International Philosophical Quarterly

Volume 43

No. 2, June 2003

Articles

Montague Brown: Aquinas and the Individuation of Human Persons Revisited

Montague Brown: Aquinas and the Individuation of Human Persons Revisited

Page 167

St. Anselm College

ABSTRACT: This paper focuses on Aquinas’s doctrine of individuation as it applies to human beings.

There are three main sections. In the first, the general lines of Aquinas’s doctrine of individuation

are presented in the context of discussing an article by Joseph Owens and some other recent work

on individuation. I argue for form as the primary principle of individuation and specify the

uniqueness of human individuality by reference to the degrees of perfection among things. The

second section focuses on three ways in which a meditation on our form—the rational soul—is fruitful

for understanding what makes us individuals. Here I consider, in turn, the three distinctive activities

of human reason—theoretical, moral, and aesthetic. Each activity is presented as it relates to three

levels of perfection in the human being. In the third section, I bring up three pertinent objections to

my thesis and suggest answers to them.

Page 167

Person signifies what is most perfect in all nature—that is, a subsistent individual of a rational nature.”

†1

My topic is

individuation, but I am especially interested in the individuation of human beings. In this brief quotation we find the

basic elements for our consideration: individuality, rational nature, and the idea of degrees of perfection—all are included

in the concept of a person. The definition is taken from Boethius. Aquinas’s treatment of individuation derives from his

reading of Boethius’s De Trinitate, but his commentary on Boethius makes use of certain Aristotelian categories. The

standard formulation of the principle of individuation in human persons, found early and late in Aquinas’s writings, is
signate matter or matter in its dimensive quantity.

†2

It is not matter in general that individuates, but particular matter

here and now. However, when it comes to making full sense out of Aquinas’s understanding of individuation, there is a

good deal of room for interpretation. In a recent article, Joseph Owens provides a clear presentation of the scope of

options available to a student of Aquinas in tackling this question. These range from esse, or the act of existing, at one

end of the spectrum to the accident of

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quantity at the other.

†3

Although there is reason to hold that each distinguishing feature of a thing contributes to its

individuality, it is form that is particularly fruitful in understanding individuation and, in particular, human individuation.

Most of my remarks will therefore focus on this element of our being and the activities that manifest it.

Page 168

This paper will be divided into three main sections. In the first, the general lines of Aquinas’s doctrine of

individuation will be presented in the context of discussing Owens’s article and some other recent work on the issue of

individuation. I shall argue for form as the primary principle of individuation and specify the uniqueness of human

individuality by reference to the degrees of perfection among things. The second section will focus on three ways in which

a meditation on our form—the rational soul—is fruitful for understanding what makes us individuals. The format will be to

consider the distinctive activities of human reason—theoretical, moral, and aesthetic. Each activity will be presented as it

relates to three levels of perfection in the human being. In the third section, we shall bring up three pertinent objections

to my thesis and attempt to answer them.

I

Page 168

Of the recent work on Aquinas’s theory of individuation, Joseph Owens’s essay, “Thomas Aquinas” stands out. In

this essay Owens presents a detailed account of the issue of individuation in the thought of Aquinas, drawing from works

early and late. The standard formulation of Aquinas is that it is signate matter that individuates members of the human

species. However, when one pushes Aquinas to explain himself metaphysically, we find that the answer strings out in a

series of principles whose order varies depending on whether we begin with reality as it is in itself (the order of being) or

with reality as we discover it (the order of knowledge).

Page 168

Consider first the order of being. Owens notes: “Aquinas makes use of two different sequences in explaining

individuation. One sequence is the order in being. First comes existence, the thing’s most basic actuality. Then comes

substance, with its components in material things of form and matter. Of these two form is prior. Then come the

accidents of material things, of which the first is quantity” (Owens, p. 186). One can see quite quickly that, if we follow

this sequence, the idea of signate matter, or matter under dimensive quantity, is far from the first principle of

explanation. In fact, it is nearly the very last. As the most basic principle of created reality, esse is recognized as the

fundamental principle of individuation. After this, the order proceeds through substance, with its composite principles

form and matter, and concludes with accidents, the most basic being quantity. Kevin White, in a recent article on

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Aquinas’s Commentary on Boethius’s De Trinitate, argues that such a sequence is incomplete: we should include the
divine being prior to esse since created esse clearly depends in the order of being on God.

†4

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There are two major philosophical problems in beginning with esse. In the first place, beginning with esse is out of

order in terms of establishing a philosophical basis for individuation, for we conclude to the principle of esse only after a

lengthy argument of implication from our experience of material things and the ways in which they do not explain

themselves. In the second place, although it may be true to say that esse is the principle of individuation of human

beings, this does not help us in understanding what, if anything, is distinctive of human individuals; for all things that

exist are individuated by esse.

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Thus, we turn to the other order—the order of knowledge. Owens explains this sequence as follows:

On the other hand, a reverse order holds in our understanding of the notion (ratio) of individuation.

This understanding has to start from the concept of what in itself alone exhibits individuality.... Only

quantity in its own nature means part outside of part. It exhibits the distinction of parts and thereby

the possibility of their real division into separate units. It is in that way the root of individuality, as

far as the notion is concerned. The other factors, as we represent them in our concepts, depend on

quantity to individuate them. (Owens, pp. 186–87)

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In this series the accident of quantity is primary in our awareness of material things and their particularity. From

this we move to substance (form and matter), and then to esse. Here again White argues for extending the sequence, in
this case, beyond quantity to include place.

†5

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This sequence is philosophically preferable since it begins where we begin; but it suffers from something of the

same problem as taking esse as the principle of individuation. For to say that something is an individual because of a

certain quantity of matter is not at all helpful in distinguishing human individuality from the individuality of other

material things, whether animals, plants, stones, or molecules. Nor, for that matter, can quantity of matter adequately

distinguish the individuality of any living thing, for the quantity of matter changes in living things while the individual

remains. Aquinas addresses this problem by distinguishing between determinative matter and indeterminative matter; it
is the latter that is the principle of individuation.

†6

This avoids the problem of linking individuality with a particular

quantity of matter, but it is not in itself a clear solution to the problem of individuation. For how can what is

indeterminative determine the individuality of something? Matter, in itself, is not determinative at all; it is only through

some formal considerations, whether accidental (as in quantity and place) or substantial, that there can be determination

of anything. As merely quantitative, accidental form fails to do the job for living things; it seems that we must turn to a

consideration of substantial form.

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Substantial form is the proximate distinguishing feature of created things. As we mentioned above, esse is indeed

the ultimate created principle in all things, and of

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course God is the cause of created esse. But we must remember that esse has no conceptual content for us: it is a

marker for our affirmation that there is an ultimate cause of all being. Hence it is not a helpful explanatory principle for

the nature of things. Likewise, one can say that matter in its most attenuated state (pushed all the way—prime matter)

is a kind of principle of individuation in material things in the sense that there is no material thing that does not, in a

way, depend on prime matter. However, prime matter is useless by itself for explaining anything. All explanation comes
through formal considerations.

†7

Even quantity and place require reference to formal distinctions. God and prime matter

are, as it were, the bookends of our metaphysical explanation of material things, but any specificity we distinguish is due

to formal considerations. Owens basically agrees with this: “Not only in spiritual substances, but also throughout the

realm of material things, the doctrine of Aquinas shows clearly enough that the form functions in this individuating

manner.... This causality of the form in its bearing upon individuation has not been emphasized in the Thomistic

tradition, but it is a requirement of the texts” (Owens, p. 185). In his essay “Individuation: An Example of the

Development in the Thought of St. Thomas Aquinas,” Robert O’Donnell concurs: “The Thomistic doctrine of individuation

is, we believe, expressed with greater clarity and precision when we say that the individuation of material composites is

rooted in substantial form. It is possible to have many individuals within the same human species precisely because each
human soul is by its nature the substantial form of an individual material body.”

†8

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The explanation of the individual person is more in terms of the rational soul than of the body. Each rational soul is

in itself an individual substance since it has an activity (thought) in which the body does not share (ST I.75.2; CG II.68).
The soul is also the form of the body; the soul’s act of being (esse) is the act of being of the composite.

†9

Thus, when

Aquinas says that the body is the principle of individuation, it is not that it is the prior cause; rather, human souls are

individuated according to bodies. Here is the key text from Book II of the Summa contra gentiles:

If the being of the form depends on matter, its multiplication, as well as its unity, depends on

matter. But if this is not the case, then the form will have to be multiplied in accordance with the

multiplication of matter, that is to say, together with the matter and in proportion to it; yet not in

such a manner that the unity or multiplicity of the form itself depends upon the matter. It has been

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shown, however, that the human soul is a form not depending in its being on matter. It therefore

follows that souls are multiplied in accordance with the multiplication of bodies, yet the latter will

not be the cause of the

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multiplication of souls.... This diversity [of souls], nevertheless, does not result from a diversity in

the essential principles of the soul itself, nor from otherness in respect of the intelligible essence of

the soul, but from the diversity in the commensuration of souls to bodies, since this soul is adapted
to this and not to that body, and that soul to another body, and so on in all other instances.

†10

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Because the individual rational soul is the kind of soul that requires a body, it is created in proportion to a particular

body. God, the soul’s creator, commensurates or proportions each particular soul to its particular body.

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When we consider material things, there is a kind of analogy of individuation based on the analogy of form (see CG

II.68.8–12). This analogy of form indicates a hierarchy of perfection among things. At the lowest level there are the

forms of the elements, and above these the forms of inanimate things. These forms are entirely embedded in matter, and

the inanimate material objects can be said to be individuated by quantity or place.

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However, one cannot say this about living things, for the individual living thing is the same throughout its life, but

the quantitative dimensions of its matter change through growth. Already we have formal considerations beyond quantity

at work in our explanation of individuality. The individuality of a plant is a function primarily of its vegetative soul, which

is its form.

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In animals the inadequacy of a quantitative explanation of individuation is more dramatic. Not only do animals have

a kind of individuality that persists despite changes in place and quantity; they also have an individuality of

consciousness: they sense and respond to other things in their environment. Thus, animals are individuated by their

experiences. In the higher animals this transcends a mere reaction to environment and progresses into something like a
rudimentary prudence.

†11

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With human beings we find activities that transcend quantity and place completely— knowing reality, freely

choosing between goods, and appreciating beauty. Since these are specific activities, activities that distinguish us from

the other animals as well as from plants and inanimate things, an adequate explanation of what constitutes human

individuality requires an analysis of these activities. Such an explanation clearly moves in the realm of form, not matter.

What works for a sufficient explanation of the individuation of rocks or roses or raccoons will not work here.

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Owens ends his article with a nod to the fruitfulness of a study of form in understanding the individuation of human

beings:

In the way it [Aquinas’s doctrine] bases individuation on the exigencies of real form, it leaves itself

open to expansion in all the qualitative fields. Dimensions follow upon form as corporeal. But from

the same form as living and sentient and rational, indefinitely variegated individual characteristics

flow forth on each of those three higher levels. There is no limit to the richness of individuation, just

as there in fact is no Leibnizian limit to the goodness of the created universe. The dimensions of

individuality itself are undefined. (Owens 188)

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Although it might be fruitful to study these many characteristics of human individuality that we share with plants

and animals, it is our rationality that most distinguishes our individuality. And, in fact, since there is only one form—the

rational soul—in the human being, all of this richness is to be found in a reflection on this soul. The complexity of the

human being—at once material, living, sensing, and rational—does not lead to fragmentation. As Aquinas says, the

higher one goes up the hierarchy of being, the more unity there is. The more perfect the form of a thing, the more that
thing is an individual. Of all material things, the human being is the most one.

†12

Let us now turn to a consideration of

this most perfect of all the forms that we experience.

II

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As we begin our meditation on human form, it is good to recall that we are simply reflecting on what we find

ourselves to be—thinking, sensing, physical beings. We should not forget that most important of Aristotelian and

Thomistic metaphysical principles: we must remain open to the multiplicity and variety of being as we find it. This is, as

it were, just the opposite of Ockham’s razor. Where Ockham says that we must not multiply causes without reason,
Aristotle and Aquinas say that we must not simplify or reduce causes without reason.

†13

We must not wield unity to

explain away multiplicity. The multiplicity we experience does indeed imply the existence of a more unified cause;

however, our knowledge of that unified cause cannot explain the nature of the multiplicity.

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To take a primary example: Aquinas says that we know of God through God’s effects: this insight is bedrock for all

that we can say philosophically about God. Our experience of many things gives rise to questions that are not sufficiently

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answered

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by those things, and so we say that there must be an explanation that transcends the things—ultimately, a cause of all

being. What we really know is that things are not independent; they depend on another for their existence, and this

other we call “God.” In our speech we turn this around and say that God is the Creator of all things; however, we must

not think that, just because we use positive language, we know something positive about how the nature of God affects
creatures.

†14

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As Aquinas says, we do not know what God is, only what He is not—not moved, not caused, not contingent, not

limited in perfection, not guided by another.

†15

Thus, all deductions from God’s nature to the nature of creatures are

illegitimate. To argue from the unity and eternity of God against the real diversity and temporality of the things of our

experience is to contradict ourselves; for we only know about the unity and eternity of God because we know the

diversity and temporality of the things of our experience. The truth that all things really are created and moved to

activity by one, timeless, and all-powerful cause does not in the least imply that the multiplicity, temporality, and agency
of all these things is unreal.

†16

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The same principles hold true for our understanding of human nature. We must not wield the unifying principle of

the human being—the rational soul—to explain away all those aspects of us that are not rational. We know that the

rational soul is the one form of the human being, but we do not know how it unifies all the many aspects of our

humanity. The truth that the many aspects of our humanity are unified by the rational soul does not in the least imply

that these many aspects are not real. To focus on our rationality is to focus on one power of the soul. We also have

powers of sensation and memory that we share with other animals, and powers of growth and nutrition that we share

with all living things, to say nothing of the chemical and physical characteristics that we share with inanimate things. In

addition, the power or faculty of reason itself is multifaceted. Aquinas speaks explicitly of two distinct activities of reason

—theoretical reason and practical reason. I shall add a third, one which is implied but not explicit in his thought

—aesthetic reason.

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Since reason operates in three distinct ways (theoretical, moral, and aesthetic), our analysis of human individuality

based on the formal characteristics of the rational soul will be divided into three sections. In the first, we shall consider

the activity of knowing being (expressed in terms of judgments of truth and falsity). In the second, we shall consider the

activity of choosing what ought to be done (expressed in terms of judgments concerning good and evil). In the third, we

shall consider the activity of appreciating things in themselves and for their own sakes (expressed in terms of judgments

concerning beauty and ugliness). In each section, our individuality will be discussed in relation to three elements: (1)

our ability

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to grasp the distinct object of reason, (2) our reflexive awareness of the first principles implied by grasping that object,
and (3) the self-constitution that our participation in that object brings into being.

†17

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Let us begin our meditation with theoretical reason. To know the truth about reality is to be engaged in an activity

that transcends the limitations of time and space, that is, the limitations of matter.

†18

Although “knowledge” is an

analogical term that can also be applied to the sense knowledge of animals, the intellectual judgment of the truth about

reality is the activity of a human being. The object of knowledge is always universal and timeless. Since the natural

objects of human knowledge are material things that are particular and temporal, such knowledge is always
incomplete.

†19

However, this does not mean that the knowledge is not real. Although there is much more to a rabbit

than its animal nature, and much more to a turnip than its vegetative nature, it remains true that all rabbits are distinct

from all turnips by this universal distinction between animal and vegetable. No physical organ can grasp what is

universal; it responds only to particulars. Since we are able to know this universal and timeless truth (and many others),

there must be something about us that is not physical, some immaterial principle that can grasp what is universal and
timeless. This we call the intellectual soul.

†20

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The implications of the truth about our rational nature are far-reaching. Since the activity of the rational soul does

not depend directly on any material organ, Aquinas goes so far as to say that the rational soul is its own substance.

When introducing his discussion of human nature, Aquinas does so under the heading: “Of man who is composed of a
spiritual and a corporeal substance.”

†21

Although he is careful to distinguish differences between the human rational soul

and an angel, there are parallels that are obvious. Of most interest to our discussion here is the implication for
individuation. Aquinas says that each angel is individuated by itself and is, because it lacks matter, its own species.

†22

Aquinas, of course, denies that human souls constitute their own species (as we will discuss more fully later), but the

ways in which separate substances are unique individuals apply to human souls, as well.

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Besides a consideration of the object of thought, there is another way of becoming aware of the unique individuality

of the human being: this involves reflection or the activity of thinking about thinking.

†23

Aquinas says that our ability to

know

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that we know indicates the transcendence of thinking over material conditions, for no material thing can, as it were, turn

back on itself without having some part of it uncovered (CG II.49.[8]). Since materiality is part outside of part, and

temporal sequence moment outside of moment, no material action can reflect on itself completely. But we can and do:

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we know the difference between rabbits and turnips, or between squares and triangles, and we know that we know these

things. There is something about our knowing that transcends materiality, something that clearly cannot be individuated

(in the sense of caused) by matter. This act of self-aware-ness is revealed in our notion of being a self. Such a notion is

impossible without some center that endures through time. Not only does this center make self-aware-ness possible;
every act of intellectual knowledge requires the individual light of the individual thinker.

†24

Human thought is no

automatic process: without the activity of this intellectual light, no amount of potentiality (ability to know or material

capacity to store information gained through sense experience) would suffice for knowledge. Aquinas argues (against

Averroes and Avicenna) that this light must be individual since each person is aware of it being himself or herself who
knows.

†25

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In addition to being individuated by our capacity to know and by the activity of knowing, we are also individuated

by being unique, living configurations of knowledge about the world. Following Aristotle, Aquinas says that each human
being is, in a way, all things.

†26

We are, as it were, the matrix of creation, participating as bodies in the world of material

things and as rational in the world of intelligible things (CG II.68[6]). We are able to be, in a way, all other things

through sense and intellect. While this insight is good grounds for holding the infinite value of the individual, there is

another way in which the current state of our knowledge indicates our individuality. No human being is in actuality all

things, only able to be all things immaterial by knowledge and material by sensation. Thus, each human being is actually

a living home for a unique recreation of the world. No human being’s knowledge of the world is exactly replicated in any

other human being. Each one of us is, in this sense, an individual, never to be repeated, and irreplaceable.

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Let us now turn to a consideration of practical reason. Here again, the object of the activity, reflection upon the

activity, and the state of the agent because of the activity all indicate how the agent is individuated in ways that

transcend material differences between persons.

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In the first place, the object of this activity—what ought to be done—clearly transcends the limitations of time and

space. Most simply, we ought to do what is good and not do what is evil.

†27

There are some human goods that are

self-evidently good in themselves (not just good as means to other goods) and hence always and everywhere to be

promoted and not violated. Such are the goods of life, knowledge, friendship, and beauty. This self-evident principle of

practical reason (do good and avoid evil) together with the self-evident basic human goods generate specific moral

norms that should always and everywhere be followed. Thus, do not

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violate the good of life (that is, do not kill); do not violate the goods of knowledge and friendship (that is, do not lie or

betray others). Just as theoretical reason’s ability to know objects that transcend space and time indicates the subsistent

individuality of the rational soul, so does practical reason’s ability to command moral absolutes.

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This brings us to a second, and perhaps more obvious, indication of each human being’s individuality as irreducible

to materiality: reflecting on our activities of pursuing good and avoiding evil, we are aware of free will.

†28

Implied in the

directive “do good and avoid evil” is the assumption that we can respond to such an obligation. But response is

impossible if we are determined. Only if we have freedom of choice can we, and should we be expected to, choose what
is good and reject what is evil.

†29

It is, of course, a theoretical possibility that, while we think we are free, we are

actually determined by factors beyond our control—whether these be material processes or the power of God.

†30

However, this is irrelevant to what is at stake. Here it is not a question of what is the case (that is an issue for theoretical

reason) but of what ought to be done. If such talk of obligation has any meaning for us, then we must count ourselves

free to choose. That is, freedom of choice is implicit in any act of practical reason: one becomes aware of it by reflecting

on what it is to decide on a course of action. Just as it is impossible to think that one knows anything without assuming

that there is an intellectual light that is one’s own, so it is impossible to claim to choose anything without assuming that

one is free to do so. As reflecting on thinking reveals the power or faculty of reason, so reflecting on choosing reveals the

power or faculty of the rational will. “No judging power moves itself to judge unless it reflects on its own action; for, if it
moves itself to judge, it must know its own judgment; and this only an intellect can do.”

†31

Such freedom of choice is

irreducibly individual: it cannot be one’s choice if someone else is the cause of it.

†32

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In addition to the evidence for individuality in practical reason’s ability to grasp universal obligations and in free

will, the state of each human being’s character indicates individuality. One’s character is the sum of all one’s choices, the
habits of virtue or vice that are developed through free decisions.

†33

This is an even clearer indication of individuality

than the unique sum of knowledge that constitutes every individual’s knowledge of the world; for although knowledge is

the result of

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experience that comes to us, in many cases, whether we will it or not, character is entirely the result of our free choices.

We are, of course, influenced by our inherited personality traits, our environment, and the people around us; but no one

can make us choose well or badly, and it is these choices that constitute character. Here is an instance of individuation of

great importance that cannot be explained by our materiality.

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When we come to aesthetic reason, we have a tougher job ahead of us, both because Aquinas says less about

reason’s role in appreciating beauty and because aesthetic reason’s distinctive characteristics are not as obvious as those

of theoretical and practical reason. Aquinas might appear to include aesthetic reason as an aspect of practical reason

insofar as he identifies the object of aesthetic appreciation (beauty) with the object of practical reason (good). “Beauty
and goodness in a thing are identical fundamentally; for they are based upon the same thing, namely, the form.”

†34

In

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one way, this identity is certainly true: if we are making metaphysical statements about the being of these qualities,

then it makes sense to identify them. This is simply Aquinas’s doctrine of the transcendentals: for every thing, we can
say of it that it is, is one, is true, is good, and is beautiful.

†35

However, we have already shown how reason is practical as

well as theoretical. When considered from the perspective of practical reason, good is prior to being: thus, truth and

beauty are basic goods. So, too, there is a distinct perspective of aesthetic reason in which beauty is prior.

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To understand this, we must see how beauty is distinct from truth and goodness. Aquinas goes some way toward

making the distinction in this same passage. He says that goodness and beauty differ logically; that is, we understand

them to be distinct. “Goodness properly relates to the appetite (goodness being what all things desire); and therefore it

has the aspect of an end (the appetite being a kind of movement towards a thing). On the other hand, beauty relates to
the cognitive faculty; for beautiful things are those which please when seen.”

†36

Good is to be done and pursued, while

beauty is contemplated and appreciated for its own sake. Aesthetic appreciation does not try to do something with its

object or to achieve it: it simply lets its object be and enjoys the beautiful thing. “Good means that which simply pleases
the appetite; while the beautiful is something pleasant to appre-hend.”

†37

Aquinas says that good has the notion of final

cause, while beauty has the notion of formal cause.

†38

Such analysis is enough to show that Aquinas considers beauty to

be a distinct object of the intellect and, as such, another indication of human individuality transcending corporeal

difference.

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Many people deny that beauty is objective, holding that aesthetic appreciation is subjective. That beauty is in the

eye of the beholder is true in a way: there is a component of sense experience in aesthetic appreciation.

†39

However,

beauty is not only in the eye of the beholder, and this in two ways: it is also in the intellect of the beholder, and prior to

being in the eye or the intellect, it is in the beautiful thing. Although beautiful things are unique, they share certain

universal characteristics; that is, they are objects of reason. “For beauty includes three conditions: integrity or perfection,

since those things that are impaired are by the very fact ugly; due proportion or harmony; and lastly, brightness, or
clarity, whence things are called beautiful that have a bright color.”

†40

The object of aesthetic reason is the beauty of

particular things, not just our feelings or sensations; we apprehend and appreciate an integrated order that is irreducible
to mere sense experience.

†41

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Not only does our ability to know the object of aesthetic reason (beauty) indicate our individuality; so also does a

reflection on the activity of appreciating beauty. When we reflect on this activity, we become aware that aesthetic reason

depends on first principles distinct from those of theoretical and practical reason. Reflecting on our knowing truth and our

choosing good, we are immediately aware of both the objective status of the first principles involved and the individuality

of the one doing the reflecting. One cannot deny the objective status of either judgments of truth or morality without

contradiction. To say that there is no such thing as truth implies the contradiction of assuming what one is denying

(truth); and to think that one may not have the wherewithal (the intellectual light) to think makes no sense since one is

thinking this. Likewise, to claim that it is good to act in a way that rejects any moral absolutes assumes what one is

denying (the pursuit of good); and to choose to deny that one makes choices is to hold that one’s choices are not one’s

choices—an obvious contradiction. Does aesthetic reason have such clear indications of its own distinctive first principle?

It is not immediately clear that it does. Certainly, we cannot so neatly formulate the absurdity of denying its first

principle.

Page 178

However, before we assume that aesthetic appreciation is merely a function of either theoretical or practical reason,

let us recall the metaphysical principle that

Page Break 179

we should never unify unless we have sufficient reason to do so. Powers are known by habits, habits by activities, and

activities by objects. We know that the activity of aesthetic appreciation is not identical to that of theoretical or moral

reasoning because we know that its object (beauty) is not identical either to truth or to goodness. It is true that we do

not have words for the habit of first principles of aesthetic reason. We can point to the law of non-contradiction for

theoretical reason and to the first principle of practical reason for moral reasoning, but we do not have such a neat

formulation for the first principle of aesthetic reason. This is a problem, but we should not, therefore, reverse our

metaphysical order and assume that because we cannot formulate the first principle of aesthetic reason, we should

therefore deny that aesthetic judgments are really distinct from theoretical or moral judgments. We must not fall prey to

Ockham’s razor and say that somehow theoretical reason or practical reason must do the work of aesthetic reason. To say

so would be to say that beauty is reducible to truth and goodness, and this is simply not true.

Page 179

This very reflecting on the activity of aesthetic judgment clearly requires individual participation. The individual

must attend to and focus on the beautiful thing. Such an act of attending involves in itself sense experience—seeing or

hearing (ST I–II.27.1 ad 3). Without this, there can be no awareness of what makes this thing beautiful. No one would
try to get another person to appreciate the beauty of something without trying to get that person to experience it.

†42

Such self-awareness in attending to and appreciating a beautiful thing is clearly the act of an individual.

Page 179

Finally, just as we are constituted as individuals by the knowledge we have and the choices we make, so we are

constituted by our aesthetic judgments. We acquire habits or virtues of aesthetic appreciation. Each person is unique in

his or her experiences of, judgments about, and artistic creations of beauty. Just as no two persons have the same body

of knowledge or precisely the same character, so no two persons have appreciated all the same instances of beauty.

Page 179

Aquinas says that art is a kind of virtue distinct from theoretical and moral virtue. It is like moral virtue in that it

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concerns something to be done, specifically, to be made. It is therefore an operative habit. On the other hand, it is like

theoretical virtue in that it is not concerned with the good use of the object but only with the object itself (ST I–II.57.3).

Unlike the virtue of prudence, art is not concerned with the proper order among the appetites nor with the justice of

choices. What matters is the good of the object, not the moral virtue of the artist. When we speak specifically of the fine

arts, then in addition to the skill necessary to bring the beautiful object into existence, the artist must have the habit of

aesthetic appreciation. This habit, whether well or ill developed, is to be found in every individual, whether an artist or

not. Every individual is constituted in part by this habit of aesthetic appreciation. Thus, it is a principle of individuation.

Page Break 180

III

Page 180

A number of objections might be raised against my argument. In the first place, if we assign individuality based on

activities that we perform, one might object that we should exclude such a designation to human beings who are not

able to participate in such activities—the very young, the senile, the seriously retarded, and the insane. A second

objection might be raised against the emphasis on form as the principle of individuation and its implications. Since

Aquinas says that intellectual creatures (he has in mind the angels) are separate species, should we say the same thing

for individual human beings? If so, what happens to the community of persons? Finally, it might be that what Aquinas

calls signate matter could be given a richer ontological status, thus preserving it as the primary principle of individuation.

Page 180

Consider the first objection. All this focus on rational activities as the basis for the individuation of persons might

imply that human beings who do not participate in these activities are not individuals in the same sense, worthy of full

respect and protection. Perhaps the very young, the senile, or the severely retarded should not be considered human

beings in the way that you and I are, and should be considered as less worthy of respect than healthy adult pigs and
horses.

†43

Aquinas’s answer is that, although substance is revealed by accidents, substance is more real than accidents.

For accidents depend on substances for their being: “A thing’s operation manifests its substance and its being, since a
thing operates according as it is a being, and its operation follows upon its proper nature.”

†44

Page 180

As Aquinas says, we know the activity by knowing the object, we know the habit by knowing the activity, we know

the power by knowing the habit, and we know the substance by knowing the powers (ST I.78.1). This is simply how we

have to proceed philosophically if we would ground our insight into what it is to be human, that is, into our substance.

Thus, in order to know what we are, we must consider what we do. We must reflect on what it is to be human. Part of

this project can be carried out in an extrinsic way. That is, we can weigh and measure, analyze our materiality in terms of

physics, chemistry, biology, and even psychology. However, such analyses must always be incomplete, for they leave out

the crucial human attributes of thought, free choice, and aesthetic judgments. To get at these characteristics of human

nature, we must reflect on what we do; and the essence of what we do (not the material conditions that accompany

every human activity) can only be understood by reflecting on what we do when we know the truth about being, choose

the good, and appreciate the beautiful. This reflection brings us to the heart of what it is to be a human individual: it is

to be a non-repeatable, irreplaceable center of intelligence, will, and judgment. And this, more than our materiality, is

the locus of our individuality.

Page 180

Still, we are not just bundles of activities, as Hume would have it, any more than just bundles of atoms: we are

unique, individual human beings. As Aquinas says,

Page Break 181

we may speak about the body sensing and the mind thinking, but more properly it is the human being who senses and

thinks through the body and the mind. “Now, of course, it is properly and truly said that man understands, for we would
not inquire into the nature of the intellect were it not for the fact that we understand ourselves.”

†45

It is clear that you

and I are the kinds of beings that demand respect as individuals. We are such beings when we sleep as well as when we

wake. If we receive a concussion, we do not lose this right to be so respected. Thinking, choosing, and appreciating are

accidents of our nature, activities we happen to be doing at the moment but not necessarily things we are always doing.

This does not make them unimportant, since it is from accidents that we become aware of the substance. However,

ontologically they are less real than substance: accidents depend on substances; if there is no substance, there can be

no accidents; if there is no human being, there can be no thinking, choosing, or appreciating.

Page 181

If we make activities alone the criteria for according ontological status and thus the respect due to the individual,

then, to be consistent, that respect must fluctuate with the activity. I would have less right to the respect as an

individual when I am sleeping or just daydreaming than when I am consciously understanding, choosing, or appreciating

(see CG II.79.[4]). The person with a higher level of activity (a higher IQ) would deserve more respect than the person

who is less intelligent. But all this is absurd: we do not think that it is appropriate to designate respect merely based on

current activity. If you and I are paradigms of what it is to be human with a clear right to be respected as individuals,
then there are no good reasons to deny these rights to any human being at any stage between conception and death.

†46

Run the time line: there is no instant in the continuum from conception to death to which one can point as the precise

moment when what was not human becomes human or what is human ceases to be so.

Page 181

To be a human being is to be the composite whose form is the rational soul. Aquinas says that the soul is not

weakened by the infirmities of age: “Since, then, the intellect is a power of the soul that needs no organ—as we proved
above—it is not weakened, either through itself or accidentally, by old age or any bodily weak-ness.”

†47

Any weakness of

intellectual activity is to be attributed to the weakness of the powers that the intellect needs, for instance, the senses,

the imagination, and the memory. As in old age, so in the very young: the bodily organs necessary for the intellect to

operate are undeveloped and therefore weak, not necessarily the intellect itself. There is no reason to believe that the

intellect of the very young or old is itself defective and therefore that the individual is not fully human. All human beings

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at all stages of life are worthy of the basic respect and protection due to us.

Page 181

The second objection concerns the danger of overemphasizing form, to the disruption of the very solidarity among

all members of the human species that we just

Page Break 182

emphasized. If each human being is individuated by form and if the human intellect is a substance capable of existing on

its own, then perhaps we should say of each human being what Aquinas says about other intellectual substances,

namely, that each is its own species. This would seem to undermine human community on all its levels and would bring

us back again to the problem of how to identify a human being, except through intellectual activities that are not always
evident in the lives of human beings.

†48

Page 182

First of all, let me make clear that my position is not that we are individuated merely by our form and those

activities that are unique to intellectual beings, but only that form is the most conspicuous indication of our individuality.

We are also individuated in all those ways that material creatures less perfect than we are individuated. The reason that

Aquinas says that intellectual substances are separate species is that they are not in continuity through matter. But we

clearly are. Not only that, but our very activities that transcend matter depend on matter, in part, for their origins (CG
II.68.12). We abstract ideas that transcend space and time from our sense experience of things in space and time.

†49

We live morally significant lives by choosing to order our passions and feelings in virtuous ways.

†50

We appreciate beauty

in the experience of sensible objects (ST I.39.8). As we mentioned above, this last activity is the clearest sign of our

intelligence acting in concert with our senses and imagination. The recognition of a beautiful sight or sound is

simultaneously and essentially the act of the mind and the body; or more precisely (to use Aquinas’s language) the act is

of the person through the mind and body (ST I.76.1; CG II.59.10). Souls are the forms of bodies; they are diverse
insofar as each soul is commensurated to a particular body.

†51

Thus there is no need to leave out our materiality when

considering individuation. Human beings are individuated—body and soul together. “Forms must be proportionate to

their proper matters, since they are related to one another as act to potentiality, the proper act corresponding to the
proper potentiality.”

†52

Page 182

Not only is there metaphysical solidarity within the species due to our materiality; these activities that transcend

our materiality are the very ways we do communicate with each other. We share ideas that we understand. We commit

ourselves freely to common enterprises, from friendship to marriage and family, to schools and colleges, to towns, states,

nations and the world. We appreciate beauty always with the thought of others appreciating it too, and we create

beautiful things for others to appreciate. Far from isolating us, these activities unite us. Were we individuated simply by

being different quantities of matter in motion, real communion would be impossible, for matter cannot be in two places

and times at the same time. These rational activities that most distinguish our individualized humanity are the very

grounds of community-building (see CG III.85.[11]).

Page Break 183

Page 183

The third objection challenges the understanding of signate matter. Although it is clear that merely quantitative

dimension is not sufficient to individuate human beings, perhaps we have not given the analogous notion of matter in

Aquinas its full due. It has been said that there is progress in Aquinas’s understanding of individuation, that the early

discussions of the body (the material component of the human being) as the principle of individuation are honed and
corrected to yield the later focus on form.

†53

However, the formulation of signate matter as the principle of individuation

is unchanged.

†54

Is this a mistake or not? If by signate matter Aquinas means simply matter designated by a particular

quantity (or, as White puts it, place), such a principle is inadequate to specify human individuality. However, when

Aquinas speaks of “this flesh and these bones,” what is implied is a much richer understanding of matter, one that comes

much closer to handling the issue of individuation. We have already said how the idea of prime matter is not much help

in individuation, for it is not something that exists in itself: there is no matter without form. But we have also said that

informed matter distinguished by quantity is only minimally helpful. Although it can designate this material being from

that one at one time and place, it does nothing to distinguish the individuality of a plant from that of a rock, or the

individuality of an animal from that of a plant or rock, or (most dramatically) the individuality of a human being from all

other material things.

Page 183

However, matter understood as the last matter that is disposed to receive the substance’s form is a much more

eligible candidate to handle this analogy of individuation. Not just any matter is able to receive life or able to sense. Plant

matter and animal matter are highly complex. Aquinas says that the human body is supreme among bodies and the only

body suitable for receiving a rational soul (CG II.68.[6]). Only the human body (flesh and bones) can receive the

intellectual soul as its form, and only this particular human body (this flesh and these bones) can receive this particular
intellectual soul.

†55

Thus, there is an analogy of last matter that parallels that of form. The last matter (flesh and bones)

is not irrelevant to the form. It is important to make this point, lest one fall into a kind of spiritualism— the idea that the

human being is really the soul, which makes use of the body (ST I.75.4). However, even as we say this, we must take

care not to think of the human being as composed of two things (soul and body) that just happen to be together. There

really is no such thing as an independent body disposed to receive the rational soul. There is really only the human

being. For this reason Aquinas insists on saying that there is only one form in the human being. There is no distinct

inorganic form, no distinct vegetable soul, no distinct animal soul, and no distinct last-formed matter. There is only one

form of the human being—the rational soul (ST I.76.5; CG II.58.[10]). More radically, there is only one real thing
here—the individual human being, whose form is the rational soul.

†56

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CONCLUSION

Page 184

In our consideration of individuation, we have focused on our rationality, that distinctive human feature that

transcends the characteristics of all the other things of our experience. However, we might have pursued other features

as well, from the vertical hierarchy of metaphysical principles to the horizontal dimension of our relations with others.

Page 184

As Owens remarks in his article on Aquinas’s doctrine of individuation, an analysis of human form extends into all

qualitative fields; we could expand our exploration in both directions along the continuum of metaphysical principles. On

the one hand, we could explore those dimensions of human individuality lying on the material side of form. We could

discuss the psychological and emotional aspects of human individuality. We could discuss those particular desires and

sensations that are unique to each person. We could even go into the biological dimensions of individuality. On the other

hand, we could explore those dimensions of human individuality lying on the formal side of form, adopting Aquinas’s
expression that esse is the “form” of forms.

†57

We could meditate on the source and meaning of human individuality in

terms of both the gift of being (esse) and the gift of grace. Admittedly, were we to head down this road, we would be

moving beyond the realm of reason and philosophy and into that of revelation and theology. One thing can, however, be

said here by philosophy. The first gift is a kind of threshold to the other. For we know by natural reason that our being is

a gift from the Creator, but we know nothing of how or why the Creator creates. If we are to learn these things, we know

that we must learn them from the Creator: they must be revealed to us. Thus, we are used to living with philosophical

mystery at the very heart of our being, keeping an ear cocked for news about how and why we were made. That there

should be news about a gift of divine life is not, of course, implied by the mystery of creation, but we know that such

news could be true, given what we do know about the absolute power and transcendence of God.

Page 184

We might also extend our consideration of individuation horizontally to include other people. For, in addition to

being individuated through our own particular activities and how these activities constitute us, we are also individuated

through our relationships with other human beings. Here is another dimension of individuation to be explored. Part of

what makes us individuals is how we are known and loved by those around us. And just as we are individuated by

ourselves but also by our interrelations with others, so we are to be valued for our own sakes but also for the sake of the

community.

Page 184

However, whatever other aspects of our humanity we might choose to explore vertically or horizontally, we must

begin with the consideration of how we are individuated by form. The unity of the human person demands that there be

only one form, the rational soul, which is the center of our uniqueness as individuals

Page Break 185

and also that through which we bind ourselves in community. Because the rational soul has activities that transcend

matter, it is not a product of material conditions or evolution. As Aquinas says, each rational soul is created by a direct

act of God (ST I.118.2). Hence, no human person is reducible to the material universe nor to the community of other

persons. Each created individual adds to the perfection of the universe. No human being is repeatable or (therefore)

replaceable. This radical uniqueness of human individuality is most clearly revealed through a meditation on the three

rational activities of the human being: knowing the truth about being, choosing what is good, and appreciating beautiful

things.

Notes

Footnote Page 167

1

. Thomas Aquinas, Summa theologiae (hereafter ST) I.29.3.c., trans. Fathers of the English Dominican Province (Allen:

Christian Classics, 1981), 1:158. “Dicendum quod persona significat id quod est perfectissimum in tota naturam, scilicet

subsistens in rationali natura” (Ottawa: Commissio Piana, 1953), 1:195.

Footnote Page 167

2

. See the early work (1255–1259) Super Boethium De Trinitate, Q. 4, a. 2; De Ente et Essentia, 2; ST I.75.4; ST

III.77.2; Summa contra gentiles (hereafter CG) II.75.[10].

Footnote Page 168

3

. Joseph Owens, “Thomas Aquinas,” in Individuation in Scholasticism: The Later Middle Ages and the Counter-

Reformation, 1150–1650, ed. Jorge J. E. Gracia (Albany: SUNY Press, 1994), 173–94. Hereafter Owens, followed by page.

Footnote Page 168

4

. Kevin White, “Individuation in Aquinas’s Super Boethium De Trinitate,” American Catholic Philosophical Quarterly 69

(1995): 543–56, at 555. These points are also mentioned in Armand Maurer’s

Footnote Page Break 169

introduction to Thomas Aquinas: Faith, Reason and Theology (Toronto: Pontifical Institute of Medieval Studies, 1987),

xxix–xxxv.

Footnote Page 169

5

. White, 555.

Footnote Page 169

6

. Super Boethium De Trinitate, 4.2.

Footnote Page 170

7

. “[M]atter in itself lacks all differentiation.” Super Boethium De Trinitate, 4.2, trans. Armand Maurer, in Thomas

Aquinas, Faith, Reason and Theology (Toronto: PIMS Press, 1987), 97. “[M]ateria in se sit indistincta.” Expositio Super

Librum Boethii de Trinitate (Leiden: E. J. Brill, 1955), 143.

Footnote Page 170

8

. Robert A. O’Donnell, C.S.P., “Individuation: An Example of the Development in the Thought of St. Thomas Aquinas,”

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New Scholasticism 33 (1959): 49–67, at 67.

Footnote Page 170

9

. “The soul communicates that existence in which it subsists to the corporeal matter, out of which and the intellectual

soul there results unity of existence” (ST I.76.1 ad 5, 1:372); “Dicendum quod anima illud esse in quo subsistit,

communicat materiae corporali, ex qua et anima intellectiva fit unum” (1:450). For more on how the rational soul is the

form of the body, see ST I.76.5 and CG II.56–57.

Footnote Page 171

10

. CG II.80–81.[7–8], trans. James P. Anderson, On the Truth of the Catholic Faith (New York: Doubleday, 1956), Book

Two: Creation, 262. “Si igitur esse formae dependet a materia, multiplicatio ipsius a materia dependet, et similiter

unitas. Si autem non, erit quidem necessarium multiplicari formam secundum multiplicationem materiae, idest simul

cum materia, et proportionem ipsius: non autem ita quod dependeat unitas vel multitudo ipsius formae a materia.

Ostensum est autem [cap. 68] quod anima humana est forma secundum suum esse a materia non dependens. Unde

sequitur quod multiplicantur quidem animae secundum quod multiplicantur corpora, non tamen multiplicatio corporum

erit causa multiplicationis animarum...non tamen ista diversitas procedit ex diversitate principiorum essentialium ipsius

animae, nec est secundum diversam rationem animae; sed est secundum diversam commensurationem animarum ad

corpora; haec enim anima est commensurata huic corpori et non illi, illa autem alii, et sic de omnibus.” Summa contra

gentiles, Apud sedem Commissionis Leoninae (Romae: Desclée/Herder, 1934), 191. See also CG II.75.[6].

Footnote Page 171

11

. See ST I–II.13.2 obj. 2 and reply, and ST II–II.47.15 obj. 3 and reply; CG II.48.[6] and 68.[11].

Footnote Page 172

12

. The more the form transcends the matter, the more, not the less, unified is the thing. “Nor is a thing composed of an

intellectual substance and corporeal matter less one than a thing made up of the form of fire and its matter, but perhaps

it is more one; because the greater the mastery of form, the greater the unity of that which is made from it and matter”

(CG II.68.[6], p. 205); “Non autem minus est aliquid unum ex substantia intellectuali et materia corporali quam ex

forma ignis et eius materia, sed forte magis: quia quanto forma magis vincit materiam, ex ea et materia efficitur magis

unum” (p. 167). See also CG II.58.[5].

Footnote Page 172

13

. See William of Ockham, Super quatuor libros sententiarum, II.24, where the distinction between the powers of the

soul (intellect and will) is denied and II.25, where he states that there is no need for an active in addition to a passive

intellect.

Footnote Page 173

14

. As Aquinas says, there is a real relation between creatures and God (they really depend on Him), but there is only a

rational relation between God and creatures (we cannot help thinking that God and creatures are interdependent even

though God in no way depends on creatures). ST I.13.7.

Footnote Page 173

15

. ST I.3 preface. We can also have analogical knowledge of God, but all this means is that whatever is real or good or

wise in creatures must preexist in God (who is the cause of all things), not univocally since that would imply that God is

a creature, but in a more perfect way. See ST I.13.2.

Footnote Page 173

16

. This is the direction of Ockham’s thought and forms the basis for that modern movement in philosophy known as

occasionalism espoused by Malebranche.

Footnote Page 174

17

. These elements correspond to three degrees of perfection in the individual human being. Aquinas speaks of three

levels of perfection in all things (ST I.6.3 and 73.1). First perfection is perfection of form, the degree of perfection in a

thing’s nature. Second perfection is perfection of activity. Third perfection refers to the end to be achieved by the

activity. Self-constitution in knowledge, virtue, and aesthetic sensitivity is not, of course, the ultimate end of the human

person: the ultimate end is God. However, the open-ended nature of such dimensions of self-constitution is, in a way, a

reach toward the divine.

Footnote Page 174

18

. ST I.84.1 and 85.1; CG III.84.[7, 10]. The content of this first section I have treated in an earlier article, “St. Thomas

Aquinas and the Individuation of Persons,” American Catholic Philosophical Quarterly 65 (1991): 29–44. I shall reiterate

some of the main points here.

Footnote Page 174

19

. We do not comprehend the essence of even the simplest thing. See De Veritate, 10.1.

Footnote Page 174

20

. Because the soul is immaterial, it cannot be destroyed and hence is immortal. See CG II.79.80–81.

Footnote Page 174

21

. ST I.75, 1:363. “De homine qui ex spirituali et corporali substantia componitur” (1:438).

Footnote Page 174

22

. ST I.50.4; CG II.93; Compendium theologiae, 77.

Footnote Page 174

23

. See De Veritate, I.9; CG II.49.[8].

Footnote Page 175

24

. Aquinas, following Aristotle, calls this the agent intellect. See ST I.79.3.

Footnote Page 175

25

. See ST I.76.2; Opusc. VI, de Unitate Intellectus contra Averroistas Parisienses.

Footnote Page 175

26

. Aristotle, De Anima, III.8 [431b20–432a2]; Thomas Aquinas, In III de Anima, Lect. 13, no. 787; see also CG

II.47.[5].

Footnote Page 175

27

. ST I–II.63 and 94.2; CG III.85.[16].

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Footnote Page 176

28

. See CG II.48.[3]. Aquinas says that the will belongs to the intellectual part of the soul, CG III.85.[2].

Footnote Page 176

29

. See ST I.83.1; CG III.84.6, 15.

Footnote Page 176

30

. Such a state would be determinism, natural (if caused by matter) or theological (if caused by God).

Footnote Page 176

31

. CG II.48.[3], p. 145. “Nulla autem potentia iudicans seipsam ad iudicandum movet nisi supra actum suum

reflectatur: oportet enim, si se ad iudicandum agit, quod suum iudicium cognoscat. Quod quidem solius intellectus est”

(p. 141).

Footnote Page 176

32

. The case of God being the cause of our free choices is another matter. God is the cause of all things and all activities,

including all acts of the will. But God is not another thing; rather, God is the cause of all things. God’s causality does not

alter the natural causality of things; rather it makes things to be what they are and to act as they do.

Footnote Page 176

33

. Virtues are in us naturally in the sense that we can become virtuous; we are not born virtuous (ST I– II.63.1; CG

III.85.[8]). An act of virtue is the good use of free will (ST I–II.55.1 ad 2). Habits of virtue, which go into the formation

of character, are formed from these free actions (ST I–II.55.3). These habits of virtue lead to righteous living (ST

I–II.55.4). See also In decem Libros Ethicorum Aristotelis ad Nicomachum Expositio, II.L.I, C. 249.

Footnote Page 177

34

. ST I.5.4 ad 1, 1:26. “Dicendum quod pulchrum et bonum in subjecto quidem sunt idem, quia super eandem rem

fundantur, scilicet super formam” (1:30).

Footnote Page 177

35

. De Veritate I.1; the doctrine is implied in the Fourth Way, where Thomas speaks about the hierarchy among things

that can be said to be more or less true, good, noble, and hence to be more or less (ST I.2.3.)

Footnote Page 177

36

. ST I.5.4 ad 1, 1:26. “Nam bonum proprie respicit appetitum; est enim bonum quod omnia appetunt. Et ideo habet

rationem finis, nam appetitus est quasi quidam motus ad rem. Pulchrum autem respicit vim cognoscitivam; pulchra enim

dicuntur quae visa placent” (1:30).

Footnote Page 177

37

. ST I–II.27.1 ad 3, 2:707. “Bonum dicatur id quod simpliciter complacet appetitui; pulchrum autem dicatur id cuius

ipsa apprehensio placet” (2:862).

Footnote Page 177

38

. ST I.5.4 and 91.3 ad 3.

Footnote Page 178

39

. Beauty is unlike the object of theoretical reason (truth) in that it really cannot be appreciated apart from the

individual thing. One can certainly abstract common characteristics that seem to be found in beautiful things, as Aristotle

does in his Poetics and as Aquinas does in the short passages that we have from him on beauty, but the appreciation of

the beauty of something requires that the thing be present. It is true that one can recall the beauty of a thing, but only

because one’s memory stores the particulars of things. We shall discuss this point more fully below.

Footnote Page 178

40

. ST I.39.8, 1:201. “Nam ad pulchritudinem tria requiruntur. Primo quidem integritas sive perfectio; quae enim

diminuta sunt, hoc ipso turpia sunt. Et debita proportio sive consonantia. Et iterum claritas; unde quae habent colorem

nitidum, pulchra esse dicuntur” (1:248).

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41

. An indication of the universality of the principles of aesthetic judgment is that one can be taught what makes an

object beautiful. When someone points out why a Beethoven string quartet is a masterpiece of music, indicating its

structure, the repetition and inventive manipulation of themes, and the rhythmical and dynamic subtleties, one’s

appreciation for the piece of music increases. When someone points out the integrated composition of a painting by Fra

Angelico in terms of line, color, and gesture, one’s appreciation for that painting grows. Of course, it is not always the

case that appreciation will be increased by aesthetic explanation, but if the explanation is good and we are interested in

learning to appreciate the beautiful object more deeply, we can learn to make better aesthetic judgments.

Footnote Page 179

42

. The beauty of literature is somewhat different since it is not necessarily seen or heard. Nevertheless, it still must

involve the sense experience of reading, the sound of the words, the rhythm of the poetic line, or the timing of the plot.

All these things require imagination, which requires an individual.

Footnote Page 180

43

. Peter Singer suggests this in his article, “Not for Humans Only: The Place of Nonhumans in Environmental Issues,” in

Ethics and Problems of the 21

st

Century , ed. K. E. Goodpaster and K. M. Sayre (Notre Dame: Univ. of Notre Dame Press,

1979), 191–206.

Footnote Page 180

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. CG II.79.[4], p. 255. “Operatio enim rei demonstat substantiam et esse ipsius: quia unumquodque operatur

secundum quod est ens, et propria operatio rei sequitur propriam ipsius naturam” (p. 188).

Footnote Page 181

45

. CG II.59.[10], p. 179. “Planum autem est quod proprie et vere dicitur quod homo intellegit: non enim intellectus

naturam investigaremus nisi per hoc quod nos intelligimus” (p. 156). See also ST I.75.2 ad 2.

Footnote Page 181

46

. This argument is presented by Richard Werner in his article, “Abortion: The Ontological Status of the Unborn,” Social

Theory and Practice 3 (1977): 201–22.

Footnote Page 181

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. CG II.79.[11], p. 257. “Cum igitur intellectus sit virtus animae quae non indiget organo, ut ex praemissis [cap. 68]

patet, ipse non debilitatur, neque per se neque per accidens, per senium vel per aliquam aliam debilitatem corporis” (p.

189). See also CG II.83.[15].

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. Aquinas himself formulates this objection in CG II.80.[2].

Footnote Page 182

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. ST I.85.1; I–II.63.1; CG III.84.[14].

Footnote Page 182

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. ST I–II.56.3. On free will and the virtues, see ST I.83.1 ad 5.

Footnote Page 182

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. CG II.81.[8]; see also CG II.83.[34–35].

Footnote Page 182

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. CG II.83.[35]; Formas autem oportet esse propriis materiis proportionatus: cum se habeant ad invicem sicut potentia

et actus; proprius enim actus propriae potentiae respondet” (p. 200).

Footnote Page 183

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. This is O’Donnell’s thesis in the above-mentioned article.

Footnote Page 183

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. Super Boethium De Trinitate 4.2; De Ente et Essentia 2; ST I.75.4; III.77.2; CG II.75.[10].

Footnote Page 183

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. Again, individuation is according to a particular body, but not caused by that body. See CG II.80– 1.[7]; ST

I–II.63.1.

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. ST I.75.4. In ST I.76.6, Aquinas insists on this unity by denying the existence of any disposition that mediates

between soul and body.

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. “Being is innermost in each thing and most fundamentally inherent in all things since it is formal in respect of

everything found in the thing” (ST I.8.1, 1:34); “Esse autem est illud quod est magis intimum cuilibet, et quod

profundius omnibus inest, cum sit formale respectu omnium quae in re sunt” (1:41). See also ST I.7.1 and De Potentia,

VII.2 ad 9.

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