Societies
East European Politics &
http://eep.sagepub.com/content/22/4/757
The online version of this article can be found at:
DOI: 10.1177/0888325408316530
2008
2008 22: 757 originally published online 16 April
East European Politics and Societies
Christy M. Glass
Poland, and Russia
Gender and Work during Transition : Job Loss in Bulgaria, Hungary,
Published by:
http://www.sagepublications.com
On behalf of:
American Council of Learned Societies
can be found at:
East European Politics & Societies
Additional services and information for
http://eep.sagepub.com/cgi/alerts
http://eep.sagepub.com/subscriptions
http://www.sagepub.com/journalsReprints.nav
http://www.sagepub.com/journalsPermissions.nav
http://eep.sagepub.com/content/22/4/757.refs.html
757
Author’s Note: The author gratefully acknowledges the helpful comments of Ivan Szelenyi, Eva Fodor,
Hannah Brueckner, Karl Ulrich Mayer, Janette Kawachi, and all participants of the Comparative Research
Workshop at Yale University. The author is an Assistant Professor of Sociology at Utah State University.
Direct all correspondence to Christy M. Glass, Department of Sociology, Social Work and Anthropology,
0730 Old Main Hill,Utah State University,Logan,UT84322-0730. Email: christy.glass@usu.edu.
East European Politics and
Societies
Volume 22 Number 4
November 2008 757-783
© 2008 Sage Publications
10.1177/0888325408316530
http://eeps.sagepub.com
hosted at
http://online.sagepub.com
Gender and Work during
Transition
Job Loss in Bulgaria, Hungary,
Poland, and Russia
Christy M. Glass
Utah State University, Logan, Utah
Did gender affect access to jobs during the transition from state socialism to market
capitalism in Eastern Europe and Russia? Using cross-national survey data from 1993
and 2000, this analysis tests several competing hypotheses regarding labor force par-
ticipation during periods of economic restructuring and recession. In 1993, women,
those with service sector experience, and those with high levels of education enjoyed a
degree of protection from job loss. By 2000, however, sizeable and significant penal-
ties existed for many women, particularly those with young children. These findings
are consistent with the short-term predictions of segmentation theory, which center on
differences between men and women’s ability to hold onto jobs during periods of eco-
nomic restructuring. As economies restructured and recovered from major economic
losses, women became increasingly vulnerable in the nascent capitalist labor markets.
Keywords:
gender; work; job loss; transition
Introduction
“Why should we employ women when men are out of work?”
—Gennady Melikyar, Russian Labor Minister, February 1993
T
o what extent did gender affect access to paid work during the transition from
state socialism to market capitalism in Central and Eastern Europe and Russia?
Were women more or less likely than men to experience job loss during this transi-
tional process? Since the start of the transition from centrally planned to market-
based economies in this region, job loss has arguably become the single most
758
East European Politics and Societies
dramatic and devastating social consequence. While many observers predicted some
short-term job losses, few predicted that as many as one-third to one-half of all jobs
would be permanently eliminated.
1
Given the importance of formal employment for
remaining out of poverty in this region—and indeed in most capitalist societies—
this paper asks whether gender predicted job loss and, if so, which mechanisms lim-
ited or sustained labor market participation among men and women. The analysis
traces changes over time in employment rates by gender, family status, education,
and job experience in four countries: Bulgaria, Hungary, Poland, and Russia and at
two time points: 1993 and 2000. By analyzing over-time as well as cross-country
data, I am able to adjudicate among competing claims regarding the effects of eco-
nomic restructuring and recession on employment status and job loss. While one set
of claims predicted that women would enjoy significant advantages in the labor mar-
ket as a result of market reforms and were therefore less likely than men to experi-
ence job loss, the other predicted that women would be the losers of reform in terms
of reduced job opportunities.
Analysis of the effect of gender on job loss in this region fills an important gap in
the literature on the social consequences of capitalist development in formerly state
socialist societies. Though a lively debate has emerged regarding the effects of mar-
ket mechanisms on social inequalities,
2
most theoretical and empirical work to date
has focused on class- and status-based inequalities. Thus, most studies have asked
who has benefited or is likely to benefit from the transition in terms of income and
occupational attainment, decision-making power, and property ownership.
3
Notably
missing from these debates are considerations of the gendered effects of market
development. Thus, with a handful of important exceptions,
4
few scholars have
sought to examine capitalist formation and economic restructuring with regard to
gender in the post-state socialist context.
Employment in Central and Eastern Europe and Russia
State Socialist Era
The history of women’s labor force participation under socialism is unique rela-
tive to the experience of women in most advanced capitalist countries, who were
gradually integrated into the labor market over a period of several decades. In
response to the institution and enforcement of full employment policies and ostensi-
ble gender equality, women flooded into the labor market under socialism. From the
1960s through the 1980s, women’s labor force participation rates in state socialist
societies were among the highest in the world. Though occupational sex segregation
and a sex-based wage gap were characteristic features of socialist labor markets, these
indicators did not reach the levels found in capitalist countries. Women were never-
theless underrepresented in the most prestigious sector of the socialist economy,
heavy industry, and were excluded from attaining the central means of occupational
mobility, membership and leadership positions in the communist party.
5
Many
women compensated for their relative lack of political capital and occupational pres-
tige by seeking high levels of educational credentials.
6
Toward the end of the social-
ist era, women on average had higher levels of academic education than men.
7
Thus,
although women occupied positions in the lower-paid tertiary sector of the socialist
economy, they attained high levels of educational credentials and occupied positions
at all levels of the occupational hierarchy.
Women’s full and full-time employment during socialism was sustained by a set of
social welfare policies and programs, including guaranteed job security and maternity
leave, family and child benefits, state-sponsored childcare, and universal health care,
that enabled women to balance work and family responsibilities. Such benefits were
critical given that the state did little or nothing to modify the sexual division of labor in
the family, all the while considerably increasing women’s roles in the public sphere. The
failure of the state to substantially influence gender relations at home led to what has
been referred to as a double or even triple burden of caring and productive activities for
women.
8
Throughout their tenure as full-time employees under socialism, women con-
tinued to be responsible for care work, housework, and the particularly time-consuming
activity of queuing for basic household goods.
9
Post-State Socialist Era
The end of state socialism brought restructuring of the labor market, reshaping of
legal and political infrastructures, welfare policy reform, and the institution of mar-
kets and private property. During this period, workers experienced massive job loss
through layoffs and forced retirements. Massive job loss and welfare reform did not
take place concurrently or uniformly in every country, however. In fact, individual
countries pursued divergent strategies of reform, which resulted in distinct timeta-
bles for and methods of labor market restructuring.
Hungary and Poland were the most successful in implementing economic
reforms, including the mass privatization of firms. Though both countries initially
experienced deep recessions and reductions in output, both were able to attain eco-
nomic growth by the mid-1990s. By 1997, over 90% of Hungarians and over 80%
of Polish workers were employed in privately owned businesses.
10
One of the con-
sequences of successful and rapid privatization in Poland and Hungary was early and
substantial labor shedding. In Hungary, employment declined nearly 20% and in
Poland nearly 15% in the early 1990s alone.
11
Bulgarians experienced massive job loss in the early 1990s as well, though not as
a result of economic restructuring. The Bulgarian government continued to protect
inefficient firms well into the 1990s; substantial economic restructuring did not
begin until 1998. However, rapid and aggressive labor shedding began as early as
1991 due to the decline of demand and lack of competitiveness of Bulgarian firms
Glass / Job Loss in Bulgaria, Hungary, Poland, and Russia
759
that accompanied trade liberalization and the collapse of the COMECON trading
system. During the economic crisis of 1992–1993, industrial production was nearly
cut in half, forcing massive labor downsizing. Bulgaria experienced one of the steep-
est declines in employment in the region: a 25% decline in jobs, and nearly double
the unemployment rate relative to other countries in the region.
12
Much like Bulgaria, Russia experienced massive economic stagnation and indus-
trial decline during the early 1990s. However, labor shedding did not take place in
Russia until the mid- to late 1990s. Despite production declines equivalent to those in
Bulgaria, Russian firms continued to resist downsizing the labor force and attempted
to retain workers through pay cuts, wage delays, work stoppages, restricted work
hours, mandatory leaves, and non-monetary benefits.
13
In fact, in surveys conducted
between 1992 and 1993, managers of state-owned firms responded that non-wage
fringe benefits accounted for 30–40% of total firm expenditures.
14
Thus, while work-
ers in Bulgaria, Hungary, and Poland experienced massive labor shedding in the early
1990s, this process did not begin in Russia until much later in the decade.
Trends in labor market restructuring combined with the decline of state-
sponsored employment guarantees led some observers to argue that women would
be categorically disadvantaged during the transition to a market economy. The intro-
duction of markets and the retrenchment of socialist welfare policies would simply
create new opportunities for gender discrimination as managers gained more power
over the labor allocation process.
15
Others argued, however, that the introduction of
market mechanisms would expand opportunities for women and would lead to
greater equality in the labor market as a result of the education and entrepreneurial
experience women gained under state socialism.
16
What many early predictions
failed to consider, however, were likely differences among countries with respect to
gender and labor force participation. Lacking comparative analyses of trends over
time, therefore, the applicability of these general predictions to women’s opportuni-
ties in this region remains unknown. After reviewing competing theories regarding
female labor force participation during periods of economic restructuring, I will ana-
lyze cross-country survey data in order to adjudicate among these competing claims
and to explore whether and how differences in rates and strategies of reform map
onto differences in labor market outcomes.
Theories of Female Labor Force Participation:
Supply and Demand
Market-based Processes and Changing Demand for Female Labor
Segmentation theory (I) predicts that women will enjoy a degree of protection from
the harshest effects of labor market restructuring due to high levels of job segregation
by sex, particularly when women are concentrated in jobs that are less sensitive to
760
East European Politics and Societies
Glass / Job Loss in Bulgaria, Hungary, Poland, and Russia
761
economic downturns such as clerical and service jobs.
17
Though specific patterns of sex
segregation vary across countries and over time, women and men rarely perform the
same work.
18
While sex segregation is generally disadvantageous to women in terms of
wages, job security, occupational prestige, and mobility, segmentation theory argues
that during periods of economic recession and labor market contraction, sex segregation
may actually protect women from job loss because of their structural concentration in
less vulnerable sectors of the economy. Because the sex typing of jobs tends to be rather
inflexible, men are unlikely to be easily substituted for women in traditionally female
jobs.
19
Moreover, because women tend to earn on average less than men, they may be
more attractive to employers facing hard budget constraints.
20
Under socialism, women were concentrated in less cyclically sensitive sectors
in formerly low-prestige occupations that during the transition to capitalism have
undergone disproportionate growth—including jobs in trade, hotel and tourism,
retail, communications, banking, finance, and educational and health services. Male-
dominated sectors, on the other hand, included those in the most vulnerable sectors
of the deindustrializing post-socialist economy: manufacturing and industry.
21
According to segmentation theory, during the transition the predominantly female
labor force in service sector occupations will be less vulnerable to lay-offs due to
their position in the least vulnerable sectors of the post-socialist economy. Long-
standing cultural and structural patterns of sex segregation will make it difficult for
men to rapidly substitute for women in female-dominated jobs—even those experi-
encing increased growth, security, and prestige.
Building on this theory, Fodor (1997; 1998) proposed that women in post-state
socialist societies would potentially enjoy advantages in the labor market above and
beyond their concentration in service sector occupations. Her theory of revalued
resources (II) suggested that in addition to women’s structural advantage in the high
growth sectors of the economy, women possessed cultural and human capital that
would make them particularly attractive to capitalist employers. Women’s educa-
tional credentials would translate into a highly valued form of cultural capital dur-
ing the transition, including skills such as “fluency in languages, analytic skills,
better self-presentation, and more flexible retraining possibilities” that will make
them more attractive to employers.
22
Competitive skills, educational credentials, pre-
dominance in service occupations would translate into greater security for women
relative to men in the labor market. Such gender-based advantages would not
inevitably be reproduced over time, however. Fodor argued that to maintain their
position in the developing market economy, women would have to mobilize politi-
cally to protect their economic and political interests as workers.
Fodor’s basic theory is compatible with human capital theory, which posits that
when faced with competition and hard budget constraints, employers will be less
able and less likely to engage in discriminatory practices based on ascribed charac-
teristics.
23
The more competitive the market, the more expensive discrimination
becomes, particularly in a social context where women possess more valuable
human and cultural capital than men. Thus, employers will seek the best-qualified
and cheapest employees available. While the segmentation theory predicts that
women will be protected from job loss during the early transitional period, Fodor’s
theory implies that the revalued resources mechanism would potentially continue to
operate in the long term. Thus, women’s continued advantage in the labor market
over time would be consistent with Fodor’s predictions but not with the more tem-
porally limited predictions of segmentation theory.
Contrary to the claims of job segmentation and revalued resources theories, the
reserve army of labor theory (III) predicts that women will be the most vulnera-
ble to lay-offs and unemployment due to their actual or perceived status as marginal
or secondary workers.
24
As the labor market contracts, jobs and workers are shed,
and this theory predicts that women will be the first to be dismissed and the last to
be re-hired. This theory depends on employers gaining significant discretionary
power over the labor process during the transition. Only with such authority may
employers—individually or collectively—pursue discriminatory practices.
At least three processes may lead to the reduction of employer demand for women’s
labor in post-state socialist societies. First, along with the elimination of job rights and
job security, the total number of jobs has declined and the competition for jobs has
increased. Women must increasingly compete with men for an ever-limited number of
jobs, including those in traditionally female-dominated sectors. Second, as policy
commitments to full employment and gender equality have been eroded, employers
have gained more autonomy and thus more discretion over whom they fire, hire, and
lay off. As a result, the preferences of employers for certain kinds of workers become
more central to the hiring/firing process. The disappearance of state subsidies and ben-
efits to support full employment for women and mothers has meant that the costs of
guaranteed leaves and childcare benefits have shifted to employers. Thus, it is possible
that employers increasingly see women not only as secondary, but also as unstable,
unreliable, and expensive employees. If so, such attitudes may lead to employer dis-
crimination against women in recruitment, hiring, and firing.
State-level Institutional Context and
Changing Supply of Female Labor
With regard to female labor force participation, the theories outlined above have
considered market-based, demand-side processes only, including employer prefer-
ences and practices, the changing sectoral composition of available jobs, and struc-
tural changes in the economy. These theories assume that the supply of women’s
labor will remain constant over time in societies undergoing transition. However,
women’s labor force participation is a function of market-based processes as well as
state and individual-level processes, such as available institutional supports for
women’s labor (e.g., childcare and family policies) and individual preferences and
762
East European Politics and Societies
Glass / Job Loss in Bulgaria, Hungary, Poland, and Russia
763
economic need for waged work, which affect the overall supply of female labor
(IV). Without understanding changes in preferences and constraints that face indi-
vidual women, we can neither fully explain nor predict patterns of women’s labor
force participation rates.
Comparative welfare state scholarship has demonstrated the importance of child-
care, maternity and parental leaves, and health care provisions in reconciling
women’s labor force participation and family responsibilities.
25
When public child-
care is available, women spend more time in paid work.
26
The absence—or presum-
ably the abrupt decline—of such benefits is likely to have a significant impact on
women’s ability to continue employment outside the home, thus potentially reduc-
ing the overall supply of female labor.
The tenuous balance of work and family under socialism rested on a set of uni-
versally available state-sponsored benefits that are rapidly being reduced, replaced, or
eliminated throughout the region. The negative consequences of the absence of such
social supports are likely to be acute for particular groups of women, such as work-
ing class women, single mothers, and mothers of small children, all of whom are less
able to rely on the market to alleviate their care-taking responsibilities. Thus, under
certain conditions, employers’ desire or ability to discriminate against women in hir-
ing and firing may be reinforced by parallel processes that effectively reduce the sup-
ply of female labor. If demand for female labor grows, increases in female labor force
participation may be stalled by downward pressures on the supply of female labor due
to reduction or absence of state or employer-sponsored social supports.
Finally, changing cultural preferences may also influence the supply of female
labor. Many observers of this region have commented on the resurgence of tradi-
tional gender and family ideologies in the wake of the transition to capitalism.
27
Women’s return to the home and family (and their implied exit from paid work) has
been proposed as a way to erase the damages done to society and the family by the
evils of state socialism—a process Gal and Kligman (2000) refer to as the sacral-
ization of the family and women’s traditional roles within it. To the extent that such
a sacralization has occurred, such ideas may potentially influence employers’ pref-
erences as well as the preferences of women who, now that they are free to do so,
reject the “double burden” imposed by state socialism and desire a retreat from paid
work. Indeed, there has been a major renaissance of the cultural symbol of the mid-
dle class housewife; the stay-at-home wife and mother has become hugely popular
and prevalent in media portrayals of the ideal family.
28
There is also survey data sug-
gestive of a backlash against women’s roles as full-time workers. In Hungary, for
instance, support for women’s full-time employment declined 15% between 1988
and 1995. Indeed by 1995, one-third of all respondents disapproved of women’s
labor force participation and believed that women should devote themselves entirely
to rearing children and housekeeping. Table 1 below outlines the theories I will test
in the analysis to follow.
764
East European Politics and Societies
Data and Analytic Strategy
This analysis relies on data from two cross-country surveys conducted in East
Central Europe and Russia that include nationally representative samples of indi-
viduals from Bulgaria, Hungary, Poland, and Russia.
29
These data are comparable
in terms of the substantive variables necessary for the current analysis, including
individual-level demographic measures, measures of educational attainment and
family/parental status, and indicators of labor market status, including work
history, current and previous job characteristics, and wages. Analysis of these
data will allow comparison of labor market trends over time and across countries
and to test the hypotheses outlined above. In addition to descriptive statistics, I
will rely on logistic regression models to examine the predictive power of gender,
family status, education, and job experience on an individual’s work status in
1993 and 2000.
Analytical Strategy
The aim of this paper is to determine the extent to which gender affected access
to jobs during the transition. Using logistic regression, I construct models to exam-
ine the effect of gender and related mechanisms on maintaining employment in
Bulgaria, Hungary, Poland, and Russia in 1993 and 2000. I construct models begin-
ning with the gross effects of sex in each country and proceed by adding theoreti-
cally meaningful variables, such as marital and parental status, and sectoral
experience, as well as control variables, such as age, education, and job history, until
the most parsimonious models are obtained.
Table 1
Outline of Theories and Hypotheses
Theory
Prediction
Mechanism
Segmentation theory (I)
Women less likely than men
Occupational sex
to experience job loss.
segregation
Revalued resources theory (II)
Women less likely than men to
Gender-based differences
experience job loss.
in cultural and human
capital
Reserve army of labor
Women more likely than men to
Gender-based
theory (III)
experience job loss.
discrimination
Supply side processes (IV)
Women more likely than men to
Decline in state supports
experience job loss.
for women’s
employment/changing
cultural preferences
Dependent Variable
At both time points, the dependent measure is whether the respondent is working
for pay. Respondents in both surveys were asked, “What is your main activity?”
Employment status is measured as a dichotomous variable where respondents are
coded as working if they report that their main activity is working for pay or com-
pensation or on maternity leave with a job, and not-working if they report their cur-
rent activity as unemployed, keeping house, on maternity leave without a job, doing
nothing, or other. Those reporting disability or disability retirement were excluded
from the analysis. I also limit my analysis to respondents between age 19 and the
official retirement age for men and women in each country at each time point.
30
Independent and Control Measures
Sex was measured as a dichotomous variable where self-reported females were
coded 1 and self-reported males were coded as 0. Two measures of family status are
included in the analysis: spouse employment is a dichotomous variable coded 1 if
respondent reports his/her spouse is currently employed and 0 if respondent reports
that spouse is currently not employed, and the presence of a young child in the
household was measured 1 if respondent reported that his/her child is age six or
younger and is currently living in the respondent’s household and 0 if the respondent
has no children or children older than age 6 living in the household.
In order to standardize educational credentials across the four countries and over
time, education was measured as a four-category variable: those with a university
education, those with a secondary academic education, those with a secondary tech-
nical or vocational education, and those with a primary education. In the multivari-
ate analyses, those with primary education are treated as the baseline category.
Service sector experience is measured as a dichotomous variable where 1 indi-
cates the respondent’s most recent job was in the service sector and 0 indicates the
respondent’s current or last job was in a non-service branch of the economy. Those
with service experience include respondents who are currently employed in the ser-
vice industry and respondents who are currently without a job but whose last job was
in the service industry. Experience in industry is measured in the same manner.
Managerial experience is measured with two variables. The first variable includes
respondents who have ever had managerial responsibility for 10 or more subordi-
nates. If a respondent has ever had 10 or more subordinates, they are coded as 1 and
all other respondents are coded as 0. The second variable includes respondents who
have ever had fewer than 10 subordinates. If a respondent has ever had 1–9 subordi-
nates, he or she is coded as 1 and all others are coded as 0. Job experience and tenure
are continuous variables. Job experience is a control measure for how many years
the respondent has been in the labor market (whether employed or not), and tenure
Glass / Job Loss in Bulgaria, Hungary, Poland, and Russia
765
is a measure of how many years the respondent has been at their current job or, if
currently jobless, how many years they spent at their previous job.
Finally, in the multivariate analyses, age was used as a continuous and dichoto-
mous variable. Age was initially included in the analyses as a curvilinear function.
However, after testing specific hypotheses regarding employment probabilities of
particular age groups, I included a control for young workers. Several scholars have
argued that young workers are particularly negatively affected in the transitional
labor markets
31
and therefore this is the age group that I controlled for in the analy-
ses. See Table 2 for the distribution of variables used in the analysis.
Results
Overall Trends in Joblessness
Jobless rates increased in all countries between 1993 and 2000—a reflection of
substantial labor shedding and job loss across the region. In 1993, however, employ-
ment rates remained relatively high: over 90% in Russia and over 70% in Bulgaria,
Hungary and Poland remained tied to the labor market. The differences between
Bulgaria, Hungary, and Poland on the one hand and Russia on the other reflect the
divergent transitional and privatization strategies and outcomes described above.
While Bulgaria, Hungary, and Poland began a process of labor shedding in the early
1990s, Russia delayed this process until the mid- to late 1990s. By 2000, the pro-
portion of those out of work further increased in all countries: employment rates
declined nearly 20% in Bulgaria, Poland, and Russia. We know that large numbers
of workers exited jobs during the 1990s, but where did they go?
As active labor force participation declined, the percentage of those unemployed
and out of the labor force grew across the region. Between 1993 and 2000, the job-
less rate in Poland nearly doubled and in Russia nearly tripled. In Hungary and
Bulgaria, the rise in joblessness over time was smaller but substantial nonetheless.
Not surprisingly, unemployment increased as well. In Bulgaria, the increase in
unemployment over time was dramatic: between 1993 and 2000 unemployment rose
from 14% to 33%, giving Bulgaria the highest increase and the highest overall
unemployment rate among the four countries. In Poland and Russia the rise in unem-
ployment was less extensive but nevertheless substantial. Only in Hungary did
unemployment rates decline slightly during this period. Thus, while in Bulgaria we
observe a massive increase in unemployment, in the other three countries the major
trend was movement out of the labor force altogether.
Overall these data confirm that substantial job loss took place in every country
and was accompanied by dramatic increases in unemployment and joblessness.
Having briefly reviewed general trends, I now consider specific hypotheses with
regard to the available data.
766
East European Politics and Societies
767
T
able 2
Distrib
ution of
V
ariables,
1993 and 2000 National Repr
esentati
v
e Samples
Bulgaria
Hungary
P
oland
Russia
1993
2000
1993
2000
1993
2000
1993
2000
Female
48.46
53.49
48.20
50.61
49.07
57.42
55.55
59.76
Spouse Emp.
57.83
24.42
57.31
24.87
51.36
28.43
61.80
18.25
Y
oung child
23.23
16.94
21.66
19.83
27.46
24.13
21.35
18.89
Age
:
19–25
11.46
16.28
14.44
13.39
14.60
12.07
14.70
12.33
26–35
27.03
22.76
24.27
27.48
26.09
24.83
28.90
23.47
36–45
29.71
28.07
32.39
28.17
29.36
27.32
32.59
34.53
46–55
26.83
27.91
24.46
27.13
17.94
25.52
19.72
27.13
Ov
er 55
4.97
4.98
4.45
3.83
12.01
10.26
4.08
2.54
Education:
Uni
v
ersity
19.41
15.12
14.19
15.13
16.40
9.02
29.19
23.89
Secondary
16.82
19.10
14.03
24.70
11.12
30.79
27.82
23.47
T
echnical
35.42
42.86
45.32
40.00
47.31
39.53
28.48
45.24
Primary or less
28.35
22.92
26.46
20.17
25.16
20.67
14.51
7.40
W
ork Experience:
Experience (mean)
20.66
11.35
21.37
20.64
21.24
22.63
18.97
19.46
T
enure (mean)
9.45
10.13
7.84
10.01
9.25
13.69
8.45
8.77
Manager
,
1–9
7.33
11.79
9.80
8.00
15.08
7.21
13.73
12.76
Manager 10
+
6.51
5.32
10.12
6.43
9.92
5.41
14.70
12.26
Industry:
Manuf
acturing e
xp
46.42
29.24
45.40
32.00
39.67
23.72
45.77
31.01
Service e
xp
20.07
28.74
26.29
36.35
26.91
30.24
30.56
31.71
W
ork Status:
Jobless
21.07
42.03
23.90
30.26
28.71
44.66
7.69
24.52
Unemplo
yed
14.09
32.89
11.67
10.09
9.36
16.37
2.14
10.29
N
3,578
602
3,214
575
3,055
721
3,550
1,419
768
East European Politics and Societies
Job segmentation (I) and revalued resources (II) theories predict that demand
for female labor as well as demand for workers in traditionally female-dominated
sectors would remain stable or increase during the transition. For these theories to be
supported, we should find that women as a group do not disproportionately experi-
ence job loss, and that education, job experience, and service sector experience pro-
tect both men and women from job loss in 1993. For revalued resources to be
supported, these trends should continue through 2000.
Figure 1a shows that employment rates were higher for women than men in
Bulgaria and Hungary, and men and women had roughly equivalent employment
Employment Rates by Sex, 1993
76
74
78
93
82
79
68
92
0
20
40
60
80
100
Bulgaria
Hungary
Poland
Russia
Men
Women
A
Figure 1
Employment Rates by Sex, 1993
Employment Rates by Sex, 2000
61
75
66
77
56
65
48
74
0
20
40
60
80
100
B
Bulgaria
Hungary
Poland
Russia
Men
Women
rates in Russia in 1993. Only in Poland were women more likely than men to be out
of a job. Regression results for the gross effect of sex confirm these findings. Being
female positively and significantly predicted having a job in Bulgaria and Hungary,
and sex had no significant effect in Russia. In Poland, women were significantly less
likely to have a job than men.
Tables 3a and 3b summarize the results of logistic regression models for each
country in 1993 and 2000. Bulgarian and Hungarian women remained more likely to
be working compared to men in 1993, even after controlling for family status, human
capital, and labor force experience. In Russia, sex had no significant effect on one’s
labor market status in 1993, and in Poland we find a net negative effect of being
female on having a job. Taken together, the descriptive statistics and regression results
offer some support to the job segmentation and revalued resources theories in
Bulgaria and Hungary in 1993. Indeed, in these two countries men disproportionately
shouldered the burden of job loss in the early years of the transition.
What about the effects of having a young child on women’s employment? There
were no negative employment effects of having a young child for women in 1993;
mothers of young children were neither more nor less likely to be working than
women or men without young children. One notable exception was Poland, where in
1993 women with young children were less than half as likely as men and women
without children to have a job.
When we examine the effect of service sector experience on holding onto a job, we
find further support for segmentation and revalued resources theories in 1993. In all
countries, service sector experience offered significant protection from job loss during
the early years of transition. Those with service sector experience in Bulgaria were
over twice as likely and in Hungary nearly three times as likely to have a job compared
to individuals without service sector experience. In Poland and Russia, individuals
with service sector experience were nearly one and a half times more likely than those
Glass / Job Loss in Bulgaria, Hungary, Poland, and Russia
769
Table 3a
Gross Effects of Sex on Having a Job by Country, 1993–2000; Logistic
Regression Coefficients from Models Predicting Work
Bulgaria
Hungary
Poland
Russia
1993
2000
1993
2000
1993
2000
1993
2000
Female
0.32
–0.21
0.29
–0.47
–0.50
–0.75
–0.17
–1.14
(0.08)
(0.17)
(0.08)
(0.18)
(0.08)
(0.16)
(0.13)
(0.13)
Constant
1.17
0.44
1.02
1.08
1.26
0.65
2.58
1.21
(0.05)
(0.12)
(0.56)
(0.13)
(0.06)
(0.12)
(0.1)
(0.1)
Chi-square
15.18
1.62
12.21
6.53
36.36
23.91
1.73
1.3
N
3578
602
3214
575
2931
721
3550
1419
Note: Numbers in parentheses are standard errors. Coefficients in bold are significant at the p
< .05 level.
770
East European Politics and Societies
Table 3b
Social Determinants of Having a Job, 1993–2000;
Logistic Regression Coefficients from Models Predicting
WORK for Individuals 19–retirement age
Bulgaria
Hungary
Poland
Russia
1993
2000
1993
2000
1993
2000
1993
2000
Female
0.20
–0.22
0.18
–0.09
–0.32
–0.91
0
–0.03
(0.09)
(0.22)
(0.09)
(0.23)
(0.11)
(0.25)
(0.18)
(0.16)
Family Status:
Spouse Emp.
0.55
0.52
0.59
0.41
0.87
1.59
(0.09)
(0.25)
(0.09)
(0.09)
(0.20)
(0.61)
SPEM*Female
–0.52
–1.22
−0.26
−0.65
Young child
0.18
0.04
–1.16
–0.19
0.67
−0.37
−0.35
−0.22
−0.36
−0.29
YCH*Female
–1.23
–1.46
–1.16
–1.30
–1.25
−0.51
−0.45
−0.22
−0.41
−0.32
Age:
Age
0.04
–0.01
−−0.05
−−0.07
−−0.14
0.04
–0.04
−0.02
−0.01
−0.01
−0.01
−0.02
−0.02
−0.01
19–25
–0.48
–0.89
–0.48
–1.09
–1.21
0.91
−0.17
−0.36
−0.17
−0.16
−0.49
−0.34
Education:
University
0.93
2.18
1.4
2.22
0.71
2.02
1.83
(0.19)
(0.37)
(0.19)
(0.43)
(0.15)
(0.47)
(0.27)
Secondary
0.55
1.61
0.5
0.83
1.36
1.14
−0.14
−0.3
−0.15
−0.29
−0.3
−0.26
Technical
0.56
1.98
0.6
1.01
0.78
1.15
−0.12
−0.27
−0.1
−0.27
−0.29
−0.24
Work History:
Experience
–0.5
–0.05
–0.06
−0.02
−0.01
−0.02
Tenure
0.04
0.03
0.05
0.03
0.04
−0.01
−0.01
−0.01
−0.01
−0.01
Manager, 1–9 0.46
0.5
−0.22
−0.14
Manager 10+
0.46
0.98
−0.18
−0.5
Industry
0.19
0.76
–1.04
−0.1
−0.23
−0.24
Services
0.84
1.33
0.98
0.35
0.32
−0.16
−0.26
−0.13
−0.11
−0.15
Constant
–0.02
–1.28
1.23
1.85
3.18
5.70
1.40
1.10
−0.39
−0.61
−0.19
−0.53
−0.27
−0.75
−0.4
−0.47
Chi-square
259.86
177.98
421.22
88.94
281.48
201.95
50.82
125.82
N
3137
602
3209
552
2880
606
3533
1346
Glass / Job Loss in Bulgaria, Hungary, Poland, and Russia
771
without such experience to have a job. In Bulgaria, the positive net effect of sex does
not disappear when I control for experience in the service sector, education, and family
status, suggesting that women benefited during the early transition above and beyond
their structural location in service jobs, their job experience, and educational creden-
tials. In Poland the opposite is true; even after controlling for family status, age, human
capital, and job experience, the net effect of being female on having a job remains neg-
ative and significant. As noted above, sex had no effect on having a job in Russia dur-
ing the earliest years of transition, and the effect of being female remains positive but is
no longer significant in Hungary after controlling for sectoral position.
Also consistent with the predictions of revalued resources theory, having a higher
education significantly protects one from job loss in 1993 in every country except
Russia. Higher education mattered the most in Hungary, where those with at least
some higher education were four times more likely to have a job compared to those
with only a primary education. Those with higher education were two and a half
times as likely in Bulgaria and twice as likely in Poland to have a job compared to
those with only primary education. The finding for Russia can perhaps be explained
by the high employment rate (over 90%) in Russia in 1993. There remained very
little variation in employment status; nearly everyone was employed and therefore
few variables significantly predicted job loss.
Interestingly I find no support in 1993 for the prediction of job segmentation
theory that job experience in industry would positively predict job loss. While indus-
try experience had no effect in Hungary, Poland, and Russia, such experience
significantly predicted employment in Bulgaria. These findings for Bulgaria are sur-
prising given the dramatic decreases in industrial output beginning in 1991. Perhaps
the full effect of this decline did not impact manufacturing workers until later in the
decade. Overall, the data from 1993 offer rather solid support for segmentation and
revalued resources theories: women were less likely than men to lose their jobs, and
higher education and experience in the service sector provided substantial protection
from job loss during the early period of transition.
Between 1993 and 2000, however, a sharply different picture emerged regarding men
and women’s employment. Women faced much steeper declines in employment compared
to men, and by 2000 protection from the service sector had eroded in most countries.
Taken together, the reserve army of labor (III) and supply side (IV) theories pre-
dict that the demand for female labor will decline and the supply of certain categories
female labor will be reduced during the transition. These theories predict the follow-
ing outcomes: (1) the supply of labor among women with young children would be
reduced throughout the region due to cutbacks in welfare spending; and (2) demand
for married women or women with employed spouses would decline concurrently
with declines in employer demand for so-called secondary wage earners. Data sup-
porting these theories would show that women—particularly married women and
women with young children—were more likely than men to experience job loss.
During the period between 1993 and 2000, a significant gender gap in employ-
ment rates had emerged in Hungary by which women were less likely than men to
be employed. In Bulgaria, the advantage women had enjoyed in 1993 had disap-
peared, while in Poland the already existing gap grew substantially larger. In Russia,
the gender gap in employment rates tripled, though the negative effect of being
female was non-significant, suggesting that the increased gap may be the result of
sampling error. Figure 2b shows that throughout the region, however, the proportion
of women out of work grew substantially during this period.
In addition to higher jobless rates in all countries, women also faced greater bar-
riers to reentry compared to men. While in 1993 women were slightly less than or
equally as likely as men to be among the long-term unemployed, by 2000 women
were much more likely to be in this category in every country. In Bulgaria and
Poland, the percentage of unemployed women who were unemployed for at least
two years more than doubled. Data from UNICEF (1999) reinforce these findings
for Poland. A 1995 survey of 2,000 unemployed individuals in Poland found that
unemployed women looking for work found jobs within an average of 16 months,
while unemployed men found jobs within an average of 14 months. By 1996, 41%
of unemployed men and only 25% of unemployed women had found jobs. Thus, not
only did women predominate among the jobless in 2000, but their ability to reenter
the labor market once they left their job had also been significantly reduced.
Turning to regression results, the positive gross effects of sex on having a job in
Bulgaria and Hungary disappeared by 2000. Not only had these effects disappeared,
but they had reversed: the gross effect of being female on having a job was signifi-
cant and negative in Hungary and Poland, while in Russia and Bulgaria sex had a
negative but non-significant effect. Furthermore, while in 1993 work in the service
sector provided a significant degree of protection from job loss, by 2000 this effect
was gone in Hungary, Poland, and Russia. Only in Bulgaria did service sector
employment continue to protect one from job loss. Thus, while we find some
772
East European Politics and Societies
Figure 2
Employment Rates by Sex, 2000
81
80
68
91
42
55
42
66
BULGARIA
HUNGARY
POLAND
RUSSIA
COUNTRY
E
M
P
L
OY
M
E
NT RATE
1993
2000
Glass / Job Loss in Bulgaria, Hungary, Poland, and Russia
773
evidence in support of job segmentation and revalued resources theories early in the
transition, by 2000 any protection women may have enjoyed had disappeared.
What about the effects of having a young child on having a job in 2000? If the supply-
side predictions of welfare institution theory hold, then we should observe a negative
impact on the employment of women with young children. As noted above, there were no
apparent negative effects of having a young child for women in 1993; except in Poland,
mothers of young children were neither more nor less likely to be working than women or
men without young children. By 2000, however, the negative effect of having a young child
on women’s employment became sizeable and significant in every country. Figure 2 depicts
the overall decline in employment rates for women with young children between 1993 and
2000. It is clear from this figure that the employment declines for mothers substantially
outpaced equivalent declines for men, women without children, and the overall popula-
tion. In Bulgaria, women with at least one young child were one-third as likely, in
Hungary one-fourth as likely, in Poland one-tenth as likely, and in Russia one-half as
likely to have a job compared to women and men without young children.
Figures 3 and 4 provide depictions of these rather dramatic findings for each
country. These figures show the significant gap in the predicted probabilities of
working by sex and parental status that emerged between 1993 and 2000.
32
As can
be seen in these figures, the net effect of having a young child had no negative effects
on one’s ability to hold down a job in either 1993 or 2000, meaning that men with
young children did not face penalties similar to their female counterparts. In fact,
after controlling for the interaction between female and having a young child, we
find that in Poland in 1993 and in Russia in 2000 having a young child actually
increased a man’s likelihood of having a job. These figures further show the pre-
dicted probabilities of working for men and women without children and for moth-
ers and fathers in every country in 2000. The advantages for men with or without
children are apparent in these figures. The sizeable disadvantages mothers faced in
holding down a job are also clearly represented.
No similarly strong pattern can be observed with regard to the effects of marriage
on men and women’s chances of having a job. The reserve army theory predicts that
married women are most likely to be seen by employers as secondary wage earners,
and are thus more likely to be laid off, fired, or not hired.
33
In 1993, marriage posi-
tively affected both men and women’s chances of having a job in all countries—a
finding obviously contrary to the predictions of the reserve army theory. Only in
Russia was there an interaction effect with being female and having a spouse.
However, both the interaction term and the net effect were positive and significant,
suggesting that while both men and women benefited from having an employed
spouse, the benefit for men was slightly larger.
By 2000, Russia and Bulgaria were the only countries where marriage continued
to have a positive (or any, for that matter) effect on employment. Again, the interac-
tion effect in Russia continues to suggest that while both men and women benefit
from having an employed spouse, the benefit to men is much larger (5 times vs. 1.4
774
East European Politics and Societies
times). The data for 1993 and 2000 seem to undermine the predictions of the reserve
army theory. Nowhere are women qua wives penalized in terms of employment.
Overall these findings are more supportive of the predictions of welfare institution
theory; over time, having a young child became more disadvantageous for women,
while marriage independent of motherhood was not significant.
Taken together, the findings for 2000 lend some degree of support to the predic-
tions of the reserve army theory and significant support for the welfare institution
theory. Maintaining a job in the transitional labor market was tenuous for women with
young children, due to reductions in demand for and/or supply of such workers.
Discussion
The major findings of this analysis are three-fold. First, there is evidence consis-
tent with job segmentation and revalued resources theories that women, those
with service sector experience, and those with higher education enjoyed a degree of
Figure 3
Predicted Probabilities of Working by Sex and Parental Status in 1993
protection from job loss in the earliest years of the transition. Not only was the gross
effect of sex positive and significant in Bulgaria and Hungary, the positive effects of
service sector experience and educational credentials were strong and significant in
every country. However, the second major finding suggests that over time any advan-
tages women may have enjoyed during the early years of the transition disappeared.
Taken together, these two findings suggest that Fodor’s revalued resources theory
was essentially correct—but was primarily a theory of transition rather than of
longer-term structural change. Indeed, it can be argued that the long-term prospects
for women in this region were contingent upon a mobilization of women to protect
their labor market status—a necessary mobilization that did not occur. Thus, perhaps
Fodor’s theory can best be understood as a conditional theory of women’s long-term
status in the region. Had there been an adequate political mobilization to enforce
anti-discrimination laws, promote women’s labor market interests, and resist reduc-
tions in family and childcare supports, women’s early and positive status in the labor
market may have endured over time.
Glass / Job Loss in Bulgaria, Hungary, Poland, and Russia
775
Figure 4
Predicted Probabilities of Working by Sex and Parental Status in 2000
776
East European Politics and Societies
Given the lack of effective mobilization, however, my findings are more consis-
tent with the shorter-term predictions of segmentation theory, which center on dif-
ferences between men and women’s ability to hold onto jobs during periods of
recession and/or economic restructuring. During the early years of transition,
women enjoyed a limited degree of protection from job loss. Ironically, over time,
as economies restructured and recovered from major economic losses, women’s
labor market status became increasingly vulnerable.
34
By 2000, women qua mothers faced serious barriers to holding down a job. This
disadvantage emerged (except in Poland where it increased) over time and in every
country. Several observers have suggested that, in addition to widespread discrimina-
tion against women with young children, employers also discriminate against women
of reproductive age who are at risk of having children. This argument implies that
employers see such potential employees as expensive and avoid risking high turnover
or long periods of mandated, statutory leave following the birth of a child. After test-
ing for the interaction of particular age categories and sex, however, we found no evi-
dence to support this claim.
35
Rather, it is the presence or absence of having a young
child that negatively and significantly affects women’s labor force status.
Two compatible explanations for this finding seem plausible. First, as state sup-
ports for women’s labor force participation eroded in every country, women found it
increasingly difficult to balance work and family, particularly when their children
were young. Second, when the costs of social provisions shifted to employers, many
began to see women with young children as more expensive and less reliable
employees. It may also simply be more culturally optimal to lay off or avoid hiring
women with young children who have (or are assumed to have) a wage-earning
husband upon whom to rely for financial support.
Both explanations assume the exit of women with young children from paid work
was largely involuntary. However, there is also the possibility that substantial
numbers of women with young children preferred to exit the labor force while their
children were young. As noted above, the ideal of the middle-class, stay-at-home
mother has become increasingly salient in popular culture since 1989. Though the
available data cannot fully adjudicate among these competing mechanisms, there is
evidence to suggest that this preference-based account does fully explain the
processes taking place in this region.
First, in response to a series of questions in the 2000 cross-national survey about
the effects of having young children on employment since 1989, a significant pro-
portion of women reported difficulties in sustaining, looking for, and finding paid
employment following the birth of a child. Nearly 50% of women in Bulgaria,
Hungary, and Poland reported that they did not get their job back following mater-
nity leave, and between 10% and 25% of women in all countries reported that child-
care duties prevented them from looking for or applying for jobs (see Table 4 for a
summary of these findings
36
). A survey of Hungarian women conducted by UNICEF
in 1999 found similar trends: 1 out of 10 women said they were unable to return to
Glass / Job Loss in Bulgaria, Hungary, Poland, and Russia
777
their former job following maternity leave despite their desire (and, in most
countries, statutory right) to do so. One in three women stated that employers
resisted rehiring them and many gave examples of cases in which employers tried to
permanently dismiss workers on parental leave.
Finally, there is some evidence that employers increasingly see women in general,
and mothers in particular, as less desirable workers. A recent ILO survey of managers
in Hungary revealed a strong preference to hire men for jobs that required technical and
supervisory skills and a willingness to work overtime.
37
Men were also seen by
employers as less likely to exhibit high turnover rates. The same managers saw women
as primarily responsible for care work in the home and stated that such duties disad-
vantage women in terms of recruitment opportunities. For example, 79% of managers
interviewed reported that having children younger than six years of age disadvantaged
women’s chances of being recruited and hired, while 90% of the same managers stated
that having a young child did not affect their recruitment decisions regarding men.
38
A
similar survey of managers in Bulgaria revealed that 54% stated a preference to hire
men, while only 25% stated a preference to hire women. This gap grew when man-
agers were asked about their gender preferences when hiring for particular types of
jobs. When hiring “experts,” 59% of managers preferred to hire men, while only 3%
preferred to hire women.
39
Finally, a 1991 study of official job advertisements through-
out the region found that women were excluded from 65–70% of all non-manual
jobs.
40
Examples abound of official (and statutorily prohibited
41
) job advertisements
that specify the gender, age, and even the physical characteristics of desired job can-
didates.
42
To the extent that such advertisements are common, this would support the
argument that women are likely to encounter rather inhospitable conditions in the labor
market during the transition. While the voluntary exit of certain women from the labor
force is not incompatible with my findings, such an account cannot fully explain the
massive exit of mothers from paid work during the 1990s.
Table 4
Effects of Childcare on Women’s Employment (in %)
Bulgaria
Hungary
Poland
Russia
Since 1989, have you stopped working to
raise children?
49
51
55
67
Did you get job your back within 3 mo. following
maternity leave?
36
47
45
48
32
Did childcare duties prevent you from
looking/applying for work?
12
24
18
22
Did childcare duties prevent you from accepting a job?
7
8
5
19
Were you ever fired due to your childcare duties?
0
5
4
13
% who experienced any work-related penalties
28
43
34
37
Source: Szelenyi and Emigh, “Poverty, Ethnicity and Gender in Market Transition.” Author’s calculations.
778
East European Politics and Societies
The third major finding of this analysis relates to Poland. At both time points,
Poland represents an outlier among the four countries. It was the only country where
a net negative effect for women and women with young children obtained in 1993,
and despite significant protection offered by service sector work in Poland, women
did not appear to benefit during the early transitional period. Poland continued to
stand apart in 2000, even though the situation for women in the other three countries
substantially deteriorated. Even after controlling for family status, human capital,
and job experience, the net effect of being a woman remained significant and size-
able. These findings are particularly surprising given that many economists point to
Poland as a major “success” story in the post-socialist region. Poland has enjoyed
one of the highest growth rates in the region, and by most aggregate measures has
gone farthest in implementing market reforms.
43
Though proponents of the “shock
therapy” program predicted initial, short-term displacement for some workers, my
findings suggest that the promised recovery and return to work has not materialized
for many Polish workers. Indeed, though many economists would predict that gen-
der disparities should have decreased over time as competition—and therefore the
associated costs of discriminating—increased, this has simply not occurred.
The small sample size of countries under study prohibits a definitive explanation for
what appears to be Polish “exceptionalism.” However, a speculative explanation would
point to the early, rapid, and draconian reform of welfare benefits and the potency of
conservative gender ideologies in Poland. Previous research has demonstrated a robust,
positive relationship between publicly available childcare and women’s employment
rates.
44
The sharp decline of public childcare in Poland compared to the other three
countries undoubtedly provides insight into the equally dramatic decline of women’s
employment during this period. Furthermore, despite having one of the highest fertility
rates in the region, Poland has the most restricted eligibility and coverage of child and
maternity benefits. Unlike the other countries where the eligibility and coverage
exceeds the ratio of households with young children, the proportion of respondents who
are eligible and who receive benefits is less than half of the proportion who have young
children in Poland.
45
As a result of these cutbacks in state supports starting in the early
1990s, women were faced with pressure to exit the labor force and/or rely on unpaid
family members following the birth of children.
Furthermore, perhaps the strongest public articulation of traditional gender ide-
ologies in the region has been put forth by Polish policy makers since the early
1990s.
46
In a country where over 90% of the population is Catholic, the Catholic
church continues to have substantial influence over politics, policies, and political
platforms. Many observers argue that without official approval of the church (which
often implies devising a platform consistent with the church’s own), political parties
and individual politicians have little chance of electoral success.
47
It is possible that
prevalent ideas about women’s roles affect both supply and demand of female labor,
Glass / Job Loss in Bulgaria, Hungary, Poland, and Russia
779
and potentially create conflicts—both material and ideological—for women who
continue in paid work. Overall, the prevalence of conservative gender ideologies in
Poland, combined with severe restrictions on access to and generosity of family and
child benefits and programs, likely explains a great deal of the difficulties for women
in getting and keeping jobs during the transitional period.
Conclusion
Understanding which groups are at greatest risk of losing their jobs, and the mecha-
nisms that increase individual-level vulnerability during periods of economic restruc-
turing is critical to formulating policies aimed at decelerating rising inequality in this
region. The current findings underscore the importance of state policies that support and
enable women’s work outside the home by mediating their oft-competing roles in the
family and the economy. Similar to demographic trends throughout the capitalist world,
divorce rates, out-of-wedlock births, and the number of female-headed households are
increasing throughout this region. These trends suggest that, not unlike the situation in
advanced capitalist societies, access to paid work is increasingly central to the material
status of women and their families. Familial policies that assume a male breadwinner,
such as those in Poland, create increased risks for women throughout the class hierar-
chy and simply fail to recognize the growing realities.
These findings also increase our understanding of the processes behind mounting
poverty in this region. Escalating poverty rates are a well-documented characteristic
of the post-state socialist region, and research suggests that access to paid work is a
decisive factor in avoiding poverty. Indeed, the presence of a single non-working
adult in a household is a major predictor of household-level poverty.
48
Thus, if par-
ticular social groups—such as women with young children—are at greater risk of
job loss and therefore poverty, effective anti-poverty programs must address the
labor market mechanisms that create this disadvantage.
Finally, these findings underscore the importance of enforcing anti-discrimination
laws. In order to be considered for EU membership, Eastern European countries
must meet certain standards with regard to anti-discrimination laws, and all countries
under study currently have such laws on the books.
49
Some countries, such as
Bulgaria, have even included progressive affirmative action provisions in the labor
code that encourage hiring qualified women over equally qualified men. However,
by most accounts, enforcement mechanisms simply do not exist. For instance,
Poland added clauses regarding equal rights and equal treatment for men and women
in employment to the Labor Code in 1996 yet there remain no formal mechanisms
through which women can pursue discrimination claims.
50
Though in principle it
remains illegal to discriminate against women, in practice discriminatory behavior
by employers goes largely unchecked throughout the region.
51
780
East European Politics and Societies
While this analysis considers gains and losses for men and women in the transi-
tional labor market in a quantitative sense, it provides little insight into changes in the
quality of available jobs or actual working conditions, including wages, job security,
working hours, protection from harassment, and opportunities for mobility, for those
who remain employed. Furthermore, we can only speculate about the implications of
the absence or reductions of social services and benefits for working families. Further
research into these and related issues will further illuminate the current findings.
Notes
1. Simon Commander and Fabrizio Coricelli, eds., Unemployment, Restructuring and the Labor
Market in Eastern Europe (World Bank: EDI Development Series, 1995); Branko Milanovic, “A Cost of
Transition: 50 Million New Poor and Growing Inequality,” Transition 5:8 (1994): 1-4.
2. See Victor Nee, “A Theory of Market Transition: From Redistribution to Markets in State Socialism,”
American Sociological Review 56:3 (1989): 267-82; Yanjie Bian and and John Logan, “Market Transition
and the Persistence of Power: The Changing Stratification System in Urban China,” American Sociological
Review. 61:5 (1996): 739-758; David Stark, “Recombinant Property in East European Capitalism,”
American Journal of Sociology 101:4 (1996): 993-1027; Ivan Szelenyi and Eric Kostello, “The Market
Transition Debate: Toward a Synthesis?” American Journal of Sociology. 101:4(1996): 645-67; Andrew
Walder, “Local Government as Industrial Firms: An Organizational Analysis of China’s Transition
Economy,” American Journal of Sociology, 101:2 (1996): 263-301.
3. Gil Eyal, Ivan Szeleneyi, and Eleanor Townsley, Making Capitalism Without Capitalists (New York:
Verso, 2001); Andrew Walder, “Markets and Income Inequality in Rural China: Political Advantage in an
Expanding Economy,” American Sociological Review 67 (2002): 231-253; Xueguang Zhou, “Economic
Transformation and Income Inequality in Urban China: Evidence from Panel Data,” American Journal of
Sociology 105 (2000):1135-1174.
4. See, for example, Eva Fodor, “Gender in Transition: Unemployment in Hungary, Poland, and
Slovakia,” East European Politics and Societies 11:3 (1997): 470-500; Eva Fodor, Working Difference:
Women’s Working Lives in Hungary and Austria 1945–1995 (Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 2003);
Susan Gal and Gail Kligman, The Politics of Gender After Socialism (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University
Press, 2000); Susan Gal and Gail Kligman, eds., Reproducing Gender: Politics, Publics, and Everyday
Life After Socialism (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2001); Lynne Haney, “‘But We Are Still
Mothers’: Gender and the Construction of Need in Post-Socialist Hungary,” Social Politics 4:2 (1997):
208-244; Lynne Haney, Inventing the Needy: The Gender Transformation from Socialist Welfare to
Welfare Capitalism in Hungary (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2002).
5. Eva Fodor, “Smiling Women and Fighting Men: The Gender of the Communist Subject in State
Socialist Hungary,” Gender & Society 16:2 (2002): 236-259; Renata Siemienska,“Continuity or Change?
The Woman’s Role in Polish Public Life Since the Fall of the Communist Regimes,” Social Politics
1 (1994): 326-334.
6. Chris Corrin, Superwoman and the Double Burden: Women’s Experience of Change in Central and
Eastern Europe and the Former Soviet Union (Toronto: Second Story Press, 2002); Chris Corrin, Magyar
Women: Hungarian Women’s Lives 1960s–1990s (London: St. Martin’s Press, 1993); Barbara Heyns and
Ireneusz Bialecki, “Educational Inequality in Poland,” In Yossi Shavit and Hans-Peter Blossfeld, eds.,
Persistent Inequality: Changing Educational Stratification in Thirteen Countries (Boulder: Westview
Press, 1992).
7. Fodor, “Gender.”
8. Corrin, Superwoman.
9. According to time budget surveys collected during the socialist era, women’s disproportionate
share of private care work far exceeded the equivalent burden shouldered by their counterparts in Western
capitalist societies. For examples of this research see Valentina Bodrova and Richard Anker, eds., Working
Women in Socialist Countries: The Fertility Connection (Geneva: ILO, 1985).
10. OECD, The OECD Economic Surveys, 1999–2000.
11. Ibid.
12. OECD, The OECD Employment Outlook Surveys, 1998.
13. Susan Linz, “Do Job Rights Govern Employment Patterns in Transition Economies?” The
American Economic Review 85:2 (1995): 425-431.
14. Ibid.
15. Jacqueline Heinen, “Unemployment and Women’s Attitudes in Poland,” Social Politics 2(1995):
91-110; Irene Kotowska, “Discrimination against Women in the Labor Market in Poland during the
Transition to a Market Economy,” Social Politics 2 (1995): 76-90; Joanna Goven, “New Parliament, Old
Discourse? The Parental Leave Debate in Hungary,” In Susan Gal and Gail Kligman, eds., Reproducing
Gender: Politics, Publics, and Everyday Life after Socialism (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press,
2000), 286-306; Eleanora Zielinska, “Between Ideology, Politics, and Common Sense: The Discourse of
Reproductive Rights in Poland,” In Susan Gal and Gail Kligman, eds., Reproducing Gender: Politics,
Publics, and Everyday Life after Socialism (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2000), 23-57.
16. See Fodor, “Gender”; and Julia Szalai, “Conflicts of Gender and Class: Paradoxes of Women’s
Occupational Mobility in Post-1989 Hungary,” In T. Van der Lippe and T. Van Dijk, eds., Women’s
Employment in Comparative Perspective (New York: Aldine de Gruyter, 2001).
17. Ruth Milkman, “Women’s Work and Economic Crisis: Some Lessons of the Great Depresssion,”
The Review of Radical Political Economics 8:1 (1976); and Ruth Milkman, “Organizing the Sexual
Division of Labor: Historical Perspectives on ‘Women’s Work’ and the American Labor Movement,”
Socialist Review 10:49(1980): 95-150.
18. See Barbara Reskin and Heidi Hartmann, eds., Women’s Work, Men’s Work: Sex Segregation on
the Job (Washington: National Academy, 1986); see also Ruth Milkman, Gender At Work: The Dynamics
of Job Segregation by Sex During World War II (Champaign: University of Illinois Press, 1987).
19. Jill Rubery, Women and Recession (New York: Routledge, 1988).
20. Monica Fong and Gillian Paull, “Women’s Economic Status in the Restructuring of Eastern
Europe,” In Valentine Moghadam, ed., Democratic Reform and the Position of Women in Transitional
Economies (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1994), 217-247.
21. Major declines in mining, iron, steel, engineering, light industry, and textiles occurred as early as
1990 in Hungary. In Poland in 1990, employment in agriculture fell by 21%, and in manufacturing and
construction by 10.7%. These figures are cited in Fong and Paull, “Women’s Economic Status.”
22. Fodor, “Gender,” 486.
23. Gary Becker, The Economics of Discrimination (Chicago, IL: The University of Chicago Press,
1975); Sandra Black and Elizabeth Brainerd, “Importing Equality? The Impact of Globalization on
Gender Discrimination,” (National Bureau of Economic Research: Working Paper 9110, 2001).
24. Irene Bruegel, “Women as a Reserve Army of Labour” Feminist Review 3(1979): 12-23; see also
Rubery, Women and Recession.
25. See Jane Lewis, ed., Women and Social Policies in Europe: Work, Family, and the State
(Cheltenham: Edward Elger, 1993); Nancy Fraser, “After the Family Wage: Gender Equity and the
Welfare State,” Political Theory 22 (1994): 591-618; Ann Orloff, “Gender In The Welfare State,”
American Review of Sociology 22 (1996): 51-78; Diane Sainsbury, Gender, Equality, and Welfare States
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996).
26. Tanja Van der Lippe, “The effect of Individual and Institutional Constraints on Hours of Paid Work
of Women,” In Tanja Van der Lippe and Liset Van Dijk, eds., Women’s Employment in Comparative
Perspective (New York: Aldine de Gruyter, 2001).
Glass / Job Loss in Bulgaria, Hungary, Poland, and Russia
781
27. See Gal and Kligman, The Politics of Gender; Heinen, “Unemployment”; Kotowska,
“Discrimination”; and Zielinska, “Between Ideology.”
28. Malgorzata Fuszara, “New Gender Relations in Poland in the 1990s,” In Susan Gal and Gail
Kligman, eds., Reproducing Gender: Politics, Publics, and Everyday Life after Socialism (Princeton, NJ:
Princeton University Press, 2000); Mira Marody and Anna Giza-Poleszczuk, “Changing Images of
Identity in Poland: From the Self-Sacrificing to the Self-Investing Woman,” In Susan Gal and Gail
Kligman, eds., Reproducing Gender: Politics, Publics and Everyday Life after Socialism (Princeton, NJ:
Princeton University Press, 2000); Zielinska “Between Ideology.”
29. Ivan Szelenyi and Donald Treiman, “Social Stratification in Eastern Europe after 1989: General
Population Survey, 1993”; Ivan Szelenyi and Rebecca Emigh, “Poverty, Ethnicity and Gender During
Transition in Eastern Europe: General Population Survey, 2000.”
30. In 1993, retirement age was 55 for women and 60 for men in Bulgaria, Hungary, and Russia and 60
for women and 65 for men in Poland. In 2000, retirement age was 55 for women and 60 for men in Bulgaria
and Russia, 56 for women and 60 for men in Hungary, and 60 for women and 56 for men in Poland.
31. D. G. Blanchflower and A. J. Oswald, “A Study of Labor Markets and Youth Unemployment
in Eastern Europe,” The Warwick Economics Research Paper Series (TWERPS) 499(1997). See also
International Labor Organization, “World Employment Report 1998–1999: Employability in the Global
Economy” (Geneva: ILO, 2001).
32. The predicted probabilities are net effects based on the multivariate analyses described above.
33. Having an employed spouse was a stronger predictor than being married. Therefore, I use having
an employed spouse as the marital indicator.
34. Between 1989 and 1993, Bulgaria experienced a 25% net decline in GDP, followed by modest
growth between 1994 and 1995. In late 1996, Bulgaria experienced major declines in output and entered
a period of economic crisis. Following a severe recession during 1996/1997, Bulgaria’s GDP began to
grow slowly in 1998. Hungary and Poland both experienced major declines in GDP between 1989 and
1994. Since 1994, however, both countries have experienced modest to significant annual growth. GDP
declines in Russia were extensive. Between 1992 and 1996, Russia’s economy shrunk to three-fifths of
its former size, with annual GDP declines in the double digits. For a review of Russia’s economic trajec-
tory since 1989, see Theodore Gerber and Michael Hout, “More Shock than Therapy: Market Transition,
Employment, and Income in Russia, 1991–1995,” American Journal of Sociology 104:1(1998): 1-50.
35. In 1993, respondents aged 19–25 were significantly less likely to have a job in Bulgaria, Hungary,
and Poland, and in 2000, in Bulgaria and Poland. While there was no effect for these workers in Hungary
in 2000, young workers were significantly more likely to have a job in Russia in 2000. However, the impor-
tant point here is that there was no significant interaction with sex in any country at any time point, sug-
gesting that barriers to entry into the labor market were as significant for young men as for young women.
36. Reported figures for Question 2 include the percentage of respondents who answered “No” to this
question indicating they did not get their job back following maternity leave. Questions 1 and 2 were asked
only of women who reported having a child who was born after 1985 living in the household. Questions 3–6
were asked only of women who reported having children under age 14 living in the household.
37. A perceived willingness to work overtime may be a major advantage to men. Data on working
hours in this region show significant numbers of employees are expected to work beyond the 40-hour
workweek. The average hours worked in every country significantly exceeds averages in the EU and the
United States, and 17–25% of employees—predominantly male—work 50 or more hours per week.
38. ILO Survey Data (1993) cited in Ariane Pailhe, “Gender Discrimination in Central Europe during
the Systemic Transition,” Economics of Transition 8:2 (2000): 505-535.
39. Emily Stoper and Emilia Laneva, “The Status of Women in New Market Economies:
Democratization and Women’s Employment Policy in Post-Communist Bulgaria,” Connecticut Journal of
International Law 9 (1996).
40. Coopers & Lybrand, “Hungary: Gender Issues in the Transition to a Market Economy,” Bureau of
Private Enterprise (USAID: Office of Women in Development, 1991).
782
East European Politics and Societies
41. Labor codes in most countries prohibit sex-specific job advertisements. For example, the Polish
Act Concerning Employment, passed in 1997, stipulated that “[N]otifications by employers for job vacan-
cies
… must not include requirements of a discriminatory character on account of, inter alia, sex.” Cited
in International Labor Organization, “World Employment Report 1998–1999: Employability in the
Global Economy,” (Geneva: ILO, 2001).
42. An example from Poland reads: “[Agency] is searching for attractive hostesses to promote brand
name products in Warsaw, must be at least 170 cm. tall, between the ages of 17 and 25 and approved by
SANEPID as disease free.” This job listing was cited in Fogo, “Sex and Age Discrimination: Why
Violations May Be Bad for Your Health,” Warsaw Business Journal (December 2, 2002).
43. EBRD ratings; UNICEF, Women in Transition (Florence: UNICEF, 1999).
44. Van der Lippe, “The Effect of Individual and Institutional Constraints.”
45. In 2000, 24% of Polish households included at least one child under age six compared to 17% of
Bulgarian households, 20% of Hungarian households, and 18% of Russian households. However, only
9% of Polish households actually received such benefits. In contrast, 33% of Bulgarian households, 43%
of Hungarian households, and 30% of Russian households received some type of child and/or parental
transfers. Figures are based on author’s calculations.
46. See Zielinska, “Between Ideology”; Marody and Giza-Poleszczuk, “Changing Images”; Fuszara,
“New Gender Relations.”
47. See Heinen, “Unemployment”; Kotowska, “Discrimination”; Zielinska, “Between Ideology.”
48. Ivan Szelenyi and Gail Kligman, Poverty, Ethnicity, and Gender in Market Transition (unpub-
lished manuscript).
49. All countries signed the United Nations Convention on Elimination of all Forms of Discrimination
against Women (CEDAW) in 1998, and all currently have sex-specific anti-discrimination clauses in their
labor codes.
50. International Labor Organization, “World Employment Report 1998–1999: Employability in the
Global Economy” (Geneva: ILO, 2001).
51. In some instances, government officials have sanctioned discriminatory behavior by employers.
For instance, in February 1993, Russia’s Labor Minister, Gennady Melikyar responded to questions about
women’s unemployment by asking, “Why should we employ women when men are out of work?” This
quote was documented by Womack in The Independent (London, March 21, 1993).
Christy Glass received her PhD from Yale University in 2005. She is currently an assistant professor of
sociology at Utah State University. Her research and teaching interests include comparative social change,
work and labor markets, welfare state institutions and gender. Her current research compares intra-firm
processes, employer preferences and work-based outcomes during the transition to capitalism in formerly
state socialist societies in Central and Eastern Europe.
Glass / Job Loss in Bulgaria, Hungary, Poland, and Russia
783
Wyszukiwarka
Podobne podstrony:
Clive Grey TOWARDS AN OVERVIEW OF WORK ON GENDER AND LANGUAGE VARIATION htm(1)
Gilchrist Gender and archaeology 1 16
Gender and Child Development
Gender and Racial Ethnic Differences in the Affirmative Action Attitudes of U S College(1)
Gender and Relationships of Children
Rise of Superpowers (USA and USSR) during and?ter World Wa
Gilchrist Gender and archaeology 1 16
henry ford my life and work
Jewish Women in the Ghettos, Concentration Camps, and Partisans During the Holocaust Sara Vicks
[Jacqueline Andall] Gender and Ethnicity in Contem(BookFi org)
The Roles of Gender and Coping Styles in the Relationship Between Child Abuse and the SCL 90 R Subsc
Ranciere On Art and Work
Miller, Stark Gender and Religiousness
Mona Lena Krook Quotas for Women in Politics, Gender and Candidate Selection Reform Worldwide (2009
Male Domestic Workers, Gender, and Migration in italy
Chamberlain, GENDER AND THE METAPHORICS OF TRANSLATION
Gurdjieff and Work
więcej podobnych podstron