilemma,
something that would rally rather than divide Polish ranks whilst maintaining a
vigorous attack against tsarist oppression, economic and otherwise. Th

is he found

in a military discourse rooted in re-application of the martial-insurrectionary tradi-
tion. Th

is would not so much solve the class struggle as transcend it, or at least

ignore it, by postponing it to a later issue after national independence had been
achieved.

Piłsudski made minimal changes in the structure of his program: a tightly knit

conspiratorial band became a disciplined military cadre, and the revolutionaries’
combat against tsarist gendarmerie became the soldier’s tactical exercise; but what
most remained the same was the leadership structure: hierarchy, loyalty, and discre-
tionary authority in the hands of the leader—merely transformed from party
chairman to commander. Th

e soldier was to be an example of sacriﬁ ce for Poland,

just as the earlier Piłsudski had regarded socialists as “a group of apostles” bearing
witness to a larger good.

Religious references in the service of political programs

had a long tradition in Poland, and would later become intertwined with the cult
of Piłsudski and his devotees.

Piłsudski reiﬁ ed a larger reality of Polish life that was essentially a reconsidera-

tion of the eﬃ

cacy of military struggle and a reconsideration of the essential value

of armed action. Th

e former was prompted by the widespread conviction that war

was imminent in Europe; the latter by the re-emergence of a new generation of
Poles, impatient with the prosaic passivity of organic work and no longer crushed
by the realization of the sacriﬁ ces implied in armed action—a generation that had
forgotten the depression of post-1864 but retained the nostalgic aﬀ ection for the
traditions of an earlier age.

ose who reached maturity in the ﬁ rst decade of the

twentieth century constituted what Roman Wapiński has called the “turning-point
generation.”

Andrzej Chwałba , Sacrum i rewolucja: Socjaliści polscy wobec praktyk i symboli religijnych

(1870–1918) (Kraków: Universitas, 1992), 128–30.

Regarding the combining of independence politics and religious symbol and tradition, see Jan

Prokop, “Polak cierpiący (z dziejów sterotypu),” in Maria Bobrownicka, ed., Mity narodowe w literatu-
rach słowiańskich (Kraków: Uniwersytet Jagielloński, 1992), 83. Th

ere is a lengthy discussion of the

Piłsudski “cult” tracing its origins to World War I in Heidi Hein-Kircher, Kult Piłsudskiego i jego zna-
czenie dla państwa polskiego 1926–1939 (Warsaw: Neriton, 2008), 11–24.

is generational element and its relationship to the January Rising are noted in Stanislaw Jan

Rostworowski’s introductory remarks to Nie tylko Pierwsza Brygada , 3 vols. (Warsaw: P. W. Egross,
1993), I, 9.

Wapiński, Pokolenia Drugiej Rzeczypospolitej , 179.

Independence Day

e new cultural and political motifs also reﬂ ected the democratization of Polish

politics in the late nineteenth century, resting on the emancipation of the serfs and
their gradual evolution into conscious citizens, rapid industrialization and urban-
ization, an increasing politically conscious proletariat, and even a quickening pace
amongst the notoriously inert peasantry.

is fundamental transformation of

Polish realities brought potentially new forces—the masses—into Polish post-1864
politics, which made new strategies not only possible but necessary. Th

e response

was a movement among the intelligentsia—largely of gentry origin—to choose a
martial option to express their political hopes: so-called “irredentism.” It is signiﬁ -
cant that the Polish legions of World War I were reckoned “the most intelligentsia
army in the world.”

It is not an exaggeration to say that the oﬃ

cer corps of the

future Polish army was essentially the gentry-intelligentsia playing soldier.

e increasing militarization of Polish politics eﬀ ected far more than the irreden-

tists of Piłsudskiite camp, but as well was visible amongst the nationalist Right—the
intellectual heirs of Realism—the so-called endecja (a term derived from the ﬁ rst let-
ters of its Polish name Narodowa Demokracja ). Moreover, military eﬀ orts, however
broadly deﬁ ned, were characteristic of Polish politics worldwide. Indeed, the fact
that, by World War I, virtually all Polish factions tried to create some military force,
reﬂ ects the degree to which the notion of military formations as political means had
spread throughout Polish thought in the preceding decades. Memoir literature rep-
resenting all political views notes the extraordinary appeal of military symbols,
motifs, and lore among the Polish youth at the turn of the twentieth century.

e Russo-Japanese war of 1904–05, and the revolution within the Russian

Empire, including Russian Poland, furnished both the opportunity and the neces-
sity for Piłsudski to transform himself from revolutionary socialist to military com-
mander. In a well-known episode, Piłsudski traveled to Japan to try and convince
the Imperial General Staﬀ to create, from amongst Russian POWs of Polish nation-
ality, a military force—which Piłsudski referred to speciﬁ cally as a “legion”—to be
used against Russia.

is was the ﬁ rst time that he attempted to address the

“Polish Question” in essentially military terms.

Michał Śliwa, Polska myśl polityczna w I połowie XX wieku (Wrocław: Ossolineum, 1993), 56ﬀ .

is is a problematical translation of the Polish “najinteligentniejsza armia świata”; see

Dworzyński, Wieniawa , 38.

e oﬃ

cer corps of inter-war Poland were overwhelmingly drawn from the intelligentsia of

gentry origin: see M. B. B. Biskupski, “Th

e Military Elite of the Polish Second Republic, 1918–1945:

A Historiographical Survey,” War & Society , 14(2) (October, 1996), 53ﬀ .  We should note Rothschild’s
reference to the legionnaires being sociologically “uniformed members of the intelligentsia”; see  Joseph
Rothschild, Piłsudski’s Coup d’Etat  (New York: Columbia University Press, 1966) ,   101–2.

For example, Marian Żegota-Januszajtis, an opponent of Piłsudski on the political right, remembers

his youthful classmates in Częstochowa as extraordinarily martial; ﬁ ve of his classmates eventually became
generals: see his Życie moje tak burzliwe . . . : Wspomnienia i dokumenty (Warsaw: BIS Press, 1993), 68.

Regarding this episode, see Janusz Wojtasik, Idea walki zbrojnej o niepodległość Polski 1864–1907

(Warsaw: MON, 1986), 162ﬀ  . A copy of the memorandum Piłsudski prepared for the Japanese
can be found in  Wacław Jędrzejewicz, Sprawa “Wieczoru”: Józef Piłsudski a wojna rosyjsko-japońska,
1904–1905  (Paris: Instytut Literacki, 1974), 46.

Piłsudski’s career as a military historian—in which he showed considerable talent—began in

1904; see Andrzej Chwałba, Józef Piłsudski historyk wojskowości  (Kraków: Universitas, 1993), 186 ; cf.
the remarks of Marceli Handelsman in “Józef Piłsudski jako historyk,” in Idea i czyn Józefa Piłsudskiego
(Warsaw: Bibljoteka dzieł naukowych, [1934] 1991), 205–19.  Handelsman credits Piłsudski with
demonstrating an interest in “social-psychology,” which characterized his own writings.

Introduction: Myths and Symbols

C R E AT I N G A P O L I S H A R M Y

e failure of the revolution of 1905 to bring independence to Poland had a pro-

found eﬀ ect on Piłsudski. His “Fighting Organization”—described as “the ﬁ rst
attempt by Polish socialists to introduce armed force in their activities and
tactics”—was extraordinarily active in 1905–06, its more than 5,000 members car-
rying out hundreds of armed actions against the tsarist authorities.

All were in

vain: a revolutionary conspiracy, without some connection with international poli-
tics, could not restore Polish freedom. Piłsudski realized the political strategy he
had pursued for a generation was ultimately bootless.

We may regard the “Fight-

ing Organization,” in both form and conception, as a transition stage from revolu-
tionary to military politics.

After 1905, Piłsudski’s closest colleagues noted that in his thinking, his manner,

even his vocabulary, war and soldiering dominated. In 1906, the PPS split and
Piłsudski along with his adherents in the “Revolutionary Fraction” re-centered
their activities from Russian Poland to more indulgent Austrian Poland. Almost
immediately Piłsudski made contact with the Austrian authorities to gain their
approval for Polish paramilitary activities on Habsburg territory. Th

e foundations

for the legions were being laid.

In 1908 the secret Union of Armed Struggle

[Związek Walki Czynnej, or ZWC], the nucleus of a future Polish army, was estab-
lished.

e staﬀ of this Lilliputian force were the socialist agitators of a few years

earlier now re-clad in military tunics.

e ZWC represented two trends in Piłsudski’s thought. Th

e ﬁ rst was the evolu-

tion from the sporadic revolutionary actions characteristic of the PPS years in favor
of careful preparation for a larger armed action, a true insurrection.

e second

was Piłsudski’s insistence that Polish political strategy must be all-national, and not
class or ideologically speciﬁ c.

In 1912, Piłsudski created a central repository to

Zygmunt Zygmuntowicz, Józef Piłsudski we Lwowie (Lwów: Tow. Miłośników Przeszłości, 1934),

10 n. 3.

e consequences of the failed revolution of 1905 on Piłsudski’s political strategy are well pre-

sented in Andrzej Friszke, O kształt niepodległej (Warsaw: Biblioteka Więzi, 1989), 44–8.

Regarding the combination of the revolutionary events of 1904–06 and the failure of his Japa-

nese mission on the formulation of Piłsudski’s thought in favor of preparation for a mass military
eﬀ ort, see Mieczysław Wrzosek, “Problem zbrojnego powstania Polskiego w 1914 r. w świetle doku-
mentów austro-węgierskiego Ministerstwa Spraw Zagranicznych,” in Studia i Materiały do Historii
Wojskowości , 32 (1990), 273–4.

Leon Wasilewski, Józef Piłsudski jakim go znałem (Warsaw: Rój, 1935), 90.

For the evolution from the ZWC to the legions see the memoir account in Bogusław Kunc, “Od

Związku Walki Czynnej do Strzełca (1909–1914),” Niepodległość , 3(1) (1930), 118ﬀ .

Signiﬁ cantly, the Organizacja Bojowa disbanded shortly after the creation of the ZWC which, in

large part, was the next stage in its evolution. Th

e ZWC represented a break with the socialist past,

which was characterized by anti-militarism; see

Stanisław Skwarczyński, “Twórca awangardy:

Dzialałność Józefa Piłsudskiego, 1893–1918,” Niepodległość, 7 (1962), 160 ; cf. Nałęcz, Irredenta pol-
ska , 132–9, 162.

Piłsudski’s movement away from support for continuous revolutionary activities in favor of

preparation, husbanding of resources, and training of cadres is succinctly traced in Władysław Pobóg-
Malinowski, “W ogniu rewolucji (1904–1908),” in Wacław Sieroszewski et al, eds., Idea i czyn Józefa
Piłsudskiego (Warsaw: Bibljoteka Dzieł Naukowych, 1934), 154–69 ; Nałęcz , Irredenta , 191–3.

See the arguments of Michał Sokolnicki, referenced in Nałęcz, Irredenta , 192–3; cf. Andrzej

Garlicki, “Spóry o niepodległość,” in Andrzej Garlicki, ed., Rok 1918: tradycje i oczekiwania (Warsaw:

Independence Day

collect money for Polish political eﬀ orts. Signiﬁ cantly, this “Polish Military Treas-
ury” ( Polski Skarb Wojskowy ) was essentially a fund for the preparation of large-
scale military eﬀ orts.

By 1912, the ZWC had gained control over a number of legal so-called riﬂ emen’s

associations [ Związki Strzeleckie ], which had formed throughout Austrian Poland
as well as within Polish colonies in Western Europe, which, in aggregate, had about
7,500 members.

It was not the only organization of its type. Th

e Right had its

own paramilitary force, of which the Falcons—the international Polish gymnastics
and paramilitary society, where endecja views were dominant—had almost 7,000
adherents in about 150 detachments. Th

ese men were drilled by Poles who had

served in the Austrian army, like Zygmunt Zieliński and Józef Haller, both of
whom were later generals in Polish service.

Supposedly non-party, but also eﬀ ec-

tively under endecja inﬂ uence, were the peasant-based military formations called
the Bartosz’s Brigades [ Drużyny Bartoszowe] , which also numbered about 7,000
men in a few hundred scattered units.

Feliks Młynarski was the central ﬁ gure in yet another series of paramilitary for-

mations associated with students, the Polish Riﬂ e Brigades [ Polskie Drużyny
Strzeleckie , or PDS]. Th

e PDS, which numbered perhaps 6,000 and had about

4,000 additional members in auxiliary scouting detachments, was independent of
both the Piłsudskiite ZWC coalition and the political Right. Indeed, virtually
every Polish political faction had its military wing, and voices that rejected at least
the potential eﬃ

cacy of armed struggle were conspicuous by their absence. In 1912

a rudimentary eﬀ ort to unite this complicated assortment of paramilitary organiza-
tions was the formation of the Temporary Coordinating Commission of Confed-
erated Independence Parties [ Komisja Tymczasowa Skonfederowanych Stronnictw
Niepodległościowych, or KTSSN], but the Falcons and the peasant units, essentially
the armed forces of the endecja, refused to cooperate, and the KTSSN never really
consolidated itself.

Nonetheless, the fact that Piłsudski was named commandant

Czytelnik, 1978), 14 . Similarly, the right also attempted to ﬁ nd formulae to unite the national com-
munity for renewed struggle. National unity as the essential project of national democracy after 1895
is discussed in  Władysław Koniczny, “Formowanie i umacnianie świadomości narodowej jako elemen-
tarne zadanie polityczne Narodowej Demokracji na przełomie XIX i XX wieku,” in Studia Historyczne ,
32(4) (1989), 545–58.  It is characteristic of the evolution of Piłsudski’s thought that the ZWC,
though at ﬁ rst dominated by members of the “Organizacja Bojowa,” quickly transformed itself by
opening its membership to non-socialist reﬂ ection, the supra-factional basis of its goals; see Julian
Woyszwiłło, Józef Piłsudski: Życie, idee i czyny: 1867–1935  (Warsaw: Biblioteka Polska, 1937), 60–1 .
Nałęcz writes that the Piłsudskiites adopted “patriotic-national phraseology,” the “God–fatherland”
vocabulary; see Nałęcz, Irredenta ,  327.

Wanda Kiędrzyńska, “Wpływy i zasoby Polskiego Skarbu Wojskowego,” Niepodległość , 13(3)

(1936), 383.

is ﬁ gure does not include members in Russian Poland; Czerep, II Brygada , 14.

Ibid., 12–13.

Ibid. , 13–14. Th

e name “Bartosz” recalls the peasant of that name who distinguished himself at

the famous Polish victory over the Russians at Racławice in 1794. Kościuszko ennobled Bartosz on the
ﬁ eld for his service, thus symbolically including the peasantry in the forefront of the national cause.

Andrzej Garlicki’s, Geneza legionów: Zarys dziejów Komisji Tymczasowej Skonfederowanych Stron-

nictw Niepodległościowych (Warsaw: Książka i Wiedza, 1964) is the standard history of the organization
but, like all his works, it is marred by inveterate hostility to Piłsudski.

Introduction: Myths and Symbols

of the combined KTSSN forces indicates clearly that he had become the dominant
ﬁ gure in Polish military politics by the eve of the war.

When hostilities erupted in 1914, these several paramilitary units were com-

bined, including a ceremonial amalgamation of the Związki Strzelecki and the
Drużyny —into the “Polish Legions” which fought under the overall Austrian com-
mand. In order to bring the legions into being, the myriad and mutually antago-
nistic Polish political factions in Austrian Poland had to agree to a uniﬁ ed
eﬀ ort, which was epitomized by the creation of the Supreme National Committee
[ Naczelny Komitet Narodowy , or NKN]. Indeed, we may say that the legions created
Polish political unity, however short-lived.

Piłsudski, who had led the largest fac-

tion, was regarded as the commander presumptive of a future Polish army. Signiﬁ -
cantly, Piłsudski created another, secret army, alongside the legions—the “Polish
Military Organization” [ Polska Organizacja Wojskowa, or POW]—which began
with a mere few hundred, but gave him another military card to play, and, in the
increasingly complex world of Polish politics, a surreptitious one under his exclu-
sive control.

On August 6th, 1914, the ﬁ rst elements of the 1st Brigade of the Legions

marched out of Kraków in Galicia, crossed the partition frontier into Russian
Poland, and became the ﬁ rst Polish army in generations to take the ﬁ eld. August
6th, 1914 was the birth of the legions: the origin of the modern Polish army. It
would not be forgotten.

Piłsudski quickly became synonymous with the martial approach to the Polish

Question, a kind of re-animated General Jan Henryk Dąbrowski of Napoleonic
fame, picking up the fallen banner unfurled against the hated Muscovite.

eﬀ ort was made to link Piłsudski with Kościuszko as the noble democrat leading
the common people, united and armed, thus re-knitting the continuity of the
irredentist tradition.

Janusz Pajewski argued that Piłsudski’s historical resonance

was even deeper: he was the “last nobleman in the history of Poland” again taking
the ﬁ eld.

e socialist politician, Ignacy Daszyński, grasped this early in the war

when he noted that:

the sympathy of the Polish masses for Piłsudski grew more and more. He became a
national hero far above all other Polish politicians of whatever camp, and his renown
obscured the names of all other Poles.

Piłsudski’s popularity derived from the appropriateness of this metaphor at a cer-
tain moment in Polish history. He remarked, quite dispassionately, in late 1915:

Nałęcz, Irredenta , 239.

Józef Buszko, “Sytuacja polityczna w Galicji (1914–1918),” in Michał Pułaski, ed., W 70-lecie

odzyskania niepodległości przez Polskę, 1918–1988 (Kraków: Uniwersytet Jagielloński, 1991), 51–2.

Jan Henryk Dąbrowski, 1755–1818, fought with distinction in the Kościuszko Rising and later

became famous as the organizer of the Polish legions who fought with Napoleon. His name is promi-
nently featured in the Polish national anthem.

As Wieniawa-Długoszowski remarked, “the Commandant [Piłsudski] is the personiﬁ cation of

the Kościuszko tradition”; see Roman Loth, ed., Bolesław Wieniawa-Długoszowski, Wymarsz i inne
wspomnienia (Warsaw: Biblioteka Więzi, 1992), 88.

Quoted in Biernat, Paradoks , 158.

Independence Day

“I shall be the model of a patriot and the spiritual leader of the nation.”

In an

important letter of 1908, Piłsudski summarized his political credo: “I want to
win.”

Piłsudski was always impatient with Poland’s fascination with defeat and

sacriﬁ ce, which he wanted to replace by conﬁ dence. Piłsudski’s brooding over the
damage done to the Polish psyche by long years of subjugation had as its antidote
a new tradition: he would be the providential ﬁ gure who would furnish it the
symbol of victory.

Writing in 1985, Piotr Wierzbicki noted that Piłsudski was

the “last Pole of whom it might be said he won all his battles.” He became the
model of Poland triumphant.

Here we see Piłsudski as the fulﬁ llment of the writ-

ings of the neo-Romantic “Young Poland” movement—Piłsudski was the “charis-
matic leader.”

As Nałęcz aptly phrased it, “all of Young Poland prepared the basis

under the myth of the Commandant.

Piłsudski was proﬁ ting from the “messianic

myth” in Polish Romantic thought. He was the salvational personage.

e legions never exceeded 25–30,000 men. However, their exploits gave them

iconic status to Poles both during the war and later during the years of independ-
ence. What the legions were is far less important than what they symbolized. Th

legions were in essence a speciﬁ c response to Poland’s historic dilemma and a para-
digm for the future Polish army and, indeed, state. Th

ey were, or were purported

to be, a founding myth for the creation of modern Poland. Th

ey were part of the

“mythic sacrilization” of Polish politics.

e legions had a brief career. In the ﬁ rst two years of the war they fought a

number of successful actions against the Russians and became famous for their
bravado and military eﬀ ectiveness. Th

ey suﬀ ered stupendous casualties. Th

e ﬁ rst

action of the legions in Russian Poland confronted little resistance and resulted in
the capture of Kielce. Th

ey later participated in the Austrian thrust toward War-

saw, which met with a reverse and they were forced to withdraw to Kraków under
very diﬃ

cult conditions in the fall of the year. Th

e largest battle of 1914 was that

of Łowczówek near Nowy Sącz in December, covering competently the Austrian
withdrawal. Th

ey suﬀ ered 50 percent casualties in a series of bloody encounters but

won considerable praise for their eﬀ orts at screening Austrian maneuvers.

Quoted in Loth, Wymarsz, 89.

Biernat quotes from a September 1908 letter from Piłsudski to Feliks Perl., in Paradoks , 84.

Włodzimierz Suleja, “Myśl polityczna Piłsudczykow a tworczość Juliusza Kadena-Bandrowskiego,” in

Henryk Zieliński, ed., W kręgu tworców myśli politycznej (Wrocław: Ossolineum, 1983), 286–7 285. Th

made Piłsudski a fascinating exception to what Miciński described as the Poles’ “eternal loyalty to the lost
cause.” See Miciński quoted in Rett R. Ludwikowski, Continuity and Change in Poland: Conservatism in
Polish Political Th

ought (Washington, D.C.: Catholic University Press, 1991), 177 . Piłsudski represented a tradi-

tion not of the defeated insurrection over which one broods, but an incipient insurrection that is approached
with hope. Cf. Waldemar Paruch, “Kreowanie legendy Józefa Piłsudskiego w Drugiej Rzeczypospolitej—
wybrane aspekty,” in Marek Jabłonowski and Elżbieta Kossewska, eds., Piłsudski na łamach i w opiniach prasy
polskiej, 1918–1989 (Warsaw: Instytut Dziennikarstwa Uniwersytetu Warszawskiego, 2005), 59.

Piotr Wierzbicki, Myśli staroświeckiego Polaka

(London: Puls, 1985), 83.

An underground

Piłsudskiite journal in occupied Warsaw commented in 1943: “In the last era we Poles have had only
one victorious leader. It was Józef Piłsudski.” See Marek Gałęzowski, Wierni Polsce; Ludzie konspiracji
piłsudczykowskiej 1939–1947  (Warsaw: LTW: 2005),   Vol. II: piłsudczykowska w kraju 1940–1946.
(Warsaw: LTW, 2007), 568–9.  By contrast, Micewski labels all Piłsudski’s political actions “ﬁ ascos”;
see Andrzej Micewski, W cieniu Marszałka Piłsudskiego  (Warsaw: Czytelnik, 1969) ,   33.

Biernat, Paradoks , 114.

Nałęcz, Irredenta , 225.

Biernat, Paradoks , 103.

Nałęcz, Irredenta , 260.

Introduction: Myths and Symbols

In 1915, the legions participated in the large Austro-German oﬀ ensive on Warsaw.

On May 16th, they fought an action at Konary against far superior Russian forces,
and another celebrated action at Kostiuchnówka in Wołyń, where 5,000 legion-
naires defended an exposed position against 13,000 Russians. Th

is one encounter

resulted in 40 percent casualties but allowed the Austrians to escape. It was the
most famous legion battle. Later actions included signiﬁ cant battles at Krechowce
and Rarańcza. All in all, the legions gained a reputation as soldiers unusually able
to hold diﬃ

cult positions, full of courage in oﬀ ensive actions, and suicidally self-

sacriﬁ cing.

However, Piłsudski became increasingly frustrated at what he regarded as

Vienna’s unwillingness to respond to Polish political aims in return for military
eﬀ orts. As a result, he opposed the numerical expansion of the legions without
concrete political concessions, and decided to resign in protest. His Polish political
opponents—notably Władysław Sikorski—who later led Poland’s government in
exile during World War II—held a rather more optimistic view of Polish capacities
to leverage concessions from the Central Powers. Th

is factional ﬁ ghting paralyzed

the legions.

By 1916, the German-Austrian victories forced the Russians out of much of

historic Poland, and the Central Powers proclaimed the existence of a restored
Polish Kingdom (the Two Emperors’ Manifesto of November 5th, 1916). Although
Piłsudski emerged as the most signiﬁ cant ﬁ gure in the Polish pseudo-government
created by the Central Powers, this did not result in a resuscitation of the legions.
Again Piłsudski concluded that no signiﬁ cant gains were to be had from Polish
manpower contributions.

In the summer of 1917, Piłsudski was arrested in War-

saw by the Germans, and incarcerated at Magdeburg. Th

e bulk of the legionnaires,

at his orders, refused to take an oath of allegiance to the Central Powers.

spent the rest of the war interned or dispersed to other fronts. Th

is was the sudden

end to the three-year history of the legion movement.

From their inception, the legions were an elite formation, deemed by more than

one analyst as “the most thoroughly educated and sophisticated army in the history
of warfare”

: 40 percent were members of the intelligentsia.

e First Brigade

especially was noted for the high percentage in the ranks.

Youth spent in immer-

sion in Polish neo-Romanticism, especially the swashbuckling novels of Sienkie-
wicz—“our generation was raised on reading Sienkiewicz”

—gave the legionnaires

Włodzimierz Suleja, “Spór o kształt aktywizmu: Piłsudski a Sikorski w latach I wojny światowej,”

in Zieliński, ed., W kręgu , 141–99.

Signiﬁ cantly, one of his central goals was to transform the legions into a Polish army, but this

he thought impossible in the circumstances; see Władysław Baranowski, Rozmowy z Piłsudskim,
1916–1931 (Warsaw: Zebra, [1938] 1990), 25.

Regarding the circumstances, see Stanisław Biegański, “Zaplecze przysięgi legionów w 1917

roku,” Niepodległość , 9 (1974), 218–28.

e original passage is: “najgruntowniej i najbardziej światowo wykstałcona armia w całej historii

wojskowości”; see

Mariusz Urbanek,

Wieniawa: Szwoleżer na pegazie (Wrocław: Wydawnictwo

Dolnośląskie, 1991), 35.

Adam Roliński, ed. A gdy na wojenkę szli Ojczyźnie służyć: Pieśni i piosenki żołnierskie z lat

1914–1918 (Kraków: Uniwersytet Jagielloński, 1989), 9.

Dworzyński, Wieniawa. 38.

Kornel Krzeczunowicz, Ostatnia kampania konna (London: Veritas, 1971), 23.

Independence Day

a remarkable cultural similarity.

It is noteworthy that many Polish legionnaires of

the 1914–18 era chose as their noms de guerre characters from Sienkiewicz’s nov-
els.

e novelist “taught [a generation] how to love the Fatherland.”

Kornel

Krzeczunowicz, a cavalry oﬃ

cer, remarked that it was the Sienkiewiczian neo-

Romanticism that united his contemporaries:

Our generation, all the oﬃ

cers from the commander of the squadron on down to the

last enlisted man capable of reading, was raised on reading Sienkiewicz’s Trilogy. . . . It
is no wonder that the language of Sienkiewicz was the common language of these
units previously strange to one another.

Franciszek Skibiński and Bolesław Wieniawa-Długoszowski both became cavalry
generals in the army of the Second Republic. During World War I, Wieniawa, a
Piłsudskiite, served in the legions under Austrian command; Skibiński, politically
to the Right, fought in Russian ranks. Both recollected teenage years molded by
patriotic military tales: “the models to emulate were [Sienkiewicz’s heroes] Skrze-
tuski, Kmicić, Wołodyjowski . . . because from my earliest youth we were nourished
by such patriotic and battleﬁ eld literature,” wrote Skibiński in words virtually
repeating Wieniawa’s own reminiscences.

e political creeds were diﬀ erent, but

both were products of the same martial ethos. In their hero-cult and military devotion,
the legions were the rebirth of the Romantic tradition.

Educated and literate, the legionnaires were remarkable for their tendency to

create song, poem, and story about their exploits, acting, as it were, as their own
press department. Th

e eccentric artist Jacek Malczewski’s drawings of dying legion-

naires with angels hovering nearby, or legionnaires dining with Christ, give some
idea of the apotheosization of the legions.

Bolesław Leśmian’s 1916 poem “Th

Legend of the Polish Soldier” is perhaps the ultimate example: a Polish soldier
meets St. George, and we witness the “the uncertainty of the Saint in his eﬀ ort to
diﬀ erentiate the soldier’s blood from that of Christ”—a clear evocation of the
“Christ among nations” trope of Polish lore.

e legions should not be understood solely as a military caste. Quite the con-

trary, we may proﬁ t from a remark by Joseph Rothschild some years ago that lik-
ened the legionnaires in social pedigree more to the gentry-intelligentsia than to

Many legionnaires adopted pseudonyms drawn from Sienkiewicz’s oeuvre. See Jacek M. Majchrowski,

Ulubieniec cezara: Bolesław Wieniawa-Długoszowski: Zarys biograﬁ i (Wrocław: Ossolineum, 1990), 64–5 ;
cf. Piotr Stawecki, Słownik biograﬁ czny generałów wojska polskiego, 1918–1939 (Warsaw: Wojskowy Instytut
Historyczny, 1994), 22–3, quoting Jacek Majchrowski’s characterization of legion senior oﬃ

cers.

Majchrowski, Ulubieniec cezara , 64.

Ibid.

Krzeczunowicz, Ostatnia kampania konna , 23.

Skibiński’s remarks are in Franciszek Skibiński, Ułańska młodość, 1917–1939 (Warsaw: MON,

1989), 7 ; for Wieniawa’s parallel recollections, see Loth, Wymarsz, 70–1. Th

e three names mentioned

are all characters in the Trilogy.

Jacek Kolbuszewski, “Romantyczne sny o wolności. Od Adama Mickiewicza do Stefana

Żeromskiego,” in Wojciech Wrzesiński, Do niepodległości: 1918, 1944/45, 1989: Wizje-drogi-spełnienie
(Warsaw: Wydawnictwo sejmowe, 1998), 258–60.

See e.g. Józef Szaniawski , Marszałek Piłsudski w obronie Polski i Europy (Warsaw: Ex Libris, 2008), 126–7.

Andrzej Z. Makowski, “Literatura wobec Niepodległości,” in Salon Niepodległości [no editor]

(Warsaw: PWN, 2008), 107.

Introduction: Myths and Symbols

hereditary praetorians.

Here we may descry the strong traditional element

represented by the legions. It was the age-old function of the gentry to deﬁ ne
themselves as both defending Poland against foreign invasion and epitomizing vir-
tues of the Polish past: representatives of all Poland in symbol. It combined the
Romantic and Noble tradition.

Szalai has argued that a characteristic function of an elite is the “setting of imi-

table patters of social behavior.”

e transmission of these “imitable” values is

accomplished “ﬁ rst and foremost” via “the media.”

Given the circumstances of

the time the media is represented by literary popularizations of legionnaire exploits,
circulation of artistic renderings and postcards of legionnaires, and, most strik-
ingly, the legionnaire repertoire of song which extended beyond military ranks to
a wide audience. Th

us the legions had a means of transmitting values via the media

characteristic of the era. According to Kowalczykowa, the legions:

had not only to ﬁ ght, but to fulﬁ ll higher expectations—to become the model of cour-
age and bravery [bojowość]. Without that they would destroy the very sense of their
existence. . . . It must sink into everyone’s memory that this is a formation qualitatively
something apart, whose goal is not just to summon [Poles] to play a role in the parti-
tioning powers’ conﬂ icts but for the struggle for independence of the Fatherland.

ey were men “redeemed by blood,” whom Piłsudski deemed the “cadres of the

future Polish army.”

T H E KO Ś C I U S Z KO  P I Ł S U D S K I S Y M B O L

e legions appropriated the Kościuszko tradition or, better, shared his charisma.

He was not just a national hero but a multiform symbol. He was a nobleman who
championed the cause of the peasantry; a scion of northeastern Poland identiﬁ ed
with the southwest, and hence not a regional ﬁ gure; a Pole of mixed ethnic descent
(he was, at least partially, a Lithuanian and Belarusian) thus reﬂ ecting the ethnic
heterogeneity of historic Poland; a soldier who encouraged the levée en masse and
broad participation in the national cause, hence a democratic ﬁ gure. He was also
the selﬂ ess hero (above faction) to whom the nation entrusted complete authority,
believing in his noble spirit and disinterested patriotism.

See Joseph Rothschild, “Marshal Józef Piłsudski on State/Society Dialectics in Restored Interwar

Poland,” in Timothy Wiles, ed., Poland between the Wars: 1918–1939 (Bloomington: Indiana Univer-
sity, 1989), 30.

Biernat, Paradoks, 125. We may note the characterization of the legionnaires as “anachronistic,”

“post-noble, from the eastern borderlands.” Th

e same could be said about Piłsudski; see Andrzej

Micewski, Z geografii politycznej II Rzeczpospolitej: Szkice (Warsaw: Znak, 1966), 135 ; cf. Paruch,
“Kreowanie,” 64–5.

Erzebet Szalai, “System Change and the Conversion of Power in Hungary,” 1. Online at <http://

www.szociologia.hu/dynamic/RevSoc_1999_SzalaiE_System_change.pdf>.

Ibid.

Alina Kowalczykowa, Piłsudski i tradycja (Chotomów: Wydawnictwo Verba, 1991), 76.

Ibid.

Independence Day

e legions had their Kościuszko in Piłsudski.

Piłsudski was quite conscious of

the appropriation of the Kościuszko myth for him. Legion songs—and they were
striking in their number—often spoke of Piłsudski as Kościuszko reborn, and
compared the two as national heroes.

Kościuszko tropes became Piłsudski tropes,

and graphic images displayed them in juxtaposition: “eﬀ ective political market-
ing,” according to Andrzej Chwałba.

e Piłsudski symbol should be regarded as sub-theme in the legion symbolism.

Piłsudski was well aware of certain requirement to posit himself as the leader of
Poland in 1914. He had to link himself to the Kościuszko tradition of insurrection,
epitomize military action and sacriﬁ ce, remove himself from any taint of factional-
ism, and suggest a providential historic mission for himself. All the while he had to
eschew personal aggrandizement. He had to be the essence of Polish Romanticism
reincarnated.

In the propaganda generated by the legions in 1914–16, much of it in the form

of song and poetry, Piłsudski lives only to symbolize Poland. He is modest, dis-
daining of ornament and decoration, oblivious to faction, a former socialist who
does not seek a socialist agenda—an ethnic Lithuanian from the mixed eastern
borderlands, who is associated with Galicia (here the comparison with Kościuszko
is perfect). He is the leader who is obeyed because he represents Poland tout court ,
not because he has achieved certain successes or occupies a certain position.

fulﬁ lls what Karol Modzelewski refers to as the “leadership syndrome” in Polish
political mythology.

In the legions, Piłsudski remarked, there are now no regional

diﬀ erences, only Poles.

e legions were soldiers without a fatherland; hence, in

Piłsudski, they had the personiﬁ cation of an ideal.

Although utterly without military training, Piłsudski was foremost a political

soldier, a symbol of the armed patriotic defense of the Polish tradition. As Carlo
Sforza noted, Piłsudski was an anachronism: never a revolutionary but a son of the

See the remarks entitled “Kościuszko-Piłsudski” in Krzysztof Stępnik, Legenda Legionów (Lublin:

Uniwersytet Marii Curie-Skłodowskiej, 1995), 154–60. Wieniawa-Długoszowski put it simply: “Th

Commandant [Piłsudski] is the incarnation of the Kościuszko tradition,” see Loth, Wymarsz , 88.

e Germans remarked that the legionnaires sang continuously; that it was part of their charac-

teristic features; see Loth, Wymarsz, 177 .

“Gdyby Piłsudskiego nie było, należałoby go wymyślić,” Gazeta Krakowska , November 11,

2008.

We should note, however, that Kościuszko and Piłsudski had somewhat diﬀ erent geopolitical

visions. Piłsudski dreamed of a federal version of the old multinational Jagiellonian state; Kościuszko
also wanted the pre-partition territory, but was a proponent of polonization. In this particular, at least,
he approached the endecja paradigm; see Andrzej Walicki, Th

e Enlightenment and the Birth of Modern

Nationhood: Polish Political Th

ought from Noble Republicanism to Tadeusz Kościuszko (Notre Dame, IN:

University of Notre Dame Press: 1989), 125–6.

Here we may note the well-known songs of tribute to Piłsudski sung by the legionnaires: “Jedzie,

jedzie na kasztance,” or “Pieśń o Józeﬁ e Piłsudskim,” “Komendancie,” or “Brygadier Piłsudski,” popu-
lar since the ﬁ rst year of the war. For the text, see Roliński, A gdy na wojenkę, 311–19 and the invalu-
able analytic comments in ibid . 457–9.

Karol Modzelewski, quoted in Mariusz Urbanek , Piłsudski bis (Warsaw: Most, 1995) , 65.

Józef Piłsudski, Korespondencja, 1914–1917 (London: Instytut Józefa Piłsudskiego, 1984), 256.

is is a paraphrase of the idea presented in Tomasz Nałęcz, “W służbie Rzeczypospolitej i w

dyspozycji Wodza (obóz legionowy od Oleandrów do zamachu majowego)” in Życie polityczne w Polsce
1918–1939 (Wrocław: Ossolineum, 1985), 209.

Introduction: Myths and Symbols

Polish nobility.

He had taken up arms to rise above faction. His abandonment of

socialism was not an ideological transformation but a disdaining of political
sordidness for larger goals. By passing from socialist revolutionary to soldier-
commander Piłsudski had been transformed from the principal socialist of Poland,
to a supra-political ﬁ gure replete with all the trappings of tradition.

Piłsudski became a legend in the poetry of the war era of multiform dimension.

In Makowski’s words, a legend that persisted throughout the inter-war period
among his devotees, culminating in Wierzyński’s 1936 poems “Wolność tragiczna,”
a mystical biography of Piłsudski in a series of verses that interpret his transcenden-
tal meaning for Poland.

Poet and ardent Piłsudskiite Kazimiera Iłłakowiczówna

doubtless had her hero in mind when she beseeched her countrymen to “Learn, oh
my nation, our list of symbols.”

Piłsudski stepped down from the canvas of Matejko, his greatness announced by the
ringing of Zygmunt [the great bell of the Wawel] and the prophesy of Wernyhora,
[the reference is to a mythic ﬁ gure in Wyspiański’s Wesele ] he is the Polish Prometheus,
the commander of the sleeping knights, the personiﬁ cation of the dream of the sword,
the avenger and the giant.

e simultaneous function of the legions as the petty gentry reborn and an ele-

ment for social equalization should not be seen as contradictory. As Aleksander
Gella pointed out some years ago, the notion of upward leveling of the population
had strong roots in the Polish political traditions, and creating gentry from the
lower orders was a well-established practice by the nineteenth century. Kowal-
czykowa refers to it as the “nobilitation of the workers.”

is phenomenon was

aided by the impoverished status of much of the gentry, which was therefore not
socially distanced from the petty bourgeoisie, or even the prosperous farming
class.

After the war, many legionnaires moved freely in the literary and artistic milieux

of the Second Republic as, in Urbanek’s words, “virtual literati.”

e most sym-

bolic example was Wieniawa-Długoszowski, holder of a doctorate in medicine from
the Jan Kazimierz University in Lwów; he also did advanced studies in art in Paris
and Berlin. His wife was an opera singer. Wieniawa was a poet, lyricist, playwright,
translator of contemporary French verse—particularly Baudelaire—and cabaret
habitué as well as a cavalry oﬃ

cer in the legions. He had no formal military training.

He was the ultimate legionnaire—scion of the gentry-intelligentsia.

e essential prerogative of the szlachta-intelligentsia was the right to imagine the

Poland they were seeking both to resurrect and create.

is Poland was essentially

Quoted in Stanisław Mackiewicz, Klucz do Piłsudskiego (London: Privately printed, 1943), 3.

e group of several poems includes the well-known passage “królom był równy”—he was the

equal of kings in “Wawel”—a brief poem that can be found in the “Wolność tragiczna” collection of
nostalgic and melancholy verse in Kazimierz Wierzyński, Poezje zebrane (London: Wiadomości, nd),
218–51.

Makowski, “Literatura wobec Niepodległości,” 107.

Kowalczykowa, Piłsudski i tradycja , 40.

Urbanek, Wieniawa , 142.

Henryk Jabłoński noted this some years ago; see the remarks and citation from Jabłoński in Jan

Jerzy Jerz, Historia krzepi? (Warsaw: Czytelnik, 1988), 217–19.

Independence Day

an idealized version of the old pre-partition commonwealth, without the realities of
a century that had seen rising class antagonisms, as well as the consolidation of
national movements among Ukrainians, Lithuanians, and even Belarusians, and the
emergence of a sense of secular peoplehood among the large Jewish population.
Th

ey imagined a Poland which reﬂ ected the old notion of “ Polska, to my ”—We are

Poland. A Poland imagined on the basis of pre-partition principles.

But this was not to be the pre-1795 state in copy. It was to be an improved,

democratized version. Th

e legions of 1914 repeated the earlier phenomenon of

serving as a means for civic virtue; an attribute credited to the earlier Napoleonic
formations. Legionnaires of 1914 dispensed with the elaborate titles characteristic
of Polish discourse, and addressed each other in the grammatically familiar form;
even oﬃ

cer ranks were initially omitted. Th

e military, especially the legions, were

a unifying element supervening in, if not eliminating, class and social barriers.

is led Wacław Lipiński to describe the interrelationship of the men in the legions

as reﬂ ecting “noble democratization” [szlachetna demokratyzacja].

is evoca-

tion of “gentry democracy” was epitomized by legionnaires addressing each other
as “citizen” [obywatel] which had been the practice of the Kościuszko era and in
turn reﬂ ected older traditions.

e legions were to serve to create a new kind of Pole, drawn from all classes but

equally sharing in a sense of social responsibility for the nation.

e legions were

also multi-ethnic: Polish patriotism, not nationalism, was the integrating compo-
nent. At least 400 Jews were legionnaires, along with volunteers from the other
minority populations.

e legions were deigned to re-create a Poland, symbolized

by Kościuszko who long predated the ethnic and religious exclusivity of the
nationalists.

e exploits of the legions captured the imagination of Polish society during the

war, and they quickly became a “military legend.” Th

e legionnaires were well aware

of the adulation by Polish society.

ese proved a potent weapon in the hands of

Piłsudski, who used the legions’ renown to gain a place for himself as the principal
soldier ﬁ ghting for the Polish cause.

Here we might proﬁ tably consult Benedict Anderson’s well-known work Imagined Communities:

Reﬂ ections on the Origins and Spread of Nationalism . Rev. edn. (London: Verso, 1991) , which, to be
sure, concentrates on constructions based on old memories and largely forgotten lore.

Biskupski, “Militarization,” 79–80. Piłsudski ended the divisions among the various paramilitary

formations on August 3rd by replacing their unit badges with a common emblem of the Polish eagle;
it was obviously a symbol of the future unity of Poland. See his remarks in Pisma zbiorowe , Vol. IV
(Warsaw: Instytut Józefa Piłsudskiego, 1937), 7–8.

Wacław Lipiński, Walka zbrojna o niepodległość Polski w latach 1905–1918 (Warsaw: Volumen,

[1935] 1990), 81.

Ibid.

Loth, Wymarsz, 10–11.

Regarding the number of Jews, see Marek Gałęzowski, Wierni Polsce. Vol. II: Publicystyka

piłsudczykowska w kraju 1940–1946 (Warsaw: LTW, 2007), 433 n. 220. Th

ere are also valuable

remarks in “W sluzbie odrodzonej Polski, Rzeczpospolita, April 8, 2008, online at <http://www.rp.
pl/artykul/171902.html>.

See for example, the memoirs of a young cavalry oﬃ

cer, Adam Ludwik Korwin-Sokołowski, as

recorded in Fragmenty wspomnień, 1910–1945 (Paris: Editions Spotkanie, 1985), 22.

Introduction: Myths and Symbols

S TAT E A N D N AT I O N

Perhaps the most fundamental division of Polish political thought in the pre-1914
era was the deﬁ nition of what Poland was. For the nationalists of Roman Dmowski,
a powerful and growing force rooted in the rising bourgeoisie, Poland was an eth-
nic community linked by language, religion, and blood. Poland was the Polish
people understood as the Polish race. Religious and ethnic minorities were not
Poles, but foreign intrusions who could at best be guests in a national Poland, but
were expected to assimilate as quickly and as completely as possible. Th

e territorial

expansion of Poland into ethnically non-Polish territories—so striking a phenom-
enon from the fourteenth to seventeenth centuries—was, regarded as an adultera-
tion of Polish unity and a direct cause of the decline and eventual annihilation of
the state in the eighteenth century. Nationalism was essentially a modernizing
movement: a “nonhistorical” disposition.

e Piłsudskiites, by contrast, always stressed the primacy of the Polish state, a

concept much misunderstood. By stressing the state, Piłsudski did not mean the
machinery of government, but rather the notion of a territory linked by common
allegiance to a central tradition which the government reiﬁ ed.

e Poles were a

historic community, their territory was not coextensive with its ethnic diﬀ usion,
but with its cultural inﬂ uence quite apart from the ethnic or religious character of
the local population. Minorities were, or at least could all be Poles if they regarded
themselves as loyal to a common patriotic—and not nationalistic—community.
Th

is form of state patriotism envisioned a Poland virtually identical to the pre-

partition conﬁ guration, with many minorities and with allegiance based upon sub-
jective volition rather than objective determination.

is, in summary, is the

“state-nation” [państwo-naród] conﬂ ict in modern Polish history.

Ivan Rudnyt-

sky has captured this in his positing of a clash between “historical legitimism” and
“ethnic self-determination.”

e legions represent a “state” rather than “national”

See Andrzej Walicki, Poland between East and West

(Cambridge, MA: Harvard Ukrainian

Research Institute, 1994), 60 . Th

e term “nonhistorical” is Rothschild’s: see Coup d’Etat, 239.

Waldemar Paruch, Myśl polityczna obozu piłsudczykowskiego, 1926–1939 (Lublin: Wydawnictwo

Uniwersytetu Marie Curie-Skłodowskiej, 2005), 103ﬀ .

See Władysław T. Kulesza, Koncepcje ideowo-polityczne obozu rządzącego w Polsce w latach

1926–1935 (Wrocław: Ossolineum, 1985), 48.

See Krzysztof Kawalec, “Państwo a naród w dwudziestoleciu międzywojennym—spory nie

zakończone,” in Wrzesiński, ed., Do niepodległości , 183–200 ; cf.  Waldemar Paruch, “Narody polityczne
czy narody etniczne w Europie Środkowej lat międzywojennych? Problematyka narodowo-etnicza w
myśli politycznej Józefa Piłsudskiego i jego zwolenników,” in Lech Maliszewski, ed., Żar niepodległości:
Międzynarodowe aspekty życia i działalności Józefa Piłsudskiego  (Lublin: Norbertinum, 2004), 276–8 .
Wandycz attempts a via media  in this conﬂ ict in his remarks about Dmowski in his “Nacjonalizm czy
patriotyzm? Dmowski kontra Piłsudski,” Seminarium PAU: Patriotyzm wczoraj i dziś  (Kraków: Polska
Akademia Umiejętności, 2003), 70–1.

is thesis of Rudnytsky’s is quoted in Walicki, Poland between East and West , 61 n. 1. Andrzej

Nowak, on the basis of new and extensive scholarship, argues that Piłsudski’s was not a devoted feder-
alist in the era 1918–20; his federalism was a sauve qui peut  of the failure of his alliance with Lithuania
and Ukraine. See his History and Geopolitics: A Contest for Eastern Europe  (Warsaw: Polish Institute for
International Aﬀ airs, 2008), 169–86.  Piotr S. Wandycz dealt with this some time ago by emphasizing
Pilsudski’s ﬂ exibility: he would accept federalism; crass imperialism was not attractive. Th

e key

Independence Day

approach to Poland’s raison d’état. At the ﬁ rst meeting of the Union of Legion-
naires in 1922, it was concluded that Polish society must be remolded “in the spirit
of the state,” not enmeshed in political wrangling. Piłsudski represented the state
to the legionnaires, and he was hence above politics.

Indeed, this concept of a multinational Poland epitomized Piłsudski’s entire

Weltanschauung : the re-creation of a pre-partition Poland as a federal structure
with Poland its central component. Piłsudski’s “federalism” and his post-1918
optimism about minority relations were of a piece.

As Andrzej Walicki has argued,

Piłsudski was essentially a political anachronism who accepted the federal idea of
1863 Poland as the guiding principle: a Polish nation as inclusive as possible, with ,
nota bene , a special place for Polish Jews.

Concern for the people on Poland’s

eastern borders and a vision of some sort of federal arrangement were part of the
Piłsudski project from his days as a PPS leader and, as Piotr Wróbel has percep-
tively noted, are there in the Party’s Program of 1892.

100

T H E L E G I O N S A S M Y T H

e legions were to be martyrs and hence they had a special obligation to Poland,

and were derivatively deserving of an exalted status among Poles. Th

is is perfectly

captured in the anthem of the legions, the “March of the First Brigade” [ My,
Pierwsza Brygada ]. Bitter and resentful, the “March” broods over the scorn
suﬀ ered by the legionnaires in the pre-war era, when polite society ridiculed
them for their seemingly irrational attachment to a military solution to Poland’s
historic dilemma. Poor, isolated, and contemned, the legionnaires were sustained
only by their faith in the charismatic Piłsudski, and their conviction that they
could save Poland.

101

was that Russia was to be denied this territory by whatever means. What relations would be estab-
lished between Poles, Ukrainians, Lithuanians, and Belarusians was too dynamic to be solved in the
1918–20 era; see his Soviet–Polish Relations, 1917–1921 (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1969),
97–100. Nowak and Wandycz are in essential agreement.

Elżbieta Kossewska, Związek Legionistów Polskich 1922–1939 (Warsaw: Oﬁ cyna Wydawnicza

ASPRA-JR, 2003), 20.

Such a conclusion is suggested implicitly in Suleja, “Myśl polityczna Piłsudczyków 286–7.

Andrzej Walicki, “Intellectual Elites and the Vicissitudes of ‘Imagined Nations’ in Poland,” East

European Politics and Society, 11(2) (1997), 245–53.

100

Piotr J. Wróbel, “Th

e Rise and Fall of Parliamentary Democracy in Interwar Poland,” in

M. B. B. Biskupski, James S. Pula, and Piotr J. Wróbel, eds., Th

e Origins of Modern Polish Democracy

(Athens: Ohio University Press, 2010), 125.   Andrzej Nowak, it should be noted, has dissented from
this characterization of Piłsudski and views him—at least up to 1920—more in practical geopolitical
terms: willing to compromise over territorial issues, as long as Poland gained a powerful position in
the east vis-à-vis Russia. See his Polska i trzy Rosje: Studium polityki wschodniej Józefa Piłsudskiego (do
kwietnia 1920 roku)  (Warsaw: Instytut historii PAN, 2001), 214–15, 601–13.  Whether or not
federalism was only adopted after the failure of the Poles to gain their objectives in their 1919–20 war
with the Russians, is problematical.

101

See Roliński, A gdy na wojenkę , 149–51, 408–12. See the comments in Kowalczykowa, Piłsudski

i tradycja , 78–9.

Introduction: Myths and Symbols

102

Wapiński, Pokolenia Drugiej Rzeczypospolitej , 187.

103

Józef Piłsudski,“Memorandum of April 1917,” in Piłsudski, Korespondencja, 256.

104

It is notable that one of the variant legion songs began with the words: “Th

e legions are a Th

er-

mopylae,” equating their eﬀ orts with the last stand of the valiant against overwhelming odds. See
Roliński, Gdy na wojenkę , 78, 386–7.

105

Michał Tadeusz Brzęk-Osiński, Legionista i piłsudczyk, 1905–1939 (Warsaw: Rytm, 2003), 67.

106

Garlicki, “Spory o niepodległość,” 14–15.

But, as the “March” continues, with 1914 the war had suddenly made the legions

appear prophets not deluded romantics. Piłsudski was a revered leader; the cause
of Poland, long dormant, had resurfaced. Th

e legions now rejected the accolades of

those who once scorned them. Th

ey’re a breed apart, self-selected, seeking nothing

but Poland’s good: willing martyrs to the Polish cause. Th

ey “throw their young

lives on the pyre” to quote the lyrics. Th

ey are devoted to their leader, who seeks

nothing for himself. Th

is First Brigade is Poland in essence, the best of the Polish

past and the hope of Poland’s future. Even their political opponents regarded them
with sympathy and respect.

102

In 1923 Piłsudski deﬁ ned the legions’ function in

Polish history—and his own as well—in these words: “Poland could only arise
from slavery by means of armed action.”

Piłsudski was convinced that the legions were not only the cadres of a future

army, they were the living link to Poland’s military past. Th

ey incarnated the neo-

Romantic vision of a military solution to the Polish national dilemma. In 1917 he
mused:

For almost two years the only ﬁ ghting part of Polish society has been the Legions, who
have renewed the tradition of the Polish soldier and by their actions created the moral
foundation upon which to build a Polish army.

103

is martyrdom is later demonstrated by the very history of the legions: plunged

into Homeric combat from the opening days of the war, they were denied the one
thing they most wanted, service to the Polish cause. At the orders of their beloved
commander, they lay down their arms—with all which that symbolized as a sol-
dier—and refused to declare allegiance to anything other than Poland. Th

ey, along

with their leader, are incarcerated: they share a martyr’s fate.

104

For, as a legionnaire

exuberantly recalled many years later, “service was based not on discipline but on
honor.”

105

e military bond united the legionnaires and created their emotional

attachment to the commander.

106

e legions played an important role in symbolically linking the broken conti-

nuity of Polish history. Poland before the partitions was a large and important state
whose claims to historic signiﬁ cance were considerable, but whose decline, begin-
ning in the mid-seventeenth century, led to disastrous etiolation and eventually
dismemberment. Th

is historic Poland ended in defeat and humiliation. Th

e long

century of partition was one of heroic sacriﬁ ce, especially in the several punctuat-
ing insurrections. Th

us Polish history is broken into two unequal parts. Th

e long

ﬁ rst chapter leading to ruin, and the shorter, second, of vain sacriﬁ ce; the symbols
of the ﬁ rst—power, majesty, and victory increasingly inappropriate for the second,
which was an era of heroic sacriﬁ ce in hopeless struggle.

Independence Day

107

I have discussed the need for new symbols after 1918 in “Th

e Invention of Modern Poland:

Piłsudski, 11 November, and the Politics of Symbolism,” in Stanislav J. Kirschbaum, ed., Central Euro-
pean History and the European Union: Th

e Meaning of Europe (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2007).

108

Nałęcz, Irredenta, 338.

109

Tomasz Nałęcz argues: “Th

e Army is an institution as old (równie dawna) as the state itself ”; see

his “Armia in statu nascendi ,” in Garlicki, Rok 1918 , 189.

110

Kossewska, Związek , 7.

111

Walery Sławek quoted in Kulesza, Koncepcje , 139.

112

Here we borrow again from Biernat, Paradoks ; cf. Nałęcz, “ In statu nascendi ,” 193.

113

Paruch, “Kreowanie,” 60.

114

Quoted in Zdzisław M. Musialik, “Józef Piłsudski, niekonwencjonalny człowiek, wódz i strateg,”

Niepodległość , 44 (1993), 90 . Herman Lieberman, a major socialist politician of the inter-war period,
observed that Piłsudski did not wish to be king of Poland; that was “too small”: he wanted to be “the
greatest man in Polish history”; see “Pamiętniki Hermana Liebermana,” I, 195, Sikorski Institute,
collection 167.

115

is is a free rendering of Paruch’s “depozytariusz[] polskiego sacrum,” in Paruch , “Kreowanie,” 69 .

e legions conﬂ ated the symbols of the two eras. Th

ey are a regular army, not

an insurrectionary band, hence they evoke pre-partition Poland. On the other
hand, they are not the noble cavalry of pre-1795 but a citizen army of the post-
1863 era of the rise of mass politics. Th

ey are modern, but evocative of the past.

e army now symbolically reunites a historical discontinuity just as it unites social

class. Post-1918 Poland needed new symbols focused on the victorious conclusion
to the struggle for independence rather than the defeat of the pre-partition era or
the futile insurrections.

107

e legions are the beginning of a series of symbols for

a modern Poland, unencumbered by a tragic past. Th

ey are transformed from mar-

tyrology to victory. In a practical sense, the legions gave Poland “what it needed
most”: “the ability to organize Armed forces and ﬁ ght a war.”

108

e legions were the perfect ancestor myth for post-1918 Poland. Th

e army was

the principle integrating mechanism, and the especial obsession of Piłsudski, who
saw in the military the key to overcoming faction and division, and inducing
national pride and conﬁ dence. Th

e animating essence of the army was the legion-

naire tradition: cohesion, sacriﬁ ce, loyalty, victory, and the unifying element for a
disjoined past. Th

e army was Poland: the legions gave birth to the army, and

Piłsudski was the father to the legions. Just as the legions had preceded the political
formation of the NKN in 1914, the army was more fundamental than a govern-
ment.

109

And Poland after 1918 was a country of many veterans: more than

3.5 million, perhaps 15 percent of the entire population.

110

Piłsudski regarded the legions as a foundational myth for a new Poland. Th

were to provide Poland a model, albeit mythologized, for what a post-1918 Poland
should be. Th

ey were the “avant-garde of the nation.”

111

ey are the mythology of

the “charismatic leadership” theme in modern Poland-Piłsudski as the unique
agency by which Poland was reborn.

112

“A new state,” Paruch reminds us, “needed

myths.”

113

Piłsudski was the iconic personality in the new Poland and the legions regarded

him as a quasi-religious ﬁ gure who enjoyed a kind of predestination to save Poland
from its historic dilemma. In 1920, Piłsudski told an American reporter: “[Dmowski
and Paderewski] are famous men; I am a legend.”

114

He was the “repository of what

is sacred to Poles.”

115

Piłsudski’s legendary status had been established by a series of

Introduction: Myths and Symbols

116

Micewski, W cieniu , 32.

117

From Pierre Bourdieu, Pascalian Meditations (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000),

175, as quoted in Loïc Wacquant, “Pointers on Pierre Bourdieu and Democratic Politics,” Constellations ,
2(1) (2004). 13 n. 30.

118

Wacquant, “Pointers,” 8.

119

Paul Cammack, “A Critical Assessment of the New Elite Paradigm,” American Sociological

Review, 55(3) (1990), 416.

120

Kossewska, Związek , 69.

121

Piłsudski was profoundly convinced that Poland’s eighteenth-century loss of independence was

due to the weakness of the pre-partition state. Th

e state was the source of Poland’s independence. See

Kulesza, Koncepcje , 38.

122

Elżbieta Kaszuba, System propagandy państwowej obozu rządzącego w Polsce w latach 1926–1939

(Wrocław: Adam Marszałek, 2004), 175.

acts which needed no ampliﬁ cation among Poles; the status was, as Micewski
observes, “a social fact.”

116

Whereas Piłsudski certainly enjoyed widespread support in Poland both before

1918 and after the war, the legions were an elect especially endowed with the right
to pay homage to the national hero: they were the priesthood in the profane
national cult of Piłsudski. As such, their military service had a special grace attached
to it: the propinquity to Piłsudski. To explain the legions’ role in building Poland,
we may usefully employ Bourdieu’s notion that the construction of the state goes
hand in hand with the construction of a sort of shared historical “transcendental”
that “becomes immanent” to all of its “subjects.” Th

rough the frameworks it

imposes upon practices, the state institutes and inculcates a common symbolic.

117

is deﬁ nition of the legions as pregnant with the future state allows us to bor-

row Wacquant’s view that the state is also “in here” as a set of “mental categories.”

118

e legions thus carried with them into the post-war era a “shared historical tran-

scendental,” which had become immanent. Th

e legionnaire habitus became a con-

sensus regarding the construction of a modern Poland. To a considerable extent,
Poland was invented after 1918 by conscious eﬀ orts by Piłsudski and his entourage
to create a modern polity based upon the values epitomized by the legions.

e Polish legions of World War I were positioned to play a role in post-1918

Poland disproportionate to their numbers: they became a “national elite” in Cam-
mack’s deﬁ nition—a “consensually uniﬁ ed” group.

119

When their leader, Piłsudski,

came to power, they quickly became prominent in military and government; a
status to which they felt entitled. In Kossewska’s words, the legionnaires were
“ennobled” by their eﬀ orts.

120

e freeing of Poland, the replacement of stultifying myth and symbol with

something born of victory, is an assertive martial understanding of the Polish
national project; Poland as the exclusive work of Polish hand, the product of all the
groups and factions basic to the old commonwealth. Poland, led by an elite deter-
mined to rid the nation of the enfeebling weaknesses of the pre-partition state

121

—

a new generation arising not “under the shadow of martyrology of the partition
era”

122

but a charismatic ﬁ gure arriving at the proper juxtaposition of forces. Th

is the mythical birth of modern Poland. It is symbolized by November 11th, 1918,
Independence Day.

Discovering Independence Day

T H E P RO B L E M

e coincidence of Independence Day with the end of World War I in the West

has prompted much speculation. To be sure, the defeat of Germany and the victory
of the Western powers created the preconditions for the rebirth of Poland. How-
ever, as Ignacy Matuszewski pointed out a generation ago, whereas November 11th
brought peace in the West, it only began a series of wars for Poland—wars in which
the Western powers played little role.

For example, had Poland been defeated by

Soviet Russia in 1920—which was likely—then November 11th, 1918, marking
the end of World War I, would have had only ironical signifi cance for Poland, not
unlike May 9th, 1945.

Indeed, the very idea that November 11th marks the birth of Polish independ-

ence is problematical at best. Th

e person most closely associated with the events of

that day, Piłsudski, specifi cally long denied that it coincided with Polish independ-
ence.

Ignacy Paderewski, another of Poland’s patriarchs, seems never to have

acknowledged the date at all. Wincenty Witos, thrice premier, denied November
11th any historic importance. During the Second Republic, both political factions
and the scholarly community long debated the correct anniversary of their coun-
try’s rebirth and did not arrive at a satisfactory resolution.

At various times, seven-

teen dates were suggested as Independence Day.

Ignacy Matuszewski, “Jedenasty listopad” in his

Wybór pism

(New York: Instytut Józefa

Piłsudskiego, 1952), 39ff .

Piłsudski concluded that the most appropriate “date for the creation of the Polish state” was

November 28th; see “Pierwsze dni Rzeczypospolitej Polskiej: Wykład pierwszy” in Józef Piłsudski,
Pisma zbiorowe, VIII, 105.

e best summary of this is Adam Próchnik, Powstanie państwa polskiego (Warsaw: Warszawska

Spółdzielnia Księgarska, 1939).  Some of the most devoted lieutenants of Piłsudski argued that not till
the decisive victory over the Russians in 1920 could true independence be established; for a summary
of this rather broader interpretation see  Wacław Lipinski, “O dzieje odbudowy państwa polskiego,”
Niepodległość , 6(2) (1932), 161–76.

Heidi Hein-Kircher, Kult Piłsudskiego i jego znaczenie dla państwa polskiego 1926–1939 (Warsaw:

Neriton, 2008), 193 . Th

ere is a very valuable essay by Adam Próchnik which discusses not only days

but time periods that might be selected to denote the moment of independence. He does not select a
particular day but concludes that the activities of Piłsudski were the central events, thus making
November 10–11 crucial; see his Powstanie państwa polskiego (Warsaw: Spółdzielnia Księgarska, 1939) .
A member of the government, in late 1919, noted that the 11th was liberation day only for the
Warsaw area, not the whole of Poland; see Roman Wapiński, “Postawy i oczekiwania,” Kwartalnik
historyczny , 95 (1989), 13.

Discovering Independence Day

If November 11th did not indicate beyond doubt the birth of modern Poland,

it did come to indicate the day upon which devotees of Piłsudski regarded Poland
as having arisen. Th

is, because it signifi ed the moment when their hero intervened

in a most confusing concatenation of events. Hence, November 11th, 1918 became
the commemorative date of a Piłsudskiite Poland. Th

e period since 1918 has wit-

nessed the gradual victory of this interpretation as a political anniversary if not as
a historiographical datum.

T H E WA R E N D S

In the fi nal stages of World War I, Germany and its Austro-Hungarian ally were in
possession of most of the territory of historic Poland. Two years before, on November
5th, 1916, they had proclaimed the creation of a Polish kingdom, but without clear
borders and in rather obvious dependency on the occupying Central Powers. Th

rudimentary Polish government that grew up within these constrained circum-
stances, the so-called Provisional State Council—later transformed into a Regency
Council—was never able to create a truly independent regime, and its close associa-
tion with the German (and to a lesser extent, Austrian) occupiers tainted (if not
precluded) any moral authority it might have enjoyed among Poles. Th

e three Polish

regents—good and decent men but without any public following or political base—
instinctively understood this in the fall of 1918 and made no eff ort to proclaim
themselves the government of Poland at the moment of the German defeat.

However, in Lublin, that portion of eastern Poland under direct Austrian rather

than German occupation, the circumstances were a bit diff erent. A group of Polish
socialists led by the distinguished parliamentarian Ignacy Daszyński proclaimed
on November 7th the formation of the “Provisional People’s Government of the
Polish Republic” (Tymczasowy Rząd Ludowy Republiki Polskiej). It claimed the
right to organize parliamentary elections; described, albeit in general terms, a ter-
ritorial vision; and announced a program of rather far-reaching social and labor
reforms. It denounced the regents in Warsaw as creatures of the Germans, unwor-
thy of respect.

e Lublin eff ort, however, failed to attract widespread support.

In a curious passage, the self-proclaimed Republic at Lublin noted that it wished
to name Piłsudski head of the armed forces of the new Poland but, since he was
unavailable, it would settle for Colonel Edward Śmigły-Rydz as “his deputy” [jego
zastępca].

See the remarks by Tadeusz Jędruszczak in Dokumenty z dziejów polskiej polityki zagranicznej,

1918–1939. Vol. I: 1918–1932 (Warsaw: Instytut Wydawniczy PAX, 1989), 6.

See Waldemar Michowicz, “Organizacja polskiego aparatu dyplomatycznego w latach 1918–1939,”

in Piotr Łossowski, ed.,

Historia dyplomacji polskiej. Tom IV: 1918–1939

(Warsaw: Państwowe

Wydawnictwo Naukowe, 1995), 6–7.

Śmigły-Rydz later asserted, quite sincerely, that he always regarded himself as acting under

Piłsudski’s orders. For his part, Piłsudski regarded the whole Lublin episode as an embarrassment and
considered Śmigły-Rydz’s role in it as evincing a lack of political judgment; see Wiesław Jan Wysocki,
“Marszałek Józef Piłsudski a Edward Śmigły-Rydz” in Adam Suchoński, ed.,

Piłsudski i jego

współpracownicy (Opole: Uniwersytet Opolski, 1999), 105–13.

Independence Day

e colonel, quickly promoted to general by Lublin, played a unique role in the

origins of the Polish government in November. Piłsudski had been arrested in July
1917. Before this, he had instructed Śmigły-Rydz to leave the legions, where he had
served as a regimental commander, and take over the secret paramilitary force, the
POW. Over the next several months he traveled about coordinating POW over a
broad area of eastern Poland. In addition, he took over military aff airs within the
secret quasi-government that the Piłsudskiites had created, the so-called “Konwent.”
Th

e POW probably numbered about 15,000 at the time the legions were disbanded.

It grew considerably over the next year despite harassment from the Germans and
Austrians. By the time the war ended, the POW was organized into a high com-
mand, i.e. Śmigły-Rydz, and four subordinate centers for the German and Austrian
occupation zones as well as Galicia and Ukraine.

It may have numbered 30,000 and

was thus, by far, the largest Polish armed force on the national territory.

By the fall of 1918 it was obvious that the German position was hopeless and

major changes were in store for Poland. Th

e regents, in anticipation of a chaotic

interstice, tried to convince the Germans to release Piłsudski from incarceration, but
to no avail.

Failing this, the premier of the regency government, Józef Świerzyński,

proposed to Śmigły-Rydz that he assume the ministry of war in the regency govern-
ment, acting as it were in Piłsudski’s stead. Instead, Rydz ordered POW to begin the
preliminary eff ort at disarming the German and Austrian occupation troops through-
out Poland.

It was at this moment, November 6th, 1918, that Śmigły-Rydz agreed

to join the Lublin government of Daszyński in the capacity that he had earlier been
off ered by the regents. Th

e diff erence was that the eff ort to disarm the forces of the

Central Powers had already been set in motion and Lublin, unlike Warsaw, was
already in Polish hands. Th

e Daszyński government, employing Piłsudski’s name,

had raised an army based substantially on the local POW.

ree days later, on November 10th, Piłsudski returned to Warsaw from the

fortress of Magdeburg, where the Germans had held him in solicitous incarcera-
tion for the last year.

Indeed, he was in a Berlin hotel for the last few days.

Exact numbers are not available, and pro-Piłsudski authors have tended to exaggerate the total.

is fi gure is based on the arguments of Tomasz Nałęcz, Polska Organizacja Wojskowa, 1914–1918

(Wrocław: Ossolineum, 1984), 115.

Śmigły-Rydz had an illustrious military career in the Polish-Russian war (1919–21) but his

political activities after 1935 and his role as commander of Polish forces in the September Campaign
of 1939 are controversial at best.

It was his status in POW which gave Śmigły-Rydz the ability to play a role in the formation of

the Daszyński government. See Andrzej Friszke, “Ignacy Daszyński, premier Tymczasowego Rządu
Ludowego Republiki Polskiej, 7 XI–14 XI 1918,” in Andrzej Chojnowski and Piotr Wróbel, eds.,
Prezydenci i premierzy Drugiej Rzeczypospolitej (Wrocław: Ossolineum, 1992), 72ff , 84.

Ryszard Wojdaliński, “Jeszcze o powstaniu Tymczasowego Rządu Ludowego (7.XI.1918),” Spotkania:

Niezależne pismo młodych katolików , 7–8 (1979), 66 .

A succinct analysis of Śmigly-Rydz’s actions at this time can be found in Piotr Stawecki,

“Marszałek Polski Edward Rydz-Smigly (1886–1941),” in Bogusław Polak, ed., Bitwy września 1939
roku. Part 2: Dowódcy września (Koszalin: Wyższa szkoła inżynierska w Koszalinie, 1993), II, 18.

Lech Wyszczulski, Listopad 1918 (Warsaw: Bellona, 2008), 143–4.

It is, perhaps, a footnote to the continuing frictions in German–Polish relations that Polish

eff orts to erect a tablet commemorating Piłsudski at Magdeburg have been vociferously blocked by the
German Left for more than a decade. See “Niemcy: Piłsudski był faszystą,” Dziennik.Pl, November 10,
2008. Online at <http://www.dziennik.pl/wydarzenia/article263036/Niemcy_Piłsudski_byl_faszysta.
html >. See also “Niemiecka wojna o Piłsudskiego,” Gazeta Wyborcza , November 10, 2008.

Discovering Independence Day

Piłsudski, erstwhile socialist, had become the leading political fi gure in Poland dur-
ing the course of the war. Working fi rst with the Austrians, then with the Germans,
Piłsudski nonetheless always kept his political options open, epitomized by the
creation of POW.

Despite his military exploits, Piłsudski’s wartime cooperation with the Central

Powers could potentially have discredited him as it had the Regency Council.
However, his convenient arrest by the Germans in 1917 made him politically the
perfect Pole—opposed simultaneously by all three partitioning powers. No other
prominent political fi gure had so marketable a pedigree.

e unique position

Piłsudski occupied relative to Poland’s geopolitical quandary was complimented by
his status relative to Polish politics. As Wojciech Roszkowski has noted, Piłsudski
was a man of the Left, regarded by the conservatives as the guarantor of order:
Piłsudski was “the only man who could master the revolutionary wave . . . [and] the
only person probably able to stop the conservative nationalists from overthrowing
a socialist government. So he was accepted by everybody.”

Even Dmowski admit-

ted later that, had the endecja come to power in November, there probably would
have been civil war.

In the fall of 1918, it was in the interests of the Germans, whose government

was descending into chaos, to help Piłsudski return to Warsaw—hence the gentle
treatment and his good hotel room. For the very numerous German forces stretched
over a vast territory in the east, a cooperative arrangement with any new authority
in Warsaw was vital. In the words of the prominent German diplomat, Harry
Kessler, who was dispatched to woo Piłsudski to cooperate with Germany, “only a
national hero in Poland could avert a catastrophe there.”

P I Ł S U D S K I R E T U R N S TO WA R S AW

Piłsudski arrived in Warsaw by train early on November 10th; the Germans had
informed the regency government of this only the night before.

It was obvious

that for the Germans, the regents, whom they had done much to install, were no

Piłsudski’s political opponents were slow to realize how his arrest by the Germans had freed him

from the awkward political baggage of his close association with the Central Powers during the war;
see Wojdaliński, “Jeszcze o powstaniu Tymczasowego Rządu Ludowego (7.XI.1918),” 63.

Remarks by Wojciech Roszkowski in “Independence Day Broadcast,” Polish Radio, English lan-

guage service, Monday, November 11, 2002. I should like to thank Michael Oborski for providing me
a copy of this broadcast .

Wojciech Roszkowski, “Niepodległość, spelnione marzenie,” Rzeczpospolita , May 14, 2005.

Quoted in Anna M. Cienciała, “11 listopada 1918 roku: Józef Piłsudski i niepodległość Polski,”

Przegląd Polski , November 8, 2002 . Online at <http://www.jpilsudski.org/artykuly-historyczne-pilsudski/
epizody-z-zycia-jozefa-pilsudskiego/item/2017-11-listopada-1918-roku-jozef-pilsudski-i-niepodleglosc-
polski >. For German interests in establishing a close working relationship with Pilsudski, see Kazimierz
Badziak, W oczekiwaniu na przełom: Na drodze od odrodzenia do załamania państwa polskiego (Łódź: ibidem,
2004), 28–30.

is according to Adam Koc, inter alia, see Wacław Jędrzejewicz, Kronika życia Józefa Piłsudskiego,

1867–1935. Vol. I: 1867–1920 (London: Polish Cultural Foundation, 1977), I, 387.

Independence Day

longer of use or interest. Hurriedly, the Warsaw POW had placed placards in the
city announcing Piłsudski’s arrival.

Piłsudski was met at the station by one of the

regents, Zdzisław Prince Lubomirski, as well as a group of his lieutenants, includ-
ing Adam Koc, commander of the Warsaw POW. Koc was adamant that he spoke
fi rst in greeting Piłsudski; a symbolic gesture whereby he would be welcomed to
the capital by a POW rather than a German appointee.

Lubomirski was in a state of agitation, and his meeting with Piłsudski made it

clear that he was not prepared to negotiate from a position of strength, but to
welcome Piłsudski as a deus ex machina. Th

e regents had recognized Piłsudski’s

singular standing in October by appointing him as Minister of War, without tell-
ing him.

Lubomirski is quoted as saying: “Finally you have arrived! What’s going

on here, what’s going on?”

It seems that Lubomirski, the most signifi cant of the

three regents, and the only one in good health in November, wanted only some
graceful way of exiting from history: “No one was in charge.”

Later, Lubomirski

took Piłsudski aside and spoke to him “ardently . . . Pole to Pole” telling him that
only he could save Poland. Lubomirski said he was prepared to transfer all power
to Piłsudski, who must be the victor [zwyciężcą musi być]. Lubomirski’s wife noted
that Piłsudski was already referring to himself as a legend, and that the “psychosis
of the moment” was promoting his status as savior of the nation.

ere were no

crowds or bands at the station, only a blind Jewish fi ddler playing “My, Pierwsza
Brygada.”

e signifi cance of Piłsudski’s arrival was considerable.

His devotees hailed it

as a providential event averting a civil war, calming the Right whilst pacifying the
Left. He literally had power thrust upon him by virtually all factions, who saw in
him the alternative to chaos or worse.

He was, in the words of Eugeniusz

Kwiatkowski, “the symbol of a state arising from a century of slavery . . . under the
impress of his overpowering personality all anarchy and chaos visibly began to
recede.”

Włodzimierz Kalicki argues that “all” saw him as a “savior.”

Wyszczulski, Listopad 1918, 145 .

See Adam Koc, “Przyjazd Józefa Piłsudskiego do Warszawy 10 listopada 1918 roku,” Niepodległość ,

7 (1962), 228 et passim.

Mieczysław Pruszyński, Tajemnica Piłsudskiego (Warsaw: Polska Ofi cyna Wydawnicza, 1996),

88–9.

Quoted in Włodzimierz Kowalski, Rok 1918 (Warsaw: Krajowa Agencja Wydawnicza, 1978),

138.

See “Jak uwolniono przed osmium laty Marszałka Piłsudskiego z Magdeburga? ,” Illustrowany

Kurjer Codzienny [hereafter IKC ] (Kraków), November 4, 1926, 4.

“Z dziennika Marii Lubomirskiej, żony księcia Zdzisława Lubomirskiego, członka Rady Regen-

cyjnej,” Rzeczpospolita , November 10, 2005.

“Jak Warszawa witała Marszałka,” Życie Warszawy , November 11, 2008.

For press reaction see Andrzej Stawarz, “Pierwsze dni wolności: Warszawa od 10 do 18 listopada

1918 r. Wybór materiałów prasowych,” Niepodległość i Pamięć, 13 (1998), 245–339.

Henryk Józewski, “Zamiast pamiętnika,” Zeszyty Historycne , 59 (1982), 81

Eugeniusz Kwiatkowski, W takim żylismy świecie (Kraków: Znak, 1990), 35.

Wlodzimierz Kalicki, “Tydzień weselny,” Gazeta Wyborcza , November 10, 2008. For similar

reactions see the quotations in Mirosława Połaszewska and Magdalena Woltanowska, “Pisarze o
odzyskaniu niepodległości,” Niepodległość i Pamięć , 13 (1998), 227–36.

Discovering Independence Day

e next few days are most confused. Small numbers may have greeted Piłsudski’s

arrival on the 10th, but by the 11th Warsaw “lived in the streets.”

Piłsudski held

discussion with Lubomirski and the other regents, and with his lieutenants in the
POW as well as representatives of the Daszyński government in Lublin, which
Piłsudski regarded as having complicated his position immeasurably. Although
Daszyński and Śmigły-Rydz accepted Piłsudski’s authority, the episode remains
controversial.

By naming him the commander of Polish armed forces, the short-

lived Lublin authorities had done Piłsudski more harm than good because of their
own impotence and political radicalism. Piłsudski needed to establish himself as a
supra-factional national leader, and any association with a group of radical leftists
with a paper government did nothing to enlarge his standing.

Moreover, for sym-

bolic reasons, his authority must be associated with the capital, Warsaw, not pro-
vincial Lublin.

Piłsudski made a number of public appearances including—what was especially

important—a meeting with representatives of the disintegrating and thoroughly
demoralized German civil and military administration, whose forces numbered at
least 80,000 in the Warsaw area.

His negotiations with the German Soldiers’

Council [Soldatenrat] on November 10th and 11th, whereby he promised them
safe conduct back to Germany in exchange for abandoning their weapons, was a
major coup.

He never referred to the Lublin authorities in his actions and

described himself in terms both vague and grand, as “the representative of the
Polish nation.”

As the Germans were either disarmed—occasionally with sharp

fi ghting—or simply abandoned their posts, Warsaw fell increasingly under Polish
control. Th

e POW played the major role here, and although there was sporadic

M. Jankowski quoted in “Piłsudski, szał radości i znikające klejnoty,” Gazeta Krakowska ,

November 11, 2008.

See Friszke, “Ignacy Daszyński, 79–80. Wojdaliński has argued that the Lublin government

actually was a political asset for Piłsudski; see Wojdaliński, “Jeszcze o powstaniu Tymczasowego Rządu
Ludowego (7.XI.1918 r.),” 74–5. Piłsudski did not confi rm Śmigły-Rydz’s status as general and he rose
to this rank only on the 21st, at Piłsudski’s nomination. Th

is can be interpreted either as a gesture of

displeasure by Piłsudski or an eff ort to confer greater legitimacy on one of his lieutenants. Th

e fact that

Piłsudski also elevated Kazimierz Sosnkowski, a man he esteemed greatly, to the rank of general on the
same day, suggests the latter explanation.

Subsequently, the November 7th anniversary was recalled with sporadic and increasingly

esoteric attention. Th

e Left made occasional reference to it as the harbinger of a subsequently unful-

fi lled progressive social agenda; see for example the tenth anniversary proclamations by various
peasant parties collected in Stanisław Kowalczyk and Aleksander Łuczak, eds., Pisma ulotne stron-
nictw ludowych w Polsce 1895–1939 (Kraków: Ludowa Spóldzielnia Wydawnicza, 1971), 148–50 ,
docs. 276–9. Th

e commemorations seem to have been the work of members of the Polish People’s

Party-Liberation [Polskie Stronnic two Ludowe-Wyzwolenie] and restricted to Warsaw and Lublin.
Upon arriving, Piłsudski initially thought of going to Lublin to investigate matters there; see Dor-
ota Truszczak and Andrzej Sowa, Drogi do niepodległej, 1918 (Warsaw: Bellona, 2008), 257.

is is the fi gure given in the recent work of Piotr Łossowski, Jak Feniks z popiołów: Oswobodzenia

ziem polskich spod okupacji w listopadzie 1918 (Łowicz: Mazowiecka Wyższa Szkoła Humanistyczno-
Pedagogiczna, 1998), 9.

Lech Królikowski and Krzysztof Oktabiński, Warszawa, 1914–1920 (Warsaw: Wydawnictwa

Akademickie i Profesjonalne, 2008), 152–3 . Badziak, W oczekiwaniu , 30.

For example in his meeting with the German Soldiers’ Council early in the morning of November

11th; see Jędrzejewicz, Kronika , I, 389 .

Independence Day

fi ghting as late as the 14th, the POW had seized all the key points in the city on
the 11th.

is agreement with the Germans was vital to the establishment of

Polish control in Warsaw.

Władysław Broniewski, the poet and legionnaire,

described that day as when Piłsudski became “Dictator.”

A humble POW recruit

recalled the 11th this way: “Th

is day of happiness and merriment should be the

National Holiday.”

If any one act established Polish independence, it was this

freeing of the capital from German control.

e POW had prepared an elaborate plan for the disarming of all the troops of the

Central Powers in both Austrian and German occupied Poland.

is was a monu-

mental task given the disproportion of forces. Although the POW and the several other
organizations that aided in the undertaking had considerable numbers and extraordi-
nary enthusiasm, they were virtually without arms. Moreover, with perhaps 15,000
total members, the POW was dwarfed by the German and Austrians forces nearby.

However, disarming the Germans proved a widespread phenomenon and pro-

ceeded with relative ease. General Stanisław Skwarczyński, who commanded the
POW in Łódź, drew this conclusion:

In Łódź, just as in all places that there was a German garrison, the movement to dis-
arm began spontaneously always on the morning of November 11th.

I cannot explain this fact otherwise than that the news of the freeing of Commandant
Piłsudski and his arrival in Warsaw was the call to action.

e regents were in a quandary. Th

ey were painfully aware of their lack of popular

support and reputation as German puppets. Moreover, the disintegration of German
control in Warsaw and the breakdown of law and order had resulted in circumstances
they were powerless to manage. Lubomirski later recalled: “all parties, from the most
radical Right to the Left wanted us to give Piłsudski control.”

At fi rst, the regents

Truszczak and Sowa, Drogi , 261 . A Piłsudskiite source certainly makes this claim; see Wacław Lipiński,

Walka zbrojna o niepodległość Polski w latach 1905–1918

(Warsaw: Volumen, 1990 [1935]), 169ff .

Mieczysław Pruszyński makes the point that Piłsudski’s long-established working relations with the Ger-
mans made him uniquely qualifi ed to negotiate their departure. Dmowski or Paderewski, who spent the
war in the anti-German camp, could not have played this crucial role; see Pruszyński, Tajemnica , 106–13 .

e disarming of the Germans throughout Poland and the establishment of Polish authority in

November is a very complex story, which has produced a large literature; see the summary in Piotr
Łossowski and Piotr Stawecki, Listopad 1918 we wspomnieniach i relacjach  (Warsaw: Ministerstwo
Obrony Narodowej, 1988), 5ff  ; Norbert Michta, Polityczne uwarunkowania narodzin Drugiej Rze-
czypospolitej   ( listopad 1918–styczeń 1919)  (Warsaw: Książka i Wiedza, 1980), 57ff .

For Piłsudski’s orders regarding the disarming of the Germans on the night of the 10th see

Tadeusz Święcicki, “Ze wspomnień o Adamie Kocu,” Niepodległość , 8 (1972), 177–8. “Z dziennika:
dwa dni sto lat,” Rzeczpospolita , November 10, 2005.

Jan Mazurek, “Wspomnienia chłopa-peowiaka,” Niepodległość , 2(2) (1930), 298–9.

Marceli Handelsman insisted upon this many years ago as the central event in a welter of factors

which, in essence, made Poland free; see his “Odkąd Polska jest państwem niepodległym?,”
Niepodległość , 5, 305.

Nałęcz, Polska Organizacja Wojskowa, 170ff .

Łossowski, Jak Feniks , 27ff .

Stanisław Skwarczyński, “Rozbrojenie niemców w Łodzi w listopadzie 1918 r.” Niepodległość, 8

(1972), 158.

Lubomirski made these remarks in 1923; see Andrzej Garlicki , Józef Piłsudski, 1867–1935

(Warsaw: Czytelnik, 1990), 202.

Discovering Independence Day

ceded to Piłsudski only certain formal authority. He was entrusted with command of
the armed forces on the evening of the 11th, an authority he already was exercising
de facto.

e rudiments of the emerging army were legionnaires and POW mem-

bers: hence November 11th is, among other things, the birth of the Polish army.

Simultaneously, the regents included this singular condition that, after the for-

mation of a new government—which in a separate note Piłsudski was requested to
undertake—Piłsudski would promise to occupy the position of commander of the
armed forces.

By this step, the regents—all three conservative monarchists—

joined the radical leftists in Lublin as recognizing Piłsudski as the pre-ordained
military leader of Poland, regardless of its government. Although we are not privy
to Piłsudski’s thoughts in these crucial days, it seemed he bided his time wishing to
maneuver to gain mastery over the situation without acquiring any debts of grati-
tude to anyone in the process.

is is well-illustrated by his refusal to embrace the red fl ag of socialism during

leftist manifestations in Warsaw on the 11th. Piłsudski announced that he wished
to represent all Poles not just one political faction. Th

e supra-party image charac-

teristic of the legion days was continued on the 11th.

Piłsudski met with various political and minority groups including Jewish fac-

tions.

Representatives of several organizations were present and made a number

of proposals. One Jewish historian referred to November 11th as being a “histori-
cal day” for both Poles and Jews. Assimilationists spoke of themselves as “Jews who
are Poles.” Th

is would have been impossible for an endecja government.

ree days later, on November 14th, the regents took their fi nal action and

declared that the confusion of the situation was dangerous and hence they entrusted
“responsibility before the nation” to Piłsudski, granting him thereby total power,
although on the basis of what authority of their own is not clear.

Piłsudski

responded two days later by informing the major powers of “the existence of an

e regents made it clear that he was being appointed only commander of the armed forces,

nothing more, on November 11th; “Rada Regencyjna do Narodu Polskiego,” in Dziennik Praw
Państwa Polskiego , November 29, 1918, No. 17, poz. 38. See Daria and Tomasz Nałęcz, “Józef
Piłsudski, Naczelnik Państwa, 22 XI 1918–14 XII 1922,” in Chojnowski and Wróbel, eds., Prezydenci
i premierzy, 22 .

Wyszczulski , Listopad 1918 , 145 .

See Władysław Pobóg-Malinowski, Najnowsza historia polityczna Polski, Tom drugi, 1914–1939 ,

2nd edn. (London: B. Świderski, 1967), 145.

A good summary of Piłsudski’s actions is Suleja, Piłsudski , 174ff . Cf. Bronisław Hełczyński, “Józef

Piłsudski jako Naczelnik Państwa (listopad 1918-grudzień 1922), Niepodległość , 9 (1974), 289ff .

Rafał Żebrowski, “Rocznica odzyskania niepodległości,” online at

<http://wort.free.ngo.pl/

archiv/02-222324/menu_02_01.html>.  Janusz Cisek calculates that Pilsudski met with twenty-three
delegations and numerous individuals on the 10th alone; this continued the next day; see his   Kalen-
darium działalności Józefa Piłsudskiego  (New York: Piłsudski Institute of America, 1992), 78–9 .

Joseph Marcus, Social and Political History of the Jews in Poland, 1919–1939 (Amsterdam: Mou-

ton, 1983), 293–4 . Marcus mistakenly refers to the meeting occurring in 1919; Janusz Pajewski,
Budowa Drugiej Rzeczypospolitej, 1918–1926 (Kraków: Polska Akademia Umiejętności, 1995), 175 .
Piłsudski did not make commitments but promised to consider the issues raised.

Halina Janowska and Tadeusz Jędruszczak, eds., Powstanie II Rzeczypospolitej: Wybór dokumentów,

1866–1925 (Warsaw: LSW, 1984), 440 . Maria Lubomirska, Zdzisław’s wife, noted that by November
12th the regency government had “really ceased to exist”: in “Z dziennika.”

Independence Day

independent Polish state.”

He did so without any date of its inception being

noted, and he issued this announcement in his capacity as “commander in chief of
the Polish army” not as head of any government, which in fact did not exist.

document, which more than any other announced the rebirth of Poland, gives us
no birth date and indicates no parents. Only on the 18th did the fi rst modern
Polish government, presided over by Jędrzej Moraczewski—a friend of Piłsudski
and acting at his behest—hold its fi rst meeting. It was only on November 22nd
that Piłsudski declared, Napoleonically: “As the Provisional head of State, I assume
supreme authority in the Polish Republic, and I shall exercise it until the summon-
ing of the Legislative Parliament.”

Meanwhile, the abortive Daszyński eff ort in

Lublin had politely agreed to relegate itself to historical footnotes, not without
Piłsudski’s encouragement.

Piłsudski enjoyed the title of Chief of State and eff ec-

tive control of the only instrument that mattered, the army. He ran Poland until
retiring, unhappily, in 1923. He later returned, but that’s another story.

ere is a famous account, perhaps apocryphal, about Piłsudski telling his erst-

while socialist colleagues that he did not wish to claim power on behalf of the Left,
but saw his responsibilities as embracing all Polish factions. Th

is is the moment that

he explained that from the red tram of socialism he departed at the stop marked
“independence.” Quite apart from the signifi cance of this event for Piłsudski’s career
as a socialist, it has great signifi cance for how he saw November 11th.

On November 29th, addressing a number of loyalists, Piłsudski commented on

the socialist disappointment with his remarks about departing from the socialist
agenda. He concluded: “Th

ey did not see that November 11th is not only one stop

among many along the line of our political life, but the border stop between two
eras: the epoch of slavery, and the epoch of independent life. . . . It is the greatest,
most signifi cant change which can occur in the life of a nation.”

Two things are certain about the circumstance of Poland’s rebirth in 1918. First,

its exact moment is far from clear; second, the chronology is intimately connected
with the activities of Piłsudski. In 1923 Piłsudski, with his characteristic feigned
nonchalance, commented on his own role in these events:

In November 1918 something happened not the least historical, just a typical event . . . a
man walked from the Vienna station who, it turns out, was named Józef Piłsudski. In
the course of the next several days, without any eff orts on the part of this man, with-
out any pressure, plotting [podkopu] or any kind of permission, something most
untypical occurred. Th

is man became a dictator.

Jan Nowak-Jeziorański argued that Piłsudski considered the 16th to be Poland’s real Independence

Day, but he off ers no proof; see Jan Nowak-Jeziorański, “Z domu niewoli: Urodziny III Rzeczpospolitej,”
Wprost, March 5, 2003.

Janowska and Jędruszczak, Powstanie , 441–2; cf. Daria and Tomasz Nałęcz, Józef Piłsudski—

legendy i fakty . (Warsaw: MAW, 1986), 22.

For the decree of November 22nd see Kazimierz. W. Kumaniecki, Odbudowa państwowości pol-

skiej. Najwazniejsze dokumenty 1912–styczeń 1924 (Warsaw: Czernecki, 1924), 136.

See Friszke, “Ignacy Daszyński,” 80ff .

Bogusław Miedziński, “Wspomnienia,” Zeszyty Historyczne 37 (1976), 170.

From a speech by Piłsudski in July 1923, reprinted in Z. Zygmuntowicz, ed., Józef Piłsudski o

sobie (Warsaw: Omnipress, [1929] 1989), 91.

Discovering Independence Day

Whereas Piłsudski only received certain powers from the regents late on the 11th
and in full on the 14th, he exercised it de facto at the moment of his arrival on the
10th. Th

e 11th is a day when the regents granted Piłsudski powers he already had,

and which they had no moral and scarce legal authority to bestow. Th

e 11th coin-

cided with the armistice on the Western Front and hence signifi ed the defeat of the
last of the three partitioning powers, Germany, and was hence the symbolic end of
the partition era. Armistice Day and Polish Independence are not just coincidental
occurrences. However, as Piłsudski told us, the 11th is the decisive day in modern
Polish history because it symbolized the end of slavery and the beginning of inde-
pendence: it was a day important not for what happened, but for what it repre-
sented. Piłsudski created the nucleus of army; and the army created Poland, as Jan
Nowak-Jeziorański noted in 1968.

It is Piłsudski, and not Dmowski or Paderewski, who is linked with November

11th, despite the fact that these two fi gures are certainly patriarchs of modern
Poland and deserve a good deal of credit for Poland’s re-appearance on the map of
Europe. Dmowski was most successful in gaining support for the Polish National
Committee (Komitet Narodowy Polski, KNP); he created and dominated the
broad support of the Western powers—including the United States—in the clos-
ing stages of the war. But Dmowski’s National Committee was never recognized as
the provisional or exile government of Poland—something that Tomaš Masaryk
was able to obtain in the case of the Czechs. Nor was Dmowski in Poland at the
crucial moment when the war ended and authority in Poland was still fl uid and
capable of being grasped and shaped. Similarly, Paderewski, whose charismatic
eloquence did much to make Poland a “good cause” in the West, particularly the
United States, was also far from Warsaw when the capital was re-emerging from
foreign occupation. By the time Paderewski returned to Poland, the best he could
arrange with Piłsudski was the position of Prime Minister—a post to which he was
preposterously unsuited and from which he resigned an embittered and much
disappointed man less than a year later. Piłsudski was Chief of State and com-
mander of the army, the real positions of power.

Besides, no matter how successful Dmowski had been in Western Europe, or

Paderewski in the US, no foreign power could grant Poland its independence; or,
perhaps better stated, no independence granted by a foreign power would ever be
fully satisfying to the Poles: something the communists would discover after 1944
when they tried to rouse Poles to commemorate what amounts to the Soviet grant-
ing of Polish independence—its other shortcomings notwithstanding. To be a
national holiday, the commemorated independence had to be something the Poles
crafted by themselves.

Only Piłsudski was in the right spot at the right time.

may well quibble about the actual work he contributed to the project of Polish
independence, but he was the best situated to receive any credit available.

Jan Nowak-Jeziorański, “11 listopada, ” Zwoje, 8(12), 1998 . Online at <http://www.zwoje-

scrolls.com/zwoje12/text02p.htm> ; reprinted from November 24, 1968 publication Na Atenie.

Miedziński makes the point that it was a cardinal failure of Dmowski’s to seek Polish independence

from the Western Powers rather than establish it at Warsaw; see Miedziński, “Wspomnienia,” 156–7.

Wojdaliński, “Jeszcze o powstaniu Tymczasowego Rządu Ludowego (7.XI.1918),” 63–4 .

Independence Day

November 11th is Piłsudskiite by necessity, and the only argument is over the

degree to which this is so. Th

is meant that November 11th became politically par-

tisan from its inception, and symbolized less a certain date than a certain historio-
graphical and political tradition. Th

is was the date that sanctifi ed a certain schema

to explain Poland’s rebirth. First, that it was essentially a Polish national project,
the Poles the effi

cient cause, and that other factors were preparatory, merely the

material causes. Second, that the chief agency by which this result was worked was
the Polish military: the legions and, at the ultimate stage, the POW; and here we
should understand the military less as an organized body of troops and more as the
focusing of a re-animation of the martial spirit. Warsaw—and nowhere else—was
the site of the rebirth of independence, and disarming the Germans freed the city.
Finally, and centrally, the directing will was Piłsudski, who thus becomes the archi-
tect, indeed the demiurge of modern Poland. Wieniawa-Długoszowski, perhaps
the most passionate Piłsudskiite of them all, epitomized this interpretation in his
memoirs:

November 11, 1918 arrived. A day of liberty and freedom, disarming the Germans
and the Commandant’s return from captivity, and, at the same time for both him and
all of Poland the day of the fruits of his extraordinarily far-seeing preparations.

Jan Lechoń, soon to become Poland’s leading poet, who had been working on a
long poem fi lled with often dark allusions to Poland’s past, was overcome by the
events of November 11th. An ardent devotee of Piłsudski, he suff ered a virtual
breakdown and, in a state of extreme agitation wrote the last portion of the “Crim-
son Poem” [poemat], entitled simply, “Piłsudski.”

Lechoń was a great artist; Wieniawa an intellectual as well as a soldier, an offi

cer,

and a gentleman, scion of the landed gentry. Wincenty Solek was a humble forester
who lived and died in obscurity. He remembered the 11th this way:

After years of slavery Poland was Free. All the patriots’ paths converged at one place
whose name was Independence. Th

e man who embodied it was Józef Piłsudski.

e military overtone of Piłsudski’s claim on Polish loyalties on November 11th is

illustrated by a contemporary who noted “each of us considers himself a soldier—
and thereby is subordinate to You.”

Regent Lubomirski’s wife recorded in her

diary: “Th

is day belongs to history, to the unforgettable, to the happy, to the tri-

umphant.”

For Jan Belcikowski it was more: November 11th was to Poland what

Easter was to the Christian faith.

Roman Loth, ed., Bolesław Wieniawa-Długoszowski, Wymarsz i inne wspomnienia (Warsaw: Biblioteka Więzi,

1992), 229 .

See Liliana Osses Adams, “Jan Lechoń, poeta romantyczny,” Zwoje , 3 (28), 2001, online at

<http://www.zwoje-scrolls.com/zwoje28/text04p.htm> , 6–7.

See Wincenty Solek, Pamiętnik legionisty (Warsaw: Instytut Wydawniczy Pax, 1988), 252.

Jan z Marnowa, Tygodnik Ilustrowany (Warsaw), November 16, 1918.

Quoted in Pajewski, Budowa Drugiej Rzeczypospolitej , 38 .

Jan Belcikowski, Dzień triumfu Ducha 11 listopada 1918 (Warsaw: Komitet propagandy czynu

polskiego, nd), 19.

Discovering Independence Day

Marian Romeyko, Przed i po maju , 3rd edn. (Warsaw: Ministerstwo Obrony Narodowej, 1967), 81.

As early as 1922, Irena Panenkowa described the Piłsudskiites as those who regarded their hero

as “the creator of Polish independence, the moral ideal, a living standard, a symbol, the greatest
contemporary Pole, and one of the greatest, and possibly simply the greatest Pole in history”; quoted
in Nałęcz, Józef Piłsudski, 9–10. Th

is characterization, the authors argue, remained accurate two

generations later.

Even those who were not loyal to Piłsudski before 1918, and were his most

mordant critics afterwards, admitted the extraordinary power he commanded at
that moment. Marian Romeyko, a lifelong opponent noted:

On that day a large segment of society acknowledged Piłsudski as the savior of the
Fatherland, as the leader of the nation. On that day he secured recognition for himself
from everybody regardless of origin, profession, or religion, with lightening speed,
automatically, without any eff ort. . . . We forgot about everything that had been said
against Piłsudski. On that day we became his sincere partisans, blindly ready to obey
his orders with complete confi dence in the future . . . [Piłsudski] was a panacea, a uni-
versal remedy for every pain, every need, whether it be in Warsaw or in all of
Poland.

Such a historiosophical understanding of Polish independence was and is radically
divisive. In accepting it you become perforce a “Piłsudskiite,” not merely a sup-
porter of the Marshal but an acolyte.

November 11th is rendered simultaneously

a national holiday and a quasi-bonding ritual for the devotees of the Piłsudski cult.
However, for those who see Poland’s rebirth either as largely the work of other
forces or other men, November 11th becomes profoundly disquieting, its celebra-
tion seems a sort of political apostasy. Only the passage of time would allow
November 11th to lose its partisan Piłsudskiite elements and become assimilated
into Polish national mythology in which the specifi cs of partisan interpretation
lose their relevancy.

e symbols of the nascent Second Republic added to the specifi c coloration of

November 11th as a day of national remembrance. Th

e brief lived Republic pro-

claimed in Lublin on November 7th referred to itself by the word “Republika”
whereas the government in Warsaw, presided over by Piłsudski, adopted the old
Polish term “Rzeczpospolita” which, though also translated as “Republic” hearkens
back to the pre-partition “Rzeczpospolita,” which is frequently translated as “com-
monwealth” and is redolent with monarchical tradition and old Polish glory. Th

symbol of the Lublin Republic was the Polish White Eagle, but without its crown;
the Warsaw government after some brief dithering put the crown on the eagle and
thus symbolically reknit the torn fabric of Polish traditional sovereignty, something
the communists foolishly eschewed after 1944.

Hence, the early days both in fact and in symbol are closely associated with

Piłsudski. Th

e celebration of November 11th as Polish Independence Day is thus

heavily freighted with Piłsudskiite connotations, quite apart from the obvious sig-
nifi cance of the day as the birth of the Polish Second Republic. In the inter-war era
the day was celebrated with much pomp and circumstance, with military parades
as the central event. Th

e military’s role in these commemorations was central and

Contesting a National Myth, 1918–26

R I VA L S O F I N D E P E N D E N C E D AY

e ﬁ rst oﬃ

cial holiday in reborn Poland was May 3rd. It had been a church

commemoration for centuries, referring to the Virgin Mary as Queen of Poland,
although the date was only ﬁ xed as May 3rd—in honor of the Constitution—in
1916, purely as an ecclesiastical holiday. In 1919 it was announced as an oﬃ

cial

government holiday, and the Vatican gave its permission to celebrate May 3rd as
a syncretic holiday of Mary Queen of Poland and Constitution Day. It was a
traditional practice inseparably bound to the Catholic Church.

Soon, a new,

secular rival celebrating the birth of modern Poland would appear. May 3rd—with
its close association with the nobility (the parliament of the 1791 Rzeczpospolita)—
virtually disappeared from the calendar of the Polish Left.

e same association

caused the peasantry to reject the celebration.

On the Right, May 3rd was noted

without obvious enthusiasm and was rarely if ever suggested as an alternative to the
celebration of Independence Day—whenever or by what hand it was wrought.

On November 17th, 1918 the Polish political Right organized a large demon-

stration marking the restoration of Polish independence. Th

e festivities included a

parade led by the clergy and followed by veterans of various units going back to
1863–64. Th

e crowd cheered for references to the freeing of Great Poland [Wielko-

polska] from German rule and mentioned the “sons of Wielkopolska” as ideal
future leaders of Poland. Western Poland was the stronghold of the endecja. Other
references mentioned cities in contest with the Germans—even invoking the

Izabella Main, Trudne świętowanie: Konﬂ ikty wokół obchodów świąt państwowych i kościelnych

w Lublinie (1944–1989) (Warsaw: Trio, 2004), 46ﬀ . It should be borne in mind that May 3rd was
always associated with the church, with which the Piłsudskiites had frequently strained relations.

Jerzy Holzer, “Polski ruch robotniczy wobec tradycji Trzeciego Maja,” in Jerzy Kowecki, Sejm czteroletni

i jego tradycje (Warsaw: Państwowe Wydawnictwo Naukowe, 1991), 262–4. Michał Śliwał, “3 Maja w
poglądach polskich socjalistów do 1918 roku,” in Alina BarszczewskaKrupa, ed., Konstytucja 3 maja w
tradycji i kulturze polskiej (Łódź: Wydawnictwo Łódzkie, 1991) 169–70.

Andrzej Friszke, “Stosunek do tradycji Sejmu Czteroletniego w okresie Drugiej wojny światowej,”

in Kowecki, Sejm czteroletni , 297; Helena Brodowska, “Tradycja 3 Maja w ruchu ludowym,” in
Barszczewska-Krupa, Konstytucja 3 Maja , 192–3.

For the Right, the celebration of May 3rd did not go beyond the nineteenth century’s remem-

brance of the 3rd. and special signiﬁ cance was not attached to it: the Kościuszko insurrection received
more space; May 3rd had a degree of irrelevance for the Right; see Roman Wapiński, “Sejm czteroletni
i Konstytucja 3 Maja w endeckiej myśli politycznej,” in Kowecki, Sejm czteroletni , 276; cf. Jacek
M. Majchrowski, “3 Maja w koncepcjach narodowo-demokratycznych 1918–1939,” in Barszczewska-
Krupa, Konstytucja 3 Maja , 184–5.

Independence Day

Teutonic Knights—and the recent freeing of Lwów from the Ukrainians, which
was largely the work of rightist leadership. Th

e Lwów victory and the struggle

with the Germans over the western borders were the main focus of the Right’s
geopolitical attention.

is demonstration was, in embryo, the counterpoise to a Piłsudskiite under-

standing of the origins of Polish independence. No date was mentioned when
independence commenced—there is a focus on Polish–German problems, and
much space is given to military leaders known to be hostile to Piłsudski, such as
General Józef Dowbór-Muśnicki or the leaders of the Lwów ﬁ ghting. Th

ere is no

mention of Piłsudski or his legions. Th

us, even before Poland’s independence was

clearly established, the political Right was attempting to create a discourse on its
origins and meaning.

Piłsudski’s status as the author of Polish independence was symbolically acknowl-

edged every November for the ﬁ rst years of the Second Republic. In 1919 a com-
mittee of prominent citizens was organized to present a “national gift” to him on
the ﬁ rst anniversary of the restoration of the state. Th

e anniversary was noted,

brieﬂ y, in the parliamentary proceedings of the day. Th

e Piłsudskiites made much

of the event.

Indeed, there was some confusion about what was being commemorated on what

day. Much of Poland chose November 5th as the anniversary of independence—
the third anniversary of the Two Emperors’ proclamation of 1916. Th

e rightist

press in Warsaw chose to warn readers not to celebrate on the 7th because that
marked the anniversary of Daszyński’s Lublin “Republika” of that day, a leftist
aﬀ air that the Gazeta Warszawska referred to as “stupidity.”

e Piłsudskiites

lamely tried to salvage some positive historical meaning for the day because of its
indirect linkage to their hero.

e committee appointed to arrange the commem-

oration issued a proclamation on November 8th but did not mention a day appro-
priate for the celebration.

See the printed proclamation and associated documents entitled “Obchód Narodowy 17 listo-

pada,” in Rocznice i obchody odzyskanie niepodległości, -1930. IM [sic], Dokumenty życia społecznego
[DZS], Biblioteka Narodowa, Warsaw (hereinafter DZS). Th

ere is also some detail provided in

“Pochód narodowy,” in Andrzej Stawarz, ed., Święto Niepodległości—tradycja a współczesność   (Warsaw:
Muzeum Niepodległości, 2003), 114–16 . For a discussion of the Right’s counter-discourse to the
Piłsudskiites, see Urszula Jakubowska, “Publicystyka Narodowej Demokracji wobec Józefa Piłsudskiego
w okresie międzywojennym” in Marek Jabłonowski and Elżbieta Kossewska, eds., Piłsudski na łamach
i w opiniach prasy polskiej, 1918–1989  (Warsaw: Instytut Dziennikarstwa Uniwerstetu Warszawskiego,
2005),  97–118.

e Marshal of the Sejm made a speech marking the anniversary of independence to open the

parliament on November 12th, 1919; see Sprawozdanie stenograﬁ czne z 97 posiedzenia Sejmu Ustawo-
dawczego z dnia 12 listopada 1919 r , 1. Regarding the gift see “Naród nagrodzi swego Naczelnika i
wodza,” Kurier Polski , November 11, 1919, 1–2; “Dar narodowy dla Józefa Piłsudskiego,” Gazeta
Polska , November 11, 1919, 1; Bolesław Limanowski, Pamiętnik, 1919–1928 (Warsaw: Książka i
Wiedza, 1973), 21, 42.

Stanisław Saborski, “W rocznicę zamachu lubelskiego,” Gazeta Warszawska , November 8, 1919, 3–4.

“W rocznicę,” Gazeta Polska , November 9, 1919, 2.

“Odezwa Komitetu Organizacyjnego Obchodu Narodowego,” November 8, 1919 in Mirosława

Pałaszewska, Święto Niepodległości: Katalog wystawy (Warsaw: Muzeum Niepodległości, 2004), 23.

Contesting a National Myth

In the capital, November 9th, 1919 was the chief day of observance—noting the

anniversary was the collapse of Germany and the initial disarming of the occupation
garrison, the “anniversary of liberation.” Th

e day was chosen because it was a Sunday

and workers were free to participate. A morning mass, parades, decorated buildings,
prominent participants (including the French Military Attaché), and the ﬁ ring of
salvos were all part of the day. Innumerable groups marched in the parade, includ-
ing Protestant, Uniate, and Jewish representatives. At the “Akademia,” following the
parade, the chairman of the city council speciﬁ cally mentioned Piłsudski as the hero
of the day.

Since Piłsudski had not yet returned to Warsaw by the 9th, he was not

included in the events being marked. November 11th was largely ignored; the 9th
was declared the “apotheosis of Poland’s liberation” by Piłsudski’s opponents. Th

press, more favorable to Piłsudski, argued that the 9th was perhaps not the best
occasion for the celebrations and hoped that the 11th would gradually emerge as a
national holiday. For the Piłsudskiites, the 11th was already ﬁ xed: because Piłsudski’s
return (and not the earlier events) really spelled the end of occupation. In fact,
Antoni Langer argued that by 1919 there was already a legend surrounding the
“Leader of the Poles,” who displayed a “hero’s talismanic power.”

Piłsudski and Prime Minister Paderewski did not attend the capital’s festivities

on the 9th due to illness. However, it was obvious that two dates were emerging as
candidates for the national holiday: the 9th, which marked the beginning of the
liberation from the German garrison in Warsaw; and the 11th, which celebrated
Piłsudski’s return and the end of occupation. Th

ere was thus a Piłsudskiite candi-

date for Independence Day but it was far from universally accepted.

e hero

remained silent about his own celebration: it was not yet a national event. In 1919,
he was not even in Warsaw but in Wilno, where he attended the re-inauguration
of the university there.

N OV E M B E R 1 1 T H I S C H O S E N

On October 22nd, 1920, formal recognition of November 11th as Independence
Day was proclaimed by the authorities in a public memorandum circulated by the
aptly named “Bureau of Internal Propaganda of the Praesidium of [przy] the

Pałaszewska, Święto Niepodległości, 5–6.

See Gazeta Polska , edited by the Piłsudski devotee Adam Skwarczyński, issues for November 9,

10, and 11. For the Langer article see “Narodziny legendy o ‘Naczelniku Polaków,’ ” Gazeta Polska ,
November 11, 1919, 2.

See “Jak Warszawa obchodził będzie rocznicę Wyzwolenia,” Gazeta Polska , November 8, 1919, 2;

“Dziesiejsze Święto narodowe,” November 9, 1–2; “Rocznica wyzwolenia,” November 9, 2; “Program
dziś. Obchodzi” November 9, 2; “Obchód rocznicy Wyzwolenia,” November 10, 1–2; “Rozważania
rocznicowe,” November 13, 4 in Kurjer Polski ; and the following articles from Gazeta Warszawska : “W
rocznicę wyzwolenia,” November 10, 3; “Święto narodów w Zagłębiu,” November 13, 8.

See Zygmunt Kaczmarek, Marszałkowie Senatu II Rzeczypospolitej (Warsaw: Wydawnictwo

Sejmowe, 1992), 86 . Th

e university had its own celebration day: November 20th, when the Polish

Army had taken the city; see the document marked “Rektor i Senat Uinwersytetu Stefana Batorego”
in Rocznice i obchody odzyskanie niepodległości, -1930. IM [sic], DZS.

Independence Day

Council of Ministers in Warsaw.” Th

e document made a number of points.

First,

independence would be celebrated on the 14th (Sunday) because the 11th was a
workday and the country could not aﬀ ord the cost. What would be marked was,
bluntly, “the assumption of power by the current Chief of State.” However, since
all of Poland did not agree on the date of emancipation [data wyzwolenia], “we are
selecting it [the 11th] temporarily” [na razie] because that day that was when
“Warsaw, the capital of Poland, was freed from the enemy.” Th

e committee created

to celebrate the second anniversary of independence speciﬁ cally named the 11th as
the rebirth of Poland.

e document appended a model speech to be used on the occasion by all gov-

ernmental agencies, as well as the texts of several verses: Konopnicka’s “Rota,”
“Ojczyzna” (of unstated authorship), and the “Połaniec Universal” from the
Kościuszko era. Also included was a poem by a farmer named Jan Żelazowski, from
Russian Poland, entitled: “Honor to the Chief of State Piłsudski” [Cześć Naczel-
nikowi Piłsudskiemu]. Th

e speech noted the tradition of struggle for independ-

ence, of which Piłsudski and the legions were “the latest example of the Polish
sword.” Although the document mentioned Wincenty Witos, the pre-eminent
peasant leader, it was overwhelmingly devoted to Piłsudski.

e Żelazowski poem, with its Stalinesque adulation, deserves to be quoted in

extenso as it obviously reﬂ ected what the Bureau considered the proper contextual-
ization of the celebration:

O brave leader, devoted to the people
Surrounded today by our love
Today in you is embodied the great idea
Poland gave birth to you as its leader.

You are the knight, the true warrior
You are the helmsman of our Polish land.
Lead us, lead, our dear leader
So that our hopes would be fulﬁ lled.

With Piłsudski ﬁ rmly in charge in 1920, the government thus created a paradigm
for a Piłsudkiite Independence Day. It would be on the 11th—which was noted as
marking the ousting of the Germans and Piłsudski’s accession to power; and
Piłsudski and his legions, the embodiment of the Polish tradition of ﬁ ghting for
independence, were the central actors. Piłsudski himself, as depicted in Żelazowski’s
poorly written poem, was the unique and providential leader of Poland.

Unless otherwise noted, all references to this document are derived from the publication entitled

“Biuro Propagandy Wewnętrznej przy Prezydjum Rady Ministrów w Warszawie” dated October 22nd,
1920 and issued over the signature of J. St. Szczerbiński, secretary of the Praesidium. A copy of this
can be found in the unsorted ﬁ les of DZS.

See “Odezwa Komitetu Obchodu Drugiej Rocznicy 11-go Listopada 1918 roku” in Pałaszewska,

Święto Niepodległości, 23.

See note 14 above.

Contesting a National Myth

Another event to mark 1920 was the formal conferring on Piłsudski of the

baton [buława] of Marshal of Poland.

e circumstances explain the very martial

aspects of the celebration. Under Piłsudski’s leadership, the Poles had been victori-
ous over the Bolsheviks in the decisive “Battle of Warsaw” (August 13th–25th, 1920)
that preceded the spectacular cavalry victory at Komarów (August 31st). Following
these victories, the Poles pursued the Russians, winning a series of major encoun-
ters in the Niemen campaign (September–October). Th

us ﬁ ghting was continuing

within days of the anniversary of independence. Piłsudski had been the author of
the greatest Polish military victory in centuries, a victory whose authorship the
Right would contest then and later. Independence Day was thus the conclusion to
a series of triumphs over a traditional enemy in a war that threatened the very exist-
ence of the state. Th

e pro-Piłsudski press understandably marked the 11th as the

anniversary of Warsaw’s liberation from the Germans but considered it merely one
day among several to note.

e 14th was essentially a ‘Military Celebration’ [Uroczystość wojskowa] focused

on Piłsudski’s new rank.

is action was explained by Piłsudskiites as confering

a military symbol onto someone who represented the fact that Poland regained its
independence by its own eﬀ orts, not through the actions of foreigners. It was
“armed action” that brought freedom and the “propagator, leader, and embodi-
ment” of this action was Piłsudski; his reception of the buława epitomized this
understanding of the manner by which Poland regained its independence: by itself,
and manu militari . Th

e close intertwining of state and army was demonstrated

by playing both the national anthem and “legionnaire songs” at the reception.

e 14th ended with Piłsudski convivially visiting the soldiers of the garrison in

their barracks.

A special committee was formed, including prominent ﬁ gures from both the

political and cultural world, and issued a proclamation with this striking passage:

He, who at the ﬁ rst call of the war stood at the ready to dedicate his life to resuscitate
the fatherland; who, in penal servitude and prison gave his own freedom for the free-
dom of the fatherland; who, with an eﬀ ort of indefatigable belief in the face of reality,
created the reality of the fatherland. He is the builder of Poland’s tomorrow.

e fatherland will not allow itself to be deceived [Ojczyzna wyszachrować się nie da]

the nation says to Józef Piłsudski.

In keeping with this conclusion, the committee insisted that henceforth the 10th,
the day of the “builder’s” return, was the true Independence Day, the day of the

For comments about the 1920 conferral of the “buława” symbolizing his new rank of Marshal,

see Bolesław Limanowski, Pamiętnik, 1919–1928 (Warsaw: Książka i Wiedza, 1973) , 21, 42; cf.
“Wręczenie buławy Józefowi Piłsudskiemu,” Kurjer Polski , November 9, 1920, 2; and, from a rightist
perspective, “Kronika,” Gazeta Warszawska , November 14, 1920, 2.

“Słoneczna wieść o Wyzwoleniu,” Kurjer Poranny , November 11, 1920, 2.

“Uroczystość wojskowa,” Kurjer Polski , November 12, 1920, 2.

“Święto czynu wyzwoleńczego,” Kurjer Polski , November 15, 1920, 1.

A convenient summary of the planned day’s events is “Uroczystość 14 listopada,” Kurjer Poranny ,

November 10, 1920, 2.

Ibid.

Independence Day

“Victory and Resurrection” of Poland. On the 10th, “the tireless ﬁ ghter for the
country’s freedom returned from Magdeburg.” Th

is was therefore the day independ-

ence should be marked.

It is noteworthy that the committee chose the 10th and

not the 11th as the proper day of celebration, thus marking Piłsudski’s return as
having prominence even over disarming the Germans and gaining control of the
capital.

Along with the Bureau’s memorandum, the admonitions of the commit-

tee are the ﬁ rst sign of a Piłsudski cult linking him, alone, to independence.
Piłsudski himself conﬂ ated the 10th and 11th thereby making Independence Day
inseparable from his return.

is understanding of Independence Day reﬂ ected Piłsudski’s dominating role

in Poland, where his powers were virtually unlimited. Cities in distant parts of
Poland sent “homage” to Piłsudski for November 11th.

Victory in 1920 gave him

a status he had not enjoyed before and would not again until 1926 when he re-
gained power by a coup d’état .

Some of the press speciﬁ cally linked the buława not to the war with the Bolshe-

viks, but to the events of November 11th two years before.

Piłsudski’s victory in

the Polish–Russian war had retrospectively emphasized the central role of the mili-
tary in recent Polish history, and made the events of 1918 only the ﬁ rst in a series
of Piłsudskiite triumphs. In fact, in a gesture ﬁ lled with symbolism, the buława was
placed on display in the days before its conferral at the main Warsaw gallery, the
Zachęta, beneath a portrait of the warrior king Stefan Batory entitled “Batory pod
Pskowem.”

e painting featured the king with Russians kneeling before him in

1579—a punctuation mark in the series of wars between the Poles and the Rus-
sians centuries earlier.

e Right had its own version of the celebration on the 14th. Doubtless the

oﬃ

cial adulation of Piłsudski must have been a provocation to the Right, which

had a rather diﬀ erent view of the route to independence. Gazeta Warszawska fea-
tured a front-page editorial noting sourly that November was a month for many
sad anniversaries in Polish history and only time would tell whether or not the
current celebrations would always be commemorated. It also noted that it was
“the nation” which ousted the Germans in November, not Piłsudski and the
POW—who went unnamed.

Even the title of “Marshal” bestowed along with the

buława was unprecedented in Polish history, the Gazeta noted disapprovingly.

“Święto Wolności Polski,” Kurjer Polski , November 14, 1920, 3; “Uroczystość 14 listopada,”

Kurjer Poranny , November 10, 1920, 2.

It is possible that the committee was unsure of the day which was to be celebrated: that the text

of its pronouncement originally left a blank for the day which was then overprinted in red. See a copy
of the text in Rocznice i obchody. Odzyskanie niepodległości (11XI-1928). Aﬁ sze. DZS.

Tadeusz Biernat, Jozef Piłsudski–Lech Wałęsa: Paradoks charyzmaycznego przywództwa. (Toruń:

Adam Marszałek, 2000), 134–5.

“Lwów i Wilno w hołdzie Naczelnikowi,” Kurjer Polski , November 15, 1920, 2.

“Święto wolności Polski w stolicu,” Kurjer Poranny , November 12, 1920, 2.

“Buława,” Gazeta Warszawska , November 12, 1920, 4.

Untitled ﬁ rst page editorial, Gazeta Warszawska , November 14, 1920, 1; “Rocznica wypędzenia

Niemców,” November 14, Gazeta Warszawska , 2.

“Buława,” Gazeta Warszawska , November 12, 1920, 4.

Contesting a National Myth

e parliament [sejm], where the Right was predominant, did not take notice of

the day in the years 1919–21.

e nationalist opposition to Piłsudski largely ignored the day chosen for

celebration. Th

eir leading organ in Warsaw grudgingly concluded that the 11th

meant the end of German occupation but did not mention any role of Piłsudski or
the POW. It asked its readers to concentrate on events in Upper Silesia—in the
southwest—being contested with the Germans, far from Piłsudski’s victories in
the east.

Indeed, the major celebration of the 11th was to mark the liberation of

Lwów from the Ukrainians.

e military leader of the Lwów Poles, Czesław

Mączyński, was a prominent rightist, and Lwów served them as a counter to the
Piłsudskiite-dominated events in Warsaw. Th

e Warsaw–Lwów relationship would

later degenerate into a kind of Piłsudskiite–endecja rivalry.

e Right staged an akademik (a symposium) in downtown Warsaw—with pro-

ceeds from tickets going to a committee favoring “the union of Upper Silesia with
the Republic” and featuring the intoning of the Rota of Konopnicka—which served
as a quasi- counter to the “Pierwsza Brygada” of the Piłsudskiites. Cheers in favor of
Piłsudski were met with angry shouts denouncing his “dictatorship” [dyktatura]
and ovations for the prominent nationalist general, Józef Haller. Events became so
heated that arrests were made.

e victories of 1920 and the celebrations of November of that year did not

bring a consensual Polish understanding of what was truly Independence Day and
what exactly was being celebrated. Th

e main elements of the Piłsudskiite reading

of events were in place but did not enjoy general approbation.

e next year, the celebrations were moved to the 11th, though the reasons for

abandoning the 10th are not clear (both were workdays). A number of features
were added which became standard components of the commemorations, includ-
ing a parade, a theatrical performance at the Wielki Teatr, and the conferring of
decorations. In 1921 these were principally for POW veterans who had played a
role in disarming the Germans in Warsaw in 1918.

e Order of the White Eagle

was created in conjunction with November 11th, but neither Paderewski nor the
anti-Piłsudski peasant leader Wincenty Witos would attend.

e political Right

noted the day but only in conjunction with the disarming of the Germans and with

See Sprawozdanie stenograﬁ czne posiedzenia Sejm Ustawodawczy for the years 1919–21.

“Obchód 11-go listopada,” Gazeta Warszawska , November 11, 1920, 2.

“Obchód paryski,” Kurjer Polski , November 10, 1919, 1. Th

e article also noted that the same

day a Polish delegation left for Riga to negotiate an end to the war with the Bolsheviks. Cf. “Druga
rocznica,” Kurjer Polski , November 11, 1. Lwów was secured from the Ukrainians on November 11th
and the city sent a delegation to Warsaw to join in the national commemorations. See “Uroczystość
14 listopada,” Kurjer Poranny , November 11, 1920, 2.

“Rocznica wypędzenia Niemcow,” November 14, Gazeta Warszawska , 2; “W drugą rocznicę,”

Gazeta Warszawska , November 15, 1920; “Rocznica wypędzenia Niemców,” Gazeta Warszawska ,
November 15, 1920.

Wacław Jędrzejewicz and Janusz Cisek, eds., Kalendarium życia Józefa Piłsudskiego, 3 vols.

(Warsaw: Rytm, 1998), II, 270 . “Z powodu trzeciej rocznicy wyzwolenia,” Polska Zbrojna, November
12, 1921, 5.

Adam Dobroński, “Obchody Święta Niepodległości w II Rzeczpospolitej,” in Stawarz, ed., Święto

Niepodległości , 9.

Independence Day

no mention of Piłsudski.

Sometimes they replaced November 11th with the vague

“a few days” in 1918.

A clear distinction thus divided the Piłsudskiites from the rightist press in the

early 1920s. Th

e former rejoiced in the liberation of Warsaw in November 1918

but broadly ascribed it to national forces, sometimes describing it anonymously.
Th

e latter mentioned Piłsudski by name and emphasized the legions and the POW

in their explanations.

An example of the latter is the coverage supplied by Polska Zbrojna , the army’s

journal which began publication in 1921. Th

e journal, like the army, was domi-

nated by devotees of the Marshal. In an essay by the main Piłsudskiite ideologist
Adam Koc, the disarming of the Germans was linked directly to the earlier creation
of the legions as part of a Piłsudski project to use military forces to restore Poland
by its own eﬀ ort, the farà da sè argument we have already encountered. It was part
of the Marshal’s “will to victory.”

An essay by F. Żmudowski linked Juliusz

Słowacki’s mystical poem about a “king-spirit” [król-duch] moving through time
in diﬀ ering reiﬁ cations as the 1918 deliverer of Poland. Th

is elevated Piłsudski to

a mystical status, a force of history. Th

e events of 1655 were invoked: the year when

the Swedish invasion met resistance at the monastery of Jasna Góra in events widely
considered miraculous. It was really not the disarming of the Germans as a distinct
act which was being celebrated, but an occasion marking another demonstration
of Piłsudski’s meaning for Poland, an unfolding process.

In the same vein, Kurjer Poranny , Piłsudski’s favorite newspaper, called upon

Poles to cease bickering and acknowledge the meaning of November 11th and the
role of what was described in language diﬃ

cult to translate as the “leader of the

national military role” [hetman narodowego wojennego znaku].

Kurjer Polski

referred to November 11th as the “great events . . . forever connected with the
person of Józef Piłsudski.”

N OV E M B E R 1 1 T H U N D E R D U R E S S

For the nationalist Right, bitter opponents of Piłsudski, November 11th was often
regarded as Independence Day, but shorn of its Piłsudskiite overtones. Hence, the
inﬂ uential Poznań journal Akademik printed a series of articles clustered around
November 11th, 1923, which discussed independence, November 11th, and
Piłsudski. Th

e clear intent was to save November 11th, but remove Piłsudski. Th

argument was that November 7th was the anniversary of the Bolshevik Revolution,

See the discussion under “Kronika,” Gazeta Warszawska , November 11, 1921. Equal if not more

space was allotted to the anniversary of the armistice.

“Jedenasty listopad,” Kurjer Polski, November 11, 1922, 11.

See Adam Koc’s front page essay “Zrzucenie jarzma,” November 11, 1921.

F. Żmudowski, “Nie zginęła,” Polska Zbrojna , November 11, 1921, 3; cf. Eugeniusz Świerczewski,

“Z teatru,” Polska Zbrojna , November 12, 1921, 5.

“W trzecią rocznicę wyzwolenia,” Kurjer Poranny , November 11, 1921, 2

“W trzecią rocznicę,” Kurjer Polski , November 11, 1921, 2.

Contesting a National Myth

of most foul memory because of its socialism. Piłsudski and his entourage were
also socialists and hence much to be lamented.

Particularly unfortunate was the

dominance the Piłsudskiites had over the army, which rendered this institution,
otherwise most attractive for rightist youth, quite repugnant.

However, Akademik

was most proud of the military formation created by rightist Warsaw students in
early November 1918: “November 11th did not ﬁ nd the young people unpre-
pared.”

Indirectly, therefore, Akademik acknowledged November 11th as Inde-

pendence Day. In contrast to the Piłsudskiites who stressed that Poland, thanks to
Piłsudski, won its own freedom, the Right often cited November 11th as Armi-
stice Day, an event which “decided freedom” for Poland.

Within a year, the Right

seemed prepared to jettison any loyalty to November 11th. Władysław Konopczyński
began a lugubrious essay by noting that November was “a dangerous time for
Poland,” a month in which Poland witnessed so many defeats, so much reck-
lessness, folly, and crimes.” Th

e Lublin episode of November 7th is cited as an

example.

In 1923, Piłsudski retired from active political life, and November 10th–11th became

a time for embittered Piłsudskiites to gather round the Marshal, remember past
glories, and excoriate the government. As a private citizen, Piłsudski was noticeably
absent from the festivities in Warsaw. A large public gathering in the capital did
not even mention his name.

e year itself was bitter for Poland as widespread

labor riots cast a pall over the nation.

e main Jewish paper in Warsaw did not

even mention Independence Day but wrung its hands over social unrest.

Mean-

while, the several governments that followed Piłsudski were not keen on celebrat-
ing the day of their nemesis’s triumph. Th

e peasant leader Witos, thrice premier in

the 1920s, referred to November 11th as the day “unjustly ﬁ xed as the anniversary
of the re-establishment of Poland,” and harbored an abiding dislike for Piłsudski
and all his supporters.

In the Polish parliament, dominated by the political Right

disinclined to Piłsudski, the November anniversary went unremarked in the early

“Na szaniec!,” Akademik Polski: Ilustrowany Dwutygodnik Młodzieży , November 15, 1923, 175.

[hereinafter Akademik Polski ]

“Młodzież a wojsko,” Akademik Polski , November 1, 1923, 164.

“Święto Legji Akademickiej,” Akademik Polski , November 15, 182.

“Dzień polityczny: Wielka rocznica,” Gazeta Warszawska , November 11, 1924, 3. Signiﬁ cantly,

Piłsudski himself acknowledged the victory of the Entente in the war as a necessary condition for
Poland’s independence; see

Michał Budny, “Wywiady Piłsudskiego w prasie amerykańskiej,”

Niepodległość, 15 (1982), 114.

“Listopad—to dla Polski niebezpieczna pora,” Gazeta Warszawska , November 8, 1924. Konopczyński

was an endek politician in the 1920s, a journalist, and one of inter-war Poland’s most celebrated
historians; see Wojciech Tygielski, “Władysław Konopczyński (1880–1952),” in Peter Brock, John
D. Stanley, and Piotr J. Wróbel, eds., Nation and History: Polish Historians from the Enlightenment to
the Second World War (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2006), 320–35.

Dobroński, “Obchody,” 11.

e extent of Independence Day celebrations of 1922–24 is unclear. In November 1923, serious

rioting swept through Poland and several regions were brieﬂ y placed under martial law. Th

e most

dramatic events were in Kraków, where a number of soldiers were killed in clashes with rioters.

See Nasz Przegląd , the issues of November 10–12, 1923.

Wincenty Witos, Moja tułaczka, 1933–1939 (Warsaw: Ludowa Spółdzielnia Wydawnicza, 1967),

116 . Witos’s loathing for Piłsudski is repeated endlessly in these memoirs.

Independence Day

1920s.

By 1923, the press began to carry stories noting the decline in festivities

associated with Independence Day.

In Kraków, the possibility arose of November

11th as a national and unifying occasion being replaced by festivities associated
with local events. In early November, the liberation of the city from Austro-
Hungarian rule was celebrated and it was suggested that the day be recognized else-
where.

e nationally inﬂ uential Kraków journal, Illustrowany Kurjer Codzienny

( IKC ) did not even mark the 11th in 1922–23.

During the 1923–26 interlude, Piłsudski, acting as a private citizen, gave

speeches or press interviews recalling the events of 1918, but oﬃ

cial commemora-

tions were relatively modest. In 1924, he delivered a lengthy analysis of the events
of 1918 on which he had long been preparing. He speciﬁ cally posed the question
of the exact date of Polish independence and, after much rumination, determined
that it was most likely between the 22nd and the 28th of November 1918.

the 28th , for example, Piłsudski had announced the day of elections to the
parliament.

IKC lamented that there were so many anniversaries in November that it was

diﬃ

cult to celebrate all of them.

In Siedlce, there was a parade in November, but

it was on the 8th and celebrated those who fell for “independence end socialism”;
no reference to the 10th or 11th was noted.

A 1924 handbook published in west-

ern Poland, designed to oﬀ er “guidelines and materials necessary for organizing
national occasions,” accorded little space to November 11th, did not mention
Piłsudski, and noted that some parts of Poland celebrated the freeing of Russian
Poland (i.e. Warsaw) from German troops as occurring on the 12th or 13th. It
recommended to its readers that they consult the works of the rightist Dmowski—
who had no link to the 11th—for a background to the events.

It would seem that

November 11th was in danger of being excised as the national holiday of the Sec-
ond Republic.

e parliamentary proceedings contain no commemorative remarks for either 1920 or 1921; see

Sprawozdanie stenograﬁ czne Sejmu Ustawodawczego for November 11th, 1920, and the sessions of
November 8th and 15th,1921.

“1918–1923,” Kurjer Polski , November 11, 1932, 3.

See “W czwartą rocznicę wyzwolenia,” IKC , November 1, 1922 and “Rocznica wyzwolenia

Krakowa,” IKC , November 2, 1922.

e November issues were largely about strikes and civic unrest.

Jędrzejewicz and Cisek, Kalendarium , II, 379–80; cf. Marceli Handelsman, “Józef Piłsudski jako

historyk,” in Wacław Sieroszewski, ed., Idea i czyn Józefa Piłsudskiego (Warsaw: Bibljoteka Dzieł Nau-
kowych, 1934), 215.

Tomasz Stańczyk has argued that Piłsudski really regarded Polish Independence day as November

29th, because it was on that day that elections to parliament were announced; the source of this conclu-
sion is not stated; see Tomasz Stańczyk, “Gorący październik,” Rzeczpospolita , November 10, 2005.

“Co dzień niesie?,” IKC , November 12, 1924. Cf. Adam Próchnik , Powstanie państwa polskiego

(Warsaw: Warszawska Społdzielnia Księgarska, 1939), 26.

“Uroczystość akademicka,” November 8, 1925, Rocznice i obchody. Odzyskanie niepodległości

(11XI)—1928. DZS; “Zawiadomienie,” Siedlce, in Roczniki i obchody. Odzyskanie niepodległości.
11. XI. b. r. w. Aﬁ sze. DZS.

Marja Bogusławska, Rocznice narodowe: Wskazówki i materjały potrzebne dla urządzających

obchody narodowe. (Nowemiasto: Drweca, 1924), I, 105–20.

Contesting a National Myth

Jędrzejewicz and Cisek, Kalendarium , II, 407; cf. Handelsman, “Józef Piłsudski jako historyk,”

215.

“Siódma rocznica rozbrojenia armiji niemieckiej w stolicy,” IKC , November 11, 1925, 4; for

similar treatment see the front page of Dziennik Białostocki , November 12, 1925.

“11 listopada ma być uroczystem świętem,” IKC , November 13, 1925, 10.

Wacław Jędrzejewicz, Kronika życia Józefa Piłsudskiego, 1867–1935. Vol. II: 1921–1935 (London:

Polska Fundacja Kulturalna, 1977), II 186–7 ; Jędrzejewicz and Cisek, Kalendarium , II, 410. For discus-
sion see Joseph Rothschild, Piłsudski’s Coup d’Etat (New York: Columbia University Press, 1966), 38–40.

e following year, the situation became yet more complex. On November 2nd,

Piłsudski participated in the formal dedication of the Grave of the Unknown Sol-
dier. Th

e remains of an anonymous defender of Lwów against the Ukrainians in

1918 were brought to Warsaw and permanently enshrined in Saxon Square [Plac
Saski] in Warsaw after a mass at the Cathedral. Piłsudski joined the president and
other dignitaries at the ceremony. Hence, yet another November date was added to
the several being given solemn attention.

e regional press virtually ignored the 11th, and what comments occurred

stressed the fact that Warsaw was liberated from the Germans, a process concern-
ing which neither Piłsudski or the POW were mentioned.

An eﬀ ort by a member

of parliament to have the 11th declared a national holiday failed and went virtually
unremarked.

On November 15th, a huge procession of more than 1,000 oﬃ

cers made a pil-

grimage to Piłsudski’s residence and made passionate speeches celebrating his role
in the 1918 events.

e ostensible purpose of their eﬀ orts was to celebrate the

anniversary of Piłsudski’s return from Magdeburg on November 10th, 1918. It was
essentially a Piłsudskiite rally. Scarcely six months later he returned to power via a
coup d’état .

Formalization of a Discourse, 1926–35

T H E M AY C O U P

On May 12th, 1926 Piłsudski overthrew the legal government of Poland by a
military coup and established a quasi-dictatorship. It was to last until his death in
1935, and beyond, as his epigones attempted to survive on the momentum his
legacy had provided, or at least as much of it as they could pretend to. Whether
they maintained his regime, or created something quite diﬀ erent, is a question
worthy of consideration. Adam Skwarczyński, a prominent Piłsudskiite ideologue,
commented that, for Poland, 1926 was as important as 1914.

In May, there had been brief ﬁ ghting between Piłsudski’s devotees in the army

and forces loyal to the government. Many, especially senior military commanders,
were placed in an impossible position of choosing between Piłsudski, whom they
revered, and the government, to which they were bound by oath. In general, oﬃ

ers who had served in the Austrian army and were bitterly anti-Piłsudski sup-
ported the legal government. Few of them enjoyed successful careers after 1926.

Piłsudski had retired from oﬃ

ce in 1923, bitterly convinced that the Polish

parliament was a vile and dysfunctional body and that its rightist members were
little more than thugs. Th

e series of short-lived governments that had come and

gone after 1923, the paralysis of the executive authority in the face of a hugely
powerful legislature, an increasingly interfering role of parliament into military
aﬀ airs, endless politicking, and petty corruption all convinced him that the coun-
try was in a dangerous position—a view not unique to him. An American scholar
characterized the government Piłsudski overthrew as follows:

a mass of collusion between government and parties, of inﬂ uence peddling, wire pull-
ing, and personnel packing by deputies and senators among ministers and administra-
tors, it was imperative that the entire executive branch—president, cabinet,
administration—be emancipated from this chronic oppression and empowered, at
last, to govern.

Elżbieta Kossewska, Związek Legionistow Polskich 1922–1939 (Warsaw: Oﬁ cyna Wydawnicza

ASPRA-JR, 2003), 40.

is is a controversial topic, and Tomasz Nałęcz has added some important qualiﬁ cations to the

usual representation of a post-1926 “purge” of oﬃ

cers who opposed the coup; see “Piłsudski i

Kaczyńscy: Rozmowa z prof. Tomaszem Nałęczem,” Przegląd-Tygodnik.pl , November 5, 1926, 3.
Online at <http://www.przeglad-tygodnik.pl/pl/artykul/pilsudski-kaczynscy>.

Joseph Rothschild, Piłsudski’s Coup d’Etat (New York: Columbia University Press, 1966), 199.

Formalization of a Discourse

ere was an element of personal rancor as well: Piłsudski held the Right directly

responsible for the assassination in 1922 of Gabriel Narutowicz, the ﬁ rst elected
president of Poland, and found appalling their later eﬀ orts to make a hero of the
assassin. Th

e fact that Piłsudski was the target of a campaign of viliﬁ cation only

intensiﬁ ed the bitterness.

Piłsudski justiﬁ ed his usurpation of power as the need to restore civic virtue to a

country on the edge of moral disintegration due to a political system which had
become dysfunctional and corrupt. His new regime was referred to as the “sanacja,”
a term diﬃ

cult to explain and even more diﬃ

cult to translate, but suggesting the

establishment of decency in public aﬀ airs. Piłsudski was oﬀ ered as the model for
the type of Pole worthy of the reborn country: a disinterested patriot, incorrupt-
ible, and dedicated exclusively to national welfare—this, in contrast to the venality
of the previous regime.

ese are the themes, we must remember, that Piłsudski

cultivated in legion days and they were attributed to him by the legionnaires in
their song and tale: “the fatherland is not subject to politics.”

Krzysztof Kawalec, in a penetrating essay, has argued that when a nation organ-

izes itself into a state—quoting Antoni Anusz—a providential ﬁ gure is required to
represent this transformation; what he refers to as the “mythologization” of the
state. Th

is is especially important in troubled times after the rebirth of the state

and, we might add, the chaos of politics in the Republic’s early years.

Piłsudski

thus represented the transformative ﬁ gure from nation to state; a factor central to
his dislike by the Right, which posited the nation as the fundament of the
country.

Piłsudskiite politics, writes Waldemar Paruch, essentially consisted of two proposi-

tions; viz. that the existence of an independent Poland was an a priori proposition
above argument, and that Poles had a moral responsibility to serve the country and
its government. Th

e initial goals of the post-1926 sanacja regime were to popularize

the meaning of independence among the masses, who would come to see themselves
as citizens of a Polish state to which they were loyal regardless of their ethnic descent.
Th

e diﬀ usion of this view was essential to the creation of a modern Poland.

e soldiers of the movement of puriﬁ cation were drawn overwhelmingly from

the ranks of the legions, the supposed best of Poland. Soon after 1926, Poland was
subject to “legionalization.” Veterans of their ranks, or POW members, rapidly
rose to ascendancy in the army and in key positions in the civil administration,
which became headed by former legion oﬃ

cers—eventually earning it the title of

“the Colonels’ regime.”

According to Roman Wapiński, legionnaires and POW

“Piłsudski i Kaczyńscy: Rozmowa z prof. Tomaszem Nałęczem.”

See Monika Adamczyk-Garbowska, “Marszałek Józef Piłsudski w oczach Żydów—wybór tek-

stów,” in Lech Maliszewski, ed., Żar niepodległości: Międzynarodowe aspekty życia i dzialałności Jozefa
Piłsudskiego (Lublin: Norbertinum, 2004) 197.

Krzysztof Kawalec, “Państwo a naród w dwudziestoleciu międzywojennym—spory nie

zakończone,” in Wojciech Wrzesiński, ed., Do niepodległości: 1918, 1944/45, 1989: Wizje-drogi-speln-
ienie (Warsaw: Wydawnictwo Sejmoue, 1998), 186–7.

Waldemar Paruch, “Między ﬁ lozoﬁ ą i grą politologiczną analiza wypowiedzi o polityce i zachowań

politycznych Józefa Piłsudskiego” in Maliszewski, ed., Żar niepodległości , 256 .

Kossewska, Związek , 94.

Independence Day

members made up 9 percent of the political elite of Poland in 1918–26, and 59 percent
thereafter.

A P I Ł S U D S K I I T E P O L A N D

Piłsudski or at least his devotees—sought essentially to create a new Poland by the
manipulation of symbols and the sanctiﬁ cation of certain iconic elements in the
Polish past; the building of a collective memory for a Poland only newly re-assembled
from disparate parts.

e veneration of Piłsudski, always characteristic of legion-

naires, became a conscious national policy after 1926. Th

e project of the adminis-

tration was to create a Piłsudskiite Poland wherein military virtues would become
national virtues . Th

e goal of all of this was to create a new citizenship: a Pole would

be a citizen of Poland, not someone of Polish ethnic descent. Th

e legions, and to a

certain extent, the army as a whole, would be the modern nobility [szlachta] of the
old commonwealth, making a community loyal to a cause, not manufacturing a
uniform nationality . In a state of more than 30 percent non-Polish by ethnicity,
such a step was designed to unify what could become a fatally divided polity
possibly shattering along ethnic fault lines.

Endecja nationalism, by contrast, would provoke the very ﬁ ssiparousness that the

Piłsudskiites sought to prevent by their emphasis on state over nation. Th

e minori-

ties question was central to the life of the Second Republic, and the ende cja’s hostil-
ity to them was a dividing issue with the Piłsudskiites. For the former, Poland was
the collection of Poles, a deﬁ nable entity of certain speciﬁ c attributes. Minorities
were either to be assimilated or, if that proved impossible, prevented from exercising
any power in a state in which they were really unwanted guests. Th

e assassination of

President Narutowicz by a rightist was prompted by the fact that he had been elected
by the votes of non-Polish minorities. Th

e Right saw in Piłsudski and his sanacja a

fundamentally evil force that was designed to dissolve the very bonds that held the
Polish people together. Th

ese were not just political diﬀ erences, but rather what Eva

Plach has referred to as a “clash of moral nations” in which two ideologies, both
claiming moral exclusivity, were locked in combat.

After 1926—at least temporarily—the state rather than the nation concept of

Poland was to be institutionalized.

In addition to posing the question about the

citizen’s rights vis-à-vis the government, this apposition asked to what degree
“politics” may interfere with state administration. For Piłsudski, the answer was
clear: politics was sordid, and prevented the government from eﬃ

cient functioning

Wapiński’s comments are cited in Kossewska, Związek , 100.

For a very incisive discussion of monuments and memory, see Izabella Main, “Memory and

History in the Cityscapes of Poland: Th

e Search for Meaning,” in D. Gard, I. Main, M. Oliver, and

J. Wood, eds., Inquiries into Past and Present (Vienna: IWM, 2005). Online at <http://www.iwm.at/
index.php?option=com_content&task=view&id=261&Itemid=288 >.

Elżbieta Kaszuba, System propagandy państwowej obozu rządzącego w Polsce w latach 1926–1939

(Wrocław: Adam Marszałek, 2004), 174.

Eva Plach, Th

e Clash of Moral Nations: Cultural Politics in Pilsudski’s Poland, 1926–1935 (Athens

OH: Ohio University Press, 2006) ; cf. Kossewska, Związek , 71.

Kawalec refers to 1926 as representing the “caesura” in the “state” versus “nation” conﬂ ict. See

Kawalec, “Państwo a naród,” 193.

Formalization of a Discourse

especially as concerned national security. Arkadiusz Kołodziejczyk has argued that
until 1926 the endecja view of the rebirth of Polish independence held sway in
Polish consciousness; it was only after 1926 that the situation changed.

Civic patriotism became the major goal of the post-1926 Piłsudski regime, replac-

ing the nationalists’ cult of the nation as ethnic community.

In Kulesza’s words,

Piłsudski desired “state assimilation” not “national assimilation.”

is explains the

cultivation, or at least toleration, of the minorities after 1926.

is new patriotism

needed new symbols elevated by new a mythology. Winning the minorities to at least
a cooperative attitude had the additional beneﬁ t of helping to solidify the military,
which was the backbone of the state. When the late 1930s brought a change and the
sanacja began to adopt a less generous attitude, reﬂ ecting the rightward drift in Polish
politics, it was a signal that the Piłsudskiite camp was in crisis.

After May 1926 “people supporting a liberal policy towards national minorities

temporarily gained the upper hand.”

In 1926 Piłsudski told a meeting of Jewish

and Ukrainian workers that he thought the minorities’ problem was solvable, and
that his observation of minorities ﬁ ghting alongside Poles in the legions made him
certain of this.

He was convinced that time and the emphasis on state over nation

would eventually lessen if not solve the problem of the minorities.

Rothschild

characterized him as “[z]ealous, in principle, to demonstrate that he could reconcile
the National Minorities to the Polish state, and free of chauvinistic xenophobia.”

e Piłsudski years were an era of relative collaboration between the government

and the Jewish community, if not as enthusiastically among the other minorities.

ey, in turn, recognized Piłsudski as someone sensitive to their national senti-

ments.

In the wake of the coup, according to Marcus, “hopes of fair political

Arkadiusz Kołodziejczyk, “Drogi do Niepodległej,” in Janusz Gmitruk and Andrzej Stawarz,

eds., Drogi do Niepodległości. W 80 rocznicę odzyskania niepodległości. Wystawa pod patronatem wojew-
ody warszawskiego (Warsaw: Muzeum Narodowe, 1998), 6 .

Waldemar Paruch, “Narody polityczne czy narody etniczne w Europie Środkowej lat

międzywojennych? Problematyka narodowo-etnicza w myśli politycznej Józefa Piłsudskiego i jego
zwolenników,” in Maliszewski, ed., Żar niepodległości , 270–4, 281–2.

Władysław T. Kulesza, Koncepcje ideowo-polityczne obozu rządzącego w Polsce w latach 1926–1935

(Wrocław: Ossolineum, 1985), 83.  Przemysław Hauser, “Jedność w wielości. Problemy narodowościowe
Rzeczypospolitej w okresie 1918–1939 i ich następstwa,” in  Wrzesiński, Do niepodległości ,  132;    Paruch,
“Narody polityczne,’’ 270–1,  273–4, 277–8.

Kaszuba, System propagandy , 172, 174. In general, the Piłsudskiites, including their leader,

devoted little time to minority issues; see Kulesza, Koncepcje, 148–54.

Kossewska , Związek , 136–7.

Joseph Marcus, Social and Political History of the Jews in Poland, 1919–1939, (Amsterdam: Mou-

ton, 1983), 214.

Quoted in Adamczyk-Garbowska, “Marszałek Józef Piłsudski w oczach Żydów,” 198–9.

Kulesza, Koncepcje , 44–5.

Rothschild, Coup d’Etat , 205.

Ezra Mendelsohn, Th

e Jews of East Central Europe between the World Wars (Bloomington, IN:

Indiana University Press, 1983), 55 . Th

e Aguda (Orthodox) party, which claimed 20 percent of all

Jewish voters supported the Piłsudski government; this was in addition to Jewish supporters from
other factions; see Marcus, Social and Political History of the Jews , 285–6. Th

e other minorities

expressed cautious support of Piłsudski in July, 1926; see ibid. , 314.

Waldemar Paruch, “Kreowanie legendy Jozefa Piłsudskiego w Drugiej Rzeczypospolitej—

wybrane aspekty,” in Marek Jabłonowski and Elżbieta Kossewska, eds., Piłsudski na łamach i w opini-
ach prasy polskiej, 1918–1989

(Warsaw: Instytut Dziennikarstwa Uniwersytetu Warszawskiego,

2005),” 80. During World War II, the Piłsudskiite underground argued that their inter-war tradition
was one of toleration and cooperation with the minorities; see Marek Gałęzowski, Wierni Polsce. Vol. I:
Ludzie konspiracji piłsudczkowskiej 1939–1947 (Warsaw: LTW, 2005) , lxx .

Independence Day

treatment of the Jews were running high.” Piłsudski was “welcomed by all the
Jewish parties.”

e change for the better was “remarkable.”

It was characteristic that, in 1929, Jewish veterans of the POW and the legions

created the “Alliance of Jewish Participants in the Struggles for the Independence
of Poland” [Związek Żydów Uczestników Walk o Niepodległość Polski], which
eventually numbered more than 6,000. On November 11th, 1933 this organiza-
tion amalgamated with the inclusive veterans’ movement. Th

e Jews in the Alliance

were dedicated to working closely with the Piłsudski government as “statebuilders”
[żydowskie elementy państwotwórcze] and spreading this ethic to their community.
Th

e Alliance epitomized what was the unrealized basis of the Piłsudskiite minority

dream: Jews dedicated to state loyalty irrespective of their minority status, drawn
from the elite of the founding elements of new Poland—the legions and the associ-
ated POW. Unfortunately, the Alliance’s ideology never reached beyond a small
percentage of Poland’s Jews, and it became increasingly isolated when rightist and
anti-Semitic views grew in the post-Piłsudski years.

Intentions aside, however, the minorities’ policy of the sanacja must be reckoned

a failure; indeed, Warsaw’s relations with its minorities, especially the Ukrainians,
worsened in the 1930s.

But even here we note exceptions and occasional sympa-

thy for Piłsudski among signiﬁ cant elements of the Ukrainian community.

Germans were virtually hostile, and the Belarusians at best indiﬀ erent. Th

is was the

opposite of what Piłsudski’s federalism foresaw. Dmowski’s view of the gradual
assimilation of the minority communities was no more successful.

In order to create a morally puriﬁ ed politics, Piłsudski commissioned Walery

Sławek to create a parliamentary group that would draw people from every party—
including national minorities—who would be pledged to supporting the govern-
ment but this pledge would not require them to desert their home party to join any
new one. Th

e odd conﬁ guration was called the Non-Partisan Bloc for Support of

the Government [Bezpartyjny Blok Współpracy z Rządem, BBWR]. Its purpose
was to allow a sanacja administration to function without constant interference

Marcus, Social and Political History of the Jews , 202, 313.

Ibid , 327.

An excellent summary of the Alliance can be found in Marek Jabłonowski, Sen o potędze Polski:

Z dziejów ruchu byłych wojskowych w II Rzeczypospolitej, 1918–1939 (Olsztyn: Ośrodek badań nau-
kowych im. Wojciecha Kętrzyńskiego, 1998), 210–13 .

See the remarks by Józef Lewandowski in his review of Henri Rollet, La Pologne au XXe siècle, in

Polin , (1986), I, 348.

Heidi Hein-Kircher, Kult Piłsudskiego i jego znaczenie dla państwa polskiego 1926–1939 (Warsaw:

Neriton, 2008), 299–301. Polish–Ukrainian relations in the Second Republic are a large and contro-
versial topic. We may only indicate a few sources of the discussion: an excellent—but now a bit
dated—bibliographical starting point is

Paul Robert Magocsi,

Galicia: A Historical Survey and

Bibliographical  Guide  (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1983), 174–205 ; particularly well writ-
ten, also discussing the Jewish role is Shimon Redlich, Together and Apart in Brzezany, Poles, Jews and
Ukrainians, 1919–1945 ( Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 2002) ; much valuable material can
be found in  Timothy Snyder, Sketches from a Secret War: A Polish Artist’s  Mission to Liberate Soviet
Ukraine  New Haven: Yale University Press, 2007) , and the chapter (133–54), in the same author’s Th

Reconstruction of Nations: Poland, Ukraine, Lithuania, Belarus: 1569–1999 (New Haven: Yale Univer-
sity Press, 2003).

ere were no veterans groups among the Germans or Ukrainians; see Jabłonowski, Sen o potędze ,

205–10. For German disdain of November 11th, see Hein-Kircher, Kult Piłsudskiego , 292–9.

Formalization of a Discourse

from a fractious parliament: a “state-party.”

Even members of the ethnic minorities

joined the Bloc: it was to be a politics above politics. It distanced the government
from the citizenry and put an end to real democratic politics. And the government
was personiﬁ ed by Piłsudski, who thus became both the symbol and the reality of
Poland’s leadership. In the ironic words of Stanisław Mackiewicz, “discerning the
greatness of Piłsudski” was that he realized “the holy ideals of the nation in spite of
the will of the nation.”

Unfortunately for the sanacja , the BBWR achieved an electoral majority only

after 1930 and, until then, the regime had to function increasingly above the law,
or at least with indiﬀ erent attention to it. Although the BBWR was designed to
solve the problem of a country run by an irresponsible political fractiousness, epitom-
ized by a chaotic sejm, it became just another party, part of the divisions and manip-
ulations characteristic of the chaos of Polish politics.

e BBWR was the sanacja’s main legislative tool, and the Piłsudskiite loyalists

liberally sprinkled about the administration were its minions, but the real power of
the new regime was Piłsudski, or rather his legend that was carefully cultivated.

He held decisive positions in the army, making him in eﬀ ect the commander in
chief in times of peace or war, and he was occasionally prime minister and always,
indirectly, guided foreign policy. But these are not the bases of his power. Th

inﬂ uence Piłsudski had in Poland after 1926 was his symbolic power—it was this
that had to be nurtured and cultivated.

With Piłsudski’s return to power in 1926, November 11th became transformed

into the embodiment of not only Polish independence but a theory of how it was
regained, manu militari —and who was its spiritus movens .

Jan Nowak-Jeziorański

recalls: “Up until 1926 Piłsudski’s opponents would not permit the recognition of
November 11th as independence day because they did not wish to associate the
day with the person of the Marshal.” Th

e endecja view that Poland arose substan-

tially thanks to international support enjoyed general acceptance before 1926.

I N S T I T U T I O N A L I Z I N G N OV E M B E R 1 1 T H

e institutionalization of November 11th began in 1926 when schools and gov-

ernment oﬃ

ces were closed for the ﬁ rst time. Th

is was done so that the date should

“remain in the permanent memory of society and endure in the thoughts of the
young generation.”

Schools issued manuals on how to celebrate the day.

For

Rothschild, Coup d’État , 262.

Kawalec, “Państwo a naród,” 195.

Kulesza , Koncepcje , 60.

Romeyko noted this some years ago; see Marian Romeyko, Przed i po maju , 3rd edn. (Warsaw:

Ministerstwo Obrony Narodowej, 1967) , 84. Cf. Hein-Kircher, Kult Piłsudskiego , 264–5.

Jan Nowak-Jeziorański, “Z domu niewoli: Urodziny III Rzeczypospolitej,” Wprost, March 5, 2003.

“11-go listopada nie będzie zajęć w urzędach i szkołach,” Kurjer Polski , November 9, 1926, 1.

After 1932 German-language schools were also closed and students were required to join the parades;
see Hein-Kircher , Kult Piłsudskiego , 127.

Ibid., 128.

Independence Day

young students, November 11th was described as “neither church nor family, but a
national celebration”—a day that brought freedom, thanks to Piłsudski.

Older

children were told to “stand at attention” before Piłsudski.

Authorities enjoined

residents to decorate their homes.

Rumors circulated by the Ministry of Internal

Aﬀ airs suggested that the 11th was soon to become the oﬃ

cial national holiday.

Regardless of his earlier tendency to muse over diﬀ erent dates, once in oﬃ

ce after

1926, Piłsudski “ordered” November 11th to be regarded as Independence Day.

Ceremonies connected to national holidays were a conscious step in creating public
support for Piłsudski and his regime.

May 3rd was de-emphasized, captured by

Badziak’s reference to its demotion from “national anniversary” to “state holiday.”

e evening before, in commemoration of Piłsudski’s return from Magdeburg,

a practice was begun to have the oﬃ

cers of the Warsaw garrison report to Piłsudski

at his oﬃ

cial residence, Belvedere Palace. Although the chief political dignitaries

joined the soldiers, the ceremony was brief and rather modest.

It would grow

with the years.

Public commemoration of the event began with a mass at the Warsaw cathedral.

Piłsudski, not then a Roman Catholic, was absent. Commemorations were also
held at Protestant churches and synagogues.

e Jewish community of Kraków

held a special service.

At Orthodox churches in Warsaw, Bishop Aleksy of

Grodno gave the homily; soldiers and students who were Orthodox were in
attendance. Th

e congregation was enjoined to pray for Poland: “Fervent prayers

for the welfare of the Republic.” Special greetings were sent to Piłsudski and Presi-
dent Ignacy Mościcki, and the crowd broke into singing “God Bless Poland” ( Boże,

See Z. Roguska, “Przemówienie okolicznościowe do młodych dzieci w dniu 11 listopada,” in

Z. Roguska and R. Korupczyńska, Święto niepodległości: Materjał na uroczystości szkolne w dniu 11 listo-
padzie , 4th edn. (Warsaw: Nasza Księgarnia, 1936), 3–10 .

See Maria Wysznacka, “Czym jest święto 11 listopada,” in Roguska and Korupczyńska , 17. Th

volume also contains stories and verse about the legions and Piłsudski, as well as the text of a brief
legionnaire play.

is was an announcement by the Ministry of Internal Aﬀ airs; see “Święto państwowe,” Kurjer

Warszawski, November 9, 1926, 1.

“Dzień 11 listopada świętem państowem,” IKC , November 8, 1926. Ząbek claims that 1926 was

established as the “formal date” for celebration by Piłsudski himself: see Wiesław Leszek Ząbek, “Organ-
izacja Narodowego Święta Niepodległości przez środowiskę piłsudczykowsko-niepodległościowe,” in
Andrzej Stawarz, ed., Święto Niepodległości—tradycja a wspołczesność (Warsaw: Muzeum Niepodległości,
2003), 82.

Paruch, “Kreowanie,” 82. Paruch here follows Antoni Czubiński; Hein-Kircher, Kult Piłsudskiego ,

253. It was Piłsudski who ordered schools and government oﬃ

ces closed on the 11th, ibid , 194.

Biernat, Paradoks , 132.

Kazimierz Badziak, “Od święta narodowego do państwowego. Tradycja Konstytucji 3 maja w II

Rzeczypospolitej,” in Barszczewsa-Krupa, “ Konstytucja 3 maja ,” 201–2. Th

e Piłsudski regime made

only a faint-hearted eﬀ ort to borrow May 3rd, but it was very reluctant. See the essay by Jan Janiak,
“Konstytucja 3 maja w myśli politycznej sanacji,” in Alina Barszczewska-Krupa, ed., Konstytucja 3
maja w tradycji i kulturze polskiej (Łodź: Wydawnictwo Łódzkie, 1991) 208–17.

Jędrzejewicz and Cisek, Kalendarium , III, 56. “Hołd wodzowi,” Polska Zbrojna , November 10,

1926; “Hołd wodzowi,” Polska Zbrojna , November 11, 1926, 1; Mirosława Pałaszewska, Święto
Niepodległości: Katalog wystawy (Warsaw: Muzeum Niepodległości, 2004), 7.

“Obchód dnia 11-go listopada,” Kurjer Warszawski , November 10, 1926, 4; “W dniu świętego

narodowego,” Kurjer Polski , November 10, 1926, 7.

“Program uroczystości w Krakowie,” IKC, November 12, 1926, 1–2.

Formalization of a Discourse

Coś Polskę ) at the conclusion.

Whether or not other Orthodox churches in Poland

followed this example is unclear.

A military review followed, on Saxon Square a few blocks away. Th

is was the ﬁ rst

time that this large public place in the heart of the city was utilized for the cere-
mony: a signiﬁ cant elevation. Th

is was the largest military review in Polish history;

it took one hour to complete, and the square accommodated the masses with dif-
ﬁ culty. Th

e military had been frantically preparing it for days. General Roman

Górecki addressed Piłsudski, in writing, to say that all the soldiers who marched
past were personally loyal to him, an obvious reference to the recent coup.

It was,

said the press, a symbol of Poland’s “strength and power” [nasza moc i potęga].
Foreign dignitaries were present, and pigeons were released.

e Jewish commu-

nity of Warsaw made a ceremonial gift of ﬂ owers to the Marshal.

e day was cold and rainy. Festivities concluded with a patriotic theatrical

performance at the Wielki Teatr and then a soirée at the Royal Castle.

Political

opponents of the Marshal said that these new celebrations were notably lacking in
enthusiasm, the pageantry stiﬀ and awkward. Th

e prominent politician Maciej

Rataj noted that Piłsudski “had lost contact with the street; he had become the
‘government’, and ceased to be the hero, the legend.”

However, even in his dis-

gust, Rataj noted the essential correctness of the decision to formalize November
11th: “Constituting November 11th as the anniversary has substantial legitimacy
[merytoryczne uzasadnienie] because it is connected with the freeing of the capi-
tal.” However, Rataj also noted that this decision carried with it problematical
consequences:

Piłsudski, by ordering the formal celebration of this day has connected it with his
person—it was also the anniversary of his return from Magdeburg. Poland began with
him and rests upon him.

Festivities were not restricted to Warsaw: major cities as well as small towns released
workers and schoolchildren from their normal obligations to join parades, military
reviews, and general festivities. In rightist Poznań, there were large military marches.
In Lublin, Toruń, and Bydgoszcz special showings of a ﬁ lm about Sobieski’s 1683
rescue of Vienna were screened.

e large market square [rynek] of Kraków cel-

ebrated an open-air mass.

e Lwów authorities thought that the size of the

“Nabożeństwo prawosławne w dniu święta państwowego,” Kurjer Warszawski , November 13, 1926, 4.

General Roman Górecki, “W rocznicę,” Polska zbrojna , November 11, 1926, 1.

For descriptions of the November 11th festivities see “Ósma rocznica wskrzeszenia Polski,” IKC ,

November 13, 2; “Rewja na Placu Saskim,” Kurjer Warszawski , November 11, 1926; “W dniu 11-go
listopada,” November 12, 1926, 2; “Przegląd wojsk d. 11 listopada,” “Parada wojskowa w d. 11 listo-
pada, 1926,

Polska zbrojna

, November 6, 1926, 4, November 7, 1926, 3; “Święto odzyskania

niepodległości,” Polska zbrojna , November 9, 1926, 1.

e most detailed description of the post-review events is “Ósma rocznica niepodległości

Rzplitej,” Polska zbrojna , November 12, 1926, 1; Jędrzejewicz and Cisek, Kalendarium , III, 56–7.

Maciej Rataj, Pamiętniki (Warsaw: Ludowa Spółdzielnia Wydawnicza, 1965), 442 .

Ibid. , 442.

“W Poznaniu,” “W Katowicach,” “W innych miastach,” “Uroczystość w Wiedniu,” IKC , Novem-

ber 13, 1926, 8.

“Przed świętem 11-go listopada,” IKC , November 11, 1926.

Independence Day

ceremonies would constitute a good warning to the local Ukrainian minority about
the power of the Polish presence in the area.

Many cities issued proclamations

instructing the citizenry to consider November 10–11 as though it were an oﬃ

cial

state holiday which, of course, it was not.

Some towns already proclaimed it

without oﬃ

cial sanction.

It was the ﬁ rst time that November 11th was being

celebrated on a large scale throughout Poland.

What was the explanation provided by the recently ensconced Piłsudskiite

authorities for all these changes and enlargement of the traditional celebrations?
Th

e Piłsudskiite press, and essays by prominent devotees of the Marshal, provided

a rationale for the celebration. Th

e central goal was unity. In 1926 this had a double

signiﬁ cance. Only through unity could multinational and multi- denominational
Poland achieve international status. Second, a virtual civil war had been fought
only a few months before as a result of Piłsudski’s coup. Relations within the armed
forces were very bitter and elements of society were unreconciled to the new
Piłsudski government.

is was especially true of western Poland, which was the

stronghold of the endecja and had been the chief focus of opposition during the
May ﬁ ghting.

Closely associated, and of rather deeper signiﬁ cance, was the manner in which

the November 1918 events were to be contextualized. Th

e ousting of the Germans

was important, but largely because it demonstrated the signiﬁ cance of armed
strength. Th

e origins of the military potential began with and were epitomized by

the legions. Th

eir inspirer and leader was Piłsudski. It was thanks to him, and the

forces he created, that Poland was capable of freeing itself by its own eﬀ orts, and
was never beholden to foreign powers. Many of these themes had been raised ear-
lier en passant , but in 1926 they were coordinated into an integrated system.
Warsaw’s Kurjer Polski editorialized the story that whereas Poland is prone to cele-
brate anniversaries it has been thoughtless about the 11th. Th

e 11th was, after all,

when the Germans were removed from Warsaw. Even though the capital may not
have been the site of the greatest eﬀ ort to evict the Germans, it should serve as a
symbol of that success. Th

ese victories were thanks to the “national orientation”

epitomized by Piłsudski.

Piłsudski symbolized faith in oneself, the unconquerable power of the Polish

spirit, and the power of arms in Polish hands. It is “our instinct for self- preservation”
[samozachowawczy], the press noted. Without the legions, independence is

“Listy ze Lwowa,” Kurjer Warszawski , November 9, 1926, 7.

See the proclamations by the city authorities for Chełm, Radom, Siedlce, and Lublin in Rocznice

i obchody. Odzyskanie niepodległości (11XI)—1928. Aﬁ sze. DZS; cf. “Z Całej Polski,” Polska Zbro-
jna , November 12, 1926, 5.

e proclamations also enjoined people to listen to the radio speech by the “Komendant,” a

reference to Piłsudski peculiar to legionnaires; see Siedlce, “Dzień 11-go listopada jest świętem
państwowym,” in Rocznice i obchody. Odzyskanie niepodległości (11XI)—1928. Aﬁ sze. DZS.

Kurjer Warszawski made a special appeal for unity; it was not alone: see “Święto dziszejsze,” Kur-

jer Warszawski November 11, 1926, 2. It regarded the cooperation of previously hostile elements as a
miracle: see “Wobec wielkiej rocznicy,” Kurjer Warszawski , November 11, 1926, 2–3. Krak

w’s IKC

emphasized that the celebration of Piłsudski should not be understood as a divisive but a unifying
gesture; see “W rocznicę wskrzeszenia Polski,” IKC , November 12, 1926, 1–2.

“Święto Niepodległości,” Kurjer Polski , November 11, 1926, 1.

Formalization of a Discourse

diﬃ

cult to imagine. Th

us the 11th, the memorialization of independence, is really

the memorialization of the army. November 11th’s commemoration was really a
triumph of the legions and all they represent.

In honor of all those who sacriﬁ ced, the 11th should be a day of national unity.

Polska Zbrojna , the army newspaper and the most passionately Piłsudskiite journal,
drew large conclusions from the 11th. General Jan Wróblewski mused that
November 11th should replace May 3rd—Polish Constitution Day recollecting
the adoption of Europe’s ﬁ rst written constitution in 1791, unfortunately in the
midst of the partitions—as the national holiday. After all, May 3rd was really an
“observation of sad memory.” By comparison, November 11th, though not yet an
oﬃ

cial holiday was a joyous day of rising from the dead [prawdziwego zmartwych

powstania]. Th

is new light shall never be extinguished, unlike the sad fate of May

3rd, 1791. “May all stand together at attention” it insisted: “and only the selﬁ sh
ignore the date.”

But the army, above all, saw in Piłsudski the “symbol of Poland

reborn . . . Our light.”

e events of November were contextualized into the larger structure of Polish

history. When Poland lost its independence it was a “moment of moral ejection for
the Polish nation from its former powerful ediﬁ ce.” But a far-sighted man dreamt of
rebuilding that ediﬁ ce through armed eﬀ ort. His eﬀ orts were rewarded on the 11th
as only he was worthy of this honor.

He was the charismatic providential ﬁ gure of

the neo-Romantic dream: Poland triumphant not retrospectively mournful.

Perhaps the initiating event in the elevation of November 11th to sacramental

status was an extraordinary live radio talk given by Piłsudski on November 11th,
1926, just a few months after seizing power.

Piłsudski instructed his entourage to

leave the room and recited his tale to his two little daughters, Jagusia and
Wandecz ka.

Ostensibly presenting a fairy tale for Polish children, Piłsudski con-

cocted a bizarre string of tales about magical things occurring on November 11th,
featuring a “leader” riding a horse called “Chestnut” [Kasztanka], who rises from

Tomasz Gąsiowski, “Salon niepodległości,” in Anna Gabryś and Monika Szewczyk, eds., Salon

Niepodległości (Warsaw: Państwowe Wydawnictwo Naukowe, 2008), 31 .

“Święto Niepodległości,” Kurjer Polski , November 11, 1926, 1.

“Listopad,” Polska Zbrojna , November 10, 1926, 1. Th

e Piłsudskiites had a complex relationship

with May 3rd: recognizing its historic importance, but critical of its failure to create a powerful state
apparatus, i.e., a Piłsudskiite Poland; see Andrzej Chojnowski, “Trzeci Maja w publicystyce politycznej
piłsudczków,” in Jerzy Kowecki, Sejm czteroletni i jego tradycje (Warsaw: Państwowe Wydawnictwo
Naukowe, 1991), 278–86.

“Prezentujmy broń,” Polska Zbrojna , November 11, 1926, 2. Th

e journal of the State Police also

argued that May 3rd had past and sad connotations whereas November 11th was already surpassing
it. See “Na święto 11 listopada,” Na Posterunku , November 8, 1929.

“11 Listopada,” Polska Zbrojna , November 11, 1926, 1. Note Garlicki’s comment that after 1926

November 11th was really a celebration of Piłsudski; see Andrzej Garlicki, “Spory o niepodległość,” in
Andrzej Garlicki, ed., Rok 1918: tradycje i oczekiwania (Warsaw: Czytelnik, 1978), 30.

is was Piłsudski’s ﬁ rst live radio broadcast. Th

e on-location broadcast from the Belvedere Palace

in Warsaw was a very daunting technical undertaking for Polish radio; see Maciej Józef Kwiatkowski,
Narodziny polskiego radia: radiofonia w Polsce w latach 1918–1929 (Warsaw: Państwowe Wydawnictwo
Naukowe, 1972), 410–11 . Th

is was quite a noteworthy event in the history of Polish broadcasting.

“Przemówienie Marszałka Piłsudskiego przez radjo dnia 11 listopada,” Polska Zbrojna , November 12,

1926, 3.

Independence Day

obscurity to command a great army in an “enchanted world, transformed.”

Piłsudski

explained that “the restoration of the body and the soul’s rebirth” will invigorate the
fearful, and concluded by wishing that the “magic 11th of November” will make all
Poles, not just children “great-souled and reborn.” Th

is was followed by the radio

orchestra’s rendition of the national anthem,

a sanacja catechesis.

is is a fascinating document, little remarked by historians, in which Piłsudski

presented a vision of himself, the army, and November 11th as having magically reani-
mated Poland.

He had often despaired at the failure of the Poles to rise to the greatness

he thought worthy of them, but here he attempted to induce it by an act of ritualization
in which November 11th, 1918 became literally magical. It was the birth of a new
conception of the national holiday, not a historic anniversary but an enchanted one.

T H E R I G H T R E S P O N D S

A fairly-tale version of the Piłsudskiite seizure of Poland was beyond bearing for
the endecja, which created a counter-argument to the Piłsudskiite project. Some
endecja organs absolutely refused to mention that November 11th was Independ-
ence Day, oﬃ

cially or otherwise.

e chief voice in this project was Marian Seyda,

probably the most important endecja political ﬁ gure in inter-war Poland. A mem-
ber of Poland’s delegation to the Paris Peace Conference, deputy in parliament,
twice a senator of the Republic, minister of defense in the 1923 center-right coali-
tion government, and indefatigable journalist, in 1926 Seyda had a powerful
pulpit in the newspaper Kurjer Poznański in the heart of the anti-Piłsudski west.
His sarcastic analysis of the events of 1926 and their meaning is signiﬁ cant, as
it created the alternative to a Piłsudskiite Poland being oﬃ

cially established after

the Marshal’s return to power in May of that year.

In a striking statement,

referring to the government, Seyda wrote: “November 11 does not belong

e fairy tale is a continuous series of symbols, colors, names, places, and of course dates, many

referring to speciﬁ c events during 1914–18. For the document see “Przemówienie przez radio w osmą
rocznicę odzyskania niepodległości (11 listopada 1926 r.)” in Pisma zbiorowe , IX, 48–52. Th

ere are

some useful comments regarding this speech in Jędrzejewicz, Kronika , II. Th

e author should like to

thank Michael Oborski, Honorary Consul of the Republic of Poland for the West Midlands of
England for this most valuable reference. Kasztanka was, incidentally, the name of Piłsudski’s horse.

“Przemówienia Marszałka Piłsudskiego,” Polska zbrojna , 3.

is important November 11th address by Piłsudski is not discussed extensively in any of the major

biographies of Piłsudski. Contemporary reaction to Piłsudski’s address was puzzlement: “[it made] the most
bizarre impression . . . something was not right here people said pointing to their heads,” was the comical
reaction of the prominent socialist Maciej Rataj. See Rataj, Pamiętniki , 442; cf. the comments in
Jędrzejewicz and Cisek, Kalandarium , III, 56–7. Th

e press gave little attention to its symbolic aspects;

see, e.g., “Co Marsz. Piłsudski powiedział przez Radjo,” Gazeta Jarocińska , November 14, 1926.

Adam Dobroński, “Obchody Święta Niepodległości w II Rzeczpospolitej,” in Stawarz, Święto

Niepodległości , 13.

Unless otherwise noted, this reconstruction is based upon Kurjer Poznański’s analysis of Novem-

ber 11th from the following essays from 1926: “Zjazd Rady Związkowej Sokoła,” November 8, 7; “Z
powodu rocznicy 11 listopada,” November 9, 1; “Jeszcze jeden dzień świętowania?” November 10, 2;
“Do społeczeństwa Polskiego,” November 10, 5; “Odznaczenia,” November 11, 1; “Rocznica—nie
gałówka,” November 11, 1.

Formalization of a Discourse

to them.”

is, of course, raised the question of whether November 11th as a

symbol belonged to the endecja, or even if they wanted it.

e very idea of celebrating the 11th was problematic: if it denoted the freeing

of the capital it was tolerable, but the government’s eﬀ orts to create a national holi-
day whose central focus was an “idolatrous commercial” [bałwochwalcza reklama]
for Piłsudski was unbearable: it had been the work of Freemasonry [masońska
centrala].

Besides, a day oﬀ from work was injurious to the economy; anniversa-

ries should not be marked by such indulgence. If a November day must be cele-
brated, how about the 15th, the anniversary of Henryk Sienkiewicz’s death? Th

Kurjer Poznański had already covered the story of a Falcon [a paramilitary organi-
zation predating 1914] holiday on the 8th, which included a church service at
St. Anne’s in Warsaw and constituted a large demonstration. Th

ere were, it seemed,

other national occasions to note. Th

Kurjer largely ignored November 11th, save

for sarcastic comments about poor public participation in the events.

As for the Piłsudskiite claim that the 11th, or better the 10th to 11th, marked

the culmination of a military eﬀ ort epitomized by the legions and personiﬁ ed by
Piłsudski—and which gave birth to a Poland not beholden to foreign agency—
Seyda had an alternative explanation. Germany’s defeat was necessary for the re-
appearance of Poland. Th

at defeat was created by the armistice, the real occasion

for celebrating on the 11th.

Gala events (and the closing of stores and oﬃ

ces

when they are being held) are reminiscent of pre-war tsarism. Yet where is the legal
justiﬁ cation for such acts? Th

e 11th was, after all, not an oﬃ

cial holiday. As for

Piłsudski’s bizarre fairy tale, it was, the Kurjer noted with sarcasm, “the usual mod-
est harangue.” Let’s “await either a storm or general smiles” [albo wichura albo
wspólny uśmiech]. Th

e whole episode had an “eastern” and old-fashioned spirit

that was in contrast to the modern world.

E L E VAT I N G N OV E M B E R 1 1 T H

As recently as 1924 Piłsudski had ruminated that November 11th was the correct
date of Polish independence, but after regaining power he elevated to talismanic
status. Th

is was part of the conscious creation of a pedigree for modern Poland,

which centralized the army and Piłsudski. A similar motive prompted the decision
to celebrate Piłsudski’s name day (March 19th) as an oﬃ

cial holiday. Although

personal vanity and the desire by Piłsudski’s entourage to establish themselves as
the elect of modern Poland certainly played a role in this transformation, the
motives are rather more complex.

Long before 1926 Piłsudski had concluded

“Rocznica—nie gałówka,” Kurjer Poznański , November 11, 1926, 1.

For this theme from the Right, see “Złoty deszcz,” Kurjer Poznański , November 11, 1926, 4.

“Rocznica 11 listopada,” Kurjer Poznański , November 11, 1926, 3.

“Rocznica zawieszenia broni,” Kurjer Poznański , November 12, 1926, 1.

See the untitled front page article, Kurjer Poznański , November 13, 1926.

Regarding the elevation of both days see the comments by Garlicki, “Spory o niepodległość,” 30–1;

cf. Eugeniusz Ponczek, Tradycja trzeciomajowa. Legenda kościuszkowska. Symbolika 11 listopada. Z badań
nad dziejami idei niepodległości Polski w latach II Wojny Światowej (Toruń: Marszałek, 2011), 242.

Independence Day

that it was necessary to create a mythic status for himself, both for reasons of prac-
tical politics and also to respond to what he concluded were the psychic cravings of
the Polish people, long demoralized by partition and defeat.

is conviction was

only strengthened by the failure of Poland after 1918 to gain either an interna-
tional position or a domestic consolidation suﬃ

cient to protect it in a dangerous

world. Poland’s failure to become the pre-partition commonwealth reborn, a fail-
ure that Piłsudski may well have personalized, haunted him and made him increas-
ingly critical and bitter of Polish realities: Poland after 1918 was not what it should
have been, and what it indeed must be, given geopolitical realities.

Hence,

November 11th was part of a Piłsudskiite project to re-animate the Polish spirit.
What Poland needed was a genealogy of victory in order to purge itself of self-
doubt.

It was for the same motives that the post-1926 Piłsudski government ﬁ nally

solved the question of the Polish national anthem, which had been repeatedly dis-
cussed in parliament since 1918 but remained unresolved.

In autumn 1926, the

song written by Józef Wybicki in 1797, “Jeszcze Polska Nie Zginęła,” became
Poland’s oﬃ

cial anthem by administrative ﬁ at.

Piłsudski, it was rumored, pre-

ferred the marching song of his own legionnaires from 1914, the proud and deﬁ ant
“My, Pierwsza Brygada,” which remained a kind of Piłsudskiite chant.

Intransi-

gent Piłsudskiites even tried to create a hybrid anthem by combining both tunes
but the eﬀ ort, mercifully, failed. Musically grotesque, the historical symbolism of
the combined march of the Napoleonic legionnaire by Wybicki, and the 1915
anthem, demonstrated the historical genealogy sought by the Piłsudskiite. Th

choice of “Jeszcze Polska” nonetheless represents a quasi-victory for them as it com-
bined stirring martial motifs with references to Polish legions (albeit of the Napo-
leonic age), the very imagery that Piłsudski had exploited and embodied since
before World War I.

Indeed, a modiﬁ ed version of the Wybicki tune had been the

marching song of the Piłsudski legionnaires until 1915 when “My, Pierwsza Bry-
gada” replaced it.

Moreover, the Wybicki march was widely known in Poland as

An excellent discussion of this theme is Alina Kowalczykowa, Piłsudski i tradycja (Chotomow:

Wydawnictwo Verba, 1991), 169ﬀ .

See Andrzej Friszke, O kształt niepodległej (Warsaw: Biblioteka Więzi, 1989), 72ﬀ .

See the very useful analysis by Dioniza Wawrzykowska-Wierciochowa, Mazurek Dąbrowskiego:

Dzieje Polskiego Hymnu Narodowego (Warsaw: Ministerstwo Obrony Narodowej, 1977) , 425ﬀ . Th

political Right preferred the digniﬁ ed and religious “Boże, Coś Polskę,” to the overtly military “Jeszcze
Polska”; there were other worthy candidates: Pawel Wroński, “Hymn wszystkich Polaków,” Gazeta
Wyborcza , May 6, 2002.

Actually, the adoption of “Jeszcze Polska” had two stages. In the fall of 1926 it became manda-

tory in public schools, and it was adopted as the national anthem only the following years; see
Wawrzykowska-Wierciochowa, Mazurek Dąbrowskiego , 447.

Nevertheless, devotees of the Marshal retained the ballad of the First Brigade as a pseudo-anthem

for the Piłsudskiite faithful. It has remained a kind of musical secret-handshake among the Marshal’s
devotees to this day.

is phenomenon is discussed at length in my “Th

e Militarization of the Discourse of Polish

Politics and the Legion Movement of the First World War,” in David Stefancic, ed., Armies in Exile
(New York: Columbia University Press, 2005), 71–101.

Wawrzykowska-Wierciochowa, Mazurek Dąbrowskiego , 414.

Formalization of a Discourse

the “Pieśń Legionów” [Song of the Legions]. Hence it comported well with the
Piłsudskiite tradition.

e political Right rejected “My, Pierwsza Brygada” as a

partisan anthem, and was unenthusiastic about “Jeszcze Polska,” preferring the
chant “Rota Konopnicka,” which originated in western Poland and was closely
associated with Polish nationalism’s anti-German struggles in the late nineteenth
century.

e themes Piłsudski conveyed in his 1926 radio address were repeated a few

months later at the crypt of Juliusz Słowacki. Th

e great Romantic poet died in

Paris in 1849 and was buried, most humbly, in Montmartre. In 1927, his remains
were returned to Poland and re-interred in the royal tombs at Wawel Castle in
Kraków. It was a lengthy procedure, Słowacki’s body traveling by sea to Gdańsk
and thence down the Wisła by steamer with many stops en route.

e culmina-

tion was on June 28th. Th

e principal speaker was Piłsudski, who delivered a lengthy

rumination on death. Piłsudski was a great devotee of Słowacki, whom he regarded
as the greatest of all Polish poets, the national bard, surpassing even Adam Mickie-
wicz. He had committed long portions of his verse to heart. In 1927 Piłsudski
utilized the occasion to argue that Słowacki had lived beyond the grave by the
greatness of his spirit. Th

is was little more than a standard rhetorical device. He

then expanded on the implications of that remark to note that: “Th

e gates of death

do not exist for certain people” because “the rights of great men are diﬀ erent from
those of lesser ones.” Lest these others not be immediately obvious, Piłsudski made
a very tortured rhetorical and logical leap by arguing that the end of Słowacki’s era
coincided with the end of the Polish army. Since the army was “the backbone of
the nation,” its extinction forced Poland to exist exclusively in a spiritual dimen-
sion, as epitomized by Słowacki. Here, we have quite left Słowacki, who never had
any martial aspects to his biography, and we are moving elsewhere. Th

e re-creation

of the army, which Piłsudski represented, was tantamount to the re-creation of a
corporeal Poland and hence had allowed the re-creation of the nation: the melding
of body and spirit. In a ﬁ nal peroration Piłsudski argued that Słowacki himself is
an incarnation of the “King-spirit,” the title and motif of the poet’s most abstract
and metaphysical work—an immanence that transcends time and re-appears in
history in diﬀ erent forms as either individual actor or, once as an entire nation, in
the case of Poland. Piłsudski quite obviously regarded himself as yet another per-
soniﬁ cation of the same phenomenon, the new “king-spirit” the reincarnation of
Poland. In elevating Słowacki, Piłsudski was, perhaps consciously, explaining

See Jerzy Domagała, “Mazurek w nowym rytmie: Rozmowa z Cezarym Leżenskim,” Rzeczpos-

polita, November 9, 2001, where Leżenski speculates on the political motives behind the adoption of
“Jeszcze Polska” in 1926.

For example, it was the “Rota” that was sung at the conclusion of a rightist-sponsored ceremony

celebrating the anniversary of the liberation of Lwów (see “Rocznica oswobodzenia Lwowa,” Akademik
Polski , 5(11–1) (December–January, 1930–31), 6, and references to the “Rota” were often tropes in
rightist political journalism, for example see Jan Mosdorf, “Zjednoczenie i niepodległość,” Akademik
Polski , 2(8) (December 1, 1928), 4.

Cardinal Prince Adam Sapieha was not pleased with the idea of re-burying Słowacki in the royal

tombs: his Catholicism was idiosyncratic at best. He reluctantly acquiesced under governmental pressure
but said the royal crypt was henceforth closed. See Neal Pease, Rome’s Most Faithful Daughter: Th

e Catho-

lic Church and Independent Poland, 1914–1939 (Athens, OH: University of Ohio Press, 2009), 174 .

Independence Day

himself as the agent who would “bear witness to the Polish spirit” in the current
age.

e spirit, we may infer, was the “state,” the “nation.”

In this strange and poetic reﬂ ection, Piłsudski not only expressed his admiration

for Słowacki, but made very clear that he accepted the Słowackian vision of Poland
as a metaphysical notion variously incarnated, and that with November 11th, 1918,
the army had reunited a Poland long required to live solely as disembodied spirit.
Piłsudski was again, as had been the case in November 1926, creating a symbolic
vocabulary to explain himself and Poland and proﬀ er an explanation and a justiﬁ -
cation for his historical role.

In 1927, there continued many of the practices begun the year before: a military

parade to Piłsudski’s oﬃ

cial residence on the evening of the 10th, public lectures,

decorations bestowed, parades, religious services for all denominations, radio trans-
mission of patriotic music, and stirring speeches—Piłsudski’s return on the 10th
was a major event.

IKC wrote that at the military review Piłsudski was “remem-

bering the ﬁ rst bloody battles of the legions,” thus bypassing Independence Day
for the legions in symbol. His return from Magdeburg was the day that ended
slavery for Poland.

Kurjer Polski noted pointedly that 1927 was the second year in which the

11th was being celebrated as a national holiday. Poland had noted May 3rd as
a “moral and spiritual emancipation,” and now this occasion represents a “cel-
ebration of political liberation.” In a counter to the Right, the Kurjer noted
that those who were passive during the war, and did not believe in Poland’s
ability to win its own freedom, do not feel attached to the day. However, those
who see the 11th as the culmination of a moral regeneration think otherwise:
an eternal beacon for the longing for freedom’s holy light whose “Chaplain
emerged as Józef Piłsudski.” In reference to the words of “My, Pierwsza Bry-
gada,” the editorial went on to describe it as the animating spirit of the legions.
Hence, the 11th is not merely the day Warsaw was liberated—as admitted by
the Right—it is the “ceremony of the idea of independence, the powerful
moral force of the nation.

November 11th meant the freeing of Poland and

the return of Piłsudski.

Again, similar celebrations throughout Poland were reported in the Warsaw

press, and the 11th was referred to as the national holiday, suggesting an oﬃ

cial

is would coincide with the remark that Piłsudski was really “the hero of a poem or a story and

not a living person”; see the remark by M. Maliński quoted in Kulesza, Koncepcje , 289 n. 3.

See the reports in the Piłsudskiite

Kurjer Polski

for November 10: “9ta rocznica święta

niepodległościowego,” “Urzędy i sklepy,” and “Program audycji warszawskiej stacji nadawczej,” November
10, 1926, 4 and 8; and “Lista odznaczonych z okazji dzisiejszego święta narodowego,” and “Rocznica
święta niepodległości,” November 11, 1927, 3, 7; Zaproszenie” in Rocznice i obchody odzyskanie
niepodległości, -1930. IM. DZS; “Stolica w dziewiatą rocznicę,” IKC , November 13, 1927, 4.

See the captioned photograph in IKC , November 14, 1927, 1. See captioned front-page photo-

graph in IKC , November 12, 1927. A good summary of events of that day, ironically, can be found in
the nationalist paper Kurjer Poznański , November 12, 1927, 3.

See the editorial signed “Jun” entitled “Święto niepodległości,” Kurjer Polski , November 11,

1927.

“W 9-tą rocznicę odzyskania Niepodległości,” Kurjer Polski , November 12, 1927.

Formalization of a Discourse

status.

Kraków’s municipal oﬃ

cials declared it a national commemoration and

had parades and special church services, including those by the Jewish community.
Th

ese were the largest events ever held in the city to mark independence.

Oﬃ

cial

placards proclaimed Piłsudski the man who would lead Poland to “a future as a
major power” [mocarstwowa przyszlość].

ere were church services in small towns, and widespread singing of “My,

Pierwsza Brygada.” A small town near Hrubieszów in the east reﬂ ected a major
theme for the Piłsudskiites: November 11th as a bonding ritual supervening over
minority frictions. Th

e 11th was for all Polish citizens regardless of ethnic back-

ground, religion, or class origin: it was a unity celebration. Th

e largest minority

demonstrations were among the Belarusians in Wilno, where local dignitaries from
the city, and as far as Nowogródek, sent expressions of greetings and loyalty to
Piłsudski.

Similar eﬀ orts to utilize the 11th to transcend ethnic, religious, and class barriers

were found in Sarny in the mixed northeast of the country. Th

e population was

urged to join “the free with the free, equal with the equal”—the old PPS motto—
“brother nations loving on the territory of the Piasts the Jageiellonians, of
Kościuszko and of Piłsudski. All those who call Poland their Fatherland are one
people.”

Piłsudski was apostrophized as the national hero.

Eﬀ orts to commemorate other days, such as Lublin’s socialists attempting to

recollect the brief government there, had only faint echoes. Even in Lublin itself,
the organizers noted that the importance of the events of November 7th was
because Piłsudski was designated head of the army. Th

is was an early sign, much

stronger in the 1930s, of Piłsudski personally eclipsing November 11th: he and not
the event was the real cause of celebration; the circumstances were virtually
incidental.

100

us, in the ﬁ rst two years after his return to power, the ground had been laid

for a far grander commemoration of November 11th. It was now the emblem of a
newly explained Poland, and Piłsudski’s role was cast in a far more profound cate-
gory. Eﬀ orts by the political Right to salvage May 3rd as the legitimate national
holiday were feeble.

101

Ibid. Posters were spread in Danzig [Gdańsk]; see “Obywatele!” (1927 I), Rocznice i obchody

odzyskanie niepodległości 11.XI b. r. w. Aﬁ sze, DZS.

See the IKC issues for November 13, 1927, 4, 10.

“Przed świętem 11 listopada,” November 10, 1927; “W Przededniu święta narodowego,”

November 11, 1927, IKC .

“Pierwsza manifestacja lojalności Białorusinów,” IKC , November 12, 1927.

See the document entitled “Obywatele” issued by the Komitet Obchodu Uroczystości Święta

Narodowego 11 listopada” in loose, unﬁ led materials, DZS.

In the ﬁ le Rocznice i obchody. Odezwie niepodległości (11XI)—1928. Aﬁ sze. DZS, there are

posters and proclamations from Białopole (near Hrubieszów), Biała Podlaska, Lublin, Gdańsk,
Radom, Sarny, and Tomaszów Lubelski. All of these were areas of signiﬁ cant minority populations.

100

“P. P. S.: Towarzysze i Towarzyszki,” November 11, 1927, in Rocznice i obchody odzyskanie

niepodległości,—1930. IM, DZS.

101

See the issues of November, 1927 of Akademik Polski , the Poznań paper edited by Mosdorf. Th

paper was also interested in Jewish and Masonic issues—to an unhealthy degree.

Independence Day

T H E C U L M I N AT I O N : 1 9 2 8

e tenth anniversary of independence was marked in 1928, and it is not surpris-

ing that that year witnessed the largest commemorations of November 11th.

102

Festivities extended over several days.

103

e ﬁ rst, and most symbolic step, was the

decision of Warsaw’s city council [Rada Miejska] on November 8th to change the
name of the main square in the city from Saxon Square to Piłsudski Square [Plac
Józefa Piłsudskiego]. It followed a stormy session that lasted until three o’clock the
next morning. After repeated votes of no-conﬁ dence and walk-outs, the supporters
of the move only won by a small majority, with the help of the Jewish members of
the council. Th

e nationalist opposition was furious.

104

e 1928 celebrations were unparalleled both in size and the number of locales

directly involved. Parts of Poland that had never held Independence Day celebra-
tions did so in 1928.

105

Warsaw’s events were on a very large scale.

106

e sanacja

regime used its control over the government oﬃ

ces to create a celebration both at

the national and local levels. In an eloquent example, the headquarters of the
Oﬃ

ce of the Capital’s celebration of the tenth anniversary just happened to be in

the State Worker’s Club.

107

A huge military review was arranged at Mokotów Field [Pole Mokotowskie] at

the southern edge of the city. An American YMCA oﬃ

cial then in Poland recalled

that:

e great day was celebrated in many ways, in many places. It was a hard-boiled man

indeed who went through these days and events unmoved. One long remembered the
endless line of men, women and children of all classes parading past Marshal Piłsudski
as he stood in front of the reviewing stand receiving the spontaneous cheers of civilians,

102

e Warsaw Committee for organizing the event noted Piłsudski as the reason why November

11th was chosen; see the text in Pałaszewska, Święto Niepodległości , 23 . Th

e events of 1927 have no

special signiﬁ cance save for the irony surrounding the death of Piłsudski’s beloved horse, Kasztanka.
Wojciech Kossak, of the famous family of artists, painted the best known of all pictures of Piłsudski,
who posed for the picture, astride Kasztanka, on Independence Day 1927. However, shortly after the
session, the horse suﬀ ered an accident and had to be destroyed. See Jędrzejewicz and Cisek, Kalanda-
rium , III, 93–4.

103

ere is a very useful calendar of events for the 1928 festivities in

Pałaszewska,

Święto

Niepodległości , 24–6.

104

“Gorąca noc na ratuszu,” Gazeta Warszawska , November 10, 1928, 8; “Burzliwe posiedzenia

warszawskiej Rady Miejskiej,” Kurjer Poznański , November 9, 1928, 3; “Plac Saski w Warszawie,”
IKC, November 11, 1928, 5. Th

e nationalists were aligned against the Piłsudskiites and the Jews; the

arguing went on until 3.00 a.m. and the ﬁ nal vote was 52–43.

105

In Pomerania there were small manifestations in 1925. Only with 1928—and governmental

intervention—did the events increase in size. See Mirosław Goloń, “Obchody rocznic odzyskania
niepodległości na Pomorzu od lat dwudziestych do dziewięcdziesiątych XX wieku,” in Zbigniew Karpus,
ed., Drogi do niepodległości (Toruń: np, 2003), 219–24.

106

See for example the numerous descriptions in Rocznice i obchody odzyskanie niepodległości.—

1930. IM. DZS. A schedule of events and locales in Warsaw is the “Program” issued by the “Biuro
Stołecznego Obchodu Dziesięciolecia,” in Rocznice i obchody odzyskanie niepodległości.—1930. IM.
DZS. A useful recent commentary is “II Rzeczpospolita świętowała z wielką pompą,” Gazeta Wyborcza ,
November 9, 2008.

107

See the program entitled “Stolica radośnie uczci Święto Dziesięciolecia Niepodległości,” in Rocznice

i obchody odzyskanie niepodległości.—1930. IM. DZS.

Formalization of a Discourse

soldiers, and war-crippled veterans, an inﬁ nitely deserved tribute of love and
devotion.

108

Piłsudski was always featured in speeches and pronouncements, and his double
role as the vanquisher of the Bolsheviks in 1920 and a hero of 1918 were common
motifs. All the events were heavily military in content but involved speeches and
galas as well.

109

ere was a large meeting of former political prisoners, led by

Ka zimierz Sosnowski, Piłsudski’s fellow inmate at Magdeburg. In the evening of
that day, Piłsudski attended a screening of a ﬁ lm version of Adam Mickiewicz’s Pan
Tadeusz , the national epic set in Piłsudski’s native region near Wilno. Signiﬁ cant
attention was focused on presenting Piłsudski with a large map made of silver,
engraved with his victorious oﬀ ensives.

110

e themes of the occasion were thus displayed unequivocally. Polish independ-

ence was the culmination of a long Piłsudskiite project beginning with the eﬀ orts
and sacriﬁ ces of the pre-war independence movement. Th

e chief actor in this was

Piłsudski himself, whose long career was crowned by martial triumphs in the east
over the eternal Russian enemy, the recollection of a historic mission for Poland
invoked in the moving and nostalgic Pan Tadeusz . After ten years, the Piłsudski
government had created an entire ethos of the context and meaning of Polish inde-
pendence, which was to characterize the Piłsudskiite for ever after.

e notion of beginning the celebration of independence on the eve of its anni-

versary also is freighted with symbolic signiﬁ cance. To be sure, it was that day—
not the 11th—when Piłsudski actually returned to Warsaw. Hence, noting the
occasion had a certain simple historical logic. But since it was the 11th and not the
day before that was chosen as epitomizing independence, the evening of the 10th
became perforce the vigil of the holiday, a recapitulation of the Polish Roman
Catholic practice of attaching great attention to December 24th as the vigil [wi gilia]
of the Lord’s birth. November 10th thus, by political syncretism, became the
wigilia of a profane national salvation, complete with a redeemer appearing from
humble circumstances—not a manger but a German prison.

e Senate, for reasons not clear, proclaimed the 10th as the day of celebration.

On that day in 1928, in a speech to parliament, the prominent socialist Ignacy
Daszyński pronounced a paean of praise to Piłsudski urging Poles to purge them-
selves of self-doubt and the slave mentality.

111

Today, he said, the anniversary of

Piłsudski’s return is really “the beginning of the Republic.”

112

He thus abjured his

own creation in Lublin a few days earlier in 1918.

108

Paul Super, Twenty-Five Years with the Poles (Trenton, NJ: Paul Super Memorial Fund, Inc., nd), 98.

109

A huge collection of these posters and brochures can be found in the unsorted materials in

Rocznice i obchody. Odzyskanie niepodległości (11.XI)—1928. DZS. See also the scattered materials
in Roczniki i obchody. Odzyskanie niepodległości. ii-xi. b.r. w. Aﬁ sze, and in Rocznice i obchody,
odzyskanie niepodległości—1930. IM, DZS.

110

See the entries in Jędrzejewicz and Cisek, Kalendarium , III, 131–2.

111

“19 11/XI 18 Święto Rzptej,” Nasz Przegląd , November 11, 1928, 1.

112

See the report of Daszyński’s speech in IKC , November 12, 1928, entitled “Święto Niepodległości

w Sejmie Rzeczpospolitej,” 8.

Independence Day

Just a few months previously the Senate had elected a new marshal, the

Piłsudskiite Julian Juliusz Szymański, replacing the endecja’s Wojciech Trąpczyński.
Trąpczyński loathed Piłsudski, and they had barely managed to remain on speak-
ing terms.

113

By contrast, Szymański, a prominent physician who had spent many

years in the United States and Brazil, was an unabashed admirer of the Marshal.
Hence in 1928 he radically changed the atmosphere in parliament when he opened
the legislative year of the Senate, on November 11th, with a peroration dedicated
to Piłsudski: “Today on the tenth anniversary all thoughts turn to him who is the
symbol of our independence and with whom the idea of independence grew.”
A tablet was unveiled to Piłsudski’s honor in the chambers. Szymański went on to
denounce previous parliaments for their hostile disposition regarding Piłsudski,
likening them to the disorder of pre-partition Poland. Th

is was a damning refer-

ence indeed in the lexicon of Polish political symbols. He hailed the 1926 coup as
instituting order in Poland and the possibility of sure progress. Th

e new era would

be reiﬁ ed by adding to the plaque to Piłsudski the motto: “From the Senate to the
Creator of the Polish Parliament.” Szymański exceeded this: he invoked a pairing
ﬁ rst heard in legion propaganda of the war era. Piłsudski was one of the two names
in the Polish “ﬁ rmament of the struggle for freedom,” the other was Tadeusz
Kościuszko.

114

Piłsudski was “our symbol of independence.” He was thus “the

founder of the Polish parliament”: words that made the Marshal both the author
of independence and the solon of reborn Poland.

In a press interview, Szymański spoke of the parliament, indeed the “entire epoch,”

living under Piłsudski’s inﬂ uence [znak].

115

is was too much, too fast for Piłsudski’s

critics, who attacked Szymański for excessive partisanship unbecoming the oﬃ

ce of

Marshal. Several months of stormy relations between Piłsudski and the parliament
ensued, and the politically inept Szymański disappeared from politics by 1930.

116

An especial feature of the year was the creation of a tenth anniversary committee,

the Chief Citizens’ Committee [Główny Komitet Społeczny] chaired by the wives of
President Mościcki and Piłsudski, and other prominent members of government. Th

purpose of the committee was to coordinate the erection of “lasting monuments”:
schools, hospitals, and other institutions permanently to commemorate November
11th, 1928. Fifty-thousand proclamations of this eﬀ ort were distributed.

117

In Kraków,

the legionnaires planned to build a veterans home in Piłsudski’s name at the Oleandry,
whence the ﬁ rst legionnaires decamped on August 6th, 1914.

118

113

Zygmunt Kaczmarek, Marszałkowie Senatu II Rzeczypospolitej (Warsaw: Wydawnictwo Sejmowe,

1992), 73.

114

“Przemówienie marszałka Szymańskiego,” Nasz Przegląd , November 11, 1928, 2; cf. “Nauka

Chrystusa i racja stanu,” IKC , November 12, 1928, 8–9.

115

“Parlementaryzm a ‘żelazny Marszałek Polski’,” IKC , November 12, 1928, 4.

116

Kaczmarek, Marszałkowie Senatu , 93–109.

117

See the untitled proclamation issued by the Główny Komitet Społeczny in Rocznice i obchody.

Odzyskanie niepodległości (11.XI)—1928. Aﬁ sze. DZS.

118

See “Komunikat No. 3,” October 27, 1928, in Rocznice i Obchody odzyskanie niepodległości,—

1930. IM, DZS. Regarding memorials and other objects being erected, see “Żywe pomniki niepodległości
staną w całej Polsce” and “Pomnik Marszałka Piłsudskiego w Sosnowcu,” IKC , November 9, 1928, 5, 10,
and the November 11, 1928 issue entitled “Odsłonięcie popiersia Marszałka Piłsudskiego we Lwowie,” 8.

Formalization of a Discourse

Virtually every town in Poland had major events in which the minority commu-

nities were prominently featured.

119

Special ceremonial committees, some quite

large, were created. Kraków celebrated the 10th to11th with special events; and the
local planning committee noted that it was Piłsudski’s POW that freed Warsaw
(something to which the Right did not admit).

120

More, the Kraków press announced

that although Kraków was really freed on October 31st, 1918, it would relinquish
priority to Warsaw’s November date: Kraków “surrenders its primacy [prymat] to
accept the “holiday of the Fatherland’s rebirth.”

121

Special decals were manufactured

for windows, showing a series of interrelated images: the crossed riﬂ es of the legions,
the date November 11th, a national eagle, and Piłsudski’s initials.

122

In a further eﬀ ort at symbolic linkages, a story was reported from Kielce that the

grave of Bartosz Głowacki was found on Independence Day, and a wreath was put
upon it and a monument planned. Głowacki was the Kraków peasant whose key
role at the victorious battle of Racławice in 1794 brought renown to Kościuszko’s
eﬀ orts. Finding Głowacki’s grave on Piłsudski’s day created a convenient linkage
between the two national heroes on the same day.

123

e historian Olgierd Górka published a lengthy eye-witness account in IKC

describing in detail the events of November 10th to 11th, 1918, conﬁ rming that
Piłsudski had eﬀ ective but not formal command of the army on the 10th and giv-
ing him full credit for negotiating the departure of the Germans on the 11th.

124

IKC , taking its cue from the account, ran an editorial calling Piłsudski “the provi-
dential man,” a “prophet . . . with iron will” who not only created our independence
(1918) but later protected it (1920).

125

In conjunction with the tenth-anniversary celebrations, a gigantic tome was

published which presented the history and achievements of the Second Republic
in enormous detail. Th

e product of many hands, including the most renowned

Polish scholars, this volume dealt with the re-creation of Poland and the signiﬁ -
cance of November 11th in the following manner. First, the editors acknowledged
at the outset that November 11th was the correct birthday of modern Poland. Th

followed the Piłsudskiite line. However, the genealogy of the Second Republic was
presented as the accumulation of many eﬀ orts, with credit extended to Dmowski

Eﬀ orts to unite the several veterans’ organizations by November 11th were not concluded, but 30,000
marched before Piłsudski on the 11th. See Jabłonowski, Sen o potędze Polski , 71, 73, 75–6, 81, 122.

119

Large celebrations were staged in Kraków, Lwów, Wilno, Lublin, Łódź, Poznań, Gniezno,

Kołobrzeg, Toruń, Białystok, Tarnów, Tarnopol, Częstochowa, Piotrków, Rzeszów, Oświęcim, Przemyśl
(where a square dedicated to the legions was opened and dedicated), and Bydgoszcz—just to name a
few. See the reports in “11 listopad 1928 roku” and “W Bydgoszczy,” a small city where the military
parade lasted ninety minutes, in Gazeta Warszawska , November 12, 1928, 1–2. Reports from Lwów,
Wilno, Katowice, Kraków, Lublin, and elsewhere are in IKC , November 12, 1928, 9–10, and IKC ,
November 13, 1–3; IKC , November 14, 5–6.

120

“Jak Kraków uczci 10-letnią rocznicę wskrzeszenia państwa Polskiego?,” IKC , November 10,

1928, 12.

121

“Co dzień niesie?,” IKC, November 12, 1928, 6.

122

See the illustration in IKC, November 11, 1928, 5.

123

“Grób Bartosza Głowackiego odnaleziony!,” IKC, November 12, 1928, 5–6.

124

See Olgierd Górka, “W nocy z 10 na 11 listopada 1918 u Marszałka,” IKC , November 12, 1918, 1.

125

“11/XI 1918,” IKC November 12, 1928, 3.S

Independence Day

and Paderewski as well as many lesser ﬁ gures. To be sure, Piłsudski is given pride of
place—even his picture is noticeably larger than that of his rivals in the profusely
illustrated volume—but this volume does not adopt the monistic Piłsudskiite
analysis that the Marshal and his devotees had already put in place by 1928, as the
oﬃ

cial celebrations of that year indicated. In the introduction, the president of

the Polish Academy of Sciences, Jan Rozwadowski, a prominent member of the
Dmowski camp, managed deftly to quote Piłsudski’s remarks regarding civic
virtue, without mentioning Piłsudski’s role in the re-creation of the state.

A Piłsudskiite could not have written such a text, as it would have neglected to

inform the readers that Piłsudski, uniquely, was the architect of the country. More-
over, the essays that discuss the events of November 11th, and its antecedents,
display signiﬁ cant diﬀ erences. Th

e essay on military history, written by a young

General Staﬀ Colonel, Stefan Rówecki—who later led the Polish underground
army during German occupation in World War II—is resoundingly Piłsudskiite,
giving the military exploits of Rówecki’s hero pride of place and relegating the
eﬀ orts of Piłsudski’s opponents to the margins.

126

However, the essay on political

history that precedes it, presents the origins of the Second Republic with balance,
discussing Dmowski and Piłsudski as virtual co-equal patriarchs, though with
obvious sympathy for the latter.

127

is massive tome, designed to provide a com-

prehensive picture of the reborn state on its tenth anniversary, reﬂ ects a stage in the
evolution of November 11th. It has been accepted as the correct and incontrovert-
ible birthday of the state—which pari passu admits the central Piłsudskiite
argument—but it has not adopted the pre-emptive Piłsudskiite explanation for the
origins of independence. It does not reﬂ ect the ethos created by the selection of
tropes and symbols which had already been gathered by the Piłsudski camp to
explain the causes and meaning of independence according to a series of integrated
myths. Nonetheless, by 1928 the scholarly community had, to a signiﬁ cant extent,
become functionally Piłsudskiite with regard to Independence Day.

e German, Belarusian, and Ukrainian “clubs” in parliament held aloof from

the festivities. Th

ese minorities’ representatives did not recognize the day; nor did

the communists.

128

e Jewish Club, however, called upon the Jews of Poland to

join in the celebrations.

129

e Polish press was livid over the decision of the German

club; Kraków’s IKC referred to it as “the Germans declaration of war.” However,
the newspaper questioned editorially whether or not the parliamentary club really
could be seen to speak for all Germans in Poland.

130

126

Signiﬁ cantly, Rówecki was not a Piłsudskiite, either at the time he prepared this essay or later as

commander of the Underground; see Zygmunt Zaremba, Wojna i konspiracja  (London: Świderski,
1957), 167 . For Rówecki’s essay see “Dzieje oręża,” in Dziesięciolecie Polski odrodzonej, 1918–1928
(Kraków/Warsaw: IKC  et al., 1928), 89–114.

127

Stanisław Zakrzewski, “Pogląd na dzieje Polski od r. 1914,” Dziesięciolecie , 55–88.

128

Dobroński, “Obchody,” 15.

129

“Żydzi wobec święto niepodległości,” IKC , November 11, 1928, 8.

130

“Mniejszości a święto niepodległości,” Gazeta Warszawska , November 8, 1928, 2; “Przeciw

państwu,” Kurjer Poznański , November 9, 1928, 1; “Antypaństwo. Demonstracja mniejszości naro-
dowych,” Kurjer Poznański, November 9, 1928, 3; “Przed uroczystym posiedzeniem,” IKC , November
10, 1928, 9.

Formalization of a Discourse

November 11th was a provocative moment in German–Polish relations. Germans

in Poznań were at best somber.

131

Reports from Upper Silesia claimed that Catho-

lic Germans, at least, were grateful to Poland for stopping the Bolshevik onslaught
of 1920 and did not succumb to the blandishments of Berlin and its local agitators.
In 1929, to the outrage of local Poles, German Protestants demonstrated opposi-
tion on Independence Day. Polish Protestants, by contrast, observed the com-
memoration.

132

Germans were conspicuously absent from the November 11th

celebrations in the Free City of Danzig, Polish Gdańsk.

133

In the 1930s, the Polish

Consulate in the heavily Polish German Silesia made November 11th a kind of
national fête for the local Poles—to the intense displeasure of the Germans.

134

In the ethnically mixed eastern border regions, strenuous eﬀ orts to involve the

minority communities met with only modest success, except among the Jews
whose participation was prominent. Metropolitan Dyonizy of the Orthodox pop-
ulation issued a proclamation, as did the mufti of Polish Moslems, Szykiewicz.

135

In many cases, proclamations were issued in languages other than Polish. In Łuck,
for example, placards appeared in Polish, Ukrainian, Hebrew, Belarusian, and even
in Czech. IKC speciﬁ cally forgave the Ukrainian and Belarusian parliamentary
clubs, and blamed any problems on local troublemakers.

136

Belarusians in No -

wogródek, the press claimed, unlike their parliamentary representatives, joined in
the November 11th celebrations.

137

Although there were few ominous signs among

the Belarusians, reports of the reactions of the Ukrainians were mixed.

138

is was

noticed with concern by the Jewish leaders and with Schadenfreude by the political
Right.

139

is was an omen of minority problems to come in Poland’s future.

Despite strenuous eﬀ orts, the sanacja regime was unable to win over the Belarusian
leadership.

140

On the other hand, the Polish minorities in other countries observed

the day.

141

131

See the report from Posener Tageblatt as noted in Kurjer Poznański , November 12, 1928, 3.

132

“Oburzające demonstracje niemieckiego unijnego kościoła ewangelickiego przeciwko Państwu

Polskiemu,” Polska Zachodnia , November 13, 1929, 3.

133

“W Gdańsku,” Gazeta Polska , November 12, 1935, 8.

134

is is presented in detail in Wojciech Poliwoda, Wspomnienia, 1913–1939 (Opole: Instytut

Śląski w Opolu, 1974), 132ﬀ , 165–71, 187–8.

135

“Prawosławni, żydzi, muzulmanie w dniu dzisięciolecia odrodzenia,” IKC , November 10, 1928.

It was mandatory for Poland’s Moslems to pray for the fatherland; see Pałaszewska, Święto Niepodległości ,
16.

136

See the articles in IKC , “Wymowa pustych ław!” and “W czyjem imieniu i jakiem prawem?,”

November 11, 1928, 2–4.

137

“Białorusini dziękują Polsce za dobrodziejstwa,” IKC , November 14, 1928, 9.

138

Cf. “Obchody dziesięciolecia niepodległości Polski zagranicą”; “Uroczysty przebieg święta

niepodległości w Polsce i zagranicą”; “Dalsze ekcesy ukraińskie”—all in Kurjer Poznański , November
13, 1928, 1–3; cf. “Prawdziwi Ukraińcy stają ramię w ramię z Polską,” IKC , November 12, 1928, 11.

139

For Jewish reaction, see “Od hymnu do prostej powieści,” Nasz Przegląd , November 13, 1928, 4.

140

Aleš Paškiević, “Józef Piłsudski i białoruska elita narodowa w II Rzeczypospolitej—lata

1918–1935,” in Maliszewski, Żar niepodległości , 87–90.

141

“Zewsząd, gdzie bije serce polskie hołd się poniesie w święcie niepodległości,” IKC , November

10, 1928, 5. Polish eﬀ orts to celebrate the 11th were suppressed by the Lithuanian authorities in
Kaunas and elsewhere in Lithuania. See IKC , November 13, 1928, 5: “Hołd łączności polskiej na
Litwie i bestialstwo szaulisów.” Similar complaints were lodged against German eﬀ orts to prevent
celebrations in Danzig; see IKC , November 13, 1928, 6.

Independence Day

e greatest success of the regime in cultivating the minorities was, as noted, the

Jews. A special parade of Warsaw’s Jews joined the ceremonies—an unprecedented
event.

142

ey marched from the heart of the Jewish neighborhood, and laid a

wreath at Piłsudski’s feet. Many wore traditional garb [w długich kapotach], and
Jewish veterans were especially featured. Music accompanied the whole procession,
reckoned at covering 2–3 kilometers. Nasz Przegląd , the most inﬂ uential Jewish
newspaper in the capital, announced that when the city council considered the
decision to change the name of Saxon Square to Plac Piłsudski, the Jewish mem-
bers broke into cheers, and a major speech favoring the motion was presented by
Abraham Truskier, a member of the Jewish Club in Parliament. Among his claims
was that Piłsudski led the country in “1914, 1916, 1918, and 1920,” the true
Piłsudskiite litany. Th

e independence of Poland was added to the Golden Book of

the Jewish community. A special proclamation was made by a number of Jewish
parties, including its parliamentary representatives to all Polish Jews to join in the
November 11th ceremonies. Th

ousands of young Jews—signiﬁ cantly wearing

either red or white, or blue and white—demonstrated in the capital; the streets
began to ﬁ ll up at 8.00 a.m. Despite occasional references to lingering anti-
Semitism, the Jews of Poland demonstrated loyalty by singing the Polish national
anthem.

143

A little Jewish girl made a speech to President Mościcki, who kissed her in

return. Deputy Szyja Heschel Farbstein, the initiator of the procession and a
member of the general committee organizing the capital’s festivities, gave a dra-
matic speech concluding that Poland’s Jews regard it as their duty to honor the
savior [zbawca] and creator of an independent Poland: “the builder of the state;
our children will say that we, with our own eyes have seen the Father of Poland.”
Piłsudski was greatly moved, and the crowds cheered. Piłsudski later received a
delegation of Warsaw Jews. Th

e Jewish scholar Rabbi Mojżesz Schorr emotionally

noted that this generation of Jews had the good fortune of remembering the hap-
piness of the rebirth of the fatherland; a fact due to “the Providential man,”
Piłsudski. Schorr began his remarks echoing Mickiewicz’s Pan Tadeusz with “My
Fatherland.”

144

e Jewish press made much of similar activities by the Jewish communities of

other Polish cities. Łódź and Wilno received special attention. In Łódź, a proces-
sion visited the graves of the veterans of 1863, which included numerous Jews. Th

Jewish community was particularly proud to note that Polish Jews in Palestine also
celebrated the event.

145

Nationalist papers such as Kurjer Poznański went to some length to report point-

edly on demonstrations by Jews in favor of Piłsudski.

146

Gazeta Warszawska , another

142

Unless otherwise noted, the description of Jewish participation in the capital’s events is drawn

from the large number of articles appearing in Nasz Przegląd , November 8–14.

143

“Młodzież żydowska ku czci Piłsudskiego,” Kurjer Poznański , November 10, 1928, 20; cf.

Hauser, “Jedność w wielości,” 135.

144

Mojżesz Schorr, “Święto Wolności,” Nasz Przegląd , November 11, 1928.

145

“Ludność żydowska na prowincji,” Nasz Przegląd , November 11, 1928, 19.

146

See, e.g., “Młodzież żydowska ku czci Piłsudskiego,” Kurjer Poznański , November 10, 1928, 20.

Formalization of a Discourse

nationalist organ, did likewise.

147

e implications of this relationship would not

be lost on regular readers; Jewish support for the idea of changing the name of
Saxon Square to Piłsudski Square was particularly galling to the Right.

148

In addi-

tion to its suspicions about Jewish machinations, the rightist press also saw the
sanacja as permeated by Freemasonry.

149

However sincere the Jewish support for the Piłsudski regime, we should not

forget that the Jews of Poland had really no options. Support for the rightist endecja
led by the anti-Semite Dmowski was impossible. Th

is left the sanacja. Th

e fact that

Piłsudski was known for his positive attitudes toward the Jews made what was
really no choice at all into something at least palatable.

150

P U B L I C S Y M B O L S

e state had increasingly portrayed Piłsudski as co-extensive with the government

if not the country. He made a series of appearances on postage stamps. Th

e ﬁ rst,

very modest version was in 1919, an issue celebrating the opening of the ﬁ rst par-
liament since the re-establishment of independence. Here, Piłsudski was not sin-
gled out for particular attention: the series in which he appeared also included
Premier Paderewski and Trąmpczyński, marshal of the parliament; other stamps
were various images of the national symbol, the White Eagle.

However, by 1926, matters had changed. On March 10th, 1926, a special stamp

was issued commemorating Piłsudski’s name day. Two years later, on the tenth
anniversary of independence, another bust of Piłsudski was emitted for regular use.
In May, there were two more Piłsudski stamps: one a proﬁ le with a belligerent
expression; the other a twinned issue with President Mościcki. Piłsudski was being
introduced into the basic symbolism of the government via the postal system.

151

had been among the ﬁ rst whose personnel had been replaced by Piłsudskiites after
the May coup. Th

e symbolic use of November 11th, Piłsudski, and the legions

reﬂ ected the sanacja domination of stamp and coin issues.

By the tenth anniversary of independence, a Piłsudskiite narrative had emerged,

with elements being added and reﬁ ned over the preceding eras which centered on
Piłsudski, the army, and the central signiﬁ cance of November 11th and events in
Warsaw. Piłsudski had become not only a providential ﬁ gure in delivering Poland
from bondage, but he represented a moral force, the sanacja, which would cleanse
the nation of generations of servility.

e legions were the army that demonstrated Poland’s desire to free itself with-

out foreign help, by sacriﬁ ce and devotion. Piłsudski led the army and he thus

147

“Askenjaza,” Gazeta Warszawska , November 9, 1928, 4.

148

“Gorąca noc na ratuszu,” Gazeta Warszawska , November 10, 1928, 8; “Burzliwe posiedzenia

warszawskiej rady miejskiej,” Kurjer Poznański , November 9, 1928, 3.

149

“Złoty deszcz,” Kurjer Poznański , November 11, 1926, 4.

150

Regarding the Jews see Marcus, Social and Political History of the Jews , 328.

151

Images of these stamps and details about their emission can be found in Fischer katalog polskich

znaków pocztowych, 2005 (Bytom: Fischer, 2005), I, 61–7.

Independence Day

reiﬁ ed the role of the army in Polish history, a symbol best captured by Kościuszko.
Th

e army had arisen in a series of stages beginning with Kościuszko but marked by

1863—the January Rising; 1908 and Piłsudski’s actions of that year in the creation
of the ﬁ ghting units of the PPS and the ZWC, of which Piłsudski was the origina-
tor; and August 6th, 1914 when the legions ﬁ rst took the ﬁ eld.

152

He returned on

the 10th, was immediately recognized as having the moral authority to lead, and
arranged the departure of the Germans the next day: this is the event that really
made Poland free. August 6th truly was the cause of November 11th; Piłsudski the
symbol and link.

153

By comparison, the actions of Paderewski or Dmowski, the

events in Wielkopolska or Lwów were insigniﬁ cant. Piłsudski had transﬁ gured
Warsaw and thus re-animated Poland.

154

Finally, should there be any doubt as to paternity over resurrected Poland,

Piłsudski’s victory in the 1920 war with the Bolsheviks dispelled it. He not only
restored Polish independence, he saved it. Newspapers such as the ardently
Piłsudskiite IKC were in the habit of celebrating a joint holiday on November
11th, anniversaries of both victories: in Warsaw over the Germans and two years
later over the Russians.

155

Most importantly, Piłsudski was creating a new Poland; in the words of Kon-

stanty Srokowski he uniﬁ ed a “national community” [wspólnota narodowa]. It
superseded the past curse of disunity, and rested on a spiritual and psychosocial
base of common loyalty to the country and not the claims of nationality. He was
making Poland into a community of various nationalities; fashioning a state patri-
otism. In so doing, he was not just ridding the Poles of their traditional weaknesses
but creating a new Polish polity.

156

e Związek Strzelecki [Union of Riﬂ emen], the original nucleus of Piłsudski’s

legionnaires, released a lengthy pamphlet which explained Piłsudski’s function for
Poland. Because of him, the last ten years had resulted in fewer weak people: an
“internal victory” in the struggle in every Pole against the dichotomy between two
selves: the ﬁ rst is cowardly, ﬁ lled with fear and uncertain; the other is conﬁ dent in
the future, understanding of his past—he is the co-creator of the present. It is
thanks to Piłsudski that this new Pole is emerging, for in him the dichotomy has
been resolved. It was this—November 11th as the birth of a new Poland and
new Poles, under Piłsudski’s stewardship—that was the central message of the

152

“Powstanie naszej armji i jej dzieje,” IKC , November 12, 1928, 6.

153

For the relationship between August 6th and November 11th, see Helena Radlańska quoted in

Maria Wiśniewska, “Legenda Józefa Piłsudskiego w prasie Armii Krajowej i Szarych Szeregów,”
Niepodległość i Pamięć , 9 (1997), 159.

154

A 1981 pamphlet endorsed November 11th as the real Independence Day due to two factors:

Warsaw was liberated and Piłsudski was there. See Dzień 11 listopada: Wybrane materiały z okresu II-
giej Rzeczpospolitej (Warsaw: Oﬁ cynr [sic] polska, 1981), 24.

155

See “W dwunastą rocznicę odzyskania niepodległości i dziesiątą rocznicę zwycięskiego

zakończeniu wojny z bolszewikami,” IKC , November 12, 1930, 1.

156

is is an important essay by Srokowski, found in the insert entitled “Kuryer literacko-nau-

kowy” to IKC  of November 12, 1928 and entitled “Czem jest niepodległość i jak uczcić dziesięciolecie jej
odzyskania?,” 1–3. Nowak, though with less enthusiasm, credits Piłsudski with the same intentions; see
Andrzej Nowak, History and Geopolitics: A Contest for Eastern Europe  (Warsaw: Polish Institute for Inter-
national Aﬀ airs, 2008), 184, in which he refers to “supra-national” rather than “nationalistic.” I agree.

Formalization of a Discourse

anniversary. Th

is was the creation of a new Poland through symbol, selective his-

torical choices, and conscious action.

Political opponents of Piłsudski in the Second Republic watched with frustra-

tion the institutionalization of November 11th as the central Polish national cele-
bration and the increasing dominance of Piłsudski. Some, such as the rightist
Christian Democrat Władysław Sikorski, or the populist Maciej Rataj, admitted
the historic logic of the occasion but objected to the excessive role attributed to
Piłsudski. However, the more radical critics of the Marshal, especially the national-
ist Right, resented the virtual disappearance of their hero Dmowski from a promi-
nent public celebration as co-patriarch of Polish independence, and developed
various strategies to deal with the increasingly gigantic proportions the Piłsudskiite
regime attached to November 11th after 1926.

157

C O D I F Y I N G A C O U N T E R  N A R R AT I V E

By 1928, a counter-narrative had emerged on the Right that was largely the work
of a handful of prominent members of the National Party [Stronnictwo Naro-
dowe] and their press. Marian Seyda and Kurjer Poznański , Stanisław Stroński and
Zygmunt Wasilewski at Gazeta Warszawska in the capital, and Poznań’s Akademik ,
frequent contributors to this paradigm included Stanislaw Głąbiński, Joachim Bar-
tosiewicz, Trąmpczyński, and a number of others.

e salient points of this paradigm can be stated simply: independence was the

result of long eﬀ orts by Dmowski and his colleagues culminating in the KNP in
Paris whose hard work was the real “ czyn ” [an untranslatable word usually referring
to armed action]. Poland’s real heroes were these men of the West who came back
to Poland with links to the modern world: Haller, Dmowski, and Paderewski. By
contrast, the Piłsudskiites were contaminated by “easternism,” a term never really
deﬁ ned.

158

Signiﬁ cantly, when Mayor Cyryl Ratajski spoke on November 11th in

Poznań, he tried delicately to suggest that Poland was the product of both the
Piłsudski faction and its opponents. Th

e crowd reacted with wild cheers at the

mention of Paderewski’s name but was subdued at reference to Piłsudski. However,
when Dmowski was hailed as “the builder of Poland and the leader of the nation”
the throng was ecstatic.

159

But for all their accomplishments, the Right’s narrative continued; Dmowski

and the others never referred to themselves as the “builder of Poland” and never
emblazoned themselves with the majesty of the fatherland. Th

is is because the real

hero was the Polish people and it is they, not some particular ﬁ gure, who deserve

157

e prominent nationalist Stanisław Głąbiński saw the pageantry associated with Piłsudski as intol-

erable and a sign of “tsarist customs”; see his Wspomnienia polityczne (Warsaw: Placet, 2007), 44–5.

158

“Baranowicze–Gdynia ‘Piłsudski’,” Gazeta Warszawska , November 7, 1928, 4. Th

is issue of the

paper was conﬁ scated as a result of this article. See “Przyczyny wczorajszej konﬁ skaty Gazety Warszaw-
s kiej , ” November 8, 1928, 1. For Stroński’s concern about “eastern elements in the Piłsudskiites,” see
also “Prawdy wiary w Polskę,” Gazeta Warszawska , November 11, 1928, 5.

159

See “Święto Niepodległości w Poznaniu,” Kurjer Poznański , November 12, 1928, 1–2.

Independence Day

the credit, a credit ultimately due to the grace of God.

160

Despite God’s credit, the

rightist press announced that Dmowski received telegrams and words of thanks for
Polish independence from the Nationalist Party and other organizations in
Poland.

161

It is striking that the political Right, in celebrating Dmowski, often

referred to him as the “leader of the nation ” [wódz narodu] reﬂ ecting the nation–
state dichotomy in modern Polish political thought. Th

e Piłsudskiites may control

the state but the Right represented the nation.

162

For the endecja, the whole legion episode was a failure. It ended in ﬁ asco in

1917 when the legions had ceased to exist. Th

is demonstrated that the entire period

1914–18 was an eﬀ ort which “ended in defeat.” Another failed Polish uprising.

163

As a consequence, there is no Polish military explanation for independence. It was
Dmowski’s KNP and their diplomatic eﬀ orts in the West, not Piłsudski’s legions,
which were the direct cause of Poland’s re-emergence. Th

e Piłsudskiite genealogy

of victory is thus denied. Th

e status of the legions as an elite was rejected as a cor-

ruption of the noble meaning of the term.

164

Poland’s independence was ultimately the result of the Entente’s triumph in

World War I. Poland was born from that victory; Verdun really freed Poland. Th

oﬃ

cial position of the endecja was that the armistice made Poland free.

165

proper photographs to display on the anniversary were thus Foch and Dmowski.

166

Even the Poles in distant America, it was noted, understood this.

167

e November

11th issue of Kurjer Poznański pictured the Arc de Triomphe on the ﬁ rst page

168

—

for Piłsudskiites, incidentally, it was Dmowski’s very focus on foreign factors rather
than events in Poland itself which made Piłsudski the real father of Polish
independence.

169

e Lublin government of November 7th, the critique continued, was a dis-

grace and the Piłsudski-appointed cabinet of socialist Jędrzej Moraczewski no bet-
ter. In general, Piłsudski brought leftist government to Poland and that was
something between a disaster and a disgrace.

170

160

“Hołd nieśmiertelnej duszy narodu polskiego,” Kurjer Poznański , November 10, 1928, 1;

Joachim Bartoszewicz, “Polityka odbudowania Polski,” November 10, 1928, 1–2; cf. Zygmunt
Wasilewski’s essay “Naród odzyskał niepodległości,” Gazeta Warszawska , November 11, 1928, 4.

161

“Romanowi Dmowskiemu,” Kurjer Poznański , November 12, 1928, 2.

162

See Kurjer Poznański , November 12, 1928, esp. “Romanowi Dmowskiemu,” 2.

163

“Przegląd prasy,” Gazeta Warszawska , November 7, 1928, 3.

164

is argument was clearly stated by Głąbiński in his Wspomnienia polityczne , 67.

165

“Dziesięciolecie: Odezwa Stronnictwa Narodowego,” Gazeta Warszawska , November 9, 1.

166

Regarding the especial gratitude to Dmowski, see “Poznańskie—R. Dmowskiemu,” Kurjer

Poznański , November 10, 1928, 2.

167

ese arguments are stated succinctly in “Odezwa Stronnictwa Narodowego na dziesięciolecie,”

signed by Bartosiewicz, Głąbiński, Seyda, Stroński, Trąmpczyński, and others. A copy can be found in
Kurjer Poznański, November 9, 1928.

168

See Stroński’s essay “Prawdy wiary w Polskę,” Gazeta Warszawska , November 11, 1928, 5, and a

story by Rybarski published the same day entitled: “Walka o sąd historii,” 5 and the special supple-
ment entitled “Niedzielny dodatek ilustrowany.”

169

Bogusław Miedziński, “Wspomnienia,” Zeszyty Historyczne , 37 (1976), 154ﬀ . See also Andrzej

Kawałkowski’s remarks in Dzień 11 listopada , 24.

170

Regarding the Daszyński government, see “11 listopada 1928,” Kurjer Poznański , November 11,

1928, 1–2. See the analysis by Stanisław Głąbiński, “Próba nowej legendy,” Kurjer Poznański , November 13,
1928, 2; cf. “10 lat temu,” Gazeta Warszawska , November 7, 1928, 3.

Formalization of a Discourse

e freeing of Warsaw was not Piłsudski’s accomplishment but a plan already in

statu nascendi thanks to the work of General Tadeusz Rozwadowski before Piłsudski
returned.

171

Rozwadowski was, by the way, a particularly favorite ﬁ gure for the

Right to counterpoise to Piłsudski. No friend of the Marshal, Rozwadowski was
usually credited by the Right with the 1920 victory over the Russians at Warsaw. If
Rozwadowski did not win the battle, God did. Hence the frequent references on
the Right to the “Miracle on the Vistula.” Rozwadowski also led the anti-Piłsudski
forces in 1926; hence he was a particularly divisive ﬁ gure.

Indeed, Piłsudski only returned on November 10th thanks to German assistance—

a rather snide aside. What ﬁ ghting there was in Warsaw was not chieﬂ y the work
of the POW but of youth formations mostly from the political Right.

172

Indeed,

the liberation of Warsaw and hence of Poland was really the war of the Polish
people not a self-proclaimed and deiﬁ ed hero.

173

November 11th should be remembered as the day the Germans lost their grip

on Warsaw and the approximate date that Lwów was freed from the Ukrainians.

174

e freeing of Wielkopolska was of equal if not greater importance.

175

e territory

had been under German rule since 1815, and in the late nineteenth century a
powerful Polish national movement had appeared; a movement central to the
endecja. Events in the west were always given greater attention by the endecja; it
was part of the nationalist project of contrasting the modern west with the retro-
grade east. Piłsudski, a son of the eastern borderlands, was thus seen by the endecja
not as a national ﬁ gure but as some sort of frontier barbarian.

November 11th was not, legally or otherwise, a national holiday. Th

at status

belonged peculiarly to May 3rd, Constitution Day. Th

is holiday always ﬁ gured

more in endecja thought.

176

November 10th meant nothing.

177

From the late 1920s

through to the early 1930s, the Right largely ignored November 11th, or men-
tioned the liberation of Lwów, an eﬀ ort led by a popular nationalist soldier
Mączyński.

178

Kurjer Warszawski , no friend of Piłsudski, celebrated the 11th by

171

“10 lat temu,” Gazeta Warszawska , November 10, 1928, 1.

172

“Święto Niepodległości u Akademików,” Gazeta Warszawska , November 8, 1928, 3; “Młodzież

akademicka a dziesięciolecie,” Kurjer Poznanski, November 12, 1928, 4.

173

“Do ogółu młodzieży akademickiej,” Kurjer Poznański , November 10, 1928, 17.

174

Note the remarks “Dzień wczorajszy we Lwowie,” Kurjer Poznański , November 11, 1928, 8.

175

See the insert of Wielkopolska Ilustracja in Kurjer Poznański , November 9, 1928; cf. “Święto

powstanców,” Kurjer Poznański , November 10, 1928, 3; “Dni przełomowe w Poznaniu,” Kurjer
Poznański , November 10, 1928, 2; “Obchód 10-lecia niepodległości w stolicy,” Kurjer Poznański ,
November 11, 1928, 5.

176

Urszula Jakubowska, “Konstytucja 3 maja w myśli politycznej Narodowej Demokracji do 1918

roku,” in Barszczewska-Krupa, ed., Konstytucja 3 maja , 161.

177

Akademik Polski from 1929 through 1931 carried no stories about Independence Day and

ignored November 11th; similarly, Kurjer Poznański said nothing until “Świat obchodził uroczyście
12-tą rocznicę zawarcia rozejmu,” November 13, 1930. One would think there was no celebration in
Poland.

178

“Rocznica oswobodzenia Lwowa,” Akademik Polski , 5(10) (December, 1930–January, 1931), 6.

e article notes that the ceremony included the singing of the “Rota.” Apparently, “Jeszcze Polska,”

the national anthem, was either not sung or its singing was not reported. See also Lech Trojanowicz,
“Duch Orląt,” Akademik Polski , 2(8) (December 1, 1928), 2; “Ręce precz od Lwowa!,” Akademik
Polski , 2(8) (December 1, 1928), 2; and for a demonstration regarding the Lwów anniversary which,
incidentally, proclaimed Dmowski “the creator of independence” see “Wiec ogólno-akademicki

Independence Day

noting the erection of a statue to one of Piłsudski’s opponents in 1926, Dowbór-
Muśnicki. What coverage it did give to the independence ceremonies omitted
Piłsudski.

179

e simplest mechanism available to the Right was to ignore the occasion.

180

Alternatively, their press would stress other worthy historic anniversaries, such as
May 3rd to diﬀ use the centrality of November 11th in the Polish consciousness.

181

An instructive example of this exercise was a lengthy article by the prominent
rightist publicist Jan Mosdorf, writing on the November anniversaries in Polish
history (which, to be sure, are plentiful) and in which he managed to omit the
most obvious, November 11th, 1918.

182

Mosdorf managed to construct the gene-

alogy of reborn Poland without ever mentioning Piłsudski or any of his works.

183

Perhaps the most eﬀ ective method, however, was to mention the anniversary of

independence as a process without any particular author, as in 1928 when the
tenth anniversary of independence was described simply as: “When we regained
the Polish state.”

184

e front page of this issue consisted of a large photograph

of the American banker Charles Dewey, who, of course, played absolutely no role
in the regaining of Polish independence.”

185

Dewey’s picture was an act of political

distraction, for the same issue included a major essay arguing that Poland was the
exclusive product of the eﬀ orts of Dmowski.

Another method of avoiding any evaluation of Piłsudski was to focus on other

themes simultaneous to the November developments in Warsaw, at the center of
which stood Piłsudski. Th

is was a useful technique as it acknowledged the incon-

trovertible and easily recalled fact that big changes for Poland were indeed traceable
to November 1918. Th

e largest of these eﬀ orts at alternative celebrations was the

huge festivities of November 10th, 1928, organized in Warsaw by the Main Aca-
demic Committee [Naczelny Komitet Akademicki], which coordinated an observ-
ance of the tenth anniversary of independence. Th

e central theme was the role

Polish academic youth had played in the struggles for independence. Th

ousands

w Poznaniu,” Akademik Polski , 2(8) (December 1, 1928), 3.Czesław Mączyński’s status as rightist hero
was recalled to the author by his nephew, Stefan Mączyński, during a conversation in Rochester, NY
in September, 1984.

179

“O pomnikach niepostawionych,” November 10, 1930, Kurjer Warszawski , 8. See the issues for

November 9–11 to note the absence of Piłsudski’s name from discussions of Independence Day.

180

A careful review of Akademik Polski for 1928–31, for example, contains not a single mention of

November 11th as Independence Day in its November issues for those years.

181

See, for example, “Korporacje w dn. 3 maja,” Akademik Polski , 2(4–5) (June 10, 1928), 4. Th

article discusses a large manifestation of several hundred organized by the rightist student “corpora-
tions” in Warsaw. Th

ese were powerful and inﬂ uential bodies whose inner workings are well illustrated

by one of their leading oﬃ

cers, Wojciech Wasiutyński, in his memoirs, Prawa strona labiryntu (Gdańsk:

Exter, 1996). Th

e Right had the advantage of far better weather for its public celebration of May 3rd

than the usually dreary November conditions facing the Piłsudskiites.

182

Jan Mosdorf, “Dwie Rocznice,” Akademik Polski , 4(3) (February 1931) , 4. Mosdorf, an anti-

Semite, was executed by the Germans during World War II for helping to organize aid for Jews in
Auschwitz. See Jędrzej Giertych, In Defence of My Country (London: Roman Dmowski Society, 1981),
306 .

183

See Mosdorf, “Zjednoczenie i niepodległość.”

184

“Czym młodzieży,” Akademik Polski , 2(7) (November 1–15, 1928), 3.

185

Ibid., 1.

Formalization of a Discourse

marched; and there were numerous speeches, many by Warsaw academics includ-
ing the rectors of the several universities and prominent clergy. A sympathizer
described the festivities as students “also having the right to their own [national]
holiday.” Th

e timing, November 10th, could hardly have been accidental as it

coincided with the arrival in Warsaw of Piłsudski ten years earlier and had a virtu-
ally sacred status among adherents of the Marshal. In an obvious slap at the
Piłsudskiite faithful, the ﬁ nal speaker, Jan Rembieliński, who had fought in the
defense of Lwów, explained that the major service of Polish youth in 1918 was not
the disarming of the Germans in 1918—the Piłsudskiite POW’s chief claim to
fame—but in preventing political radicalism from engulﬁ ng Poland. Th

e latter

reference was an obvious attack on the left-wing genealogy of the Piłsudskiites.

186

ese strategies of diverting attention, selective silence, political syncretism, or

referring to events as occurring without human agency were all later hallmarks of
communist Poland in dealing with awkward historic anniversaries, but were well-
established in the inter-war period by the political Right. Th

us, by the tenth anni-

versary of Poland reborn there were two mutually exclusive narratives, two founding
myths in competition.

A N AT I O N A L C E L E B R AT I O N

Once again in power, Piłsudski made sure that the November 11th commemora-
tions were both grand and martial. His wife later recalled that he had long been
convinced that Poland “did too little to commemorate the great victories in our
history, and attached too much sentimentalism to our tragic anniversaries.” Hence,
it was at his initiative that a major military review was organized to commemorate
the 250th anniversary of Sobieski’s 1683 victory at Vienna. Piłsudski personally
planned the event, down to its smallest details.

187

For him, it was a bold declaration

of Polish military glory against a background of increasing international danger.

188

Similarly, November 11th was commemorated by a huge military review, either in
the center of Warsaw, or at the open Mokotów ﬁ eld in the south.

189

In the ﬁ rst

years after the May coup, Piłsudski regularly attended, appearing on horseback
until 1929.

190

His military aide, Mieczysław Łepecki, recorded this adulatory reac-

tion to observing Piłsudski at the 1932 commemoration:

I could not control my emotions when I looked at him during the military review.
I am not a scholar, and I do not know whether the proponents of the theory are right
or wrong who argue the connection which develops between the physical body and

186

Stanisław Fijalski, “Wielkie Święto Akademickie,” Akademik Polski , 2(8) (December 1, 1928), 3.

187

Aleksandra Piłsudska, Wspomnienia (London: Gryf, 1960), 356 ; Janusz Jędrzejewicz, W Służbie

idei: Fragmenty pamiętnika i pism (London: Oﬁ cyna poetów i malarzy, 1972), 190ﬀ .

188

Adam Ludwik Korwin-Sokołowski, Fragmenty wspomnień, 1910–1945 (Paris: Editions Spotkanie,

1985), 109.

189

Ceremonies alternated between Pole Mokotowskie, a large ﬁ eld in the south of the city, to the

more centrally located Plac Piłsudskiego. See Pałaszewska, Święto Niepodległości , 8.

190

See Jędrzejewicz, Kronika, II , 257ﬀ , 285–6, 320–1, 346–7, 377, 408, 427, 465.

Independence Day

the psyche’s structure, but when I gazed upon the physically superb form of the Mar-
shall so well harmonized with the greatness of his spirit, I knew they were right.

191

Pro-government—which meant functionally pro-Piłsudski—ceremonies followed
the pattern of the post-1926 paradigm (though noticeably reduced in size) through
the early 1930s. Warsaw staged large events with parades, concerts of legion and
other patriotic music, lectures, and other features. Oﬃ

ces and schools were closed;

stores less regularly. Other cities arranged reduced versions of the same pattern.

After 1928, special ceremonial committees were again organized in outlying areas

and increasingly they followed the practice of the capital in arranging a military concert
on the night of the 10th before more general festivities the next day. Th

ese committees

often included representatives of minority (especially Jewish) organizations—other
minorities generally held aloof, though their occasional participation was given exten-
sive coverage.

192

e Piłsudskiites wanted to include minorities whether they wished it

or not. Statutes and buildings were dedicated to Piłsudski’s honor.

One of the more unusual Warsaw presentations was a 1930 series of events in

post-partition history being staged as tableaux by the garrison: four associated with
Kościuszko, and the last four with the August 6th, 1914 march of the legions, the
legions in battle, the disarming of the Germans in 1918, and a collage entitled
“Th

e Resurrection of Poland.” Only elements associated with Piłsudski were fea-

tured. In explaining the ﬁ nal composite scene, it was explained that the Kościuszko
Mound near Kraków would be featured with Piłsudski’s legions arriving. Th

ere was

a bust of Piłsudski displayed as “the realizer of the thoughts and armed eﬀ orts
begun by the ﬁ rst soldier Tadeusz Kościuszko”

193

e domination of the army by

Piłsudski loyalists was obvious.

ere was a curious eﬀ ort, also in 1930, launched by Senate Marshal and

Piłsudski acolyte Szymański, to have November 11th declared (alongside May 3rd)
a national holiday: a status it did not have despite the obvious state-sponsored
festivities. Proponents of the Szymański eﬀ ort noted that May 3rd, 1791 were at
best an unfulﬁ lled dream, and at worst the opening of the last fatal partitions.
However, opponents countered that November 11th did not, after all, have national
status: the liberation of Małopolska, i.e. the Kraków region, was best dated as
October 31st, and Poznań region December 27th; only Warsaw and Russian
Poland could claim November 10th–11th. Besides, May 3rd had been sanctioned
by the Vatican at the behest of the Polish episcopate, and was hence both a reli-
gious and state holiday. Th

e Szymański eﬀ ort failed aborning, but left November

11th in a most awkward status: the day the state celebrated independence but had
no oﬃ

cial reason to do so. It was the national holiday only to Piłsudskiites and

those who could tolerate them.

194

191

Mieczysław Łepecki , Pamiętnik adiutanta Marszałka Piłsudskiego

(Warsaw: Państwowe

Wydawnictwo Naukowe, 1987) .

192

Information for 1932, which virtually duplicates 1929–31, can be found in Rocznice i obchody.

Odzyskanie niepodległości (11.XI) 1929–1932. Aﬁ sze. DZS.

193

See “Objaśnienie” in Rocznice i obchody. Odzyskanie niepodległości—1930 IM, DZS.

194

e issue is well summarized in “Nie będzie święta narodowego 11-go listopada,” IKC ,

November 10, 1930, 7.

Formalization of a Discourse

195

Rothschild argues that it was 1930 when Piłsudski, exasperated and exhausted by politics,

moved to “a more overt form of authoritarianism”; see his Coup d’Etat , 158.

196

Kulesza, Koncepcje , 21.

197

See “Obchód Święta Niepodległości w stolicy,” November 10, 1931, 8; “Niepodległość i wiara,”

November 11, 1931, 2; “Obchód Święta Niepodległości w stolicy,” Kurjer Polski  November 12, 1931, 1,
and the issue for November 13, 1931 issue of Kurjer Polski  with photographs on page 6. Cf.
“Uroczystość 13-lecia Niepodległości w Warszawie,” Polska Zachodnia , November 12, 1931, 1.

198

Dobroński, “Obchody,” 17.

199

Targowica refers to the 1792 collaboration of some Polish nobles with the Russians preceding

an invasion; it is the most damning word in the Polish political vocabulary.

e year 1930 was a diﬃ

cult one for the Piłsudskiites and Poland in general.

Frustrated by parliament and convinced (or at least claiming) that a coup by the
Right was being contemplated, the regime arrested a number of prominent politi-
cal ﬁ gures, journalists, and others.

195

ey were held in the fortress of Brześć, where

they were degraded and mistreated, some were also beaten. Th

e fact that most were

soon released, and trials for a few ended with minor sentences, is not of issue. It
was a disgraceful undertaking that denigrated the regime and Piłsudski in person
and was a “profound shock to the nation.”

196

e sanacja claim to being above poli-

tics and beginning a moral rebirth of Poland was seriously damaged. Th

e political

Right never forgave the sanacja ; Piłsudski’s reputation did not fully recover.

Despite demonstrations of admiration for Piłsudski, there were obvious indica-

tions of dissatisfaction after the Brześć arrests. Kurjer Polski in Warsaw, which had
spoken exuberantly of Piłsudski in the late 1920s, was more restrained in 1931 and
even mused that November 11th only stood alongside May 3rd and Polish Soldiers
Day in August [the anniversary of the victory over the Russians before Warsaw in
1920] as major days for Polish pride: something unacceptable to a true Piłsudskiite.
Th

e photographs printed of the Independence Day celebrations notably omitted

Piłsudski. Kurjer also ran a regular column on the prisoners at Brześć.

197

By 1931

the peasant parties had achieved a tentative coalition. Th

eir chief paper, Zielony

Sztandar , appeared with major portions edited out—about Brześć—and it carried
no news about the 11th.

198

Witos, the most prominent peasant leader was among

those languishing at Brześć.

School parades and rallies were rather more frequent in the borderlands [Chełm

and Grodno, inter alia] or in Silesia in the western regions than in Central Poland.
Local committees issued proclamations praising Piłsudski, who has led the army
against the Russian invader [Włodzimierz, Radom, Łomża, Krasnystaw, Wilno,
and Wołkowysk]; Pińsk’s celebrations noted that Piłsudski had again established
Poland as the antemurale christianitatis and repulsed eastern barbarism; saved and
built the country [Mińsk Mazowiecki, Ostrów Mazowiecki, Nowogródek]; raised
Poland’s international stature [Łomża]; spoke of the need for unity [Sochaczew];
celebrated the participation of minorities in the new Poland, a work due to
Piłsudski’s policy of full rights for minorities [Drohobycz, Włodzimierz]; and
denounced the divisive nature of parliamentarianism [sejmowładztwo], which it
compared to the treason of Targowica [Włodzimierz].

199

e last was an attempt to

justify the Brześć arrests. Th

ese examples are chosen at random. Warsaw, Zamość,

and Wilno rallies usually recalled the victory of 1920 as well. Some mentioned the

Independence Day

200

See the Grodno “Poranek ku uczczeniu 11-tej rocznicy niepodległości Polski,” and the Trębowla

“Odezwa,” both in Rocznice i obchody odzyskanie niepodległości—1930. IM, DZS. Cf. the numer-
ous other announcements there and in Rocznice i obchody. Odzyskanie niepodległości (11 XI).
1929–1932. Aﬁ sze, and Roczniki i obchody. Odzyskanie niepodległości. 11. XI. b. r. w. Aﬁ sze. DZS
for 1930–1931.

201

See, for example, the many proclamations and announcements found in ibid.

202

Kaszuba, System propagandy , 185–7.

203

Regarding the stamp see Fischer katalog , 2005 , I, 69.

204

Fischer katalog, 2005 , I, 69.

205

“Komitet Budowy Pomnika Poległych Peowiaków,” in Rocznice i obchody. Odzyskanie

niepodległości (11.XI) 1933–35. Aﬁ sze. DZS.

return from Magdeburg or the legions by name, but this was relatively rare.

200

same pattern persisted through 1933.

201

For the ﬁ rst time, the regime’s propaganda ministry issued guidelines on how to

commemorate November 11th and other state occasions.

202

e year 1933 also

marked a radical change in the way the postal and mint oﬃ

ces chose to present

national symbols. Th

e postal ministry issued a stamp on November 11th in 1933,

and it celebrated Independence Day. Th

e design was very simple: a medal with the

dates 1918–33. Th

e medal was signiﬁ cant, however, because it was the Cross of

Independence [Krzyż Niepodległości], only established in 1930 and awarded to
those who had distinguished themselves in armed action in the period leading up
to World War I and until 1921, but excluding the Polish–Russian war. It was
designed to be awarded to pre-1914 military organizations such as the legions and
their direct ancestors. Th

e fact that it would be released on November 11th gave

state recognition to a day not yet oﬃ

cially designated as Independence Day.

203

In 1934, the ﬁ rst Piłsudski stamp since 1928 appeared. It was issued notably on

August 6th, the anniversary of the march of the First Brigade. Th

e stamp, quite large

and handsome, bore a recent likeness of Piłsudski but at the bottom was a shield
bearing the legions’ version of the Polish Eagle from 1914. Th

e stamp was referred to

as the twentieth anniversary issue.

204

us the contemporary Piłsudski was twinned

with the legion (indeed, pre-legion) eagle, not the oﬃ

cial emblem of state.

Equally striking was the action of the mint. Starting in 1934 the large denomi-

nation coins of Poland bore the proﬁ le of Piłsudski on the obverse. Th

e reverse was

the Polish eagle. However, the ﬁ rst coins released did not carry the likeness of the
oﬃ

cial state eagle but that of the legions. Only later did the coin replace this eagle

with the oﬃ

cial version. Also in 1934 was the twentieth anniversary of the begin-

ning of World War I, and speciﬁ cally for the Piłsudskiites it was the birth of the
legions, the child of the riﬂ eman of pre-1914. Th

us the coinage of Poland was both

Piłsudskiite and legionnaire in 1933–34.

e only unusual 1933 event associated with the independence observations

was the erection of a monument in Warsaw to the fallen POW members on
November 10th, after which the committee proceeded to Belvedere Palace to cel-
ebrate Piłsudski.

205

Appropriately, indeed perhaps purposefully, the political Right

held a public meeting the same day including a service at St. Anne’s church in
Warsaw. Th

e purpose was to commemorate the service of the students of Warsaw

in liberating the city ﬁ fteen years earlier. Th

is was, in eﬀ ect, an alternative version

Formalization of a Discourse

206

See “Akademicki komitet Obchodu 15-lecia Niepodległości,” November 8, 1933 in Rocznice

i obchody, 1931–1938, DZS.

207

“Święto Niepodległości,” Kurjer Polski , November 7, 1934, 8; “Wczorajsze uroczystości w stolicy,”

Kurjer Polski , November 11, 1934, 3. Regarding the 1935 ceremonies, by which time the 10th had been
formally adopted as POW day, see “Uroczystość Peowiacka,” Gazeta Polska , November 11, 1935.

208

See Adam Koc, “Przyjazd Józefa Piłsudskiego do Warszawy 10 listopada 1918 roku,”

Niepodległość , 7 (1962), 228 et passim.

209

“Mikrofony Polskiego Radia w dniu Święta Niepodległości,” Kurjer Polski , November 9, 1934,

6, and “Święto Niepodległości w stolicy,” Kurjer Polski , November 9, 1934, 6.

210

Piłsudski’s rambling observations made just four days before the November 11th military review

are recorded in Korwin-Sokołowski, Fragmenty wspomnień , 122–3. It is not surprising that one of the
radical authoritarian Piłsudskiite political groupings in the 1930s called itself “November 11th”; see
Edward D. Wynot, Polish Politics in Transition: Th

e Camp of National Unity and the Struggle for

Power, 1935–1939 (Athens, GA: University of Georgia Press, 1974), 42 .

211

“W dzień Święta Niepodległości,” Kurjer Polski , November 11, 1934, 3; “Święto Niepodległości

w stolicy,” Kurjer Polski , November 12, 1934 .

212

e Independence Day celebrations of 1929–33 presented no new features from those begun after

Piłsudski’s return in 1926. See Jędrzejewicz and Cisek, Kalendarium , III, 167, 200, 232, 257, 294–5.

of the POW narrative. After their religious services they proceeded to the Tomb of
the Unknown Soldier on Piłsudski Square.

206

Whereas the purpose was to remind

the population that it was not just (or even largely) the POW that liberated the
city, by 1933 the Right was being ensnared by Piłsudskiite symbolism. Th

e day of

the celebration, the rally at the tomb, and the assembly on Piłsudski Square—all of
these were essentially Piłsudskiite tropes.

e POW aspects of 1933 were formalized the next year when the 10th was

unoﬃ

cially designated as the POW Celebration [Święto Peowiaków].

207

e previ-

ous year’s meeting at the new statue was repeated. Th

is meant the 10th was now a

double celebration: Piłsudski’s return and the emergence of the POW from its
subterranean existence—an event symbolized by Koc, the POW’s leader, meeting
Piłsudski at the train as it arrived in Warsaw on November 10th, 1918.

208

In a

further reminder of the military origins of Piłsudski’s current stature, the surviving
members of the Strzelcy [Riﬂ emen] of pre-1914 years, the precursors of the legions,
lit a bonﬁ re on Piłsudski Square on the 10th and sang “My, Pierwsza Brygada.”

209

Piłsudski observed shortly before the 11th that he regarded the day as “belonging
to those who commanded the army before I returned from Magdeburg,” making
it clear that for him the anniversary was essentially a celebration of the POW’s role
in Poland’s rebirth.

210

e Right usually began its celebrations with a mass; the

Piłsudskiite chose pagan festivals.

Kurjer Polski reminded its readers that it was the legions which were the origins

of the modern Polish military, which now made Poland a major power [mocarstwo],
and that it was Piłsudski’s return that accounted for the disarming of the Germans.
Without Piłsudski the result would have been anarchy. Th

e paper also announced,

en passant , a rather curious project to restore Piłsudski’s native manor in Zulów to
the condition of his childhood, a scansion begun by buying the original family
home. Th

e project was to be completed, appropriately, by November 11th, 1935.

Whether or not it was a success is not clear; Piłsudski died a few months before.

211

In the capital, as the international situation deteriorated in the 1930s, military

bravado was increasingly seen as a psychological substitute for tanks and planes.

212

Independence Day

213

Piłsudski was in such poor health that his attendance was unsure until the last moment. He had

instructed General Edward Śmigły-Rydz to be ready to stand in for him. Piłsudski apparently person-
ally planned the military review; see Jędrzejewicz, Kronika , II, 493–4; cf. Łepecki, Pamiętnik , 237ﬀ .
Th

e front page of the illustrated weekly, Kurjer Poranny , showed a strikingly vigorous Piłsudski on the

grandstand reviewing the troops. In reality he was in need of his adjutants’ support to get through the
day and was exhausted for several days thereafter; see the front page of Kurjer Poranny , “Dodatek do
Nr. 320.”

214

Untitled document from Pińsk addressed “Obywatele Żydzi!” issued over the signature of

M. Goldberg, the Klub President in Rocznice i obchody. Odzyskanie niepodległości (11.XI) 1933–35.
Aﬁ sze. DZS.

215

e Wilno Jews, inter alia, had made similar declarations in 1933; see “Obywatele Żydzi!”

(1933) in Rocznice i obchody. Odzyskanie Niepodległości 1933–35 Aﬁ sze. DZS. In 1928, a main
street in town was re-named to honor Piłsudski and the nearby open area was called “Freedom Square”;
see “Program uroczystości jubileuszowych 10-lecia niepodległości Państwa Polskiego,” Pińsk, in Roc-
znice i obchody. Odzyskanie niepodległości.—1930. IM. DZS.

216

Shimon Redlich, Together and Apart in Brzeżany: Poles, Jews, and Ukrainians, 1919–1945

(Bloomington, IN: Indiana University Press, 2002), 68 . Th

is report is based on an oral recollection of

a Ukrainian from Brzeżany.

217

“Święto niepodległości na prowincji,” Gazeta Polska , November 13, 1935, 4.

218

Whether the anti-Jewish outbursts in Wilno were connected with the anniversary of Polish

independence cannot be determined. Certainly, November was a time of heightened Polish patriotic
consciousness. On the other hand, all witnesses attribute the anti-Jewish acts to the academic Right,
perhaps the most anti-Piłsudskiite element in Poland and no champions of November 11th as
a day of national remembrance. See the document entitled “Wniosek nagły Koła Żydowskiego” of
November 16, 1931 and other materials in Jarosław Wolkonowski, “Wilno 1919–1939: Miasto
polsko-żydowskie,” Karta: Kwartalnik historyczny , 34 (2002), 45–51 .

e 1934 celebration was focused on a huge military review in Mokotów Field in

which Piłsudski, already gravely ill, attended. His wraith-like appearance, and col-
lapse from exhaustion during the review made the day unusually emotional.

213

press, signiﬁ cantly, did not remark Piłsudski’s obvious frailty.

e practice of smaller communities issuing manifestoes and staging ceremonies

persisted in 1934 and the declaration of the Pińsk Jews was notably eloquent. In
1919 there had been an infamous massacre there when a number of local Jews were
killed by units of the Polish army in circumstances still controversial. Fifteen years
later, the local Jewish governmental organization [Żydowski Klub Myśli Państwowej]
noted that November 11th was the day “the entire nation threw its hearts at His feet
and gave him without hesitation the fate of Poland.” Th

e local synagogue held serv-

ices.

214

Of the several minorities in inter-war Poland, only the Jews made such ardent

declarations of Polish loyalties.

215

Similar statements would be unlikely from Belarusians,

even less so from Ukrainians, and impossible from Germans.

November 11th also, unfortunately, became the focus of outbursts of Polish

nationalist zealotry, especially as the international situation deteriorated or in areas
where ethnic tensions were high. Hence, in Brzeżany—Śmigły-Rydz’s hometown—
where a vigorous Ukrainian movement had developed, local Poles used November
11th as an excuse to vandalize Ukrainian institutions and shops.

216

However, in

Łuck, the local Ukrainian deputy to parliament, Piotr Pewnyj, spoke at November
11th celebrations, as did Rabbi Gliklich from the large local Jewish community.

217

In Wilno, which had a large and famous Jewish population, much of early Novem-
ber 1931 was befouled by nationalist riots directed against them.

218

Henryk Gryn-

berg, in his novella Drohobycz, Drohobycz, a ﬁ ctionalized memoir of this small

Formalization of a Discourse

219

See Henryk Grynberg, Drohobycz, Drohobycz (Warsaw: W.A.B., 1997), 17 .

220

Ibid. , 12. In his introductory remarks, Grynberg claims that the stories are essentially ﬁ ctional-

ized accounts of witnesses.

221

ere is a considerable amount of information in this regard in the 1934 ﬁ le of Rocznice i

obchody 1931–38, DZS.

Eastern Galicia town in the 1930s, refers to its most illustrious son, Bruno Schulz,
drawing portraits of Mościcki and Piłsudski on May 3rd and November 11th in
his art class.

219

ere is also a moving scene that utilized November 11th to capture

the tragedy of the assimilating Jew in Poland at this time of rising ethnic
tensions:

Behind our place was the house and garden of Mr. Lang. He was a Jew and a Pole [To
był Żyd-Polak], a Legionnaire with the Cross of the Valiant. Th

is was the same medal

that Semmel the barber had, as well as Mr. Leichter who owned the “Sztuka” cinema,
and Mr. Bernfeld who lived on his wife’s dowry. On November 11th they would
parade in their uniforms, and the Poles would call out: Hey, Kike Soldier! [Jojne-
karabin]

220

Here, November 11th with its martial and patriotic symbolism both animates the
Jew who has come to consider himself a Pole and the anti-Semite who resents the
appropriation of symbols by someone he does not deem worthy of them. It is a
microcosm of the dynamic nationality problem of the Second Republic. Th

ese few

examples are suggestive, but the extent and enthusiasm of participation in Novem-
ber 11th commemorations by Poland’s large minority population awaits further
elaboration.

By the early 1930s, the Independence Day celebrations had evolved into an

increasingly solemn ritual, with little resemblance to a joyous celebration. Organ-
izing committees went to considerable lengths to urge people to smile and wear
festive clothing.

221

e commemorations always began on the evening of the

10th, to mark the return from Magdeburg. Th

e parades, involving government

workers, student groups, and the military, marched through the streets of Warsaw
converging on Belvedere Palace, Piłsudski’s residence. Th

ose observing the mov-

ing columns did so with silent curiosity. Th

e lateness of the hour and the short

days of November made this procession rather shadowy, scarce enlivened by the
usually dreary weather. It was only upon arriving at the Palace that the assembled
demonstrated with any enthusiasm. At this point Piłsudski made his appearance,
usually rather ﬂ eeting, to acknowledge the marchers and receive the military
delegations.

Although the concerts, parades, and large military review of the next day pro-

vided a more celebratory atmosphere, Piłsudski increasingly made his appearance
rare and brief. In general, he was becoming more distant, the “Recluse of Belve-
dere” [samotnik belwederski]. Th

is reﬂ ected his rapidly declining health and

increasing irritability, but also shrouded him ever more in mystery. Whether or not
it was his will, in the last years of his life Piłsudski was behaving more like a
shadowy national legend than a living political actor. Th

e ﬁ nal observations of

Independence Day and the Celebration

of Piłsudski’s Legend, 1935–39

T H E E L E VAT I O N O F P I Ł S U D S K I ’ S S P E C T E R

Piłsudski died on May 12th, 1935. He had made it clear that he wanted to be
buried in the royal crypt in Kraków.

e ceremonies marking Independence Day

later that year represented a further development in the relationship between
November 11th and the biography and personality of Piłsudski. In ﬁ ne , during his
lifetime the Piłsudskiites had striven to identify him with the central role in regain-
ing national independence. However, with his death in 1935, a perceptible change
in the ceremonies made it clear that the relative roles were being reversed. For the
Piłsudskiites, November 11th was worthy of commemoration not because it
brought independence, but rather that independence was important to celebrate
because it was the major achievement of their hero. November 11th became the
celebration of Piłsudski, with independence merely serving as the occasion.

On November 10th, 1935, the front page of the Warsaw daily Gazeta Polska ,

consisted of an enormous drawing of Piłsudski without caption or title.

is epit-

omized the elaborate two-day program of commemorations. Th

e ceremonies were

much enlarged in scope and solemnity, and emphasized Piłsudski and mourning
his death, not liberation day. Masses were celebrated in various parts of the city,
with the main service at the Cathedral of St. John. Musical and academic presenta-
tions were arranged at many places.

A military concert late in the afternoon her-

alded the major event: a mass meeting with bonﬁ res at Piłsudski Square, two
minutes of silence in his honor, and then a solemn march to Belvedere Palace
(Piłsudski’s oﬃ

cial residence from 1926–35) which was a rather considerable

e crypt had ostensibly been closed since Słowacki’s burial there in 1927, and Cardinal Sapieha

was not happy to allow Piłsudski, whose Catholicism was problematical at best, to be interred there.
But the Cardinal’s patriotism carried the day and Piłsudski got his wish: be was buried with the kings.
See Neal Pease, Rome’s Most Faithful Daughter: Th

e Catholic Church and Independent Poland, 1914–

1939 (Athens, OH: University of Ohio Press, 2009), 174.

Gazeta Polska , November 10, 1935, 1. Th

e drawing was by Głowacki. Th

Gazeta Polska was a

Piłsudskiite organ edited by one of the late Marshal’s most controversial lieutenants, Bogusław Miedziński.
It has a curious history. It began life as Nowa Gazeta  in 1906, the ﬁ rst speciﬁ cally Jewish paper published
in Polish in Warsaw. It was assimilationist and patriotic. It changed its name to Gazeta Polska  shortly after
November 11th, 1918 and was a Piłsudskiite organ for the entire inter-war era; see Marian Fuks, Prasa
żydowska w Warszawie, 1823–1939  (Warsaw: Państwowa Akademia Nauk, 1979), 148–9.

“Akademje,” Gazeta Polska , November 11, 1918, 4. See also other articles for this day noted in

Gazeta Polska .

Independence Day

distance from the Square. At 8.00 p.m., a large delegation of senior military oﬃ

ers congregated and, at precisely 8.45 p.m., the moment of Piłsudski’s death the
previous May, silence was observed for “Th

e Creator of Independent Poland.”

Stefan Starzyński, the mayor of Warsaw, and a passionate devotee of the late Mar-
shal, spoke to a large crowd in the center of the city, which summarized the
Piłsudskiite understanding of what, exactly, was being celebrated:

Seventeen years ago the man returned from Magdeburg to whom we thank for reawak-
ening the nation’s faith in an independent Poland, for creating, through the Legions
and the P.O.W., a Polish army, for winning by bloody sacriﬁ ce the borders of Poland,
for building the country’s internal strength, for preparing us to live when the moment
came when we would not have Him.

at terrible moment came this year. On May 12th, half a year ago, Marshal Piłsudski

left us. Our Leader, and Tutor [Wychowawca]. We were alone. It is diﬃ

cult for us in

the year of his death to celebrate happily this joyous day of liberation.

Starzyński concluded by calling on the population to be loyal to Piłsudski’s inspira-
tion and to epitomize this faith in the erection of a monument in his honor in the
square.

Later, at the Warsaw Philharmonic, Starzyński spoke again, with redou-

bled fervor: Piłsudski was uniquely to thank for November 11th and hence the day
was “a day of honor and homage [dzień czci i hołdu] by the whole nation for the
Great Marshal” who was, Starzyński concluded, “the greatest Man in the course of
our history.”

At no point in his brief remarks did Starzyński mention any faction

not associated with Piłsudski in his evocation of the birth of modern Poland.

was a completely Piłsudskiite genealogy of the state: Poland had been created manu
militari by certain elements that were led by Piłsudski. Not only were Dmowski
and Paderewski omitted but the entire political tradition not associated with the
Piłsudkiites disappeared from the national mythology. Indeed, November 11th
was no longer celebrating independence, it was celebrating Piłsudski. Th

e Novem-

ber 11th Committee, chaired by Starzyński, asked rhetorically: “Who can replace
Him? He was the greatest Pole of all time.”

“W przeddzień Święta Niepodległości,” Gazeta Polska , November 10, 1935, 4–6; “Pochód do

Belwederu,” and “Hołd armji,” Gazeta Polska , November 10, 1935, 4.

“Przemówienie prezydenta miasta,” Gazeta Polska , November 11, 1935, 4.

“Przemówienie prezydenta miasta St. Starzyńskiego,” Gazeta Polska , November 12, 1935, 8.

Starzyński, an unusually competent mayor, was completely under the spell of Piłsudski and, in the
words of one old comrade he “could see no future without him [Piłsudski]”; see Zygmunt Zaremba,
Wojna i konspiracja (London: Świderski,1957), 72–3 .

Starzyński had been an oﬃ

cer in Piłsudski’s “Pierwsza Brygada” during World War I. His heroic

service as mayor of Warsaw during the German invasion of 1939 has won him great respect; see
Edward Henzel, “Stefan Starzyński: Niezłomny Prezydent Warszawy,” Zwoje , 7 (11), 1998 , online at
<http://www.zwoje-scrolls.com/zwoje11/text11p.htm>.

“Proclamation of Społeczny Komitet obywatelski obchodu 11-go listopada,” in Rocznice i

obchody. Odzyskanie Niepodległości (11. XI), 1933–35. Aﬁ sze. DZS. Wilno’s celebration committee
even announced in 1936 that henceforth November 11th would be known as “Józef Piłsudski Day,” a
conclusion implied by the content of much of the 1935 activities. See the proclamation of the “Wilno
obywatelski Komitet obchody,” Rocznice i obchody. Odzyskanie niepodległości 11.xi, 1936–37.
Aﬁ sze. DZS.

Piłsudski’s

Legend

e next day was to be dominated by a massive military review at Mokotów Field.

In the reviewing stand, in the place once occupied by Piłsudski, was his successor as
inspector general of the armed forces, Edward Śmigły-Rydz, Piłsudski’s favorite
oﬃ

cer.

In addition to the enormous military review, there was a morning mass, lec-

tures, military concerts, parades by uniformed societies, formal placing of ﬂ owers on
the graves of fallen defenders of the capital—from as long ago as the Swedish invasion
of 1655—and the bestowing of innumerable state decorations by the president.

Statues of Piłsudski were unveiled in various places, accompanied by the playing

of the national anthem and “My, Pierwsza Brygada.”

All of these events were

transmitted by radio, occasionally punctuated by propagandistic remarks about
Piłsudski.

ere was no school, and no state oﬃ

ces functioned. Th

e usual obser-

vations were organized throughout Poland, but this time each included a perora-
tion about Piłsudski, referred to as the “father of the Fatherland” and so forth.

A special committee was formed [Naczelny Komitet Pamięci], consisting of prom-
inent ﬁ gures from various elements of society, to coordinate large scale projects
designed to immortalize Piłsudski by erecting a memorial at every place connected
with him—some of most minor signiﬁ cance.

is national eﬀ ort was to be com-

pleted by November 11th, 1936.

On November 10th, it was announced that in schools throughout Poland there

was to be read a proclamation which described Piłsudski as the “directing genius of
the rebuilding of the State . . . whose greatness is to be the object of admiration and
pride for future generations.” Polish youth were to be inspired by the model fur-
nished by Piłsudski.

e lead editorial in the Warsaw Piłsudskiite paper Gazeta Polska elevated

Piłsudski’s November 11th achievements to virtual salavational proportions. Th

religious overtones are unmistakable:

See “Program dziesieszych uroczystości,” Gazeta Polski , November 10, 1935, 4; “Rewja wojsk w

dniu Święta Niepodległości” complete with a picture of Śmigły-Rydz on the reviewing stand in Gazeta
Polska , November 12, 1935, 1; “Rewja wojsk na Polu Mokotowskiem,” Gazeta Polska , November 12,
1935, 12. (As regards Piłsudski’s opinion of Śmigły-Rydz, see his oft-quoted glowing 1922 evaluation
quoted in Piotr Stawecki, Słownik biograﬁ czny generalów wojska polskiego, 1918–1939 (Warsaw: Wojskowy
Instytut Historyczny, 1994), 15–16 ; “Zbiórka organizacji społecznych na pl. J. Piłsudskiego,” Gazeta
Polska , November 11, 1935, 4. A valuable recent essay on this theme is Wiesław Jan Wysocki,
“Marszałek Józef Piłsudski a Edward Śmigły-Rydz” in Adam Suchoński, ed.,

Piłsudski i jego

współpracownicy (Opole: Uniwersytet Opolski, 1999), 105–13. Th

at Piłsudski had decided Śmigły-

Rydz would be his military successor was bruited in the Polish press before the Marshal’s death; see
Bernard Singer, Od Witosa do Sławka (Paris: Instytut Literacki, 1962), 214.

“Dzisiejsze uroczystości na Pradze”; “Odznaczenia w dniu Święta Niepodległości”; “Odznaczenia złotym

krzyżem zasługi,” Gazeta Polska , November 10, 1935, 6; “Uroczystość w M. S. Wojsk,” Gazeta Polska , Novem-
ber 11, 1935, 2; “Rewja wojsk na polu Mokotowskiem,” Gazeta Polska , November 12, 1935, 12.

See “Odsłonięcie popiersia Marszałka Piłsudskiego w lokalu cechów warszawskich” and “Odsłonięcie

pomnika Marszałka Piłsudskiego w Rembertowie,” both in Gazeta Polska , November 11, 1935, 7.

“Audycje radjowe w dniach 17-ej Rocznicy Niepodległości,” Gazeta Polska , November 11, 1935, 8.

ere is a handy series of these in Rocznice i obchody. Odzyskanie Niepodległości (11.XI)

1933–35. Aﬁ sze. DZS.

Heidi Hein-Kircher, Kult Piłsudskiego i jego znaczenie dla państwa polskiego 1926–1939 (Warsaw:

Neriton, 2008), 77–91 .

Ibid , 176–8.

“Młodzieży,” November 6, 1935, in Rocznice i obchody 1931–18. DZS.

Independence Day

It was a diﬀ erent people to which Józef Piłsudski appeared on November 11, 1918 –
diﬀ erent from those that live today. Th

e martyrdom of his life, for his life was martyr-

dom, has changed the nation. . . . He who does not act [to serve Poland] betrays the
Leader, even if he had been loyal to him during his lifetime. And only he who acts [for
Poland] serves Him.

e religious, or perhaps pagan, aspects of Piłsudski’s death were demonstrated by

the decision to give his name to a vast mound being erected on the hill of Sowiniec
south of Kraków. In 1934 the Union of Polish Legionnaires [Związek Legionistów
Polskich] announced plans to build a mound, to be called the “Independence”
monument, near an older and similar one dedicated to Kościuszko. Th

e undertak-

ing was superintended by a Warsaw committee led by Walery Sławek, perhaps
Piłsudski’s most dedicated lieutenant, and also a former legionnaire. Construction
began auspiciously on August 6th, 1934 the twentieth anniversary of the march of
the legions’s First Brigade. Th

e project progressed slowly—it was only completed

in 1937—as earth from all sites where Polish soldiers fought in World War I was
collected. Although the monument was supposed to honor those who had fought
for Polish independence, considering the day chosen to commence the eﬀ ort it was
particularly dedicated to the legions.

With the death of Piłsudski, the mound was re-named in his honor. A special

stamp was issued soliciting funds for the project. It consisted of two separate
imprints: a small Polish eagle on red background, and a re-issue of the 1934 stamp
bearing Piłsudski’s likeness and the legionnaire eagle. Here again we have the jux-
taposition of multiple symbols. Th

e Piłsudski mound reﬂ ects pre-Christian prac-

tices, and this conjures the cult-like atmosphere characteristic of much of Piłsudski’s
following. Th

e fact that Gazeta Polska commented: “To the Polish Religion a new

relic has been added”—requires no commentary.

e monument was in the vicinity of three others. Th

e aforementioned

Kościuszko Mound (1820–23) has the most obvious signiﬁ cance as the progenitor
of the struggle to which Piłsudski brought ultimate victory. Th

e other two mounds

are dedicated to legendary ﬁ gures Krak and Wanda. Both are extremely old, dating
perhaps to the ninth century, if not earlier, and probably pre-dating the introduc-
tion of Christianity to the local population. Piłsudski is thus elevated—quite liter-
ally—to legendary dimensions.

Shortly after his death a small series of ﬁ ve mourning stamps were issued bearing

his likeness in old age. Th

e stamps, however, were issued on large sheets in which

the proﬁ le of Piłsudski is separated from the next stamp by the odd location of the
bordering material separating the stamps, what philatelists refer to as the gutter.
Piłsudski’s portrait is placed in the middle of four white blank spaces, a cross, upon
which he is suspended. It is impossible to discover whether this bizarre printing
style was used for other stamps but it was a feature of the Piłsudski mourning issue;
an obvious Christian religious motif, in juxtaposition to the pagan connotations of
the mound. In either case Piłsudski is given supernatural linkages. Taken together,

“Nowy listopad,” Gazeta Polska , November 11, 135, 1.

Quoted in Hein-Kircher, Kult Piłsudskiego , 158 .

Piłsudski’s

Legend

we have Kościuszko, legions, religious symbolism, and Piłsudski all intertwined at
a moment of severe psychic crisis in Poland: the unanticipated death of the national
icon.

Bruno Schultz, the idiosyncratic writer and devout Piłsudskiite, composed an

arresting essay soon after the Marshal’s death. His remarks capture the elevation of
Piłsudski inherited by his downcast and leaderless lieutenants. It deserves quota-
tion in extenso. It begins: “Th

e legend is the organ by which greatest is appre-

hended.” Since “Positivism” is the “religion of times that have not known greatness,”
it was diﬃ

cult at ﬁ rst to appreciate the “Magnitude” of Piłsudski. He “suspended

the laws of ordinary processes.” Only through legend could he be grasped. Seeming
antimonies and contradictions are due to the inability of reason to perceive the
huge dimension of this “Other.” He “comprises the nation within himself.” But he
is both “father and creator” of the nation. He “exhibits superhuman dimensions.”
Unlike Napoleon this “Other” was greater than his acts. “He has laid himself over
Poland like a cloud and endures.” “His role in History is only beginning.” Piłsudski
“emerged out of the undergrowth of history . . . out of the past.” He was “sheer
continuity” heavy with the “teeming visions of poets.” “In the act of dying,”
emerged the “ﬁ nal mask” which is “the countenance of Poland—forever.”

is beautifully crafted paean captures the overwhelming burden Piłsudski’s

epigone labored under. If a sensitive intellectual—a Jew in a land that knew much
anti-Semitism—could regard Piłsudski as virtually incomprehensible in his maj-
esty, then who or what could replace him?

N OV E M B E R 1 1 T H A S I D E O L O G Y

With Piłsudski’s death, the servitors of his memory transformed the meaning of
November 11th. Th

ey completed the re-conceptualization of the birth of modern

Poland which had been developing, episodically, since 1918. After 1935 it became
a fully integrated ideological doctrine.

Piłsudski was the embodiment of the

Polish insurrectionary tradition, whose distant spiritual heir was Kościuszko and
was last evidenced by the January Rising of 1863. It was he who re-animated this
spirit by founding the movement that led to the legions of World War I. Th

ese

formations, and these alone, were the organizational, and more, spiritual frame-
work of the modern Polish army. And it was the army which created Poland, not
an army as understood in the West, but the army as the embodiment of the most
exalted Polish ideals of heroism, sacriﬁ ce, and dedication. Piłsudski was “the leader”
of this quintessentially Polish army: it and no other force, no other actor, were
responsible for Polish independence.

But they did not act alone. Rather, by his return on November 10th—a Sunday,

be it noted—Piłsudski ignited the latent patriotic resources of the nation, he

See “Th

e Formation of Legends,” Tygodnik Ilustrowany , 22 (May 12, 1935), English translation

in Jerzy Ficowski, ed., Letters and Drawings of Bruno Schultz, with Selected Prose (New York: Harper &
Row, 1988), 59–62.

In Kaszuba’s words, the “cult grew to the level of an ideology”; see her System propagandy , 250 .

Independence Day

reviviﬁ ed his country. Hence, his coming is a salvational event. Th

e next day he

succeeded to his deserved role as head of the nation—the technicalities of his func-
tion and responsibilities being insigniﬁ cant details. He was deprived of his rightful
position by sordid politicking in 1923, the temporary re-crudescence of a peren-
nial national failing, an episode of unworthiness reminiscent of the civic laxity that
led to ruin in pre-partition Poland. But he returned in 1926, after three years, and
order was restored both in practical and spiritual terms. It was with his return that
the nation took on its proper form, adopted those signs and symbols which made
it what it was, and latently, had always been: the anthem, the newly designed eagle,
the exaltation of the army as moral exemplar. Th

ese were all the symbolic creation

of a new Poland, based on the re-animation of the best traditional elements, which
Piłsudski alone had crafted and re-animated. Because Piłsudski had worked this
manu militari , the army had become central to the meaning of Polish life. Th

army was thus, as Piotr Cichoracki has argued, the central element in the creation
of the “cult” of Piłsudski within Poland.

Piłsudski’s name day, his death, and

Independence Day were marked at his oﬃ

cial residence, Belvedere Palace, by a

Trinitarian symbol.

To be sure, the usual trappings of vaingloriousness associated with dictatorial

regimes are present in post-1926 Poland, as are the elements of praetorianism among
the veterans of the legions. However, the motives behind the cult were rather more
complex, and perhaps less squalid than they ﬁ rst appear. Th

e principal goal was to

create integrating mechanisms to allow Poland to survive after 1935. Certainly the
same motive could be attributed to several initiatives associated with Piłsudski, or
later his epigone. But the creation and manipulation of symbols was the most subtle
and most fundamental of all these eﬀ orts as it attempted to inveigle itself directly
into the national consciousness by explaining reality through a series of symbolic
structures. It was an eﬀ ort to re-invent Poland, to provide Poles with a national
genealogy to replace the confusing and often lugubrious clutter of pre-partition his-
tory, and the heroic yet vain martyrdom of the insurrectionary era that followed.

In this eﬀ ort, November 11th was the central element. By focusing on that day

as the beginning of Poland, it made it possible to suggest new paradigms for the
nation—though fashioned on the material provided by a lengthy past. Piłsudski
was the architect of this new creation and hence it was necessary to explain
November 11th as peculiarly his work, purged of the contributions of others.

Increasingly solemn and religious overtones accompanied the November 11th

observations as Piłsudski was transformed into a transcendent being, truly a provi-
dential ﬁ gure. Th

is introduced a paradoxical element into the Piłsudskiite concep-

tion of Poland’s rebirth, which is the symbol represented by November 11th. If the
ﬁ gure of Piłsudski transcended the signiﬁ cance of the event, the whole project
risked self-annihilation as the death of Piłsudski clearly left the nation bereft.

Piotr Cichoracki , Z nami jest On: Kult Marszałka Józefa Piłsudskiego w Wojsku Polskim w latach

1926–1939 (Wrocław: Towarzystwo Przyjaciół Ossolineum, 2001).

Regarding the Belvedere ceremonies see Elżbieta Kaszuba, System propagandy państwowej obozu

rządzącego w Polsce w latach 1926–1939 (Wrocław: Adam Marszałek, 2004), 261 .

Piłsudski’s

Legend

Hence, there is an inevitable logic in the phenomenon reported by Cichoracki that
the erection of the Piłsudski cult reached its apogee in 1935–37 and declined
thereafter.

is would correspond to a re-adjustment to the relative weights of the

Piłsudski symbol as against that of Independence Day. Th

e ﬁ rst major step in this

process was the elevation of a new commander for the Polish military. Ironically, to
preserve the essence of the Piłsudskiite version of Poland the centrality of Piłsudski
had to be reduced.

e Piłsudski-November 11th legend was really all that held together the Mar-

shal’s acolytes after his death. Th

e sanacja was deﬁ cient in enunciating a guiding

ideology to besetting national problems. Janusz Jędrzejewicz’s dictum that a
Piłsudskiite was “a man of deep faith, however that faith possessed no dogma” is an
inculpation.

Elżbieta Kaszuba was correct in noting that the post-1926 Piłsudski

regime stressed creating a “common mentality” rather than inculcating an ideol-
ogy.

ese unifying notions are what Piłsudski referred to as imponderabilia —a

term impossible to translate but which to Piłsudskiites reached Trinitarian dimen-
sions in its incomprehensible profundity. It is a truism that, without Piłsudski’s
commanding presence, the government he created in 1926 disintegrated into
chaos held together by inertia and a desire to retain power for its own end. It is not
surprising then, that the eﬀ ort to maintain the Piłsudski legend and the meaning
of November 11th was so important: it was virtually all they had. Ironically, by the
late 1930s, the sanacja regime ﬁ nally discerned new means for mobilizing the pub-
lic: external threat and the need to rally in support of the armed forces as a result.

e political Right was placed in a diﬃ

cult position by the double signiﬁ cance

of the November observances in 1935. Not only were they attempting to continue
another narrative, but now they had national bereavement with which to contend.
In Warsaw, they arranged a large celebration of Paderewski on his 75th birthday;
the maestro was a notable opponent of Piłsudski, who also enjoyed paternity claims
to inter-war Poland. Their press again posited independence as a collective
accomplishment rather than isolate Piłsudski as the author of the victory of
November 11th. Kurier Poznański , in a rather tasteless reference, suggested a
comparison between the mortality of the recently deceased Piłsudski, and the
immortality of the nation. Th

ere were masses and rallies to this eﬀ ect at several

places in Poland. Some events notably involved clashes with Jews.

Local eﬀ orts by

the Right to include Paderewski, Dmowski, and other elements in Independence
Day ceremonies—notably in 1938 Bydgoszcz—resulted in violence.

Cichoracki , Z nami jest On , 18.

Quoted in Włodzimierz Suleja, “Myśl polityczna Piłsudczyków a twórczoś

ċ Juliusza Kadena-

Bandrowskiego,” in Zygmunt Zieliński, ed., W kręgu tworców myśli politycznej (Wrocław: Ossolineum,
1983), 283 . Andrzej Romanowski has modernized this attribution by noting that “Piłsudski really
hated doctrine”; see his remarks in “Socjalista wszystkich Polaków,” Gazeta Wyborcza , May 13, 2005.

Kaszuba, System propagandy , 171 .

See the following articles in Kurjer Poznański : “Akademija ku czci Ignacego Paderewskiego,”

November 7, 1935, 1; the remarks on the untitled November 10, 1935 front page; “Manifestacje młodzieży
Narodowej w Poznaniu i w Warszawie,” November 12, 1935, 5; “Obchód dnia Niepodległości w Pozna-
niu,” November 12, 1935, 8; “Obchód dnia niepodległości,” November 12, 1935, 3.

Kaszuba, System propagandy , 271–2 . Note the similarities with 2011.

Independence Day

T H E FA I L E D T R A N S F E R E N C E O F C H A R I S M

In 1936, the November 10th–11th commemoration was used to announce the
elevation of Śmigły-Rydz, to the rank of marshal of Poland.

Pictures of this were

distributed throughout the school system.

Legionnaires played a notable role in

the ceremonies.

e conferring of the bulawa of rank was on the 10th, which was

thus transformed from a vigil at Piłsudski’s Belvedere into what the Piłsudskiite
Kurjer Polski referred to as “the celebration of the Armed Forces of the Republic,”
Śmigły-Rydz merely being the focal point.

Here we see an eﬀ ort at multiple manipulations of symbols. Piłsudski had been

the ﬁ rst and only Marshal. His death had left Poland bereft. Now Śmigły-Rydz
assumed the same title on the very days that had been associated with Piłsudski. Th

fact that the event was accompanied by much military pageantry (and even a chaste
kiss from digniﬁ ed President Ignacy Mościcki), strengthened the notion that Polish
independence was the product of military eﬀ orts directed by the devotees of
Piłsudski who, now in the person of Śmigły-Rydz, were still watching over the for-
tunes of Poland—an eﬀ ort to transfer the 11th from Piłsudski’s ceremony to his
successor’s.

Piłsudski’s hand was seen in selecting Śmigły-Rydz: the new marshal

had been, after all, head of the POW as well as being a legionnaire: Poland could not
have an “orphan army” [osierocona armja]; it had gained a new, but familiar stepfa-
ther. Th

e links between Piłsudski and Śmigły-Rydz were repeated endlessly.

e intended meaning of the November 10th–11th ceremonies was conveyed

by an anonymous contemporary painting entitled “Apoteoza Józefa Piłsudskiego”

Śmigły-Rydz was promoted to “generał broni,” i.e. a three-star general oﬃ

cer on the 10th, and

hours later on the 11th was given the baton of Marshal of Poland. (Some sources suggest that both
promotions occurred on the 11th.) Also on November 11th, 1936, Kazimierz Sosnowski, who had
shared Piłsudski’s Magdeburg imprisonment, was promoted to generał broni. Both Sosnowski and
Śmigły-Rydz had been in rank as two-star generals [generał dywizji] since June 1st, 1919. Sosnowski
was probably Piłsudski’s closest military collaborator until 1926 after which the two were rather
alienated. Th

e government did this, it seems, to distract in some measure from the unseemly haste

with which Śmigły-Rydz was advanced; see  Wacław Jędrzejewicz, Wspomnienia  (Wrocław: Ossoli-
neum, 1993), 271 . Regarding the dates of service for the two generals see  Tadeusz Kryska-Karski and
Stanisław Żurakowski, Generałowie Polski niepodległej  (Warsaw: Editions Spotkania, 1991), 19, 26.

Zoﬁ a Waszkiewicz, “W cieniu Józefa Piłsudskiego: Rozważania o kulcie Edwarda Śmigłego-

Rydza,” in Mariusz Wołoś and Krzysztof Kania, eds., Polska bez Marszałka: Dylematy Piłsudczykow po
1935 roku (Toruń: Adam Marszałek, 2008), 424 .

Elżbieta Kossewska , Związek Legionistów Polskich 1922–1939 (Warsaw: Oﬁ cyna Wydawnicza

ASPRA-JR, 2003), 100 .

“Buława,” Kurjer Polski , November 10, 1936, 1. Regarding the alteration of the ceremonies on the

10th see the same papers front page remarks and the article “Święto Niepodległości,” November 8, 1936, 11. Th

ceremonies were broadcast live on radio and ﬁ lmed for later use; see Kaszuba, System propagndy , 300.

See Edward D. Wynot, Polish Politics in Transition: Th

e Camp of National Unity and the Struggle for

Power, 1935–1939  (Athens, GA: University of Georgia Press, 1974), 64ﬀ  . A fascinating view of how this
appeared from the perspective of the political Left is furnished by Janusz Żarnowski, Polska Partia Socjal-
istyczna w latach 1935–1939  (Warsaw: Książka i Wiedza, 1965), 155 . Many Piłsudskiites were appalled
by Śmigły-Rydz’s elevation to the rank of marshal, regarding it as usurping a status of which only Piłsudski
was worthy; see Janusz Jędrzejewicz, W Służbie idei: Fragmenty pamiętnika i pism  (London: Oﬁ cyna
poetow i malarzy, 1972), 223–4; cf. the remarks of his brother, Wacław, in Jędrzejewicz, Wspomnienia ,
271. Allies of the new marshal thought he spoke with unusual eloquence on this day, the zenith of his
career; see Henryk Gruber, Wspomnienia i uwagi  (London: Gryf, 1968), 360.

ere are innumerable articles in, for example, Kurjer Polski , in this regard in the issues of

November 8, 10, and 11, 1936.

Piłsudski’s

Legend

[Th

e Apotheosis of Józef Piłsudski]. Th

ree ﬁ gures are displayed against a dark pur-

plish background. At the center, slightly elevated, is Piłsudski staring directly
ahead. In his right hand he holds the White Eagle of Poland, which stands astride
a globe rotated to present Poland, enormously enlarged, in the center. Accepting
the globe is President Mościcki, who is below Piłsudski and to his right. Mościcki’s
expression, unlike the ﬁ xed stare of the Marshal, is rather wistful. On the same
plane as Mościcki, and hence to the lower left of Piłsudski is Śmigły-Rydz, and he
is receiving, rather clumsily, the marshal’s baton from Piłsudski. Like Mościcki,
he stares, benignly, into space. Gracing Piłsudski’s shoulders are what appear to be
angel wings, though the nimbus that enshrouds him prevents complete discern-
ment. Five of the great warrior kings of Polish history ﬂ oat just over Piłsudski’s
shoulder, but hovering nearest is Kościuszko literally at the ear of the Marshal.

Quite apart from the graphic trinitarianism, we see the entrusting by Piłsudski

of state care to Mościcki, and military responsibility to Śmigły-Rydz, each with an
appropriate symbol. Whereas Piłsudski has already risen to the exalted ranks of the
royal shades, he communes most closely with Kościuszko, who was linked to
Piłsudski since the historical genealogy of the legion era. Whereas the canvas is
dark, Piłsudski is lucent and he alone stares arrestingly at the viewer. He has cen-
tered Polish history and represents the link between the glories of the past and the
present. No longer fully of the earth, he has not become only a shade, but remains
a powerful, indeed seraphic presence guiding Poland. Although artistically quite
dreadful, the painting is politically the perfect post-Piłsudski evocation of Novem-
ber 11th. Th

e decision to elevate Śmigły-Rydz to the rank of marshal on that day

is here elaborately explained in symbol.

is eﬀ ort at transferring the charisma of Piłsudski to Śmigły-Rydz was at best

a partial success: even old comrades-in-arms resented this too rapid elevation,
which was for many a “profanation of Piłsudski’s memory” rather than its institu-
tionalization.

As a contemporary remarked, Śmigły-Rydz “lacked completely the

elements of a commander.” He also “had no talent as a politician.”

e promotion of Śmigły-Rydz represented the restructuring of the sanacja.

Piłsudski had left no political testament beyond the indication that he wished
Sławek to replace Mościcki as president. When Mościcki refused to resign, profound
diﬃ

culties ensued from which Śmigły-Rydz, in alliance with Mościcki, emerged

A handsome reproduction of the painting can be found in Rzecz największa—Polska II Rzeczpo-

spolita, 1918–1939 (Warsaw: Muzeum Niepodległości, 1998), unpaginated. See reproduction No. 47,
“Apoteoza Józefa Piłsudskiego,”1935.

Ibid. Th

e history of the canvas’s display is not known. It is currently on display at the Muzeum

Niepodległości in Warsaw and has frequently been reproduced since the fall of communism. Th

museum has provided the date of 1935 to the canvas, which is almost certainly incorrect as it was
obviously inspired by the elevation of Śmigły-Rydz—and hence the depiction of handing over the
marshal’s baton—in November 1936.

See Hanna and Tadeusz Jędruszczak, Ostatnie lata Drugiej Rzeczypospolitej (1935–1939) (Warsaw:

Książka i Wiedza, 1979), 228–9 . A fellow oﬃ

cer referred to Śmigły-Rydz as becoming a marshal

“on credit”; see Stanisław Kopański, Moja służba w Wojsku Polskim, 1917–1939 (London: Veritas,
1965), 236 . Even the legionnaire movement divided; see Kossewska, Związek , 115 .

See Stanisław Wachowiak, Czasy, które przeżyłem quoted in Magdelena Woltanowska, Scenariusz

wystawy: Rzecz największa Polska II Rzpta. 1918–39 (Warsaw: Muzeum Niepodleglosci, 1998), 7.

Independence Day

victorious. Out-maneuvered and profoundly depressed over the Marshal’s death,
Sławek eventually committed suicide.

T H E S A N A C J A E VO LV E S

In addition to a change in personnel, the post-1935 regime became markedly more
authoritarian and nationalistic. It found itself locked in a largely losing struggle
with the political Right to win over the population by patriotic appeals to unity
and support of the military, eﬀ orts frequently descending into vulgar chauvinism.
Th

e Right moved ﬁ rst in this contest to outﬂ ank their traditional Piłsudskiite

adversaries by creating, in late 1926, the Camp of Great Poland [Obóz Wielkiej
Polski, OWP], led by Dmowski, in order to mobilize the masses behind a radical
rightist program. Its radicalism eventually led to its delegalization.

e sanacja was slow to respond. Adrift without Piłsudski, facing a resurgent

Right, the government spent 1935 searching for a new basis of support. Th

e result

was the Camp of National Unity [Obóz Zjednoczenia Narodowego, OZON], an
obvious counter to the OWP. Th

e new body was not a political party but an eﬀ ort

at mass mobilization inspired by the need to support the cause of national defense.
It was an unwieldy conglomeration of organizations and some, but not all, promi-
nent Piłsudskiite leaders. Th

e Left, including the Piłsudskiites, as well as the con-

servatives, avoided the OZON as it attempted reconciliation with the increasingly
fascistic radical rightist movements in Poland.

Unlike the Right, however, it

sought co-existence with the minorities and condemned open frictions with the
Jews.

e obvious hero of OZON was Śmigły-Rydz, but he never developed the

shadow of the devotion enjoyed by Piłsudski; indeed, he was resented by signiﬁ cant
elements of the old guard. Legionnaires, the backbone of the post-1926 regime,
were badly divided by OZON, even showing signs of increasing decomposition.

is disarray in Piłsudskiite ranks was made inevitable by the congeries of groups

it represented: “socialists, populists, nationalists, conservatives, Catholics, and
others.”

Piłsudski and his vision of a multinational Polish state held these disparate

groups together. Without him they began to disintegrate and gravitate toward dif-
ferent camps. Without a clear ideology, the Piłsudskiites had little but the Marshal’s
legend to hold them together. Hence, cultivating the legend was vitally important.

OZON was another manifestation of the perennial struggle in Polish political

praxis between “Naród” and “Państwo”—nation and state. Piłsudski—the personi-
ﬁ cation of the state—represented the victory of the latter.

But by the 1930s, ethnic

For mutual eﬀ orts by the Piłsudskiite Right to make common-cause with the nationalists see

the collection of essays edited by Wołoś and Kania, eds., Polska bez Marszałka . Ironically, one of
the Piłsudskiite groups seeking accommodation with the Right was the “November 11th Club”; see

Andrzej Micewski,

W cieniu Marszałka Piłsudskiego

(Warsaw: Czytelnik, 1969), 205

;

Tadeusz

Jędruszczak, Piłsudczycy bez Piłsudskiego: Powstanie Obozu Zjednoczenia Narodowego w 1937 roku
(Warsaw: Państwowe Wydawnictwo Naukowe, 1963), 155–6.

Kaszuba, System propagandy , 179 . Th

ese were represented by the so-called “nationalist-

Piłsudskiites,” a political grotesquerie; see Micewski, W cieniu , 243–4 .

Kossewska. Związek , 120 .

Micewski, W cieniu , 200 .

e phrase is attributed to Stpiczyński by Władysław T. Kulesza; see his Koncepcje ideowo-polityczne

obozu rządzącego w Polsce w latach 1926–1935 (Wrocław: Ossolineum, 1985), 125.

Piłsudski’s

Legend

nationalism had captured wide segments of Polish society, especially the young:
patriotism via homogenization.

Toleration of ethnic minorities, characteristic of

Piłsudkiiite thought, vanished. OZON soon copied many aspects of the Far Right;
even eventually excluding Jews.

OZON was the Piłsudskiites belated attempt to regain the initiative by shifting

their emphasis to “nation”—a rightist preoccupation.

Indeed, whether the post-

1935 Polish regime was really still Piłsudskiite or not became an open question; the
basic unity of the movement, so obviously centered on the Marshal, disintegrated,
and never really re-coalesced. Cichoracki’s comments about Piłsudski’s cult waning
after 1937 becomes again worthy of note. Th

e very deﬁ nition of “Piłsudskiism”

was problematical. For a regime in crisis, Independence Day became an especially
important occasion to rally support as it increasingly tried to utilize and control
national ceremonies to engender enthusiasm and loyalty.

e ﬁ nal step in the process of institutionalizing the linkage between Independ-

ence Day and Piłsudski was on April 23rd, 1937 when parliament announced:

e date of November 11 as the anniversary of the Polish Nation regaining independ-

ent state existence [niepodległy byt państwowy] and as the day for all time associated
with the great name Józef Piłsudski, victorious Leader of the Nation in the Struggle for
Freedom of the fatherland, is the date for celebrating Independence Day [uroczystym
Świętem Niepodległości].

Finally November 11th was the national holiday and it belonged to Piłsudski by
oﬃ

cial decree.

November 11th, 1937 included the largest military parade thus far presented,

including motorized units. Th

ere were prayers for Piłsudski, including one by Pri-

mate Cardinal Augustyn Hlond. Th

e threatening international situation explained

the urgings for national unity and an end to the traditional divisions in Polish
society. Calls to adopt Piłsudski as a model to inspire the “national psyche” were
repeated. Śmigły-Rydz, who spoke well, presented himself as the student of
Piłsudski. Mościcki referred to the 11th as “the most important state holiday”
[największe święto państwa], a diminution of the traditional acknowledgement of
May 3rd.

To end the day, a large review was staged in Warsaw with a series of live

is is a paraphrase of Ernest Gellner as rendered by Walicki; see Andrzej Walicki, Th

e Enlighten-

ment and the Birth of Modern Nationhood: Polish Political Th

ought from Noble Republicanism to Tadeusz

Kościuszko (Notre Dame, IN: University of Notre Dame Press: 1989), 91 .

Waldemar Paruch, “Narody polityczne czy narody etniczne w Europie Środkowej lat

międzywojennych? Problematyka narodowo—etnicza w myśli politycznej Jozefa Piłsudskiego i jego
zwolennikow” in Lech Maliszewski, ed., Żar niepodległości: Międzynarodowe aspekty życia i dzialałności
Jóefa Piłsudskiego (Lublin: Norbertinum, 2004), 278–80.

Kaszuba, System propagandy , 184 . Micewski, W cieniu , 393. OZON was supposed to announce

its new ideology to rally Poles in a diﬃ

cult situation by emphasizing “defending Poland” on Independ-

ence Day in 1936. But the ideological underpinnings were long delayed and rather anticlimactic when
the statement was only issued on February 21, 1937.

Dziennik ustaw RP , April 30, 1937, poz. 33 . I should like to thank Wojciech Materski for pro-

viding me with this information. Since the 11th was celebrated only twice before the war, how pro-
foundly it settled into the mentality of the average Pole remains subject to conjecture.

See “Dziedzictwo,” “U wrót wolności,” “Gdy Marszałek Edward Śmigły-Rydz otrzymywał

buławę,” Kurjer Polski , November 11, 1936; and “W 18-tą rocznicę Niepodległości,” “Dzień radości i
rozmyślań,” “Rewja zbrojnej Polski,” Kurjer Polski , November 12, 1936, 1–3.

Independence Day

montages from the era 1794–1914: it began with Kościuszko and ended with the
representation of the legions.

In keeping with the theme of supporting the armed

forces, special eﬀ orts were made exhibiting “fraternization of the army with
youth.”

As usual, smaller ceremonies were held in many cities throughout the

country. Although reports indicate the participation of the minority communities,
the numbers and enthusiasm cannot be determined.

In outlying areas, the popu-

lation was encouraged to place radios outside so that the local population could
follow the Warsaw events.

F I L M A S S Y M B O L , 1 9 3 7

e military commissioned a very suggestive—and lengthy—documentary ﬁ lm

that was released in 1937. Entitled Sztandar Wolności [Banner of Freedom], it was
produced under the “artistic and literary direction” of Ryszard Ordyński and dis-
tributed by Patria-Film in Warsaw.

It is a cinematic presentation of the Piłsudski

legend and the centrality of November 11th through the brilliant use of documen-
tary footage—both still photographs and motion pictures, with spare narration.
Ostensibly the ﬁ lm is a history of the origins of modern Poland in the struggle for
independence since 1863 through the Second Republic. In reality, it is rather a
highly interpretive presentation of the era stressing only one, Piłsudskiite, element.
It is preceded by a text that concludes its analysis of the Poles struggle for
independence:

And always at the forefront was the same man in a gray uniform, with his brow fur-
rowed by great care, his eagle eye ﬁ xed on the distant future.

e ﬁ lm footage begins with massed cavalry on review under Piłsudski in the early

1930s. Stressing the current strength and success of Poland, exempliﬁ ed by this
military might, the ﬁ lm begins a retrospective journey through the late nineteenth
century. Th

e review discusses Piłsudski’s years as a socialist, but rather brieﬂ y, and

spends much more time on the ZWC and the origins and growth of the legions and

See the invitation from the “Kolejowe przysposobienie wojskowe i rodzina kolejowa” in Rocznice

i obchody 1931–38. DZS.

Jędruszczak, Piłsudczycy bez Piłsudskiego , 189 .

See the many proclamations in Rocznice i obchody. Odzyskanie niepodległości 11.XI, 1936–37.

Aﬁ sze. DZS. For 1937 see the material in Roczniki i obchody. Odzyskanie niepodległości. 1936–37. Aﬁ sze.
DZS. For 1938 see Roczniki i obchody. Odzyskanie niepodległości 11.XI, 1938. Aﬁ sze.

See “Program” from Włodawa in Roczniki i obchody odzyskanie niepodległości 11.XI b.r.w.

Aﬁ sze. DZS.

Ordyński was a well-established and highly regarded director whose several ﬁ lms included the 1928

Pan Tadeusz , which Piłsudski, as we have noted, saw on the Independence Day ceremonies of that year.

Sztandar Wolnosci , 1937, Falanga, distributed by Patria-Film (Warsaw), directed by Ryszard

Ordyński with Marja Jehanne Wielopolska and Halina Ostrowska-Grabska; music by Jan Maklewicz.
Wielopolska worshipped Piłsudski; see Zbigniew Wójcik, “Dzisiejsze kontrowersje wokół postaci
Marszałka Piłsudskiego,” in Adam Suchoński, ed., Jozef Piłsudski i jego współpracownicy (Opole: Uni-
wersytet Opolski, 1999), 27; Hein-Kircher, Kult Piłsudskiego , 113 . Th

e ﬁ lm was commissioned by the

Military History Oﬃ

ce [Wojskowe Biuro Historyczne]; see Kaszuba, System propagandy , 265 .

Piłsudski’s

Legend

their key ﬁ gures. Th

e “Polish Question” during World War I is exclusively answered

by Piłsudski and his entourage. As the ﬁ lm’s chronology reaches late 1918, it creates
an extraordinary series of images to mark the transition from the war to the reborn
Polish state. First, we are shown Piłsudski’s place of conﬁ nement at Magdeburg,
followed by a long scene that allows us to read a newspaper report of his arrival in
Warsaw, where he is met by both the regents and Koc leading the POW. As this
scene ends, the strains of the national anthem are heard, which grows in volume as
marching troops are shown, followed by still pictures of Piłsudski gazing at us with
penetrating stare. Th

en the screen is ﬁ lled with the words: “November 11, 1918”

superimposed over the version of the Polish eagle worn by the legions. Th

is eagle is

then transformed into the eagle emblem of the Second Republic and the word “Pol-
ska” ﬁ lls the screen, followed by “Free and Independent.” Finally Piłsudski’s distinc-
tive, powerful proﬁ le is blended with the outlines of the eagle to make the two
images one and inseparable. Th

e ﬁ lm then, anticlimactically, considers the life of the

Second Republic. Th

is is a very compelling and ingenious series of interpositions

and woven symbols and is the epitome of the entire ﬁ lm. Piłsudski and his legions
created Poland, on November 11th; he is Poland and has become part of it.

roughout the entire lengthy production Piłsudski’s contemporaries are

reduced to minor ﬁ gures: Dmowski omitted, Paderewski a ﬂ eeting appearance,
and no still photograph at all, only a few action sequences.

We see Haller only in

passing; Śmigły-Rydz and even generals such as Lucjan Żeligowski appear more
often. Considerable late attention is given to Mościcki. Sikorski is seen but not
identiﬁ ed. Piłsudski and his devotees dominate to the exclusion of all other groups
and factions. Th

e ﬁ lm has blended the biography of Piłsudski, the conspiratorial-

martial tradition, the anthem, and the eagle symbols quite deftly to make it clear
that the transition from struggle to the victory of independence has only one pos-
sible explanation and that November 11th is the central, linking symbol between
sacriﬁ ce and victory; the tribulation of the past and the glory of the present.

G L O O M E C L I P S E S T H E C E L E B R AT I O N

With the international situation becoming ever more foreboding, November 11th
was all the more a grand and self-conﬁ dent display. Military reviews, some taking
hours and featuring the best equipment of the Polish army had been a feature since
the mid-1930s. Even critics of the government’s increasingly authoritarian prac-
tices, the Left, led by the Polish Socialist Party, dutifully marched on November
11th and issued declarations in support of the army as the protector of national
independence.

e Right was in a quandary: its support for the military was

overcome by its loathing for Piłsudski and especially the regime of his lieutenants.

is reaches rather petty levels when, for example, the Polish issue at the Paris Peace Conference

of 1919 is illustrated by a few seconds of images and a narration that identiﬁ es Paderewski as Poland’s
representative there, but does not mention Dmowski who was Poland’s other plenipotentiary.

Żarnowski , Polska Partia Socjalistyczna , 283ﬀ ; Wynot, Polish Politics in Transition , 168 .

Independence Day

e increasing ﬂ irtation of the sanacja with nationalist ideology met with only

minimal eﬀ orts by the Right to ﬁ nd common cause with the regime.

e last celebration before the beginning of World War II, in November 1938,

was particularly grand.

e oﬃ

cial telegraphic agency released a brochure carrying

a quotation of Piłsudski’s from 1920, urging Poland to become the greatest military
power in the east.

It was, after all, the twentieth anniversary of independence. Th

press noted that the twentieth anniversary commemorations were radically diﬀ erent
from a decade earlier: there was a joyful quality in 1928 that was absent in 1938
when international problems cast a pall over the festivities.

Poland of 1928 was a

far more optimistic country than a decade later. Nonetheless, virtually every city in
Poland had a large manifestation, emphasizing the usual military themes.

Reﬂ ecting the Piłsudskiite tradition, which attached equal importance to the

leader’s return on November 10th, the celebration started on that day (rather than
the 11th) with parades and academic programs, which consciously linked Piłsudski’s
actions of twenty years before with the current policies of the government as con-
stituting an unbroken tradition of statecraft.

In outlying communities, rather larger eﬀ orts were undertaken in conjunction

with the anniversary. Some were designed speciﬁ cally to raise money for the army;
a gesture both handsome and pathetic.

Grodno, in the east, emphasized that the

key to Polish independence was always an army and that the realization of this was
the especial attribute of Piłsudski.

e socialists made an eﬀ ort (for the ﬁ rst time

in years) to recall the brief Daszyński government of November 7th, whose twen-
tieth anniversary was also being marked. A socialist group in Warsaw suggested a
sort of amalgamated holiday of the 7th and the 11th, but this did not seem to be
popular.

ese were small and sporadic eﬀ orts.

Poles in Zaolzie, a territory seized from Czechoslovakia in the fall of 1938, dur-

ing the Munich crisis, established a special celebratory committee and announced

For details see the extensive coverage in Kurjer Polski , November 9–12, always on the front

page.

See “1918–1938, Biuletyn Giełdowy Polskiej Agencji Telegraﬁ cznej,” n.d., in the unsorted mate-

rials for 1938 in DZS.

“Gdy runęła przemoc zaborców,” Kurjer Polski , November 11, 1938, 5.

See, e.g., Marian Marek Drozdowski , Stefan Starzyński, prezydent Warszawy (Warsaw: Państwowy

Instytut Wydawniczy, 1974), 141–2.

Poland’s frantic eﬀ orts to prepare for war with Germany or Russia are well presented in the

memoirs of Śmigły-Rydz’s choice for Chief of the General Staﬀ , Wacław Stachiewicz; see his   Pisma.
Vol. I: Przygotowania wojenne w Polsce 1935–1939  (Paris: Instytut Literacki, 1977) . However, the latest
research suggests that Poland’s modernization and rebuilding plan was highly competent and, had it
been allowed to reach 1942, a German invasion would have been much diﬀ erent; see  Tymoteusz
Pawłowski, Armia Marszałka Śmigłego: Idea rozbudowy Wojska Polskiego, 1935–1939  (Warsaw: Rytm,
2009), esp. 325–32.

“W dwudziestą Rocznicę Odzyskania Niepodległości,” Grodno, 1938: a 32-page printed pam-

phlet in Rocznice i obchody 1931–38. DZS.

Flyer by Naczelny Komitet Polski Pracujący obchodu 20-lecia niepodległości, in Rocznice i

obchody 1931–38. DZS

For the 1938 eﬀ orts outside of Warsaw there is a very large ﬁ le, including the socialist eﬀ ort to

recall the Daszyński government in Rocznice i obchody. Odzyskanie niepodległości. 1938. Aﬁ sze.
DZS. Th

e PPS even suggested that both celebrations should be combined. See “Ludu Pracujący!

Chłopi i Robotnicy!” in Rocznice i obchody 1931–38. DZS.

Piłsudski’s

Legend

plans to build a school bearing Piłsudski’s name as a testament to his far- sightedness
which, somehow, resulted in the area’s being ﬁ nally returned to Poland.

In one

rather curious proclamation, the military and diplomatic success in regaining
Zaolzie was reckoned to the “national testament of the Great Marshal,” of course
now rather deceased.

e celebrations here were strikingly large—and the most

joyous in the country with dancing in the streets—which president Mościcki and
many senior military oﬃ

cials attended.

e postal authorities issued a special

stamp on Independence Day depicting Zaolzie joining Poland under the beneﬁ -
cent shelter of the Queen of Heaven.

Maps prepared just weeks before the outbreak of the war in September 1939

indicate that city planners in Warsaw envisioned major changes in the capital to
memorialize permanently Piłsudski and the associated symbols relative to inde-
pendence. A grand “Józef Piłsudski Boulevard” [Aleje Józefa Piłsudskiego] was
envisioned to traverse the south central city from west to east commencing in a
broad park to be named “Th

e Field of Glory” [Pole Chwały]—there ﬂ anked by the

church of “Divine Providence” adjacent to “Victory of 1920 Square”—and many
blocks later terminating at “Freedom Square” [Plac Wolności]]. Issuing from this
central artery were to be streets named “Boulevard of the Legions,” which in turn
would be intercepted by “First Brigade Street” and “Second Brigade Street” among
others. Nearby arteries of varying grandeur would bear the names of General Kaz-
imierz Sosnkowski and Marshal Śmigły-Rydz. Several episodes in Piłsudski’s long
career as an underground political organizer would also be commemorated by
streets, as would famous military actions of the legions. Virtually no episode in
Piłsudski’s career, or any of his closest associates, was to be omitted in this dense
network of squares, boulevards, and public buildings, which to a considerable
degree would re-center historic Warsaw to the south of its traditional heart. Curi-
ously, no new street named “November 11th” was designated, as there already was
such a thoroughfare in existence some distance away, in the relatively insigniﬁ cant
northern Praga district far from the city center. Th

is was perhaps not the omission

it would ﬁ rst appear, because the planned “Piłsudski Boulevard” would have as its
main junction the intersection with “Independence Boulevard” [Aleje Niepodległości]
a long-established major north-south artery. Hence, anyone coming to Warsaw
from the west, as he did on November 10th, 1918, would follow “Piłsudski” until
arriving, inevitably and grandly, at “Independence.”

e postal authorities also placed Piłsudski into the heroic reading of the Polish

past. In 1938 a series of thirteen Independence Day stamps exhibiting famous

“Obywatele!” in Rocznice i obchody 1931–38. DZS. Poland’s claims to Transolzia were very

powerful; seizing it from Czechoslovakia when the latter was being blackmailed by Hitler was, how-
ever, not an appetizing action.

“Obywatele” Komitet Budowy Publicznej Szkoły powiatowy w Szadku, in Rocznice i, obchody,

1931–38 . DZS.

“11 listopada w Cieszynie,” Kurjer Polski , November 12, 1938, 2.

Fischer katalog polskich znaków pocztowych, 2005 (Bytom: Fischer, 2005), I, 73.

is design for the city is apparent in the map, originally prepared in August 1939, re-issued as

Warszawa Przedwojenna: Plan miasta z 1939 r . (Warsaw: Kartograﬁ a, 2004).

Independence Day

Fischer katalog , 74. Th

ere was also a bloc of four celebrating August 6th including this large

march-past stamp and portrait of Piłsudski and Śmigły-Rydz.

e cards are in the possession of the author.

moments in Polish military history were issued. All were the typical rectangular
shape associated with postage stamps. Only the ﬁ nal, thirteenth stamp (and the
highest price) was larger, horizontal, and carried a proﬁ le of Piłsudski, with attack-
ing soldiers covered by an eagle banner in the background and the date November
11, 1918. A special bloc of four stamps picturing Piłsudski, the martyred Naruto-
wicz, Śmigły-Rydz, and Mościcki bore the date November 11, and noted that it
was the twentieth anniversary.

A few days before the invasions of September 1939 a special stamp was issued,

the last of the Second Republic. An art-deco Piłsudski, with massive shoulders,
stands with hand at the sword; a column of legionnaires marches past him into
history (to his right), whilst from his left into the foreground the contemporary
Polish army marches under his eagle eye. He wears a massive cape (which, by the
way, Piłsudski never wore) that gives the suggestion of wings. Th

e date at the bot-

tom is “August 6, 1914–1939: Th

e 25th anniversary of the First Brigade.” Piłsudski

thus presides over the legions, which withdraw into the past replaced by a modern
force that marches into view. As if this symbolism did not suﬃ

ce, a block of three

stamps was issued the same day. Th

e above stamp paired with another bearing a

Śmigły-Rydz proﬁ le, and a third the 1935 mourning portrait of Piłsudski. Again
the sanacja postal agency presents with a symbolic explanation of Polish political
realities: we mourn his loss, but he is really not dead because he has been replaced
by another legionnaire who also helped transmogrify the legions into a modern
force. Th

e tradition is intact.

A large series of pre-printed postal cards were also

issued with the Piłsudski benediction stamp. Th

ese also have imprinted a large

legion eagle and the date August 6, 1914 and a reproduction of a combat photo-
graph featuring Piłsudski.

Piłsudski’s death in 1935 plunged the regime into chaos. Th

ey attempted to

enlarge the legend of Piłsudski as justiﬁ cation for their continuation in power as its
legatees. In this scrambling for maintaining symbolic linkages they elevated Śmigły-
Rydz as a kind of Piłsudski re-animated, and issued endless statements about the
almost God-like role of Piłsudski in Polish history. What happened to November 11th
in this welter of activity? For years the sanacja had been emphasizing November
11th as it epitomized an essentially Piłsudskiite genealogy for the state and an expla-
nation for its structure and evolution. After 1935, the Marshal’s death overshad-
owed the centrality of the date. Piłsudski became everything and Independence Day
was only one of his numberless achievements. November 11th as a conﬂ ation of
symbols was in danger of losing its role as the focus of myths and legends. Th

regime was close to relying exclusively on the Piłsudski inheritance—which was
vague in the extreme—to justify its role. But, then came World War II, which
would challenge November 11th as symbolizing anything worth retaining. Inde-
pendence Day and the story it presented were facing extinction. Whether there
would be a November 11th symbol of a Piłsudskiite Poland was in question.

Maintaining a Piłsudskiite

Independence Day, 1939–45

G E R M A N O C C U PAT I O N

e German invasion of September 1st, 1939 coupled with the massive Russian

attack of the 17th destroyed Poland. Ferocious resistance ended after about ﬁ ve
weeks. Śmigły-Rydz was unable to perform the miracle of command the situation
required. Th

e government that so closely associated itself with Piłsudski had been

driven into exile. What symbols could survive so devastating a turn of events?

German and Soviet occupation in 1939 meant the devastation of the pre-war

sanacja regime and its proponents. Polish society attached blame to the govern-
ment for the defeat, and its leaders were discredited. Śmigły-Rydz, who went into
exile rather than stay with the army, was the target of considerable opprobrium.
Even before Piłsudski’s death, the followers of the Marshal were dividing into many
separate camps—and compromise with the nationalist Right was the overriding
theme. Once German occupation began, the Piłsudskiites shattered. A report on
the underground written in December 1942 reports a Piłsudskiite-sanacja camp
in complete disarray and isolated from society, hoping only for some sort of re-
emergence after the war.

e question really became: would the symbol of Piłsudski

and the status of November 11th survive the regime that had represented both?

Given the circumstances, every November 11th during occupation was poign-

ant indeed. Th

e Germans chose November 11th, 1939 to make a public announce-

ment in Łódź of their intention of de-Polonizing the area that had been incorporated
into the Reich . Th

e speech was noteworthy for its abusive and threatening lan-

guage.

e Jewish Council of Elders, just appointed under German orders, was

arrested and many were killed.

e night before, which had been celebrated in

Poland as marking Piłsudski’s triumphant return, was dedicated to destroying
Polish monuments in the city, including the removal of religious symbols denounced

is valuable and detailed document can be found in Marek Gałęzowski, “Raport specjalny. Sanacja,”

Zeszyty Historyczne , 143 (2003), 150–69. For a detailed account of underground reaction to Piłsudski, see
Eugeniusz Ponczek, Tradycja trzeciomajowa (Toruń: Marszałek, 2011), 243–67, 293–309.

Mirosław Cygański, “Działalność urzędu rejencji w Łodzi pod kierownictwem F. Ubelhora i

W. Mosera w latach 1939–1942,” Rocznik Łodzki , 17 (1973), 200.

Josef Zelkowicz, In Th

ose Terrible Days: Notes from the Łódź Ghetto , ed. Michal Unger (Jerusalem:

Yad Vashem, 2002), 21 . Th

is was part of a larger action to eliminate Jewish and Polish leaders; see

Julian Baranowski, “Administracja niemiecka i tzw. samorząd w getcie łódzkim 1940–1944,” in
Wiesław Puś and Stanisław Liszewski, eds., Dzieje żydów w Łodzi 1820–1944: Wybrane problemy
(Łódź: Wydawnictwo Łódzkie, 1991), 318.

100

Independence Day

as relics of the “Polish clerical regime.”

In Bydgoszcz, the day saw a roundup of

3,000 people, and in Fordon a campaign of executions begun a few weeks before
concluded with 300 victims. Th

ere were mass arrests in the Lublin area, including

the rector of the Catholic university and a number of clergy.

In Zielonka near

Warsaw, Scouts were shot for unfurling a banner containing the opening words of
Maria Konopnicka’s “Rota”: “Never will a German spit in our faces, nor Germanize
our children.”

After the German and Russian invasions of Poland in 1939, there was, of course

no possibility of open commemoration of November 11th in the occupied home-
land. Surreptitious commemorations, however, are occasionally recalled in memoir
literature. A prominent physician in the Zamość area wrote that Polish society was
full of expectation and anxiety on November 10th, 1939 in anticipation of some
major occurrence the next day, possibly street demonstrations; an anxiety shared
by the German occupiers who redoubled their watchfulness. Th

is observation from

Zamość is repeated in a Warsaw report, which noted that a wave of anticipatory
arrests of former military oﬃ

cers preceded November 11th.

Mass arrests of the intelligentsia were carried out on November 9th in Lublin.

In Bydgoszcz 3,000 were arrested on the 11th; the faculty of Lublin’s Catholic
University was also rounded up.

e comparison with 1938 was disorienting to

the Warsaw population: “What awaits us?” Tadeusz Dzierżykraj-Rogalski recorded
in his diary.

In 1940–41 the approach of the November holiday provoked the

ﬁ rst huge street roundups, the so-called łapanki.

Hostages were taken in all the

major cities, several dozen in Warsaw, including a number of prominent academ-
ics.

In Kraków, the German authorities announced that November 11th com-

memorations were illegal and that one person in every building which displayed
a Polish ﬂ ag on that day would be shot.

Warsaw underground organizations

asked for no public demonstrations but that the occasion be remembered.

Despite this, there were huge crowds in the churches on the 11th, with ﬂ owers

Cygański, “Działalność urzędu,” 210.

See Jacek Wołoszyn, “Charakterystyka niemieckiej i sowieckiej polityki terroru wobec społeczeństwa

i podziemia zbrojnego na Lubelszczyźnie w latach 1939–1947,” in Sławomir Poleszak and Adam
Puławski, eds., Podziemie zbrojne na Lubelszczyźnie wobec dwóch totalitaryzmów 1939–1956 (Warsaw:
Instytut Pamięci Narodowej, 2002), 14 .

Mirosława Pałaszewska, Święto Niepodległości: Katalog wystawy (Warsaw: Muzeum Niepodległości,

2004), 11. For the Scouts’ participation in this event, made into a moving ﬁ lm in 2008, see “‘11
listopada’—ﬁ lm harcerzy o wojennej akcji,” Gazeta Wyborcza , November 10, 2008.

Ludwik Landau, Kronika lat wojny i okupacji. Vol. I: Wrzesień 1939–listopad 1940 (Warsaw:

Polskie Wydawnictwo Naukowe, 1962), I, 66–7 ; Karol Irzykowski, Dziennik. Vol. II: 1916–1944
(Kraków: Wydawnictwo Literackie, 2001), II, 417 .

Andrzej Krzysztof Kunert, Rzeczpospolita walcząca: Wrzesień–grudzień, 1939. Kalendarium

(Warsaw: Wydawnictwo sejmowe, 1993), 168 .

Ibid.

Jerzy Krzyżanowski, “Koleje pracowitego życia,” online edition of Nowy Dziennik , January 12, 2007, 2.

Wiesław Jan Wysocki, “Obchody Święta Niepodległości w Polsce niesuwerennej 1939–1945,” in

Andrzej Stawarz, ed., Święto niepodległości–tradycja a wspołczesność (Warsaw: Muzeum Niepodległości,
2003), 55.

Kunert, Wrzesień–grudzień , 164–5.

Ibid. , 166–7.

Maintaining a Piłsudskiite Independence Day

101

and banners. At the Piłsudski Mound near Kraków, Edward Wyrób raised the
Polish ﬂ ag.

What actually occurred on the 11th in the early years of occupation was not

dramatic. Scouts brought ﬂ owers to hospitalized veterans in Zamość and students
were dismissed early from school to attend a commemorative mass, but that was
all.

ere are similar reports from Warsaw, where soldiers’ graves had banners

reading, “Pomścimy was!” (We shall avenge you!).

Flowers were placed at the

Tomb of the Unknown Soldier in Warsaw on the 11th, and at a few other monu-
ments (usually red and white, the national colors).

Even these minor observances

disappeared in 1940. Th

ere was still an early school dismissal and a mass, but

attendance was noticeably down.

November 11th, in Zamość, saw banners and

Polish ﬂ ags appear but nothing more.

After 1940, the Zamość doctor made no

further diary entries on the 11th.

Either nothing occurred there, or he was too

despairing to record it

On November 11th, 1940 the RAF ﬂ ew its ﬁ rst mission over occupied Poland.

In addition to bombs, it dropped leaﬂ ets with the words Niech żyje Polska! [Long
live Poland] on them. Th

e response of the population has not been recorded.

In Kraków, capital of occupied Poland, a number of houses displayed patriotic

banners on the 11th. In response, the German governor general, Hans Frank,
ordered one male from each house so decorated to be shot. He also forbade church
services on the 11th.

One of the leaders of the Polish underground movement,

Stefan Korboński, was arrested by the Gestapo without warning on November
9th at his home in the city. Along with several score others, he was taken to one
of the buildings of the Jagiellonian University. He was in dread that his arrest
meant that the underground had been penetrated. However, the Germans soon
informed the prisoners that they had been seized “as prominent citizens” to be
“hostages for public order in the city” on Independence Day. “Should any riots
occur” Korboński recalled “we would be shot.” Two days later, with the city calm
on the afternoon of the 11th, Korboński and the others were released. For him,
it was doubly joyous because the Germans had not learned of his role in the
underground government.

ough November 11th failed to spawn widespread confrontations, the

Germans continued to treat the season with especial caution. As a result, prominent

Andrzej Krzysztof Kunert, Styczeń–grudzień 1940 (Warsaw: Wydawnictwo sejmowe, 1997).

Zygmunt Klukowski, Dziennik z lat okupacji zamojszczyzny (1939–1944), 2nd edn. (Lublin:

Lubelska Spółdzielnia Wydawnicza, 1959), 71 . Dr. Klukowski was a physician in Szczebrzeszyn near
Zamość. Cf. Landau, Kronika , 69.

Tomasz Szarota, Okupowanej Warszawy dzień powszedni: Studium historyczne (Warsaw: Czytelnik,

1973), 484 ; Landau, Kronika , 69; Kunert, Wrzesień–grudzień , 166–7.

Wysocki, “Obchody,” 55.

Klukowski, Dziennik , 167.

Landau, Kronika , 792.

Ibid. , 234, 295, 377.

Kunert, Styczeń–grudzień, 1941.

Ibid. , 55; cf. Kunert, Wrzesień–grudzień, 164–5.

See Stefan Korboński, Fighting Warsaw: Th

e Story of the Polish Underground State, 1939–1945 ,

new edn. (New York: Hippocrene Books, 2004), 14–16.

102

Independence Day

Poles did not want to be in the capital in the days preceding the anniversary, so as
to avoid the virtually random precautionary arrests the Germans always carried out
in early November. In 1940 the Underground Army’s Bulletin [ Biuletyn Informa-
cyjny ] contained an article entitled “November 11th,” with strong Piłsudskiite
overtones, which will be discussed below. But, beyond this, the day saw only a few
ﬂ owers placed at national symbols.

e next year, 1941, was marked by an upsurge in patriotic display on Novem-

ber 11th. Th

e underground unit Wawer covered Warsaw with hundreds of signs

and painted mottoes on many walls, “Poland Lives” and “Poland Will Win” being
the most common. Masses of commemoration were attended by tens of thou-
sands.

e second in command of Wawer later recalled that, whereas in 1940

their eﬀ orts had been rudimentary, in 1941:

We decorated all of Warsaw on National Independence Day in 1941. Th

e city looked

impressive. On virtually every house was an inscription “Poland will win” and the date
November 11, 1941. Th

e same inscription was written on the sidewalks of all the busi-

est parts of Warsaw with paint diﬃ

cult to wash oﬀ . More than 300 small placards with

these words and the national symbol were glued to posts and bulletin boards.

It was also Wawer that was responsible for the fact that ﬂ ags, ﬂ owers, and banners
were on all military monuments, and candles were lit at the Tomb of the Unknown
Soldier; Polish ﬂ ags appeared magically on lampposts and electric lines. Th

e white

was easy to make, but the red was fashioned from altering German banners stolen
from public places and re-sewn.

e underground press called upon all Poles,

especially those with children, to declaim patriotic verse, and sing the national
anthem, to show national unity and contempt for the enemy.

e literary critic Adam Grzymała-Siedlecki recalled that rumors of the Anglo-

American invasion of North Africa—Operation Torch—excited Warsaw in 1942
with the hope that the war had entered its ﬁ nal phase. Such enthusiasm bred
incaution. He remembered the events that were to lead to his several months’ con-
ﬁ nement in the infamous Pawiak prison:

Last year [1941], just like 1940, I tried not to be in Warsaw in the days before
November 11th, nor to spend the night in my own home: it was known that the
Gestapo every year at this time anticipated a political demonstration and as a prophy-
lactic measure arrested people left and right . . . Th

us, I should have left Warsaw before

the 11th . . . But that attack on Morocco! If I only waited there would be a wave of the
most sensational news. More, it would be joyous news. It would be a pity to lose con-
tact with radio from London or Moscow. Probably, in the heat of emotion, I simply
forgot about the need to leave.

He was arrested on the night of the 10th and spent Polish Independence Day in
interrogation.

Wysocki, “Obchody,” 56–7; Pałaszewska, Święto Niepodległości, 27.

Pałaszewska, Święto Niepodległości , 12; Kunert, Styczeń–grudzień, 1941 .

See Pałaszewska, Święto Niepodległości, 26.

Adam Grzymała-Siedlecki, Sto jedenaście dni letargu: Wspomnienia z Pawiaka z lat 1942/1943

(Kraków: Wydawnictwo Literackie, 1965), 9–10.

Maintaining a Piłsudskiite Independence Day

103

e rumor circulated through Warsaw that in that particular anniversary season

the Germans had decided to arrest Zdzisław Prince Lubomirski as well. In 1918
Regent Lubomirski had welcomed Piłsudski to Warsaw and to power. Now with
the most bitter irony twenty-four years later, a frail old man long without any
political involvement, Lubomirski marked November 11th with arrest and degra-
dation.

Joining Lubomirski were Stanisław Wojciechowki, former president of

Poland, Wojciech Trąmpczyński, former marshal of Parliament, as well as many
other distinguished ﬁ gures from the political and academic world.

Probably reacting to the larger actions of 1941, the Germans made wholesale

arrests in early November 1942, at least 2,000 in Warsaw alone on the night of
November 6th. Despite this, Wawer was active again, and the capital was covered
by signs and slogans of faith in victory for Poland.

e Germans, with extraordi-

nary sensitivity to Piłsudskiite symbols, increased the number of occasions to exer-
cise vigilance, including July 22nd (the anniversary of Piłsudski’s incarceration by
the Germans in 1917) and May 12th (the day of his death in 1935).

e posters appeared again in 1943 marking the quarter century of independ-

ence; the favorite representation was the “kotwica” the anchor-like linking of the
letters “P” and “W” symbolizing “Poland ﬁ ghts” [Polska walczy] and the words,
“November 11, 1918–1943.” Th

e same year, mourning notices were plastered

throughout the city recalling the deaths of German victims, signed “the Nation.”
Th

e oﬃ

cial German paper Nowy Kurier Warszawski issued on November 11th,

1943 had a Polish eagle overstamped on page 3; the kotwica, and the words “11.
XI 1918–11.XI 1943 XXV. Poland will be victorious.” What percentage of the
edition was so altered is unknown.

In general, it is diﬃ

cult to gauge the degree of importance attached to November

11th—or to Piłsudski for that matter—by the population of German-occupied
Poland. Marek Gałęzowski has made a pioneering study of the underground press
in Warsaw and it allows us a fragmentary reconstruction about how these symbols
survived the war. Th

e press, especially the rightist organs, mentioned Piłsudski

rather infrequently and he was not particularly emphasized in discussions of Novem-
ber 11th, which typically tended to attribute the triumph to larger national eﬀ orts.
Th

e exception was the press issued directly by the underground army [Armia Kra-

jowa, AK] and of course the Piłsudskiite journals. In ﬁ ne, these are really pre-war
divisions. Th

e degree to which these tendencies reﬂ ected popular sentiment is prob-

lematical. Commemoration peaked in 1943 and declined thereafter.

Ibid. , 19–20, 22. Lubomirski was born in 1865, which made him in his late seventies at the time

of his arrest. He died in 1943.

Wysocki, “Obchody,” 57.

Pro-Memoria (1941–1944): Raporty Departamentu Informacyi Delegatura Rządu RP na kraj o zbrod-

niach na narodzie polskim (Warsaw: Muzeum Historii Polskiego Ruchu Ludowego, 2004).

A copy of both of these can be found in the Muzeum Historyczne m. st. Warszawy, Stare Miasto,

Warsaw.

Here I am following closely the arguments in Gałęzowski’s “Postać Marszałka Piłsudskiego w

opiniach prasy konspiracyjnej w kraju w latach Drugiej Wojny Światowej,” in Marek Jabłonowski and
Elżbieta Kossewska, eds., Piłsudski na łamach i w opiniach prasy polskiej, 1918–1989 (Warsaw: Instytut
Dziennikarstwa Uniwersytetu Warszawskiego, 2005), 191–3, 207–12. See also Ponczek, Tradycja , 243.

104

Independence Day

Shortly before Independence Day in 1941, a Piłsudskiite pamphlet alerted Poles

that November 11th was more than a comforting memory, but “the very content, the
whole sense of our attitude” under occupation.

In late 1942 the Piłsudskiite under-

ground press issued an article about Poland’s past and future. Th

e article stated clearly

at the outset that it insisted that it was the days of November 11th and August 15th
[victory in 1920] which made Poland free. It was neither a “gift from Versailles” nor the
work of Dmowski and the KNP. What Poland needed now was another November
11th and another Piłsudski.

On the twenty-ﬁ fth anniversary of November 11th, in

1943, Piłsudskiite articles insisted it was armed action that created independence, the
symbol of which remained Piłsudski.

Droga , a Piłsudski organ, essayed a theoretical

piece on the 11th describing Piłsudski’s normative value for what they deemed “state
culture” [kultura państwowa]: a combination of intellectual and moral disposition
which renders order to the country but preserves the essence of democracy.

Piłsudskiite underground realized, however, that their argument was diﬃ

cult: “Piłsudski

is not popular” one underground journal lamented on Independence Day of 1943.

One of the most unusual memorializations of November 11th on its twenty-

ﬁ fth anniversary was stamps issued by Polish inmates at the German prison camp
Woldenberg IIC. One bore Piłsudski’s likeness and the simple notation
“11-XI-1918–1943.” Th

e other, more elaborate, was a postal card with a Polish eagle

surrounded by war banners also marked November 11, 1918–43. Th

e circumstances

under which these stamps were produced and circulated are quite fantastic.

RU S S I A N O C C U PAT I O N

Our knowledge of daily life in occupied eastern Poland is fragmentary.

Most of

the area was seized by the Soviets after September 17th, 1939. However, an excep-
tion was the area around Wilno, in northeastern Poland, which was brieﬂ y under
Lithuanian control after Poland’s defeat.

is ﬁ rst Independence Day under

See Marek Gałęzowski, Wierni Polsce. Vol. II: Publicystyka piłsudczykowska w kraju 1940–1946 . (War-

saw: LTW, 2007), II, 62.

See Janusz Makowski, “Reﬂ eksje o przeszłości i przyszłości,” November–December, 1942, in

Gałęzowski, Wierni Polsce: Publicystyka , II, 45–6.

“Dwudziestopięciolecie Odrodzonej Polski,” in Gałęzowski, Wierni Polsce: Publicystyka , II, 60–2.

Ibid. , II, 682–3.

Ibid. , II, 76. Th

e scouting movement retained a Piłsudskiite exegesis of November 11th; see

Ponczek, Tradycja , 256.

e stamp and postal card are in the possession of the author. For a discussion see “Lager Post”

online at <http://home.golden.net/medals/lager.html>.

See Maria Wardzyńska, Sytuacja ludności polskiej w Generalnym Komisariacie Litwy, czerwiec 1941– lipiec

1944 (Warsaw: Główna Komisja Badania Zbrodni Przeciwko Narodowi Polskiemu, 1993), 11ﬀ .

e northeastern portion of the Polish Second Republic endured an unenviable and complex

fate after the German and Soviet invasions of September 1939. Initially, the western portion of this
territory, including the dominating city of Wilno, was given by the Soviets to Lithuania whilst the
eastern portion was annexed to the USSR. However, in August 1940, all of Lithuania was annexed
by the Soviets, including the Wilno region. Th

is state of aﬀ airs lasted until the summer of 1941 and

the German invasion of Russia that resulted in the region becoming part of the so-called Reich-
kommisariat Ostland. Th

e Lithuanian population generally regarded the Germans positively and

Maintaining a Piłsudskiite Independence Day

105

occupation was painful for the Poles of Wilno, Piłsudski’s beloved hometown. Th

Lithuanian authorities told the Poles that they were to avoid any public ceremo-
nies.

ey were probably anxious due to the spontaneous demonstration a few

days earlier at Rossa Cemetery, where a huge Polish throng gathered near the grave
of Piłsudski’s mother (where Piłsudski’s heart was also buried) in what an eyewit-
ness described as a “funereal, patriotic national manifestation.”

Nonetheless,

crowds ﬁ lled the street, the churches—it was Saturday—overﬂ owed. Th

e city, the

population of which was overwhelmingly Polish, took on a brief festive atmos-
phere. However, the political demonstrations feared by the Lithuanians did not
take place.

Two years later, again on the anniversary of independence on November

11th, 1941, the newly ensconced German authorities in Kowno required local
Poles to register with the police as part of a policy of brutal suppression.

For the rest of the Polish east we have a fragmentary picture of November 11th

under Soviet occupation. A recently published diary from Brześć thus takes on
special importance. It covers only several weeks in late 1939 and was written by a
teacher, the daughter of a professor from the University of Warsaw who fought as
a cavalry oﬃ

cer in the September campaign and became a German POW. Proud

and intensely patriotic, she palpably despised the new Soviet regime. Her recollec-
tion of the ﬁ rst November 11th, a Saturday in 1939, in Brześć is quite emotional:

e anniversary of the [Bolshevik] revolution almost coincided with our national holi-

day, November 11th, the anniversary of independence regained. Th

ose red parades

were thus particularly painful for us. It was a sad and gloomy November day. Students
rushed oﬀ to school . . . We went up to the church’s gates. Th

e main door to the church

was locked. Despite this many young people were gathered in the cemetery. We found
a side entrance and were soon among the praying throng. I could not stop my
tears . . . Everyone was on their knees deep into prayer . . . Th

e girls were sobbing; the

boys’ eyes were ﬁ lled with tears.

Later she went to her school and discovered that a student had written on the
blackboard “Poland will never die” and was emotionally overcome. She was told
that her class would be observed that day by an oﬃ

cial “visitor” and that her lesson

was to be dedicated to “nationality relations in Western Belarus [what had been

cooperated with them enthusiastically in governing the area until the collapse of the German military
position in the east. Th

e Wilno region was, in 1939, overwhelmingly Polish in population with a

signiﬁ cant Jewish minority; the Lithuanian element was nugatory.

Stanisława Lewandowska, Życie codzienne Wilna w latach II wojny światowej (Warsaw: Instytut

Historii PAN, 1997), 40.

See the memoirs of Aleksander Blum, then a Polish soldier, in his Moja zimna wojna (wspom-

nienia emigracyjn e) (London: Privately printed, 1984), 164.

See the eyewitness account in Mieczysław Krzepkowski, “Wspomnienia dziennikarza z czasów

okupacji (Wilno, 1939–1941),” Zeszyty Historyczne , 45 (1978), 151 . A Polish soldier in Wilno in
November 1939 described the almost palpable depression of the Poles as constituting an “All Souls
Day of the Polish Nation” (Zaduszki Narodu Polskiego); see Blum , Moja zimna wojna , 164.

However, this only concerned Poles who had arrived in Kowno since January 1st, 1939; see

Wardzyńska, Sytuacja ludności polskiej w Generalnym Komisariacie Litwy, 49–50.

Wanda Maria Pasierbińska, “Od Ruska do Germańca,” Biuletyn Instytutu Pamięci Narodowej ,

12(47) (December, 2004), 93.

106

Independence Day

weeks before, eastern Poland] and . . . the glorious Red Army.” Appalled by celebrat-
ing the dismemberment of her country on its national holiday, yet fearful of the
consequences of disobedience, she lived a day of agony. After this “terrible experi-
ence in school on November 11th” she could endure no more, and escaped west-
wards to German-occupied Poland, preferring the Nazis to the Soviets. For her, the
profanation of November 11th made her life unbearable.

Lwów, the largest city in the Polish east, was occupied by the Soviets in late

September 1939. On precisely November 11th, 1939 Lt. Stanisław Rumań arrived
there on foot. He had fought against the Germans, but when retreating eastwards
fell into Russian captivity from which he escaped. Now he was trying to reach his
parents in Kołomyja in eastern Galicia. At the main Lwów railway station he saw a
mad scene. Shots were being ﬁ red everywhere and “some sort of huge roundup”
[obława] was in progress. Th

e youth of the city, famous for their perfervid patriot-

ism, had organized a demonstration in honor of Independence Day; now they were
paying the price. Apparently it centered around the station that still bore the inscrip-
tion “Leopolis, semper ﬁ delis,”

which was peculiarly poignant at that moment,

We have a few scattered references about the commemoration of Independence

Day by Poles captured by the Soviets in 1939 and who were destined to die at
Katyń.

ese pathetic records found on the thousands of exhumed bodies tell a

similar tale of depression and despair. Many wrote a few words on the anniversary
of national independence, which had been so martially and conﬁ dently celebrated
before the war. Although these materials are far too fragmentary to attempt an
aperçu of the ideological structure of the prisoners, we must recall that the cult of
Piłsudski, as already noted, had been sedulously promoted in the army for several
years before the war. Stanislaw Świaniewicz, one of the very few survivors of the
Kozielsk camp, recalled his fellow prisoners thus:

ey revered the memory of Marshal Piłsudski, whom the Russians regarded as their

archenemy. In 1940 the name day of Marshal Piłsudski (March 19th) was celebrated
in the camp in spite of all the precautions which the Soviet authorities had taken.

is notion is echoed by the few extant diary notes from the camp. Dobiesław

Jakubowicz noted on his small calendar that he and his fellow prisoners celebrated
November 11th, 1939 “modestly” and that he went to confession. He was pro-
foundly depressed and worried about his family.

Stefan Pieńkowski noted in his

pocket notebook that the observance of “Our [national] holiday was more than
modest.”

Maksymilian Trzepałka recalled that on November 11th in Kozielsk:

Ibid. , 93–5.

Stanisław Rumań, “Uciekłem Sowietom i Niemcom,” Biuletyn Instytutu Pamięci Narodowej ,

5–6(52–3) (May–June, 2005), 159.

e author would like to thank Anna M. Cienciala, of the University of Kansas, for guidance to

these materials relative to the commemoration of November 11th by Poles destined to die in Russian
captivity.

As quoted in Louis FitzGibbon, Katyń (Torrance, CA: Th

e Noontide Press, 1979), 38.

For the recollections of Jakubowicz see Pamiętniki znalezione w Katyniu , 2nd edn. (Paris and

Warsaw: Editions Spotkania, 1990), 35.

Ibid. , 72.

Maintaining a Piłsudskiite Independence Day

107

“Independence Day. It is terrible to be in slavery, deprived of freedom. Th

ere was

a small religious service in the barracks. Th

e Colonel recited verse in the evening,

and one of us sang a few songs.”

Bronisław Wajs recalled that the brief religious

service ended with the signing of not only the religious hymn “Boże, Coś Polskę,”
but the national anthem “Jeszcze Polska nie zginęła.”

November 11th moved

Stanisław Bakula to an emotional reﬂ ection: “Today is our Independence Day.
A free Fatherland exists only in the hearts of the nation. Evidently God wished that
Poland be cleansed [żeby Polska i czyściec przeszła]. However, despite deep faith in
[Poland’s] rebirth, it is diﬃ

cult to spend this day in captivity.”

Andrzej Riegier, an

attorney from Katowice, noted that the 11th was “gloomy and despairing,” and
that during the singing of the patriotic songs the soldiers wept. Just a year before
things had looked so diﬀ erent, he lamented.

Of all the references, the most bizarre

is the report by Bakula that in November the prisoners organized “spiritualist
séances” [seanse spirytystyczne] to invoke the shade of Piłsudski. Th

ese eﬀ orts

were, it would seem, partially successful as the Marshal was reported to have
appeared and uttered the single word “federation” [federacja], the symbol of the
Piłsudskiite vision for Poland after 1918.

From the camp at Starobielsk there is a fascinating memoir by Józef Czapski,

who later was evacuated to Iraq, which recalls the commemoration of Independ-
ence Day, probably in 1940, by an oﬃ

cer named Kwolek:

When November 11th arrived, despite a prohibition on any observation, the day
was marked in all the barracks, most elaborately in [the barrack known as] “Shang-
hai”. One of our colleagues declaimed the “Letter from Siberia” of Or-Ot

, which,

given the circumstances, made a profound impression [wstrząsające wrażenie],
because it seemed to have been written for us. He also declaimed from Mickiewicz
and even Lechoń’s “Crimson Poem” [Karmazynowy Poemat].

Kwolek not only

organized an Academic session [Akademia], but he committed a greater crime: he
hung in a visible place a large black cross made from boards. Th

is was ﬁ nally too

much. Already ill, quiet but determined Lt. Kwolek was taken away immediately
after November 11th.

Ibid. , 142.

Ibid. , 176.

Ibid. , 220, 230–1.

Ibid. , 279.

Ibid. , 221, 231.

Or-Ot was the pseudonym for the popular inter-war poet and publicist Artur Oppman

(1867–1931). Oppman, who was also a colonel in the Polish Army, was the author of much religious
and patriotic verse, with characteristic Polish melancholy. He is not, however, considered a major
poet.

Jan Lechoń, one of the greatest of modern Polish poets, was an ardent patriot and enamored of

Piłsudski. November 11th was for Lechoń a day of almost unbearable joy. He later recalled writing the
“Crimson Poem”: at that time in a state “unconscious with emotion and really ill”; see Roman Loth,
“Wstęp” in Jan Lechoń, Poezje (Wrocław: Ossolineum, 1990), xi–xiii . We do not know what portion
of the rather long poem “Karmazynowy Poemat” [Crimson Poem] the soldier at Starobielsk recited.
However, one of the poem’s last portions, composed probably immediately after November 11th, is
entitled “Piłsudski” and is a moving and understated verse of great power. For Lechoń’s reﬂ ections of
the day and its meaning see his Dziennik (Warsaw: PIW, 1992), II, 581–2.

Józef Czapski , Wspomnienia starobielskie (Rome: Polish Second Corps, 1945), 32 . Anna

M. Cienciala was kind enough to provide me with a copy of portions of this rare volume.

108

Independence Day

Kwolek died in 1941 while working in a Russian mine in the far north.

By late 1943 the German military situation had deteriorated in the east, and the

Soviets were advancing. For the Poles of the area, however, the celebration of
November 11th was still dangerous if not impossible. Perhaps seventy-ﬁ ve miles
south of Wilno at the village of Derewno near Nowogródek, a tragically symbolic
observance is described by Józef Garliński as being arranged by Polish guerilla
units. In addition to the soldiers, civilians and the local Soviet partisan unit were
invited. Relations with the Soviet units were notoriously bad, as they had carried
out mass murders in the vicinity earlier in the year. Th

e patriotic occasion pro-

moted the AK area commander to declare “the Polish partisans were ﬁ ghting for
their native soil and that Poland would not cede an inch of it to anyone.” Shortly
thereafter the Polish soldiers were attacked by the Soviets and killed or captured

e Soviet decision to extirpate Polish military units in this area doubtless pre-

dated the November 11th festivities, which thus became a requiem for the Polish
eastern borderlands [kresy].

e Soviet desire to dominate Poland included an eﬀ ort to assimilate November

11th into their ideological restructuring of the Polish past. Soon after their establish-
ment on Polish territory in the late summer of 1943, the Soviets created the “First
Corps of the Polish Armed Forces.” Th

ey confronted the problem of dealing with

Poland’s traditional Independence Day. In Żwycięzymy (We Shall Win) , the Polish-
language organ circulated among the troops, an article entitled “Two Anniversaries”
explained that by choosing cooperation with the Soviets, the Poles had linked the
two countries in friendship and conjoined Polish Independence Day with the
November 7th anniversary of the Bolshevik Revolution. Hence, November 11th
could conveniently be celebrated as a symbol of Polish-Soviet friendship.

Even

November 7th, the anniversary of the Daszyński government in Lublin, received
Party attention, largely as a makeweight to the foulness of the Piłsudski regime that
had commenced a few days later.

November 7th was celebrated with much fanfare,

including such grotesqueries as masses in the churches and a speech by Party chief
Bolesław Bierut in (ironically) the “November 11th Th

eater” in Lublin.

A year later, when these forces found themselves near Warsaw, a yet more inclu-

sive assimilation was essayed, which added the Roman Catholic All Saints’ Day
into a kind of triple ideological syncretism. Th

e local civilian population as well as

Red Army oﬃ

cers were invited to join the Polish soldiers over several days of cel-

ebration, including remembrances of the fallen, ideological lectures, and less

Ibid. , 32.

is incident is recounted in Józef Garliński, Poland, SOE and the Allies (London: George Allen

and Unwin, 1969), 138–40.

See “Dwie rocznice,” Zwyciężymy , 48 (November 2, 1943) as quoted in Leonard Skibiński , I

Brygada Artylerii Armat, 1943–1945. Dzieje I Warszawskiej Brygady Artylerii Armat im. Gen. Józefa
Bema  (Warsaw: Ministerstwo Obrony Narodowej, 1984). 36 . In Lublin, and perhaps elsewhere, the
November 11th celebrations went on much as they had before 1939; see Izabella Main, Trudne
świętowanie: Konﬂ ikty wokół obchodów świąt państwowych i kościelnych w Lublinie (1944–1989)
(Warsaw:  Trio,  2004),  43–4.

Ibid. , 41.

Ibid. , 41–3.

Maintaining a Piłsudskiite Independence Day

109

somber diversions. Polish-Soviet comradeship in arms was intended to be the glue
that bound these otherwise radically discordant elements.

In fact, in 1944 the Kremlin went out of its way to mark November 11th. Large

ceremonies were organized in Moscow, with gatherings and speeches by Poles
working with Stalin in the Committee of National Liberation [Polski Komitet
Wyzwolenia Narodowego, or PKWN] and the National Home Council [Krajowa
Rada Narodowa, or KRN] founded by Moscow. Th

e speech by Aleksander Jusz-

kiewicz, secretary general of the ironically named Union of Polish Patriots [Związek
Patriotów Polskich, or ZPP], was broadcast by radio. Poles scattered about the
Soviet Union were allowed to commemorate the day in their schools and other
institutions.

e seat of the new communist government of Poland, Lublin, saw a parade,

speeches, and a military concert in celebrations lasting much of the day. Local lead-
ers of the National Liberation Committee sent regards to the Soviet hierarchs on
what they referred to as “Independence Day” for Poland. Th

e contents of the oﬃ

cial pronouncements that day were ominous for those capable of reading between
the lines. General Michał Rola-Żymierski, commander of the Polish forces formed
under Soviet auspices (and a former legionnaire), issued “Order No. 100” to all
personnel of the army on November 11th, 1944. It included a lengthy historical
excursus. Beginning with the acknowledgment that twenty-six years previously
Poland had regained its independence, it then quickly noted that this freedom was
doomed to short duration due to the “reactionary government” of the Piłsudskiites
who were responsible for the defeat in 1939. By contrast, the Red Army and its
Polish allies were freeing the country from the German invader and bringing true
reform. Hence, the soldiers were ordered to rally to the new order and be on guard
against anti-Soviet attitudes.

Lest the implications of this be unclear, the Committee of National Liberation

issued a statement the same day in which the freedom of Poland was linked directly
to the 1917 Russian Revolution that had created the preconditions for independ-
ence. Similarly to Order No. 100, the declaration lamented that the Polish govern-
ment had failed to create a truly free Poland after 1918. Instead, obedient to the
“Commandant” [i.e. Piłsudski] there emerged a “reactionary anti-populist, anti-
democratic regime” of ill-consequence. Hence, there was now to be a new day
marking the rebirth of Polish statehood—July 22nd, 1944—when the PKWN had
announced its formation.

us was born November 11th’s successor; however,

the date was never formally renounced as Independence Day. Churches continued
to oﬀ er service on the 11th, often with veterans prominently present.

Skibiński, I Brygada , 156–8.

Wysocki, “Obchody,” 57; Andrzej Kaczyński, “Zakazane Święta,” Rzeczpospolita , November 10,

2005.

is order is quoted extensively in Wysocki, “Obchody,” 58–9.

Ibid. , 59.

Wojciech Polak, “Niezależne obchody narodowego święta niepodległości w ostatnich

dziesięcioleciach PRL,” in Wojciech Polak, ed., Niepodległość: spełnione marzenie pokoleń i wyzwanie na
przyszłość (Toruń: Województwo Kujawsko-Pomorskie, nd), 109.

110

Independence Day

e implications of these announcements became policy by the following

November, with the war over and the former Lublin authorities safely ensconced
in Warsaw. On November 11th, 1945 a series of announcements appeared in the
regime’s press, the most notably entitled “Why We Shall Not Celebrate November
11th.” Th

e case against Piłsudski and his adherents now appeared in full form.

November 11th was the anniversary of reaction led by Piłsudski who adopted a
blindly “pro-German” policy, which ignored the most vital interests of the Polish
people in both domestic policy and especially in its recklessly anti-Soviet orien-
tation. Th

is disastrous course led to the September 1939 catastrophe “whose

beginning can be dated to November 11th, 1918.” Hence that date—formerly a
national holiday—was transformed into a black anniversary of infamy. Piłsudski
had been transmogriﬁ ed from the architect of Poland’s independence into the
cause of Poland’s disaster. But, the principal element of his disservice to Poland—
opposition to Russia—was now reversed both practically and symbolically by
proclaiming that July 22nd was to be henceforth the national holiday, a practice
that never gained much support and was gradually de-emphasized in communist
Poland.

Along with November 11th, other dates no longer to be commemorated were

May 3rd and August 15th—the anniversary of Poland’s victory over the Bolsheviks
in 1920 and celebrated as “Polish Soldier’s Day.”

e events of 1918 were vaguely

alluded to by annual references to November 7th, the anniversary of the Daszyński
government in Lublin and, conveniently, the anniversary of the Bolshevik Revolu-
tion as well.

Piłsudski became, “for the communists . . . the most hated . . . ﬁ gure in

modern Polish history.”

T H E P O L I S H G OV E R N M E N T  I N  E X I L E

e Polish government-in-exile inherited a problematic anniversary of November

11th. Th

e exile government of Poland—assembled ﬁ rst in France and later in

London, and led by General Władysław Sikorski (though constitutionally a con-
tinuation of the pre-war regime of the Piłsudskiites)—was in policy and personnel
quite hostile to its predecessor.

Hence November 11th was, for the Sikorski gov-

ernment, most awkward. As the celebration of the rebirth of Polish independence,
it could hardly be ignored as it provided the basis for the validity of the exile gov-
ernment itself. However, the imbedded Piłsudskiite elements of November 11th

Main, Trudne świętowanie, 20, 68.

My analysis here draws substantially on ibid. , 60.

Pałaszewska, Święto Niepodległości , 12.

For a review of 1945 newspaper accounts of November 11th, see Wysocki, “Obchody,” 60. Th

continued into the 1950s; see Tadeusz Biernat, Jozef Piłsudski–Lech Wałęsa: Paradoks charyzmaycznego
przywództwa. (Toruń: Adam Marszałek, 2000), 200 n. 32.

See the important studies by Andrzej Grywacz and Marcin Kwiecień, “Sikorszczycy kontra

Sanatorzy, 1939–1940,” Zeszyty Historyczne , 127 (1999), 63–127 , and the monograph by Jacek
Piotrowski, Piłsudczycy bez lidera (po 1 września 1939 roku (Toruń: Adam Marszałek, 2003) .

Maintaining a Piłsudskiite Independence Day

111

were a serious problem.

Hence, the initial policy was to keep the occasion but

ignore Piłsudski. Sikorski told the French that he wanted to preserve a “tactful
silence” [taktowne milczenie] about Piłsudski.

His name was omitted from patri-

otic declarations, his picture was removed from government oﬃ

ces, and even the

songs celebrating the exploits of his legions were frowned upon: singing “My,
Pierwsza Brygada” was banned, or at least strongly discouraged.

Sikorski did not mention Independence Day in his order of November 11th,

1939; he made a passing reference the following year, but omitted Piłsudski’s name.
He said nothing in 1941; in 1942 he noted it was the anniversary of the Battle of
Trafalgar.

His speech of that year was very critical of the sanacja and provoked an

enraged response from the underground Piłsudskiites in Poland who found his
words divisive, especially on a national holiday.

e government’s oﬃ

cial press,

the Monitor Polski (later Dziennik Ustaw ), said nothing on November 11th from
1939 through 1942.

President Władysław Raczkiewicz, members of the government, and once even

Sikorski himself, attended a mass at the Polish church in London on November
11th. Only the most insigniﬁ cant additional ceremonies were conducted: Raczkie-
wicz decorated a few ﬂ yers in 1941, and held a tea party in 1945.

Whereas the

traditional attending of a commemorative religious service on November 11th was
not forbidden, soldiers who did so risked disfavor.

Among those aﬀ ected were

pilots from the famed Kościuszko Squadron who had just arrived in Paris follow-
ing an arduous escape from Poland after the September Campaign. Gathering at a
Paris restaurant on the national holiday, Witold Krasnodębski raised a most opti-
mistic toast:

We will be celebrating the next anniversary of Poland’s independence back in our
country, because we have loyal allies who not only will give us modern planes, but will
ﬁ ght the enemy alongside us. Our victory is certain.

Zbigniew Wójcik goes farther and regards the campaign against the Piłsudskiite tradition to have

been “one of the most, if not the most important political goal” of the Sikorski government. See his
“Dzisiejsze kontrowersje wokół postaci Marszałka Piłsudskiego,” in Adam Suchoński, ed.,

Józef

Piłsudski i jego współpracownicy (Opole: Uniwersytet Opolski, 1999), 17.

Tadeusz Wyrwa, “Z dziejów rządu polskiego w Angers,” Zeszyty Historyczne , 68 (1984), 222.

See Andrzej Krzysztof Kunert, ed., Rozkazy naczelnych wodzów Polskich Siły Zbrojnach,

1939–1945. Vol. I: Rozkazy do żołnierzy . (Warsaw: Adiutor, 2002), I, 32 , 33, 76, 189.

Gałęzowski, Wierni Polsce , 516–18. Divisive comments from Sikorski at a time that demanded

national unity was a standard criticism of the Piłsudskiites.

See Andrzej Krzysztof Kunert, ed., Rzeczpospolita Polska czasu wojny: Dziennik Ustaw RP: Moni-

tor Polski, 1939–1945 (Warsaw: Kopia, 1995).

See Jacek Piotrowski, ed., Dzienniki czynności Prezydenta RP Władysława Raczkiewicza,

1939–1947  . Vol. I: 1939–1942; Vol. II: 1943–1947  (Wrocław: Wydanie Universytetu Wrocławskiego,
2004), I , 268, 458, 625; II, 152, 389, 522, 600;  Witold D. Sylwestrowicz, Listy niewysłane: Dziennik
z okresu wojny: wrzesień 1939–kwiecień 1945  (Paris: Instytut Literacki, 1988), 84.

According to a Piłsudskiite source, it required an “act of courage” for Polish soldiers in exile to

attend November 11th commemorations; see Władysław Pobóg-Malinowski, Najnowsza historia poli-
tyczna Polski, 1864–1945. Vol. III: Okres 1939–1945 , 2nd edn. (London: Gryf, 1981), III, 92–3 .

Quoted in Lynne Olson and Stanley Cloud, A Question of Honor: Th

e Kościuszko Squadron:

Forgotten Heroes of World War II (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 2004), 82 . Perhaps more wistful is the
diary entry of another Polish pilot on November 10th, 1940: “Today is our anniversary,” Sylwestro-
wicz, Listy niewysłane, 54.

112

Independence Day

For senior members of the former Polish government, Sikorski’s disfavor had immediate
consequences. On November 11th, 1939, a bitterly painful anniversary for any Pole,
General Felicjan Sławoj-Składkowski, the last premier of the pre-war government, and a
physician, patriotically asked Sikorski to be given a post in the medical corps, at any
rank. He was brutally and humiliatingly rejected for reasons of political partisanship.
Other high-ranking Polish generals associated with Piłsudski met with similar treatment
or worse at the hands of Sikorski and his entourage.

Many were sequestered at Rothe-

say in Scotland.

e pathetic Śmigły-Rydz, languishing in Romanian internment,

chose November 11th, 1939 to announce his resignation as commander-in-chief.

November 11th thus marked both the pinnacle and the lowest point in his life. It was
his close association with Piłsudski that had allowed him to claim the Marshal’s baton in
1936. Th

ree years later, he was the central scapegoat for the failure of the Polish Army—

so closely associated with Piłsudski and his entourage—to defend the country.

Sikorski empaneled a special investigative commission to evaluate the causes of

the September defeat. Th

is so-called “Haller Committee” was eponymously named

after its aged chairman General Józef Haller, a long-time opponent of Piłsudski.

is disreputable eﬀ ort dominated the fanatically anti-Pilsudskiite General Izydor

Modelski, who regarded the entire military establishment of Poland in 1939 as
virtually traitorous.

is committee began with unseemly enthusiasm but lost

momentum by early 1940, and accomplished little of note besides assembling
weighty dossiers. Despite its legal and political impotence, this inquisition of the
Piłsudskiite military elite was the clearest indication of the intention of the Sikorski
government to extirpate both the living Piłsudskiites and the cult of the Marshal
from Polish politics, especially the army. An important element of this campaign
was the re-conceptualization of the Polish past and the re-casting of November
11th as something other than a celebration of Piłsudski.

e main actor in this campaign of political vengeance against the Piłsudskiites was played by General

Izydor Modelski; see his “Dwa listy do Gen. Sikorskiego,” Zeszyty Historyczne , 127 (1999), 190–204; cf. the
comments in Grywacz and Kwiecień, “Sikorszczycy,” 63ﬀ . Th

e shame and frustration experienced by many

Piłsudskiite oﬃ

cers who were openly blamed by the Sikorski regime for Poland’s defeat in 1939 and later

given no opportunity to serve their country cannot be exaggerated. A number were driven to suicide. Sławoj-
Składkowski was famous for his child-like devotion to Piłsudski; this alone would have made him disagree-
able to Sikorski, quite apart from his position as premier of a government associated with defeat in 1939.
Regarding Sławoj-Składkowski’s attitude toward Piłsudski, see Andrzej Chojnowski, “Felicjan Sławoj
Składkowski, premier Rzeczypospolitej 15 V 1936–30 IX 1939,” in Andrzej Chojnowski and Piotr Wróbel,
Prezydenci i premierzy Drugiej Rzeczypospolitej (Wrocław: Ossolineum, 1992), 359. Controversy still sur-
rounds Sikorski’s treatment of another Piłsudskiite senior oﬃ

cer in September, 1939, the intellectually

sophisticated General Wacław Stachiewicz, the chief of general staﬀ , who may well have been forced by
Sikorski into French internment in Algeria for much of the war. See Piotrowski, Piłsudczycy , 276, quoting
Lipiński.

Ibid. , 187.

Henryk Gruber, Wspomnienia i uwagi (London: Gryf, 1968), 419. Other sources indicate that

Śmigły-Rydz actually resigned as commander-in-chief as early as September 27th. Whether or not this
was made immediately public is unclear. In any event, the fact that Gruber, a Piłsudskiite, would recall
it happening on November 11th is itself signiﬁ cant. For the date of September 27th see Piotr Stawecki,
“Marszałek Polski Edward Rydz-Smigły (1886–1941),” in Bogusław Polak, ed., Bitwy września 1939
roku. Part 2: Dowodcy września (Koszalin: Wyższa szkoła inżynierska w Koszalinie, 1993), 22.

e most recent and thorough discussion of the “Haller Commission” is Andrzej Grywacz and

Marcin Kwiecień, “Sikorszczycy i kontra Sanatorzy, 1939–1940 (ciąg dalszy),” Zeszyty Historyczne ,
129 (1999), 52–70.

Ibid. , 56.

Maintaining a Piłsudskiite Independence Day

113

Sikorski’s sensitivity to any attempt to recall the Piłsudskiite version of November

11th provoked what has been called his “Piłsudski complex.”

He speciﬁ cally con-

demned any eﬀ orts to maintain a Piłsudski “legend.”

Hence, the extraordinary

reaction of the general to the appearance of an article entitled “November 11th”
[jedenasty listopad] in the November 8th, 1940 issue of the Biuletyn Informacyjny
of the central command of the underground Polish military in Warsaw.

In an

emotive passage recalling the birth of independence twenty-two years earlier, this
article decried the absence of a contemporary Piłsudski “with his extraordinary
political intuition [geniuszem intuicji politycznej], iron will, and patriotic pas-
sion.” Painfully aware of this absence, “we must compensate by national unity and
all rally around our banners, the President of the Republic, and the Commander
in Chief [i.e. Sikorski].”

Despite this call for unity and support of his government, Sikorski was incensed

when, three months after its publication, he read this passage and demanded an
investigation citing the “objectionable tone” of the sentences quoted above. He
made it very clear that any positive reference to Piłsudski in conjunction with
November 11th was simultaneous insubordinate and a personal aﬀ ront. Although
the underground commander in Poland, General Stefan Rówecki (Grot) was
dumbfounded by Sikorski’s reaction, opponents of the Piłsudski regime within
Poland also made much of the article and it produced a mini crisis amongst the
political elite in occupied Warsaw.

Sikorski may well have been suspicious of

the political inclinations of the AK where the Piłsudskiites retained a considerable
presence, and showed marked cohesion.

Another example of the lengths to which the Sikorski regime would go to edit

references to November 11th was the oﬃ

cial reprinting of a radio speech by Amer-

ican politician Wendell Willkie on that day in 1941. Th

e ﬁ rst ﬁ ve lines of the

speech were cut from the version in the government’s reprinting: they had referred
to the anniversary of independence.

Within the exile government, observation of November 11th was a function of

internecine intrigues and the balance of power. As premier and minister of war,
Sikorski dominated everything until his death in 1943. Th

e president, the genial

e poet Jan Lechoń had fascinating remarks in this context. Lechoń, it should be remembered was

a great admirer of Piłsudski. See Jan Lechoń, Dziennik, Vol. I (Warsaw: PIW, 1992), I, 276 ; cf. Krzysztof
Tarka, “Spór of legendę Marszałka,” in Suchoński, ed., Józef Piłsudski i jego współpracownicy , 133 .

Tarka, “Spór o legendę Marszałka,” 136. On the other hand, Rothschild has reminded us that in the

1920s it was Piłsudski who sought to discredit Sikorski as an “alternative candidate for savior of Poland”;
see Joseph Rothschild, Piłsudski’s Coup d’État (New York: Columbia University Press, 1966), 73.

Biuletyn Informacyjny was the press organ of the Chief Command of the Union of Armed

Struggle [Komenda Główna Związku Walki Zbrojnej], the progenitor of the better-known Armia
Krajowa (AK), or Polish Underground Army. Piłsudski was very popular within the AK; see Wiśniewska
“Legenda Józefa Piłsudskiego,” 160.

is incident, including an extended quotation from “Jedenasty listopada” is recounted in

Krzysztof Tarka, “Spór o legendę Marszałka,” 132ﬀ .

e debate that the article provoked in the underground within Poland is discussed in Zygmunt

Zaremba, Wojna i konspiracja (London: Świderski, 1957), 167ﬀ .

Piotrowski, Piłsudczycy, 281.

Kunert, Styczeń–grudzień, 374. A good general account of the Sikorski government and Piłsudski

is Ponczek, Tradycja , 309ﬀ .

114

Independence Day

but inconsequential Raczkiewicz, gained his position largely by being suﬃ

ciently

innocuous that his Piłsudskiite past would be a sop to the adherents of the Marshal
without representing any substantive opposition to Sikorski. Hence it was Racz-
kiewicz, not Sikorski, who made the radio address on November 11th, 1939.

Stanisław Kot, Sikorski’s most signiﬁ cant advisor and a passionate opponent of the

Piłsudskiites, emphasized the persistence of this diﬃ

culty for the exile Sikorski gov-

ernment in November 1942 regarding the morale of the Polish armed forces: “the
army is saturated with the cult of Marshal Piłsudski.” A young recruit made the fol-
lowing report regarding Independence Day: “On that November day he brought the
capital back to life, he revived the Polish Nation. Th

e Leader had returned! Piłsudski

stood at the head of the Nation.”

For Sikorski, whose dislike of Piłsudski was a

combination of political diﬀ erences and personal vanity, such celebrations of his rival
were quite insuﬀ erable. It was precisely the conjuring of Piłsudski, not the anniver-
sary itself that vexed Sikorski. Indeed, it is clear that before the war, Sikorski had
regarded November 11th as the correct anniversary of the rebirth of Polish independ-
ence, and noted it as such even in private correspondence to critics of Piłsudski.

Sikorski regarded himself to be in conﬂ ict with the legend of Piłsudski as well as with
the machinations of the late Marshal’s devotees. Hence, on November 11th, Sikorski
made inspiring radio broadcasts to Poles everywhere, in which he spoke of a bright
future but did not dwell on the (Piłsudskiite) origins of the occasion.

In the fall of 1942, the Sikorski government issued orders to all Polish military

detachments that November 11th was not to be observed as the national holiday
[święto narodowe]; May 3rd, Polish Constitution Day, would alone enjoy such a
status.

e ardently anti-communist Sikorski government thus declared the

dethroning of November 11th long before the communists ever took power in
Warsaw.

100

On November 11th, 1942 Sikorski made a radio broadcast denouncing

Zygmunt Kaczmarek, Marszałkowie Senatu II Rzeczypospolitej (Warsaw: Wydawnictwo Sejmowe,

1992), 149. Sikorski treated Raczkiewicz with ill-disguised disdain. Th

is is one of the instances in

which Sikorski and Piłsudski agreed; the latter had once referred to Raczkiewicz as “spineless”: ibid. ,
138. Raczkiewicz mentioned in his October 3rd, 1939 address that he followed in the footsteps of “the
great Marshal.” As a matter of fact he did not; he was actually in Paderewski’s footsteps. Th

is reference

must have been galling to Sikorski; see Kunert , Rzeczpospolita Polska , 220.

Quoted in Stanisław Kot, Listy z Rosji do Gen. Sikorskiego (London: Jutro Polski, 1955), 403–4.

Kot was determined—to the point of obsession—to remove Piłsudskiite inﬂ uence from the Polish
government; see Andrzej Grywacz and Marcin Kwiecień, “Sikorszczycy kontra Sanatorzy, 1939–1940
(ciąg dalszy),” Zeszyty Historyczne , 129 (1999), 108 . Regarding the cult in the underground army (AK)
see Maria Wiśniewska,“Legenda Józefa Piłsudskiego w prasie Armii Krajowej i Szarych Szeregów,”
Niepodległość i Pamięci , 9 (1997).160.

For example, Sikorski wrote to Ignacy Jan Paderewski on November 11th, 1938 the following

words: “I write this letter on November 11th . . . on the day on which the nation regained independ-
ence.” One year later Sikorski again wrote to Paderewski “on the twentieth anniversary of Poland’s
regaining its independence”; see Tadeusz Jędruszczak and Artur Leinwand, eds., Archiwum polityczne
Ignacego Paderewskiego . Vol. IV : 1935–1940 (Wrocław: Ossolineum, 1974), IV, 148, 179–80.

Regarding Sikorski’s radio remarks on November 11th, 1942 see the diary entry for November 13, 1942

in Adam Kamiński , Diariusz podręczny, 1939–1945 (Warsaw: Instytut Pamięci Narodowej, 2001), 202.

e political Right, long rather dubious about May 3rd, seemingly rediscovered it during the

war—most convenient; see Eugeniusz Ponczek, “Polska podziemna wobec tradycji Konstytucji 3 maja
(1939–1945),” in Alina Barszczewska-Krupa, Konstytucja 3 maja w tradycji i kulturze polskiej (Łódź:
Wydawnictwo Łódzkie, 1991), 257–8.

100

Zbigniew Wójcik, “Dzisiejsze kontrowersje wokół postaci Marszałka Piłsudskiego,” in Suchoński,

ed., Jozef Piłsudski i jego współpracownicy , 17.

Maintaining a Piłsudskiite Independence Day

115

the pre-war regime, concluding: “those guilty for these crimes will not play any
role.”

101

A high-ranking Polish oﬃ

cer, close to Sikorski and quite critical of the

Piłsudski government, regarded this decision as understandable but misguided. In
his diary, General Józef Zając recalled:

e current government of course associates the 11th of November exclusively with

the person of Piłsudski, but is not accurate, even without him, probably; the 11th
would be connected with regaining independence.

102

e eﬀ ort to replace November 11th with May 3rd was not the happiest. Whereas

the commemoration of the adoption of the Polish Constitution on May 3rd,
1791—Europe’s ﬁ rst written constitution history (proud Poles have always
noted)—had a long tradition in Poland, and among Poles abroad, the symbolism
is problematical at best. May 3rd was the Poles’ deﬁ ant response to the crisis of old
Poland, a riposte to those, then and later, who argued Poland deserved its destruc-
tion. But, after all, the Constitution died aborning and it introduced an era not of
independence but the darkness of the partitions and a century and a quarter of
occupation and unfreedom. Indeed, the creation of November 11th as the national
holiday was originally designed to avoid the very ambiguous legacy symbolized by
May 3rd. By re-centering May 3rd, the Sikorski government was symbolically
abandoning the notion of the Second Republic as a rejuvenating event in Polish
history. Th

is was probably inevitable given the obloquy of military defeat in 1939

and Sikorski’s desire to distance himself from the pre-war regime. November 11th
was integrated into the oﬃ

cial symbolism of the Second Republic; hence the

former could not survive the denigration of the latter.

103

Despite Sikorski’s discontent, November 11th was marked in London by the Polish

community with considerable display in 1942. A commemorative mass was celebrated
with President Raczkiewicz and other members of the government in attendance.
Polish military representatives laid a wreath at the grave of the British Unknown Sol-
dier. As noted, Sikorski sent a radio address to the homeland that evening.

104

When Sikorski was killed in a plane crash oﬀ Gibraltar in July 1943, his successor

as commander-in-chief of the Polish armed forces, Kazimierz Sosnkowski, who had
been an old comrade of Piłsudski’s, immediately reversed the tone of oﬃ

cial utter-

ances by recalling the Marshal with words of the highest praise.

105

Sosnkowski was

101

Tadeusz Lachowicki-Czechowicz, Dziennik Egerski: Zapiski komendanta obozu oﬁ cerów polskich

na Węgrzech, 1939–1944 ( Warsaw: Rytm, 2003), 214.

102

Józef Zając, W Szkocji i na środkowym wschodzie. II. Tom pamietników wojennych (London:

Veritas, 1967), II, 240 . Zając noted that even the year before the celebration of November 11th was
considerably diminished from the pageantry characteristic of the pre-war era; see ibid. 48–9.

103

e May constitution linked Poland with the Western democracies, especially France, which

was important to Sikorski; see Andrzej Friszke, “Stosunek do tradycji, Sejmu Czteroletniego w okresie
Drugiej wojny światowej,” in Jerzy Kowecki, Sejm czteroletni i jego tradycje (Warsaw: Państwowe
Wydawnictwo Naukowe, 1991), 288–94.

104

Pałaszewska, Święto Niepodległości , 12.

105

See “Order Number 8” of July 11th, 1943 as quoted in Witold Babiński, Przyczynki historyczne

do okresu 1939–1945  (London: Świderski, 1967), 197–8 . Sosnkowski cleverly praised Sikorski on
July 11th, 1943 for having served brilliantly in 1919–20 under Piłsudski’s leadership. See Kunert,
Rzeczpospolita Polska,  68.  Earlier Sosnkowski had been falsely accused by socialist politician Herman
Lieberman of siphoning oﬀ  government money to “promote the Piłsudski cult.” See Babiński, Przy-
czynki,   183.

116

Independence Day

not the conventional Pilsudskiite. He did not support the May 1926 coup but instead
botched a suicide attempt. He was never thereafter admitted to the Marshal’s inner
circle, and he and Piłsudski were estranged.

106

is, in turn, made him less repugnant

to the Sikorski exile regime. He continued to extol Piłsudski for the rest of the war
and many years afterwards in Canadian exile. For Sosnkowski, November 11th was,
without a doubt, the national holiday par excellence and speciﬁ cally the anniversary
of Piłsudski’s role in re-establishing Polish independence. It is thus not surprising that
in 1943 a mass was also celebrated, and the new premier, Stanisław Mikołajczyk, and
Defense Minister General Marian Kukiel spoke on the BBC. An address to Poland
was also broadcast by Kukiel.

107

Raczkiewicz made a radio address from London on

November 11th, 1943, in which he mentioned the legions and Piłsudski, and noted
the nation rallied around him in November, 1918.

108

ese were words unspeakable

for Sikorski. Despite this, the government remained dominated by anti-Piłsudskiites;
and, to a certain extent, Sosnkowski was isolated.

109

Sosnkowski’s ability to resuscitate oﬃ

cial commemoration of November 11th

was short-lived. In the summer of 1944, the allies’ failure to lend assistance to the
insurgents during the Warsaw Uprising drove Sosnkowski to the limits of endur-
ance. On September 1st, he issued an order that accused Poland’s allies “not only
with lacking good faith in providing the Warsaw rising with eﬀ ective aid and scan-
dalous inaction, but he even accused them of betrayal.” Churchill personally
demanded Sosnkowski’s removal and, ironically, on November 11th, 1944, the
general and his wife left for exile in Canada as neither the Americans nor British
would grant him a visa.

110

e whole episode reﬂ ects rather poorly on Sosnkowski;

but the behavior of the Americans and British was disgraceful.

Polish émigré politicians associated with Piłsudski continued their tradition of

claiming for their hero the unique authorship for Polish independence, and
regarded November 11th as Independence Day quite apart from any disinclination
on the part of Sikorski.

111

Such sentiments were particularly popular in the army,

as Kot had lamented. For example, the troops of the 1st Armored Division, ﬁ ght-
ing in Holland, duly celebrated it in 1944, albeit after Sikorski’s death.

112

Polish oﬃ

cers interned in Hungary were a particular sort of quasi-émigrés. Th

Hungarian authorities let the Poles celebrate November 11th, 1939 with lectures,
songs, and other activities. Hungarian notables were in attendance, and both
national anthems were played.

113

In subsequent years, November 11th was also

observed—in 1943 with a wreath lain at a monument to Piłsudski.

114

e thirtieth

106

Kazimierz Sosnkowski: Myśl-praca-walka: Przyczynki do monograﬁ i oraz uzupełnienia do mate-

rialów historyczynych Kazimierza Sosnkowskiego (London: Veritas, 1988), 72–4.

107

Pałaszewska, Święto Niepodległości , 12; 27.

108

Kunert, Rzeczpospolita Polska , 119.

109

Piotrowski, Piłsudczycy , 283.

110

is episode is succinctly presented in Eligiusz Tomkowiak, “Generał Kazimierz Sosnkowski

(1885–1969),” in Polak, Bitwy września , II, 95–6.

111

See for example the speech made in London by General Kazimierz Sosnkowski on March 20th,

1943 in Kazimierz Sosnkowski, Materiały historyczne (London: Gryf, 1966), 90–8, esp. 93.

112

Pierwsza Dywizja pancerna w walce: Praca zbiorowa (Brussels: La Colonne, 1947), 275.

113

Lachowicki-Czechowicz, Dziennik Egerski , 56.

114

Ibid. , 118, 164, 246, 256, 259, 274, 314.

Maintaining a Piłsudskiite Independence Day

117

115

Ibid. , 95, 137, 181, 189, 296.

116

Piotrowski, Piłsudczycy , 117ﬀ , 148. Marek Gałęzowski, Wierni Polsce. Vol. I: Ludzie konspiracji

piłsudczkowskiej 1939–1947 (Warsaw: LTW, 2005), xi–xiii . Th

is opposition did not extend to the

underground army in Poland—a branch of the Sikorski government to which the Piłsudskiites were
unquestionably loyal. See ibid. , xxv–xxvii.

117

For example, the Piłsudskiite Sosnkowski was alienated from the post-1926 sanacja government

despite his loyalty to the Piłsudskiite genealogy of modern Poland; see Piotrowski, Piłsudczycy , 161–3.

118

Regarding Piłsudskiite factionalism see Piotrowski, Piłsudczycy , 187, 252–3.

119

Marek Gałęzowski, Wzór piłsudczyka: Wacław Lipiński, 1896–1949: żolnierz, historyk, działacz

polityczny (Warsaw: Neriton, 2001), 144ﬀ , 165ﬀ , 171 .

anniversary of the legion march of 1914 was commemorated as well— approximately
10 percent of those incarcerated were legionnaires. Th

e anniversary of Piłsudski’s

death was also marked, as well as his name day. Lectures were organized; masses
were celebrated for him. Even though there were Sikorski loyalists in the camp,
and partisans of Dmowski or Paderewski, this indicates a powerful Piłsudski cult
and devotion to November 11th among these oﬃ

cers.

115

In general, the Piłsudskiites in exile were disorganized and demoralized. Th

were riven by a series of questions that made it impossible for them to organize
any sort of eﬀ ective counter to the anti-sanacja orientation of the Sikorski
government.

116

Many Piłsudskiites regarded the Marshal’s death in 1935 as really ending the

Piłsudski era because his followers failed to discern and articulate a post-mortem
project.

117

is was in large part Piłsudski’s own fault because his followers really

had no ideology save loyalty to him. Th

is series of delicate threads disappeared after

his death. What we may call these “ultra-loyalists” were reluctant or even opposed
to working with the Piłsudskite regime that took power after 1935.

A second group was loyal to the Piłsudskiite project up to the collapse of the

Republic in 1939. Th

ey were really adrift because Mościcki and Śmigły-Rydz were

in Romanian internment and neither had proven a replacement for the Marshal:
for instance, Sławek, a suicide; Beck, dying of consumption; Wieniawa, morbidly
depressed and eventually a suicide; and other major ﬁ gures scattered about. Th

ere

was no leader to the sanajca regime in exile. Th

is was a fundamental divide in the

Piłsudskiite ranks.

118

Beyond that, there was the question of what was the meaning of the 1939 defeat.

e Sikorski regime was quick to assign blame for the September disaster to the

Piłsudskiites. After all, the mystique of Piłsudski was ultimately based on a series
of victories: over great odds during World War I; over the Russians in 1920; and,
less tastefully, over the legal regime in 1926. By contrast, the 1939 exiles were
stained by overwhelming defeat.

Wacław Lipiński, regarded by his fellows as the “model” [wzór] Piłsudskiite, was

frustrated and despondent in the immediate post-1939 period in exile. His fellow
Piłsudskiites were stunned by the events, the Sikorski regime was hostile, and there
seemed no obvious leader. From what he could gather, the situation in occupied
Poland was the same. Th

e central question for him was: did our era end in 1935 or

is there something yet to do?

119

118

Independence Day

120

His opposition to Piłsudski in 1926 had no aﬀ ect on his career. He was promoted and enjoyed

the highest regard by such Piłsudskiites as General Gustaw Orlicz-Dreszer and Sosnkowski, as well as
Piłsudski himself. He was one of the most decorated soldiers of the Polish Army by the end of World
War II. In 1995 he was awarded posthumously Poland’s highest decoration, the Order of the White
Eagle, by President Lech Wałęsa; it was awarded on November 11th.

121

Zając , W Szkocji , 240.

122

Władysław Anders, Bez ostatniego rozdziału: Wspomnienia z lat 1939–1946 , 3rd. edn. (London:

Gryf, 1959), 68.

123

See Ander’s speech given at Predappio after his troops took the town, in Bogusław Polak, ed., Generał

broni Władysław Anders: Wybór pism i rozkazów (Warsaw: University of Warsaw Press, 2009), 156–7 .

124

ere was a small Polish settlement in Iran from early in the war but it grew very rapidly in 1942 only

to dwindle over the next year. At its apogee it numbered almost 50,000; see Artur Patek, “Polska diaspora
w Azji,” in Adam Walaszek, ed., Polska diaspora (Kraków: Wydawnictwo Literackie, 2001), 381–2 .

125

See Karol Bader, “11 listopada 1918,” Polak w Iranie , November 14, 1943. Th

is article is repro-

duced in Andrzej Krzysztof Kunert, Polacy w Iranie, 1942–1945. Vol. I: Antologia (Warsaw: Rada
Ochrony Pamięci Walk i Męczeństwa, 2002), I, 323 ; cf. Ponczek, Tradycja , 315.

Particular attention is deserved by General Władysław Anders who led a sizeable

contingent of Polish troops—under overall British command—in North Africa.
Th

e troops, like Anders himself, had fallen into Soviet captivity in the September

1939 campaign. Th

ey languished there until 1941; Anders was tortured. In 1941,

when Hitler invaded Russia, an agreement of cooperation was signed between
Poland and the Soviets and the Poles were released. After a long sojourn in Russia,
they eventually made their way to Egypt as the 2nd Polish Corps. Th

ey were later

to distinguish themselves in the Italian Campaign (1943–45). Th

ey settled in

the British Isles after the war and contained many adherents of Piłsudski.

Anders—a legendary soldier—was, however, a dubious Piłsudskiite. He had

been one of Piłsudski’s most important opponents during the May 1926 coup
d’état .

120

In November 1942, the Sikorski government informed Ander’s forces that

they may not celebrate November 11th; only May 3rd could be noted. In response,
the troops still held a commemorative mass, though no larger celebrations.

121

When Anders was approached by Sikorski’s advisor, the diplomat Stanisław Kot, to
purge Piłsudskiite oﬃ

cers from his ranks, he announced his admiration for

Piłsudski and refused to discuss the issue.

122

In 1944, with Sikorski dead, Anders

made a November 11th speech—his ﬁ rst. On the one hand, he failed to mention
the Marshal, but, on the other, he referred to 1918’s Independence Day as due to
a military eﬀ ort—the traditional Piłsudskiite refrain.

123

For the many Poles uprooted and scattered by the war, the question of Inde-

pendence Day was complicated. Here we have only fragmentary evidence. Most
fascinating is the behavior of the large Polish colony in Iran. Th

ese expatriates had

found themselves in Soviet hands after the Russian invasion of September 1939.
After the signing of the Sikorski–Maisky treaty of 1941 re-establishing relations
between Poland and the Soviets, these hapless Poles were gradually allowed to leave
the Soviet Union. Eventually a sizeable colony, under British control, assembled in
Iran, primarily in Tehran, but with a signiﬁ cant concentration at Isfahan as well.

124

On November 14th, 1943 the local Polish-language daily, Polak w Iranie , published
an article entitled “November 11, 1918” [11 listopad 1918], written by the pre-war
Polish envoy to Tehran, Karol Bader, which somehow managed to discuss that day
in some detail without ever mentioning Piłsudski’s name.

125

Bader exhorted his

Maintaining a Piłsudskiite Independence Day

119

126

e details are from “Dzień Niepodległości w Teheranie,” November 24, 1943, Gazeta Polska

(Jerusalem), reproduced in Kunert , Polacy w Iranie , 324.

127

Whether this was an error committed by the French and British press or an accurate report of

the name the local Poles attached to the celebration cannot be determined. If the latter is true, it would
demonstrate a rather considerable eﬀ ort to re-cast national symbols and traditions.

128

“Obchody Święta Narodowego w Isfahanie,” Polak w Iranie , December 5, 1943, reproduced in

Kunert, Polacy w Iranie , 324.

129

e fact that the Gazeta Polska of Jerusalem carried the report of the Tehran observances with-

out comment suggests that here, too, the omission of Piłsudski on November 11th was practiced; see
Kunert, Polacy w Iranie , 324.

130

ere is a valuable analysis of Rafał Habielski, “Historia czy polityka? Piłsudski na emigracji,” in

Jabłonowski and Kossewska, Piłsudski na łamach , 224, 230.

fellow Poles to remember “twenty-ﬁ ve or ﬁ fty years” hence that day as the work of
“our spirit and hands, and the fruit of our immeasurable suﬀ ering.” It was, it seems,
a collective accomplishment without any particular agent, the direct contradiction
of the historiographical disposition of the Piłsudskiites.

A few days later, the Polish colony in Tehran held a large celebration to com-

memorate the twenty-ﬁ fth anniversary of independence.

126

A mass, special prayers

in the synagogue by Polish Jews, a radio program, speeches by academics, and
pictures of Sikorski (in itself a symbolic statement) marked the occasion, which
was described somewhat oddly by the local French and British press as marking
November 11th, “Th

e Commemoration Day of the Polish Underground Army,”

an observation which, in fact, did not exist.

127

ere were similar celebrations in

Isfahan at about the same time.

128

What is characteristic of both was the total

absence of Piłsudski’s name from the occasion.

129

For these Poles, November 11th

was not in any way connected with him. Although it is impossible to gauge how
typical this disposition was, the Iranian Poles certainly seemed to be following a
pro-Sikorski understanding of November 11th. For them, at least, November 11th
had ceased to be Piłsudskiite.

For the Polish exile community in England—London was the capital of Poland

in exile (the larger Polish community in the United States was dominated by immi-
grants from an earlier day)—the end of the war did not close the debate over
November 11th and Piłsudski’s role. Th

ey retained their by now deeply imbedded

patterns. For the Piłsudskiites, November 1918 belonged to the Marshal. Th

intensity of the debate gradually mellowed and the willingness to credit Piłsudski
and recognize November 11th spread slowly yet widely. Th

e Right, however, con-

tinued to attribute independence to larger national factors and minimized
Piłsudski’s contributions.

130

Independence Day as Symbol of Protest

P O L I S H C O M M U N I S M A N D N OV E M B E R 1 1 T H

It is not surprising that, after the communist seizure of power in the closing stages of
World War II, November 11th, with its awkward Piłsudskiite elements, would be
viewed by the authorities with disdain and hostility.

In part, this was a function of a

re-conceptualization of Polish history that relegated the Polish Second Republic to a
most unworthy chapter. It was a brief, failed episode that was in stark contrast to the
socialist Poland that followed it. Th

e ardently anti-Soviet coloration of the Piłsudski

government, and its striking victory over the Red Army in 1920, were impossible
historical baggage for the Polish communists to carry. Hence, the excoriation of the
Second Republic, especially its Piłsudskiite elements, was a necessity for the com-
munist authorities.

As a matter of fact, considerable historiographical attention was

devoted to uncovering and celebrating the socialist elements in the genealogy of the
Second Republic, including the brief Daszyński episode in Lublin, which then are
contrasted with the changes associated with Piłsudski and November 11th.

e Second Republic was described as an “Independent Poland born in the old,

noble [szlacheckie], lords’ [pańskie] garments”—which, thus misbegotten, inevit-
ably betrayed its revolutionary and progressive tradition and brought imperialist
war on Soviet Russia.

Because Piłsudski was so centrally associated with the

reborn Polish military, it was a characteristic feature of communist Poland [Polska

Piłsudski’s ascension to power in 1918 was regarded as a “betrayal of socialism” and a victory of the

“petite bourgeoisie” by Polish Marxists. Th

is is quite apart from the animosity engendered by his having

engineered the defeat of the Red Army before Warsaw in 1920. For an early denunciation of the November
1918 Piłsudski government, see Julian Marchlewski’s remarks in “Rosja proletariacka a Polska burżuazyjna”
as reprinted in Julian Marchlewski, Pisma wybrane (Warsaw: Książka i Wiedza, 1956), II, 746–7 .

is was particularly marked in quasi-scholarly texts translated from Russian or the work of joint

Polish-Russian collaboration. Here we read of Piłsudski as the “providential man of the bourgeoisie”
or, in the felicitous words of Stefan Arski, “the most dedicated Condotieri of British imperialism”;
see St. Arski, A. Korta, and Z. Safj an, Zmowa grabieżców: Awantura Piłsudskiego w 1920r. (Warsaw:
Ministerstwo Obrony Narodowej, nd), or F. Zujew, Międzynarodowy imperializm za kulisami wojny
1919–1920r . (Warsaw: Książka i Wiedza, 1955) [translated from Russian] .

See, e.g., Jan Gajewski, “Dramat roku dwudziestego,” Prawo i Życie , 23(8) (1970), 7–10 . Piłsudski

was essentially an agent of the Polish landed aristocracy, which made war against the Russians to recover
their estates, etc. Th

e government-in-exile in London lamented as early as 1949 that there was a system-

atic elimination of Piłsudski (as well as Dmowski) from the history being taught in Poland as well as a
relentless denigration of the Second Republic; see  Tadeusz Wolsza, Rząd RP na obczyźnie wobec wydarzeń
w kraju, 1945–1950  (Warsaw: Instytut PAN, 1998), 234–5 .School textbooks in the PRL, especially in
the 1950s, were particularly outrageous in their references to Piłsudski, who was almost always labeled
simply a “fascist”; see Adam Suchoński, “Postać Józefa Piłsudskiego w podręcznikach szkołnych” in
Adam Suchoński , Piłsudski i jego współpracownicy  (Opole: Uniwersytet Opolski), 140ﬀ .

Independence Day as Symbol of Protest

121

Rzecz pospolita Ludowa, or PRL] historiography to denigrate Piłsudski’s military
talents and blame the later military weakness of Poland largely on him or his lieu-
tenants.

Suppression of November 11th and suppression of Piłsudski became

intertwined goals.

Rejecting the ceremonies of the pre-war state was part of a goal

of the “absolute metamorphosis of the mentality of the Polish nation.”

e PRL authorities tried to manipulate public consciousness by ﬁ rst downplaying

traditional holidays such as May 3rd and November 11th, and then eliminating their
celebration.

Simultaneously, the state launched an eﬀ ort to make July 22nd a new

Independence Day, which linked the birth of modern Poland to the 1944 declaration
of the communist Lublin Committee. As July 22nd was emphasized, November 11th
was increasingly referred to as a holiday characteristic of the “rotten West.”

In a rather

clever, but abortive eﬀ ort, the Party even suggested in the 1970s celebrating Novem-
ber 7th as Independence Day. Th

is would neatly combine the Bolshevik Revolution

and Daszyński’s government of 1918, linking the two in a kind of progressive pedigree
for modern Poland.

e eﬀ ort was short-lived, probably because it essayed the com-

bination of the Daszyński eﬀ ort with a peculiarly Russian phenomenon.

In the late 1940s the regime was sensitive to political activities around November

11th, regarding them as designed to invoke the pre-war symbol of independence.
Remnants of the wartime underground forces, even scouting organizations, attempted
to celebrate national holidays, if only in small symbolic ways such as that organized
near Katowice by a group of scouts in November 1946. Ironically, those who braved
this action were part of a nationalist faction loyal to Piłsudski’s arch-rival, Dmowski.
For them, November 11th was a patriotic and national event and a challenge to the
communists, no longer just a Piłsudskiite tradition.

May 3rd was similarly sup-

pressed but remained acknowledged in the churches as a religious holiday.

A particularly graceful version of this “de-bunking” of Piłsudski’s military signiﬁ cance is Henryk

Zieliński’s essay “Józef Piłsudski” in the series “Politycy II Rzeczypospolitej” in Polityka , 13(7) (1968),
40–1. Th

e ultimate campaign against the Piłsudski military tradition is the bizarre memoir of Marian

Romeyko, Przed i po maju, 3rd edn. (Warsaw: Ministerstwo Obrony Narodowej, 1967). A career oﬃ

cer

in the Second Republic, Romeyko returned to Poland after World War II, where his works, passionately
critical of Piłsudski and his entourage, were widely distributed by the communist authorities.

See Wojciech Roszkowski’s remarks in Independence Day Broadcast, Polish Radio, English

language service, Monday, November 11th, 2002. Cf. Andrzej Friszke, Opozycja polityczna w PRL,
1945–1980 (London, Aneks, 1994), 125 .

Marek A. Jakubiak, “Prewencja władz PRL wobec organizatorów i uczestników nieoﬁ cjalnych

uroczystości niepodległościowych,” in Andrzej

Stawarz, ed.,

Święto niepodległości—tradycja a

wspołczesność (Warsaw: Muzeum Niepodległości, 2003), 63 .

e communist authorities ﬁ rst allowed the celebration of May 3rd, then combined it with the

far more politically convenient May 1st, and then suppressed it (1946). May 3rd, after all, had strong
anti-Russian connotations: the struggle to preserve Poland against tsarist Russia. See Izabella Main,
Trudne świętowanie: Konﬂ ikty wokół obchodów świąt państwowych i kościelnych w Lublinie (1944–1989)
(Warsaw: Trio, 2004), 48ﬀ . ; Jerzy Kowecki, “Trzeci Maja od Polski Ludowej do Rzeczypospolitej
Polskiej Rekonesans,” in Jerzy Kowecki,

Sejm czteroletni i jego tradycje

(Warsaw: Państwowe

Wydawnictwo Naukowe, 1991), 301–2.

See the recollections of Henry Samsonowicz in “Smutni w święto?, Dziennik Polski , November

12, 1998.”

Ibid.

Very little is known of this action; see Jan Józef Wysocki, “ ‘Żolnierze w krótkich spodenkach’—

opowieść o samodzielnym plutonie szturmowym ‘Huragan,’ ” Biuletyn Instytutu Pamięci Narodowej , 10
(November, 2001), 58–61 , esp. 60.

Main, Trudne świętowanie , 148 .

122

Independence Day

e Secret Police [Ministerstwo Bezpieczeństwa Publicznego] interpreted signs

appearing on a church in Lublin in early November 1949, calling for a “day of
renewed hope” as probably “concealing the intention of celebrating the sanacja
holiday of November 11th.” Similarly dangerous motives were attached to the
removal of a red ﬂ ag from a farm cooperative near Rzeszów on the 5th; the appear-
ance of an anti-government pamphlet found in Katowice on the 10th; and plac-
ards at the same time noted in Brodnica, Kielce, and Chrzanów.

Security personnel

were given special favor for squelching public manifestations.

is was an era, we

should note, when the Party exhibited a fanatical animosity toward Piłsudski. In a
1947 essay in the Party’s theoretical journal Nowe Drogi, Piłsudski was described as
a man who “had contempt and hatred for his own people.” Th

is was the hallmark

of the “black legend,” which lasted till 1956 in the PRL, coextensive with the Sta-
linist era.

On November 10th–11th, 1949, not a word was said about independence, but

the Party paper was ﬂ ooded with articles concerning Marshal Konstantin Rokossov-
sky, the Soviet oﬃ

cer just appointed to be Poland’s defense minister who, inciden-

tally, was of Polish origin.

e next year, reports from the security services again

indicated increased political activity around November 11th. Th

ree people were

arrested in Warsaw for circulating likenesses of Piłsudski.

Party headquarters in

Kamieniec near Szczecin were set ablaze on the night of November 10th, and there
were ﬁ res and destruction of party placards in Chorzów and Zbąszynek; “anti-
state” or “anti-Soviet” posters were reported in a number of places though their
speciﬁ c contents were not disclosed.

Agricultural workers near Koszalin refused

to work on the 11th, claiming it was a holiday. Flags commemorating the day
appeared in Gdańsk. In Bydgoszcz, someone reputed to be connected with the
underground AK was arrested and found to have Independence Day leaﬂ ets. Th

ere

was a similar event in Gliwice.

Most of these reports only indicate that the activi-

ties were “anti-state” or “anti-Soviet” or involved elements thought to be associated
with the former AK or the underground Alliance of Polish Youth [Związek
Młodzieży Polskiej], hence the degree to which these activities constituted eﬀ orts
to preserve the commemorative traditions of November 11th is problematical.

In general, during the ﬁ rst years of communist rule, including the anniversary

year 1948, the practice was to denigrate the Second Republic as both a reactionary

Biuletyn dzienny Ministerstwa Bezpieczeństwa Publicznego , 25(416) , November 11, 1949, in

Lukasz Kamiński, ed., Biuletyny dzienne Ministerstwa Publicznego, 1949–1950 (Warsaw: Instytut
Pamięci Narodowej, 2004), 442 [hereafter BDMP].

Jakubiak, “Prewencja,” 65–8.

See Rafał Stobiecki, “Józef Piłsudski w historiograﬁ i polskiej po 1945 roku,” in Marek Jabłonowski

and Elżbieta Kossewska, eds., Piłsudski na łamach i w opiniach prasy polskiej, 1918–1989 (Warsaw:
Instytut Dziennikarstwa Uniwersytetu Warszawskiego, 2005), 353–61. An excellent account of the
regime’s treatment of Piłsudski and the sanacja before 1956 is Marcin Węgliński, “Piłsudski i ‘sanacja’
w piśmiennictwie Polski Ludowej w latach 1945–1965,” Niepodległość , 55 (2005), 180–216 .

See Trybuna Ludu , front page articles for November 10–13, 1949. Th

e only other major theme

meriting front-page headlines was the Bolshevik Revolution.

BDMP , 254, November 7, 1950, 830.

BDMP , 259, November 13, 1950, 844.

BDMP , 260 and 263, November 14, and November 17, 1950, 845, 849.

Independence Day as Symbol of Protest

123

regime and a failure in 1939, and tie this black story to Piłsudski who was only
invoked as a target of excoriation.

ere is a certain irony in the conﬂ ation of

Piłsudski with the Second Republic. Th

e communists were doing negatively exactly

what the Piłsudskiites did with a positive intent: explain inter-war Poland as a
Piłsudskiite project.

is became part of a larger conceptualization of the history of the Second

Republic. Piłsudski was a nasty and vulgar fraud, an incompetent egotist with
Napoleonic pretensions, who served the reactionary Right despite his seeming
early leftism.

His military eﬀ orts were unimpressive, his captaincy of the armed

forces a farrago of incompetence, November 11th happened quite apart from his
will, and his cult was a massive defrauding of the Polish population—which bore
ill fruits including an inclination to fanatical acts of bravura of which the Warsaw
Rising of 1944 was the most recent and tragic.

I N D E P E N D E N C E W I T H O U T P I Ł S U D S K I , 1 9 5 6

e year 1956 was a major punctuation mark in the history of the PRL, its chief

events including the invasion of Hungary by Soviet forces—with obvious signiﬁ -
cance for Poland and riots in many places, especially Poznań; and Khrushchev’s
trip to Warsaw. However, the coming to power of Władysław Gomułka and his
promise of major reforms was the central development. It was also a turning point
in the history of November 11th in the PRL. Stalinism, the worst years of

Wiesław Władyka, “Z Drugą Rzeczpospolitą na plecach. Postać Józefa Piłsudskiego w prasie i

propagandzie PRL do 1980 roku,” in Jabłonowska and Kossewska, Piłsudski na łamach , 286–90 .
Słowo Powszechne , in a less critical article about Piłsudski in 1968, made the same reference to his
being, in eﬀ ect, central in the Second Republic’s creation and life; see ibid. , 300–1.

e claim by PRL writers that Piłsudski came to power in 1918 as an instrument of the reaction-

ary Right comports ill with contemporary documents which report that many on the political Left
regarded Piłsudski with great enthusiasm. For example, a workers’ meeting in January 1919 in Zagłębie
Dąbrowskie saw a delegate declare Piłsudski “a great and good man, a God”: see Rady delegatów robot-
niczych w Polsce, 1918–1919: Materiały i dokumenty (Warsaw: Książka i Wiedza, 1965), II, 128–9.

e “Piłsudski as a dangerous legend thesis” was well-developed in the PRL. A succinct state-

ment of it is by Wojciech Sulewski, “Klucz do legendy Józefa Piłsudskiego,” Życie Literackie , 12(5)
(1974), 12–13 . For a similar treatment of the “legendary role” of Piłsudski’s relationship to November
11th, see Tadeusz Bolduan, “Legenda ‘Blękitnego Generala’,” Czas , May 14, 1978, 15–17. Curiously,
many of these exposés of the Piłsudski legend note that aﬀ ection for the Marshal was still alive, indeed
growing, in the Polish population, especially among the young. See, for example, the unsigned com-
muniqué by the oﬃ

cial Polska Agencja Prasowa entitled “Co się kryje za legendą?” reprinted in Wiec-

zór Wybrzeża , May 12, 1982, in conjunction with Piłsudski’s birthday in CEU Archives, Central
European University, Budapest. Incidentally, this has also been the traditional argument in the indict-
ment of Piłsudski and his devotees by the extreme Right. See Jędrzej Giertych, “Prymat polityki,”
Słowo Narodowe , 2(6) (June, 1990), 1–3 , who writes: “such was Piłsudski who, during his life carried
out a series of revolutionary acts all of which were contrary to the good of Poland and were in the
interest of Germany, or Great Britain, and such were also many AK commanders at mid or lower
levels, whose inﬂ uence . . . weighed on the decision to launch the rising in Warsaw in 1944.” Here
Giertych turns the Piłsudskiite fascination with the insurrectionary tradition of 1863 back upon them.
However, to surrender the Warsaw Rising to the Piłsudskiites is perhaps a dangerous gambit for the
Right as it consigns the powerful 1944 legend to Piłsudski.

124

Independence Day

communist oppression, were over, and November 11th began to return after years
of suppression: in the days around the 11th there was a noticeable rise in vandalism
of statues and monuments to the Soviet liberation of Poland.

On November

11th, Primate Stefan Wyszyński made a diplomatic speech referring to Poland’s
many trials, and the need to preserve the national culture.

Jan Olszewski—premier of Poland after the fall of communism—recalled that

during the Stalinist years before 1956 the observation of November 11th was
fraught with danger: “Th

e recollection of November 11th was an anti-state act,

almost an act of psychic terror for someone who recollected it.” Only after the
Gomułka changes in 1956 was this state of aﬀ airs ended.

While downplaying Piłsudski’s role and denying attributes characteristic of the

pre-1939 era, the PRL nonetheless did not deny the historical signiﬁ cance of
November 11th, especially at major anniversaries. In 1958, the original liberality
of the Gomułka regime had not yet disappeared, and the anniversary of independ-
ence was treated with some variation. In general, it became a PRL tradition to
celebrate the Daszyński Lublin government on November 7th but to avoid men-
tioning Piłsudski in conjunction with the events of 1918.

e central role of the

Bolshevik Revolution was particularly emphasized.

In 1958, the Catholic quasi-independent Tygodnik Powszechny ran a quite posi-

tive essay by Stefan Kisielewski devoid of the usual class-traitor cant, which under-
scored the “historical importance” of November 11th and deemed it an “all national
anniversary, a major civic and national holiday.” Th

e essay, notably, did not men-

tion Piłsudski’s name. However, Adam Krzyżanowski’s essay in the same journal
contained some surprisingly positive remarks about the Marshal and compared
him favorably to Dmowski.

ese views were isolated; the Party was not so indulgent to Piłsudski. Perhaps

the most sophisticated eﬀ ort in PRL historiography to dethrone November 11th
and simultaneously elevate the communist alternative holiday of July 1944 was
undertaken by Henryk Jabłoński, who combined considerable skill as a historian
with a very successful political career. In an early monograph, Jabłoński dealt with
November 11th by reducing it to a necessary, but derivative, culmination of larger
processes made possible by the victory of socialism in Russia.

It was clear that

Main, Trudne świętowanie , 138 .

Ibid. , 145.

Arkadiusz Kołodziejczyk, “Drogi do Niepodległej,” in Janusz Gmitruk and Andrzej Stawarz, eds.,

Drogi do Niepodległegłości. W 80 rocznicę odzyskania niepodległości. Wystawa pod patronatem wojewody
warszawskiego (Warsaw: Muzeum Narodowe, 1998), 8 .

Andrzej Kaczyński, “Zakazane Święta,” Rzeczpospolita , November 10, 2005. Th

e evolution of the

evaluation of Piłsudski in PRL historiography is succinctly presented in Heidi Hein-Kircher, Kult
Piłsudskiego i jego znaczenie dla państwa polskiego 1926–1939 (Warsaw: Neriton, 2008), 25–6 . Nota-
bly, during the depths of Stalinism, even Daszyński was not mentioned: he was a “traitor to socialism”;
see Władyka, “Z Drugą Rzeczpospolitą na plecach,” 294–7.

Ibid. , 294–5.

Stefan Kisielewski, “W rocznicę odrodzenia państwa polskiego po czterdziestu latach,” Tygodnik

Powszechny , November 9, 1958; See PL-100, 27–8, CEU Archives; Władyka, “Z Drugą Rzeczpospolitą
na plecach,” 296–7.

See Henryk Jabłoński, Narodziny Drugiej Rzeczypospolitej (1918–1919) (Warsaw: Wiedza Pow-

szechna, 1962), 73.

Independence Day as Symbol of Protest

125

November 11th was becoming increasingly a neglected or at least ambiguous occa-
sion. Th

e writer Maria Dąbrowska recorded in her diary that, by the 1960s, the day

had become “sad and conﬁ scated.”

is eﬀ ort to acknowledge November 11th but remove its Piłsudskiite elements

became the standard treatment of the anniversary in the PRL.

is is reﬂ ected in

a memorandum, for internal circulation only, to the leadership, produced by the
Society of Fighters for Freedom and Democracy [Związek Bojowników o Wolność
i Demokrację, or ZBOWiD], the national veterans’ organization of the PRL. It
provided a host of days to be commemorated. It contains some grotesque manipu-
lations: expectedly, November 7th was to be celebrated as the anniversary of the
Bolshevik Revolution. However, November 11th was also to be celebrated but
because on that day in 1943, in an action by communist partisans, seven Germans
were injured in the obscure town of Gabice. Not only that, but explosives were
placed in Polesie, and near the tiny hamlet of Nasutów a peasant battalion saw
action. Th

ese are the trivial events being commemorated on November 11th. Th

eﬀ orts by ZBOWiD to retain the day under these silly pretexts were obvious.

T H E PA RT Y B E G I N S I T S S U R R E N D E R

November 11th, 1968 marked the ﬁ ftieth anniversary of Polish independence, a
sensitive occasion. Th

e Polish Episcopate issued a lengthy proclamation stressing

Poland’s historic right to be independent. It included a long list of nineteenth-
century cultural ﬁ gures and a few political personalities—for example, General
Józef Sowiński of 1831 (November Rising) fame and Romuald Traugutt from the
January Rising (1863–64)—but omitted Piłsudski; although it did trace modern
Poland’s rebirth speciﬁ cally to November 1918 and did not make any reference to
the war having created Polish independence, nor did it include any reference to the
Daszyński government nor the Bolshevik Revolution.

e anniversary required some more elaborate explanation of the PRL’s under-

standing of Piłsudski and the meaning of November 11th.

All Party and state

dignitaries assembled in Lublin on November 7th to celebrate Independence Day,
understood as the Daszyński government’s appearance and, of course, the Bolshe-
vik Revolution.

Maria Dąbrowska, Dzienniki powojenne, 1960–1965 (Warsaw: Czytelnik, 1996), 209 .

A considerable project was undertaken in 1958 by the Historical Bureau of the Polish Army

[Biuro Historyczne Wojska Polskiego] to collect the documents and recollections of veterans of the
November 11th, 1918 rising that disarmed the Germans and Austrians. Th

e results were not published

for forty years; see Piotr Łossowski , Jak Feniks z popiołów: Oswobodzenia ziem polskich spod okupacji w
listopadzie 1918 (Łowicz: Mazowiecka Wyższa Szkoła Humanistyczno-Pedagogiczna, 1998), 10 .

See Kalendarium rocznic historycznych lat 1939–1945 (Warsaw, 1960). In Rocznice i obchody.

Odzyskanie Niepodległości 11-listopada. Broszury. DZS.

For the text see Mirosława Pałaszewska, Święto Niepodległości; Katalog wystawy (Warsaw: Muzeum

Niepodległości, 2004), 28–30 .

e censorship of historical references was partially and brieﬂ y relaxed in 1968; see Jakub

Karpiński, Countdown: Th

e Polish Upheavals of 1956, 1968, 1970, 1976, 1980 (New York: Karz-Cohl

Publishers, 1982), 149 .

Pałaszewska, Święto Niepodległości , 12 .

126

Independence Day

e Party chose to present Piłsudski and 1918 as important events but nonethe-

less cursed by “intrinsic incapacity” [organiczna niezdolność], which precluded
Poland from true independence and true security.

Piłsudski was mentioned but

only by disdainful reference to his “legend.” Th

rough obtuseness, or purposeful

disdain, the Party opened its 5th Congress in Warsaw on November 11th, 1968.

A speaker noted that the 11th was an important date but underlined the causative
signiﬁ cance of the Bolshevik Revolution, in contrast to the deeply ﬂ awed Poland
created in 1918.

In Trybuna Ludu, the Party’s fervent nationalist-communist Mieczysław Moczar

raised again the issue of the Daszyński government, but here negatively: what failed
in Lublin in 1918 succeeded there in 1944. Premier Józef Cyrankiewicz, speaking
at the Party Congress, drew matters to a point: We celebrate November 7th and
not the 11th because on the latter day Piłsudski became a tool of the oppressive
class of possessors which ﬁ nally succeeded in getting the day recognized in 1937.
Th

is was all the more deceitful, because it drew attention from the true anniversary

of independence, November 7th.

A study of the Party’s Trybuna Ludu epitomizes the government’s understanding

of the events of ﬁ fty years previously. Th

e Bolshevik Revolution was of enormous

signiﬁ cance and its ﬁ fty-ﬁ rst anniversary required especial attention.

Daszyński government in Lublin was perhaps the central November development
in Poland—it is likened to the 1944 Lublin decree establishing communism.

inter-war government was only mentioned as being responsible for losing World
War II. Th

e Party opened its congress on the 11th and that eclipsed all other

news.

Piłsudski was mentioned once in early to mid-November in a passing refer-

ence to his vain eﬀ orts to preserve some of the progressive elements of the Daszyński
government.

ere was no other mention of the events of November 10–11, the

disarming of the Germans, Piłsudski’s return, the proclamation of a free Poland, or
any of the other developments traditionally associated with mid-month.

e leading daily, Życie Warszawy , echoed the Party journal but included addi-

tional themes. Th

ere was immense and enthusiastic celebration of the Bolshevik

See “Felieton Jana Górskiego: Przemiany czasu—powroty myśli,” transcript of Radio Warszawa

II, December 1, 1968. Archives of CEU.

Krzysztof Lesiakowski, Mieczysław Moczar, “Mietek”: Biograﬁ a polityczna (Warsaw: Rytm, 1998),

359 ; cf. Main, Trudne świętowanie , 191–4 .

Main concludes that even these disparaging remarks ironically caused greater interest in society

regarding the 11th; see ibid. , 194–5, 202.

Władyka, “Z Drugą Rzeczpospolitą na plecach,” 298–300.

“Obchody 51 rocznicy Rewolucji Październikowej,” Trybuna Ludu , November 5, 1968, 1; the

special study of the Revolution was the topic of “Uroczyste akademie” of November 6, 1968, 1; “Dziś
centralna akademia w Lublinie,” Trybuna Ludu , November 7, 1968, 1. Th

ere are other major articles

on November 7th and 8th, as well.

Curiously, one article about Daszyński—“Pięćdziesięciolecie,” Trybuna Ludu , November 6,

1968, 5—also notes that it is the ﬁ ftieth anniversary of the Polish Army; really a Piłsudskiite refer-
ence that seems to have crept in.

Prime Minister Józef Cyrankiewicz’s speech denounced the sanacja and praised Daszyński: the

two Party traditions; see the Trybuna Ludu ’s vast coverage through the 13th.

Stanisław Krzykała, “Dwie niepodległości,” Trybuna Ludu , November 7, 1968, 3.

Independence Day as Symbol of Protest

127

Revolution.

e Daszyński episode was raised repeatedly, and the Party Congress

was lavishly covered.

It included a speech by the unpleasant Moczar, which men-

tioned Piłsudski as wrongfully attempting to build Poland “at the side of “Austria
and Prussia” and not realizing the importance of the Russian Revolution.

Reports

from a conference of major historians in Lublin, dedicated to the anniversary
of independence, apparently managed to discuss the topic without mentioning
Piłsudski.

Jabłoński, returning to his earlier project, now noted that the Second Republic

was not without its virtues. In a November 1968 essay appearing in Trybuna Ludu
near Independence Day, Jabłoński argued that the state created in 1918 was “not
fully democratic but as it were it had many attributes of a bourgeois-democratic
state structure.” However, Piłsudski’s eastern policies, it claimed, were foul, and he
was really a dictator after 1926. Jabłoński elaborated by arguing a kind of political
syncretism which credited 1918 with re-commencing Poland’s formal existence,
but equally signiﬁ cant, witnessing the creation of the Communist Party. It was the
latter, Jabłoński noted, which was able, ﬁ nally, by 1944, to ensure the existence of
the only kind of Poland that could have true freedom and democracy, which were
ﬁ nally established only in 1944. Hence, 1918 was not without meaning, but it was
incomplete, ﬂ awed, a process brought to fulﬁ llment only in 1944: “An independ-
ent Poland is a socialist Poland,” he concluded. Hence the two occasions, 1918 and
1944, are not in conﬂ ict but reconcilable within a larger analytical framework.

is was a far cleverer way to deal with November 11th than to ignore or deny it,

and it had the added advantage of poaching some of its historic luster to furbish
the lugubrious 1944 anniversary that the communists tried so hard and so unsuc-
cessfully to convince Poles was worth celebrating.

But there were some fascinating additional themes. For example, Jan Zygmunt

Jakubowski wrote a piece about Polish culture in the twentieth century and noted
that the Second Republic was not without its attainments.

But the most notably

was an essay by the journalist cum historian Andrzej Micewski entitled “Piłsudski,
or Independence without ‘Experiments’.” Micewski discussed Piłsudski at some
length and included some very positive remarks including one quotation calling
him a “legend.” He noted his return from Magdeburg on the 10th, and some other
bits of Piłsudski lore, and concluded that the regaining of independence in 1918—
which inferentially he credited to Piłsudski—had “gigantic signiﬁ cance.” Th

e only

cautionary aspects are criticism of his eﬀ orts to remake Poland after 1918 as too

e editions of November 6th and 7th are dominated by a celebration of the Bolshevik Revolu-

tion. Subsequent days saw a gradual lessening of coverage.

Teresa Monasterska, “Rząd Ludowy w Lublinie,” Życie Warszawy , November 7, 1968, 3. Party

Congress issues, including the texts of all, or at least most of the speeches, can be found in Życie
Warszawy , November 10–13, 1968.

“Przemówienie M. Moczara w Warszawie,” Życie Warszawy , November 7, 1968, 2.

“Dziś uroczysta akademia,” Życie Warszawy , November 7, 1968, 1.

is is presented quite elaborately in “Niepodległość i tradycje narodowe. W 60 rocznicę odbu-

dowy państwowości polskiej,” in Henryk Jabłoński, W świetle historii: Studia, szkice, wypowiedzi
(Wrocław: Ossolineum, 1988), 23–167 .

Jan Zygmunt Jakubowski, “Niepodległość i kultura,” Życie Warszawy , November 10–11, 1968, 3 .

128

Independence Day

timid and half-hearted and the latter failures of his sanacja regime.

is was a

major event in the government’s discussion of Piłsudski and the November
events.

e attacks or, at best, eﬀ orts to ignore Piłsudski provoked a series of articles in

the Tygodnik Powszechny , which went beyond Micewski’s piece in Życie Warszawy ,
and emphasized Piłsudski’s large role in the founding of the republic. Th

e inextri-

cable reality of Piłsudski and the republic was emphasized and, since the inter-war
state was given certain credit, this indirectly redounded to the account of Piłsudski.
Th

us 1918 and its founding in November had begun to attract public support.

e Party was confronting the rudiments of an alternative discourse.

It reacted

without a coherent policy and seemed to be ﬂ oundering in search of a correct tone
to take regarding November 11th and its Piłsudskiite heritage. For senior members
of the Party who had experienced struggle with the sanacja regime ﬁ rst-hand, res-
urrecting November 11th was psychologically impossible, but for younger writers
and those not so deeply involved in the Party’s hegemony, such as Micewski or
Tygodnik Powszechny , 1968 oﬀ ered new perspectives. Oﬃ

cial attitude towards the

11th was becoming blurry and contradictory.

ough oﬃ

cially ignored, November 11th was discretely commemorated for

years before the fall of communism. Th

e most ardent eﬀ ort to preserve the sym-

bolic heritage of the Second Republic was undertaken by a fascinating organiza-
tion that described itself as “Soldiers’ Serving God and Fatherland” [Żołnierska
służba Bogu i Ojczyźnie].

is was a rather loose confederation that consisted of

a central committee of several very senior retired oﬃ

cers, and which cooperated

with a great many people, some acting in small groups, throughout Poland. Th

“Soldiers” traced their own origins to a single event on November 11, 1953:

a priest from Kielce imprisoned in Mokotów [in Warsaw] at pavilion X began to
repeat the prayers of the Holy Mass which was heard in the adjoining cells. Th

is was

for us—his fellow prisoners, an extraordinary experience: we all prayed aloud. We
swore that, if we regain our freedom, we shall fulﬁ ll, with the devotion of the most
faithful sons, our duty to God and Poland.

Soon thereafter, in 1956 or 1957, the organization began its activities, working
closely with leaders of the Roman Catholic Church in Poland, including Cardinal
Wyszyński. In general, the eﬀ orts of the group were dedicated to restoring and
preserving damaged or neglected memorials to Polish battles, sacriﬁ ces, and heroes.
It also ﬁ nanced new monuments, held religious services, and placed obituaries in
the press, many on anniversaries of the death of military ﬁ gures. Whereas the range
of people and events honored by the “Soldiers” was considerable, amongst its
earliest actions was to work with living legionnaires and POW veterans in Kraków

Andrzej Micewski, “Piłsudski, czyli niepodległość bez ‘eksperymentów’,”

Życie Warszawy ,

November 8, 1968, 3, 8.

Władyka, “Z Drugą Rzeczpospolitą na plecach,” 301–5.

e information that follows is based, unless otherwise noted, on the document “Bogu i

Ojczyźnie: Kronika żołnierskiej służby (1947–1977),” Spotkania: Niezależne pismo młodych katolików ,
5–6 (October, 1978), 349–75.

Ibid. , 351.

Independence Day as Symbol of Protest

129

Ibid. , 353.

Ibid. , 354–5.

See Adam Boniecki, Kalendarium życia Karola Wojtyły (Kraków: Znak, 1983), 13 .

e Cardinal’s letter is quoted in Ząbek, “Organizacja,” 85–6 where the issue is discussed.

e group that organized this eﬀ ort was ROPCiO. See R. Miecz, “Poznańska MO w akcji 11

listopada,” Opinia , 1(9) (January, 1978), 13, in Joanna M. Preibisz, ed., Polish Dissident Publications:
An Annotated Bibliography (New York: Praeger, 1982), 96 [hereafter PDP]. One of ROPCiO’s found-
ers was the ardent Piłsudskiite Leszek Moczulski. Th

e organization is characterized as having “based its

program on the Piłsudski tradition” by Piotr J. Wróbel in his Historical Dictionary of Poland, 1945–
1996 (Westport, CT: Greenwood, 1998), 200 .

to restore Piłsudski’s crypt at the Wawel in 1957. A few years later, in 1964, they
arranged a memorial mass on the ﬁ ftieth anniversary of the First Brigade’s leaving
for war in 1914.

In 1968, the ﬁ ftieth anniversary of independence, they expanded their activities

and organized a huge demonstration at the shrine of Jasna Góra in Częstochowa
involving “both Polish cardinals, all the bishops of Poland, all generals living in the
country, all regimental commanders of the [pre-1939] army, all veterans groups
and representatives from every district of the AK: Many thousands of partici-
pants.”

It was the largest and most elaborate celebration of November 11th since

1938. At the same time, they restored Śmigły-Rydz’s grave in Warsaw—which
soon became a frequently visited site—and recommenced the practice of saying a
mass on the occasion of Piłsudski’s name day (March 19th). Although these events
had obvious political signiﬁ cance, they were organized in close cooperation with
the church and held either in, or adjacent to, religious properties.

Whilst the Archbishop of Kraków (Karol Wojtyła) began the practice of meet-

ing with veterans of 1914–20 and 1939–45 every November to remember the
events of 1918, at the same time Wojtyła became actively involved in eﬀ orts to
renovate the Sowiniec memorial mound (south of the city) dedicated to Piłsudski,
which had been allowed to fall into ruins under the communists.

In 1957, Col.

Józef Herzog led a group of veterans to preserve the mound. Th

eir eﬀ orts were

praised by Wojtyła whom, in a letter to Herzog in 1974, made it clear whom he
regarded as the architect of modern Polish independence.

e next year, a dissident organization plastered the walls of Poznań with patri-

otic slogans on November 11th, only to have them removed by the security police.
A large group of dissidents, led by the Piłsudskiite Movement for the Defense
of Human and Civic Rights [Ruch Obrony Praw Człowieka i Obywatela, or
ROPCiO] was the moving force behind a number of observances nationwide.

e Party in Ideological Chaos

e ﬁ rst mass commemoration of Independence Day in Poland after World War

II—after years of grumpy neglect by the authorities—took place in 1978. After the
disruptive strikes in 1976 and the Pope’s election in 1978, the Party felt thrown on
the defensive and reverted to its traditional reaction to November 11th. Th

authorities anticipated that some major demonstrations might well be staged so, in
an eﬀ ort to distract attention away from the 11th, they emphasized, as usual, the
transcendent signiﬁ cance of the Bolshevik Revolution,

and the importance of

Daszyński’s November 7th.

e rather clumsy attempts to suggest that Lublin was

doubly blessed by twice being the site of re-creating Polish independence—1918
and the communist version in 1944—was probably a mistake, as it underlined the
dubious merit of Lublin as the home of Polish independence. A barrage of propa-
ganda was issued to argue this point. Th

is was a rather pathetic attempt to distract

attention from November 11th and met with widespread scorn.

Changes appeared: Marek Ruszczyc tried to salvage the signiﬁ cance of Lublin but in

so doing he had to mention the central role of the legions and Śmigły-Rydz, a persona
odiosa to the Party, in the events in Lublin.

Życie Warszawy went yet further. Ryszarda

Kazimerska published a long article on Daszyński based on his memoirs. Not only did
she mention Śmigły-Rydz, but she quoted—without comment—Daszyński’s reference
to Piłsudski as “the symbol of the idea of independence who returned as a hero on the
10th.” He was met by the POW, which was at work disarming the Germans. It was
these events in Warsaw—not Daszyński and Lublin—that “lit the dawn of freedom.”

November 7th was being tainted by Piłsudskiite elements.

e Party’s discussion of the anniversary of Polish independence was ideologi-

cally chaotic. Fundamentally, the papers were full of articles commemorating the
anniversary of “independence” though what was actually being commemorated

See for example the front page of Życie Warszawy , November 8, 1978.

“Cały kraj obchodzi 60 rocznicę odzyskania niepodległości,” Życie Warszawy , November 6, 1978,

1, 2; Wojciech Polak, “Niezależne obchody narodowego święta niepodległości w ostatnich
dziesięcioleciach PRL,” in Wojciech Polak, ed., Niepodległość: spełnione marzenie pokoleń i wyzwanie na
przyszłość (Toruń: Województwo Kujawsko-Pomorskie, nd), 109; Mirosława Pałaszewska, Święto
Niepodległości; Katalog wystawy (Warsaw: Muzeum Niepodległości, 2004) 13.

See “Obchody rocznicy odzyskania niepodległości,” Gospodarz , 2(12), November 25, 1978, 1;

Adam Wojciechowski, “60 rocznica odzyskania niepodległości a polityka PZPR,” Opinia , No. 6(14),
June, 1978, 20–1 ;  Władysław Barański, “Porachunki historyczne,” Opinia , 6(14), June, 1978, 30–1 ;
“PRL obchodzi niepodległość,” Robotnik , 25 November 25, 1978, 1–2.; cf. Marek A. Jakubiak, “Pre-
wencja władz PRL wobec organizatorów i uczestników nieoﬁ cjalnych uroczystości niepodległościowych,”
in Andrzej Stawarz, Święto niepodległości—tradycja a wspołczesność  (Warsaw: Muzeum Niepodległości,
2003), which discusses the regimes eﬀ orts at provocation, 71.

Marek Ruszczyc, “Pierwszy rząd Polskiej Republiki Ludowej,” Życie Warszawy , November 6, 1978, 2.

Ryszarda Kazimierska, “Daszyński,” Życie Warszawy , November 9, 1978, 2.

e Party in Ideological Chaos

131

was omitted.

Piłsudski, the events of November 10–11 or both were often edited

out of narratives, leaving explanations incomprehensible or at least puzzling.

A report on the speech on rising Party star Edward Gierek noted that he men-
tioned the importance of the Bolshevik Revolution, but omitted Warsaw, the focus
of Piłsudski’s activities.

A conference of historians regarding the origins of inde-

pendence drew extensive press coverage, but, according to reports, such major
scholars as Stefan Kieniewicz, Tadeusz Jędruszczak, and Andrzej Ajnenkiel, among
others, spoke only of Daszyński—with Kieniewicz even leaping from Daszyński to
premier Jędrzej Moraczewski (installed by Piłsudski on November 18th, 1918)
without any mention of the Marshal).

e Party arranged major meetings: none

on the 11th, but on November 4th in Lublin and the next day in Warsaw. Piłsudski
was not mentioned and the communist genealogy of modern Poland was still
featured.

e press reported parades, ceremonies at the Tomb of the Unknown

Soldier, and invoked the names of famous Poles—though omitting Piłsudski.

November 10–11, the press seemed in a quandary. Party paper Trybuna Ludu   men-
tioned nothing about Piłsudski or the events of November 1918 in its November
10–13 issues. Życie Warszawy  oddly noted on November 10th that it was the thirty-
ﬁ fth anniversary of the PRL—a bit of mathematical legerdemain.

e regime did not abandon its traditional hostility to the symbolism attaching

to November 11th despite popular eﬀ orts to commemorate the day.

e censors,

for example, saw ﬁ t to remove words from a paid obituary in the daily Życie
Warszawy , because it noted that the deceased had been a member of Piłsudski’s
legions and the POW.

A bizarre passage noted that Daszyński’s government did

not prove enduring because it was replaced by some un-named “new government in
Warsaw.” Piłsudski was not noted, nor were any of the events of November 10–11.

e censorship authorities referred to Piłsudski as “oﬃ

cially unrecognized” and

E.g. “Obchody 60 rocznicy odzyskania niepodległości,” Trybuna Ludu , November 6, 1978, 1.

Note, e.g., “Wspólnie dla wszystkich—POLSKA,” Życie Warszawy , November 7, 1978, 2 which,

although seemingly explaining the rebirth of independence and its meaning for Poles, edits out any
mention of Piłsudski, and the people who disarmed the Germans in Warsaw—an act that is referred
to as the “liquidation” of the German administration with no agent noted.

“Przemówienie Edwarda Gierka,” Życie Warszawy , November 7, 1978, 1, 3; “Uroczyste posiedze-

nia w 60 rocznicę odzyskania niepodległości przez Polskę,” Trybuna Ludu , November 7, 1978, 1.

“Niepodległość i jej znaczenie dla rozwoju społeczenstwa polskiego,” Życie Warszawy , November

9, 1978, 1; “Obchody 60-lecia niepodległości Polski,” Trybuna Ludu , November 9, 1978, 1, 4; and
“Obchody rocznicy 60-lecia odzyskania niepodległości,” Trybuna Ludu , November 11–12, 1, 4; cf.
Stefan Kieniewicz, “Utrata państwowości i drogi jej odzyskania,” Polityka, November 11, 1978, 1, 14,
where he mentions the importance of the legions as an inspirational force but associates them with
Sikorski, Haller, and Dowbór along with Piłsudski—not a very convincing genealogy. His remarks that
Piłsudski’s federal plans were not “democratic” speaks for itself regarding the author’s disposition.

Pałaszewska, Święto Niepodległości , 13.

For a discussion of events see, e.g., “Obchody 60 rocznicy odzyskania przez Polskę niepodległości,”

Trybuna Ludu , November 8, 1978, 1, 4.

Życie Warszawy , November 10, 1978, 1.

Wiesław Władyka, “Z Drugą Rzeczpospolitą na plecach. Postać Jozefa Piłsudskiego w prasie i

propagandzie PRL do 1980 roku,” in Marek Jabłonowski and Elżbieta Kossewska, eds., Piłsudski na
łamach i w opiniach prasy polskiej, 1918–1989

(Warsaw: Instytut Dziennikarstwa Uniwersytetu

Warszawskiego, 2005), 305–11.

It is signiﬁ cant that a group of aged veterans brought a court action against the newspaper over this

action; see “Powództwo uznajemy, przepraszamy . . . ,” Droga , 1 (June–July, 1978), 21–2, PDP.

See “Cały kraj.”

132

Independence Day

proscribed any eﬀ orts to rehabilitate the Second Republic.

A review of the 1978

literature produced in the PRL referred to Piłsudski as “camouﬂ aged” and the Par-
ty’s fear of a “legend which continued to remain alive”

Jacek Bocheński noted that

certain national symbols were forbidden, including Piłsudski.

A good example is

the sentimental discussion of Polish patriotic poetry of the 1914–18 era including
Piłsudskiites such as Tuwim, Wierzyński, and Iłłakowiczówna without mentioning
Piłsudski.

e Warsaw journal, Życie Warszawy , carried the peculiar reminiscences

of Jerzy Tomorowicz, a leftist with Party connections who declared November 7th
“the day Poland regained its national independence.” He also referred to Piłsudski
sarcastically as a “providential man” but only to those who feared revolution. Besides,
Piłsudski not only crushed the revolutionary movement in Poland but made war on
revolutionary Russia.

By 1978 this was a shop-worn litany.

At the same time, on the ﬁ rst page of Życie Warszawy , there was a famous picture

of Germans being disarmed on the streets of Warsaw on November 11th, 1918—
one of the central icons of the Piłsudski exegesis. On the same day, the major essay
on “Independence” by Adam Wysocki was essentially Piłsudskiite. It mentioned
the legions and the POW, and their disarming of the Germans before enthusiastic
crowds in Warsaw. It noted that Daszyński’s government lasted only till Piłsudski’s
return—thus re-focusing the November events from November 7th to the
10th/11th. Piłsudski is addressed directly; he was then “the most popular leader
and commander.” Regardless of the controversy surrounding his later activities, the
re-gaining of independence transcended them, it was “the most essential”
[najbardziej istotne] act. Th

is veritable exoneration of Piłsudski for his post-1918

actions was more than the Piłsudskiites had essayed in previous decades.

e press carried stories about Piłsudski that were positive, even adulatory; noted

the legions and the POW; and even referenced Śmigły-Rydz, who for decades was
only invoked by the communists as a symbol of sanacja incompetence. Życie Warszawy
published a series of articles that referred to the 11th as a “momentous [doniosła]
anniversary” associated with Piłsudski; argued that it was Piłsudski’s personal popular-
ity and the “legion legend” that made the day possible; boasted of telegrams of con-
gratulations from foreign dignitaries on November 11th; and emphasized rallies and
celebratory events everywhere. November 11th meant the end of the war for Europe,
but for Poland—or at least for Życie Warszawy —it was Independence Day.

See the pamphlet entitled “Oﬃ

cial Censorship in the Polish People’s Republic. April, 1978,”

(Ann Arbor, MI: North American Center for Polish Aﬀ airs, 1978) 2, 29. A copy can be found in Irena
Grudzińska Gross Collection, Central Connecticut State University, Box 2, f. 5. [hereafter GGC]

“WL,” “Sześćdziesięciolecie,” Res Publica , 1979, 1.

Jacek Bocheński, Untitled article, Zapis , October, 1978, 11, in Polish Underground Publica-

tions, Central Connecticut State University, New Britain, Connecticut [hereafter PUP].

Ryszard Matuszewski, “Ta, co nie zginęła.” Polityka , November 11, 1978.

Jerzy Tomorowicz, “Pierwsze miesiące niepodległości,” Literatura , November 2, 1978, 9.

Adam Wysocki, “Niepodległa,” Życie Warszawy , November 6, 1978, 1, 2.

See the following articles in Życie Warszawy : “Listopad 1918” by Adam W. Wysocki on Novem-

ber 10; “Rok 1918” in the November 11–12 edition, 1; “Oświadczenie prezydenta USA z okazji 60
rocznicy niepodległości Polski,” November 13, 1978, 1 (and other telegrams are reproduced as well).
President Carter noted that it was an especially meaningful day for the Poles of America; “W całym
kraju trwają obchody 60 rocznicy niepodległości Polski,” November 13, 1978, 1.

e Party in Ideological Chaos

133

The Party had made the decision to celebrate independence and do it in

early November, but failed to take the final step of declaring November 11th
to be Independence Day. It was a symbol the PRL could not embrace but
which it no longer had the will or clarity to resist in a coordinated manner.
The Party’s version of modern Polish history was shattered in 1978 and was
never rebuilt.

T H E O P P O S I T I O N A N D N OV E M B E R 1 1 T H

In reality, 1978 marked the unofficial resurrection of November 11th as
Polish Independence Day. Not since World War II was so much attention
devoted to the date and the events and people associated with it. Virtually
every segment of Polish society was somehow involved in the recollection of
November 11th.

us we must be careful about conclusions regarding the government’s reac-

tion to November 11th. Th

e oﬃ

cial Party organ and sporadic activities by the

police and censorship agencies usually ignored Piłsudski or clouded the occasion
with references to PRL anniversaries, the Bolshevik Revolution, the short-lived
Lublin government—the now increasingly worn shibboleths of the regime. Th

ere

was no consistently applied reaction to November 11th and its Piłsudskiite sym-
bolism: different segments of the PRL reacted without coordination and
even contradictorily.

In contrast to the authorities, opposition groups (notably students) held

large observances on the 11th.

In Warsaw, ceremonies organized by the Work-

ers’ Defense Committee [Komitet Obrony Robotników, or KOR]—the ﬁ rst
large opposition movement in the PRL and one of the spiritual if not direct
ancestors of Solidarity—began on November 10th, the anniversary of Piłsudski’s
return. Th

e celebration consisted of a sophisticated statement that re-inter-

preted Polish history by re-conceptualizing the history of the inter-war Repub-
lic and the unveiling of a plaque in honor of Piłsudski at the Church of St.
Aleksander in Warsaw (parenthetically, this was the church where, in 1920,
Poland’s successful campaign into Ukraine and capture of Kiev was cele-
brated).

e next day, huge crowds gathered at a mass in the cathedral of

St. John in Warsaw, which overﬂ owed the church, ﬁ lled the next church (a Jes-
uit establishment) and then poured into the streets, becoming an open-air
service conducted by megaphone to that whole area of Warsaw. Th

e mass was

immediately followed by what one participant deemed “the ﬁ rst patriotic dem-
onstration in many years.” Similar services and rallies, combining both reli-
gious observance and secular commemorations, were held in many cities

See Izabella Main, Trudne świętowanie; Konﬂ ikty wokół obchodów świąt państwowych i kościelnych

w Lublinie (1944–1989) (Warsaw: Trio, 2004), 218–21.

is was only the second plaque, in Poland honoring Piłsudski, claimed ROPCiO; the other was

at the Wawel; see “Komunikat,” Ruch Obrony Praw Człowieka i Obywatela w Polsce: Biuro Prasowe,
Warsaw, November 15, 1978. PUP; Polak, “Niezależne obchody,” 109.

134

Independence Day

throughout Poland.

e church gave its indirect blessing to these events by

the episcopate’s pastoral letter of October 4th, 1978, which began with these
words: “Th

e Polish Nation attaches great weight to the date of November

11th.”

ree things about this phenomenon are striking. First, the celebration actually

began with a vigil on November 10th, a very Piłsudskiite touch. Second, the serv-
ice was followed by a demonstration—which was neither planned nor controlled
by KOR or its aﬃ

liates –that moved instinctively to the area around Poland’s Tomb

of the Unknown Soldier, a place known before World War II (and, incidentally,
again after 1989) as “Piłsudski Square.” Th

ird, the purpose of the demonstration

was to re-link Poland’s interrupted twentieth century by re-evaluating the much-
abused Second Republic.

e Polish bishops, meeting at the sixty-ﬁ fth Conference, issued a special letter

to be read in all churches, which underscored the historic importance of the anni-
versary of Poland’s independence.

In an event with unusual historic overtones,

aged General Mieczysław Boruta-Spiechowicz made an address at Piłsudski’s crypt
at the Wawel in Kraków. Boruta began with a long quotation from Piłsudski, who
he introduced as the “Parent and Creator of the Miracle on the Wisła”—the Polish
victory over the Russians in August 1920. After a number of remarks of passionate
patriotism—including a reference to Katyń—and profound religious devotion,
Boruta again cited Piłsudski at the closing, quoting the famous 1927 injunction of
Piłsudski: to “serve only Poland, love only Poland, and hate those who serve for-
eigners.”

Shortly thereafter, Primate Stefan Wyszyński met with hundreds of vet-

erans and issued a Christmas statement celebrating both November 11th and the
deeds of Piłsudski.

e fact that an old soldier would make patriotic remarks on the anniversary of

independence was less notable than the fact that, by speaking at Piłsudski’s crypt,
Boruta was associating Piłsudski with the celebration of independence in a unique
and powerful manner. To students of Polish history, however, the occasion was
even more extraordinary. Boruta had been a legionnaire in 1914, but not a Piłsudski
devotee. In 1926, he had fought against Piłsudski in the May coup. After World

See Jan Józef Lipski, KOR: A History of the Workers’ Defense Committee in Poland, 1976–1981

(Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1985), 277–8 . Th

e British journalist, Timo-

thy Garton Ash, noted that among the demonstrators he saw pre-war Polish uniforms reminiscent of
the Polish Army of the Piłsudski era; see his Th

e Polish Revolution: Solidarity (New York: Vintage

Books, 1985), 86–7. In addition to the events in Warsaw, there were large demonstrations also in
Łódź, Kraków, and Gdańsk; see “Obchody rocznicy odzyskania niepodległości,” 1; Wojciech
Ziembiński, “11 listopada 1978,” Opinia , 10–11 (October–November, 1978), 12–15.

For the text see Pałaszewska , Święto Niepodległości , 31–2.

“Słowo biskupów na 60-lecie odzyskania niepodległości Polski,” Opinia , 10–11 (October–

November, 1978), 16. PDP.

“Przemówienie M. Boruty-Spiechowicza wygłoszone 11.XI. 1978 roku w krypcie Marszałka J.

Piłsudskiego na Wawelu,” Spotkanie : Niezależne pismo młodych katolików , 5–6 (Październik, 1978),
394–6.

“Prymasowski opłatek Żolnierzy RP,” Opinia , 1 (January 1979), 8–9; Opłatek u Prymasa,”

Droga , 4 (January 1979), 1. PDP. Also speaking at this occasion was the much-decorated and contro-
versial soldier General Mieczysław Boruta-Spiechowicz.

e Party in Ideological Chaos

135

War II, he was one of the small handful of Polish soldiers to return to Poland,
already communist controlled, and served, albeit brieﬂ y, in their army as a senior
commander. Boruta was thus a controversial ﬁ gure and certainly not a traditional
Piłsudskiite. His celebration of Piłsudski had an unusual symbolism, a kind of
retrospective historical expiation.

e sixtieth anniversary, in 1978, was provoking much re-consideration in

Poland. ROPCiO issued a “Proclamation to the Polish Nation”

dated November

11th, celebrating the unoﬃ

cial commemoration of the rebirth of Polish independ-

ence and urging Poles to undertake public eﬀ orts in support of the Helsinki Accord
and the International Covenant on Human Rights, an obvious precursor to the
Solidarity movement of less than two years later. Piłsudski was quoted and the
population—apostrophized as “soldiers of the Rzeczpospolita—was called upon to
remember and resist. Observations started on the 10th; 10,000 copies of the Proc-
lamation were seized by the authorities.

Equally signiﬁ cant, the burgeoning underground press of the late 1970s gave

considerable space to November 11th, and Piłsudski. Głos commemorated the six-
tieth anniversary of independence by noting that in both 1918 and ﬁ fty years later
the communists were the only Party not to support the true regaining of independ-
ence.

e underground journal aimed at the rural population, Gospodarz , argued

that the farmers, too, had contributed to the re-capturing of independence on
November 11th.

Other journals compared the era of 1918 with the present, with

considerable preference for the former.

An obvious problem confronting ROPCiO and the other underground organi-

zations fascinated by Piłsudski and the Second Republic was to evaluate the degree
to which these traditions were meaningful to contemporary Poland. Before answer-
ing this question, however, it was necessary to decide which traditions were actu-
ally being evaluated. As we have seen, Piłsudskiite émigrés during World War II
could not decide whether the Piłsudski legacy ended with 1935, or with the col-
lapse of the regime in the September campaign. Th

is question was more than just

a verdict on a period of slightly more than four years: it was a cumulative judgment
of the Second Republic. If it ended unworthily in 1939 it was a problematical
model to counterpoise against the PRL.

An intriguing response was furnished in an essay by Adam Michnik, published

under a pseudonym in the émigré journal Kultura , entitled “Th

e shadow of forgot-

ten ancestors” [Cienie zapomnianych przodków]. Michnik argued that ultimately
Dmowski was the “patron” of the PRL regime and Piłsudski “the patron of

“11 listopada. Odezwa do narodu polskiego,” issued by Ruch Obrony Praw Człowieka, Novem-

ber 15, 1978, 1–2. Among the signers were Leszek Moczulski (who, later, was a most controversial
ﬁ gure) and General Spiechowicz. For Ruch’s Piłsudskiite origins see Andrzej Friszke, Opozycja polityc-
zna w PRL, 1945–1980 (London, Aneks, 1994), 255.

Komunikat , November 15, 1978.

“Tradycje polityczne,” Głos , 11–12 (November–December, 1978), 4–5. PDP.

“Rocznicowe reﬂ eksje,” Gospodarz , 2(12) (November 25, 1978), 1. PDP.

For example, “Szanse na niepodległość dawniej i dziś,” Opinia , 10–11 (October–November,

1978), 3–7; K. A. “11 listopada 1918,” in the same journal, 7–10; “PRL obchodzi niepodległość,”
1–2. PDP.

136

Independence Day

contemporary opposition.”

To accept the PRL as a given, we may infer, was like

the endecja’s acceptance of continued Russian rule in 1914. Th

is conclusion was

reﬂ ected in comments made by Adam Bromke, a Polish scholar living in Canada.
In his well-known analysis, Polish history is a dialectical struggle between realism
and idealism.

Piłsudski, like the AK of World War II—and perhaps by extension

both the legions and the current opposition—were idealists. By contrast, the
endecja tradition, spurning the risky strategy of the irredentists, were essentially
realist.

November 11th was the ultimate idealist celebration. However, Solidarity

did not embody the Romantic insurrectionary tradition of the Piłsudskiites but
used his symbol as a rallying point whilst not urging its followers to replicate the
armed struggle he epitomized. A “patron” is not a model.

e fact that Catholic activists had organized a series of pilgrimages to Jasna

Góra Shrine at Częstochowa—where the miraculous icon of the Black Madonna is
displayed—in commemoration of the sixtieth anniversary, was widely reported in
the underground press. Notably the processions were speciﬁ cally celebrating
Piłsudski and his martial exploits in 1914–20 as part of the commemoration.

is was perhaps not surprising as earlier in the year, as reported in the under-

ground press, masses for the repose of Piłsudski’s soul were held at the cathedral in
Warsaw as well as in Kraków.

On the forty-third anniversary of Piłsudski’s death in 1978, there were memo-

rial services for him in several cities, despite eﬀ orts by the police to prevent or at
least discourage them.

Other episodes in the Piłsudski legend were also com-

memorated with religious services—on August 6th, in both Warsaw and Kraków,
the anniversary of the “First Brigade’s” departure for the front in 1914.

In April 1978 KOR’s underground Information Bulletin [Biuletyn Informa-

cyjny] issued a lengthy analysis of Independence Day. It began by saying that Poles
had been waiting for thirty-four years for the authorities to admit that the 11th
was indeed Independence Day. Despite the oﬃ

cial stress on the liberating conse-

quences of the Bolshevik Revolution, communism actually opposed the re-creation
of Polish independence. It was not November 7th that brought freedom to Poland;
indeed, the ﬁ rst international development to mention is Wilson’s speech to the
Senate on January 22nd, 1917, endorsing an independent Poland. Since Trybuna
Ludu and other PRL sources had provided a mendacious version of events, KOR
took it upon itself to rectify the situation. It argued that the birth of the Polish
Army is traceable to the march of the “Pierwsza Brygada” on August 6th, 1914. It
was Polish actions, not Bolshevism that was the determining factor.

Quoted in Friszke, Opozycja polityczna, 298.

Adam Bromke, Poland’s Politics: Idealism vs. Realism (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press,

1967).

See Friszke, Opozycja polityczna , 298, 318.

See, e.g., W. Z., “Rok Niepodległości na Jasnej Górze,” Opinia , 3 (March, 1978), 8; untitled

essay in Opinia , 10–11, October–November, 1978, 1.

“Nabożeństwa za duszę śp. Marszałka Józefa Piłsudskiego,” Opinia , 4 (April, 1978), 13–14; “W

43 rocznicę zgonu Józefa Piłsudskiego,” Opinia , 5 (May, 1978), 7. PDP.

“Pamietajmy,” Opinia , 7–8 (July–August, 1978), 42. PDP.

[KOR] Biuletyn Informacyjny , April 19, 1978 in GGC, Box 1, folder 3.

e Party in Ideological Chaos

137

In November, KOR returned to the subject that it had begun earlier. On Novem-

ber 11th the Regency Council [Rada Regencyjna] gave power to Piłsudski, and
hence that day is the anniversary of independence, it argued. Even his opponents,
KOR insisted, recognize Piłsudski’s role. It continued with a poetic defense of the
Second Republic and concluded that it is this era that November 11th really cele-
brates.

November 11th was the day commemorating the best traditions of Polish

history.

In Łódź, representatives of ROPCiO boldly demanded that city authorities

restore the pre-World War II names to streets in the city: “Piłsudski” and “Novem-
ber 11th.”

(Th

is was actually done in 1979).

Public calls for restoring Piłsudski’s

name to squares and other sites throughout Poland as a gesture to commemorate
the anniversary of independence soon appeared.

e Boy Scouts of Kraków

decided to maintain the Piłsudski Mound—a monument unﬁ nished at the out-
break of the war and much dilapidated since.

On the 11th, ROPCiO organized

a large demonstration in Gdańsk and Warsaw that captured public attention.

general, opposition groups, though divided over numerous issues, cooperated in
staging demonstrations.

In Łódź, the authorities made a large number of pre-

ventative arrests on the 10th but demonstrations followed the next day anyway,
including the singing of legion songs and services at their memorials.

Jacek

Woźniakowski, the prominent Catholic intellectual, used the occasion of the sixti-
eth anniversary of November 11th, 1918 to present an address to the Warsaw PEN
Club, which celebrated the achievements of the Second Republic, especially in the
cultural ﬁ eld: a stark dissent from the PRL’s oﬃ

cial denigration of the inter-war

state.

Warsaw had unoﬃ

cial placards announcing that there would be prayers at Jasna

Góra, the Wawel, the Dominican Church on Freta Street, and at the cathedral of
St. John at 6.00 p.m. for those who sacriﬁ ced for Poland all denoting November
11th. Th

e placard bore a crowned eagle and a cross, and was signed “Poles.”

smaller towns there were several eﬀ orts at commemoration. Th

e regime’s own

umbrella organization, the National Unity Front [Front Jedności Narodowej, or
FJN] in Bielsko-Biała and Cieszyn announced a rally for October 19th, including

“Oświadczenie” in [KOR] Biuletyn Informacyjny , November 9, 1978. GGC, Box 1, folder 5.

“W sześćdziesiątą rocznicę,” November 10, 1978, KOR in GGC Box 1, folder 5.

“Wniosek obywatelski w sprawie przywrócenia dawnych nazw ulicom Łodzi,” Opinia , 5 (May,

1978), 25–6. PDP.

Jakubiak, “Prewencja,” 73.

“Konkurs o nagrodę Roku Niepodległości za odwagę cywilną,” Opinia , 5 (May, 1978), 32.

PDP.

Z. W. “Raduje się serce: harcerze na Kopcu J. Piłsudskiego,” Opinia , 7–8 (July–August, 1978), 51.

PDP.

Piotr Zaremba, Młodo-Polacy: Historia Ruchu Młodej Polski (Gdańsk: Arche, 2000), 69.

In Łódź and Lublin the crowds sang “My, Pierwsza Brygada”; Polak, “Niezależne obchody,”

110.

Main, Trudne świętowanie , 213–16.

Jacek Woźniakowski, “Kultura Polski w pierwszych latach niepodległości,” in Puls , 4–5 (1978–79),

3–8. PDP.

See the 1978 poster in Rocznicy i obchody odzyskania niepodległości 11-listopada—plakaty.

DZS.

138

Independence Day

patriotic songs to celebrate “the historic fact of the regaining of independence.”

is alone shows the chaos in the Party policy. In Zgierz, a poster asked the popu-

lation to “confront the present with history” and to thank those who played a role
in national independence.

Piłsudski and other important anniversaries connected

with him became the only national symbols for the opposition to rally round.

T H E S O L I D A R I T Y E R A

In comparison with the great explosion of 1978 the events of the following
November were less spectacular though still considerable. Despite a pre-emptive
wave of arrests by the security police that netted more than one hundred activists,
there were demonstrations in a number of cities, including calls for freedom for
other nations of the Soviet bloc. Police intervention led to beatings and the use of
gas to disperse demonstrators.

At the oﬃ

cial founding of the Piłsudskiite opposi-

tion movement, Confederation for Independent Poland [Konfederacja Polski
Niepodległej, or KPN] in the fall, it was announced that the organization would
commemorate Independence Day with a mass in honor of Piłsudski in Warsaw
Cathedral.

e large demonstrations that followed were centered at the Tomb of

the Unknown Soldier and resulted in a number of arrests.

e KPN was the focus

of a rapidly growing revival of interest in Piłsudski among Polish youth in the
1980s, which saw in the Marshal the symbol of an anti-Russian struggle for
independence.

Underground journals mused: “Was it possible to be a Piłsudskiite” today? Iron-

ically, this question was answered aﬃ

rmatively in the journal of Catholic youth,

traditionally a segment of society solidly endecja and anti-Piłsudskiite.

Jacek

Bartyzel of the Young Poland Movement [Ruch Młodej Polski] described himself
as both a “conservative” and a “Piłsudskiite.” A map of the old commonwealth
hung on his wall. He explained that he believed in the “great power tradition of

Bielsko-Biała, 1978, in Rocznicy i obchody odzyskania niepodległości 11-listopada—plakaty.

DZS.

“Miejski Komitet FJN w Zgierzu,” in Rocznicy i obchody odzyskania niepodległości

11- listopada—plakaty. DZS.

Main, Trudne świętowanie , 234–5.

See“Oświadczenie” issued by ROPCiO, nd. PDP; Polak, “Niezależne obchody,” 112–14.

See the KPN’s Gazeta Polska , 5 (November, 1979), 1–4, PDP. It is noteworthy that the Piłsudskiite

KPN named its underground paper Gazeta Polska , the title of the organ of the Piłsudski regime in the
inter-war eras.

See the untitled statement issued by KOR dated December 11, 1979. Cf. KOR’s “Wiadomości z

Polski” a copy in GGC Box 1, f. 9; “W Warszawie,” Biuletyn informacyjny , 34 (November–December,
1979), 65.

Andrzej Friszke makes the important point that the Piłsudski cult in the 1980s was not interested

in Piłsudskiite ideas but in its symbols, especially the central one of the leader of the struggle for
independence. See his Druga Wielka Emigracja, 1945–1990. Vol. I: Życie polityczne emigracji
(Warsaw: Biblioteka “Więzi,” 1999), 449; untitled front page article in Przegląd wiadomości agencyjnych ,
November 18, 1987.

Jacek Bartyzel, “Czy można być dzisiaj piłsudczykiem?” Bratniak , 16 (March–April, 1979), 8ﬀ .

e Party in Ideological Chaos

139

Poland, not the martyr tradition”

(an answer characteristic of Piłsudski himself,

who despised despairing ruminations over a tragic past and dreamed large dreams
about a great future).

Opposition journals distributed poems (notably Piłsudskiite Kazimierz

Wierzyński’s “November, 1918”), songs, and recollections of the Marshal, includ-
ing excerpts from his speeches.

e Piłsudskiite journal Droga re-published the

Marshal’s remarks to his legionnaires of August 1927 in which he called upon
Poles, in a famous peroration to “hate those who serve foreigners.”

e implica-

tions of the ﬁ nal exhortation for the Party were obvious.

ere were demonstrations on November 11th in Gdańsk,

and Aleksander

Hall, a conservative underground activist, was arrested on November 11th, 1979.
While incarcerated, he was asked by a fellow prisoner as to why he was taken into
custody: “For the National Holiday,” he answered. He was told that there was
another one like him in custody. Later, he found out it was Lech Wałęsa.

An activ-

ist recalled that the PRL’s secret police conducted a regular manhunt for dissidents
on November 11th: “Th

at anniversary was something very dangerous [fatalne].”

A curious indication of the times was the release in 1980 of the ﬁ lm by Bohdan

Poręba entitled Polonia Restituta .

A lengthy “docu-drama” featuring a series of

quality performances, the ﬁ lm was unusual in that it celebrated the birth of the
Second Republic in 1918, and included an extensive cinematic depiction of
Dmowski, Paderewski, and Piłsudski.

Characteristic of Poręba’s ideological pre-

dilections, the ﬁ lm combined ardent patriotism, a positive and repeated reference
to Roman Catholic piety, and a celebration of the radical, indeed, communist ele-
ments in the Polish past.

ere are frequent and unfailingly nasty depictions of

the Germans; the Russians are virtually absent, and Bolshevism is never criticized

Zaremba , Młodo-Polacy . 53ﬀ .

For example, Droga published a poem entitled “Pierwsza Brygada” and another, by Kazimierz

Wierzyńki, “Listopad 1918,” as well as remarks by Piłsudski in the ﬁ rst issue of 1979. See Droga , 4,
January, 1979, 5–14. PDP. Kazimierz Wierzyński (1896–1969) was a legionnaire and, like his fellow
poet Jan Lechoń, an ardent Piłsudskiite.

See “Przemówienie na zjeździe legionistów w Kaliszu,” PZ, IX, 78–92. Excerpts were published

in Droga , 4 (January, 1979), 13–14. PDP.

Jan Karandziej, “Musiałem przeskakiwać przez plot,” Biuletyn IPN , 67–8, August–September,

2006, 129–30.

Zaremba, Młodo-Polacy , 124.

Ibid., 124.

e ﬁ lm was, apparently, produced in 1979 and premiered in Warsaw in 1981 but bore the date

1980. I should like to thank my brother, J. R. Biskupski, for bringing this to my attention.

e ﬁ rst cinematic depiction of Piłsudski occurred just three years earlier in Jerzy Kawalerowicz’s

Śmierć Prezydenta [Death of a President]; it was not particularly sympathetic; see Bolesław Michałek
and Frank Turaj, Th

e Modern Cinema of Poland (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1988),

63–4.

Poręba enjoyed the favor of the communist authorities, despite such controversial ﬁ lms as Hubal ,

which explored Polish Romantic patriotism. In 1981, he emerged as one of the leaders of the national-
ist and anti-Semitic organization “Grünwald,” which was spawned by the Warsaw branch of the
PZPR. A “nationalist communist” before the creation of the Th

ird Republic, Poręba has of late

been associated with the nationalist and Catholic xenophobic Right. See his website <http://www.
bohdanporeba.bo.pl/>, and the essay by Jerzy Przystawa, “W sprawie Bohdana Poręby,” online at
<http://www.janbacz.republika.pl/poreba.htm>.

140

Independence Day

but invoked as a phantasm frightening the craven and hypocritical leaders of the
Western powers. Actor Janusz Zakrzeński’s Piłsudski is well crafted, and generally
sympathetic, probably the most positive image of him ever presented by the PRL.

However, whereas the lengthy ﬁ lm is careful to record the progression of events by
frequently presenting reminders of the exact day, it skips over November 11th
entirely: Piłsudski leaves Berlin on the 10th and is next seen several days later.
Although the POW is frequently mentioned, the disarming of the Germans is
made to appear an exclusively spontaneous phenomenon with neither direction
from, nor inspiration by, Piłsudski and his lieutenants. Nor are the Piłsudskiite
loyalties of the insurgents indicated. Hence, Poręba’s ﬁ lm represents a punctuation
mark in the history of the PRL’s eﬀ orts to present an acceptable version of the
rebirth of Polish independence. Piłsudski is clearly and positively present, but he is
not the demiurge of the events as insisted upon by his partisans. Instead, he shares
the stage with the contributions of both Paderewski and Dmowski—who are pre-
sented most positively—and even more with the Polish masses, especially the
workers’ movement.

is pastiche of nationalism, religion, and proletarian socialism was the PRL’s

attempt to legitimize itself by appropriating digestible elements of the national
tradition whilst still retaining something of the communist cosmology. It was
rehearsed many times since 1945. 1980’s Polonia Restituta , on the eve of Solidarity,
was one of the ﬁ nal attempts to popularize this historical genealogy of modern
Poland. Despite the acknowledgment of Piłsudski, the ﬁ lm could not bring itself
to restore November 11th to the status of national symbol, and tried to hurry past
it.

e year Solidarity was born, 1980, was the ﬁ rst year in which PRL security

forces did not interfere with November 11th celebrations.

Piłsudski became a

trope for the opposition movement to communist rule, which grew rapidly in
1980.

It was the symbol of Piłsudski—especially his anti-Russian disposition—

not his largely forgotten policies, which provided the inspiration.

One of the

leaders of the opposition, Janusz Onyszkiewicz, a professor at Warsaw University
who became a major ﬁ gure in Solidarity and eventually a minister in the govern-
ment of post-communist Poland, recalled that Piłsudski served as an “inspiration”
for Solidarity. Piłsudski’s aphorisms, and especially his beloved “My, Pierwsza
Brygada,” banned by PRL authorities, became iconic. Many Solidarity supporters
instinctively drew parallels between themselves and the Piłsudskiite faithful from
the 1914–18 era, especially the “First Brigade,” both “strongly committed to the
cause of our independence.”

An unoﬃ

cial motto of the opposition in contem-

plating the weakness of their position relative to the power of institutionalized

Zakrzeński was killed in a plane crash near Smolensk in September 2010, which also claimed the

lives of the president of Poland and more than ninety other people.

Jakubiak, “Prewencja,” 74.

“Listopad,” Puls , 9 (Fall–Winter, 1980), 134.

Friszke, Druga Wielka Emigracja, 449.

“Independence Day Broadcast,” Polish Radio, English language service, November 11, 2002.

Onyszkiewicz, incidentally, was married to Piłsudski’s granddaughter.

e Party in Ideological Chaos

141

communism was the refrain: “Piłsudski could also do the impossible!”

Legion-

naires such as General Boruta were invited as honorary quests at Solidarity con-
gresses.

For these people, re-instituting November 11th as Poland’s Independence

Day would be entirely logical. Reﬂ ecting the times, in 1980 underground organiza-
tions in Warsaw issued pamphlets urging the population to celebrate November
11th.

e city of Katowice even planned to erect a monument to Piłsudski.

Majchrowski has argued, contemporary Polish society instinctively turned to the
symbols of the last moments of a truly free Poland, the Piłsudski era.

Hence, by

the eve of Solidarity we witness the complete re-Piłsudskiization of November 11th.
National independence could not be marked without consigning it to his credit

Solidarity symbol Lech Wałęsa had been a devotee of the Marshal since his

youth, and began sporting the symbolic large mustache made famous by the
Marshal whilst still a young man.

In the Wałęsa family, “Piłsudski was a cult

ﬁ gure.” Th

e grandfather of the Solidarity leader—and future president—was

apparently a member of the POW, and a dubious family legend even boasted that
Piłsudski was saved from the Russians by a Wałęsa in 1920. Legends aside, old
pictures of the Marshal were maintained by Walęsa’s grandfather as icons to inau-
gurate future generations into the cult.

In the early days of Solidarity, Wałęsa

traded on the Piłsudski symbols, and his supporters liked to suggest that he had a
historical function similar to his hero’s, the deliverer of Poland.

e Warsaw Independence Day crowds grew by 1980 to 10,000 and to 20,000

in 1981.

It became a characteristic of the demonstrations to sing Piłsudski’s “My,

Pierwsza Brygada.” ROPCiO even began its celebration on the 10th, a truly
Piłsudskiite gesture. Gdańsk saw special masses and rallies and reproductions of
Piłsudski and the legionnaire eagle.

In 1981, just before the declaration of martial law (on December 13th), there

was a major Piłsudskiite event in Gdańsk, home of the movement. Placards

Note the observation by Andrzej M. Koboś in “Historia Polski na scenie światowej: Z Profe-

sorem Normanem R. Daviesem rozmawia Andrzej M. Koboś (listopad 1988),” Zwoje 3 (1997), online
at <http://www.zwoje-scrolls.com/zwoje03/text02p.htm>.

Mariusz Urbanek, Piłsudski bis (Warsaw: Most, 1995), 124.

See “Oświadczenie” by Ruch Młodej Polski, in Rocznice i obchody. Odzyskanie niepodległości.

11-listopada. Broszury. DZS.

Włodzimierz Syzdek, “Spór o pomnik,” Życie Warszawy , November 14, 1988, 2.

See Tadeusz Biernat quoting Majchrowski in Jozef Piłsudski–Lech Wałęsa: Paradoks charyzmayc-

znego przywództwa . (Toruń: Adam Marszałek, 2000), 144 n. 65.

Lech Wałęsa, A Way of Hope: An Autobiography (New York: Henry Holt and Company, 1987),

184 . Despite his devotion to Piłsudski, as late as 2006, Wałęsa admitted that credit for Poland’s rebirth
in 1918 was still problematical; see “Oko i co za nim,” Wprost , May 11, 2006. Online at <http://www.
wprost.pl/ar/4024/Okno-i-co-za-nim/>.

Ibid , 18–19.

An American journalist cites a reference in 1980 to a symbolic Polish genealogy being marketed

in Warsaw: Józef Poniatowski, Piłsudski, Wałęsa; see Mary Craig, Lech Wałęsa and His Poland (New
York: Continuum, 1987), 189–90 . Cf. Jerzy Holzer’s comments on Wałęsa attempting to appropriate
Piłsudskiite symbols, quoted in Urbanek , Piłsudski bis , 27.

On the rising crowds see Andrzej Czesław Żak, “Nadszedł listopad 1918 . . .” in Leon Łochowski,

ed., Ta, co nie zginęła (Warsaw: Departament wychowania wojska polskiego), 19.

Untitled article, Biuletyn NZSP (Gdańsk), November 18, 1980, 2; “11 listopad 1918” Biuletyn

informacyjny stoczni gdańskiej , November 7, 1980, 1.

142

Independence Day

appeared throughout the city, bearing the likeness of Piłsudski and announcing the
celebration of the sixty-third anniversary of independence on November 11th.
Th

ere was a special mass at St. Mary’s (the votive church for the “Miracle on the

Vistula,” which is the way the political Right described Piłsudski’s victory over the
Russians in 1920), a march from the church to the statue of the seventeenth-cen-
tury hero-king Jan Sobieski, and a rally there of speeches and patriotic song. Forty
thousand were in attendance.

e high point of the day was at 2.00 p.m. when

the dockyard repair shop formally christened itself in honor of Piłsudski: the name
would be placed on the main gate.

In Kraków—where a history of the legions was declaimed—20,000 gathered.

In Warsaw, there were 50,000. Veterans groups were prominent.

In Łódź, a “Civic

Committee for the Memory of Józef Piłsudski [Społeczny Komitet Pamięci Józefa
Piłsudskiego] was created to commemorate November 11th; and through the years
of martial law the local church was actively involved with the ceremonies.

Solidarity posted a number of placards of which the most clever was issued in

1,000 copies—which printed November 11, 1918 in the lower left corner and
November 11, 1981 in the upper right. However, in much larger numbers in the
middle it printed 1918 with the last two numbers upside down; in other words,
1981 had turned the independence of 1918 upside down.

e Party was confused and occasionally even joined in the Piłsudski celebra-

tions. Th

ey even tried to co-sponsor May 3rd observances with Solidarity.

Other

than a handful of uncoordinated actions, it failed to maintain an alternative dis-
course; it had seemingly lost the interpretation of Polish history to the opposition.
Th

ere were, for example, as there had been in 1978, observation in Bielsko-Biała,

which involved both members of the government’s ZBOWiD and FJN and those
of Solidarity, the local priest, and members of Clubs of the Catholic Intelligentsia
[Kluby Inteligentcji Katolickiej, or KIK]

all acting under the aegis of a “Commit-

tee for the celebration of Independence Day in Bielsko-Biała.”

At the national

level, the Party ruminated over oﬃ

cial commemorations—for the ﬁ rst time since

1945.

e underground Solidarity press distributed an issue on November 30th, 1981

in honor of the sixty-third anniversary. On the front page, it reprinted Piłsudski’s
November 16th telegram to the powers announcing the re- appearance of the Polish

Pałaszewska, Święto Niepodległości , 14.

“63 rocznica niepodległości Polski 11 listopada,” in Rocznice i obchody odzyskania niepodległości

11-listopada—plakaty, DZS. Th

e Party refused to countenance the change of name; see Main, Trudne

świętowanie, 259.

Pałaszewska, Święto Niepodległości , 14.

Ząbek, “Organizacja,” 83–4.

Untitled poster by Młodożeniec, in Rocznice i obchody odzyskania niepodległości 11-listopada—

plakaty, DZS.

Main, Trudne świętowanie , 263ﬀ .

Begun in 1956 and disbanded with martial law in 1981.

Poster issued over the name “Komitet obchodów Święta Niepodległości w Bielsku-Białej,” in

Rocznice i obchody odzyskania niepodległości 11-listopada—plakaty, DZS. Polak, “Niezależne
obchody,” 115.

Main, Trudne świętowanie , 251–62.

e Party in Ideological Chaos

143

state. It carried reports of ceremonies carried out in Bydgoszcz, Elbląg, and Gdańsk.
Th

e anniversary of re-naming the repair facilities was noted. Most of the page con-

sisted of a large picture of ancient veterans gathered at Piłsudski’s crypt at the
Wawel.

e KPN press called on Poles to be loyal to the tradition of November

11th.

ere were minor celebrations in other regions of Poland, including mount-

ing a tablet at a house in Łódź where Piłsudski had lived.

Documents from

November 1918 were reprinted in many journals.

e growing public celebration of November 11th was interrupted by the dec-

laration of martial law on December 13th, 1981. However, the opposition planned
major demonstrations on November 10–11, 1982. Th

e regime of the last PRL

leader, General Wojciech Jaruzelski, was so concerned about this, that they released
a communiqué announcing agreement regarding a papal visit as a means of mol-
lifying the population. Although there were strikes throughout the country, and
some violent clashes with hundreds of arrests, the magnitude of the demonstra-
tions was below what the authorities had feared and Solidarity had hoped.

result was a temporary detente in Poland and the release of many political
prisoners.

Somewhat wistful underground pamphlets remarked that the communist

authorities had distorted the meaning of November 11th for so long that Poles
must remember that the truth still dwells within them.

100

A poorly printed under-

ground journal for youth reminded its readers that even if they did not know
anything about November 11th they had a right to because “it’s theirs.”

101

Charac-

teristic was the situation in Płock, where Solidarity and Party representatives had
participated in Independence Day ceremonies the year before but did nothing in
1982. Th

e underground press urged parents to teach their children, on that day,

“Who was Józef Piłsudski?”

102

“Depesza notyﬁ kująca powstanie Państwa Polskiego,” Tygodnik Solidarności , November 20,

1981, 34, 1.

Małgorzata Żuławnik and Mariusz Żuławnik, “Powrót na łamy. Józef Piłsudski w prasie oﬁ cjal-

nej i podziemnej w latach 1980–1989,” in Jabłonowski and Kossewska , Piłsudski na łamach , 325.

Wiadomości (Poznań), November 13, 1981, in Wolne Słowo : Wydawnictwa Regionu Wielkopol-

ska NSZZ Solidarność, 1980–1981: Materiały źródłowe.

(Poznań: Wielkopolskie Muzeum Walk

Niepodległościowych, 1981). For other proclamations by the underground in 1981 see Pałaszewska,
Święto Niepodległości , 33–4.

Żuławnik and Żuławnik, “Powrót,” 326.

“Warszawa,” Tygodnik wojenny, NSZZ Solidarność

, November 25, 1982; “Analiza prasy

podziemnej w Polsce,” Kraj , December 13–31, 1982, 23–7. Regarding police intervention in 1982 see
Żak, “Nadszedł listopad,” 19; Polak, “Niezależne obchody,” 116.

Regarding the anticipated crisis of November 10–11, 1982 and its consequences see Jan B.

DeWeydenthal, Bruce D. Porter, and Kevin Devlin, Th

e Polish Drama: 1980–1982 (Lexington, MA

and Toronto: Lexington Books, 1983), 273ﬀ .

100

MKK Piaseczno, “11 listopada, 1918–84.” In Rocznice i obchody. Odzyskanie niepodległości.

11-listopada. Broszury. DZS.

101

“11 listopada,” Solidarność lubuska: Dodatek nadzwyczajny , November 11, 1981, PUP.

102

Mariusz Żuławnik, “Nieoﬁ cjalne obchody świąt narodowych w Płocku 1980–1989,” in Stawarz,

ed., Święto niepodległości, 102.

144

Independence Day

T H E R E G I M E E M B R A C E S P I Ł S U D S K I

As though to pilfer the Piłsudski talisman from the underground, the Party’s press
paid far more attention to Piłsudski 1982–84, especially at times of national com-
memorations such as November 11th. Th

is trend continued through the decade

with the regime making its peace with Piłsudski and, to a lesser extent, with the
Second Republic. By the mid-1980s, the press was ﬂ ooded with Piłsudski material,
reaching overwhelming proportions by 1988. Micewski has conjectured that this
was an eﬀ ort to divert people’s attention to a bygone era rather than have them
concern themselves with pressing current economic problems; a likely explana-
tion.

103

In eﬀ ect, it was a struggle between the Party and the opposition over utiliz-

ing Piłsudski.

While the regime was making its peace with Piłsudski and November 11th, the

opposition was de-emphasizing its previous celebratory invocation. In general, the
early and mid-1980s witnessed a pattern: calls for demonstrations on the part of
underground leaders (many of which were rather small), masses in various churches,
and eﬀ orts at larger demonstrations broken up by police.

104

ere were occasional

references to Piłsudski, excerpts from his speeches, or his photograph. One under-
ground journal linked November 11th to the victory over the Russians of 1920; a
Piłsudskiite turn.

105

However, there was a clear mood of despondency settling over

the opposition. In 1985 one underground journal from the Baltic coast compared
the situation to 1900: there was still twenty years work to do.

106

Wola noted that

November 11th observations would be held “in mourning” in 1984, made all the
more depressing by the murder of Fr. Jerzy Popiełuszko, the charismatic priest
known for his patriotic sermons.

107

e Club in Service to Independence [Klub Służby Niepodległości], a Piłsudskiite

underground organization linked with Solidarity, began the tradition of gathering
at monuments and graves on November 11th. Th

ey condemned the PRL for tak-

ing the anniversary from the Polish people and invoked the legions and the POW
as their inspiration. Ironically the coverage in the underground press of Piłsudski,
and holidays such as November 11th, went into temporary decline, only to return
powerfully after 1985; probably reﬂ ecting the general disillusion of the opposition.

108

A strange phenomenon was at work: the Party was desperately using Piłsudski and

103

Andrzej Micewski, “Między dwiema orientacjami, ” Znaki czasu , 13 (1989), 87 .

104

“11 listopad,” Głos, November–December, 1982, 4; “11 listopada w Warszawie,” KOS (Komitet

Oporu Społecznego), November 20, 1983, 1; “Z zakładów,” Głos Wolnego Robotnika , November 27,
1983; untitled article, Obserwator Wielkopolski , 75, November–December, 1983; “11 listopada,”
Tygodnik Mazowsze Solidarność , 106 (November 15, 1984), 1; “11 listopada,” Głos Wolnego Robotnika .
For Lublin, see Main, Trudne świętowanie , 304; “11 listopada,” KOS , November 17, 1986, 1; “Komu-
nikat No. 30,” Kronika małopolska , October 28, 1985; “11 listopada,” Woła, November 16, 1987;
Polak, “Niezależne obchody,” 116–19.

105

“11 listopada w katedrze,” Głos Wolnego Robotnika, November 16, 1985.

106

“Dziś niepodległości” [sic],

Niepodległość: Pismo Liberalno-demokratycznej Partii “Nie,” 2,

December, 1985.

107

“Ku niepodległości,” Wola, November 12, 1984.

108

Żuławnik and Żuławnik, “Powrót,” 327–30, 338.

e Party in Ideological Chaos

145

November 11th to rally support, and the opposition reacted by regarding both as
somehow tainted.

e Party’s oﬃ

cial explanation of the birth of independence was still attributing

it to the circumstances created by the Bolshevik Revolution, but changes were
appearing in the Party’s line. For days before November 11th, Trybuna Ludu was
ﬁ lled with stories about the Bolshevik Revolution.

109

On the 10th an odd eﬀ ort by

the Party announced that 1987 was the seventieth anniversary of independence
and the ﬁ ﬁ eth anniversary of the outbreak of World War II. Th

is was a bizarre

conﬁ guration: though it would link independence to the Bolshevik Revolution it
was certainly not the ﬁ ftieth anniversary of the war. Th

e Party and its allies, the

United Peasant Party [Zjednoczone Stronnictwo Ludowe, or ZSL] and the SD
(Democratic Party), both adjuncts of the ruling communists, held a joint meeting
at the Royal Castle in Warsaw with other organizations present. Th

e proclamation

issued placed the Bolsheviks as primary cause, but did commend all of those of any
political orientation who aided the cause of independence. Th

e 11th—let alone

the 10th—were not mentioned, nor was Piłsudski.

110

e most notable change in the Party doctrine was contained in a long essay by

the historian Eugeniusz Duraczyński, who mused over the events precipitating
Polish independence. Here, surprisingly, Piłsudski was quoted in passing, and con-
siderable space is given, again, to the Daszyński government in Lublin. Historians
have argued, Duraczyński noted, whether or not the rebirth of Poland can be
traced to the Lublin events, and many have accepted this version. But whereas the
Left still held on to that view, the 11th was a “military commemoration” [święto
wojskowe] which was later, in 1937, recognized as Independence Day.

Piłsudski returned on the 10th, Duraczyński continued, and he had captured

the imagination of many Poles, especially the young. On the 11th, he gained mili-
tary authority, and the Daszyński government recognized his leadership. And, on
the 14th, he issued his ﬁ rst oﬃ

cial proclamation. “Th

ese were the beginnings of

Poland reborning.” However, the most important event was still the Bolshevik
Revolution, which changed things not only for Poland but for much of Europe as
well. Hence the November events in Poland are, in reality, derivative of the previ-
ous year’s developments in Russia.

111

is was a major concession in the Party’s version of Independence Day and

Piłsudski’s role in it. Whereas it still tried to salvage the Bolshevik Revolution as
the causative factor, and lauded the Lublin aﬀ air of a year later, it was obvious that
Piłsudski was the main actor. Certain elements of the Piłsudskiite genealogy were
still omitted: the disarming of the Germans, the role of the POW, the legion tradi-
tion, etc. Nonetheless, it approaches a pre-1935 understanding of Independence
Day, even if some of the preferred details of that camp’s traditional explanations are
omitted. It is noteworthy that Dmowski and Paderewski were mentioned only en

109

See the front page material about the Bolshevik Revolution in the November 3, 1987 issue of

Trybuna Ludu.

110

“70-lecia odzyskania niepodległości i 50-lecia wybuchu II wojny światowej,” Trybuna Ludu,

November 10, 1987, 1.

111

Eugeniusz Duraczyński, “Czy w 1918 ‘wybuchła’ Polska?,” Trybuna Ludu , November 10, 1987, 1.

146

Independence Day

passant  and no other ﬁ gure than Daszyński—who gets little space—is mentioned.
On the 11th, Trybuna Ludu  referred to the “69th anniversary of Poland’s regaining
independence”—a major concession, even though Piłsudski’s name was not men-
tioned in the articles of that day.

112

A long speech by Jeremy Maciszewski was also printed, which tried to amalga-

mate several narratives of the birth of Polish independence. It was really a victory
for everybody to whom ultimate credit was due: it was the will of the nation that
made Poland free—the endecja position of a bygone era. However, the Piłsudski
return, German disarming, and gaining of power on the 14th—all basic Piłsudskiite
claims—are mentioned as well. Indeed, the legions and the POW are speciﬁ cally
referred to as the rudiments of the emerging Polish Army.

A few scraps of the traditional Party argument are maintained: Piłsudski sup-

ported counter-revolutionaries during the Russian civil war; the Bolshevik Revolu-
tion played a signiﬁ cant role; Piłsudski really abandoned socialism after 1918; the
Second Republic, though not without its achievements, could not overcome
Poland’s principle diﬃ

culties. Finally, among the list of authors of Polish inde-

pendence—a list headed by Piłsudski—are also found proto-communist Julian
Marchlewski and the Party heroine Koszutska-Kostrzewa, dubious progenitors. By
1987, the upper ranks of the Party had gone far in making peace with Piłsudski
and the 11th, though old traditions of opposition were diﬃ

cult to overcome.

113

In 1987, many Polish cities had special masses in honor of the day.

114

Demon-

strations followed the services in Gdańsk, Katowice, Toruń, and Wrocław.

115

ere

were a few arrests. In Kraków, a procession began to march to the center of the city
after mass at Wawel Cathedral. However, the police stopped it.

116

A few people

were able to place ﬂ owers at the Tomb of the Unknown Soldier in the city, but
immediately afterwards one of their number, a member of the Piłsudskiite KPN,
was arrested. Th

e Party was both promoting November 11th and attempting to

stiﬂ e its celebration.

e largest demonstrations took place in Warsaw. Many crowded the street out-

side the Cathedral of St. John; supporters of Solidarity held banners demanding a
“Catholic, not a Bolshevik” Poland. Th

e homilist made an emotional reference to

the day Poland “threw oﬀ its shackles” in 1918, thus fulﬁ lling the “dreams of gen-
erations.” Following this, several thousand began moving in the direction of the
erstwhile “Piłsudski Square” but were confronted by heavily armed police with

112

“69 rocznica odzyskania niepodległości Polski,” Trybuna Ludu , November 12, 1987, 2, 5.

113

“Uroczyste obchody 69 rocznicy odzyskania niepodległości,” Trybuna Ludu, November 12,

1987, 2. Main notes a greater frequency of Piłsudski’s name being mentioned without derogation in
Lublin as early as 1983; see her Trudne świętowanie , 307.

114

e details which follow (except where otherwise noted) are from “Dzień Niepodległości w

zniewolonym kraju. Kordony milicyjne, tarcze i pałki” which appeared in the London Dziennik Polski
on November 13, 1987. It was reprinted in the collection edited by Kazimierz Węgrzecki, Czarne
plamy historii: Kronikarskie odnotowania, 1.9.1939–17.5.1989  (London: Veritas, 1990), 108–9.  See in
addition “Rocznik odzyskania Niepodległości w Siedlcach,” Gazeta Podlaska , December 4, 1987, 4;
“W rocznicę niepodległości,” Tygodnik Mazowsze Solidarnosci , November 11, 1987.

115

See, e.g., “Głosy i odgłosy,” Solidarność walcząca , November 15–19, 1987.

116

Untitled article, Zomorządność , November 4, 1987; “11 listopada na Wawelu,” Zomorządność,

November 19, 1987.

e Party in Ideological Chaos

147

shields and clubs. Th

ere were violent confrontations when about ﬁ fty marchers

broke through the cordon, while others were beaten and arrested. Only Leszek
Moczulski of the KPN and two others made it to the Tomb of the Unknown Sol-
dier to lay a wreath. Moczulski was a devotee of the Marshal.

117

Underground Soli-

darity regarded the celebration of November 11th as a major activity.

118

reﬂ ected the infatuation of the underground with November 11th and Piłsudski.

By 1988, however, the Jaruzelski government adopted a ﬁ nal desperate strategy

to save the regime. It capitulated to the November 11th-Piłsudski nexus it had
been intermittently embracing and combating for more than two decades. Novem-
ber 11th and the whole symbolic paraphernalia of Piłsudski were no longer to be
suppressed but to be assimilated. But no ideologically based regime can survive the
celebration of its antithesis.

Police intervention virtually ended.

119

In Warsaw, they even allowed an “Inde-

pendence Run” through the city streets; something which proved enduring.

120

November 11th the government issued stamps with non-communist political ﬁ g-
ures including, mirabile dictu , Piłsudski.

121

e Catholic journal issued by PAX,

the quasi-regime organization Życie Chrzescijańskie w Polsce , compared July 22nd
with November 11th and lamented that no moment existed in Poland in 1988 in
which to celebrate without problems. If we read between the lines it is a compari-
son to something meaningless and something un-noted. Th

e rest of the issue pro-

vided a traditional endecja history of Poland’s 1918 rebirth without mentioning
Piłsudski at all.

122

It seems the Catholic Right was less inclined to compromise with

the Piłsudski tradition than was the Party.

e central change was a special two-day session of the PRL parliament. Th

marshal of the sejm, Roman Malinowski, insisted that November 11th really did
not “collide” with July 22nd. Indeed, November 11th was never suppressed [znie-
sione]. As a result, it really is not necessary to issue a resolution: “I gather that the
government would declare that November 11th has returned as the national and
state celebration.” Such a proclamation would meet with “the recognition of soci-

117

Untitled article, Głos Robotnika , November 16, 1987. Ironically, Moczulski, it seems, had been

a paid agent of the security service for several years prior, becoming an opposition leader only in the
spring of 1977. Th

ereafter, he was arrested uncountable times and repeatedly jailed. Moczulski has

continued to deny the charge which surfaced in 2005; see “Agent Moczulski?,” Życie Warszawy , April
7, 2005, 1; “Sąd: Moczulski był agentem SB do 1977 roku,” Gazeta Wyborcza , April 6, 2005, 1; and
“Lustracja Leszka Moczulskiego,” Rzeczpospolita , November 9, 2005; “Sąd II instancji: Moczulski był
agentem SB,” Życie Warszawy , September 12, 2006.

118

See the front-page untitled article in Gazeta Polska (KPN newspaper), 5, November 1, 1987,

and the essay quoting Piłsudski in extenso entitled “11 listopada,” 4.

119

Żak, “Nadszedł listopad 1918,” 19; Polak, “Niezależne obchody,” 120–1.

120

Pałaszewska, Święto Niepodległości , 37.

121

Dariusz Libionka, “Znaczki pocztowe krajów ‘demokracji ludowej’ źródłem do analizy propa-

gandy komunistycznej,” Polska 1944/45–1989. Warsztat badawczy. Studia i materiały , 6 (2004), 191.

122

“Od redakcji,” Życie chrześcijańskie w Polsce , 11(12) (1988), 8. Th

e lead article in this anniver-

sary journal was a rambling history of post-partition Poland, which emphasized the roles of Dmowski
and Paderewski while selecting November 11th as Independence Day. Curiously, it omitted Piłsudski;
see Zenon Komender, “Drogi do Niepodległości,” in ibid ., 10–30. Th

is same approach is followed by

Zoﬁ a Waszkiewicz in her essay, “Niepodległość Polski w polityce europejskiej lat 1914–1918,”
ibid. , 40–52.

148

Independence Day

ety and sympathy of the government.”

123

Undeterred, the Stronnictwo Demokraty-

czne , the adjunct of the Party in the PRL, called for the restoration of the 11th as
the oﬃ

cial holiday, and he wanted a speciﬁ c act passed to recall the day.

124

e Party historian Henryk Jabłoński, who some years earlier had tried to

diminish November 11th and elevate July 22nd, now achieved his epiphany: in a
speech to parliament he argued that November 11th was the national holiday dat-
ing from 1937. It was the day that Piłsudski gained eﬀ ective power. Th

ough nei-

ther the Left nor the endecja recognized this, the 11th “grew in strength” in Polish
society. Th

e legion movement, led by Piłsudski, dated to 1908 (the founding of the

ZWC). Th

e First Brigade and the POW both played worthy roles. Th

e Bolshevik

Revolution and the Daszyński Lublin government are mentioned only in passing.
Jabłoński, it seems, had become a quasi-Piłsudskiite.

125

e Warsaw City Council moved to create, with only one dissenting vote, a

“Józef Piłsudski Park” near Mokotów Field, where the interewar military reviews
were staged and Piłsudski’s catafalque had been on display in 1935. Th

is would,

the resolution read, “return to its proper place in the history of the nation the ﬁ g-
ure of Marshal Józef Piłsudski, the creator of the reborn Fatherland.” Th

e council

reminded the city that before the war there had been plans to have a “Józef Piłsudski
Boulevard,” and that many things were now being re-named in his honor. After all,
they continued—in a striking comment—November 11th is a “symbolic date” for
Poles “even though it was not always honored. Th

ey wanted to recall the date ‘as

fast as possible’ because so much time has passed since people have grown up who
did not attach any signiﬁ cance to it.”

126

On November 11th, a huge, though uncrowned, eagle appeared on the front

page of Trybuna Ludu . A picture of government representatives laying a wreath on
Piłsudski’s sarcophagus was beside it. Th

e Party paper was now rivaling the

Piłsudskiite press of the inter-war period in its celebration of Piłsudski. In an ar ticle
entitled “Fulﬁ lling the Desires of the Polish Nation,” we read of the March of the
First Brigade on August 6th, 1914, that Piłsudski was “the founder of the legions,
the chief of state, and a man of legend.” Army oﬃ

cers and many Party dignitaries

attended ceremonies at Piłsudski’s grave at the Wawel. Th

e band played “My,

Pierwsza Brygada,” and a banner was laid: “To Józef Piłsudski from the leaders of
the PRL.” Th

e Party reminded us that all Poles, even those living abroad, acknowl-

edge November 11th as Independence Day.

127

e Second Republic was now praised, and masses in churches throughout

Poland were announced and ceremonies were held in many cities, with celebra-

123

“W 70 rocznicę niepodległości: Uroczyste posiedzenie Sejmu,” Życie Warszawy , November 8,

1988, 1. “Upamiętnienie 70 rocznicy odzyskania niepodległości,” Życie Warszawy , November 10,
1988, 1–2; ”Uroczyste posiedzenie Sejmu PRL,” Trybuna Ludu , November 10, 1988, 1–3. Malinowski
was technically correct: the PRL never legally dethroned November 11th although, curiously, it did
legally disallow May 3rd celebrations; see Kaczyński, “Zakazane Święta.”

124

“11-listopada świętym państwowym: Propozycja Stronnictwa Demokratycznego,”

Życie

Warszawy , November 9, 1988, 1–2. Earlier, the Party had championed the restitution of May 3rd.

125

“Przemówienia Henryka Jabłońskiego ,” Trybuna Ludu , November 10, 1988, 3.

126

“Sesja stołecznej Rady Narodowej,” Życie Warszawy , November 10, 1988, 2.

127

“Spełnione dążenia narodu polskiego,” Trybuna Ludu, November 11, 1988, 1.

e Party in Ideological Chaos

149

tions starting, notably, on the 10th.

128

Party headquarters in Warsaw was draped in

a huge banner celebrating 1918. General Jaruzelski greeted thousands of marchers,
and soldiers in period uniforms (including legionnaires) were on guard at the
Tomb of the Unknown Soldier.

129

is was followed by a banquet at the Wielki

Teatr at which General Sosnkowski’s widow was guest of honor. Legion songs were
sung and actors portraying Piłsudski and his legions made an appearance. Th

“mass for the Fatherland,” celebrated at the garrison church in Warsaw, was carried
live by Polish television to begin the festivities of the day. Warsaw mounted an
exhibit at the Royal Castle dedicated to “the ﬁ rst days of independence,” which
began portentously with November 11th.

130

e Party’s Trybuna Ludu was more eﬀ usive about Piłsudski and November

11th than was the capital’s daily Życie Warszawa , the front page of which carried a
note from the Soviet Communist Party congratulating the Poles on Independence
Day; a photograph of legionnaires meeting at ZBOWiD headquarters; news that
there would be an artillery salute in Warsaw to honor the day; a story emphasizing
how important was the march of the Pierwsza Brygada on August 6th, 1914; and
reports of November 11th abroad.

131

is was followed by a special four-page sup-

plement containing Edmund Tomaszewski’s essay “Independence after 70 Years!”
[Po 70 latach: Niepodległość!]—the title of which says it all.

132

And an article by

Władysław Tybura discussing the “Legion Idea of Józef Piłsudski” and the fact that
November 11th, though times change, belongs forever to all Poles.

133

Also included

were the memoirs of a POW veteran from Radom, a discussion of the historiogra-
phy surrounding Piłsudski, and an interview with one of Poland’s best-known
modern historians, Andrzej Ajnenkiel, in which he noted that only now could he
speak openly about Piłsudski.

134

e regime even adopted the practice of the sanacja by creating special commit-

tees to oversee national celebrations of Independence Day. Th

e chief one, in Warsaw,

was headed by Jaruzelski himself, and included everyone from high- ranking Party
stalwarts to the old-time singer Mieczysław Fogg.

135

e Party made pathetic

attempts to join this barrage of Piłsudskiite imagery by noting that it had restored a
legion cemetery near Tarnobrzeg, and that the Party’s two most famous generals,
Michał Rola-Żymierski and Zygmunt Berling had, after all, been legionnaires.

136

128

Ibid.

129

Pałaszewska, Święto Niepodległości , 13.

130

“Duszpasterstwo WP na 70-lecie niepodległości,” Trybuna Ludu , November 7, 1988, 2.

“Uroczysta odprawa wart,” “Koncert w Teatrze Wielkim,” Trybuna Ludu, November 11, 1988, 12–13;
“Cała Polska uroczyście obchodziła,” Życie Warszawy , November 12–13, 1988, 1–2, 4.

131

See Życie Warszawy , November 11, 1988, 1.

132

Edmund Tomaszewski, “Przed 70 laty: Niepodległość!,” Życie Warszawy , November 11, 1988,

supplement.

133

Władysław Tybura, “Dziedzictwo,” Życie Warszawy , November 11, 1988.

134

Maria Sylwia Walewska, “Już jest ta Polska,” “Powrót na tron?” [interview with Andrzej Ajnen-

kiel], “Biograﬁ a pierwszego Marszałka Rzeczpospolitej,” Życie Warszawy , November 11, 1988 [supple-
ment], 1–2, 4.

135

“Ogólnopolski honorowy komitet obchodów 70 rocznicy Odzyskania Niepodległości przez

Polskę,” Trybuna Ludu, November 12–13, 1988.

136

“Od Legionów do ludowego wojska,” Trybuna Ludu , November 12–13, 1988, 5.

150

Independence Day

e legions were the subject of much attention, including a long sympathetic

essay in Życie Warszawy to the eﬀ ect that a special museum to the legionnaires was
to have been erected at their bivouac at the Oleandry in Kraków, whence the
march of August 6th. However, the Second Republic only succeeded in building
one of three buildings by 1928. Th

e site was now a petrochemical company with a

parking lot attached. At this rather dismal site, was erected for the ﬁ rst time a
monument to Piłsudski; ﬂ owers were lain at a stone to the dashing legionnaire
Władysław “Belina” Prażmowski, and thus “Oleandry returns oﬃ

cially to the col-

lection of places of national memory”; “symbol of that eﬀ ort which began inde-
pendence.”

137

e Party, we see, was more attentive than the sanacja about

preserving Piłsudskiite mementoes. Th

e paper also reported that Piłsudski’s home

(at Sulejówek near Warsaw) was going to be rebuilt as a museum; that a local street
was re-named after him, and a plaque had been unveiled. Th

is re-constructed the

legion–Piłsudski–November 11th lineage and relegated the endecja, as well as
Party-position, to nothingness.

138

In Katowice, posters with a crowned eagle rising from broken chains were dis-

tributed. Bydgoszcz mounted an exhibit on Piłsudski and the seventieth anniver-
sary; Radom did much the same, as did Zakopane.

139

On November 11th Rzeszów

opened an exhibition of the military eﬀ orts of 1914–18, with a signiﬁ cant portion
about the legions.

Virtually every city in Poland had a November 11th demonstration, some

with thousands in attendance. Piłsudski’s likeness, reference to the legions,
singing of legion songs, and other symbols of the inter-war era abounded.
Wreaths were laid at legionnaire graves, monuments restored, and public thanks
oﬀ ered up to Piłsudski. Th

ere were large conferences in Poznań and Kraków

featuring Piłsudski and the legions. Warsaw mounted an exhibit at the Royal
Castle dedicated to “the ﬁ rst days of independence.”

140

e advertisements fea-

tured a large photo of Piłsudski.

141

In the cathedral in Warsaw a plaque to

Piłsudski was unveiled in conjunction with the seventieth anniversary and a
striking picture of the Marshal was circulated. Th

ere were large conferences in

Poznań and Kraków regarding the ﬁ rst years of independence, both featuring
Piłsudski and the legions.

142

An atmosphere of great relief and satisfaction was seen everywhere. Th

e oﬃ

cial

press reported on many of these, and they were recounted with jubilation by the

137

Janina Paradowska, “Oleandry,” Życie Warszawy , November 12–13, 1988, 1–3; cf. Dobroński,

“Obchody,” 15.

138

“Uroczystości w Sulejówku,” Życie Warszawy , November 14, 1988, 1–2.

139

Both of these posters may be found in Rocznicy i obchody odzyskania niepodległości-plakaty.

DZS.

140

Invitations and announcements to all these events can be found in Rocznice i obchody.

Odzyskanie niepodległości 11-listopada. Broszury. Warsaw’s exhibit still began,

nota bene , with

November 7th; old traditions die hard.

141

See the poster entitled “Wystawa w Zamku Królewskim,” in Rocznice i obchody. Odzyskanie

niepodległości 11-listopada. Plakaty.

142

See the catalogues dated 1988 in Rocznice i obchody. Odzyskanie niepodległości 11-listopada.

Broszury.

e Party in Ideological Chaos

151

underground papers.

143

Oﬃ

cial and unoﬃ

cial celebrations were now indistin-

guishable, though the motives were quite diﬀ erent.

A striking coin was issued by the mint bearing the likeness of Piłsudski, the ﬁ rst

with his image since 1939. Th

e obverse depicts a rather youthful Piłsudski with the

legend “Seventieth Anniversary of the Regaining of Independence.” Th

e reverse is

a compromise: neither the eagle of the legions nor the state version of 1918–39,
but the crownless eagle of the PRL—the regime was making a pathetic attempt
symbolically to appropriate the Piłsudskiite tradition, yet hang on to feathers.

e PRL had never issued a stamp commemorating Independence Day or depict-

ing Piłsudski. Th

ere had been a number celebrating the Bolshevik Revolution, how-

ever. Indeed, no stamps at all were issued on November 11th until 1968. On that
day, the Party tastelessly issued a stamp in conjunction with the 5th Congress of the
Party. Th

ere were again no stamps issued on that date until 1975 when the restora-

tion of an old building was noted and, in 1978—the sixtieth anniversary—we see a
picture of the Warsaw zoo. Th

en, suddenly, in 1988, when the regime was making

so many gestures toward the Piłsudskiite tradition, a November 11th sheet was
issued entitled: “seventieth anniversary of Poland’s regaining independence.” It
included Daszyński, Witos, Wojciechowski, Korfanty, Paderewski, and Narutowicz
(all prominent ﬁ gures from the Second Republic); the communist pioneer Julian
Marchlewski (a small face-saving); and, ﬁ nally, Piłsudski.

A striking demonstration of this volte-face was the issuance of a small book

entitled March, March Polonia: Th

e Songs with Which We Gained Independence by

Wacław Panek.

144

e volume began with the following words: “On November 11,

1918, after more than a century of slavery, Poland regained its independence.”

145

e introduction went on to emphasize the role of Piłsudski and the legions in the

regaining of Polish independence, and to present the music and texts of a number
of traditional patriotic airs, with particular attention to the songs of the legions,
including the melodies associated with Piłsudski and the First Brigade.

146

In both

tone and content, this small volume could well have been released by the Piłsudski
Institute in 1935. Additionally, it was issued in a very large edition of over 50,000.

143

See, for example, Wolna Polska (Wrocław), November–December, 1988; Nasz Głos (Białystok),

November, 1988; Głos Śląsko-Dąbrowski  (Katowice), November, 1988; Solidarność. Informator. Region
Środkowo-wschodni  (Lublin), November 27, 1988; Feniks  (Gorzów Wielkopolski), November 17,
1988. In Toruń, which had virtually no tradition of commemorating November 11th (as late as 1975,
the local press heralded the day as the anniversary of Angola’s independence) the situation changed
after 1988. See Mirosław Goloń, “Obchody rocznic odzyskania niepodległości na Pomorzu od lat
dwudziestych do dziewięcdziesiątych XX wieku,” in Zbigniew Karpus, ed., Drogi do niepodległości
(Toruń: np, 2003), 220–7.

144

Wacław Panek, Marsz, marsz Polonia: Pieśni, z którymi szliśmy do niepodległości (Warsaw: Insty-

tut Wydawniczy “Nasza Księgarnia,” 1988).

145

Ibid. Th

e volume is not paginated.

146

Included in the collection are a number of songs associated directly with Piłsudski and the

Pierwsza Brygada, including “Pierwsza kadrowa,” “My, Pierwsza Brygada,” and the personal paean to
Piłsudski, “Pieśń o wodzu miłym” complete with a heroic drawing of the mounted Marshal. Th

author comments laconically that the ardently Piłsudskiite “My, Pierwsza Brygada” was a song that
“elicited such powerful emotions, released such a great wave of patriotic feeling” that, along with four
others, it could well have become the national anthem. Few Piłsudskiites would have dared present so
controversial an argument before World War II.

152

Independence Day

Panek’s pamphlet is the published epitaph of the PRL’s failed war with the
Piłsudskiite tradition of Independence Day in Poland.

Perhaps as striking is the authorities’ willingness to allow a work by Zenon

Janusz Michalski to appear, entitled Siwy strzelca strój [Th

e Gray Uniform of a

Riﬂ eman]. Michalski was a passionate Piłsudskiite, and this work used a title
derived from an anthem of the World War I era in which the “Commandant” is
repeatedly apostrophized as “My beloved Leader.” Th

e book quickly went through

multiple editions and sold 140,000 copies.

147

Other pamphlets of legion song and

poetry, with many pictures of Piłsudski and essays on the traditionally very sensi-
tive subject of the Polish–Russian war of 1919–20 were included.

148

In honor of the seventieth anniversary, Wisełka , the journal designed for circula-

tion abroad to teachers in Polish communities, began with an editorial praising the
importance of November 11th and spoke of Piłsudski’s return on the 10th and
ascension to power the next day.

149

It reprinted Lechoń’s “Piłsudski” and featured a

series of poems celebrating November 11th and Piłsudski’s Pierwsza Brygada.

150

Jan Lewandowski contributed an adulatory essay on the legions, concluding that
on November 11th Piłsudski “began to fulﬁ ll the task which the Commandant
had placed before the legions and the POW.”

151

e cover was Wojciech Kossak’s

famous portrait of Piłsudski astride Kasztanka. Lest the enemy of the commandant
be forgotten, the inside cover had another Kossak piece, a legion charging against
the Russians.

In commemoration with the seventieth anniversary of 1918, 30,000 copies of a

1935 collection of photographs of Piłsudski’s funeral were published. According to
the introduction, “it was an occasion for our Countrymen to turn their attention
to a Person dear to them—Marshal Józef Piłsudski.”

152

An important seventieth anniversary event that demonstrated the Party’s desper-

ate gyrations meshed with the considered opinions of the educational elite was a
large display at the Arsenal in Wrocław, for which a handsome guide of 2,000 cop-
ies was subsequently issued.

153

e exhibit bore the imprimatur of the Ossolineum

and the Historical Museum, and a number of scholars were publically associated
with the display, probably the most well-known being the historian Wojciech
Wrzesiński of Wrocław University. Th

e introduction referred to November 11th as

the “symbol of the triumph of the insurrectionary conception of the rebuilding of
Poland.” Th

is is the essence of the Piłsudskiite genealogy of post-1918 Poland.

e exhibit was devoted to what was described in rather convoluted language as

the “fundamental role” of “national commemorations” [świętości narodowe] that

147

See Zenon Janusz Michalski, Królom był równy (Warsaw-Nadarzyn: Vipart, 1997) , note on the

back cover.

148

See the pamphlet, issued by something called the “Warszawskie koło przewodniko terenowych”

a copy of which is in Rocznice i obchody. Odzyskanie niepodległości. 11-listopada. Broszury. DZS.

149

“Od redakcji,” Wisełka , 3–4 (1998), 1–2.

150

Ibid ., 11, 36–7, 39.

151

Jan Lewandowski, “Legiony, POW, Piłsudski,” Wisełka , 21–5.

152

Idą posępni, a grają im dzwony (Warsaw: Wydawnictwo Polskie, 1988).

153

Unless otherwise noted the following description is from Jeszcze Polska nie zginęła: Wystawa z

okazji 70 rocznicy odzyskania niepodległości. Informator (Wrocław: np, 1988).

e Party in Ideological Chaos

153

154

An important work in this context is Patrice M. Dabrowski, Commemorations and the Shaping

of Modern Poland (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 2004) .

155

Żeromski, who knew Piłsudski well, was a bridge between the positivist and neo-Romantic liter-

ary genres.

function as “both iconic and literary-historical” representations” and also “bearers
of the essence and catalysts of the patriotic disposition” [nośniki treści i kataliza-
tory postaw patriotycznych]. Th

ese holidays “have made real the ethos of armed

struggle for independence.”

ere follow a series of events and people, some very awkward for the traditional

project of the PRL: the 1902 Lwów celebration of the 492nd anniversary of the
victory over the Germans at Grünwald; Adam Styka’s 1891 artworks, such as Polo-
nia , to raise money and consciousness; the re-burial of Kazimierz Wielki in 1869;
the translation of Adam Mickiewicz’s ashes to the Wawel in 1890.

154

ere fol-

lowed a re-capitulation of the growth of neo-Romantic insurrectionary sentiment,
the irredentist tradition, including the cult of Prince Józef Poniatowski of Napo-
leonic fame; the historical works of Szymon Askenazy—one of Poland’s greatest
historians and a devotee of Piłsudski; the huge Jan Matejko painting of Kościuszko’s
victory over the Russians at Racławice; the works of Romantic writers Stefan
Żeromski,

155

and Stanisław Wyspiański—whose famous play Wesele is a monu-

ment to the Polish hero-tradition and to a degree a pre-ﬁ guring of Piłsudski. In
addition there were gloriﬁ cations of Poland’s martial past, allegories and apotheo-
sis, and how these many cultural events were taken up by politics. Th

is spirit was

growing since ca. 1900 and was epitomized by Józef Piłsudski. It was a historical
philosophy based lovingly on Piłsudski’s chosen place in Polish history.

ere followed a re-capitulation of the events of 1918: Piłsudski’s arrival on the

10th accelerated events. However, the major factor on the 11th was the armistice—
here a nod to the endecja narrative. Th

e Second Republic is given a balanced ana-

lysis—not excoriated as in the PRL tradition. Th

ere is no mention of the events of

November 7th in either Lublin or Russia. Th

is is a quasi-Piłsudskiite version of

November 11th, denying him exclusive credit but granting him a major share, and
sweeping other claimants aside.

T H E O P P O S I T I O N A N D T H E U S E O F T H E

P I Ł S U D K I  N OV E M B E R 1 1 T H S Y M B O L

e opposition movements, including the Solidarity underground, issued a large

number of unoﬃ

cial stamps. Th

ese were scattered and ephemeral and there exists

no compendium of them. However, we do have access to a large number.
Considered in toto they present a valuable insight into the political culture that
informed the opposition. Th

e frequency of references to the legions, the ZWC, the

Second Republic, Piłsudski’s colleagues and, most of all, the Marshal himself is
noticeable.

154

Independence Day

156

ere is a Katalog znaczków pocztowych Konfederacji Polski Niepodległej, 1984–1990. Vol. I (Warsaw:

Wydawnictwo Polskie, 1990), which is a partial and imperfect guide to KPN issues. In all other instances
the stamps mentioned are in the possession of the author.

e ﬁ rst to consider is the several issues of the Piłsudkiite KPN. In the 1984–90

period they issued approximately 250 stamps, many quite crude. Among these were
nine commemorating November 11th, 1918 (most issued in 1998); nineteen
depicting the legions and twenty-ﬁ ve bearing Piłsudski’s likeness. Several of these
were copies of the stamps of the Second Republic featuring Piłsudski and the legions
in juxtaposition. Th

e others ranged from contemporary political prisoners, leaders

from 1939–45, the Pope, celebrations of the Second Republic and others.

156

e Solidarity underground or its various branches issued a large number of

stamps, whose range and number have not been calculated. Among these we see a
number of signiﬁ cant images; although we cannot pretend to completeness. On
Independence Day the Wrocław underground issued two very large images of
Piłsudski: one superimposed over a legion eagle, the other over the borders of
1921–39. Both celebrated Piłsudski in conjunction with November 11th. Solidar-
ity in 1985 issued a double portrait of Piłsudski with a quotation: “He who builds
on lies and falsehood is weak in comparison to him who wants to build upon the
truth.” Two other blocs of six were also issued. One included randomly chosen
images of Piłsudski; the other contained likenesses of his lieutenants Sławek and
Sosnkowski, and the legion eagle.

e November 11th stamp in 1986 from Bytom depicted Piłsudski and the

legions. Th

e same year Tomaszów Mazowiecki issued a double stamp: one a por-

trait of Piłsudski with saber, the other a legion eagle. Th

is appeared in a number of

variations. Another Solidarity branch issued a reproduction of the November 11th,
1938 portrait of Piłsudski leading the legions.

In 1988, there was a profusion of Piłsudski issues. Several with the Solidarity

mottos displayed the Marshal and the legion eagle; another, quite large, showed
Piłsudski with a lengthy quotation: “as long as a single Polish heart beats the name
of Poland will not disappear from the world.” Two others had the legion eagle
mounted on a cross. A large series of Nowa Huta stamps depicted Piłsudski at vari-
ous stages in his life and the legionnaire eagle, all bearing the reference to the eighti-
eth anniversary. A striking bloc of stamps was entitled “March in the footsteps of
the First Cadre,” depicting the legionnaires dated August 1914 and their combat
route against the Russians as well. Th

e third stamp showed the August 1988 solidar-

ity marchers, a signiﬁ cant linkage. Another series presented four legion badges from
1914 over the Solidarity banner. A bloc of six displayed the legionnaires in combat.
Eleven larger KPN issues pictured Polish Risings since 1768: one from the legions,
another from the POW; one had a quotation from Piłsudski. Th

ere were other

legion eagles, Piłsudski portraits, and depictions of heads of state of the Second
Republic (Piłsudski gets two portraits, the others only one). A particularly worthy
issue from the Warsaw branch of Solidarity carried the likenesses of Piłsudski and
his Magdeburg compatriot Sosnkowski and was dated June 1988; it marked the
eightieth anniversary of the founding of the ZWC. It carried a quotation from

e Party in Ideological Chaos

155

157

Stamps in author’s possession.

158

“Oświadczenie,” Paragraf , November 20, 1988, PUP.

159

“Manifestacja niepodległościowa,” Z dnia na dzień , November 3–16, 1988. PUP.

160

Andrzej Korycki, “11 listopada,” Nauczyciel, 3, November, 1988. PUP.

161

“Wieczór który zbudził Białystok,” Nasz Głos (Białystok), November, 1988. PUP.

162

“Harcerze,” Okieńko: Niezależne pismo dzieci , 21, November, 1988, PUP.

163

“Piłsudski: Romantyzm bez iluzji, ” Tu i Teraz , 71, November, 1988. PUP.

164

Untitled article, Wiadomości bieżące , October 30–November 11, 1988, 1. PUP.

165

“Pamięć o niepodległej,” Dekada Polska , November 15, 1988. PUP.

Piłsudski: “Th

e creation of the ZWC was a fact of enormous historical meaning. By

this act was begun the ﬁ nal victorious phase of the Poles’ struggle for an independ-
ent state.”

157

ere was even an unusual bloc of Woodrow Wilson, Dmowski, and

Piłsudski celebrating the seventieth anniversary. It pictured Poland within its 1939
frontiers, the date 1988, and the words “We are ﬁ nally free.”

In 1989, a double stamp dated November 11th was issued with the words

“Małopolska again,” i.e. free once more. Postcards with Piłsudski and the legion
eagle, and an odd grouping of ﬁ ve pictures: Piłsudski the largest, Jędrzej Moracze-
wski, and Kazimierz Bartel, two Piłsudskiite prime ministers; and Haller and Kor-
fanty (two opponents). It was entitled “Creators of Poland” issued by Warsaw’s
“Niezłomni,” and had an odd cast of characters. A stamp memorializing the anni-
versary of the death of Leopold Lis-Kula was issued. He was the perfect legion
symbol: in every way a remarkable man, he had been a member of the Związek
Strezelecki, a legionnaire, and a POW member. He rose with phenomenal speed
through the ranks, was wounded, and decorated several times. He was killed at age
twenty-two while ﬁ ghting the Ukrainians, already holding the rank of colonel. He
was particularly beloved by Piłsudski: the ultimate legionnaire.

e underground press issued a profusion of anniversary stories, most carrying

Piłsudskiite or legionnaire motifs. Kraków’s Paragraf exclaimed that November
11th was widely celebrated for the ﬁ rst time in the history of the PRL.

158

Wrocław’s

Z dnia na dzień noted that there was a large November 11th demonstration for the
ﬁ rst time in ﬁ ve years. Th

ey wanted to “thank” Piłsudski.

159

A similar gesture was

reported in Gorzów Wielkopolski. Poznań’s independent paper noted on Novem-
ber 11th that Poles had had their own history taken from them for years.

160

Białystok’s underground journal reminded its readers in November that it all
started with the August 6th march of the First Brigade in 1914.

161

On Independ-

ence Day, Okienko , an underground publication for children, had a special issue
ﬁ lled with legionnaire drawings, portraits of the Marshal, and quotations from
him.

162

Tu i teraz reminded its readers that Piłsudski was a Romantic not in favor

of prosaic organic work.

163

Wiadomości bieżące from Gdańsk began its November

11th issue with Piłsudski’s most famous quotation, the one inscribed on his grave,
about he who never gives up being the true victor.

164

Dekada Polska counterpoised

November 11th with the gaining of independence, and 1944 with its loss.

165

journal “for internal use” issued by the Kraków episcopate began with a large pic-
ture of Piłsudski (hardly a model Catholic) followed with a Lechoń poem, and
explained that this was an especially important year for Poles. On the one side was
the “noisy voice of state propaganda”: people putting ﬂ owers on the graves of

156

Independence Day

166

“1918–1988 ,” Czuwamy , November, 1988. PUP.

167

“Pytanie do Ministra Jerzego Urbana,” Wiadomości bieżące , October 30–November 11, 1988.

PUP.

168

“W 70-tą rocznicę odzyskania niepodległości,” Głos Śląsko-Dąbrowski , November, 1988. PUP.

169

“Oświadczenie,” Paragraf , November 20, 1988, 1.

170

Untitled article, Solidarność: Przegląd wiadomości agencyjnych , November 25, 1988. PUP.

171

“Niedziela w Gdańsku,” Tygodnik Mazowsze Solidarności , December 14, 1988. PUP.

172

“Oświadczenie,” Paragraf

, November 20, 1988; untitled article,

Obserwator Wielkopolski ,

December 26, 1988. PUP.

173

Untitled article , Wiadomości bieżące

, October 30–November 11, 1988; “Oświadczenie,”

Paragraf, November 20, 1988, 1. PUP.

174

Lech Pękosławski, “11 listopada: ku niepodległości,” Głos wolnego Robotnika, November 15,

1989, 1 PUP.

Piłsudski and the legionnaires; the same people who, ﬁ ve or ten years before,
wanted to destroy these very monuments. On the other side were those loyal to the
idea of independence.

166

Wiadomości bieżące from Gdańsk put forward the most obvious question to the

government: why are you allowing November 11th celebrations now while you
excoriated Piłsudski just a few years ago?

167

A Silesian independent organ noted

that the regime now wanted to link itself to both the First and Second Republics.

168

e Party’s embracing of November 11th was too repulsive for some of the under-

ground press: Kraków’s Paragraf reminded its readers that many who now praised
Piłsudski had persecuted patriots only shortly before. “Th

e PRL is not the true heir

of the Second Republic” it insisted, but, to the contrary, its opponent: “Poland still
awaits its Independence Day.”

169

e regime’s reaction to all these manifestations was disordered: while virtually

proclaiming the re-institutionalization of November 11th as the national holiday,
its forces occasionally broke up patriotic demonstrations on Independence Day.

170

ere was a near-riot in Gdańsk and considerable violence.

171

ere were similar

events in Katowice. Poznań’s mayor would not allow demonstrations on the 11th.

172

e legionnaire organization, Union of Legionnaires [Związek Legionistów], was

not allowed to register as a legal body

173

What the regime was facing in accommodating the opposition was signaled by

Lech Pękosławski’s essay in the still quasi-underground press. He lectured the Party
that accepting November 11th meant the denunciation of the Soviet invasion of
1939, the recognition of the London exile authorities as the legal government of
Poland, the celebration the August 6th, 1914 march of the legionnaires, the
acknowledgment that Poland regained its freedom in 1918 “by the sword,” and
recognizing “the will and genius of the Commandant.”

174

To be worthy of the

opposition’s Weltanschauung, the Party still had much work to do. Th

e regime and

the opposition could both use Piłsudskiite trappings, but the conjuring was not
the same.

e Function of Independence Day in the

ird Republic: Since 1989

N OV E M B E R 1 1 T H R E D U X ?

e communist regime fell in 1989, replaced initially by the Party’s General

Wojciech Jaruzelski as president and the long-time anti-communist Tadeusz
Ma zowiecki as premier. While the government was still in transition, Independ-
ence Day was similarly a commemoration in transition. On February 15th, 1989,
November 11th had been oﬃ

cially restored to its 1937 status as an oﬃ

cial holi-

day.

e crowds in Warsaw that November were moderate, and the ceremony

was spontaneous and without clear organization. It was as though the population
was still unsure what to celebrate and how to do so.

e main square in Warsaw was

re-named “Józef Piłsudski Place” as it had been during the Second Republic. In the
corner facing the square a plaque was installed with a likeness of the Marshal and
an inscription neatly avoiding all but the heroic aspects of Piłsudski’s long and
controversial career:

Józef Piłsudski (1867–1935), statesman, Marshal of Poland, incarnation of the desire
for independence, creator of the Legions, ﬁ rst Chief of State, victorious commander
in the war with Bolshevik Russia.

A military band played “My, Pierwsza Brygada,” the Piłsudskiite marching song; a
statue to him was formally begun; large crowds assembled; state and church digni-
taries spoke and prayed. It was symbolic that among the celebrants during the day
were Jaruzelski, and Piłsudski’s granddaughter, Joanna Onyszkiewicz.

However, as

the holiday fell on a Sunday, the government was conveniently excused from any
oﬃ

cial announcement of a state holiday.

Large events were held in Kraków for the

“repose of the soul of Józef Piłsudski” followed by a procession. An odd event
began (which is still held) of a race from the Oleandry—where the First Brigade
marched out on August 6th, 1914—to the Piłsudski Mound and back again. We

See the “Decree of February 15, 1989” in Mirosława Pałaszewska, Święto Niepodległości; Katalog

wystawy (Warsaw: Muzeum Niepodległości, 2004), 36.

Zdzisław Pietrasik, “Sztuczne ognie,” Online at Polityka , 47, 1998, online at <http://archiwum.

polityka.pl/art/sztuczne-ognie,389463.html>;

“Sny listopadowe,”

Wiadomości: Tygodnik NSZZ

Solidarność . (Mazowsze region), November 12, 1989, 1. PUP.

Author’s personal observation.

Pałaszewska, Święto Niepodległości , 15.

“Święto Niepodległości,” Donosy , 381, November 12, 1990.

158

Independence Day

can see this as another symbolic journey: from the humble beginnings of 1914 to
immortalization for Piłsudski and his minions.

e recapitulation of the March of

the First Brigade, from Oleandry to Kielce, was re-enacted for the twenty-ﬁ fth
time since 1945: an unusual event intermittently tolerated by the PRL
authorities.

By 1990, rhetoric had become passionately patriotic and the victory over the

Bolsheviks had considerable attention. Th

at aside, it was essentially a Piłsudski-

legion ceremony with wreaths lain upon Piłsudski’s coﬃ

n as part of the program.

In 1990 Piłsudski’s two daughters came from London to participate in the wreath-
laying. Th

ere was also a ceremony at the Sowiniec mound.

In the town of Tomaszów Lubelski, a local committee celebrated the 11th with

a dedication of a plaque to Piłsudski and a ﬁ eld mass.

It was noted that the monu-

ment was destroyed during the Stalinist era and restored in 1988 with the support
of the then illegal Solidarity. Th

e base of the monument bore the words, attributed

to Piłsudski: “One may not trample upon the altars of the past.” Th

e nation must

“preserve its heroes” the inscription continued, “to save the consciousness” of the
country. “No one may again deny the historic service of Piłsudski and the Legions.”
Large, crowned, legionnaire eagles were on display. Similar events were held in
Katowice. Placards with the PRL eagle in juxtaposition to the inter-war version
were common.

For the next few years, unveiling of statues of Piłsudski were car-

ried out in many places in Poland on November 11th.

e press noted that 1991 was a more “oﬃ

cial” celebration: Piłsudski’s ancient

daughter was again a guest of honor; scouts re-enacted Piłsudski’s return to the
capital in 1918; television broadcast historic ﬁ lms; and a greater eﬀ ort was made to
re-contextualize the event.

“Even the former communists became Piłsudski fans,”

noted the historian Wojciech Roszkowski, ironically.

ereafter, the historicization of the celebration proceeded rapidly.

Piłsudski

had once remarked that he would more likely be remembered for his gestures than
his deeds and November 11th been acquiring many accompanying gestures. We

See the poster entitled “11 listopada Święto Niepodległości,” in Rocznice i obchody odzyskania

niepodległości 11-listopada—plakaty. DZS.

A valuable, though chronologically unclear account of the event is Grażyna Falkiewicz, “‘A komu

droga do nieba, to tym, co służą ojczyźnie’”—from a verse by Jan Kochanowski— Oleandry , 1, August,
2001, online at <http://jozwa22.republika.pl/1/droga.htm>. See also “Obchody rocznicy wymarszu I
Brygady,” Gazeta Krakowska , August 12, 1990, 2.

Tomaszów Lubelski had been the scene of anti-Jewish excesses by Poland’s (temporary) Ukrain-

ian ally in 1920. Polish troops had also harassed the local Jews earlier—a foul tradition.

Documents in Rocznicy i obchody odzyskania niepodległości 11-listopada—plakaty. DZS. Cf.

“Uroczyste obchody 72 rocznicy odzyskania niepodległości,” in Rocznice i obchody odzyskania
niepodległości 11-listopada—plakaty. DZS.

Wiesław Leszek Ząbek, “Organizacja Narodowego Święta Niepodległości przez środowiska

piłsudczykowsko-niepodległościowe”, in Andrzej

Stawarz, ed.,

Święto Niepodległości—tradycja a

wspołczesność , (Warsaw: Muzeum Niepodległości, 2003), 84–5.

“Święto Niepodległości,” Donosy , 661, November 12, 1991.

See his remarks in Independence Day Broadcast, Polish Radio, English language service,

November 11, 2002.

A useful, though rather telegraphic summary of events surrounding Piłsudski and November

11th ceremonies in the last several years can be found in Ząbek, “Organizacja,” 84–91.

e Th

ird Republic

159

come closer to the meaning of the quotation if we translate “gestures” as
“symbols.”

ere were elaborate ceremonies in Kraków in 1992 organized by the Union of

Polish Legionnaires. Th

ey celebrated both November 10th and 11th, the Piłsudskiite

tradition, with a military concert in the square and a performance of Wyspiański’s
Emancipation [Wyzwolenie]; also, ﬂ owers being placed at Piłsudski’s grave; a mass
at the Katyń memorial, thence to the Tomb of the Unknown Soldier; and, ﬁ nally,
the screening of the ﬁ lm “Arise my Poland.”

In 1993, on the seventy-ﬁ fth anni-

versary, the organizing committee for the celebration issued a decree which con-
cluded with a famous quotation from Piłsudski: “To be defeated but not give up is
victory.”

By 1994, the ceremonial promotion of oﬃ

cers on the 11th, an inter-war tradi-

tion, was revived. In 1998, on the eightieth anniversary, the commemoration was
made more elaborate, including more Piłsudskiite symbolism.

A rather modest

plaque was installed in Warsaw on the building where he stayed on November
10th, 1918 at 50 Mokotowska Street. It bore this portentous motto: “It is Him we
thank that we are Poles.”

Wprost ran an essay naming Piłsudski the only incontro-

vertible “statesman” in modern Polish history.

ere was a large military review, with soldiers dressed in period uniforms. Th

actor Janusz Zakrzeński became the center of an elaborate annual Warsaw re-
enactment of Piłsudski’s return from Magdeburg. Zakrzeński proclaimed the words
of the despondent idealist Piłsudski: “I grieve only that in a reborn country the
spirit of the nation has not also been reborn.” Cavalry units joined the military
review. Crowds held banners with quotations from Piłsudski. Ryszard Kaczorowski,
last president of the Polish government in exile from the post-1939 era, traveled
from London to join other dignitaries at Piłsudski Square in Warsaw.

A statue to

the Marshal was dedicated in pouring rain in the presence of Piłsudski’s beloved
daughter, Jagoda, now in her eighties.

Lech Wałęsa, ﬁ rst president of post-

communist Poland was, however, not there. Instead, he was in Kraków, laying

See the 1992 poster issued by the wojewoda of Kraków in Rocznice i obchody odzyskania

niepodległości 11-listopada—plakaty. DZS.

Pałaszewska , Święto Niepodległości , 36–7.

In a bizarre recollection of Poland’s endecja past, a ceremony in Torun in 9th–11th November,

1997 featured a wreath at the Haller monument but no mention of Piłsudski. See “Narodowe Święto
Niepodległości 1997” in Rocznice i obchody. Odzyskanie niepodległości 11-listopada. Broszury.
DZS.

“Jemu zawdzieczamy że jesteśmy Polakami”; see Wiesław Leszek Ząbek, “Józef Piłsudski w trady-

cji i legendzie,” Piłsudczyk , 10(37–8), 2000, 17 .

Jerzy Surdykowski, “Mistrzowie zakrętów,” August 2, 1998. Reprinted in May 11, 2006 issue of

Wprost , online at <http://www.wprost.pl/ar/5005/MISTRZOWIE-ZAKRETOW/?I=818 >.

Quite apart from the larger symbolism of Kaczorowski representing the continuance of the Sec-

ond Republic was the fact that he also, ironically, represented the government, which under Sikorski
had tried to de-emphasize the November 11th commemorations.

In his memoirs Mieczysław Pruszyński, a participant, records that an ancient Pauline Father—

perhaps a former legionnaire chaplain—was supposed to bless the statue with holy water but claimed
that he was ordered not to by the Leszek Głódź, chaplain general of the Polish Army, on the grounds
that holy water could not be employed in such a service; an odd tale indeed. See Pruszyński’s Migawki
wspomnień (Warsaw: Rosner i wspólnicy, 2002), 378 .

160

Independence Day

ﬂ owers at Piłsudski’s grave, in an eﬀ ort at yet greater symbolism.

Piłsudski had

become a spirit. Wałęsa explained his motives:

I decided to spend November 10th at the coﬃ

n of the Marshal. It is his iron will, his

extraordinary political intuition that we have to thank for independence. I wanted to
share with him our profound concerns for our Fatherland, to hear, in the silence, and
the void, this great Pole.

However, interpretations of the meaning of November 11th were not completely
uniform. Representatives of the extreme Right, the reborn endecja, maintained
their negative evaluation of Piłsudski’s historic role, and insisted—as in the inter-
war era—that the leader of Poland’s successful eﬀ ort at national independence in
1914–19 was Dmowski.

However, this was a rather isolated view. A leading

member of the populist Right, Leszek Skonka, essayed an interpretation of Inde-
pendence Day that in part reverted to the endecja interpretation of the inter-war
era.

Skonka wished to see November 11th celebrated as a joint product of the

focused will of the Polish nation, not “attributing everything to supernatural power
and exclusively to Józef Piłsudski.” Th

is eﬀ ort at dethroning Piłsudski as the sole

architect of modern Poland was, however, not a repetition of the pre-war national-
ist position. First, Skonka speciﬁ cally acknowledged November 11th as, incontro-
vertibly, Independence Day; second, he made no criticism of either Piłsudski (“It
is impermissible to underestimate the role and signiﬁ cance of Józef Piłsudski”);
and third, and here the break with the traditional endecja practice is most striking,
he had no criticism of the entire Piłsudskiite movement. He did, however, remark
that celebration of the day during the Second Republic became “more oﬃ

cial than

national.”

Instead, what Skonka preferred was to use the day to commemorate a

broad galaxy of patriarchs of modern Poland whilst underscoring the occasion as
the work of reiﬁ ed national will. Th

us, even the non-Piłsudskiite interpretation of

November 11th had, by its eightieth anniversary, substantially appropriated ele-
ments of the Piłsudskiite Weltansicht .

e next year, scenes in Kraków complimented the activities in Warsaw. Th

prime minister marked the occasion by laying a wreath on Piłsudski’s grave in the
Wawel, and large parades moved through the city. Th

e former American president

“Świetowanie niepodległości,” Dziennik Polski , November 12, 1998.

Lech Wałęsa, “Cztery pokolenia,” Wprost , 834, November 22, 1998, online at <http://www.

wprost.pl/ar/3171/Cztery-pokolenia/?I=834>.

See Jędrzej Giertych, “Prymat polityki,” 1–3. Th

ere were also demonstrations of this in 2011.

Leszek Skonka, a leading member of the Solidarity movement in the Wrocław area later became

a sharp critic of Wałęsa and the entire Solidarity leadership. By the late 1990s, he was an active and
mordant critic of the post-communist government of the Th

ird Republic, whose main argument was

that the Polish nation had become pathologically demoralized. His interpretation of November 11th
reﬂ ects his ideological populism with its stress on the need to re-invigorate Poland by convincing the
broad masses of their capacity for great achievements.

Skonka’s analysis is succinctly presented in an address he gave on November 11th, 1998 in

Wrocław, entitled “W hołdzie tym którzy odrodzili Polskę po 123 latach niewoli,” available at <http://
www.wroclaw.com/kpos.htm>. See also “Przemówienie Dra Leszka Skonki na spotkaniu patriotycz-
nym we Wrocławiu przed pomnikiem oﬁ ar Stalinizmu,” Archiwum—problemy Polski posierpniowej—
rok 2000 , Part I, online at <http://www.wroclaw.com/kpos.htm>.

To be sure, the reduction of Piłsudski to merely primus inter pares among the patriarchs of the

Second Republic would not be acceptable to the canonic Piłsudskiite.

e Th

ird Republic

161

George Bush was present.

Kraków soon embellished the celebration with a cav-

alry unit—the “Kraków Ułan Squadron of J. Piłsudski”—in period uniforms, led
by a professional actor to lend the proper panache. Meanwhile, in Warsaw the
speeches, parades, and re-enactments continued.

ey centered at the new statue

of the Marshal at the head of Piłsudski Square, whence the Marshal gazes,
more wistful than heroic, at the Tomb of the Unknown Soldier across the square.
It commemorates the 1919–20 war, Poland’s only great victory since the age of
Sobieski.

Zakrzeński had by now become consumed by his role.

In 2001, the spectacle

of large numbers of soldiers, in 1920 uniforms no less, in the Warsaw presentation,
moved him profoundly. “It is as though they wished to say by their bearing: Ziuk
[Piłsudski’s nickname], do not grieve, we are still here. Look how our lances shine
and the people see it!”

Zakrzeński, himself an ardent Piłsudskiite, had grasped,

perhaps unconsciously, what the Piłsudskiites wanted November 11th to be: the
hero returning from afar, exhausted yet masterful. Th

e army, a symbol of national

will, pronounced romantic yet despairing words: A Piłsudskiite apotheosis. In
1918 Piłsudski was consciously acting out the role of providential ﬁ gure; three
generations later the actor instinctively understood.

In 2001 the ceremony featured the highest state dignitaries laying a wreath at

Piłsudski’s statue, and then President Aleksander Kwaśniewski used the occasion to
endorse EU membership as providing the best future for Poland which, he said,
quoting Wyspiański, was, after all, a “wielka rzecz” (loosely translated as a “big
deal”). Th

e inﬂ uential Catholic journal Tygodnik Powszechny featured a large pic-

ture of Piłsudski for its November 11th issue; a Catholic celebration of Piłsudski
had been unthinkable during his lifetime.

e most important concrete contribution of November 11th, 1918 to the crea-

tion of the new state was the disarming of the Germans and the restoration of the
Poles’ rule in their own capital. In Tygodnik Powszechny Andrzej Romanowski—
under a picture of Piłsudski—wrote that November 11th was not the beginning
of independence, but rather the culmination of the “second November [1830]
Rising: the liberation of Warsaw.” It was “Piłsudski day.”

us Piłsudski and

Regarding 1998, see “Z Okazji Święta Niepodległości,” Donosy , 2431, November 12, 1998, and

“Na nasze Święto Niepodległości,” Donosy , 2432, November 13, 1998; “Hołd Niepodległej,” Dziennik
Polski , November 12, 1998. Regarding 1999, see “Uroczystości w Warszawie: Dzień reﬂ eksji,” Dziennik
Polski , November 12, 1999, and “Obchody Święta Niepodległości: Wolność zdobywana,” Dziennik
Polski , November 12, 1999.

“Święto z ułanami,” Dziennik Polski , November 13, 2000; “Co to jest Święto Niepodległości,”

Donosy , 2911, November 13, 2000; “Świętowanie 11 listopada,” Donosy , 2911, November 13, 2000.

Sławomir Mizerski, “Z marszałkiem po kraju,” Polityka , 45 , November 9, 2002, online at

<http://archiwum.polityka.pl/art/znbsp;marszalkiem-po-kraju,376392.html > .

Janusz Zakrzeński is the author of a strange reﬂ ection, Moje spotkanie z Marszałkiem (Warsaw:

Adam, 2002) about how the role of Piłsudski has come in many ways to dominate his life. Th

ese

remarks come from pp. 55ﬀ . Th

e quotation he attributed to Piłsudski is a paraphrase of Piłsudski’s well-

known remarks of November 1925 made at Sulejówek; see Z. Zygmuntowicz, Piłsudski o sobie (Warsaw:
Omnipress, [1929] 1989), 114–16.

Andrzej Romanowski, “Dzień wolnej Warszawy,” Tygodnik Powszechny , 45, November 11,

2001, 1.

162

Independence Day

November 11th fulﬁ lled what the November Rising—and by implication the
whole nineteenth-century insurrectionary tradition—failed to do: free Poland.

e authorities used November 11th, 2002 for the ceremonial re-opening of the

Piłsudski mound after ﬁ ve years of reconstruction. President Kwaśniewski, who
spent his early career as an oﬃ

cial of the Communist Party, which regarded

Piłsudski as an enemy of the Polish people, solemnly announced that the mound
was “symbolic” and the Polish people were henceforth morally obliged to preserve
it.

is was reminiscent of the sanacja goal of true citizenship. In Warsaw,

Kwaśniewski spoke of Poland’s need to act with unity and self-conﬁ dence, the
same themes Piłsudski announced in 1918.

November 11th had thus come full

circle; we were again in 1935. Piłsudski’s partisans had long ago sought to claim
authorship of independence to promote their hero; by 2002, the anniversary of
independence was, as it had been in 1935–39, used to celebrate Piłsudski.

N OV E M B E R 1 1 T H W I T H O U T T E A R S ?

An eﬀ ort to turn November 11th into an elaborate ritual for inculcating Piłsudskiite
themes was essayed in Wrocław in 2002.

e Wrocław Center for Excellency in

Teaching [Wrocławskie Centrum Doskonalenia Nauczycieli] staged a contest at
the urging of a member of the city council. Th

e winner was to be announced at a

large ceremony in the city square on November 11th, 2002. Th

e project continued

in later years.

e eﬀ ort was to teach patriotism to students when the fatherland is not threat-

ened by war. Twenty-six local schools in the area participated. It was a diﬃ

cult task,

the report describing the program explained: the regaining of freedom is often
related to tragic events rather than to the joyous celebration. Th

is, the authors

argued, is the opposite of what is done by the French, Americans, or Czechs. Mar-
tyrology was not the best school of patriotism. Instead a new positive national cel-
ebration should be created: this led to a series of celebratory events for students at
various grade levels.

Eleven-year-olds made caricatures of Piłsudski, emphasizing his huge musta-

chio. Another group of young students performed a rhythmic “hip-hop” to denote
November 11th. Th

e stage had two large maps of Europe: one with Poland

included, the other without Poland. Standing before the maps, the student would
recite patriotic phrases. November 11th had changed the map. Legion songs such
as “My, Pierwsza Brygada” and the jaunty “Raduj jeszcze serce” [Rejoice my Heart]
were performed, and concluded with the national anthem. Th

is symbolically tied

the Napoleonic legions to those of Piłsudski. Th

e high-school [gimnazjum] stu-

“Obchody Święta Niepodległości: Symboliczne miejsca,” Dziennik Polski , November 12, 2002.

“11 listopada w Warszawie: Dwanaście salw,” Dziennik Polski , November 12, 2002.

Unless otherwise noted, all the information about the Wrocław district school program is from

“Scenariusze radośnych obchodów Święta Niepodległości 11 X [sic] 2002.” A copy of this is in the
unsorted materials of DZS.

“Zbliża się 11 listopada,” Gazeta Wyborcza , April 10, 2004.

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163

dents in the city wrote essays on regaining independence, which featured Piłsudski
prominently; paintings of Piłsudski abounded. Th

e teachers distributed a quiz

with questions such as “What do you know about the Marshal?”

Primary schools held a program to “Celebrate our Independence” with bas relief

of Piłsudski’s mustachio. A 13-year-old girl with the name Szeptycka (ironically
conjuring one of Piłsudski’s most bitter enemies) made a portrait of Piłsudski con-
structed from words clipped from newspapers and magazines: soldier, honor,
guardian, defender, justice, fatherland, duty, pillar of polonism, love of fatherland,
Poland, and others. Th

ere were Piłsudski mustachio contests—the interest in his

mustachio seems to have been a major theme. Lessons planned for various levels
were dominated by references to Piłsudski, as were many quotations from the
Marshal.

A school pamphlet refers to Piłsudski as “the model of patriotism . . . the creator

of the independence of the Polish state.” His “eyes were powerful, his face hand-
some and distinctive.” Th

is entire 80-page guide for teachers was little more than a

celebration of Piłsudski and the legions; indeed, a devotional. Th

e text never men-

tions Dmowski, and Paderewski only once in passing. It is diﬃ

cult to imagine a

school district in inter-war Poland presenting a version of independence so com-
pletely Piłsudskiite in form and content.

ere were no notable changes in the celebration of November 11th for the next

few years. Linkages with other patriotic occasions, such as the 1944 Warsaw Ris-
ing, became ever more frequent as November 11th evolved into a national holiday
of Polish sacriﬁ ce and heroism rather than merely of speciﬁ c events of 1918. In
September 2003, 700 people decided to celebrate the occasion of the Warsaw Ris-
ing by running from the Piłsudski to the Kościuskzo mounds.

Again, the linkage

between Kościuszko and Piłsudski, ﬁ rst adumbrated in 1914, was made. In Novem-
ber 2003, the seventy-ﬁ fth anniversary of independence, Piłsudski’s home in Sule-
jówek opened to the local population after three years of restoration.

A Warsaw

museum mounted an exhibition on Piłsudski and the legions but with art from the
insurrectionary era and portraits of famous soldiers and kings; a most martial pres-
entation.

In echoes of Poland’s multinational Second Republic, the Moslems of

Białystok prayed for Poland on the 11th as did the Orthodox and Protestant popu-
lation in the church of St. Nicholas.

An editorial in Rzeczpospolita , though headed

by a statue of Piłsudski in Warsaw, noted that independence was the work of the
whole nation and mentioned Dmowski, Paderewski, and even Witos by name, an
exception to the mono-Piłsudskiite genealogy.

In an exotic touch, Prime Minister

“Siedemset osób na trasie Marszobiegu Niepodległości,” Gazeta Wyborcza , September 11, 2003.

“Dom Marszałka w Sulejówku jak nowy,” Gazeta Wyborcza , July 11, 2003.

“Trwała historia,” Gazeta Wyborcza , November 10, 2003.

“85. Rocznica odzyskania niepodległości,” Gazeta Wyborcza (Białystok), November 11, 2003.

e practice proved enduring; see “Wierni różnych wyznań modlą się za Ojczyznę,” Wirtualna Polska .

Online at <http://wiadomosci.wp.pl/drukuj.html?kat=1342&wid=8595569>.

“Początek niepodległości,” Rzeczpospolita , November 10, 2003.

164

Independence Day

Leszek Miller celebrated Independence Day in Iraq with the Polish military con-
tingent there.

P U RG I N G T H E P R L

Poland’s upcoming admission to the EU met with various reactions on Independ-
ence Day; members from the radical Right made protests—though these were
minor events.

e governor [wojewoda] of Silesia by contrast spoke of 2004 as

“fulﬁ lling the testament” of 1918, rather than an “infringement on sovereignty.”

“Sovereignty” was a key word in the sanacja vocabulary.

A large Warsaw exhibition was opened with its “most important element” being

materials illustrating “the Legions of Marshal Piłsudski,” opined the

Gazeta

Wyborcza (one of the largest circulation newspaper in Poland).

Rzeczpospolita edi-

torialized that the origins of independence are traceable to the August 6th, 1914
march of the First Brigade, which was considered an “irresponsible episode” at the
time, and only later seen in its real signiﬁ cance. Paderewski and Dmowski were
credited, but Piłsudski had the pride of place, and the only illustration on November
11th was a picture of the Marshal.

2004 marked the sixtieth anniversary of Poland’s “liberation” by the communists

in 1944. As far as Gazeta Wyborcza was concerned, the day should be erased from
deserving commemoration: “no authentic leader returned from Magdeburg.”

Schools in Radom ran out of copies of legionnaire uniforms for historical pageants
because the demand was so great.

Celebrations were now completely national

with activities everywhere: speeches, parades, wreath-layings, and other symbolic
practices.

Contemporary events could not be excluded from recollections of the

past. In Lublin, Archbishop Józef Życiński called upon the crowd to “combine love

“Święto Niepodległości w Babilonie—Mazurek Dąbrowskiego i grochówka,” Gazeta Wyborcza ,

November 12, 2003; “Miller in Middle East,” Th

e Warsaw Voice , November 19, 2003, online at

<http://www.warsawvoice.pl/WVpage/pages/article.php/4133/article> .

See, for example, the report from Opole in “Jak obchodzono Dzień Niepodległości,” Gazeta

Wyborcza (Opole), November 11, 2003. Th

e right-wing Nasza Polska made the curious comparison

that, on November 11th, 1932, Poland was economically sound but on the same day in 2003 it was
poised on the edge of a “catastrophe ”: see Nasza Polska , 45, November 11, 2003.

“Śląskie obchody Święta Niepodległości,” Gazeta Wyborcza (Katowice), November 11, 2003.

e wojewoda of Bydgoszcz used November 11th to refer to the EU as a “new independence.” See

“Bydgoskie obchody Święta Niepodległości,” Gazeta Wyborcza (Bydgoszcz), November 11, 2003.

“Trwała historia,” Gazeta Wyborcza, November 10, 2003.

“Początek Niepodległości,” Rzeczpospolita, November 10, 2003.

“Niepotrzebne święto 22 lipca—komentarz Ernesta Skalskiego,” Gazeta Wyborcza , July 22, 2004.

“Dzień Niepodległości,” Gazeta Wyborcza , November 9, 2004.

A selection of articles from the press indicate the broad nature of the festivities: see “Świętowaliśmy

niepodległość,” Gazeta Wyborcza , November 11, 2004; “Toruńskie obchody Święta Niepodległości,”
Gazeta Wyborcza , November 11, 2004; “Kto stanie pod pomnikiem Legionisty,” Gazeta Wyborcza ,
November 9, 2004; “Pracowite Święto Niepodległości,”

Gazeta Wyborcza , November 11, 2004;

“Obchody Święta Niepodległości,” Gazeta Wyborcza , November 11, 2004; “Święto wolnej Polski,”
Gazeta Wyborcza , November 11, 2004; “Święto Niepodległości w Bydgoszczy,” Gazeta Wyborcza ,
November 11, 2004.

e Th

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165

of the fatherland with love of Europe.” However, not far away a ﬂ ag of the EU was
being burned.

Kwaśniewski delivered a lengthy address. He quoted Piłsudski on civic duty and

ended with the sanacja state patriotism sentiment appropriate to Piłsudski in
1926:

real statehood [państwowość], and a real army—these have always been for our coun-
try matters inseparably united. On November 11th, 1918 Józef Piłsudski took formal
command of all Poland’s armed forces. It is this moment we remember as the begin-
ning of our independence.

Here, the theme of Poland farà da sè , the military explanation of Poland’s rebirth,
the worship of Piłsudski, and the centrality of November 11th are all explained by
a former communist functionary eighty-six years later.

A 2004 poll ranked Piłsudski second (after the Pope) among “Poles of whom we

are proud.” In 1996 the Marshal had been ranked ﬁ rst. Th

e pollsters explained this

relative decline to a greater sensitivity to recent international prestige attaching to
John Paul II.

As Piotr Wierzbicki, no Piłsudskiite, wrote in 1985: “Th

e marshal

has settled in our hearts forever.”

Piłsudski’s connection to Independence Day

was overwhelming: an OBOP poll noted that 54 percent of those questioned
“spontaneously” mentioned Piłsudski “as the person who to the highest degree”
was associated with that day. Th

is attribute was especially noticed by the most

educated of those polled. By comparison Paderewski earned a mere 5 percent and
Dmowski a microscopic 2 percent. Th

e poll indicated that recognition of Novem-

ber 11th increased with education and wealth, and was more prevalent in youth
and among professional people.

November 11th, according to a Pentor public opinion survey, did not become

immediately popular after its re-instatement in 1989. Only 26 percent of the pop-
ulation recognized it as a key national holiday, only barely ahead of adherents of
July 22nd. However, its popularity grew very rapidly and by 2009 it was by far the
choice of the population as the main national commemoration.

Another survey

indicated that from 1989 to 2000 the percentage of the population recognizing the
signiﬁ cance of November 11th increased from fewer than 40 percent to more than
80 percent.

On the occasion of November 11th, a test was prepared in 2006 for

“Święto Niepodległości,” Gazeta Wyborcza , November 11, 2004.

“Wystąpienie prezydenta RP,” interia.pl , November 11, 2004, online at <http://fakty.interia.pl/

fakty-dnia/news/wystapienie-prezydenta-rp,561327> .

“Bohaterowie i antybohaterowie RP,” Gazeta Wyborcza , November 10, 2004.

“Marszałek zadomowił się na dobre w naszych sercach,” in Piotr Wierzbicki, Myśli staroświeckiego

Polaka (London: Puls, 1985), 83.

“Święto Niepodległości i inne święta państwowe w świadomości społecznej,” November, 1999

Ośrodek Badania Opinii Publicznej, Warsaw, online at <http://www.obop.pl/abin/r/518/151-99.pdf >.

Wojciech Szacki, “11 listopada najważniejszy,” Gazeta Wyborcza , April 1, 2009; cf. the earlier

remarks in “11 listopada najważniejszy ,” Gazeta Wyborcza , November 10, 2008; cf. Andrzej Stawarz,
“Pierwsze dni wolności: Warszawa od 10 do 18 listopada 1918r. Wybor materiałow prasowych,”
Niepodległość i Pamięć , 13 (1998), 245–6.

Andrzej Stawarz, “Powinności i dylematy współczesnego muzeum historycznego związane ze

Świętem Narodowym 11 Listopada (na przykładzie Muzeum Niepodległości),” in Stawarz, Święto
Niepodległości , 105–6.

166

Independence Day

high-school students. It had nineteen questions; twelve dealt with the legions or
Piłsudski. Dmowski and Paderewski did not appear anywhere on the multiple-
choice examination.

Janusz Tazbir, the renowned historian, was asked in 2004 to rank the ten most

important dates in Polish history. He included the Battle of Vienna on September
10th, 1683; the Battle of Grünwald on July 15th, 1410; and the Confederation of
Warsaw of January 28th, 1573. Number ﬁ ve was the 1920 Battle of Warsaw, a vic-
tory of Piłsudski’s authorship. However, the ﬁ rst place on the list was given to
November 11th, 1918 “for Poland regained its independence after such a long era
of slavery.”

A 2003 poll conducted by CBOS agreed: November 11th was “the

most important of all Polish dates.” A second poll repeated these results, placing
November 11th before May 3rd.

No other occasion drew major support.

memories of the Second Republic faded, only Piłsudski remained as a ﬁ gure from
the era.

Polls also found that the younger generation attached more signiﬁ cance to

November 11th than did their elders.

In 2008 the prominent scholar Andrzej

Paczkowski was “shocked” at the high level of attachment to November 11th. “It
is very important to the state [note, he did not say ‘nation’] that we are ready to live
in Poland and even to die for it.” Th

ose ready to die for Poland eclipsed a similar

category in the EU.

Long ago, Aleksander Hertz saw the re-emergence of Poland

in 1918 as something still more profound: by re-creating the Polish state, it meant
the real birth of the Polish nation.

e online journal Interia speculated in 2004 what Independence Day meant

for the average Pole: ﬂ ags, ﬂ owers at monuments, military concerts and roll-calls
of the fallen, political speeches, and perhaps the grocery store closed for the day.
Th

ere are no guidelines or regulations indicating the correct conduct; hence Poles

must decide for themselves what to do.

e greatest testimony of Piłsudski’s sig-

niﬁ cance for Poland is that his November 11th now belongs to all Poles.

“Święto Niepodległości—Test,” Interklasa: Polski portal edukacyjny , online at <http://eduseek.

interklasa.pl/artykuly/artykul/ida/4008> .

“Rocznice okiem historyka. Dla Gazety prof. Janusz Tazbir,” Gazeta Wyborcza , November 9, 2004.

“Ulubione rocznice Polaków,” Gazeta Wyborcza , November 9, 2004. Th

ere was a tradition of

going to the countryside in early May: “majówka.” Th

is certainly discouraged public demonstrations.

I have inquired of numerous Poles resident in the PRL about the circumstances of “majówka.” Th

are drawn from all parts of Poland: see the list of letters in the Bibliography. Th

e celebration of May

Day—the 1st—also blurred the special status of the 3rd. Friszke concludes that by the end of the war
May 3rd was the most popular holiday; see Andrzej Friszke “Stosunek do tradycji Sejmu Czterolet-
niego w okresie Drugiej wojny światowej,” in Jerzy Kowecki, Sejm czteroletni i jego tradycje (Warsaw:
Państwowe Wydawnictwo Naukowe, 1991) 299.

“Święto 1 Maja wiecznie żywe,” Rzeczpospolita , May 1, 2009.

“Coraz słabiej pamiętamy II RP,” Gazeta Wyborcza , October 11, 2008.

“Najważniejsze święto,” Rzeczpospolita , November 10, 2008.

“Dumni i gotowi polec za ojczyznę,” Rzeczpospolita, November 8, 2008.

Quoted in Andrzej Micewski, W cieniu Marszałka Piłsudskiego (Warsaw: Czytelnik, 1969), 96.

“Święto Niepodległości,” interia.pl

November 11, 2004,

<http://fakty.interia.pl/news/swieto-

niepodleglosci/560093> ; “Świętowanie rocznicy odzyskania niepodległości,” Gazeta Wyborcza (Radom),
November 11, 2005. Online at <http://wiadomosci.gazeta.pl/kraj/1,34309,3010965.html> .

Zdzislaw Kościelak has recently suggested that November 11th has become “a national bore” for

Poland; see his “Smuta Narodowa,” Wprost , 1042, November 17, 2002.

e Th

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167

In 2005, the Senate unanimously passed a resolution celebrating the eighty-

seventh anniversary of independence on November 11th. It emphasized the many
who had sacriﬁ ced for Poland and concluded by noting the contributions of
Piłsudski, Dmowski, Paderewski, Korfanty, and Witos as well as “hundreds of
others.

”

Otherwise, November 11th in 2005–07 exhibited the features that had become

features of the Th

ird Republic.

National television ﬁ lled the days with patriotic

programming, most about Piłsudski, but with a large component of legion songs
and a special program about the Marshal’s heart resting in Wilno.

Rzeszów held

special services for native son Lis Kula, and the habit of laying wreaths at Piłsudski
and legion monuments was now an established tradition. In Wrocław, an actor
impersonating Piłsudski made his appearance on the 11th—a rival to Warsaw’s
Zakrzeński; the city of Gdynia did better, for their impersonator rode through the
street on a horse. Another actor played Piłsudski in Gdańsk.

Special eﬀ orts were

made there to replicate the style and composition of the parade to resemble those
of the inter-war period.

Warsaw had squads of Polish cavalry parading through-

out the city to great enthusiasm and tears of joy.

Actors at the University of

Warsaw re-enacted the disarming of the Germans in 1918.

In Kalisz, marchers

“Senat przyjął uchwałę z okazji Dnia Niepodległości,” Wirtualna Polska , November 10, 2005.

Online at <http://wiadomosci.wp.pl/drukuj.html?kat=42874&wid=8087738> .

For 2006, see “11 listopada,” Rzeczpospolita , November 12, 2006, and “Obchody Narodowego

Święta Niepodległości,” Ministerstwo Obrony Narodowej—serwis internetowy , November 16, 2006,
online at

<http://mon.gov.pl/artykul_wiecej.php?idartykul=2401>.

“Radosne narodowe święto,”

Rzecz pospolita, November 9, 2006. A good summary of events across the nation is “Cały kraj czci
Święto Niepodległości,”

Bankier.pl

, online at

<http://www.bankier.pl/wiadomosc/Caly-kraj-czci-

Swieto- Niepodleglosci-1508522.html> . For ceremonies in Warsaw and President Kaczyński’s remarks
see “Obchody Odzyskania Niepodległości,” Wprost,  November 16, 2006, online at <http://www.
wprost.pl/ar/96802/Obchody-Odzyskania-Niepodleglosci/>.  A good summary of 2007 is “Święto
Niepodległości,” Rzeczpospolita , November 11, 2007 online at <http://www.rp.pl/artykul/68413.
html> , and “W całym kraju obchodzono Święto Niepodległości,” Gazeta Wyborcza, November 11,
2007 ,  online  at   <http://wiadomosci.gazeta.pl/Wiadomosci/2029020,80291,4663345.html> .

For events in 2005 a sampling illustrates the general themes; see “11 Listopada w Płocku,” Gazeta

Wyborcza (Płock), November 11, 2005; “Uroczyste obchody Dnia Niepodległości w Krakowie,” Wirtu-
alna Polska , November 11, 2005, online at <http://wiadomosci.wp.pl/kat,1342,title,Uroczyste-obchody-
Dnia-Niepodleglosci-w-Krakowie,wid,8088076,wiadomosc.html> ; “Obchody Święta Niepodległości w
Toruniu,” Gazeta Wyborcza (Toruń), November 11, 2005; “Święto Niepodległości,” Gazeta Wyborcza
(Rzeszów), November 11, 2005; “Święto Niepodległości w Lublinie,”

Gazeta Wyborcza (Lublin),

November 11, 2005; “Święto Niepodległości w Katowicach,” Gazeta Wyborcza  (Katowice), November
11, 2005; “Narodowe Święto Niepodległości,” Gazeta Wyborcza  (Częstochowa), November 11, 2005.
For television coverage in 2006 see “Święto Niepodległości w TVP,” wirtualnamedia , online at <http://
www.wirtualnemedia.pl/artykul/swieto-niepodleglosci-w-tvp>.

Regarding the Gdynia impersonation see “Cały kraj święcił Dzień Niepodległości,”

Życie

Warszawy

, November 12, 2005. Regarding events in Wrocław see “Święto Niepodległości we

Wrocławiu,” Gazeta Wyborcza, November 11, 2005. For Gdańsk see “Uczciliśmy 11 listopada, ” Gazeta
Wyborcza , November 11, 2005.

“Trójmiasto w Dzień Niepodległości: ‘walki’ w Gdańsku i marszałek Piłsudski w Gdyni,” Wirtualna

Polska , November 11, 2005. Online at <http://wiadomosci.wp.pl/kat,1342,title,Trojmiasto-w-Dzien-
Niepodleglosci-walki-w-Gdansku-i-marszalek-Pilsudski-w-Gdyni,wid,8088063,wiadomosc.html>.

“Poszli za mundurem,”

Rzeczpospolita , November 11, 2005” and “Uroczyście w Święto

Niepodległości,” Rzeczpospolita , November 12, 2005. For Kraków activities, prominently featuring
Piłsudski, see “Uroczystości niepodległościowe,” Gazeta Wyborcza , November 10, 2005.

“Historyczna inscenizacja,” Rzeczpospolita, November 4, 2006.

168

Independence Day

followed the route Piłsudski trod when he visited the city in 1921.

National

minorities, very rare in the Th

ird Republic, also participated in the ceremonies: the

Orthodox in Białystok, the Moslems in Podlasie, and the now small Jewish commu-
nity. Even the large Polish population across the eastern border in Belarus, Ukraine,
and Lithuania joined in the festivities.

After 2006, Wilno’s Poles gathered at Rossa

cemetery, where Piłsudski’s heart is buried, on November 11th.

is was super-

seded in 2007 when the president of Lithuania visited Warsaw to participate in the
November 11th observations. Th

ese included laying a wreath at Piłsudski’s grave;

a symbolic gesture given Piłsudski’s ties to Lithuania, and the history of unhappy
recent relations between the two countries.

In 2005, an election year, November 11th had become a fully politicized event.

Donald Tusk, running for president, promised that if he were elected he would
report to the nation every May 3rd and November 11th on his foreign policy.

His

political opponent, Jarosław Kaczyński, was so ardent a devotee of Piłsudski that
the journal Wprost referred to him as “Jarosław Piłsudski.” Th

e Marshal had been

his idol since childhood, as had been the case with Wałęsa.

Jarosław’s brother

Lech explained to Gazeta Wyborcza that, had he been there, he would have sup-
ported Piłsudski’s 1926 coup.

He also described himself, in the early years of the

century, as both a Piłsudskiite and a “man of the right,” which would have been
incomprehensible to the Marshal but demonstrates how November 11th tran-
scended the original Left–Right quarrels of past years.

Ever since the tenth anniversary of the restoration of independence, eﬀ orts have

been underway to use the occasion to re-conceive the celebration of November
11th. In 1999 Prime Minister Jerzy Buzek announced a competition for “the best
civic work pro bono publico ” focusing attention, according to Joanna Th

en, on

“social and economic” aspects of independence. It soon grew in popularity and was
“institutionalized” by the early years of the century.

Calls for a less traditional

“Około tysiąca młodych ludzi w Marszu Wolności,” Wirtualna Polska , November 11, 2005.

Online at <http://wiadomosci.wp.pl/drukuj.html?kat=42874&wid=8088018> .

“Koncert w Grodnie z okazji Święta Niepodległości,” Wirtualna Polska , November 11, 2006.

Online at < http://wiadomosci.wp.pl/drukuj.html?kst=1356&wid=8596112> , and “Wileńskie obchody
Święta Niepodległości,” Wirtualna Polska , November 11, 2006. Online at <http://wiadomosci.wp.pl/
drukuj.html?kat=1356&wid=8595660> ; “Ukraina: obchody Święta Niepodległości w Żytomierzu,”
ekai.pl , November 11, 2007, online at <http://ekai.pl/wydarzenia/x13401/ukraina-obchody-swieta-
niepodleglosci-w-zytomierzu/> .

“88. rocznica odzyskania niepodległości,” Kurier Wileński: Dziennik Polski na Litwie , November

21, 2006; “Litwa: Wileńskie obchody Święta Niepodległości,” Gazeta.pl , November 12, 2007, online
at <http://wiadomosci.gazeta.pl/Wiadomosci/2029020,80708,4662006.html>.

See “Prezydent Litwy w Święto Niepodległości w Polsce,” Wprost , November 11, 2007; “Święto

Niepodległości,” Rzeczpospolita , November 11, 2007, online at <http://www.rp.pl/artykul/68413.html>.

“Tusk: 3 maja i 11 listopada sprawozdanie z polityki zagranicznej,” Rzeczpospolita, October 4, 2005.

“Naczelnik IV Rzeczpospolitej,” Wprost , November 12, 2005, online at <http://www.wprost.pl/

ar/82798/Naczelnik-IV-Rzeczypospolitej/>

Janusz Korwin-Mikke, “Kaczyński* 1870,” Najwyższy Czas! , May 20, 2006, online at < http://

korwin-mikke.pl/najwyzszy_czas/zobacz/kaczynski_82011870/116>.

Andrzej Romanowski, “Nie lubię 11 listopada,” Gazeta Wyborcza , April 1, 2009.

Joanna Th

en, “Pro Bono Publico—Obywatelskie Święto Niepodległości,”

ngo.pl

, online at

<http://wiadomosci.ngo.pl/wiadomosci/240457.html>.

e Th

ird Republic

169

approach to Independence Day found vocal support within the Polish political
milieu. For example, in 2002, the conservative politician Jan Rokita called for
“new ways” of displaying patriotism.

is theme of “patriotism of joy” or the

“patriotism of tomorrow” soon attracted a following in several cities throughout
Poland, where eﬀ orts were made to change the traditionally solemn demeanor of
the day.

By 2005, the Ministry of Education was sponsoring the movement.

roughout Poland there were scattered eﬀ orts to expand November 11th from a

government holiday to a civic event. Th

e Wrocław school eﬀ orts since 2002 are an

example. Another is the creation of a “citizen’s Holiday of National Independence”
associated with Kraków, where prizes are awarded for private or organizational
eﬀ orts for community betterment (also entitled “Pro Publico Bono”). A Founda-
tion oversees the event and the cardinal of Kraków is its patron. Th

is is an espe-

cially interesting example of the degree to which November 11th has become a
public, not just an oﬃ

cial, holiday.

Wrocław became a center for celebratory

events on November 11th with the accent on youthful participation and de-
emphasizing the usual military and solemn aspects.

P I Ł S U D S K I I N S T I T U T I O N A L I Z E D

It is a testament to Piłsudski’s standing in contemporary Poland that the anniver-
sary of his death is noted by a large public event involving the president and prom-
inent politicians as well as a general audience. In 2005 the Democratic Left Alliance
[Sojusz Lewica Demokratyczna, or SLD], the post-communist party, was not
invited to attend but did so anyway: a bizarre example of communist reconcilia-
tion with the Marshal. When it started to rain in Warsaw during the midst of the
ceremony, the president of the Union of Piłsudskiites noted that “even heaven
weeps over the grave of the Marshal.” It was an unusually graceful way of moving
the ceremony indoors.

e usually somber Rzeczpospolita quoted Ignacy Mościcki

on the anniversary of Piłsudski’s death that he was “the king of our hearts.”

the same day, the newspaper carried a retrospective on Piłsudski by the prominent
historian Wojciech Roszkowski, who is also a member of Kaczyński’s rightist Law
and Justice Party [Prawo i Sprawiedliwość, or PiS]: in a very positive analysis

“W całym kraju świętowano Dzień Niepodległości,” Gazeta Wyborcza , November 11, 2003.

Regarding the “patriotism of tomorrow” and its relationship to Polish patriotic traditions see

“Ujazdowski: Polacy są przywiązani do tradycji patriotycznych,” Witualna Polska , November 11,
2005. Online at <http://wiadomosci.wp.pl/drukuj.html?kat=42874&wid=8087906>.

“Obchody Święta Niepodległości—patriotyzm jutra,” Gazeta Wyborcza , November 12, 2005;

“Deklaracja ‘Patriotyzm jutra’,” Gazeta Wyborcza, November 11, 2005.

Waldemar Rataj, “Kraków. Obywatelskie Święto Niepodległości,” November 8, 2005, online at

<http://wiadomosci.ngo.pl/x/140395> .

See, e.g., “11.11.2007 Obchody Święta Niepodległości,”

Studente.pl

, November 15, 2007.

Online at <http://studente.pl/artykul.php?id=4607> .

“Marszałek wiecznie żywy,” Onet.pl , May 17, 2005, online at <http://wiadomosci.onet.pl/kiosk/

historia/marszalek-wiecznie-zywy,1,3329753,wiadomosc.html> .

Quoted in “Pożegnanie Marszałka,” Rzeczpospolita , May 14, 2005.

170

Independence Day

emphasizing the Marshal’s far-sightedness, in one or two sentences Roszkowski
disposed of all the criticism leveled against Piłsudski.

In 2008 was the ninetieth anniversary of Polish independence. Zakrzeński, now

noticeably too old for his role, arrived at the Warsaw station in his Piłsudski imper-
sonation. (He always arrives on the same day, November 11th rather than the cor-
rect November 10th: it is a tradition of conscious historical inaccuracy that has
been adopted by the Th

ird Republic). Th

ere was a historical re-enactment: the

Minister of National Defense Bogdan Klich—who spoke tracing the day to the
legions—greeted “Piłsudski” at the station when he arrived, then huge throngs
crowded to greet “the Commandant” at Plac Piłsudskiego, there were even mem-
bers of the 1918 regency government with him.

Soldiers in historic uniforms

were in attendance and military detachments from Ukraine, Hungary, America,
and Germany.

As Życie Warszawy concluded: “Such manifestations on the anni-

versary of Poland’s regaining independence have never happened before.”

ere

were a great many events scattered about, many of a military nature but including
ﬁ reworks, multimedia demonstrations, concerts, and many displays (some with
archival footage). Speeches were, of course, in abundance.

e radical rightist “All-Polish Youth”—whose roots went back to 1922—staged

a minor demonstration calling for a Catholic Poland and the return of Wilno and
Lwów.

e demonstration had curious historical analogies. Poland without

Wilno would have been inconceivable to Piłsudski, a Catholic Poland of little
consequence. Th

e Right—his traditional enemy—was demonstrating in a square

named in his honor to reclaim a city he could never have endured losing.

e day was marred by grotesque partisan bickering. Ceremonies on the 11th

included the German chancellor and the president of Ukraine and Lithuania. Presi-
dent Kaczyński’s speech at the Tomb of the Unknown Soldier was historically gener-
ous and did not repeat the Piłsudskiite-centered analysis of earlier addresses.

However,

the evening was diﬀ erent. Kaczyński invited 800 people to the gala ball—including a
number of heads of state and many foreign dignitaries—arranged as part of the cele-
bration of the day. He omitted Lech Wałęsa, his predecessor and, ironically, fellow
Piłsudskiite; there had been unseemly bickering between the two for some time. Th

marshal of the sejm likened it to refusing to invite Piłsudski during the Second Repub-

Wojciech Roszkowski, “Niepodległość, spelnione marzenie,” Rzeczpospolita , May 14, 2005, 1–3.

“90 lat polskiej niepodległości,” Rzeczpospolita , November 11, 2008; “Jak Warszawa witała

Marszałka,” Życie Warszawy , November 11, 2008.

“11 listopada bez Wałęsy,” Gazeta Wyborcza , November 12, 2008.

“To będzie niezwykle Święto Niepodległości,” Życie Warszawy , November 9, 2008. Th

e newspa-

per also published an hour-by-hour schedule of the celebrations as “Wielki dzień, wiele atrakcji,” Życie
Warszawy , November 11, 2008.

“11-listopada—gdzie warto się wybrać?,” Gazeta.pl , November 10, 2008, online at <http://

wyborcza.pl/1,94898,5901423.html>. An extensive, “blow-by-blow” account is “Obchody Święta
Niepodległości—relacja na żywo,”

Gazeta.pl

, November 11, 2008, online at

<http://wyborcza.

pl/1,94898,5901423.html> .

“Młodzież Wszechpolska przeszła w Marszu Dumy Narodowej,” Rzeczpospolita , November 11,

2008.

For an analysis see “III Rzeczpospolita ma także dobre cechy,” Rzeczpospolita, November 12,

2008.

e Th

ird Republic

171

lic. Prime Minister Donald Tusk was dismayed: Wałęsa belonged in the same pan-
theon as Piłsudski he explained.

Several members of the government refused to

attend in protest of the slighting of Wałęsa.

Kaczyński, in keeping with his broader

genealogy of modern Poland, announced at the ball that November 11th was the
birth of one of Poland’s greatest generations, the “Columbuses” of Polish history.

In addition to the enlarged dimension of the ceremonies, they repeated the activ-

ities of the last several years. In Poznań, cavalry paraded in the uniforms of the inter-
war era; in Wrocław students displayed results of a contest called “Th

e Marshal’s

Moustache.” Kraków also had a parade in historic uniforms, as well as the now-
traditional mass at the Wawel. Bronisław Komorowski, marshal of the sejm—later
president—noted in a speech there that Piłsudski’s legions began in Kraków.

Gdańsk saw mass singing of “My, Pierwsza Brygada,” and a speech by a Piłsudski
impersonator.

100

Other cities staged gatherings, some commemorating events far

from November 11th, but important to Polish national consciousness, such as those
at Auschwitz, or in memory of Katyń, or near the Czech border in remembrance of
the 1938 annexation of Transolzia.

101

Poles in neighboring countries celebrated the

11th, as had become the custom, including at the cemetery in Lwów where the
defenders of the city from the Ukrainians are buried.

102

e Ukrainian authorities

had only recently allowed the re-construction of the site.

What was diﬀ erent was the degree of speculation the anniversary prompted.

Émigré historian Piotr S. Wandycz wrote of the “symbolic day” of the 11th; he also
admitted that controversy still remained as to whether Piłsudski by military action
or Dmowski via diplomacy was the principal author of independence.

103

Norman

Davies noted that the discussion was itself a distraction as it tended to obscure the
role of others.

104

Andrzej Chwałba suggested that Poland would have become inde-

pendent without Piłsudski but insisted on his extraordinary role.

105

Andrzej Friszke

tried to credit both circumstances and symbolic ﬁ gures in his explanation for the
re-appearance of Poland.

106

Tomasz Nałęcz oﬀ ered what amounted to a counter-

factual consideration entitled “Independence without Piłsudski?” in which he con-
cluded that Piłsudski was indispensable. If November 11th was the symbol of the
Piłsudskiite re-creation of Poland, the day becomes symbolically necessary.

107

“Premierowi trudno zaakceptować decyzję prezydenta,” Rzeczpospolita , November 11, 2008.

“11 listopada bez Wałęsy,” Gazeta Wyborcza , November 12, 2008.

“Gala w cieniu nieobecnych,” Rzeczpospolita , November 12, 2008.

“Komorowski o niepodległości w Krakowie,” Rzeczpospolita , November 11, 2008.

100

“Polska świętowała 90. rocznicę odzyskania niepodległości,” November 12, 2008.

101

“Znicze pod Ścianą Straceń na terenie Auschwitz ,” Rzeczpospolita , November 11, 2008.

102

“Uroczystości niepodległościowe na Ukrainie,” Rzeczpospolita , November 11, 2008.

103

Piotr S. Wandycz, “Tym się tylko żyje, za co się umiera,” Rzeczpospolita , November 7, 2008.

104

“Davies: Niepodległość jest kruchą, dlatego trzeba ją pielegnować,” Gazeta Krakowska , November

11, 2008.

105

“Gdyby Piłsudskiego nie było, należałoby go wymyślić,” Gazeta Krakowska , November 11, 2008.

106

He notably avoided mentioning Piłsudski although he spoke of “eminent representatives” who created

“major centers of Polish politics” as “symbolic ﬁ gures” who were vital to the re-emergence of Poland. See his
comments in “Th

e Poles and Independence” in the special issue of Th

e Polish Voice , November 9, 2008, 4.

107

Tomasz Nałęcz, “Niepodległość bez Marszałka?” Tygodnik Powszechny , November 4, 2008,

online at <http://tygodnik.onet.pl/35,0,16770,niepodleglosc_bez_marszalka,artykul.html > .

172

Independence Day

T H E N AT I O N A L H O L I D AY

November 11th has now been quite ﬁ rmly re-implanted as the national holiday,
although May 3rd still enjoys widespread consideration.

108

No one would celebrate

anything on the anniversary of July 22nd, 1944.

109

In a recent issue of Rzeczpos-

polita , Poland’s leading daily, the journalist Maciej Rybiński began a political com-
mentary with words which, by their very matter-of-factness are quite eloquent:
“On the 11th of November we observed the Holiday of the National Independ-
ence of Poland which was secured by Marshal Józef Piłsudski.”

110

On November

11, 2002 the English-language service of Polish Radio broadcast a special program
describing Piłsudski, in the introduction, as “the founding father of independent
Poland reborn in 1918.”

111

at is all: the issue, or at least the paternity, is now

decided. Th

e man and the occasion have become inextricable, a process consider-

ably aided by time’s blurring of clarity.

How deeply the meaning of November 11th, or the Piłsudskiite connections,

has penetrated the minds of contemporary Poles remains an open question.

112

Patriotism and national celebration are vexing questions for contemporary Poles
searching for guideposts in today’s realities.

113

Izabella Main has even speculated

that the Piłsudski “cult” among Poles crested in 1989 and has faded quite rapidly
since; a problematical conclusion.

114

By 2002, many Poles had no idea what had happened on November 11th.

115

is erosion of national memory was essential: to make the originally sectarian

version of November 11th part of the national culture it had to become shorn of
its erstwhile partisan attachments.

116

is was a function of time. Whereas the

Marshal still has his promoters and detractors, he is no longer a really partisan
ﬁ gure in Polish political culture. He has transcended—or perhaps outlasted—that
role. Not long before he died, he remarked “gradually, the nation would lose the

108

As late as 1999, slightly more people recognized May 3rd as the national holiday than Novem-

ber 11th: 92 percent versus 89 percent; see “Święto niepodległości i inne święta państwowe w
świadomości społecznej,” 3.

109

“Niepotrzebne święto—22 lipca: komentarz Ernesta Skalskiego,” Gazeta Wyborcza , July 22,

2004.

110

Maciej Rybiński, “Oświecone Święto Niepodległości Stoenu,” Rzeczpospolita , November 13,

2001.

111

“Independence Day Broadcast,” Polish Radio, English-language service, November 11th,

2002.

112

See, e.g., the discussion of youth in “Woła walentyńki,” Trybuna.com.pl, November 11, 2003.

Online at <http://www.trybuna.com.pl/200311/d.htm?id=1004> .

113

A thoughtful reﬂ ection is Zdzisław Pietrasik, “Orzeł i reszta,” Polityka 45, 2001. Online at

<http://archiwum.polityka.pl/art/orzel-i-reszta,371396.html> .

114

Main, Trudne świętowanie , 349.

115

“Cytat dyplomatyczny,” Wprost , 990, November 18, 2001.

116

A characteristic feature of this was the resolution of the two-Piłsudski controversy after the fall

of communism. Th

e “heroic version” was denied by the PRL in favor of the “Foul Legend” which

stressed Piłsudski’s faults and the excesses of his regime. In the mid-1990s a “Monodrama” appeared
on the Polish stage which presented a Piłsudski with both positive and negative characteristics but,
signiﬁ cantly, whose devotion and service to Polish independence are presented as beyond question; see
Gustaw Romanowski, “Dwa oblicza Piłsudskiego,” Rzeczpospolita , July 4, 1995, 27 . Hence, by render-
ing Piłsudski a hero, however ﬂ awed, November 11th is no longer subject to controversy.

e Th

ird Republic

173

117

Quoted in Julian Woyszwiłło, Józef Piłsudski: Życie, idee i czyny: 1867–1935 (Warsaw: Bibli-

oteka Polska, 1937), 181.

118

Romanowski, “Dwa oblicza Piłsudskiego,” 27.

119

See the remarks by Krystyna Kołosowska in “Independence Day Broadcast,” Polish Radio, English-

language service, November 11, 2002.

120

“Święto na pl. Piłsudskiego,” Rzeczpospolita, May 2, 2006.

121

“Cytat dyplomatyczny—Arytmetyka czy cel,” Wprost, March 5, 2003, online at <http://www.

wprost.pl/ar/48738/Cytat-dyplomatyczny-Arytmetyka-czy-cel/> .

122

Micewski, W cieniu , 410.

123

Mackiewicz, Klucz do Piłsudskiego , 164.

habit of so strongly associating its fate with one person.”

117

Piłsudski is still a com-

prehensible ﬁ gure for Poles, wrote Gustaw Romanowski in 1995, because “Not
much has changed in the national character of the Poles in the last seventy years.”

118

He was perhaps correct. Th

e distinguished contemporary historian Janusz Pajew-

ski, whose extraordinary longevity allowed him to outlast communism, recently
recalled his youth in 1918:

People, who like I, lived through those wonderful never to be forgotten November
days of 1918, see in Józef Piłsudski . . . the vision of “Poland Resurrecting,” the vision
of “Poland Resurrected.” People who lived through the victorious war in defense of the
freshly regained Independence discern in Józef Piłsudski the victorious Leader, who
adorned Polish standards with laurels the like of which it has not known since the era
of Chocim and Vienna. Today’s generation certainly already cannot understand what
the “Vision of Poland Resurrecting” meant for us. But for everyone Józef Piłsudski is
a ﬁ gure in Polish history who devoted the work and eﬀ ort of his whole life to Poland,
who, his entire life, taught national dignity, national pride, taught contempt for those
who would bow to the East or the West. Who taught, “to be defeated and not give up
is victory, but to win and rest on your laurels is defeat.” As he was often defeated, but
he never surrendered.

Complete with its Christian religious symbolism, its geopolitical presuppositions
and martial references, Pajewski has expressed the essential Piłsudskiite under-
standing of November 11th. Fittingly, Polish radio in 2002 described Piłsudski’s
grave as a “shrine.”

119

Religion and politics again are interpenetrated, the sacraliza-

tion of November 11th and all its trappings together with its patron. In yet another
example of historical syncretism, beginning with 2006, the oﬃ

cial celebration of

May 3rd (the only pre-1939 rival of November 11th) was located to Piłsudski
Square in Warsaw, thus he had come to embrace the “other” national holiday.

120

e weekly journal Wprost told its readers that the main function of November

11th was that it was a “good yearly occasion to commemorate the Chief of State
[i.e. Piłsudski].”

121

In a cogent summary, Andrzej Micewski has remarked that, to modern Poles, the

name Piłsudski represents “the independence tradition, with a vision of a noble and
knightly Poland with various positive emotional attributes.”

122

is is the continu-

ing fascination with the Marshal. Th

e fact that that there is no extant Piłsudskiite

ideology is not signiﬁ cant, because there never was one. Indeed, as Stanisław Mack-
iewicz noted a generation ago, Polish love for Piłsudski, not the elements of an
ideology, constituted “great capital” that would serve Poland in the future.”

123

174

Independence Day

124

“Pamięci Romana Dmowskiego,” Myśl Polska , 3, January 15, 2006.

125

See “Roman Dmowski ze styropianu,” Rzeczpospolita , April 24, 2006.

126

“Reagan na placu,” Życie Warszawy , June 8, 2004.

127

“Stolica powinna uhonorować Dmowskiego,” eLPR: serwis internetowy Ligi Polskich Rodzin , April 25,

2006, online at <http://www.lpr.pl/index.php?sr=!czytaj&id=2536&dz=kraj&x=8&pocz=2895&gr= >.

128

“Dmowski patrzący na Jazdów,” Rzeczpospolita , April 25, 2006; cf. “Roman Dmowski ze

styropianu.”

129

See “Pomnik Dmowskiego wzbudza kontrowersję,”

Gazeta Wyborcza

, October 19, 2006.

“Roman Dmowski ze swastiką,” Gazeta Wyborcza , November 13, 2006; “Nie malujmy sobie pom-
ników-komentarz,” Gazeta Wyborcza , November 13, 2006. “Pomnik Romana Dmowskiego pomalow-
any na rozowo,” Życie Warszawy , November 11, 2006.

130

See the remarks by Janusz Gmitruk and Andrzej Stawarz, dated November 11, 1998, in Drogi

do Niepodległej, 4; cf. “Brakuje nam radosnych świąt.”

Even the intellectual opponents of the Piłsudskiite vision of Poland had learned

to accommodate November 11th by the early years of the twenty-ﬁ rst century.
Th

e rightist weekly Nasza Polska combined a celebration of Piłsudski, complete

with a brooding picture, with a populist critique of internationalism, the EU, and
“Jewish circles” [kręgi żydowskie]. Th

e eﬀ orts at sharing November 11th, essayed

in the 1990s by the reborn endecja, reached paradoxically symbolic proportions
by 2006.

124

Even since 1999 the Polish Right had been attempting to have a ﬁ t-

ting memorial established in Warsaw honoring Dmowski.

125

e rightist League

of Polish Families [Liga Polskich Rodzin, or LPR] added its political lobbying to
the eﬀ orts after 2005 and the process accelerated. A rather large bronze statue was
commissioned, public funds appropriated, and a prepossessing site in the very
center of the capital established at Plac na Rozdrożu.

126

e coalition of rightist

activists announced that the failure to honor Dmowski—the putative architect
of Polish independence—after more than ﬁ fteen years of restored independence
was “a scandal.”

127

Curiously, they expedited their eﬀ orts in the spring of 2006

so that the monument could be unveiled on the most suitable occasion, Inde-
pendence Day, November 11th.

128

Hence, by 2006 even the most partisan

Dmowskiite not only recognized November 11th but wished to exploit it to direct
attention to their hero; perhaps the ultimate posthumous accolade from Piłsudski’s
long-time rival. Th

e statue was highly controversial and was soon defaced.

129

In 2010 and 2011 there were small but passionate demonstrations around it by
ultra-nationalists.

Musings remain about the temper of November 11th. It is frequently remarked

that the day is somber rather than joyous. It is an Independence Day without cel-
ebration. Ironically, the only place in Poland where this is not true is in Poznania,
where November 11th was long disliked for its Piłsudskiite overtones. Th

e day is

festive in the area because it is St. Martin’s Day. In 1998 two scholars noted that
November 11th was a traditional day in rural Poland for settling debts and obliga-
tions. Th

e new agricultural year then begins on “St. Martin’s Day.” It is thus a day

for re-beginnings. Perhaps it is thus a syncretism, after all, if the Second Republic
was indeed a new (albeit short-lived) start for the Poles.

130

e ﬁ nal question is not whether or not contemporary Poles recall the details of

1918, but whether the symbols associated with it still resonate. As Norman Davies
has noted: “All myths serve a purpose.” It is only a matter of which is useful in the

e Th

ird Republic

175

131

Norman Davies, “Polish National Mythologies,” Th

e Milewski Polish Studies Lecture, 1996

(New Britain, CT: Th

e Polish Studies Program, 1998), 23.

132

Marek Jabłonowski and Elżbieta Kossewska, “Wstęp,” in Marek Jabłonowski and Elżbieta

Kossewska, eds., Piłsudski na łamach i w opiniach prasy polskiej, 1918–1989 (Warsaw: Instytut Dzien-
nikarstwa Uniwersytetu Warszawskiego, 2005), 8.

133

As quoted in ibid. , 8.

134

Andrzej Stawarz, “Słowo wstępne,” in Stawarz, Święto niepodległości , 5.

135

Jan Nowak-Jeziorański, “Z domu niewoli: Urodziny III Rzeczpospolitej,” Wprost , March 5, 2003.

136

See Andrzej Garlicki’s conclusion that the Th

ird Republic neither has, nor will ever have, a

birthday; “Wojna dat,” Polityka , November 9, 2009, online at <http://www.polityka.pl/historia/
272580,1,wojna-dat.read > .

137

Teresa Torańska, “Wywiad z Janem Nowakiem-Jeziorańskim,” Gazeta Wyborcza , May 14, 2003.

138

“Sny listopadowe,” Wiadomości: Tygodnik NSZZ Solidarność (Mazowsze), November 12, 1989, 3. PUP.

139

An example is the article cited by Kossewska drawn from the inﬂ uential Polonia newspaper the

Dziennik Chicagoski , which referred to the post-1926 regime as a “government without a nation.” See
her Związek Legionistów , 191 n. 87.

contemporary world.

131

Indeed, the more unconscious the Poles are of the sources

of these symbols the more profoundly they have become part of the national con-
sciousness.

132

As Lechoń noted, it is only after the Piłsudskiite defenders are gone

that everyone will acknowledge him.

133

What the meaning of November 11th is

for the contemporary Pole is an open question.

134

D O E S N OV E M B E R 1 1 T H H AV E A F U T U R E ?

What will be the fate of these symbols in a Poland that has become part of the EU
and seeks, or is required, to blend Polish patriotism with a larger European loyalty?
Not long before his death, Jan Nowak mused that “every nation has to have its day
of victory” and without November 11th Poland does not. He remembered when,
as a small child, he watched his grandmother weep with joy on that day in 1918.
He regarded the Right’s refusal to acknowledge the day as a historic mistake.

135

collapse of communism and the restoration of national independence after 1989
was, by contrast, an extenuated procedure (rozłożone w czasie).

136

World War II

had certainly brought no victory. For Nowak, November 11th was Poland’s only
victory day; though he doubted whether most Poles of the twenty-ﬁ rst century
realized it.

137

As a Solidarity activist noted in 1989: 1918 existed an “an ethos of

independence” and no such clear ethos existed in 1989.

138

Ironically, November 11th has had a divisive eﬀ ect on Poland’s relationship with

the largest community of Poles living abroad: American Polonia. For the Poles of
America, November 11th was not the national holiday; this attribution was always
attached to May 3rd. Only loyal Piłsudskiites celebrated November 11th and they
were always a small minority in Polonia. Indeed, the disposition of Polonia toward
Piłsudski, and especially the sanacja government of 1926–39 was hostile.

139

It is

Paderewski, not Piłsudski, who has been the modern hero for American Polonia.
In general we deal with a complex structure in the numerous Polonia communities
of America, the children of turn-of-the century immigrants do not recognize
November 11th—and they are the great majority of Americans of Polish ancestry.
Th

e post-World War II émigrés are split among Piłsudskiites and his opponents

176

Independence Day

140

See, for example, Andrzej Suchcitz, Ludwik Haik, and Wojciech Rojek, eds., Wybór dokumentów

do dziejów polskiego uchodźstwa niepodległościowego, 1939–1991 (London: Towarzystwo Naukowe na
obczyźnie, 1997), 426–8 , 561ﬀ , 630–1, where November 11th goes unremarked and Piłsudski
unmentioned. In his Independence Day Proclamation in 1947, President August Zaleski mentioned
Kościuszko, but Piłsudski was notably absent; see Pałaszewska, Święto Niepodległości , 28.

141

“11 Listopada,” Myśl Polska (London), December 1–15, 1973, 7.

142

Interestingly, the Polish embassy in London hosts a diplomatic reception on May 3rd, whereas

November 11th is largely reserved for the local Poles.

143

Jacek Cieślak, “Kossaki do szuﬂ ady,” Rzeczpospolita , February 21, 2004. For reﬂ ections on the idea

of European versus Polish patriotism see “Naga prawda o patriotyzmie,” Wirtualna Polska, November 10,
2005, online at <http://wiadomosci.wp.pl/drukuj.html?kat=42874&wid=8086308> .

but the former seem to predominate. Th

is probably reﬂ ects the substantial military

component among them, a milieu in which Piłsudski was always popular. Poles
that have come to the United States after 1989 bring with them November 11th
in their mental world. Th

us they are all. at least functionally. Piłsudskiites. As such,

the largest Polish population outside the homeland presents the most complicated
proﬁ le regarding the meaning of November 11th and its Piłsudskiite symbolism.

e day seems to have had greater resonance among Poles in Britain, but even

here the government-in-exile rarely issued proclamations.

140

An editorial in Myśl

Polska of London stated, in 1973, that “Th

e anniversary of November 11th is com-

memorated in emigration ﬁ rst of all because its celebration is not permitted in the
homeland.”

141

is poses an ironic question for the post-1989 Poles in the British

Isles.

142

Hence, for international Polonia, the re-institutionalization of November 11th

has created a division of symbolic dimension between those for whom November
11th—with all its Piłsudskiite symbolism—marks Polish independence, and those
for whom it does not. It is a further contribution to the gradual disappearance of
the bonds that hold Polonia to its Polish homeland.

In 2004 Andrzej Saramonowicz reﬂ ected on these questions. His musings are

worth considering because he was trained as a historian at the University of War-
saw but also as a ﬁ lm director. It is in the latter capacity that he has made a career:
in television, ﬁ lm, and the theater. His is the world of tropes and metonyms. He
responded to the question of how someone born in the 1960s should understand
the question of what it means to be a Pole; what should be the informing elements
of contemporary Polish consciousness? Should, for example, the martial art of Kos-
sak, which was so much the manifestation of patriotic emotion a century ago, be
consigned to museums, he asked rhetorically? Perhaps, but “when on November
11th I take my daughter to Piłsudski Square and show her Janusz Zakrzeński in his
carriage, and she says to him ‘Good Day, Marshal’, I have tears in my eyes.” “But,”
he asks, “how long can this go on?” How long, indeed.

143

Conclusions

November 11th is the symbol that represents a number of themes which have
informed the modern Polish consciousness. First of all, it represents the Poland
that Piłsudski wanted it to become not the one he did so much to liberate. Poland
was a defeated country by 1914: many generations had been living in unfreedom.
Th

ose who were dedicated to armed eﬀ ort to reclaim a lost independence were

generally regarded as something between romantics and madmen. Th

ese armed

units had a lengthy pedigree, from Kościuszko’s era through the century of insur-
rection to Piłsudski’s military squads of the ZWC and then ﬁ nally the legions.

e legions, in turn, represented the rebirth not only of a Polish Army, but a

change in consciousness to an aﬃ

rmative disposition; a jettisoning of a past,

shrouded in shame and despair. Poland before 1914 was a failed project; either
destroyed or collapsed by 1795, unredeemed despite repeated eﬀ orts in the
nineteenth century, and later increasingly a lost cause. Th

e legions both rejected

the past and embraced it. Failure was rejected, the insurrectionary tradition
embraced.

e legions were the symbol of the military formation which, in conjunction

with the POW, freed Warsaw, the capital: the ﬁ rst time it was in Polish hands for
almost a century. But to say that the army freed Poland and that Piłsudski repre-
sented the army is to miss the more profound symbol of the legions and their role
in November 1918. Th

e virtues demanded of the legionnaires were patriotism,

conﬁ dence, a faith in the future, a multinational representation of old Poland, the
szlachta again reprising its role as repository of national virtues. Th

ese are not

military attributes alone; they are responses to the despondency in which bondage
had consigned the Poles, the damage done to the national ego. Th

e Kraków school

of historians taught that Poland was a failure: it lacked leadership, discipline,
conﬁ dence, and the will to survive. Th

e legions were the response. It was their imag-

ined Poland reborn. And the nucleus was Piłsudski. He wanted to use the legions as
a model of a future Poland, a Poland which was, in essence, the great Poland of the
pre-partition era reborn, freed from the self-doubt that shackled Poles to their sad
fate. Th

ey conjured a Poland of variegated citizens not ethnic uniformity. Th

legions were not merely soldiers, they were the vanguard of a new Poland.

Piłsudski was not the symbol of a failed insurrectionary—he was not a Józef

Sowiński dying at Wola; a Romuald Traugut hanged in Warsaw; a Kościuszko fall-
ing from his mount at Maciejowice and supposedly saying “Finis Poloniae.” Piłsudski
was a man who “wanted to win,” whose reckless self-conﬁ dence is what the Poles
had lacked for so long. His legions were the antidote to national pessimism. Piłsudski

178

Independence Day

fulﬁ lled the heroic ﬁ gure that grew powerfully in the nineteenth century. Here,
again, we should see this phenomenon as a consequence of failure: Poland was so
crushed that only someone virtually supernatural could save it from its ruins.

When the POW and the legionnaires disarmed the Germans on November 11th,

1918 they asserted a Poland conﬁ dent of victory, grasping something that had eluded
them for centuries: the ﬁ rst consequential victory since Sobieski at Vienna in 1683.
More, November 11th was a Polish victory, orchestrated by a Polish hero. It was not
the product of geopolitical tinkering by the Great Powers that Dmowski had sought,
nor the benevolence of Wilson and others that Paderewski had hoped to win. Th

Poles gained their own independence. Th

at is the reason Polish history has forgotten

Dmowski and consigned Paderewski to a place of sympathy signifying nothing.

November 11th has endured because it is the birth of modern Poland; it was the

joyous celebration of re-emergence from captivity. Poland, as Nowak-Jeziorański
reminded us, has no other day in its history. But it is not a day of celebration, it is
a day of reﬂ ection: the brooding Piłsudski—the arch-Romantic ﬁ gure, spending a
lifetime seeking redemption for Poland; the insurrectionary tradition and the mul-
titude of heroes with names long forgotten but a phenomenon revered for its sac-
riﬁ ce; a glorious past that quietly reminds every Pole that the modest dimensions
of contemporary Poland are but a small reminder of what Poland once was: the
Poles are a great people reduced by circumstance to a humble role. November 11th
is the nostalgic recollection of a lost greatness.

Under Nazi occupation, November 11th symbolized the will to live; under

communism, the alternative to the grayness of everyday life and the constant
humiliation of subservience to Russia, including a need to cringingly thank Mos-
cow for Poland’s liberty. Th

e Polish Communist Party was many things, but ﬁ rst

and foremost it was an embarrassment.

November 11th was but one of several versions of the factors leading to the birth

of modern Poland, but it became the chosen one because it answered so much
longing of the Polish spirit: victory, redemption of the past, heroism, the providen-
tial ﬁ gure, the romantic past; the conviction that Poland is not like other nations
of Eastern Europe, it represents far more. November 11th is a day on which you
reﬂ ect on the triumph and tragedy of being a Pole. It is Independence Day because
it saved the spirit of Poland. And November 11th is modern Poland: the past
revived and transcended.

What role does November 11th have in the future of Poland? Ironically, current

Poland corresponds more closely to the endecja version of Dmowski than the federal
structure of Piłsudski. Th

e eastern territories, with their lore and legend, are gone for

ever. Poland as the center of a collection of federated states is a dream of the past.
Poland is the homogenous state the endecja wanted. It does not even have many
Jews, Dmowski’s nemesis.

Is the Th

ird Republic an endecja vision come true?

A generous estimate puts the Jewish population at 20,000.

Here we may again pose Nowak’s question of whether—at least in 1914–18—the territorial programs

of Piłsudski and the endecja were as radically diﬀ erent as is usually assumed; see his Polska i trzy Rosje:
Studium polityki wschodniej Jozefa Pilsudskiego (do kwietnia 1920 roku) (Warsaw: Arcana, 2001), 215.

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T H E P R E S S

Dziennik Białostocki (Białystok)
Dziennik Ostrowski

( Ostrów Wielkopolski)

  Dziennik Polski   (Warsaw)
  Gazeta Jarocińska   (Jarocin)
  Gazeta Krakowska
  Gazeta Polska   (Warsaw)
  Gazeta Warszawska
  Gazeta Wyborcza   (Warsaw)
  IKC   (Kraków)
  Kurjer Polski   (Warsaw)
  Kurjer Poranny   (Warsaw)
  Kurjer Poznański
  Kurjer Warszawski
  Monitor Polski
  Na Posterunku. Gazeta policji państwowej   (Warsaw)
  Nasz Przegląd: Organ Niezależny   (Jewish-Warsaw)
  Polska Zachodnia   (Katowice)
  Polska Zbrojna   (Military-Warsaw)
  Przegląd Polski   (New  York)
  Rzeczpospolita   (Warsaw)
  Trybuna Ludu   (Warsaw)
  Urzędowa Gazeta Gminy Izraelickiej w Katowicach   (Katowice)

U N D E RG RO U N D P R E S S

  Biuletyn Informacyjny   (Warsaw)
  Biuletyn Informacyjny stoczni gdańskiej   (Gdańsk)
  Biuletyn NZSP   (Gdansk)
  Czuwamy   (Kraków)

Index

Abczyński,  Henryk    1
Ajnenkiel,  Andrzej    131 ,   149
AK  (Armia  Krajowa)    103 ,   108 ,   113 ,   114    n.   96 ,

122 , 123 n. 21 , 129 , 136

Aleksy  of  Grodno,  Bishop    52
Anders,  Gen.  Władysław    118
Anusz,  Antoni    47
army    20 ,   29 ,   87–8

creation of 7–13
see also Independence Day

Arski,  Stefan    120    n.   2
Ash,  Timothy  Garton    134    n.   25
Askenazy,  Szymon    153
Auschwitz    171
Austria    10–11;     see also    Poland

Bader,  Karol    118
Badziak,  Kazimierz    52
Bakula,  Stanisław    107
Bartel,  Kazimierz    155
Bartosiewicz,  Joachim    71
Bartosz’s  Brigades    8
Bartyzel,  Jacek    138
Batory,  Stefan    40
Baudelaire,  Charles    15
  BBWR (Bezpartyjny Blok Współpracy z

Rządem) 50–1

Beck,  Józef    117
Belcikowski,  Jan    32
Belvedere  Palace    52 ,   55    n.   66 ,   78 ,   81 ,   83 ,   88 ,   90
Berling,  Gen.  Zygmunt    149
Bielsko–Biała    142
Biernat,  Tadeusz    3
Bierut,  Bolesław    108
Bocheński,  Jacek    132
Bolshevik  Revolution    42 ,   105 ,   110 ,   131 ,   133 ,

146 , 148

linked to Poland by communists 108 , 121 ,

124 , 125–7 , 130 , 136 , 145

Bonaparte, Napoleon 1 , 9 n. 39 , 87
Boruta–Spiechowicz, Gen. Mieczysław

134–5 , 141

Bourdieu,  Pierre    21
Bromke,  Adam    136
Broniewski,  Władysław    28
Brześć    77 ,   105
Brzeżany    80
Bush,  George  H.  W.    161
Buzek,  Jerzy    168
Bydgoszcz    100

Cammack, Paul 21
Carter, Pres. Jimmy 132 n. 22

Chełmoński,  Józef    3
Churchill,  Winston    116
Chwałba,  Andrzej    14 ,   171
Cichoracki,  Piotr    88 ,   89 ,   93
Cisek,  Janusz    29    n.   50
Cyrankiewicz,  Józef    126
Czapski,  Józef    107
Czechoslovakia    96
Czerep,  Stanisław    2    n.   5

Dąbrowska,  Maria    125
Dąbrowski,  Gen.  Jan  Henryk    9
Danzig,     see    Gdańsk
Daszyński,  Ignacy    9 ,   96 ,   121 ,   127 ,   130–1 ,   132 ,

146 , 151

Lublin government 23–4 , 27 , 30 ,

36 , 63 , 108 , 110 , 120 , 124 ,
125–6 , 145 , 148

Davies,  Norman    171 ,   174
Derewno    108
Dewey,  Charles    74
Dmowski,  Roman    17 ,   20 ,   25 ,   28    n.   37 ,   50 ,

65–6 , 70 , 104 , 117 , 121 , 124 , 135 , 155 ,
164 , 167 , 171 , 179

celebrating independence role of 71–2 ,

73 n. 178 , 74

fi gure of Right 44 , 69 , 71–2 , 89 , 92 ,

147 n. 122 , 160 , 174

ignored/omitted 31 , 71 , 84 , 95 , 120 n. 3 ,

145–6 , 163 , 165 , 166 , 174 , 178

in fi lm 139–40

Dowbór–Muśnicki, Gen. Józef 36 , 74 ,

131 n. 9

Duraczyński,  Eugeniusz    145
Dyonizy,  Metropolitan    67
Dzierżykraj–Rogalski,  Tadeusz    100

endecja 6 , 25 , 29 , 41 , 51 , 64 , 69 , 136 , 138 ,

146 , 148

counters  Piłsudskiite  project    56–7
nationalism    48 ,   49
reborn    160 ,   174 ,   178
strongholds    8 ,   35 ,   54
view  of  legions    72
view  of  Piłsudski    73 ,   160

Falcons,  the    8 ,   57
Farbstein,  Szyja  Heschel    68
FJN  (Front  Jedności  Narodowej)    137 ,   142
Foch,  Marshal    72
Fogg,  Mieczysław    149
Fordon    100
Frank,  Hans    101

196

Index

Freemasons 57 , 69
Friszke, Andrzej 138 n. 59 , 166 n. 58 , 171

Gał

ȩzowski, Marek 103

Galicia    24
Garliński,  Józef    108
Gąsiorowski,  Wacław    3
Gdańsk    67 ,   139 ,   141–2 ,   143 ,   155 ,   156 ,   167
Gella,  Aleksander    15
Gellner,  Ernest    93    n.   43
Germany ,    see    Independence  Day ;    Poland
Gierek,  Edward    131
Giertych,  J

ȩdrzej 123 n. 21

Głąbiński,  Stanisław    71
Gliklich,  Rabbi    80
Głódź,  Leszek    159    n.   20
Głowacki,  Bartosz    65 ,   83    n.   2
Gomułka,  Władysław    123–4
Górecki,  Gen.  Roman    53
Górka,  Olgierd    65
Grottger,  Jan    3
Gruber,  Henryk    112    n.   85
Grynberg,  Henryk    80
Grzymała–Siedlecki,  Adam    102

Hall,  Aleksander    139
Haller  Committee    112
Haller,  Józef    8 ,   41 ,   71 ,   95 ,   112 ,   131    n.   9 ,   155 ,

159 n. 16

Handelsman,  Marceli    6    n.   23 ,   28    n.   41
Hertz,  Aleksander    166
Herzog,  Col.  Józef    129
Hitler,  Adolf    97    n.   64 ,   118
Hlond,  Card.  Augustyn    93
Hungary    116 ,   123

IKC (Illustrowany Kurjer Codzienny) 44 , 54

n. 59 , 60 , 65 , 66 , 67 , 70

Iłłakowiczówna, Kazimiera x , 15 , 132
Independence Day

army and 33–4 , 52 , 53 , 55 , 60 , 62–3 , 75 ,

80 , 93 , 95–6

as  ideology    87–9
as  national  celebration    75–82
as  the  national  holiday    172–5
bigotry  and    80–1
counter–narrative    71–5
date  chosen    37–42
date  under  duress    42–5
demonstrations  (1987)    146–7
elevating    57–61
  fi ftieth  anniversary  (1968)    125–8 ,   129
future  of    175–6 ,   178–9
government–in–exile  and    110–16 ,   118
in  German–occupied  Poland    99–104 ,   105
in  Kraków    43    n.   49 ,   61 ,   65 ,   100–1 ,   146 ,

157 , 159 , 160–1 , 171

in  Lublin    109 ,   164
in  Solidarity  era    138–43
in  Soviet–occupied  Poland    104–10

in Warsaw 36–7 , 38 , 43 , 52–3 , 62 , 74–6 ,

78–9 ,   81 ,   83–5 ,   93–4 ,   101 ,   102–3 ,   133 ,
137 ,   138 ,   141 ,   146–7 ,   157 ,   159 ,   161 ,
167 ,   170

institutionalizing  date  of    51–6
meaning  of    178
objections  to    56–7
Piłsudski  and    31–4 ,   40–5 ,   51 ,   52–3 ,   55–6 ,

60–1 , 62–3 , 75–6 , 83–4 , 87–9 , 93 , 119 ,
157–63 , 164–8 , 172

Polish  communism  and    120–3
politically  partisan    32 ,   33
popularity  of    165–6
post–Stalinist    123–5
problems  associated  with  date  of    22–3
rivals    35–7 ,   52 ,   55 ,   73 ,   109–10 ,   114–15 ,

121 , 124 , 126 , 172 , 173 , 175

seventieth anniversary (1988) 147–53 ,

154–5

sixtieth  anniversary  (1978)    130–8
tenth  anniversary  (1928)    62–9
the  opposition  and    133–8
twentieth  anniversary  (1938)    96–8

Iran 118–19

Jabłoński,  Henryk    124 ,   127 ,   148
Jakubowicz,  Dobiesław    106
Jakubowski,  Jan  Zygmunt    127
January  Insurrection/Rising  (1863–64)    2 ,   4 ,

70 , 87 , 125

Japan    6
Jaruzelski,  Gen.  Wojciech    143 ,   147 ,   149 ,   157
Jasna  Góra    42 ,   129 ,   136 ,   137
  J

ȩdruszczak, Tadeusz 131

ȩdrzejewicz, Janusz 89

ȩdrzejewicz, Wacław 90 n. 32

John Paul II, Pope 129 , 130 , 154 , 165
Juszkiewicz, Aleksander 109

Kaczorowski,  Ryszard    159
Kaczyński,  Jarosław    168 ,   169
Kaczyński,  Pres.  Lech    167    n.   67 ,   168 ,   170–1
Kalicki,  Włodzimierz    26
Kaszuba,  Elżbieta    89
Katyń    106 ,   134 ,   171
Kawalec,  Krzysztof    47 ,   48    n.   13
Kawalerowicz,  Jerzy    139    n.   68
Kazimerska,  Ryszarda    130
Kessler,  Harry    25
Khrushchev,  Nikita    123
Kielce    10 ,   65 ,   158
Kieniewicz,  Stefan    131
KIK  (Klub  Inteligencji  Polskiej)    142
Kisielewski,  Stefan    124
Klich,  Bogdan    170
Klukowski,  Dr  Zygmunt    101    n.   15
Kmicić,  Andrzej  (fi ctional  character)    12
KNP  (Komitet  Narodowy  Polski)    31 ,   71 ,   72 ,   104
Koc,  Adam    26 ,   42 ,   79 ,   95
Kołodziejczyk,  Arkadiusz    49

Index

197

Komarów    39
Komorowski,  Bronisław    171
Konary    11
Konopczyński,  Władysław    43
Konopnicka,  Maria    3 ,   38 ,   41 ,   100
KOR  (Komitet  Obrony  Robotników)    133 ,   134 ,

136–7

Korboński,  Stefan    101
Korfanty,  Wojciech    151 ,   155 ,   167
Kościelak,  Zdzislaw    166    n.   65
Kościuszko  Mound    76 ,   86 ,   163
Kościuszko  Rising/insurrection    1 ,   9    n.   39 ,   35    n.   4
Kościuszko  Squadron    111
Kościuszko,  Tadeusz    1 ,   8    n.   35 ,   38 ,   61 ,   94 ,

153 , 176 n. 140 , 177

as  symbol    13–14 ,   16 ,   70
cult    3–4
linked  to  Piłsudski    9 ,   64 ,   65 ,   76 ,   86 ,   87 ,

91 , 163

Kossak,  Wojciech    3 ,   62    n.   102 ,   152 ,   176
Kossewska,  Elżbieta    21 ,   175    n.   139
Kostiuchnówka    11
Koszutska,  Maria    146
Koszutska–Kostrzewa,     see    Koszutska,  Maria
Kot,  Stanisław    114 ,   116 ,   118
Kowalczykowa,  Alina    13 ,   15
Kowno    105
Kozielsk    106
KPN    138 ,   143 ,   146 ,   147 ,   154
Krak  Mound    86
Kraków    44 ,   64 ,   76 ,   83 ,   128 ,   137 ,   142 ,   155 ,

169 , 177; see also Independence Day ;
Oleandry ; Wawel, the

Krasnod

ȩbski, Witold 111

Krechowce    11
KRN  (Krajowa  Rada  Narodowa)    109
Krzeczunowicz,  Kornel    12
Krzyżanowski,  Adam    124
KTSSN  (Komisja  Tymczasowa  Skonfederowanych

Stronnictw Niepodległościowych) 8–9

Kukiel,  Gen.  Marian    116
Kulesza,  Władysław  T.    49
Kwaśniewski,  Pres.  Aleksander    161 ,   162 ,   165
Kwiatkowski,  Eugeniusz    26
Kwolek,  Lt.    107–8

Langer, Antoni 37
Lechoń, Jan 32 , 107 , 113 n. 88 , 139 n. 62 ,

152 , 155 , 175

legion  movement    1–2 ,   11 ,   148
legionalization    47
legions    10 ,   17 ,   38 ,   42 ,   58 ,   150 ,   154–5 ,   177

as myth 18–21

First Brigade 9 , 11 , 19 , 78 , 86 , 98 , 129 , 136 ,

140 , 148 , 151 , 155 , 157–8 , 164

Jewish  veterans  of    50
nature  of    11–13 ,   15–16
  see also    endecja ;    Piłsudski,  Józef

Łepecki, Mieczysław 75
Leśmian, Bolesław 12

Lewandowski,  Jan    152
Lieberman,  Herman    20    n.   114 ,   115    n.   105
Lipiński,  Wacław    16 ,   117
Lis–Kula,  Leopold    155 ,   167
Lithuania    67    n.   141 ,   104–5 ,   168
Łódź    28 ,   68 ,   99 ,   137 ,   142 ,   143
London    115 ,   119 ,   176
Łowczówek    10
LPR  (Liga  Polskich  Rodzin)    174
Lublin    29 ,   33 ,   43 ,   61 ,   72 ,   100 ,   130 ,   133

Committee 121
see also Daszyński, Ignacy ; Independence Day

Lubomirska,  Maria    29    n.   52
Lubomirski,  Zdzisław  Prince    26–7 ,   28 ,   32 ,   103
Lwów    36 ,   41 ,   45 ,   73 ,   75 ,   106 ,   153 ,   170 ,   171

Maciszewski,  Jeremy    146
Mackiewicz,  Stanisław    51 ,   173
Mączyński,  Czesław    41 ,   73
Mączyński,  Stefan    74    n.   178
Magdeburg    40 ,   45 ,   52 ,   53 ,   60 ,   63 ,   81 ,   127 ,

154 , 159

in fi lm 95
Piłsudski imprisoned at 11 , 24

Main,  Izabella    172
Majchrowski,  Jacek    141
Maklewicz,  Jan    94    n.   53
Makowski,  Andrzej  Z.    15
Malczewski,  Jacek    3 ,   12
Malinowski,  Roman    147 ,   148    n.   123
Marchlewski,  Julian    120    n.   1 ,   146 ,   151
Marcus,  Joseph    49
Masaryk,  Tomaš    31
Matejko,  Jan    3 ,   153
Matuszewski,  Ignacy    22
Mazowiecki,  Tadeusz    157
Mazowiecki,  Tomaszów    154
Micewski,  Andrzej    21 ,   127–8 ,   144 ,   173
Michalski,  Zenon  Janusz    152
Michnik,  Adam    135
Mickiewicz,  Adam    59 ,   63 ,   68 ,   107 ,   153
Miedziński,  Bogusław    83    n.   2
Mikołajczyk,  Stanisław    116
Miller,  Leszek    164
Młynarski,  Feliks    8
Moczar,  Mieczysław    126 ,   127
Moczulski,  Leszek    129    n.   57 ,   135    n.   30 ,   147
Modelski,  Gen.  Izydor    112
Modzelewski,  Karol    14
Moraczewski,  J

ȩdrzej 30 , 72 , 131 , 155

Mościcki, Pres. Ignacy 52 , 64 , 68 , 81 , 90 , 93 ,

97 , 117 , 169

in art/fi lm 91 , 95
pictured on stamps 69 , 98

Moscow 109
Mosdorf, Jan 61 n. 101 , 74

Nał

ȩcz, Tomasz 1 , 10 , 46 n. 2 , 171

Narutowicz, Pres. Gabriel 47 , 48 , 98 , 151
National Party 71 , 72

198

Index

nationalism 17; see also endecja ;

sanacja regime

Nike  (goddess  of  victory)    3    n.   7
NKN    9 ,   20
Nowak,  Andrzej    17    n.   96 ,   18    n.   100 ,

70 n. 156

Nowak–Jeziorański, Jan 30 n. 53 , 31 , 51 ,

175 , 178

Oleandry    64 ,   150 ,   157–8
Olszewski,  Jan    124
Onyszkiewicz,  Janusz    140
Onyszkiewicz,  Joanna    157
Oppman,  Artur    107
Ordyński,  Ryszard    94
Orlicz–Dreszer,  Gen.  Gustaw    118    n.   120
Or–Ot

see Oppman, Artur

Ostrowska–Grabska,  Halina    94    n.   53
OWP  (Obóz  Wielkiej  Polski)    92
OZON  (Obóz  Zjednoczenia

Narodowego) 92–3

Paczkowski, Andrzej 166
Paderewski, Ignacy 20 , 22 , 28 n. 37 , 41 , 66 ,

69 , 70 , 114 n. 95 , 114 n. 97 , 117 , 151 ,
164 , 167 , 175

as  Prime  Minister    31 ,   37
celebrated  by  Right    71 ,   89 ,   147    n.   122
ignored/omitted    31 ,   84 ,   95 ,   145–6 ,   163 ,

165 , 166 , 178

in fi lm 139–40

Pajewski,  Janusz    9 ,   173
Panek,  Wacław    151–2
Panenkowa,  Irena    33    n.   69
Paris    111
Paruch,  Waldemar    20 ,   47
PDS  (Polskie  Drużyny  Strzeleckie)    8
  P

ȩkosławski, Lech 156

Pewnyj,  Piotr    80
Pieńkowski,  Stefan    106
Piłsudska,  Jagoda,     see    Piłsudska,  Jagusia
Piłsudska,  Jagusia    55 ,   159
Piłsudska,  Wandeczka    55
Piłsudski,  Józef    xi–xii ,   13 ,   22–3 ,   58 ,

71 , 74 , 82 , 96 , 99 , 103–4 ,
106 , 107 , 108 , 129 , 130 , 174 , 179

arrested    11 ,   24 ,   25
as  symbol    14–15 ,   177–8
attitude  of  American  Poles  to    175–6
author/hero  of  independence    36–7 ,   38 ,   63 ,

64 , 65–6 , 68 , 70 , 72

becomes  Marshal  of  Poland    39 ,   40
celebrating    134–5
communist  regime  embraces    144–53
contemporary  views  of    172–3
creation  of  army  and    7–9
cult    88–9 ,   93 ,   112 ,   114 ,   117 ,   138    n.   59 ,

141 , 172

from  Wilno    105
government–in–exile  and    110–16 ,   118
ignoring    128 ,   131–2 ,   133
illness/death    80 ,   81 ,   83 ,   98
in  fi lm    94–5 ,   139–40
institutionalized    169–71
legions  and    14–15 ,   16 ,   18–19 ,   20–1 ,   47 ,

54–5

militarization  of  politics  and    4–6
mourning/commemorating    83–7 ,   97–8
on  Słowacki    59–60
overthrows  government    46–7
Polish  state  concept  and    17–18 ,

48–9 , 92

popularity    9–10
public  symbols    69 ,   78 ,   151
reputation  damaged    77
retires    43
return  to  Warsaw    24 ,   25–34 ,   79
Śmigły–Rydz  linked  to    90–1 ,   93 ,   98
Soviet/communist  view  of    109–10 ,   120–1 ,

122–3 , 124 , 125–8

the opposition and 136 , 137 , 138 , 140–3 ,

144–5 , 147 , 153–6

see also endecja ; Independence Day ;

Kościuszko, Tadeusz ; Poland ; sanacja
regime

Piłsudski Mound 86 , 101 , 129 , 137 , 157 , 158 ,

162 , 163

Piłsudski Square 62 , 68 , 69 , 79 , 83–4 , 134 ,

146 , 159 , 161 , 170 , 173 , 176

Pińsk    80
PiS  (Prawo  i  Sprawiedliwość)    169
PKWN  (Polski  Komitet  Wyzwolenia

Narodowego) 109

Plac  Piłsudskiego,     see    Piłsudski  Square
Plach,  Eva    xi ,   48
Płock    143
Poland

Austrian/Austrian–occupied    7–8 ,   9 ,   23–4 ,   28
Belarusians  in    67 ,   80
First  World  War  and    23–5
German–occupied    23–5 ,   27–8 ,   35 ,   41 ,

99–104 , 105 , 106

Germans  in    66–7 ,   80
government–in–exile    110–19
Jews  in    16 ,   18 ,   29 ,   49–50 ,   66 ,   67–9 ,   80–1 ,

93 , 99 , 168 , 178

minorities in 16 , 17 , 48–51 , 61 , 65 , 66–8 ,

76 , 77 , 80–1 , 93 , 94 , 168

national  anthem    58–9
Piłsudskiite    48–51
Russian    6 ,   7 ,   9 ,   10 ,   38 ,   44 ,   76
Soviet–occupied    99 ,   104–10
Ukrainians  in    49 ,   50 ,   67 ,   80

Polish history

martial themes in 2–4 , 21 , 32 , 70 , 165
martyrs/martyr tradition in 3 , 18–19 ,

139 , 162

Index

199

romanticism/neo–romanticism in 2–3 , 10 ,

11–12 , 13 , 14 , 19

state–nation confl ict in 17 , 48 , 72 , 92

Poniatowski,  Józef    141    n.   82 ,   153
Popiełuszko,  Fr.  Jerzy    144
  Por

ȩba, Bohdan 139–40

POW (Polska Organizacja Wojskowa) 9 , 25 ,

29 , 32 , 41–2 , 47 , 65 , 128 , 141 , 177

ignoring  the    40 ,   45 ,   73
in  fi lm    140
Jewish  veterans  of    50
Łódź    28
monument/Celebration    78–9
Śmigły–Rydz  head  of    24 ,   90
Warsaw    26 ,   27–8 ,   130 ,   132

Poznań    71 ,   123
Poznania    174
PPS  (Polska  Partia  Socjalistyczna)    4 ,   7 ,   18 ,   61 ,

70 , 96 n. 63

Prażmowski, Władysław “Belina” 150
PRL (Polska Rzeczpospolita Ludowa) 133 ,

135–6 , 137 , 153 , 156 , 164

eagle    151 ,   158
historiography    120–1 ,   124–5 ,   140
1956  in    123–4

Próchnik, Adam 22 n. 4
Pruszyński, Mieczysław 28 n. 37 , 159 n. 20

Raczkiewicz,  Pres.  Władysław    111 ,   114 ,   115 ,   116
Rarańcza    11
Rataj,  Maciej    53 ,   56    n.   70 ,   71
Ratajski,  Mayor  Cyryl    71
Rembieliński,  Jan    75
Riegier,  Andrzej    107
Rokita,  Jan    169
Rokossovsky,  Marshal  Konstantin    122
Rola–Żymierski,  Gen.  Michał    109 ,   149
Roman  Catholic  Church    128–9 ,   134
Romanowski,  Andrzej    89    n.   24 ,   161
Romanowski,  Gustaw    173
Romeyko,  Marian    33 ,   121    n.   4
  ROPCiO (Ruch Obrony Praw Człowieka i

Obywatela) 129 , 133 n. 24 , 135 , 137 , 141

Roszkowski,  Wojciech    25 ,   158 ,   169–70
Rothschild,  Joseph    12 ,   49 ,   77    n.   195 ,   113    n.   89
Rówecki,  Stefan    66 ,   113
Rozwadowski,  Gen.  Tadeusz    73
Rozwadowski,  Jan    66
Rudnytsky,  Ivan    17
Rumań,  Lt.  Stanisław    106
Russia    11;     see also    Poland
Russian  Revolution  (1905)    6 ,   7
Ruszczyc,  Marek    130
Rybiński,  Maciej    172

sanacja regime 56 , 62 , 77 , 126 n. 41 , 128 , 175

end  of    99
evolves    92–4
in  exile    117

Jewish  support  for    69
meaning  of    47
minorities  and    48–9 ,   50–1 ,   67
nationalism  of    92 ,   96
reaction  to  Piłsudski  death    89 ,   91 ,   92 ,   98
Sikorski  criticizes    111

Sapieha, Card. Prince Adam 59 n. 88 ,

83 n. 1

Saramonowicz, Andrzej 176
Saxon Square 45 , 53 , 62 , 68 , 69;

see also Piłsudski Square

Schorr,  Rabbi  Mojżesz    68
Schulz,  Bruno    81 ,   87
SD  (Stronnictwo  Demokratyczne)    145
Seyda,  Marian    56–7 ,   71
Sforza,  Carlo    14
Sienkiewicz,  Henryk    3 ,   11–12 ,   57
Sikorski,  Gen.  Władysław    xii ,   11 ,   71 ,   95 ,

118–19 , 131 n. 9 , 159 n. 19

Piłsudski and 110–17

Sikorski–Maisky  treaty    118
Singer,  Bernard    82   n.  222
Skibiński,  Franciszek    12
Skonka,  Leszek    160
Skrzetuski,  Jan  (fi ctional  character)    12
Skwarczyński,  Adam    46
Skwarczyński,  Gen.  Stanisław    28
Sławek,  Walery    50 ,   86 ,   91–2 ,   117 ,   154
Sławoj–Składkowski,  Gen.  Felicjan    112
Słowacki,  Juliusz    3 ,   42 ,   59–60 ,   83    n.   1
Śmigły–Rydz,  Edward    23–4 ,   27 ,   80 ,   85 ,

92 , 96 n. 60 , 117

becomes  Marshal  of  Poland    90–1
communist  view  of    130 ,   132
discredited    99
honoring    97 ,   98 ,   129
in  fi lm    95
resigns  as  commander–in–chief    112
  see also    Piłsudski,  Józef

Sobieski,  Jan  III    53 ,   75 ,   142 ,   161 ,   178
Solek,  Wincenty    32
Solidarity    133 ,   135 ,   136 ,   144 ,   146 ,   158 ,

160 n. 24 , 175

underground 147 , 153 , 154
see also Independence Day

Sosnkowski, Kazimierz 27 n. 32 , 63 , 90 n. 28 ,

97 , 117 n. 117 , 118 n. 120 , 149 , 154

succeeds Sikorski 115–16

Soviet Union, see Independence Day ; Piłsudski,

Józef ; Poland

Sowiniec  mound,     see    Piłsudski  Mound
Sowiński,  Gen.  Józef    125 ,   177
Srokowski,  Konstanty    70
Stachiewicz,  Wacław    96    n.   60 ,   112    n.   83
Stalin,  Josef    109 ,   122
Stańczyk,  Tomasz    44    n.   57
Starobielsk    107
Starzyński,  Stefan    84
Stroński,  Stanisław    71

200

Index

Styka,  Adam    153
Styka,  Jan    3
Sucholdolski,  Rajnold    x    n.   5
Świaniewicz,  Stanisław    106
Świerzyński,  Józef    24
Szalai,  Erzebet    13
Szczerbiński,  J.  St.    38    n.   14
Szykiewicz,  Mufti    67
Szymański,  Julian  Juliusz    64 ,   76

Targowica    77
Tazbir,  Janusz    166
  Th

en, Joanna 168

Tomaszewski,  Edmund    149
Tomorowicz,  Jerzy    132
Trąmpczyński,  Wojciech    64 ,   69 ,

71 , 103

Transolzia    97    n.   64 ,   171
Traugutt,  Romuald    125 ,   177
Truskier,  Abraham    68
Trzepałka,  Maksymilian    106
Tusk,  Donald    168 ,   171
Tuwim,  Julian    132
Tybura,  Władysław    149

Ukraine    24;     see also    Lwów ;    Poland
United  States  of  America    31 ,   175–6
Upper  Silesia    41 ,   67
Urbanek,  Mariusz    15

Virgin Mary 35

Wacquant,  Loïc    21
Wajs,  Bronisław    107
  Wał

ȩsa, Lech 118 n. 120 , 139 , 141 , 159–60 ,

168 , 170–1

Walicki,  Andrzej    18
Wanda  Mound    86
Wandycz,  Piotr  S.    17    n.   96 ,   171
Wapiński,  Roman    5 ,   47
Warsaw    10–11 ,   41 ,   65 ,   70 ,   97 ,   100 ,   113

Battle  of    39
Jews  in    68
liberation  of    32 ,   41–2 ,   45 ,   54 ,   73 ,   177
Uprising  (1944)    116 ,   123 ,   163
  see also    Independence  Day ;   Piłsudski,  Józef ;

POW

Wasilewski,  Zygmunt    71
Wasiutyński,  Wojciech    74    n.   181
Wawel  Castle    59

Wawel, the 15 , 129 , 133 n. 24 , 134 , 137 , 143 ,

148 , 153 , 160 , 171

Wawer    102 ,   103
Wielki,  Kazimierz    153
Wielopolska,  Marja  Jehanne    94    n.   53
Wieniawa–Długoszowski,  Bolesław    9    n.   40 ,   12 ,

15 , 32 , 117

Wierzbicki,  Piotr    10 ,   165
Wierzyński,  Kazimierz    15 ,   132 ,   139
Willkie,  Wendell    113
Wilno    80 ,   84    n.   8 ,   104–5 ,   108 ,   167 ,   168 ,   170
Wilson,  Woodrow    136 ,   155 ,   178
Witos,  Wincenty    22 ,   38 ,   41 ,   43 ,   77 ,   151 ,

163 , 167

Wojciechowski,  Stanisław    103 ,   151
Wójcik,  Zbigniew    111    n.   75
Wojtyła,  Karol,     see   John Paul II, Pope
Wołodyjowski,  Michał  (fi ctional  character)    12
Woźniakowski,  Jacek    137
Wróbel,  Piotr    18
Wróblewski,  Gen.  Jan    55
Wrocław    152 ,   154 ,   155 ,   162 ,   167 ,   169
Wrzesiński,  Wojciech    152
Wybicki,  Józef    58
Wyrób,  Edward    101
Wysocki,  Adam    132
Wyspiański,  Stanisław    15 ,   153 ,   159 ,   161
Wyszyński,  Stefan    124 ,   128 ,   134

Ząbek,  Wiesław  Leszek    52    n.   41
Zając,  Gen.  Józef    115
Zakrzeński,  Janusz    140 ,   159 ,   161 ,   167 ,

170 , 176

Zaleski,  Pres.  August    176    n.   140
Zamość    100 ,   101
Zaolzie    96–7
  ZBOWiD (Związek Bojowników o Wolność i

Demokrację) 125 , 142 , 149

Żegota–Januszajtis,  Marian    6    n.   21
Żelazowski,  Jan    38
Żeligowski,  Lucjan    95
Żeromski,  Stefan    153
Zieliński,  Zygmunt    8
Zielonka    100
Żmudowski,  F.    42
ZPP  (Związek  Patriotów  Polskich)    109
ZSL  (Zjednoczone  Stronnictwo  Ludowe)    145
ZWC  (Związek  Walki  Czynnej)    7–8 ,   70 ,   94 ,

148 , 153 , 154–5 , 177

Życiński, Archbishop Józef 164

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