NATO–Russia Relations in the Twenty-First Century

NATO–Russia Relations in the
Twenty-First Century

Since the end of the Cold War, NATO has redeﬁ ned its raison d’etre: extending
its membership, broadening its political goals and widening its zone of operation.
It has also sought to enhance its co-operation with Russia, for example through
the NATO–Russia Council, though moves here have coincided with factors
which make co-operation more difﬁ cult, such as growing uncertainty about the
transition to democracy in Russia, a feeling among some people in Russia that
NATO enlargement, and the simultaneous diminution of Russia’s inﬂ uence were
related, and, more recently, Russia’s attempts to reassert its inﬂ uence over its
neighbouring states. This book analyzes the current state of relations between
NATO and Russia, examining a number of key areas, and assesses the prospects
for future development. It concludes that all parties have a powerful interest in
building and maintaining security, and that co-operation and the growth of the zone
of democracy hold out the best hope for solving some of Russia’s most seminal
security concerns.

Aurel Braun is Professor of International Relations and Political Science at the
University of Toronto. He has published extensively on communist affairs and
strategic studies with a special focus on the problems of the transformation of the
socialist systems in the former Soviet Union and in Eastern Europe. He is also
a specialist in international law. He is the author and/or editor of several books,
including Dilemmas of Transition and The Extreme Right: Freedom and Security
At Risk.

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Aurel Braun

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Braun, Aurel.

Nato-Russia relations in the twenty-ﬁ rst century / Aurel Braun. p. cm.
– (Routledge contemporary Russia and Eastern Europe series) Includes
bibliographical references and index. ISBN 978-0-415-45319-6 (cloth :
alk. paper) – ISBN 978-0-203-92901-8 (ebook) 1. North Atlantic Treaty
Organization–Russia (Federation) 2. Russia (Federation)–Foreign
relations. I. Title. JZ5930.B73 2008
355’.0310918210947–dc22
2007039022

ISBN 10: 0-415-45319-4 (hbk)
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Contents

List of tables ix
List of contributors

Acknowledgements xii

Introduction

SECTION I

1 Electing to ﬁ ght: emerging democracies and international

instability 11

EDWARD D. MANSFIELD AND JACK SNYDER

2 Post-postcommunist Russia, the international environment

and NATO

TIMOTHY J. COLTON

3 Russia, NATO enlargement and the strengthening of

democracy in the European space

S. NEIL MACFARLANE

SECTION II

4 Enlargement and the perils of containment

AUREL BRAUN

5 NATO beyond Russia

STANLEY R. SLOAN

6 NATO enlargement and Russia

JEFFREY SIMON

Tables

1 Russian mass preferences on major policy issues, winter 2003–04

2 Correlation matrix for issue preferences, education, and age group

3 Trend in mass attitudes toward NATO as a bloc, 1997–2004

4 Comparison of mass and elite attitudes toward NATO, April 2004

5 Trend in mass attitudes toward Russia joining NATO, 2001–04

6 Trend in mass attitudes toward strengthened cooperation with

NATO, 1999–2004

7 Comparison of mass and elite attitudes toward strengthened

cooperation with NATO, April 2004

Contributors

Stephen J. Blank, Douglas MacArthur Professor of Research of National Security

Affairs, US Army War College. Current research includes proliferation and the
revolution in military affairs, and energy and security in Eurasia. Publications
include Imperial Decline: Russia’s Changing Role in Asia (Duke).

Aurel Braun, Professor of International Relations and Political Science at the

University of Toronto. He has published extensively on communist affairs and
strategic studies with a special focus on the problems of the transformation of
the socialist systems in the former Soviet Union and in Eastern Europe. He
is also a specialist in international law. His publications include Dilemmas
of Transition (Rowman & Littleﬁ eld) and The Extreme Right: Freedom and
Security at Risk (Westview).

Timothy J. Colton, Director, Davis Center for Russian and Eurasian Affairs, Morris

and Anna Feldberg Professor of Government and Russian Studies, Harvard
University. Research interests include Russian and post-Soviet government and
politics, Russian elections and public opinion. Publications include Transitional
Citizens: Voters and What Inﬂ uences Them in the New Russia (Harvard).

Robert O. Freedman, Peggy Meyerhoff Pearlstone Professor of Political Science,

Baltimore Hebrew University and Visiting Professor of Political Science, Johns
Hopkins University. Research includes post-Soviet foreign policy and the
Middle East. Publications include Moscow and the Middle East: Soviet Policy
Since the Invasion of Afghanistan (Cambridge).

S. Neil MacFarlane, Lester B. Pearson Professor of International Relations,

Chair of Politics and Director of the Centre for International Study, University
of Oxford. Research interests include international organizations and security,
and foreign policy of the former Soviet Union/CIS. Publications include Human
Security and the UN: A Critical History (Indiana).

Edward D. Mansﬁ eld, Hum Rosen Professor of Political Science, University

of Pennsylvania. Research focuses on international security and international
political economy. Currently working on the effects of democratization on
interstate conﬂ ict and the political economy of international trade. Publications
include Power, Trade and War (Princeton).

Contributors

Peter R. Neumann, Director, Centre for Defense Studies, King’s College London,

UK. Research includes international terrorism, intelligence, and terrorist
strategy. Publications include Britain’s Long War: British Strategy in the
Northern Ireland Conﬂ ict 1969–98 (Palgrave Macmillan).

Jeffrey Simon, Senior Research Fellow, Institute for National Strategic Studies,

National Defense University. Research interests include NATO and civil–
military relations. Publications include NATO and the Czech and Slovak
Republics: A Comparative Study of Civil–Military Relations (Rowman &
Littleﬁ eld) and Poland and NATO: A Study of Civil–Military Relations (Rowman
& Littleﬁ eld).

Stanley R. Sloan, Director, Atlantic Community Initiative, Visiting Scholar,

Middlebury College. Publications include NATO, the European Union, and
the Atlantic Community: The Transatlantic Bargain Challenged (Rowman &
Littleﬁ eld).

Jack Snyder, Robert and Renee Belfer Professor of International Relations in

the Political Science Department and the Institute of War and Peace Studies,
Columbia University. Current research focuses on international relations theory,
post-Soviet politics and nationalism. Publications include From Voting to
Violence: Democratization and Nationalist Conﬂ ict (Norton).

Acknowledgements

As we move deeper into the twenty-ﬁ rst century, the assumption that the North
Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), Russia, as well as Alliance–Russian rela-
tions will somehow just muddle through, is sadly little more than just wishful
thinking, as is the idea that standard scholarly analysis will remain adequate.
Relative complacency would mean a static approach that ultimately is likely to
prove bereft of new ideas at a time when we need to deal with an increasingly
complex international political and strategic situation. If we are to better address
security, in all of its dimensions, in the vast region that stretches from Vancouver
to Vladivostok, and includes the NATO members and the countries that occupy
the former Soviet space, there is considerable need for new thinking about issues,
identities, and strategies. It would be extraordinarily difﬁ cult, if not impossible,
however, for any individual to bring sufﬁ cient expertise to effectively address all
of this. I think it is most fortunate, therefore, that we were able to bring together
a group of distinguished senior scholars to focus on these matters. Collectively,
we were able to work out ideas and bring to bear a variety of perspectives to the
Alliance–Russia relationship that hopefully both reﬂ ects current and will stimulate
new thinking on change and security.

In the process of shaping this book, we collectively beneﬁ ted from the input

and advice of many. I want to thank Mikhail A. Troitskiy from the Moscow State
Institute of International Relations, Peter Lunak from NATO, and John Kirton,
Director of the G8 Research Group, as well as the Hon. William Graham, Senator
Jane Cordy, the Hon. David Pratt, Senator Colin Kenny, and Dr Bernard Patry. We
also very much welcomed the input of senior diplomats from Russia and NATO,
and their views and questions helped us to better focus our analysis for this book.
Without all of this help, this work would certainly not have been possible.

There are many others who deserve our gratitude. This work was made

possible through the generous funding of the Department of Foreign Affairs and
International Trade (DFAIT) of Canada, NATO’s Public Diplomacy Division, and
the Department of National Defence of Canada. In particular, I want to thank two
individuals for their unstinting support and wise advice, Paul Chapin from DFAIT
and J. P. Ollivier of the NATO Public Diplomacy Division. I especially want to
thank the indefatigable Aharon Mayne of DFAIT for his magniﬁ cent and crucial
input. Many others also worked hard to make this project possible. They included

Introduction

Thinking about security and democracy

Aurel Braun

With the end of the Cold War, NATO has continued to struggle to deﬁ ne its identity
and clarify its raison d’être. It has made considerable progress as it broadened its
political goals, partly reﬂ ected through enlargement, and it has widened its areas of
operation, far beyond its original zone. As the Alliance also sought simultaneously
to enhance its cooperation with Russia, the latter has become more assertive just
as its transition to democracy has become more uncertain. Yet, all parties have
a powerful interest in building and maintaining security. This work attempts to
assess the problems and prospects of achieving the right balance for the twenty-ﬁ rst
century – one that could allow for these goals to be fulﬁ lled.

Further, the objective here is to evaluate transatlantic security in an innovative,

broadly construed fashion, allowing for a certain degree of geographic elasticity
that encompasses the vast Vancouver to Vladivostok region. This work also
incorporates the premise that although NATO enlargement has coincided with a
diminution of Russian regional inﬂ uence (and may perhaps have stimulated it), the
growth of the zone of democracy may hold out the best hope for solving some of
Russia’s most seminal security concerns and is most likely to help create a large
zone of stability. Consequently, this book assesses the possibilities of an evolving
security framework that can reconcile NATO’s drive for democratization with
Russian security needs. Nevertheless, in this assessment, the contributors to this
book are also informed by the fact that a signiﬁ cant segment of the Russian policy-
making elite appears to have concluded that there has been a direct correlation
(and for many, a causal relationship) between NATO enlargement and the retreat
of Russian inﬂ uence. As such, we need to be cognizant of the fact that Moscow’s
acquiescence to past post Communist enlargement is not the same as genuine
acceptance. NATO assurances to the contrary and despite the creation of the
NATO–Russia Council there have been widespread concerns in Russia that
Alliance enlargement is aimed against Moscow.

NATO, for its part, remains worried about the direction of Russia’s transition

and about its prospects of becoming a stable, pluralistic country. Moscow has been
centralizing power at home, has placed new restraints on the activities of NGOs,

has greatly increased state control over the economy, particularly the energy sector,
and has used the energy leverage derived from its vast oil and natural gas reserves
to try to attain foreign policy goals. Though Russia has sought to employ such

2 A.

Braun

leverage in a subtle way in Western Europe, it has been far more blunt and assertive
when it comes to the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) members and
Eastern European states. For instance, Moscow has made particularly strenuous
efforts in the past few years to project its inﬂ uence into some of the neighboring
states such as the Ukraine and Georgia.

This book tries to take advantage of the collective expertise of its contributors

to conduct a 360 degree examination of issues and to continually test the interplay
between domestic and foreign policy variables in order to produce an analysis
that illuminates current developments and provides analysts with better tools to
understand future tendencies and trends. The collection, then, assesses a larger
strategic frame, the dialogues and the policies that shape transition and NATO–
Russian relations and the domestic factors that inﬂ uence perceptions of external
developments and drive foreign policy. Each section of the book seeks a cohesive
approach and an organic linkage to the work’s overarching theme.

The ﬁ rst section provides a theoretical framework for better understanding

international behaviour in periods of transition from one political order to another
as well as the interplay between domestic and external variables when it comes to
strengthening democracy in Russia and building trust within the vast geographi -
cal zone that we are examining. In the opening chapter in this section, Edward
D. Mansﬁ eld and Jack Snyder challenge the more simplistic expectations that
regime change toward democracy will necessarily reduce the risk of conﬂ ict.
There were, indeed, widespread expectations that democratization in East Central
Europe and Russian declarations about Moscow’s goals to democratize and join
the com munity of democratic states would ensure peace and stability. Mansﬁ eld
and Snyder certainly do not argue that all democratic transitions are dangerous
and in fact acknowledge that those that occur in the presence of strong, stable
domestic institu tions are often rather peaceful. What they do suggest, though, is
that according to their research, there is considerable risk of war in the case of
states that are start ing to democratize and that lack the coherence in the political
institutions that are required to make democracy work – such as the rule of law,
organized parties that compete in elections and professional news media. Mansﬁ eld
and Snyder are espe cially concerned when these institutions are deformed or weak,
or when politicians try to resort to nationalist appeals in order to prevail in electoral
competitions.

According to them this increases the prospects that democratiza-

tion will facilitate hostilities at home and abroad. Further, intense nationalism
and exaggerated foreign policy goals create a volatile domestic and international
situation.

Mansﬁ eld and Snyder point to problems when powerful elites are threatened

by democratization. The two authors’ arguments, moreover, have prescriptive
implications. These are especially relevant to Russia, other former Soviet republics,
and to part of Eastern Europe. The writers point out that although transitions do
not necessarily need to proceed slowly, they need to be built on solid foundations
in order to neutralize potential spoilers in society. Certainly, Mansﬁ eld and Snyder
are rightly concerned about failed and violent transitions that may leave behind
nationalist ideologies, militarized institutions, anti-democratic rules, and foreign

Introduction

enmities that both inhibit democratization and raise the risks of violent external
behaviour.

In the second chapter in this section, Timothy J. Colton examines speciﬁ c

Russian developments and attitudes that ultimately relate to democratization and
external security, from an “inside out” perspective. He conducts a kind of “reality
check” about contemporary Russia and its Eurasian neighbours. Russian has, in his
view, entered a qualitatively new phase. He suggests that crucial choices about the
political regime and the organization of public and private life has been conﬁ rmed
in most places and that with new international alignments either in place or coming
into sight, this makes a re-examination of relations between a new Russia and
NATO especially timely. He also highlights the need for the Euro-Atlantic alliance
and the established democracies to review and to update their policy options.

That said, adjustments will not be easy in the case of any of the parties. Colton,

though, suggests areas where the options are not necessarily obvious but execution
remains difﬁ cult. He also brings into his work extensive empirical studies about
Russian attitudes and perceptions regarding domestic interests and external.
Problems with democratization, the concern of the Russian public about domestic
stability, fears about a changing international environment and differences between
elite and mass opinion within Russia (where the former have been consistently
more hostile) mean that post-communist Russia is driven both by complex and
contradictory impulses that the Western alliance needs to better understand and
more effectively address. The challenge, therefore, is that of new thinking and
Colton concludes that the United States and the Alliance, having lived off the
intellectual capital of many years past, needs to commit to ﬁ nding new frameworks
for security in Europe, which should include in that new structure a modern
democratic Russia that just does not yet exist.

By contrast, S. Neil MacFarlane, in the next chapter, employs an “outside-in”

approach. First, he points out that many in the West and in Eastern Europe consider
NATO enlargement to be one vital dimension of a large project to create a single
normative space that is characterized by democratic values, respect for human
rights, open economies, and durable peace. Institutions including the European
Union (EU) see the same goals. Yet, MacFarlane makes it clear that Russia’s current
government, and perhaps most Russians, show little interest in the development
in liberal democratic institutions and in the past several years we have witnessed
a steady effort, on the part of the government, to narrow the space for freedom of
expression in the media. In fact, he suggests that Russia’s resistance to efforts by
outsiders to engage in its internal affairs is accompanied by a robust defense of
the very traditional notions of absolute sovereignty. Further, Russia has viewed
democratic “revolutions” in both Georgia and Ukraine as resulting from Western
interference motivated by a desire to weaken Russian inﬂ uence in the region.

MacFarlane in essence argues that the deepening engagement of Western

insti tutions and states in the affairs of the non-Russian former Soviet republics
raises the prospects of growing tension in these institutions’ and states’ relations
with Russia. With Russia consolidating the regime’s power at the centre and that
of the centre over the subjects of the Russian Federation and over the economy,

4 A.

Braun

Moscow’s reaction to external forces has been to increasingly push back. But the
Russian position on relations with its neighbouring states and its actions in many
parts of the world MacFarlane concludes, are difﬁ cult to reconcile with Western
democratic preferences. This in turn, he argues, may make the creation of a vast
zone of security, within the regions we are addressing, more difﬁ cult to attain and
the potential for Russian conﬂ ict with NATO states, in the broader international
system, greater.

In the second section of the book, the chapters deal with the NATO transforma-

tion and Alliance perceptions and goals. In my chapter in this section, I caution
that what seems to be the effective transformation of NATO into a more political
organization and into an alliance that is capable of out-of-area operations and of
enlarging its membership into the former communist space in Europe (while bring-
ing Russia in through the NATO–Russia Council), in fact, camouﬂ ages important
conﬂ icting goals and ﬁ ssures that in the long term endanger both the spread of
democracy and the building of security. Basically, I suggest that what emerges, on
closer scrutiny, are attempts by Russia, the East European members and some key
Western allies at complex, multiple and overlapping containment to ensure national
interests and guarantee long term security. This, however, requires an intricate
political choreography that will be extraordinarily difﬁ cult to achieve.

NATO, therefore, needs to look beyond superﬁ cial arrangements and has to

remain patient and persistent in building democracy and fostering a community
of democratic states. Russia, in turn, needs to forgo Primakovian fantasies

regaining superpower status by manipulating neighbours and undercutting the large
democracies, just as the Eastern European states have to appreciate that they are
not likely to succeed by building “walls,” segregating Russia and creating buffer
zones.

As well, key Western European states in the Alliance need to come to the

realization that they are likely to be better off by working on an equitable and
sustainable partnership with Washington, rather than cynically seeking to use
Russia to create a counterweight to the US and contain it. Further, the West
European allies need to realize that they would better aid the Alliance and the
prospects for a wider security architecture if they treated the new members with
greater sensitivity and reassurance.

Stanley R. Sloan, in the next chapter in this section, brings a somewhat different

perspective to the discussion of NATO and its relations with Russia when he asserts
that Russia is no longer the primary security concern for the Alliance, even though
Russia’s evolution remains an important variable in Europe’s future. That Russia
is not the Alliance’s primary concern, of course, is to an extent self-evident, but
in his approach, Sloan, places Russia into a different compartment and hierarchy
than many other analysts as he assesses the current health and future outlook for
the Alliance. The latter, in his view, is moving beyond Russia, and even Europe, on
the way to becoming an alliance with global missions. Sloan recognizes that within
the Alliance there are problems in a quest for restructuring a positive transatlantic
dynamic and that the issues of Europeanism and Atlanticism have to be addressed
by France, Germany and Great Britain.

Introduction

Sloan is also right to point out that the attitudes and capabilities that the United

States and Europe bring to the NATO table, in the near future, will determine
whether the Alliance will become part of the answer to the problems of global
stability. The question, though, remains whether his minimization of the role and
reality of Russia is justiﬁ ed and wise in terms of Alliance thinking and long-term
strategy and whether such an approach would in fact lead to a productive trans-
atlantic bargain that, in his words, “has moved beyond Russia.”

Jeffrey Simon, in the third chapter of this section, examines NATO and Russia

through distinct stages of Alliance evolution and via the need for NATO to shift its
focus toward building barriers against new threats. He also points to the desirability
of the Alliance to build bridges to ensure vital energy supplies from the Caspian
and Black Seas to Europe. He further contends that in order to accomplish these
tasks of building barriers against threats and construct bridges, NATO needs to
foster wider regional and broader functional security cooperation. That means, in
his view, reaching out, not only to all the 26 Alliance members, but also working
with the Partnership for Peace partners, including Russia.

There are opportunities, according to Simon, in a number of areas including

working with the Black Sea region organizations, though there are some problems
given the predominance of competitive national agendas. Moreover, Russia’s role
in the Black Sea will remain crucial. Last, Simon points out that, in order to meet
post-9/11 challenges, NATO also needs to better cooperate and coordinate its
efforts with the EU and that such successful cooperation could be the basis for a
new transatlantic relationship that will enhance European security.

In the third section of this work the authors deal with prospects for cooperation,

in various other areas, between NATO and Alliance states on the one hand; and
Russia on the other. Effective cooperation would enhance the prospects for security
in the vast region that we are looking at as well as improve the prospects for
advancing democracy. Difﬁ culties and obstacles, though, also reﬂ ect the inhibiting
factors in building trust and strengthening democracy in the region and of setting
NATO–Russia relations on a new footing.

In his chapter, Peter Neumann examines the prospects for cooperation in the

areas that deal with terrorism. The latter of course is of profound concern to all
NATO members as well as to Russia. Therefore, one would think that this is
where we could see great progress in NATO–Russia relations where cooperation
in counter-terrorism could have a vital, beneﬁ cial “spill-over effect.” Though there
have been important areas of cooperation with Russia when it comes to terrorism,
Neumann points out that there are also great obstacles. He also notes that there
are major conceptual differences in the approaches to terrorism, even between key
West European states on one hand and the United States on the other. Further, he
shows that the EU does not have a “collective” will and that as an organization it is
unlikely to be able to take the lead role in building a cooperative relationship with
Russia. Instead, he suggests that bilateral relations between individual EU members
and Russia will remain the predominant way in which threats from terrorism are
addressed. His argument that Russia’s role in the ﬁ ght against terrorism is critical,
but that the European Union is not the channel through which this partnership

6 A.

Braun

should be pursued is especially salient. It suggests that bilateral relations, including
those between the United States and Canada on the one hand, and Russia on the
other, also remain crucial.

The problems of terrorism persist and even grow as the questions about the

security of the Russian nuclear arsenal and the disappearance ﬁ ssile material remain
unresolved. Therefore, Russia and all the NATO states need to be on the same page,
conceptually, when it comes to addressing terrorism. They should be persistent and
creative, according to Neumann, whether bilaterally or multilaterally, in engaging
in counter-terrorism in terms of defeating this twenty-ﬁ rst century scourge and
especially if the parties are to achieve consensus on this issue to build trust and
enhance security throughout this large region.

In the second chapter in this section, Robert Freedman addresses the question

of whether Russia can be a partner for NATO in the Middle East – or even more
speciﬁ cally, whether Russia can be a genuine partner in general. Freedman,
moreover, makes particularly strenuous efforts to evaluate the interplay of domestic
and foreign policy variables under President Putin’s rule. To accomplish his goals,
he employs four case studies, including “The war on terrorism” and “Russia’s
relations with Iran.” Through these case studies he is able to present a deep and
nuanced picture, but one that is hardly reassuring.

Freedman demonstrates that there is a strong link between domestic developments

in Russia and its foreign policy behaviour. He ﬁ nds that, together with Russia’s
retreat from democracy, Russia’s policies in the Middle East are increasingly at
variance with those of Western interests. After meticulously dissecting Russian
behaviour, in the four cases, Freedman concludes that Russia pursues policies based
on a particular interpretation of national interest that are so linked to authoritarian
domestic politics and grandiose international goals that there are grave questions
as to whether Russia could be deemed to be a real partner to NATO in the various
crises in the Middle East. It is also questionable, he contends, whether Putin’s
Russia can be trusted to play a partnership role in the international community.
Such a pessimistic assessment suggests that overall developments in Russia do not
bode well for a productive partnership with NATO.

In the last chapter in this section, Stephen J. Blank largely concurs with this

pessimistic assessment. He suggests that the optimistic proclamations by Russian,
American and European elites – as recently as 2002 – that there was a consensus
about the goal of reuniting Russia with the West has been superseded by skepticism
and growing tensions on economic, political and military issues. Russia has largely
renounced whatever goals it had articulated relating to integration, just as it has
deviated from an evolution toward democracy.

Instead, Blank argues that Russia has pursued an imperial posture throughout

the CIS and an obstructionist policy especially in its relations with the United
States. He contends that there may yet be a positive resolution to these problems
because, ﬁ rst, Russia may understand just how costly and unsustainable its policies
within the CIS are and, second, the West will help Moscow appreciate the steadily
rising price for pursuing policies that in the long-term damage it as well its relations
with democratic states. He claims that the Western political will to build new

Introduction

initiatives could help, especially if these lead to policies designed to realize the
opportunity that exists to push Russia back onto a more positive track. At the same
time, Blank points out that failure to bring change will mean the loss of a chance
to create a durable system of security for resolving wars and conﬂ icts in the CIS
and this in turn would be extremely deleterious to the prospects of NATO–Russia
cooperation and security.

In sum, there is a consensus among the contributors that, although there are

opportunities for building trust and strengthening democracies in a new NATO–
Russian relationship in this century, there are also many risks and grave dangers.
Russia has been evolving differently from most of the Eastern European states
and Moscow’s domestic detours from democracy and unbridled foreign policy
ambitions have made it a difﬁ cult and unpredictable partner. Yet, unless we are
prepared to think of NATO as an entity that has moved “beyond Russia,” a position
that may be both premature and imprudent, we need to carefully rethink the entire
Alliance–Russia relationship. We should appreciate that it is too early to give up on
democracy in Russia, just as it would seem to be too risky to think that we can build
long-lasting, sustainable security in this vast region without a democratic Russia.
Granted that Russian democracy may not look like those in Western Europe, but the
core elements that Mansﬁ eld, Snyder and Colton, among others, have written about
do have to be there and again there is no reason why Russia, for its own beneﬁ t,
may not come back to thinking that this will suit its own long-term interests.

What we do need, however, is new thinking that is also realistic about the

opportunities and about the difﬁ culties in Russia. As well, the Alliance has to set its
own house in order if it is to move beyond what are at times contradictory bilateral
relations with Moscow. Clever political choreography by the West Europeans, the
Eastern European states or Russia is not likely to bring them the “containment”
that they think they can achieve. Moreover, the multiple attempts at containment
are highly unlikely to coalesce into one effective, overarching security strategy.

Yet, there are many crucial areas of common interest, whether combating

terrorism, or addressing frozen conﬂ icts, regional cooperation or energy distribution
where cooperation in this vast region would beneﬁ t greatly from an effective
overall security approach. Moreover, a good deal of cooperation could be realized
even if we recognized that in some areas disagreements would persist. To achieve
substantial progress though, Russia would need to move beyond nineteenth
century style international ambitions and twenty-ﬁ rst century fantasies; the Eastern
European states within NATO would have to think in terms of bridges not walls in
their eastern relations; the Western Europeans and the North American members
would have to work for a revitalized partnership instead of counterweights; and
the Alliance as a whole would need to formulate a policy towards Russia that
is generous and sensitive, but at the same time unapologetic about the need for
democratic transformation and responsible international behaviour.

8 A.

Braun

Notes

1 Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty, Features, “Russia Says U.S. Building ‘New Berlin

Wall’,” 8 July 2007.

2 Andrew E. Kramer, “50% Good News Is the Bad News in Russian Radio,” New York

Times, 22 April 2007; Alan Rusbridger, “Press Repression in Russia and Turkey
Growing,” Guardian, 22 May 2007; Steven Lee Myers, “Youth Groups Created by
Kremlin Serve Putin’s Cause,” New York Times, 8 July 2007.

3 Yuliya Tymoshenko, “Containing Russia,” Foreign Affairs, May–June 2007; Radio Free

Europe/Radio Liberty, Features, Roman Kupchinsky, “Russia–Ukraine: Pipeline Conﬂ ict
Resurfaces,” 28 June 2007; Ahto Lobjakas, “Georgia: Walking a Tightrope Toward
the West,” Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty, Features, 4 November 2006; Andrew E.
Kramer, “Russia Threatens Cut in Belarus Gas Supply,” New York Times, 2 August
2007.

4 The problems of Russia becoming an “authoritarian Great Power” are well articulated by

Azar Gat in “The Return of Authoritarian Great Powers,” Foreign Affairs, July–August
2007.

5 Aurel Braun, “All Quiet on the Russian Front? Russia, Its Neighbors, and the Russian

Diaspora,” in Michael Mandelbaum, ed., The New European Diasporas (New York:
Council on Foreign Relations Press, 2000), pp. 139–40.

Electing to ﬁ ght

Emerging democracies and
international instability

Edward D. Mansﬁ eld and Jack Snyder

The collapse of the Berlin Wall and the fall of the Soviet Union led to wide-
spread hopes that countries in the former Eastern bloc would undergo transitions
to democracy and thereby contribute to peace and stability in the region. These
hopes rested largely on the ﬁ nding that war has never broken out between mature
democracies.

Various observers extrapolated from the existence of a “democratic

peace” to argue that any regime change toward democracy will reduce the risk of
conﬂ ict.

In the long run, it is probably true that the further spread of democracy will

promote peace and stability. In the short run, however, the initial stages of democ-
ra tization frequently stimulate both international and civil wars. This link between
democratization and the use of force has been apparent in various regions during the
post-Cold War era, but the underlying pattern is as old as democracy itself, dating
to the French Revolution, if not earlier. Our argument is not that all demo cratic
transitions are dangerous. Those that occur in the face of strong, stable domestic
insti tutions are often quite peaceful. In contrast, there is a considerable risk of war in
states that are starting to democratize and that lack the coherent politi cal institutions
needed to make democracy work, such as an effective state bureaucracy, the rule of
law, organized parties that compete in fair elections, and pro fes sional news media.
When these institutions are deformed or weak, politicians are better able to resort
to nationalist appeals, tarring their opponents as enemies of the nation, in order to
prevail in electoral competition. The use of such appeals generally heightens the
prospect that democratization will stimulate hostilities at home and abroad.

Wars of democratization

The end of the Cold War precipitated a wave of democratization throughout the
world. Some of these transitions were orderly and peaceful; others were not. In
1991, Yugoslavia splintered into warring nations only months after elections in
which ethnic nationalism played an important role.

In the aftermath of the Soviet

Union’s collapse, popular sentiment expressed in the streets and at the ballot box
fueled a heated conﬂ ict between Armenia and Azerbaijan over the disputed enclave
of Nagorno-Karabakh.

As Peru and Ecuador made halting efforts to democratize

during the 1980s and 1990s, each of their governments bid for popularity by

12 E.D. Mansfield and J. Snyder

provoking armed clashes that culminated in a war in the upper Amazon in 1995.

Soon after Ethiopia’s Dergue dictatorship collapsed, the country’s elected govern-
ment went to war with Eritrea in 1998; the latter country had recently adopted a
democratic constitution.

In 1999, the nuclear-armed, elected regimes of India and

Pakistan fought the Kargil War after Pakistani forces inﬁ ltrated northern Kashmir.
The war erupted as Pakistan was taking steps to foster democratization, including
changing its constitution to strengthen the powers of elected leaders.

Furthermore, civil violence in various democratizing countries spilled into

neigh bor ing countries during the 1990s. In 1993, Burundi held elections that
intensiﬁ ed ethnic polarization between Hutus and Tutsis, leading to some 200,000
fatal ities. In nearby Rwanda, an internationally orchestrated accord that was
intended to promote greater pluralism and political openness instead created the
conditions for a genocide that killed almost a million Tutsi and some moderate
Hutu in 1994.

The Tutsi’s exile army, which was based in Uganda, invaded

Rwanda to end the genocide. Its victory led Hutu refugees to ﬂ ee into neighboring
Congo, where further ﬁ ghting has caused millions of additional deaths.

Elsewhere, democratic transitions coincided with secessionist wars. East Timor

voted to separate from Indonesia in an internationally mandated 1999 refer en dum,
prompting Indonesian-backed Timorese militias to unleash a wave of large-scale
attacks. During the initial phase of democratization, Russia fought two wars against
the breakaway province of Chechnya. Vladimir Putin was elected president of
Russia in 2000 largely on the basis of the popular support for his plan to invade
Chechnya and eradicate what he characterized as its lair of terrorists and brigands.
In each of the situations discussed in this section, the turbulent start of democra-
tization in countries with weak political institutions contributed to violence. This
tendency, however, is hardly limited to the post-Cold War era. Over the past two
centuries, most great powers and many smaller states resorted to the sword as they
started making democratic transitions.

The links between incomplete democratic transitions and war

Some countries make relatively speedy and smooth transitions to consolidated
democracy, as occurred in Hungary, Poland, and some other parts of the post-
communist world. Such transitions are unlikely to be violent. Our argument is
that wars are especially likely to occur when transitions stall prior to the estab-
lish ment of coherent democratic institutions in countries where the underlying
political institutions are weak and unstable. Under these conditions, there is an
increased demand for mass participation in politics, which compels elites to recruit
popular allies in order to gain ofﬁ ce. At the same time, however, the absence of
coherent democratic institutions limits the extent to which elites are account-
able to the average voter.

Groups that are threatened by democratization have

reason to exploit this situation by invoking populist rhetoric of rule for the people
without sub scrib ing to rule by the people. Even those groups that would prefer
the establishment of stable democracy ﬁ nd the nascent and poorly formed demo-
cratic institutions too ineffectual to serve their purposes. Furthermore, elites of

Electing to fight 13

various stripes have the motive and the opportunity to resort to nationalist rhetoric
to mobilize mass support, unleashing a political dynamic that often draws the
democratizing country into military conﬂ icts.

The break-up of an autocratic regime can proceed in various ways. In some

cases, one autocrat is replaced by another. This is a common outcome when power
is concentrated in the hands of a few elites and mass mobilization is limited. In
other cases, the autocratic regime is relatively quickly and smoothly replaced by
a democratic regime. This trajectory is most likely when power is widely diffused
throughout society, the populace is relatively well-educated, institutions that can
be adapted to democracy are already in place at the time of the transition or can
be quickly constructed, and leaders of the autocratic regime expect to avoid being
punished by the new democratic government.

In many cases, however, the autocratic regime’s collapse yields an incomplete

democratic transition to a mixed (or “anocratic”) regime that combines some
features of autocracy and some features of democracy. Some mixed regimes are
quite stable: they are no more likely to become embroiled in war than are stable
democracies or stable autocracies.

Others revert to autocracy or ultimately

(often in a series of stop-and-go spurts) become coherent democracies; both of
these types of regimes are slightly more war-prone than stable regimes. War is
most likely in mixed regimes that have experienced an incomplete transition from
autocracy towards democracy. It is the political dynamic set in motion by this type
of transition in countries where state institutions are weak, rather than the steady-
state politics of a mixed regime, that increases the risk of armed conﬂ ict.

The nature of power and the calculus of interests in incomplete
democratization

As an autocratic regime starts to collapse and demands for mass participation
increase, power often diffuses throughout society.

Elites in the autocratic regime

retain resources and networks of loyalties that can be adapted to the new political
setting. At the same time, new elites frequently are able to articulate and thus draw
power from the aspirations of rising social classes, interest groups, or aggrieved
ethnicities. Where state institutions are weak, mass groups compete for power,
and elite cartels are strong relative to the state but divided among themselves,
conditions are ripe for nationalist mobilization and war.

Under these circumstances, the state is likely to have trouble managing the

rising power of mass groups and elite interest groups, including bureaucratic and
economic cartels that split off from the collapsing autocracy. Existing institutions
are eroding and new democratic institutions are not sufﬁ ciently well formed to
replace them. The result is likely to be what Samuel Huntington has described
as the dynamic of “praetorian societies.”

In such societies, each parochial

group aims to make sure that its interests are served and no group has the ability
or the incentive to ensure that the overall policy is coherent.

Short-sighted

political bargains stemming from logrolling among concentrated interests can
contribute to political–military conﬂ ict, especially if the more inﬂ uential cartels

14 E.D. Mansfield and J. Snyder

include imperialist, militarist, and protectionist interests. For example, Germany’s
incomplete democratization in the late nineteenth century generated a “marriage
of iron and rye.” Weakened German state authorities doled out a ﬂ eet-building
program to elicit the support of the navy and the steel trusts (thus making an
enemy of Britain), offered agricultural protection to obtain the favor of aristo-
cratic rye growers and small farmers (thus angering grain-exporting Russia), and
engaged in an arms race and an offensive strategy for land warfare to mollify the
general staff (thus driving France further into the arms of Britain and Russia).

The logrolling that marked domestic politics in this case is hardly unique. On the
contrary, it marks many instances of incomplete democratization that erupted
into war.

Emerging democratic institutions in such countries are likely to be too weak and

manipulable to enable the public to counteract this type of dangerous logrolling.
Mass politics in weakly institutionalized transitional regimes can, ironically, rein-
force the strength of concentrated interests, as each elite cartel works to recruit
a mass pressure group to back its piece of the logroll. Thus, in the German case,
aristo cratic landowners used the Agrarian League to convince small farmers to
support agricultural protectionism. Through subsidies to the popular Navy League,
the navy gained the support of middle-class leaders for the new ﬂ eet program,
which promised to become a powerful symbol of modernity and an attractive
source of employment.

Mass politics in these regimes can bolster the power of concentrated interests

because imperfect democratic institutions are susceptible to agenda control by
elites. Prior to World War One, the Kaiser, not the elected Reichstag, appointed
ministers in the German government. Elected ofﬁ cials had little expertise about or
control over foreign policy, other than through their power over the purse. Even
budgets were enacted on a multi-year cycle, minimizing the opportunities for these
ofﬁ cials to exert control. Elections were timed to take advantage of trumped-up
national security crises, thereby maximizing the electorate’s sympathy for pro-
military, pro-colonial, and nationalist candidates.

Bismarck and his successors

used this control of the electoral agenda and nationalist appeals to drive wedges
between workers and the middle class, which might otherwise have participated in a
pro-democracy coalition.

Control of the legislative agenda also helped proponents

of the expansion and modernization of the German ﬂ eet arrange a deal whereby
the Catholic Center Party voted for a large naval appropriation in exchange for
elimi nating a set of laws that discriminated against Catholics. Consequently, the
logroll among concentrated interests trumped diffuse interests, setting the stage
for belligerent German policies that precipitated a series of international crises and
then the outbreak of World War One.

These crises were in many ways an unintended side effect of self-seeking

interest-group behavior. Each elite cartel feared that relinquishing its part of the
policy bundle would lead to ruin. Only the state authorities – who had brokered
the logrolled package – had reason to focus primarily on its consequences taken
as a whole. They, however, were too weak to forge a prudent outcome. Narrow
interests, such as the military, repeatedly subverted efforts by top government

Electing to fight 15

leaders to rein in Germany’s overextended foreign policy. As Austrian ofﬁ cials
wondered aloud during the July 1914 crisis that occurred on the eve of World
War One, “Who rules in Berlin, [Chancellor] Bethmann or [Chief of the General
Staff] Moltke?”

Incomplete democratization in the face of weak institutions gives elites ample

opportunity to engage in reckless foreign policy gambles in order to promote their
own rise or forestall their downfall. As elites in the old, autocratic regime see their
power and privilege fading and their ideological legitimacy in shambles, they have
reason to fear that democratization will curtail their capacity to use state power
to advance their parochial interests and that they will be punished for criminal
behavior that was business-as-usual in the autocratic system. Furthermore, the
weakness of emerging democratic institutions creates considerable doubt that
a new democratic regime could effectively guarantee any amnesty or golden
parachute that they might be promised in exchange for an agreement to surrender
power. Under these conditions, gambling for the resurrection of autocratic power
may seem like an attractive option. The combination of repression, patronage, and
steps to create a populist sort of legitimacy may also seem attractive. Regardless of
which strategy is chosen, taking risks to stave off further democratization is likely
to appeal to inﬂ uential autocratic elites.

These risks often involve foreign policy gambits that promote crises and war.

Even if such a strategy has a low probability of success, elites may calculate that
this tack is a promising way to rally public opinion, enhance the prestige of the
regime or military interest groups, and conquer the resources needed to maintain a
strategy of patronage. This strategy succeeded for Vladimir Putin in Chechnya. It
succeeded brieﬂ y for Slobodan Milosevic, until failing spectacularly in Kosovo. It
failed for Ayub Khan and Nawaz Sharif in Pakistan, for the Argentine junta in the
Falklands/Malvinas War, and ultimately for Germany’s coalition of iron and rye.

Institutions in incomplete democratization

The most fundamental problem associated with incomplete democratization
occurring in the face of weak governmental institutions is the gap between rising
demands for mass participation and the inability of institutions to reconcile conﬂ icts
of interest among groups in society.

However, this problem is not inevitable.

Sometimes a colonial regime or an autocracy leaves a useable bureaucracy in its
wake that can be adapted to the new regime. In certain cases, such as Great Britain
in the nineteenth century, India after independence, and South Africa in the 1990s,
the institutions of representative government for the old elite can even be adapted
to make the transition to a system of mass suffrage. Some of these institutions may
be largely administrative; others may pertain to the effective management of demo-
cratic competition. Both types of institutions are needed for democracy to ﬂ ourish.
In general, transitions are smoothest and most successful when the pre con ditions
for democracy develop in a sequence that begins with the construction of orderly
state administrative power and then proceeds by strengthening the rule of law and
institutions of public debate. Only afterwards is it likely that these institutions will

16 E.D. Mansfield and J. Snyder

be able to meet the challenge of integrating the conﬂ icting interests unleashed by
universal suffrage.

Such favorable patterns are rare, however, and it is especially difﬁ cult for aspir-

ing democrats to inﬂ uence the sequence of democratization. The central obstacle to
doing so is that elites in transitional societies frequently attempt to manipulate weak
democratic institutions to serve their parochial interests. Typically, elites aim to
keep institutions of mass accountability as weak as possible, if not destroying them
altogether. Another problem is that peoples who consider themselves deprived of
the right of self-determination, encouraged by the rhetoric of powerful actors in the
international community about the norm of universal suffrage, generally insist on
free elections early in the transition process. States that want to resist full account-
ability usually have to resort to electoral fraud or other measures that undermine
democracy rather than laying the groundwork for it.

These institutional deformations increase the risk of political–military conﬂ ict

in various ways. For example, they can weaken central authorities and strengthen
elite cartels, including those composed of military and economic elites close to
the old regime, and leaders of irredentist or separatist ethnic groups representing
rising social forces. Some of these groups may have a parochial interest in war
and imperialism. Even if some special interests are opposed to risky foreign
policies and conﬂ ict, the weakness of the central authorities inhibits their ability
to forestall logrolling that allows each group, including those with an interest in
policies that are likely to promote war, to get what it wants most. The result is
often an overcommitted foreign policy involving coercive diplomacy, opportunistic
aggression, arms racing, or support for ethnic irredentism. Even worse, the
weakness of central authority and the inconsistency of various policy goals due
to logrolling hinder the ability of the democratizing state to send clear, credible
signals to its foreign adversaries. That neither its threats nor its promises can be
trusted also raises the specter of war.

Nationalism and incomplete democratization

In addition, the inability of weak institutions to accommodate rising demands for
mass political participation can prompt elites to use ideology as a means to help
cobble together a ruling coalition. The break-up of an autocratic regime requires
new leaders and authorities to ﬁ nd a way of legitimizing their power. Even in mixed
regimes, where democratic institutions are in their infancy, elites must have popular
support in order to rule. The result is often a rise in belligerent nationalism.

Elites have several ideological options for making their appeals to the mass

public. First, they can turn to liberalism and its reliance on free and open competition
for the right to rule, its celebration of the rule of law, and its view that leaders
should be selected via the secret ballot of citizens. Liberalism, however, is unlikely
to be an attractive ideological option for elites in poorly institutionalized, newly
democratizing states. The stress that this ideology places on leaders’ accountability
to the average voter may sit poorly with elites from the old regime, whose privileges
and power typically depend on avoiding accountability. Liberalism may also fail

Electing to fight 17

to serve the interests of some rising elites, including ethnic separatists who want
national self-determination in a new state, rather than accountability to the median
voter in an existing one.

Second, elites can make ideological appeals to the class interests of workers or

peasants. Such appeals may be attractive to some rising radical elites, but workers
and peasants tend to be short on guns, money, organizational capacity, and political
consciousness at the beginning of democratization. Class appeals are rarely an
attractive strategy for old elites, since their class interests almost by deﬁ nition
clash with those of workers and peasants. Nonetheless, elites in the old regime
may try to appeal to lower-class groups by emphasizing other concerns that they
have in common, for example, sectoral interests or cultural and religious values.
Such cross-class alliances usually are bound together by nationalism, an ideology
with tremendous appeal for elites in democratizing states.

Third, nationalism holds that the people as a whole have the right to self-rule,

but it is silent on whether the government should be strictly accountable to the
average voter through democratic processes and the rule of law. Thus, relying on
nationalism allows elites to offer government for the people, but not necessarily
by the people. Nationalism also provides a justiﬁ cation for curtailing the rights
of potential opponents.

Nationalists can use the distinction between their own

nation and others – and between their nation’s friends and foes – as a pretext for
accusing “enemies” and “traitors” whose civic rights must be rolled back in order
to safeguard the nation. These enmities often cross international borders: there is
a long-standing tradition of tarring domestic opponents as traitors by portraying
them as the “ﬁ fth column” of enemies abroad. Nationalists adapted this strategy
during the French Revolution and have continued doing so ever since.

In the face of an incomplete democratic transition when domestic institutions

are weak, elites have a strong incentive to play the nationalist card in public
debates and discourse, taking advantage of their domination over key news media.
For example, Alfred Hugenberg, a board member of Krupp Steel who was also
the head of Weimar Germany’s largest nationalist party, owned the wire service
that supplied most of the news to many of Germany’s smaller cities and towns.
Hugenberg’s partial monopoly fed a steady diet of slanted news to these areas,
precisely the ones that voted heavily for Adolf Hitler.

Sometimes autocratic ruling elites retain control of economic assets and special-

ized information that creates a partial media monopoly. As Yugoslavia disintegrated,
for example, its central leadership had no control over what was broadcast on
television because an earlier decentralization had given media jurisdiction to Serbia,
Croatia, and the other ethnically deﬁ ned republics. This allowed Milosevic, who
was Serbia’s local party boss, to assert virtually complete control over television
news in Belgrade. He used the news to present an inﬂ ammatory picture of Albanian
threats to Serbian interests in Kosovo, a tack that Franjo Tudjman also took in
Zagreb.

In other cases, it may be newly rising elites who achieve partial media

monopolies. Increases in education and literacy among disadvantaged minorities
frequently stimulate demands for news media in their vernacular language. State-
wide media, in which multiple groups debate ideas in a shared language, give way

18 E.D. Mansfield and J. Snyder

to various local media outlets that are controlled by one linguistic or ethno-religious
faction, that pander to their narrow target groups, and that are linguistically immune
from scrutiny and rebuttal from outsiders.

When certain groups succeed in structuring political participation around

nationalist issues, competing groups have an incentive to try to outﬂ ank the nation-
al ists. Frequently, this produces a mass bidding war for the mantle of elite
nationalism. Otto von Bismarck and his successors who managed the coalition of
iron and rye, for example, used nationalism to win elections that kept conservative
elites in power, even though they wanted to avoid nationalist wars. Such conﬂ icts,
they feared, would destabilize the old order. The elites leading the German army
similarly resisted incorporating the middle classes in the ofﬁ cer corps, fearing that
doing so would threaten their dominant position in society. Germany repeatedly
shied away from resorting to the sword in the overseas crises that its belligerence
provoked. Middle-class nationalists, however, exploited Germany’s unwillingness
to use force abroad, arguing that if threats to the country’s survival were as severe
as existing elites claimed, then the iron-and-rye regime had done a poor job of
parrying them and existing elites should stand aside and let the vigorous middle
class run the state, its army, and its diplomacy.

In sum, then, absent strong state institutions, prospective leaders in a country

undergoing an incomplete democratic transition struggle for legitimacy in an
ill-deﬁ ned, contested political arena. Nationalism offers a means to rally popular
support without actually offering accountability the newly mobilized mass public.
Under these circumstances, war sometimes occurs as a direct result of nationalist
political objectives, such as the aim of regaining a lost territory. War, however, may
also occur as an indirect result of the complex politics that mark transitional states.
It may be an unintended by-product of belligerent and untrustworthy diplomacy
that provokes fear in other countries. The rhetoric that nationalists use to mobilize
the public may increase the risk of war by distorting the nation’s view of whether
it could win the ﬁ ght or reach a satisfactory compromise with the enemy. Further,
leaders may become hostage to their rhetoric, their reputations tied to nationalist
commitments from which they cannot afford to deviate. Heterogeneous political
coalitions may become stuck with reckless foreign policies when uncompromising
nationalism is the glue that binds them together. Hence, while nationalistic leaders
and publics in incomplete democracies often do not want war, it often occurs
nonetheless as an indirect by-product of nationalist politics.

Russia’s wars in Chechnya

Since the focus of this volume is Russian relations with members of NATO, it is
useful to brieﬂ y consider how our argument helps to explain Moscow’s behavior
in the realm of security affairs. Weakened by the developments that precipitated
the collapse of the Soviet Union, Russia has not engaged in military adventures
beyond what were the Soviet Union’s borders. However, it has intervened mili-
tarily in the civil war between Georgia and Georgia’s separatist Abkhazian region.
Moreover, as we mentioned earlier, Russia has fought two wars in Chechnya. In

Electing to fight 19

part, Russian leaders waged these wars to address the political dynamics accom-
panying the turbulent, incomplete democratization that Russia experienced during
the 1990s.

President Boris Yeltsin launched the First Chechen War (1994–96) during a

period when the party of nationalist anti-Semite Vladimir Zhirinovsky had just
won a quarter of the seats in a Duma election and polls indicated that almost three
quarters of the population were unhappy with Yeltsin’s performance. Yeltsin
seems to have cracked down on the Chechen independence movement as a means
to boost his standing and break the political deadlock created by incomplete
democratization. Indeed, Michael McFaul has argued that “Yeltsin did not order his
troops into Chechnya to save the Russian Federation. He moved against Chechnya
to save his presidency.”

Although this interpretation of the First Chechen War might be considered

controversial, there is little doubt that Putin mounted the Second Chechen War in
1999 to enhance his popularity enough to succeed Yeltsin as president. The strategy
worked as planned, largely because Russia sustained fewer casualties than in the
ﬁ rst war and the elections were held before it became clear that the invasion had
not suppressed Chechen resistance.

The Chechen conﬂ icts illustrate a number of the causal mechanisms that we

have emphasized, especially the tendency for leaders in incompletely democratizing
regimes to gamble for resurrection, launch nationalist bidding wars, and use
nationalist prestige strategies to govern when domestic institutions are weak. As
McFaul argues, however, democratization in a turbulent great power could have
generated a far more dangerous outcome than these two wars. Such an outcome
has not come to pass, he maintains, because Russia’s elites and economic oligarchs
have a strong interest in maintaining stable economic relations with the West and
no interest in jeopardizing their hold on power by promoting mass nationalism.

Although Russian institutions were weak during the 1990s, the relatively scant
mass mobilization and demand for mass participation limited the pressure that was
placed on these institutions and thus contained the dangers of democratization.

Democratization and the democratic peace

We have argued that incomplete democratization increases the danger of war
when political institutions are weak. Yet it is widely recognized that war has
never happened between mature democracies. In our view, mature democracies
behave differently than countries in the initial stages of democratization because
they have institutions that are better able to ensure democratic accountability,
thereby reducing the ability of elites to galvanize support through the use of
bellicose nationalist rhetoric. Understanding these institutional underpinnings
of the democratic peace sheds some additional light on the relationship between
democratization and war.

Existing studies offer three primary explanations for the democratic peace. First,

many observers attribute the democratic peace to democratic institutions that render
the government accountable to voters who bear the costs and risks of war. As the

20 E.D. Mansfield and J. Snyder

philosopher Immanuel Kant famously argued, kings could pass along the costs of
war to their powerless subjects, but elected ofﬁ cials would suffer at the polls if
they dragged their citizens into harmful wars. Consequently, elected governments
are more prudent in their decisions to use force: they do not ﬁ ght each other and
are in general more adept at avoiding unsuccessful, costly wars.

In contrast, states that are only partially democratic do not exhibit the same

degree of prudence and cost-consciousness.

Resorting to the sword during the

initial phase of a democratic transition often proves to be particularly expensive.
For example, Serbians paid a heavy price for the nationalist wars that Serbia waged
during its experiment with partially democratic elections in the late 1980s and
early 1990s. Likewise, although democratizing Armenia defeated Azerbaijan in its
early 1990s war over Nagorno-Karabakh, it suffered economic ruin, a despoiled
environment, and massive emigration in the process.

In general, the public does not start the process of democratization desiring war

or domination over other nations. Rather, widespread nationalist belligerence arises
later, due to the political dynamics that mark the early stages of democratization
and that frustrate – rather than empower – the prudent preferences of the median
voter. Whereas the well-developed institutions in mature democracies ensure that
elites will be held accountable to cost-conscious voters, incomplete democratization
in states with weak political institutions does not. For reasons that we touched on
earlier, both rising and declining elites in incompletely democratizing states are
likely to use nationalist appeals to attract mass allies and to gain the legitimacy
needed to rule. The use of such rhetoric increases public bellicosity and decreases
sensitivity to the costs of war.

Second, other observers attribute the democratic peace to shared norms and

a common liberal identity that governs behavior among democracies.

This

explanation suggests that democratizing states might be warlike because they
have not yet developed strong liberal norms. However, these normative claims
do not resolve the issue of why democratizing states are war-prone. Our research
reveals that states undergoing incomplete democratic transitions in the face of
weak domestic institutions are more likely to become embroiled in conﬂ ict than
any other type of regime, including authoritarian regimes, which should be even
less constrained by democratic norms.

It is not enough to show why voters in

democratizing states are slow to become participants in the democratic peace;
we need to explain why they are actually drawn away from it, and are especially
attracted to ideas that promote belligerence. Addressing that question requires
focusing on institutions, not just norms.

Third, some explanations of the democratic peace emphasize that democracies

are not inherently paciﬁ c, but that they are better able to credibly signal their
intentions to foreign governments. Voters will punish democratic leaders if
they back down after making threats to adversaries. Foreign leaders understand
this and believe that democratic heads of state will make only those threats
that they intend to carry out. That a democracy is more politically transparent
than other regimes reduces the prospect that its leaders will bluff or renege on
international agreements. Democracies are therefore better able to conclude and

Electing to fight 21

stick to bargains.

As long as participants in an international crisis prefer some

outcome to war, the transparency of democracies should enable decision makers
to resolve disputes before they escalate. There should be little guesswork about
which participant has greater resolve, leading democracies to strike a bargain that
avoids the costs of ﬁ ghting.

Of course, this explanation hinges partly on the preferences of democratic lead-

ers: it would break down in the face of leaders who are willing to gamble everything
on global domination and who view no long-term compromise as preferable to
war. Equally, the credibility of democratic commitments can be a double-edged
sword. In 1941, for example, the United States imposed an oil and steel embargo
on Japan. The embargo was so credible that Japan’s government decided it had no
choice but to launch a war as quickly as possible, while it still had some chance
of victory.

Democracy goes only so far in making a state transparent and transparency goes

only so far in dampening disputes. As such, we doubt that the democratic peace rests
principally on transparency and credibility in bargaining. The ability of democracies
to bargain effectively may help to explain why they are able successfully reconcile
their differences, but a full explanation rests on institutionalized accountability
to the cost-conscious median voter. Furthermore, it is possible that the domestic
politics of democratizing states – especially the instability of political coalitions
– inhibits their ability to send clear, credible threats and promises that avert war.
However, this problem is best understood as one feature in a broader spectrum of
political dilemmas that confound the diplomacy of democratizing states.

In sum, it is unlikely that voters in democratizing states have more interest

in a belligerent foreign policy than their counterparts in mature democracies.
Instead, it is likely that voters in both types of regimes seek efﬁ cient, prudent
solutions to political dilemmas. The public in newly democratizing states often
becomes belligerent with respect to foreign policy, not because of the unsettled
boundaries of new states or pre-existing nationalist preferences, but rather because
of deformations in the institutional and informational environments that form and
aggregate preferences in these states.

Conclusions

Democratic transitions that do not follow an auspicious sequence run the risk of
becoming derailed prior to the establishment of consolidated democracy. They also
risk triggering intense nationalism and war when a country’s political institutions
are especially weak at the outset of the transition and when elites are threatened
by the regime change.

Our argument has prescriptive implications in those cases where policymakers

have some ability to inﬂ uence the timing and sequencing of a transition.

Where

the institutional requisites for consolidated democracy do not exist, it is best to
develop them before encouraging mass political contestation. In cases where
powerful elites are threatened by democratization, it is best to find ways of
convincing them that they will be treated fairly by the future democratic regime.

22 E.D. Mansfield and J. Snyder

Transitions do not necessarily have to proceed slowly, but they need to be built on
sound foundations and to neutralize potential spoilers in society.

These prescriptions are important for both the short run and the long run.

In the short run, transitions that ignore them risk stalling and degenerating into
nation alist politics that increase the specter of war. Over the long run, a failed and
violent transition may leave a legacy of nationalist ideology, militarized institu-
tions, anti-democratic rules, and foreign enmities that will hinder future efforts
to forge democracy and raise the risk of violence during subsequent attempts at
democratization.

Notes

1 This paper draws heavily on Edward D. Mansﬁ eld and Jack Snyder, Electing to Fight:

Why Emerging Democracies Go to War (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 2005).

2 See, for example, Bruce Russett, Grasping the Democratic Peace (Princeton: Princeton

University Press, 1993).

3 See, for example, President Bill Clinton’s 1994 State of the Union Address, “Transcript

of Clinton’s Address,” New York Times, 26 January 1994, p. A17; and Bruce Russett and
John R. Oneal, Triangulating Peace: Democracy, Interdependence, and International
Organizations (New York: Norton, 2001).

4 Susan Woodward, Balkan Tragedy (Washington, D.C.: The Brookings Institution,

1995), p. 17.

5 Stuart Kaufman, Modern Hatreds: The Symbolic Politics of Ethnic War (Ithaca, N.Y.:

Cornell University Press, 2001), chap. 3.

6 David R. Mares, Violent Peace: Militarized Interstate Bargaining in Latin America

(New York: Columbia University Press, 2001), chap. 7.

7 Tekeste Negash and Kjetil Tronvoll, Brothers at War: Making Sense of the Eritrean–

Ethiopian War (Oxford: James Currey, 2000).

8 See Ian Talbot, India and Pakistan (London: Arnold, 2000), p. 275; and Hasan-

Askari Rizvi, Military, State and Society in Pakistan (New York: St Martin’s, 2000),
chap. 10.

9 Gérard Prunier, The Rwanda Crisis: History of a Genocide (New York: Columbia

University Press, 1995) chaps. 3 & 5.

10 Samuel P. Huntington, Political Order in Changing Societies (New Haven: Yale

University Press, 1968).

11 See Edward D. Mansﬁ eld and Jack Snyder, “Democratic Transitions and War: From

Napoleon to the Millennium’s End,” in Chester A. Crocker, Fen Osler Hampson, and
Pamela Aall, eds., Turbulent Peace: The Challenges of Managing International Conﬂ ict
(Washington, D.C.: United States Institute of Peace Press, 2001), pp. 113–26.

12 Michael Mann, “The Emergence of Modern European Nationalism,” in John A. Hall

and Ian Jarvie, eds., Transition to Modernity (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press,
1992), pp. 137–66.

13 Huntington, Political Order in Changing Societies.
14 Huntington, Political Order in Changing Societies, chap. 4.

Electing to fight 23

15 Eckart Kehr, Economic Interest, Militarism, and Foreign Policy (Berkeley: University

of California Press, 1977); and Jack Snyder, Myths of Empire: Domestic Politics and
International Ambition (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1991), chap. 3.

16 Brett Fairbairn, Democracy in the Undemocratic State: The German Reichstag Elections

of 1898 and 1903 (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1997), p. 48.

17 Beverly Heckart, From Bassermann to Bebel: The Grand Bloc’s Quest for Reform in

the Kaiserreich, 1900–1914 (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1974); and Snyder,
Myths of Empire, chap. 3.

18 Gerhard Ritter, The Sword and the Sceptre: The Problem of Militarization in Germany

(Coral Gables, FL: University of Miami Press, 1969), vol. 2, pp. 257–63.

19 Huntington, Political Order in Changing Societies, chap. 1.
20 Robert A. Dahl, Polyarchy: Participation and Opposition (New Haven: Yale University

Press, 1971), p. 44.

21 Modris Eksteins, The Limits of Reason: The German Democratic Press and the Collapse

of Weimar Germany (London: Oxford University Press, 1975), pp. 78–81.

22 Mark Thompson, Forging War: The Media in Serbia, Croatia, and Bosnia-Herzegovina

(London: Article 19, International Center Against Censorship), May 1994.

23 Jack Snyder, From Voting to Violence: Democratization and Nationalist Conﬂ ict (New

York: Norton, 2000), pp. 294–5.

24 Geoff Eley, Reshaping the German Right (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1980),

pp. 322–4.

25 Michael McFaul, “Eurasia Letter: Politics after Chechnya,” Foreign Policy, No. 99

(Summer 1995), p. 110; and Snyder, From Voting to Violence, p. 236.

26 On the initial popularity of the war, see Daniel Treisman, “Russia Renewed,” Foreign

Affairs, Vol. 81, No. 6 (November–December 2002), p. 70.

27 Michael McFaul, “A Precarious Peace: Domestic Politics in the Making of Russian

Foreign Policy,” International Security, Vol. 22, No. 3 (Winter 1997–98), pp. 5–35.

28 D. Scott Bennett and Allan C. Stam, “The Declining Advantages of Democracy: A

Combined Model of War Outcomes and Duration,” Journal of Conﬂ ict Resolution, Vol.
42, No. 3 (June 1998), pp. 344–66; David Lake, “Powerful Paciﬁ sts: Democratic States
and War,” American Political Science Review, Vol. 86, No. 1 (March 1992), pp. 24–37;
Dan Reiter and Allan C. Stam, Democracies at War (Princeton: Princeton University
Press, 2002); and Randolph Siverson, “Democracies and War Participation: In Defense
of the Institutional Constraints Argument,” European Journal of International Relations,
Vol. 1, No. 4 (December 1995), pp. 481–9.

29 H. E. Goemans, War and Punishment: The Causes of War Termination and the First

World War (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2000), chap. 3; and Reiter and Stam,
Democracies at War.

30 Snyder, From Voting to Violence, p. 221.
31 See Michael Doyle, “Liberalism and World Politics,” American Political Science

Review, Vol. 80, No. 4 (December 1986), pp. 1151–69; and John M. Owen, Liberal
Peace, Liberal War (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1997).

32 Mansﬁ eld and Snyder, Electing to Fight, chaps. 5 & 6.
33 See James Fearon, “Domestic Political Audiences and the Escalation of International

Disputes,” American Political Science Review, Vol. 88, No. 3 (September 1994),

24 E.D. Mansfield and J. Snyder

pp. 577–92; Kenneth A. Schultz, “Do Democratic Institutions Constrain or Inform?
Contrasting Two Institutional Perspectives on Democracy and War,” International
Organization, Vol. 53, No. 2 (Spring 1999), pp. 233–66; G. John Ikenberry, After
Victory: Institutions, Strategic Restraints, and the Rebuilding of Order After Major
Wars (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2001); and Charles Lipson, Reliable
Partners: How Democracies Have Made a Separate Peace (Princeton: Princeton
University Press, 2003). For a qualiﬁ cation, see Anne Sartori, “The Might of the Pen:
A Reputational Theory of Communication in International Disputes,” International
Organization, Vol. 56, No. 1 (Winter 2002), pp. 121–49.

34 Michael Barnhart, Japan Prepares for Total War (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University

Press, 1987), pp. 170–1, 240.

35 See also Edward D. Mansﬁ eld and Jack Snyder, “Prone to Violence: The Paradox of

the Democratic Peace,” The National Interest, No. 82 (Winter 2005–06), pp. 39–45.

36 Nancy Bermeo, “Myths of Moderation: Confrontation and Conﬂ ict During Democracy

Transition,” in Lisa Anderson, ed., Transitions to Democracy (New York: Columbia
University Press, 1999), pp. 120–40; and Stephen John Stedman, “Spoiler Problems in
Peace Processes,” International Security, Vol. 22, No. 2 (Fall 1997), pp. 5–53.

Post-postcommunist Russia, the
international environment and
NATO

Timothy J. Colton

The transformation of the Soviet Union and of its moribund communist regime got
underway two decades ago. Mikhail Gorbachev’s attempt to give state socialism a
human face was in full ﬂ ower three or four years after that, ran aground, and was
consigned to the ash heap a decade and a half ago. Boris Yeltsin, the orthodox
provincial communist who became in turn a heterodox reform communist, an
anticommunist, and then a post-communist, ruled Russia as its elected president
for the better part of a decade. The post-communist era in the history of the Russian
Federation and the other successor states to the Soviet Union is drawing to a close,
or in any case has entered a qualitatively new phase. Crucial choices about politi-
cal regime and the organization of public and private life have been worried over,
made, and, in most cases, conﬁ rmed. New international alignments are either in
place or coming into sight. The ripening sense that this is so makes the issue of the
relationship of the new Russia to NATO especially timely. It behooves us in the
Euro-Atlantic alliance and the established democracies to review and update our
policy options. When it comes to post-postcommunist Russia, those options are
not at all obvious in the discovery or simple in the execution.

The first revelation of a reality check about contemporary Russia and its

Eurasian neighbors is that the experience and governing arrangements of the
societies located there are multifaceted and diverse, and ever more so with every
passing year. Even in the late 1990s one might have stood by the notion that these
places were deﬁ ned above all by a common Soviet and communist provenance
and by a unidimensional and linear “transition” out of that past to the good things
of political democracy, a market economy and civil society. There is still much to
be gained from alertness to commonalities across the countries of the region, and
without question a residue of shared experiences, during and prior to the twentieth
century, remains. Today, nonetheless, one is struck no less by the diversity of their
experience and by the role of background, formative, and driving forces that in
years past were of little or no signiﬁ cance in the area.

On the political front alone, in the former Soviet Union we witness the yawning

gap between states that satisfy most deﬁ ning criteria of democracy (the three Baltic
countries, in particular) and those that satisfy none (in Central Asia, in particular).
The recent trajectory of Russia, the most closely watched state in the set, has
been disappointing and puzzling. In the standard taxonomy of Freedom House, it

26 T.J.

Colton

progressed under Gorbachev and Yeltsin from “Not free” status (dictatorship) to
a “Partly free” condition (imperfectly democratic). Only then, far from graduating
into the “Free” category (democracy), as the optimists foresaw, it began to slide
backward in the second half of the 1990s, and more emphatically in the ﬁ rst half
of the 2000s. In Freedom House’s 2005 report, covering developments up to the
end of year 2004, Russia, for the ﬁ rst time since it was an integral part of the Soviet
Union, tumbled discouragingly back into Freedom House’s “Not free” category.
There it remained stuck in the 2006 and 2007 reports. Post-Orange Revolution
Ukraine, by contrast, was upgraded from “Partly free” to “Free” on the 2006
Freedom House grade sheet.

One may argue the fine points of measurement, and ask, as I would ask,

whether Vladimir Putin’s Russia fully merits the unsavory company of Aleksandr
Lukashenko’s Belarus, Gurbanguli Berdymukhamedov’s Turkmenistan, and Islam
Karimov’s Uzbekistan. That said, and with due allowance for all the nuances
and qualiﬁ cations, few will dispute the illiberal and undemocratic trend. It can
be documented in domain after domain. An incomplete list of manifestations
would include the tightening of governmental controls over the mass media; the
abridgment of competition among political parties; limits on the independence of
non-governmental organizations; the use of politicized justice to quell actual or
potential opposition; and recentralization of the federal system.

So far as driving forces are concerned, some of the mainstays of the tumultuous

1990s remain determinative in today’s Russia (uncertainty over ultimate destination,
mass and elite divisions over fundamental values, inter-ethnic and center-periphery
conﬂ ict, and corruption, for instance); while others have lost all or much of their
bite (notably, economic contraction, ﬁ scal crisis, the pervasive weakness of the
state, and the exaggerated inﬂ uence of “the oligarchs”). Meanwhile, new moving
forces, largely unanticipated and not yet fully understood there or here, impinge
on political actors and help shape public choices. Prime examples of insurgent
factors would be Russia’s post-1998 economic boom and the soaring oil prices
that have fueled it, radicalized and politicized Islam, terrorism, re-entry of the
secret services into high politics and the cementing of their centrality to Russia’s
“deep state,”

demographic decline, lightly regulated immigration from other

post-Soviet countries, and xenophobia toward resident foreigners and minorities.
Divergent within-country trends, combined with the differential impact of region-
wide and world-systemic tendencies and with calculating, innovative decisions by
political leaders, have produced an ever-wider scatter of foreign-policy outcomes
in the post-Soviet space. Georgia’s emphatic and Ukraine’s hesitant shift toward
integration with Europe point one way. Karimov’s ejection of American forces
from Uzbekistan, re-embrace of Moscow, and ostracism by the EU for human-
rights offenses point for now in another direction. Russia, meanwhile, wobbles
and mystiﬁ es.

Although its revamped political arrangements lie somewhere in the gray zone

bounded by fuzzy terms like “managed democracy,” “soft authoritarianism,”
and “competitive authoritarianism,” things have not reached the point where the
preferences of the Russian population do not matter at all for domestic and foreign

Post-postcommunist Russia 27

policy. We should be alert to the distinct possibility that, if present trends continue,
it will come to this tipping point at some time. We are not there yet. At a minimum,
what the Russian population perceives, thinks, and desires is still pertinent to
state decisions. Putin’s Kremlin invested heavily in public relations and in public
opinion polling and monitoring. And the persistence of electoral mechanisms
and of signiﬁ cant elements of political pluralism and competition continues to
oblige the ruling group to mount and manage periodic electoral contests. One very
signiﬁ cant electoral round at the national level has just occurred. In December 2007
Russians elected a State Duma controlled by the pro-Putin and pro-Kremlin United
Russia party; in March 2008 they overwhelmingly conﬁ rmed Putin’s choice of his
protégé, Dmitrii Medvedev, as his presidential successor.

So what do Russians want? As illustrative evidence, I adduce in Table 1 sum-

maries of responses to four opinion questions put to a sample of the electorate by
Henry Hale, Michael McFaul, myself, and Russian research partners in 2003–04,
after that winter’s election to the Duma. The loyalist United Russia party won a
plurality of the popular vote, and a two-thirds majority of the party-list and district
seats, in that election; several months later, Putin, building on the United Russia
base and on his extraordinary personal popularity, effortlessly won re-election to
his second presidential term.

The vista we behold here is rather complex. On economic reform, about one

Russian in four preferred in 2003–04 to revive state ownership and central plan-
ning, along Soviet lines; and yet, a slight majority of all respondents wanted not
to reverse or freeze market reforms but to “continue and deepen” them. On treat-
ment of the so-called oligarchs, the magnates who beneﬁ ted from Yeltsinesque
privatization in the 1990s, substantial minorities several months after the arrest
of the oil mogul Mikhail Khodorkovsky favored harshly punitive strategies
(imprisonment and/or conﬁ scation of their ill-gotten gains); a plurality favored
the moderate remedy of requiring the oligarchs to pay higher taxes. On the third
domestic controversy, the war in Chechnya, where the question was phrased in
binary terms, Russians overall preferred a strategy of negotiations to one relying
on military force. The fourth question was about relations with the West. Here the
most popular option by a long shot was to consider the West as an ally as opposed
to an enemy, a rival, or a friend.

What this snapshot suggests is that, to an extent that may surprise some observers,

Russian domestic opinion midway through the Putin era could not be categorized
as uniformly reactionary or even conservative. There was heterogeneity in mass
attitudes on all four of the questions selected. And on all four questions a majority
or a large plurality expressed a preference for a reformist, moderate, or West-
friendly stance.

How do these opinions stack up with the actual behavior of the Russian state

under Putin? Arguably, there is quite a bit of congruence on the two pieces of
economic policy. With respect to taxation, macroeconomics, and small and medium
business, Putin’s government has been a steadier reformer than Yeltsin’s. Toward
the big-business elite, the ofﬁ cial line since 2003 has been selectively punitive,
prosecuting Khodorkovsky and Yukos while leaving most other beneﬁ ciaries of

28 T.J.

Colton

Table 1 Russian mass preferences on major policy issues, winter 2003–04

Issue and position

Percent

Economic reform

Return to socialist economy

Leave things as are

Continue and deepen market reforms

Don’t know

The oligarchs

Throw in prison

Conﬁ scate property

Force to pay higher taxes

Leave alone

Don’t know

Strategy for Chechnya

Force 37
Negotiations 55
Don’t know

How Russia should relate to the West

As an enemy

As a rival

As an ally

As a friend

Don’t know

Notes
a From survey of eligible Russian voters in the weeks following the State Duma election of 14

December 2004. N = 1,648 weighted cases. The survey work was funded by the National Science
Foundation.

b Question reads: “There are various opinions about the market reforms that are being carried out in

our country. What do you think, is it necessary to return to the socialist economy, to leave everything
essentially as it is now, or to continue and deepen market reforms?”

c Question reads: “There has been a lot of talk recently about the results of privatization in Russia and

especially of what to do with the so-called oligarchs and other rich persons who became wealthy as
a result of the privatization of the 1990s. What in general is your point of view on this problem and
of what needs to be done about the oligarchs? Should [we] let the oligarchs keep everything they
have, let the oligarchs keep their property but force them to pay higher taxes, take away everything
the oligarchs got as a result of privatization, or take away everything the oligarchs got as a result of
privatization and throw them in prison?” Responses given here and in Table 2 in reverse order.

d Question reads: “To resolve the problem of Chechnya, do you think it is necessary to use primarily

force or negotiations?”

e Question reads: “There are various opinions about what relations should be like between Russia and

the West … Should Russia relate to the West as to an enemy, a rival, an ally, or a friend?”

the Roaring Nineties untouched in the enjoyment of their wealth and only lightly
impeded in the pursuit of its increase. The marked reversion to public ownership
in the oil and gas sector, the one that overshadows all others in output and trade
revenues, draws on the anti-oligarchs animus and Russian nationalism, without yet
going so far as to tilt the overall economic balance back toward state domination.
On the Second Chechen War, what with the fairly even split in opinion in 2003–04,

Post-postcommunist Russia 29

no policy would have won the approval of all. Of the two main options, ﬁ ght or
talk, Putin favored the former, which happens to have had less mass support than
the latter, and had considerable success after the Beslan hostages catastrophe in
September 2004 in isolating the remnants of the anti-Moscow guerrilla forces and
grinding them down militarily. Even here, the president has made a gesture toward
negotiationist sentiment in Russia as a whole and locally in Chechnya by author-
izing the creation of indigenous, formally elected, and semi-autonomous political
institutions and of Grozny-controlled militias and death squads to prosecute the
crackdown on the rebels. In relations with the West, Putin’s policy was more of a
cipher and the ﬁ t with popular opinion is more problematic. While pursuing adver-
sarial relations with the United States and the Western countries on some scores,
Russia’s second president always balanced these actions with accommodative
responses on other scores and its third president is likely to do the same.

It would be useful to know whether Russians’ discrete opinions on the economy,

the oligarchs, Chechnya and internal order, and foreign relations are mutually
rein forc ing or disconnected. It would be helpful also to see how opinion cleav-
ages relate to salient features of the country’s changing social structure. Table 2,
based on the same opinion questions as Table 1, furnishes some evidence on both
those scores.

One message of the correlations reported in Table 2 is that there have indeed

been interconnections among Russians’ issue opinions, but only across some of the
issues, not all. The preference for a deepening of economic reform was associated
in 2003–04 with a relatively lenient line on the oligarchs. But economic reformism
had no connection whatever with opinions on Chechnya, and anti-oligarch
sentiment had only a minor connection. Pro-Western attitudes in foreign policy
were associated with economic reformism and with tolerance of the oligarchs, but
not in a powerful way.

Most interesting is the story vis-à-vis the two social-structural features included

in the analysis – education, which can be used as a proxy for socioeconomic status,
and chronological age, which studies of Russian politics under Yeltsin found to be

Table 2 Correlation matrix for issue preferences, education, and age group

Variable

Econ reform

Oligarchs

Chechnya

West

Education

Econ reform
Oligarchs

.36*

Chechnya

.00

.08*

West

.07*

.115*

.12*

Education

.30*

.28*

–.00

–.04

Age group

–.28*

–.23*

.165*

–.05

–.24*

Notes
* p

) .01

a Pearson’s r. From the same survey as Table 1. Opinion indicators are the ordinal categories given in

the responses in Table 1, with “Don’t know” cases excluded pair-wise. The educational categories
are none or elementary, incomplete secondary, secondary, secondary specialized, incomplete higher,
and higher. The age categories are 29 and younger, 30 to 39, 40 to 49, 50 to 59, 60 to 69, and 70
and older.

30 T.J.

Colton

the most potent axis of cleavage within the mass public. As modernization theory
would predict, better-educated and higher-status citizens of Russia are apt to have
more progressive opinions on economic issues, and the more poorly educated
to have more statist and egalitarian opinions. As might have been predicted by
differing socialization and lifetime experiences within the population, a similar
association holds for the age variable: younger Russians tend to have more
market-oriented views on the economy and older Russians tend to have more
socialistic views. Toward Chechnya, however, we see no relationship between a
pro-negotiation stance and education level, and the relationship with biological
generation is exactly the reverse of what we observe on economic policy. That is,
the younger Russians were in 2003–04, the more likely they were to be hawks on
Chechnya, and the older they were, the more likely to be doves.

When it comes

to foreign policy, there is no relationship to speak of between policy preference
and either education or age group.

The age variable is the more gripping of the two social variables, owing to

its longitudinal implications. Given natural turnover in the population and the
succession of human generations, the clock would seem to be working gradually
for acceptance of economic and socioeconomic change, against a more humane
settlement of the Chechnya and similar issues, and neither for nor against pursuing
accommodating relations with the countries of the West. It follows that, looking
across the full spectrum of issues, popular opinion in post-postcommunist Russia
cannot easily be mapped onto familiar liberal-conservative, left-right, or, if you
prefer, Westernizer-Slavophile continua. It is messier than that.

In making note of the ﬁ t between some aspects of state behavior and some

currents in public opinion, I do not mean to imply that government policy has been
motivated solely or even mostly by public opinion or the wish to appease it. It is
fair to say, though, that in certain regards public opinion in post-postcommunist
Russia continues to have varying degrees of autonomy from, and impact on, the
state. A recent example from domestic politics would be the inhospitable reaction
of pensioners to government attempts to monetize social-assistance payments in
the winter of 2004–05, a reaction that spilled over into the streets of Russian cities
and forced the government to modify its monetization plan. A good example from
the national-security realm would be popular sentiment on military manpower. To
accommodate mass and especially middle-class resistance to conscription, Putin
and his former defense minister Sergei Ivanov have decreed a reduction of the
draft term to twelve months by the year 2008. In some other essential regards –
and Russia is hardly unique here – governing elites take the lead in shaping public
preferences and exploiting them for political advantage. In doing so, a precondition
of success has been has been mass-media manipulation of, and in some instances
the outright manufacture of, critical events. Critical events since the rise of Putin
take in the acts of violence in and surrounding the North Caucasus, the arrest of
Mikhail Khodorkovsky, and, outside the country, the attacks of September 11,
2001, and the American invasion of Iraq.

In thinking of Russia and the international environment in the near-term and

middle-term future, it is best to weigh leaders, bureaucrats, and the deep state

Post-postcommunist Russia 31

more heavily than the composition of preference at the social grassroots. In foreign
policy, mass opinion in Russia’s managed democracy/soft authoritarianism ﬁ gures
into elite calculations principally as a constraint on government initiative rather
than as a source of steady input. The constraint on policymakers from below is
looser here than it is in many realms of domestic policy, if for no other reason
than the mass public pays much less attention to international events and imputes
much less salience to foreign-policy issues than to domestic issues. Elite opinion
can be expected to make the most impact on policy outputs when it is reinforced
by mass opinion. In Russia, there is some spread between elite and mass prefer-
ences on foreign policy, as we shall see, but an anti-Western trend is noticeable
for both.

To penetrate beneath the surface of Russian attitudes either at the mass base

or in elite circles is to uncover considerable ambiguity in these attitudes. What
does being an “ally” of the West mean in practise? President Putin seldom uses
the word. Instead, he is a great fan of the word partnër, “partner,” rather than
soyuznik, the term we used in our 2003–04 electoral survey for “ally.” Soyuznik
connotes a formal and binding understanding with clear speciﬁ cation of the rights
and duties of the participants. An alliance relationship is necessarily a selective
if not an exclusive one. Partnër signiﬁ es a more informal, a more contingent and
discretionary, and a less exclusive relationship. In most constructions of the term,
partnerships can be in relation to a variety of speciﬁ c goals and can multiply
without logical limit. And, in some constructions, partnership has room for
competition as well as cooperation.

For Yeltsin and his associates, foreign policy was ﬁ rst and foremost an act of

realistic acquiescence in the West’s superior power resources, necessitated by
Russia’s military and political disarray and especially by its extreme economic
weakness. With Andrei Kozyrev as foreign minister until 1996, if not as much
in later years, partnërstvo also implied an eagerness to enrich the relationship
with the Western nations and at least a willingness to entertain eventual merger
of Russia into the partner’s community. Much has changed, because of cultural
trends, a delayed response to the dismantling of the Soviet Union, a backlash
against the perceived excesses and failures on Yeltsin’s watch, and – last but not
least – a reaction against Western and particularly American actions on a host
of foreign-policy issues, from the occupation of Iraq to arms control and entry
into the World Trade Organization (WTO). The point of convergence for the
most profound Russian resentments and fears since Yeltsin yielded to Putin in
1999–2000 is what is seen as Western plotting to further diminish Russia’s place
in the world – at the very time when the country’s economic revival under Putin
has been leading many to the conviction that Russia’s place should be conﬁ rmed
and augmented. On many of these points, there is a sharp discrepancy between
Russian perceptions and perceptions in the non-Russian states of the area, one that
goes back to the fundamental difference between metropole and periphery in the
preceding, imperial arrangement.

In my conversations in Moscow, where I visit several times a year, I have

recently heard great cynicism about Western motives in the security domain. This

32 T.J.

Colton

is especially striking in relation to trends in Russia’s “Near Abroad,” the former
Soviet republics that rim it to the west and south. One can look far and wide for
a single Russian who will accept at face value almost any component of the case
for NATO enlargement or who doubts that the United States and the EU possess
and are acting on a blueprint for further diminishing or, as many would now
say, eliminating Russian inﬂ uence in the post-Soviet space. It is thus in Russia’s
immediate neighborhood that anti-Western sentiments have focused in the opening
years of the new century, and it is here, on the borderline between domestic and
international affairs, that they will continue to focus.

The decision of the mid-1990s to expand NATO to the east, into the territories

of the defunct Soviet bloc, was publicly justiﬁ ed by its architects primarily as a
formula for bringing about stability in post-communist Eastern and Central Europe.
But the policy, executed despite the Yeltsin administration’s indignant opposition,
served two other goals as well, although they were rarely articulated as bluntly as
the ﬁ rst: to salve Western guilt over not having done much to help small countries
as they endured decades of communist tyranny; and to contain post-communist
Russia, to ensure that it could never again begin to amass the inﬂ uence its Soviet
predecessor wielded in Europe from the 1940s through the 1980s. The proponents
of this policy, referring chieﬂ y to the ﬁ rst of the three goals, preached that Russia’s
grounds for opposing it had no objective basis, that Moscow would have no
alterna tive to consenting to enlargement, and that Russian resistance to the change
would mellow with the passage of time. To quote Richard C. Holbrooke, the chief
advocate of Alliance enlargement within the ﬁ rst Clinton administration, speaking
to the Council on Foreign Relations in December 1996:

Russia’s objections are well known and loudly voiced. But there is no indica-
tion that this is a core issue between the two countries [Russia and the United
States]. This is theater of a very minor sort. It will not determine the future of
Russia. It will not determine the outcome of power struggles in Russia. And
it will not determine the shape of the Russian military … Private conversa-
tions … indicate that while [the Russians] go through the rituals … they have
to object just as they objected to Pershing [medium-range ballistic missile]
deployments in the ’80s. But they will accept it and it will not pose a direct
threat to Russia.

The reasonableness of Russian opposition to NATO enlargement can be

debated until we are blue in the face. It is a matter of perspective. Sufﬁ ce it to say
that the bulk of the country’s foreign-policy establishment think with well-nigh
unanimity that their disapproval is eminently rational, and not a matter of pique or
theater, and that their objections have always been echoed in varying degrees by
dissenters within the Western Alliance. As a practical matter, Russian governments
have gone along with the inevitable, as Holbrooke and others forecast a decade
ago. That is, they grudgingly signed the NATO-Russia Founding Act on Mutual
Relations, Cooperation and Security in 1997 and accepted as a fait accompli that
year’s ﬁ rst wave of enlargement (which added the Czech Republic, Hungary, and

Post-postcommunist Russia 33

Poland to the Alliance); in 2004 they reluctantly did the same for a second wave of
enlargement (which incorporated Bulgaria, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Romania,
Slovakia, and Slovenia).

But the key tenet in the rosy scenario painted by Holbrooke and others was the

third – that whatever Russian cantankerousness there was would subside as the
country got used to the idea of former satellites joining the Alliance and as it came
to realize that NATO enlargement was not a genuine threat to Russia’s interests
and security. It is precisely on this point that the empirical evidence most ﬂ ies in
the face of the initial assumptions and forecast. Russian attitudes toward NATO
have hardened rather than softened.

Table 3 quarries data collected and posted by the Public Opinion Foundation

in Moscow, a pro-government but highly professional polling ﬁ rm directed by
Aleksandr Oslon. The table tracks mass attitudes in Russia toward NATO as a
bloc from 1997, shortly before the ﬁ rst burst of enlargement into the eastern half
of Europe, to the spring of 2004, at the time of the latest burst. In 1997 fewer than
40 percent of Russians regarded NATO as an “aggressive” alliance and about
25 percent regarded it as “defensive” in nature. By April 2004 the alarmists seeing
NATO as an aggressive entity had risen to almost 60 percent of the population,
and outnumbered the moderates who looked at it as a defensive alliance by better
than three to one. The terrorist attack on New York in 2001 and the US-Russian
rapprochement of the months that followed seemed to dampen anti-NATO feeling
some, but it had revived and attained new heights by 2004, in all probability due to
American actions in the Middle East.

Subsequent surveys by the Public Opinion

Foundation, employing differently worded survey questions, show no meaningful
shift in Russian opinion on the matter since 2004.

Table 4 adds depth to the picture by displaying responses for four opinion

questions administered to respondents in April of 2004. As can be seen in the ﬁ rst
column (the upper section of which reproduces information given in Table 3),
pluralities of Russians in 2004 believed that NATO and Russian interests as a rule
diverge and that the enlargement of 2004 was a bad idea, while outright majorities
considered NATO to be an offensive alliance and felt that the military threat to
Russia had worsened as a result of the recent enlargement. The second column of
Table 4 provides valuable information on elite opinion, relying on an admittedly
small sample of regional administrators and media ﬁ gures. On every dimension,

Table 3 Trend in mass attitudes toward NATO as a bloc, 1997–2004

Nature of
NATO

February
1997

September
2001

May
2002

December
2002

April
2004

Aggressive

38 50 54 48 58

Defensive

24 26 24 26 17

Don’t

know

38 24 22 26 26

Notes
a From national surveys by Public Opinion Foundation, Moscow, as reported at http://bd.english.fom.

ru/report/cat/frontier/NATO/ed041629. Question reads: “Do you regard NATO as an aggressive or
a defensive military bloc?”

34 T.J.

Colton

Table 4 Comparison of mass and elite attitudes toward NATO, April 2004

Question

Mass sample

Elite sample

Nature of NATO

Aggressive

Defensive

Don’t know

NATO and Russian interests

Tend to coincide

Tend to diverge

Don’t know

Attitude toward 2004 enlargement

Positive

Indifferent

Negative

Don’t know

Military threat after enlargement

Greater

No change

Don’t know

Notes
a From national survey by Public Opinion Foundation, as reported at http://bd.english.fom.ru/report/

map/dominant/edominant2004/edom0415/edomt0415_1/ed041508.

b From Public Opinion Foundation telephone interviews with “100 experts representing the regional

and media elite of Russia.” http://bd.english.fom.ru/report/map/dominant/edominant2004/edom0415/
edomt0415_1/ed041524.

c Question same as in Table 3 above. Mass data repeats column 5 of Table 3.
d Question reads: “According to one opinion, the interests of Russia and NATO are more likely to

coincide, while according to a different opinion, they are more likely to diverge. Which of these two
opinions is closest to your own?”

e Question reads: “How do you feel about the fact that seven Eastern European states have joined

NATO: positive, negative, or indifferent?”

f Question reads: “As a result of NATO’s expansion, do you believe the military threat to Russia has

grown, or not?”

elite opinion was more hostile to NATO than mass opinion. The gap in anti-NATO
attitudes between elite and mass informants ranged from10 percentage points in
the case of NATO as an aggressive alliance to 20 percentage points in the case of
the change in the military threat to Russia after the 2004 expansion.

Does this all mean that anti-NATO and anti-Western feeling among ordinary

and policy-involved Russians has reached a threshold where accommodation with
NATO and Western governments has become politically untenable? Fortunately,
even the data in Tables 3 and 4 do not warrant so gloomy a conclusion. As comes
out in Table 3, far from negligible minorities of the population (between 17 and
26 percent) were of the opinion between 1997 and 2004 that NATO was primarily a
defensive military bloc, not an aggressive one, and anywhere from 22 to 38 percent
of the population had no set opinion on the subject, and were presumably amenable
to guidance by the government on it. In Table 4 we can make out a similar pattern,
with about 40 percent to 60 percent of the Russian mass audience polled taking a
soft line toward NATO or harboring no opinion either way. Table 4 shows, more-
over, that elite members surveyed expressed both pro-NATO and anti-NATO views

Post-postcommunist Russia 35

in larger proportions than did members of Oslon’s mass samples. The only opinion
found less frequently in the elite samples are the “Don’t know” responses.

The theoretical possibility of Russia eventually becoming a member of the

NATO Alliance has been mentioned, if not actively promoted, by all American
and Russian presidents to hold ofﬁ ce since the dissolution of the Soviet Union in
1991. Plumbing Russian opinion on this option is to hold it to the highest possible
test concerning NATO intentions. What do citizens of the Russian Federation think
about the possibility of their country joining the NATO? The most commonly
found opinion at the mass level, as is plain in Table 5, is decidedly against NATO
membership. A plurality of 39 percent of Russians thought NATO membership
undesirable in 2001, a proportion that grew to 46 percent in May 2004, dropped
back to 41 percent in December 2002, and was at 48 percent in April 2004. At no
time did anti-membership feeling prevail among a majority of the population, and
in two surveys (those of September 2001 and December 2002) anti-membership
opinions led pro-membership opinions by fewer than 10 percentage points –
and always with roughly one respondent in four having no ﬁ xed opinion on the
subject.

Inasmuch as full membership in the Alliance for Russia is not under active

consideration on either side, less demanding options for cooperation between Russia
and NATO are of more immediate relevance. And here, as is laid out in our last
two tables, 6 and 7, the evidence from opinion surveys is a lot more encouraging.
A preference for strengthening cooperation with the NATO bloc prevailed over
a distaste for cooperation in ﬁ ve consecutive surveys of the population taken
between mid-1999 and the spring of 2004. Even in April 2004 – on the heels of
the unwanted (by the Russians) admission to the Alliance of three former Soviet
republics, three former members of the Warsaw Pact (Slovakia was half of Soviet-
era Czechoslovakia), and one former Yugoslav republic – pro-cooperation forces
outnumbered anti-cooperation forces by 51 percent to 22 percent. And, ironically,
the proclivity for cooperation was greater in the same elite stratum where the habit
of badmouthing NATO as an aggressive player is also most deeply entrenched.
Ninety percent of Aleksandr Oslon’s elite-level respondents in 2004, almost twice
as many as at the mass level, wanted to step up cooperation with NATO.

There are, therefore, contradictory impulses toward relations with NATO at

Table 5 Trend in mass attitudes toward Russia joining NATO, 2001–04

Attitude toward joining

September 2001 May 2002 December 2002 April 2004

Desirable and possible

Desirable but impossible

Undesirable and possible

Undesirable and impossible

Don’t know

Notes
a From national surveys by Public Opinion Foundation, as reported at same source as for Table 4.

Question reads: “The issue of Russia joining NATO is often considered. Which of the following
views is closest to your own? Russia’s joining NATO is …”

36 T.J.

Colton

Table 6 Trend in mass attitudes toward strengthened cooperation with NATO,

1999–2004

Attitude toward
strengthening cooperation

July
1999

September
2001

May
2002

December
2002

April
2004

Positive

Negative

Don’t know

Notes
a From national surveys by Public Opinion Foundation, as reported at same source as for Tables 4

and 5. Question reads: “Should Russia strengthen its cooperation with NATO, or not?”

Table 7 Comparison of mass and elite attitudes toward strengthened cooperation with

NATO, April 2004

Attitude toward strengthening cooperation

Mass sample

Elite sample

Yes

Positive

Notes
a From a national survey by Public Opinion Foundation, as reported at same source as for Table 4.

Question reads: “The issue of Russia joining NATO is often considered. Which of the following
views is closest to your own? Russia’s joining NATO is …”

work in the body politic of post-postcommunist Russia. Most Russians still want
cooperative ties, while most of those same Russians ﬁ nd NATO more of a menace
than they did in the past. These contradictions, and the quandary for Western policy-
makers, are bound to worsen if NATO pushes ahead with plans for extending its
2004 boundaries further to the east. Mikhail Saakashvili’s Georgia has pushed
hardest for an invitation, and Russia undoubtedly will ﬁ ght such a shift until the
end. But Georgia will be small potatoes compared to the massive campaign Russia
is certain to wage to keep a second country on the potential candidates’ list, one far
larger and far dearer to Russian hearts – Ukraine – from transferring its allegiance
completely to the Western Alliance, as its president, Viktor Yushchenko, intends
it to do. Polls show Russians to be extremely sensitive to even token gestures of
military collaboration between Ukraine and NATO, such as the joint exercises
scheduled for Crimea, but canceled, in 2006. NATO–Ukraine cooperation, to say
nothing of NATO membership for Ukraine, is more repugnant to Russian citizens
than NATO cooperation with Russia.

This is not to argue for perpetuation of the status quo. I merely caution that

unreﬂ ecting attempts to change the status quo, especially if they continue in
the mold of the mechanical enlargement strategy of the 1990s, will create huge
problems in our relationship with Russia. As for Russia, even without foreign-
policy headaches it faces numerous domestic conundrums in the years ahead.
Vladimir Putin’s constitutional second term as president of the federation expired
in the spring of 2008. He succeeded in handing the baton to a designated heir,

Post-postcommunist Russia 37

Dmitrii Medvedev, but for the time being will hold the important ofﬁ ce of prime
minister in the new government. For that and other reasons, Medvedev will at the
outset rule with far less authority than his patron had. He will have his hands full
with domestic problems, such as diversifying an economy more dependent than
ever on exports of fuels and metals, sustaining growth, and managing a difﬁ cult
security situation in the North Caucasus. The Kremlin ideologists are determined to
handle this agenda while maintaining Russia as what has been called, since 2004,
“sovereign democracy” (suverennaya demokratiya). The phrase boils down to a
commitment to prevent external players from shaping Russia’s internal political
environment, as happened, spokesmen for the ruling group have insisted, in the
“colored revolutions” in Georgia, Ukraine, and Kyrgyzstan.

The external stimulus that most affected internal trends in post-communist

countries beyond the western borders of the former Soviet Union was the prospect
and then the reality of acceptance into the European Union – not into NATO. For
Russia and, for all practical purposes, for Ukraine, EU admission is an impossibility
for the time being. The Russian elite lacks even the aspiration to enter the EU,
and thereby “Europe,” that drives many in the Ukrainian elite. This hurdle makes
NATO and its expanding eastern frontier much more of a bone of contention
between Russia and Western governments than if there was some other game
in town.

All of which drives me to the conclusion that the United States and the NATO

Alliance, having lived off of the intellectual capital of decades past, must now
commit to a searching exploration of frameworks for security in Europe. Mindless
extension of the policy line of the 1990s will not produce the easy gains it produced
then, will make neo-containment of Russia and rollback of its inﬂ uence more and
more the focus of policy, and will intensify Russia’s political isolation. It is time
to open dialogue and debate about a new structure for a new age. One way or
the other, that new structure has to make room for the modern, democratic, self-
conﬁ dent, and restrained Russian state which does not yet exist but without which
neither Russia nor Europe will be whole.

Notes

1 This evocative phrase seems to have originated in descriptions of Turkish politics and to

have been put into international general circulation by Suleyman Demirel, president of
Turkey from 1994 to 1999.

2 In raw proportions, 45 percent of survey respondents under the age of 30 preferred a

military solution on Chechnya and 49 percent preferred a negotiated solution; over the
age of 69, 23 percent preferred a military solution and 64 percent preferred a negotiated
solution.

3 At http://www.cfr.org/publication/74/expanding_nato.html.
4 The invasion of Iraq in March 2003 was not, of course, a NATO operation, but, besides

the United States and Britain, the big military players, a number of NATO members sent
smaller contingents.

38 T.J.

Colton

5 For example, Oslon’s researchers asked survey respondents in May 2002, April 2004,

August 2005, and June 2006 whether they considered that NATO “poses a threat to
Russia’s security.” Fifty-one percent in 2004 and 50 percent in 2006 said it did; 26 percent
in 2004 and 25 percent in 2006 said it did; and 23 percent in 2004 and 25 percent in
2006 had no answer to the question. See the report at http://bd.english.fom.ru/report/cat/
frontier/NATO/etb062310.

6 A Public Opinion Foundation poll in June 2006 found that 60 percent of Russians

disapproved of joint exercises between Ukraine and NATO, 3 percent approved, and 25
percent were indifferent. Compare this to a survey by the same organization in August
2005 in which only 20 percent disapproved of recently concluded NATO-Russian war
games, with 38 percent approving and 42 percent being unable to say. At http://bd.english.
fom.ru/report/map/ed062312; and http://bd.english.fom.ru/report/map/etb053510.

Russia, NATO enlargement and
the strengthening of democracy
in the European space

S. Neil MacFarlane

Introduction

NATO enlargement is considered by many to be one dimension of a project to
create not only a single security space, but also a single normative space – a space
characterized by democratic values, respect for human rights, open economies,
and durable peace. NATO is just one of a number of international institutions
pursuing this shared objective, the others including the Council of Europe (CoE),
the European Union (EU), and the Organization for Security and Co-operation in
Europe (OSCE).

On the face of it, one might expect that both NATO enlargement and the pro-

motion of democratic transformation might generate problems in the relationship
with Russia. From a realist or geopolitical perspective, the expansion of the North
Atlantic Alliance weakens Russia’s position in Europe. The same might be true
of democracy promotion. Russia’s government and, apparently, most Russians,
show little interest in the development of liberal democratic institutions and
practice. Putin’s regime displays much greater interest in control and consolida-
tion than in democratization. Where the latter gets in the way of the former, it is
sidelined.

There are many dimensions to this pattern. The past six years have witnessed

a steady effort on the part of the government to narrow the space for freedom of
expression in the media. The numbers of independent outlets for news and analysis
have shrunk. Those that remain have read the writing on the wall, and censor
themselves. As the case of Anna Politkovskaya suggests, being off message can be
hazardous. The Duma has effectively been neutralized by changes in percentages
rules limiting the representation of the most critical political forces on the liberal end
of the spectrum; the president has effective control of the less pluralistic legislature
that has resulted. The centre has made considerable progress in reasserting control
over the regions (for example, through new rules on the selection of regional
governors and through the creation of “super-regions” administered by central
appointees). It has also had considerable success in restoring state control over
the commanding heights of the economy, particularly in the energy sector through
Gazprom and Rosneft, sometimes at the expense of foreign investors.

Russian diplomats and policymakers generally react very badly to European (or

40 S.N.

MacFarlane

transatlantic) efforts to project democratic norms into the Russian Federation or,
for that matter, the former Soviet space minus the Baltics. The offhand rejection
of external criticism of the lack of due process in the Khodorkovsky trial is an
eloquent example. More recently, on the eve of the 2006 G8 Summit in Saint
Petersburg, Russian ofﬁ cials warned Western ofﬁ cial representatives to steer
clear of the Moscow conference of the democratic opposition, while arresting and
harassing several participants in the sessions. The Russian government rebranded
the conﬂ ict in Chechnya as a counter-terrorist operation. In its prosecution of
the conﬂ ict, it has conspicuously ignored its legal obligations under the Geneva
Conventions, the Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, and Council of Europe
instruments, as well as its political obligations under the OSCE human dimension
and its partnership agreement with the European Union.

The message is clear;

Russia’s course of action in regard to (non)democratic governance will proceed
whatever outsiders might think about it.

Russia’s resistance to the effort of outsiders to engage in its internal affairs

is accompanied by a robust defense of a very traditional conception of absolute
sovereignty. Russian behaviour in the United Nations (UN) Security Council
when matters of humanitarian intervention (or, more modestly, non-consent-
based enforcement under Chapter VII of the Charter) arise suggests a profound
opposition to the notion that states, in their exercise of internal sovereignty, might
be bound by international humanitarian and human rights norms. Arguably, there
is an emerging international normative consensus to the effect that where states are
either incapable of protecting, or unwilling to protect, civilians affected by conﬂ ict,
other states and their organizations have a responsibility to do so until such time
as the state in question is in a position to fulﬁ l its responsibilities in respect of its
citizens.

Whether or not such a norm is emerging in international society as a

whole, it is clearly not part of the Russian landscape of diplomacy. The positions on
intervention in Darfur taken by Russia in the UN Security Council are an eloquent
illustration. Russia, along with China, has consistently resisted Security Council
draft resolutions that would permit a robust UN presence in the region, or that
would impose targeted sanctions on Sudanese ofﬁ cials. This resistance reﬂ ects
not only the long-standing Russian objection to intervention in the internal affairs
of states on humanitarian or human rights grounds, but also, presumably, Russia’s
growing economic relationship with Sudan.

These patterns extend to Russia’s former Soviet neighbourhood as well, par-

ticu larly those republics having experienced one colour or another of “democratic”
revolution. The events in Georgia in 2003 and in Ukraine in 2004 were widely
interpreted in the Russian Federation to be the result of Western interference,
motivated by a desire to erode Russia’s position and inﬂ uence in the region. In the
case of Georgia, the Rose Revolution was followed by an escalation of Russian
pressure on Georgia. In Ukraine, Russia has possibly used energy supply as an
instrument to manipulate parliamentary elections. The change in government in
Kyrgyzstan has been accompanied by a deliberate (and partially successful) Russian
effort to reduce American military presence in the region through rapprochement
with Uzbekistan.

Russia, NATO enlargement, and the strengthening of democracy 41

In short, the Russian Federation is a poster child of resistance to the democratic

and human rights agenda of Europe, and, with some qualiﬁ cation,

of the transatlantic

community. To the extent that Europe and its North American partners take such
issues seriously, the account above would suggest a growing potential for conﬂ ict
in the relationship between NATO and the Russian Federation as NATO continues
to enlarge, as it deepens its relations with the non-Russian successor states to the
Soviet Union, and as parallel EU processes of enlargement and deepening (the
neighbourhood policy and strategy, for example) evolve. The potential for such
conﬂ ict is not primarily ideational. Russian concerns over the contagion effect of
the “colour revolutions” in Georgia and Ukraine have largely dissipated. Instead,
it is power-political and strategic. However, the Russian leadership places a
premium on maintaining the Federation’s inﬂ uence within the former Soviet
region; increasing Western political and military engagement with the non-Russian
republics threatens that inﬂ uence and contests Russia’s pre-eminence.

In exploring these themes, I look ﬁ rst of all at emerging Russian understandings

of international order. I follow with consideration of Russians’ conception of their
own place in that order. I then turn to the implications of the ﬁ rst two for Russian
foreign policy, including Russia’s relations with NATO and the EU. Although
Russian writers, politicians and statesmen have perspectives on all of these issues
that are quite different from those of their European and transatlantic counterparts,
and although these differences have generated a considerable amount of tension
on speciﬁ c issues, there seems to be little prospect of systemic conﬂ ict setting
the Russian Federation at odds with the West in general and NATO in particular.
On the other hand, for reasons discussed below, there is reason for concern about
the possibility of tension emerging between Russia and Western institutions over
relations with the non-Russian former Soviet republics and their place in a European
security architecture. Moreover, as Russia regains its strength, its government may
be expected to become more active in regions such as Africa and the Arab Middle
East where, for much of the past ﬁ fteen years, Russian policy has been dormant.
This may complicate the pursuit of Western interests in these regions.

The Russian understanding of world order

The Yeltsin years were a period of substantial contestation in Russian discussions
on world order. The period was initially dominated by the liberal internationalist
perspectives inherited from the Gorbachev years. Integration into global structures,
cooperation with, and assistance from, those structures as Russia attempted to
reform its economy and polity were the order of the day. The hegemony of the
liberal understanding of international order characteristic of 1991–92 disappeared
reasonably rapidly in the mid-1990s, as the depth of Russia’s domestic crisis, the
disorder of its neighbourhood, and the limits on Western willingness to accord
Russia access to and equality of status in global and regional institutions became
clearer. The uncritical embrace of liberal democratic and cooperative principles
in international relations was largely superseded by a discourse focusing on the
distinctiveness of Russia, revolving around a Eurasian identity, and the need to

42 S.N.

MacFarlane

focus on concrete Russian interests notably in the “near abroad” and to explore
possibilities for balancing against the West and the United States in particular.

Multipolarity had several variants – one being the exploration of a tripartite

Russia–Europe–USA balance, another being the development of strategic relations
with other marginalized emerging powers (China and India, for example). This
strand in Russian foreign policy also ran into problems. Among the proposed
partners, Europe fairly consistently demonstrated its incapacity to act as a
cohesive and effective player in international relations. China and India were
unwilling to jeopardise their relations with the West to pursue a balancing strategy.
Moreover, their bilateral relationship was (and is) sufﬁ ciently strained to make
them improbable partners in a global alliance of the excluded. Russia itself lacked
the power to make it happen and also was unwilling to forego its own privileged
place to make room for its putative allies, as was demonstrated by its posture on
UN Security Council reform.

The emergence of Vladimir Putin in 1999–2000 has produced a more realistic

perspective on international order. The quixotic and contradictory quality of
foreign policy discourse in the Yeltsin era is largely gone. There is little remaining
faith in prospects for multipolar balancing of US power and an acceptance that, Iraq
notwithstanding, the current hegemonic distribution of power is likely to remain for
the foreseeable future. This does not suggest an abandonment of multipolarity, but,
rather, a redeﬁ nition towards a more pragmatic variant in which Russia is likely
to seek partners anywhere that mutual interests on matters of signiﬁ cance exist.
These may include partnership relations with the US and other Western states, but
also (where risks are manageable) partnerships with states whose objectives are
inconsistent with, or antithetical to, those of the transatlantic community. The latter
is evident, for example, in Russian policy towards Iran.

At the end of the day, though, there is, for Russia, no point in challenging the

United States directly on issues where the American leadership believes its vital
interests are at stake. This reticence reﬂ ects learning from experience. The effort
to constrain US and NATO diplomacy with respect to Serbia at Dayton and then
again concerning Kosovo went nowhere. The same was true of the Russian effort
to forestall military action against Iraq in 2003. The conclusion that the Russian
government appears to have come to is that it has no real capacity to restrain the
US and that not much can be done (directly, anyway) to resist US initiatives. The
effort to do so is potentially very costly and risks substantial humiliation. Far better
to let the hegemon dig his own grave.

The fact of decline and Russia’s place in international relations

This less ambitious view of international order reﬂ ects a reasonably realistic
assessment of Russia’s place in the world. The story of the Yeltsin years is
one of the steady decline in Russian power. In absolute terms, GNP shrank by
approximately 50 percent. It was not until 2003 that the Russian Federation
restored GDP levels to those of 1993. The relative decline is even more striking,
as the United States and China grew rapidly in the same period. In 2005, Russian

Russia, NATO enlargement, and the strengthening of democracy 43

GDP (at $763,720 million) was just below that of Mexico ($763,468 million),
about $4000 million below that of Canada ($1,115,192 million), and roughly a
third of Chinese GDP ($2,228,862 million), with the United States at $12,455,068
million.

Russia is beneﬁ ting from the windfall associated with rising prices for

energy products. This rise has largely driven its recovery over the past six years.
It may be expected to continue. But there is a long, long way to go before Russia
re-enters the list of world powers.

Economic decline was accompanied by demographic decline in the 1990s and

the early years of this decade, resulting from very low birth rates and increasing
mortality, particularly among males. Both in some sense suggest a crisis of morale.
The failure of the population to reproduce reﬂ ected not only the hardships of
economic collapse and the disappearance of social safety nets, but doubt about
the future. High male morbidity is a product largely of self-harming behaviour
(excessive consumption of tobacco products and alcohol). Government efforts to
reverse the decline in the birth rate have had little discernible effect. At the time
President Putin took ofﬁ ce, Russia’s population was estimated at 146.3 million.
By 2004, it had fallen to 143.8 million, the 2004 annual growth rate being –.5%.

If present trends continue, Russia may expect to lose 18 million people of working
age over the next twenty years. Meanwhile, at the current rate of economic growth,
the Russian economy will require an additional 7 million workers by 2015.

A third important dimension of declining Russian power was the massive

contraction in the Russian military and the obvious reduction in the effectiveness of
its application. In the mid-1980s, NATO worried about the capacity of the USSR to
break out through Central Europe to the English Channel and designed mechanisms
for extended nuclear deterrence to compensate for NATO’s perceived conventional
deﬁ ciencies. The performance of the Russian Army in 1994–96 and 1999 to the
present in Chechnya suggests great difﬁ culty in handling a local insurgency in a
territory that constitutes less than 1 percent of Russia’s land area and involving an
ethnic group that constitutes 2 percent of Russia’s population, and this despite the
military’s apparently complete indifference to principles of proportionality and
discrimination in war.

In a larger sense, Russia has witnessed huge erosion in its regional strategic

position. It lost control of the Warsaw Pact buffer. The other union republics of the
USSR departed. Three of them are now members of NATO; a number of others
aspire to membership. The EU has also expanded into the former Soviet space,
and may continue to do so in Ukraine and Moldova. NATO and NATO member
states enjoy a deepening presence in a number of other former Soviet republics,
extending from Georgia and Azerbaijan in the west to Kyrgyzstan in Central Asia.
Russia appeared incapable not only of sustaining its inﬂ uence in the former Soviet
space, but also of preventing strategic penetration of that space by NATO and the
United States. Efforts to organize the former Soviet space into a coherent regional
zone of economic and security cooperation, meanwhile, failed.

The ﬁ nal dimension to mention here is “soft power.” In the communist era, the

USSR arguably had a forceful ideological agenda to promote, and this agenda was,
for much of the time, reasonably inﬂ uential among working class parties in the

44 S.N.

MacFarlane

north and anti-colonial movements and post-colonial governments in the south.
Russia today has no such agenda, and consequently lacks whatever power might
come from the attractiveness of Russian principles and values. The economic
collapse, state weakness and policy ineffectiveness, corruption, disorder, massive
criminality, and widespread misery that characterized the 1990s, hardly provided
an attractive model for emulation by other states and societies in the interna tional
system.

The Putin foreign policy agenda

In short, when Putin arrived in ofﬁ ce in 1999, ﬁ rst as prime minister and then as
president, he inherited a country in deep domestic crisis and one that had been
ignored on every major occasion in the 1990s when it disagreed with NATO and
the Western states (for example, the ﬁ rst round of NATO enlargement, the 1995
NATO-led intervention in Bosnia, the 1998 Anglo-American bombing of Iraq,
and the 1999 NATO attack on Serbia and subsequent occupation of Kosovo).
The resump tion of the war in Chechnya notwithstanding, the key priority since
Yeltsin’s departure has been to stop the bleeding and to turn Russia around. As
Aleksei Pushkov put it, “On 26 March 2000, Vladimir Putin inherited a weak,
corrupt, and paralysed country on the verge of disintegration … Putin’s strate-
gic goal was to get Russia back on its feet.”

The dimensions of this agenda are

reasonably straightforward, although together they posed a daunting challenge:
stabilizing Putin’s hold on power, regenerating the economy and balancing the
books, consolidating executive control over the state and restoring the state’s
capacity to maintain order, restoring the state’s position in the key sectors of the
economy upon which recovery would be largely based, curbing the inﬂ uence of
Russia’s economic oligarchs, sorting the relationship between the executive and the
legislature, reasserting central control over the country’s regions, and preventing
the loss of further territory or the spread of existing insurgencies.

The central theme in Putin’s foreign policy in his early years was, not surprisingly,

the effort to create and sustain external conditions that permit domestic stabilization
and recovery. As Putin put it in his ﬁ rst presidential term, Russia’s activity in foreign
affairs must “enable us to concentrate efforts and resources as far as possible on
addressing the social and economic tasks of the state.”

The parallels to earlier

periods of domestic crisis, such as the aftermath of the Crimean War, and the post-
Civil War new economic policy, are clear, as is that to the Gorbachev era, when an
accommodating foreign policy was a logical concomitant of perestroika.

In consequence, one key theme of Russian foreign policy discourse for much of

the Putin era was “partnership” – with respect to Europe, the United States, and also
with China. Multipolarity in this context became a quest for managed cooperative
relationships amongst the various centres of the various forms of power in the
system, rather than a quasi-nineteenth century crude balancing effort.

The understanding of Russia’s weakness, and of the necessity to get along with

major players in the international system while addressing key domestic tasks,
produced a nuanced view of international behaviour. Issues arising could be

Russia, NATO enlargement, and the strengthening of democracy 45

divided into at least three categories. First, where there was potential disagreement
between Russia and the United States in particular on issues of vital interest to the
latter, it made sense to cooperate or to duck. The best examples of acquiescence are
associated with the American war on terror declared after the attacks of September
11, 2001. Here, the United States made clear that it would proceed, whatever others
thought. Given the systemic structure of power, there was no point in resistance,
even when US responses touched upon what were deemed to be areas of strategic
interest to the Russian Federation. Thus, having spent considerable time and effort
in preventing military penetration of Central Asia, when the action in Afghanistan
rose to the top of the US agenda in late 2001, the Russian government acquiesced,
allowing the US base in Kyrgyzstan and Uzbekistan and providing intelligence
assistance for the invasion of Afghanistan itself.

This is not to say that the Russian leadership failed to seek a quid pro quo. The

reward concerned Chechnya; Russia associated itself with the war on terror, and
cooperated in it; the reward seems to have been carte blanche regarding the messy
prosecution of its counter-insurgency.

Elsewhere, the Russian government quietly acquiesced in several questions

that its predecessors had resisted. One was the demise of the Anti-ballistic Missile
Treaty. The Bush Administration announced its intention to withdraw soon after
it took ofﬁ ce, in view of its commitment to theatre and possibly strategic missile
defence. The Russians let it go, Putin commenting that in his view, the American
decision was a mistake. Likewise, on the second round of NATO enlargement,
which included three former Soviet republics (Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania),
Russia was unhappy, but did not make an issue of it. The contrast with the Yeltsin
era, when Russia’s president threatened a cold peace at the very least, was dramatic.
The underlying Russian text appeared to be: we don’t like it, but there is nothing
we can do about it at the moment, so let it go.

The process leading up to the Iraq War of 2003 illustrates not so much acqui-

escence as ducking. Here, Russia could have played a much more prominent role
in the UN Security Council in opposition to American preferences. It did not, since
others (and notably France) were willing to do the heavy lifting. Russia encouraged
them to do so very publicly, not least at the tripartite April 2003 summit in Saint
Petersburg. The calculus here seems to have been to let others take the heat in their
relations with the United States. Since these others had the ability to block UN
approval of the US invasion, the Russian Federation could secure its preferred out-
come without incurring signiﬁ cant penalties in the Russian–American relationship.
By endorsing Franco-German opposition, the Russian government was willing to
accept a degree of risk, with the attendant possibility of negative unintended con-
sequences from its cheering from the sidelines. However, those risks were clearly
lower than they would have been had Russia led the charge.

It is unclear how durable this ducking behaviour is. One might expect that, as

Russian power and resources grow, and as the power and purpose of the United
States are increasingly compromised by the disaster in Iraq and the attendant
domestic political consequences, Russia may be becoming more assertive on
issues of importance to the United States. In the case of Iran, for example, the

46 S.N.

MacFarlane

Russian government has consistently resisted American preferences for an end
to the Russia–Iranian nuclear technology relationship, since Iran was not only
an important customer for a struggling industry, but also because Russia valued
cooperation with Iran on regional issues in the Caucasus and Caspian Basin.
Russian policymakers rightly judged that, although irritating to the Americans,
this policy was unlikely to cause serious aggravation in the bilateral relationship.
Evidence of Iranian enrichment efforts, however, has pushed Iran up the US policy
agenda, increasing the risk for Russia. The fact that they openly continue to block
a robust UN Security Council response suggests that, as Russia recovers, it is
becoming more tolerant of risk. Once again, though, they are sharing the risk with
China. Whether they would accept it alone is unknown.

In the second category are issues on which Russia has a clear and generally

understood vital interest at stake, whereas US and European interests are secondary,
if they exist at all. So, for example, it was clear that the United States government
was unhappy about the Khodokorvsky affair and the associated state theft of private
assets. European policymakers are obviously unhappy with the pressure placed on
Shell at the end of 2006 regarding supposed violations of Russian environmental
regulations in the development of Sakhalin II. Yet it is equally clear that the
Americans and their European allies have been unwilling to back up their position
with signiﬁ cant retaliatory action. Russian behaviour in the conﬂ ict in Chechnya
displays a similar calculus. Many in the West are unhappy with how the Putin gov-
ernment has chosen to prosecute the war. However, Western countries are clearly
unwilling to allow their dislike of Russian policy to complicate broader bilateral
relations. And, for that matter, Putin has effectively used the discourse of counter-
terrorism to defuse external pressure on this point. In both instances, the Russian
position is enhanced by the fact that the issues just mentioned clearly fall within
their normal domestic jurisdiction. In pursuing the policies in question, they are,
arguably, exercising their sovereign rights. The same is true of the broader anti-
democratic agenda of the Putin Administration.

In these respects, the potential for serious conﬂ ict between Russia and NATO

is limited, despite their considerable disagreement over visions of a future Europe.
Neither side is disposed to push on matters of vital interest to the other.

The third category comprises issues falling between the two just discussed. Its

complexity is most clear with regard to Russia’s relations with the other former
Soviet republics (minus the Baltics). This space also is that most relevant to the
theme of this collection, since one of the two next logical focuses of democratic
enlargement now that the second round of enlargement is coming to term is exactly
the former Soviet republics.

The continuing Russian commitment to primacy in this space is unquestioned, and

is an important qualiﬁ er to the predominance of internal recovery and consolidation
as the basis for contemporary Russian foreign policy. The preoccupation with the
neighbourhood reﬂ ects an understanding that events and processes in contiguous
states can produce substantial negative externalities (terrorism, criminality, illegal
migration) for Russia itself. The focus on the CIS is also informed by a fairly
narrowly zero-sum view of foreign policy and national interest. If the dominant

Russia, NATO enlargement, and the strengthening of democracy 47

perspective in NATO/EU Europe focuses on cooperation for mutual gain, that in
Russia is informed by a competitive and relative gain perspective. The improvement
in Russia’s economy and Russia’s attendant political consolidation favour greater
Russian assertion on its immediate periphery. The risk aversion characteristic of
the past several years of Russian policy in this region may diminish if the domestic
situation continues to improve.

The deepening Western and particularly American engagement with the region

is equally clear, and not only in terms of the war on terror. The Caspian Basin plays
an important role in discussions of European and transatlantic energy security,
as a potentially signiﬁ cant alternative source of supply. Ukraine and Belarus are
perceived as increasingly important transit countries for energy product from
the Russian Federation. Finally, the changing membership of both NATO and
the EU favours increasing institutional engagement in the former Soviet region.
Poland has given a strong impetus to more serious NATO and EU consideration
of Ukraine. The Baltic republics have played a similar catalyzing role in the
south-eastward extension of Europe’s new neighbourhood strategy, as well as in
NATO’s deepening cooperation with Caucasian states and Ukraine. In other words,
the lobby within European institutions for more systematic engagement with the
former Soviet republics has grown in size and inﬂ uence. It is worth noting that these
states not only seek deeper NATO and EU engagement in the former Soviet Union,
but also have strong historical reasons for suspicion of Russian policy, and deeply
ambivalent relations with the Russian Federation. To the extent that their inﬂ uence
is effective, this may exacerbate tensions between NATO and Russia in the longer
term. The key areas of potential difﬁ culty include energy security, unresolved
border demarcation issues in the Baltic region, the Kaliningrad question, Russia’s
presence in and policy towards Transnistria, and the Baltic and Polish perspectives
on NATO accession for Georgia and, possibly, for Ukraine.

Many Russians saw signs of democratic transition in the former Soviet space

to be troubling for at least two reasons. First, to the extent that this transition was
successful, it carried the potential for a wider opening to the West on the part of
these states. The 2003 revolution in Georgia produced an unequivocal commit-
ment on the part of that country to membership in NATO and the EU, as well as
a dramatic acceleration in the development of the US–Georgian strategic relation-
ship. The demise of Eduard Shevardnadze in a popular uprising also contributed
to the EU decision to include the Caucasus in its neighbourhood initiative. The
Orange Revolution produced an unambiguous, though perhaps unsustainable, turn
towards the West on the part of the successor Ukrainian government and a dramatic
acceleration in Western institutional interest in that country. In this respect,
the enlargement of democratic space in this part of Eurasia is seen as having
geopolitical implications detrimental to Russia’s position in international relations.
Moreover, there was clear concern in Russia that the disease was catching, that
successful electoral revolutions would have a demonstration effect in other former
Soviet republics, and possibly in Russia itself. In other words, the enlargement of
democratic space was seen as directly threatening to the stability of the status quo
in Russia itself. Although this concern has diminished as Russian conﬁ dence in

48 S.N.

MacFarlane

its capacity to control spillover has grown, it is indicative of a general discomfort
with the transferral of Western values to the region.

In short, the potential for disagreement between Russia and European and

transatlantic institutions in this space is growing. We see this already both in
general and case-speciﬁ c terms. Perhaps the most pertinent general example,
given the thrust of this volume, is the evolution of Russian perspectives on the
democracy promotion activities of the OSCE’s Ofﬁ ce for Democratic Institutions
and Human Rights (ODIHR), and also on the activities of OSCE ﬁ eld ofﬁ ces in
the former Soviet republics. The Russian Government has expressed increasing
concern about the activities of both, which has construed to be a violation of the
sovereignty principle.

In July 2004, Russia enlisted several similarly criticized former Soviet states in

joint pressure on these institutions. A CIS Statement signed by nine states pilloried
the Organization for ignoring its own fundamental documents, overemphasizing
humanitarian and human rights monitoring, promoting democratic institutions
over other dimensions of security, and employing double standards in its focus on
“Eastern” members while paying no attention to similar problems elsewhere. The
work of ODIHR was singled out for paying insufﬁ cient attention to the conditions
of individual states and its excessive politicization. OSCE ﬁ eld missions were
criticized essentially for interfering in internal affairs of member states, and for
displaying insufﬁ cient respect for sitting governments.

This was followed by

Russian opposition to the adoption of annual budgets and by considerable difﬁ culty
in the election of a new Secretary-General.

Perhaps the best example concerns Russian policy towards Uzbekistan. In 2005,

there was a major human rights incident in Andijan, in the Ferghana region of
that country.

European states criticised Uzbek government actions very quickly,

and demanded an independent investigation. The United States prevaricated for
a time, perhaps reﬂ ecting concern over the effect of criticism on its close defence
relationship with Uzbekistan. But eventually the State Department embraced the
appeal for an independent investigation of the incident. Any such investigation
was adamantly rejected by the government of Uzbekistan, which argued that what
happened in Andijan was a matter of domestic jurisdiction.

The interesting play here was Russia’s. The Russian leadership very consistently

took the view that the Andijan matter was a question of domestic jurisdiction and
strongly supported the Uzbek claim that the action in question was a proportionate
response to terrorist activity and that no international investigation was warranted.

This position was coordinated with the likeminded Chinese leadership, and was
followed by the orchestration of a regional campaign against the US military
presence in Central Asia. Russian activity displayed continuing caution, however.
Rather than tackling the matter directly, the Russian Federation worked through
regional organizations and relied on states within the region to take a leading role.
The question of removing US bases from Central Asia was raised principally by
the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO), which suggested that since the
terrorist threat in Afghanistan had been largely addressed [sic], the reasons for US
deployment in the area no longer applied. The organization went further to request

Russia, NATO enlargement, and the strengthening of democracy 49

that a timetable for US withdrawal from Central Asia be deﬁ ned.

Uzbekistan

eventually demanded the withdrawal of US forces. The treaty of alliance that
President Karimov signed with his Russian counterpart in November 2005 grants
Russia the “right to use military installations” in Uzbekistan on the basis of further
agreements,

and has been accompanied by the resumption of Russian military

exercises in Uzbekistan (in September 2005 for the ﬁ rst time since 1991) and a
dramatic acceleration in Russian economic activity in the country.

Although the view in Brussels appears to be that there is little to be done about

this strategic reversal in Central Asia, there is some potential for risk in the Russian
policy trajectory. In the ﬁ rst place, Central Asia, and Kazakhstan in particular,
are seen as a very important potential energy source for Europe. The Russian
government has displayed considerable and growing ambivalence about Western
involvement in energy development in the Russian oil and gas sector. As Russian
inﬂ uence in Central Asia grows, this attitude may spill over into Russian views on
energy development and trade in Central Asia. Moreover, Russian policymakers
have more than occasionally obstructed efforts to create transit routes for the
export of oil and gas from the region that avoid Russian territory. As Russia’s
regional position improves, such activity may increase, generating friction with
NATO states.

Elsewhere, the Caucasus and, in particular, Georgia, suggests a similar Russian

reassertion. In the Georgian case, the Russian Federation has done what it can to
limit international engagement that might complicate Russia’s regional policy.
For example, in 2004 the Russian government vetoed the renewal of the OSCE
border-monitoring mission along Georgia’s frontier with Chechnya, despite wide
consensus within the OSCE on that mission’s continuation. As already noted,
Russia has continued, and accelerated, its granting of Russian citizenship to
residents of the breakaway territories of Abkhazia and South Ossetia. Seconded
Russian military personnel serve in the armed forces of these territories. Russia
provides substantial support to their budgets. In January 2006, Russia’s gas supply
to Georgia was interrupted by damage to two pipelines in the North Caucasus,
while Russian electricity supply to Georgia was disrupted by another explosion
that destroyed two pylons on a major power transmission line. Although Russian
authorities blamed unidentiﬁ ed terrorist groups for the disruptions, the apparently
coordinated effort to halt Russian energy supply to Georgia, involving action in two
widely separated areas, raised questions for many as to whether this was an effort
to foment instability in Georgia, or to make Georgia’s government more receptive
to Russian foreign policy and security preferences.

That these actions have been

accompanied by an escalating war of words between the two countries suggests
that the Russian Federation has a broad agenda of limiting Georgia’s capacity to
integrate with Western institutions (including NATO) and pulling Georgia back
into line. In September 2006, ostensibly in response to the arrest of alleged Russian
spies in Georgia, Russia escalated further with wider economic sanctions and travel
bans. The Russian cut off of gas supplies to Ukraine in mid-winter 2005–06 could
be construed as an effort to inﬂ uence the parliamentary electoral process in that
country, and, more broadly, to reduce popular support for the reformist coalition

50 S.N.

MacFarlane

that took power in 2004. Finally, Russia’s consistent support of the Lukashenka
government in Belarus, in the face of growing NATO and EU efforts to isolate
that government, constitutes a direct challenge to the democratizing agenda of
European institutions.

These events suggest that – to the extent that NATO and the EU are committed

to the enlargement of an integrated liberal and democratic space that includes
the non-Russian former Soviet republics – they are likely to run into increasing
difﬁ culty with Russia. These difﬁ culties are likely to grow as Russia’s self-
conﬁ dence returns.

Conclusion

The discussion of Russia, NATO and the enlargement of Europe’s democratic
space has a slightly surreal character. Russia is not committed (at least at the
moment) to the construction of a liberal democratic political order within its own
borders. It is singing from a completely different sheet, focusing on consolidation
of the political regime’s power at the centre, and the power of the centre over the
subjects of the Russian Federation and the commanding heights of its economy.
The internal focus of Russian policymakers in the early years of the Putin period
produced a retrenchment and rationalization of Russian foreign policy. However,
Russian retrenchment was incomplete, since Russia showed no sign of permitting
the deeper integration of the former Soviet area into broader European institutional
structures (through NATO membership, for example), and substantial (and growing)
capacity to resist democratic transformation in its immediate periphery.

In these circumstances, the deepening engagement of Western institutions and

states in the affairs of the non-Russian former Soviet republics raises the prospect of
growing tension in these institutions’ and states’ relations with Russia. Long-term
generational and cultural change within Russia itself may mitigate the prospect of
conﬂ ict with Western states and institutions, but the process of cultural change is
ambiguous,

hardly historically determined, and likely to be slow.

Beyond the Russian periphery, Russia was for the most part unwilling to chal-

lenge the Western agenda. This reﬂ ected Russia’s recognition of its persisting
relative weakness and of the need to focus on internal processes. However, the
partial retrenchment and regional focus in Russian foreign policy is a result of an
historically contingent understanding of Russia’s place in the international system
and in the regional balance of power. As the process of internal reconsolidation
continues and as Russia continues to beneﬁ t from windfall proﬁ ts from its energy
exports while the United States squanders its resources and prestige, and the
domestic base for America’s international activism erodes, it is reasonable to expect
a widening Russian reengagement in the international system. This possibility is
already evident in the rekindling of Russia’s diplomacy towards the Middle East
(the talks with Hamas ofﬁ cials in Moscow, the revival of the Russian–Syrian rela-
tionship, and Putin’s visit to Israel, for example), as well as Russia’s reappearance
as a player on the African scene (Putin’s visit to South Africa, as well as the role
Russia plays in respect of Sudan discussed above). Many of the positions taken by

Russia, NATO enlargement, and the strengthening of democracy 51

Russia on central problems in these regions are difﬁ cult to square with Western
preferences. In this respect, one may expect also a gradual increase in the potential
for conﬂ ict with NATO states in the broader international system.

Notes

1 For an early analysis of this point, see S. Neil MacFarlane, “Vozmozhnosti Mirovogo

Soobshchestva v Reshenii Konﬂ ikta,” Tsentral’naya Azia i Kavkaz, No. 4 (10), 2000,
pp. 161–4.

2 See Nicholas Wheeler, Saving Strangers: Humanitarian Intervention in International

Society (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000); International Commission on
Intervention and State Sovereignty, The Responsibility to Protect (Ottawa: IDRC,
2001); Jennifer Welsh, ed., Humanitarian Intervention and International Relations
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2003); S. Neil MacFarlane and Yuen Foong Khong,
The United Nations and Human Security: A Critical History (Bloomington, IN: Indiana
University Press, 2006).

3 For a useful discussion, see “West Fears Russia Veto over U.N. Sanctions for Darfur

Bloodshed,” Mosnews, 15 February 2005. Available at: http://www.mosnews.com/
news/2005/02/15/darfur.shtml [Accessed 27 October 2006].

4 For example, the US abandonment of basic principles of their own law (habeas corpus,

access to counsel and access to the courts, trial by one’s peers), and of international law
(the Geneva Conventions, the International Convention on Torture), in what the US
Administration construes as its “war on terror” – which suggests that some members
of the transatlantic community approximate the Russian understanding of international
obligation and the rule of law. For an early consideration of these issues, see S.
Neil MacFarlane, “Charter Values and the Response to Terrorism,” in Jane Boulden
and Thomas G. Weiss, eds, Terrorism and the UN Before and After September 11
(Bloomington, IN: Indiana University Press, 2004).

5 World Bank, “2005 International Comparison Program,” http://siteresources.worldbank.

org/ICPINT/Resources/ICP-report-prelim.pdf, pp. 22–24.

6 World Bank, “Russian Federation Data Proﬁ le.” Available at: http://devdata.worldbank.

org/external/CPProfile.asp?PTYPE=CP&CCODE=RUS [Accessed 20 August
2006].

7 Fraser Cameron, “Russia on the Eve of the G8 Summit,” European Policy Centre Policy

Brief (July 2006), p. 2.

8 For a useful account of this failure, M. B. Olcott, A. Aslund and S. W. Garnett,

Getting It Wrong: Regional Cooperation and the Commonwealth of Independent States
(Washington, D.C.: The Brookings Institution, 2000).

9 Alexey Pushkov, “Putin at the Helm,” in Dov Lynch, ed., What Russia Sees, Chaillot

Paper No. 74 (Paris: European Union Institute for Security Studies, 2005), p. 46.

10 This agenda is discussed in greater detail in S. Neil MacFarlane, “Is Russia an Emerging

Power?,” International Affairs, LXXXII, No. 1 (January 2006), pp. 46–7.

11 Vladimir Putin, “Speech at the Foreign Ministry” (19 January 2001). See also “The

National Security Concept of the Russian Federation” (18 January 2000), pp. 2–4.

52 S.N.

MacFarlane

Available at: http://www.fas.org/nuke/guide/russia/doctrine/gazeta012400.htm
[Accessed 20 August 2006].

12 Interview with senior ofﬁ cial of the National Security Council, September 2005.
13 Statement by CIS Member Countries on the State of Affairs in the OSCE, Moscow, 3

July 2004. Available at: http://www.mid.ru/brp_4.nsf/e78a48070f128a7b4325699900
5bcbb3/3be4758c05585a09c3256ecc00255a52?OpenDocument [Accessed 25 August
2006]. Armenia, Belarus, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Moldova, Russia, Tajikistan,
Uzbekistan and Ukraine signed. Georgia, Turkmenistan and Azerbaijan did not. The
statement was presented to the OSCE Permanent Council on 9 July 2004 by the Russian
representative.

14 For a summary account of these events, see “Uzbekistan: Willing to Act,” The World

Today, LXI, No. 8–9 (August–September 2005), pp. 28–30. See also OSCE/ODIHR,
“Preliminary Findings on the Events in Andijan, Uzbekistan, 13 May 2005” (Warsaw:
ODIHR, 20 June 2005); and Human Rights Watch, “’Bullets Were Falling Like
Rain’: The Andijan Massacre, May 13, 2005” (New York: Human Rights Watch,
2005). Available at: http://hrw.org/reports/2005/uzbekistan0605/ [Accessed 24 August
2005].

15 On this point, see Sergei Lavrov, “Interview with Newspaper Izvestia,” 17 May 2005.

Available at: http://mid.ru [Accessed 3 December 2005].

16 On these points, see Daniel Kimmage, “Central Asia: SCO – Shoring Up the Post-Soviet

Status Quo,” Central Asia Report (14 July 2005). Available at: http://www.rferl.org/
reports/centralasia/2005/07/26-140705.asp [Accessed 24 August 2006].

17 See “Dogovor o soyuznicheskikh otnosheniakh mezhdy Rossiiskoi Federatsiei i

Respublikoi Uzbekistan,” 14 November 2005, Article 4. Available at: http://www.mid.
ru/ns-rsng.nsf/6bc38aceada6e44b432569e700419ef5/432569d800221466c3256eb6003
17a9f?OpenDocument [Accessed 24 August 2005].

18 See Vladimir Socor, “Uzbekistan: Enter Russia, Exit America,” Eurasia Daily Monitor

II, Issue 215 (Washington, D.C.: The Jamestown Foundation, 17 November 2005).

19 For an account of these events and interpretation of their possible signiﬁ cance, see

Vladimir Socor, “Russian Energy Supply Cutoff to Georgia: Another Wake-Up Signal
to the West,” Eurasia Daily Monitor III, Issue 15 (Washington, D.C.: The Jamestown
Foundation, 23 January 2006).

20 See the paper in this volume by Tim Colton (chap. 2).

Enlargement and the perils of
containment

Aurel Braun

In most respects, the NATO enlargement debate seems to be over. The fear that
enlargement was going to be dangerous, premature, or, at least, irrelevant

does not

appear to have been borne out. In two enlargements, in 1999 and in 2004, NATO
has added ten new members, including the three newly independent Baltic States,
and has signiﬁ cantly expanded the “zone of democracy.” Russia has acquiesced
to these enlargements and, in fact, has joined the NATO–Russia Council which,
in turn, has promised to provide a powerful institutional consultative mechanism
and allows for senior Russian military representation at Alliance headquarters.
NATO for its part has moved to broaden its political role and greatly widened the
geographical scope of its missions, including the International Security Assistance
Force (ISAF), in Afghanistan.

In fact, the Alliance has developed an increasingly

global view.

Further, the Alliance not only remains committed to additional

enlargement, but several states, including Georgia and Ukraine (at least, many of
their leaders), are clamoring to join.

Last, Russia, with the bloody exception of

Chechnya, seems politically stable, awash in oil at a time of record world energy
prices, and is enjoying impressive economic growth. Thus, most of the pivots for
a reassuring and sustainable security architecture from Vancouver to Vladivostok
seem to be in place.

This positive picture, however, camouﬂ ages important conﬂ icting goals and

ﬁ ssures that in the long term endanger both the spread of democracy and the build-
ing of security. Russia’s grudging acquiescence to enlargement is not the same as
genuine acceptance of the Western principle of expanding the zone of democracy.
Moscow’s assumed impulse of forging deeper ties with the West and its declared
goal of building a strategic partnership with Western Europe while at the same time
relentlessly insisting on complete, unassailable sovereignty (thereby rejecting any
external involvement or criticism)

remain a contradiction that is yet to be resolved.

The new members from Eastern Europe continue to try to ﬁ nd ways to exercise
sufﬁ cient weight within the Alliance so that they can ensure the security protections
that they have long sought and seek to help enlarge the zone of democracy so that
they may have the security buffers that they believe they need. Some of the key
Western European allies, particularly France and Germany, have pursued policies
that highlight Alliance issues of identity and relevance while they have attempted
to ﬁ nd counterweights to what they viewed as excessive American power in a

56 A.

Braun

uni-polar world. Moreover, to address the latter concern, these West European
allies have, at times, turned to Russia.

Underneath the surface then, there has been a considerable amount of activity

that represents a signiﬁ cant degree of insecurity due to contradictions, ﬁ ssures, and
perceived threats. On closer scrutiny, I would suggest, what emerge are attempts
by Russia, the Eastern European members, and some key Western European allies
at complex, multiple and overlapping containments to ensure national interests
and guarantee long-term security. The various parties have tried to create an
extraordinarily intricate choreography to make these containments effective. Yet,
success depends on avoiding any major missteps and this is highly unlikely, given
the intrinsic uncertainties and most importantly, the failure to address frontally
some of the key issues of security and democratization.

Russian choreography

A decade and a half following the dissolution of the Soviet Union, it would be inap-
propriate to speak of Russia as a disoriented state, but it would not be inac cu rate to
suggest that it suffers, at least in part, from an identity crisis.

The enlargement of

NATO has hardly helped, for despite what the Russians believed was a commitment
to the contrary by the US, at the time of German uniﬁ cation, NATO has expanded
to their border (as has the EU). Though NATO is not among the top national issues,
a large percentage of the Russian population is concerned by Alliance enlargement,
and a plurality views it as a threat to Russia.

President Vladimir Putin himself also

strongly disparaged enlargement in the summer of 2005 when he contended that it
did not improve world security.

His anger at enlargement was palpable when he

sharply attacked the United States and NATO in May 2007, on the 62nd anniversary
of the defeat of Nazi Germany, and made provocative allusion to the Third Reich.

Moreover, Russia’s view of itself, in a sense, is ﬁ ltered partially through NATO
enlargement, for this is where some key threats, in its eyes, materialize, and it is in
certain ways the Alliance, led by the US, against which it measures itself.

Clearly, Russia is no longer a superpower with a global reach, but it is not an

ordinary regional power. The regions in which Russia is a power, including Europe,
East Asia, and the Middle East, are themselves profoundly important strategically.
Russia, with its vast territory, enormous natural resources, and great scientiﬁ c
talent, confronting a dramatically changed post-Cold War environment, is, not
surprisingly, driven by both grave security concerns and signiﬁ cant temptations.
Former prime minister, Yevgeny Primakov, addressed both this dilemma and a
possible resolution. He went back to a nineteenth century Russian foreign minister,
Aleksandr Gorchakov, for inspiration for rebuilding Russian power.

Following

Gorchakov’s model, Primakov concluded that Russia’s weakness is temporary, that
even when weakened Russia could pursue an active and effective foreign policy
to ensure a strong voice in international politics, that it could do this in part by
manipulating other powers and playing on various resentments, and that it could
use foreign policy successes to rebuild domestic strength, and eventually, reassert
its former international power.

Enlargement and the perils of containment 57

At ﬁ rst, President Putin appeared to strongly reject this Primakovian approach

when he declared himself committed both to democratization at home and
cooperation with the West abroad. In the past few years though, the Putin gov ern-
ment’s domestic and foreign policies have taken on a strong Primakovian tinge.

Domestically, Putin has paid lip service to democratization, but substantively,

has moved to greater political and economic centralization and restrictive judicial
practices. He appears to be persuaded that the best way to guarantee domestic
recovery is to use his own particular deﬁ nition of democracy and economic
freedom. In April 2005, he rejected Western criticism and declared that, “as a
sovereign country, Russia can and will independently determine for itself the
timeframe and the conditions of its movement [toward democracy].”

In 2007

he asserted that Western criticism of Moscow for its record on democracy was in
reality just a ploy to make Russia more pliable on international issues.

Yet, the

deﬁ nition of liberal democracies is not inﬁ nitely elastic. They are political orders
that possess a combination of constitutional freedoms, vertical accountability of
ofﬁ ce holders to the electorate, strong horizontal accountability of ofﬁ ce holders to
other centres of authority, so that no individual or group can stand above the rule
of law

and are permeated by rule-bounded uncertainty about political outcomes.

This is what characterizes the most successful liberal democracies in Eastern Europe
and distinguishes them from illiberal democracies where the rule of law is applied
capriciously at best. The latter approach is reﬂ ected in President Putin’s support
for legislation that would tighten control over some 450,000 non-governmental
organizations (NGOs), including Western human rights and environmental organi-
zations operating in Russia. He argued that all these should be within the “state’s
ﬁ eld of vision” and that the law will provide a means of preventing organizations
from being “used as a tool of foreign policy by other states.”

Thus, in a sense,

Putin was also indicating the linkage between domestic and foreign policy in his
goal of strengthening Russia domestically and safeguarding it internationally. It is
also little wonder that Transparency International has currently placed Russia at
number 121 as one of the least transparent countries in which to do business.

Internationally, the Putin government’s policies, which have increasingly

followed a Primakovian line, seem to rely on intricate maneuvers and manipulation
to contain developments or threats while Russia rebuilds its strength and regains
what it thinks should be its rightful international status. In fact, Moscow appears
to be pursuing a policy of overlapping containments that involve stopping further
NATO enlargement on Russia’s borders, weakening NATO itself, isolating or
“leapfrogging” the Eastern European members, manipulating key West European
states, and counterbalancing the United States.

First, Russia has continued to express its unhappiness about NATO enlargement,

despite reassurances from NATO Secretary General Jaap de Hoop Scheffer that
“the enlarged NATO does not have any motive or plan which would run counter
to the interests of Russia.”

Russian concerns are not just another case of imperial

nostalgia, though Putin did characterize the collapse of the Soviet system as the
“greatest geopolitical catastrophe of the century.”

Rather, Moscow has been very

protective and worried about the zone immediately on its borders, and speciﬁ cally

58 A.

Braun

about Georgia and Ukraine. In 2004, in both countries waves of democratization
brought in governments that Russia view with great suspicion. The strong push
by both Georgia and Ukraine for NATO membership

could only reinforce

Russian concerns. In the case of Ukraine, in fact, President Putin placed his own
reputation at considerable risk when he endorsed the “Kremlin candidate,” Viktor
Yanukovich, in fraudulent elections in 2004 only to see him swept aside by popular
outrage and as the favorite of the West, Viktor Yushchenko, gained the Ukrainian
Presidency.

Matters were made even worse for Moscow as NATO encouraged the forces

of democracy in Ukraine and as, at least in Russian eyes, then Polish president
Aleksander Kwasniewski played a crucial role in supporting the Orange Revolution
and in ensuring Yushchenko’s victory.

True, Ukraine is a long way from NATO

membership and Viktor Yanukovich, who later became prime minister, has been
entirely unenthusiastic about joining the Alliance. President Bush himself has
cautioned the Ukrainian leadership that the country has much to do still

before it

will gain entry into the Alliance. Nevertheless, Ukraine is eligible for membership,
and given its strategic location and huge Russian ethnic minority, it is unlikely that
Russia would forego its efforts to prevent enlargement here.

Second, Russia has tried to contain NATO by working to weaken it from within,

but it has done so in a subtle and sophisticated fashion. Western fears early on
that bringing Russia into some institutional framework within NATO will weaken
the Alliance, however, have not been borne out. Henry Kissinger’s warning that
the 1997 Founding Act that created the NATO–Russia Permanent Joint Council
(PJC) might dilute the Alliance

did not materialize. In fact, the PJC’s basic

irrelevance was evident during the Kosovo crisis,

and in 2002, it was replaced

by the NATO–Russia Council (NRC), which promised greater consultation and
reassurance.

Russia, though, has not been able to use the NRC as an effective

blocking mechanism in the Alliance on matters such as Iraq or Afghanistan, though
it has found it useful as a forum for dialogue.

Nonetheless, as a senior Russian

diplomat intimated, Moscow has tried to use the NRC as a means of creating a
“balance of power” within NATO and to be “fair” to Europe (meaning France and
Germany).

Given the ﬁ ssures in the Alliance, this would hardly enhance NATO’s

effectiveness. Further, the same diplomat also expressed satisfaction that this
partial inclusion of Russia sent a clear message to the new members, especially the
Baltic States, as to just how strong and inﬂ uential Russia remained, and that despite
the former’s full membership in the Alliance, they had no hope of outﬂ anking or
pressuring Moscow.

Third, such attempts to marginalize Eastern European NATO members have

been an ongoing project for Moscow. Part of it has been through the use of direct
pres sure on East European states via Russia’s control of energy supplies. For
example, from 1997 to 2000 alone, Russia cut off oil deliveries to Lithuania’s
key oil reﬁ nery at Mazeikiai at least nine times to pressure that government.

More recently, Russia has decided that it will build a new gas pipeline to supply
Germany and Western Europe under the Baltic Sea, thereby bypassing Lithuania
and Poland.

Enlargement and the perils of containment 59

Further, Russia has used certain political gestures to convey to the Eastern

European states its displeasure or that it did not see these states as particularly
relevant. For instance, in June 2005, President Putin pointedly did not invite the
leaders of Poland to the 750th anniversary of the founding of Kaliningrad to make
clear his anger at Warsaw for helping the democratic opposition gain power in
Ukraine. At the same event, Putin grandly feted Chancellor Gerhard Schroeder of
Germany and President Jacques Chirac of France.

As well, at the 60th anniversary

celebration in Moscow of the end of World War Two, President Putin did not
acknowledge Poland as a wartime ally, did not apologize for the 1939 Nazi–Soviet
Pact, which led to the dismemberment of Poland, or note the Stalinist repression
of Poland.

This refusal to atone for the Molotov–Ribbentrop Protocols, which

in addition to the dismemberment of Poland, led to the annexation of the Baltic
States and Moldova, sent a blunt message to the Eastern European states both about
the relative insigniﬁ cance that they held for Moscow and the domestic character
(hardline) of Putin’s government.

Moscow has also not hesitated to use direct verbal messages to try to intimidate

or isolate Eastern European Alliance members, particularly those in the northern
tier of the region. In April 2005, for example, Putin declared that “support for the
rights of compatriots abroad is a crucial goal. It cannot be subject to a diplomatic
or political bargain” and pointedly for the Baltic States emphasized that “those
who do not respect, observe or ensure human rights have no right to demand that
human rights be observed by others.”

In 2007, when Estonia moved the Red

Army monument of a Soviet soldier from downtown Tallinn, Putin immediately
raised his strong concern and his foreign minister and the Kremlin-friendly
Russian press launched furious attacks on the Baltic State.

Further, Putin did not

hesitate to heap abuse on East European leaders who, in his eyes, acted against
Russian national interests, or who tried to rally NATO support for such actions.
Following Kwasniewski’s mediation in the wake of the fraudulent November 2004
presidential elections in Ukraine, Putin suggested that the Polish leader was just
an opportunist who had in his youth worked for Soviet interests, “We in Russia
… know him from the times he was working with the Komsomol with us.”

It is

noteworthy that Putin was sending out such harsh messages to Eastern European
states just as he was making strenuous efforts at building strong ties with France
and Germany, and as important disagreements between Eastern European states on
the one hand and the two West European members on the other hand on the war
in Iraq remained unresolved. It is little wonder that the East European members of
the Alliance felt that Russia was trying to isolate them, diminish their inﬂ uence,
and divide the Alliance.

Fourth, Russian attempts to forge strong relations, especially with France and

Germany in Western Europe, though, have been driven by considerably more
than just a desire to bypass or isolate the East European members. Moscow’s
efforts seem designed to increase Russia’s weight in Europe and ultimately, to
better contain both NATO and the last remaining superpower. True, like Boris
Yeltsin, Putin has sought to bring Russia closer to the West, but he has wanted
to do this on Russia’s terms.

Given the high level of Russian energy exports to

60 A.

Braun

Western Europe and the large scale of trade,

this is an area where prospects for

exercising Russian inﬂ uence seem quite promising. Following the outbreak of the
Iraq war, questions about the security of supplies and skyrocketing energy prices,
the Russian position appears to have improved even further. In addition, as some
of the West European governments chafed under US leadership in a unipolar
world, Russia saw (and continues to see) this as a new opportunity to draw closer
to Europe on its own terms.

Putin’s government appreciated early on that it had to thread a ﬁ ne line in

dealing with Western Europe since there was a preference there for a community
approach as opposed to a national one. Yet, Moscow also understood that high
levels of dependence on energy supplies from Russia, such as in the case of
Germany and the various ambitions of key European leaders could be used to
enhance Russia’s position in Europe, possibly both against the Eastern European
states and the US. Not coincidentally, Putin greatly strengthened his political
friendship with Gerhard Schroeder and Jacques Chirac in February 2003 when the
trio met and harshly criticized the Bush administration on its policy on Iraq.

Putin

also cultivated a strong personal friendship (and signiﬁ cantly increased natural gas
shipment to Italy) with Italy’s Silvio Berlusconi, who reciprocated by defending the
Russian government’s prosecution of Yukos CEO, Mikhail Khodorkovsky on the
basis that the Russian leader was “a very good legal expert.”

Most signiﬁ cantly,

Putin was particularly careful in cultivating a friendship with Chirac. The Russian
leader sought to give the French president the maximum credit for the February
2003 joint statement on Iraq. Putin declared that this kind of agreement could only
happen in France, that historic credit should go to Chirac, and that the document
was “the ﬁ rst building block in the construction of the very same multipolar world
of which I spoke.”

Yet, despite these attempts at engagement, Russia has not been nearly as

successful as it had hoped in using its relations with key West European states to
further its goals of containment. True, there has been considerable friction between
some of the West European states and the new members in Eastern Europe. France
and Poland in particular have had poor relations, made all the more difﬁ cult
by the condescending rhetoric of the former French president

toward Poland.

Nevertheless, Russia has not been able to take full advantage of such ﬁ ssures.
For example, although France did not rush to support the Orange Revolution in
Ukraine, it did not try to impede the mission of then Polish president Kwasniewski
and of the European foreign policy chief, Javier Solana that helped mediate new
elections and enabled the victory of Viktor Yushchenko.

Russia’s relative

ineffectiveness was also evident in its quest to stop West European criticism of
its actions in Chechnya. Though, in 2005, French foreign minister Michel Barnier
softened France’s rhetoric when he spoke of a “Chechen crisis” rather than of a
“Chechen war,” as his predecessor Dominique de Villepin had, the French gov ern-
ment remained quite critical of Russia’s actions, and the French press has continued
to be relentless in condemning Russia’s actions.

Fifth, there remain serious questions as to the wisdom and viability of Russian

attempts to use West European states to contain or counterbalance the US. There

Enlargement and the perils of containment 61

is in fact a problem with any attempt by Russia to substitute Western Europe
for the US, even if the intention is just to contain the latter. At least for the near
future, Russia has to deal with the US as the sole superpower and the only entity
that has a truly global reach. As an inﬂ uential Russian analyst has argued, even
though Russia might highlight relations with Europe or China, “whether we like
it or not, our possibilities in the rest of the world are largely determined by our
relations with the United States.”

Moreover, even if Russia had been able to build

a strong Russian, French and German axis (and this was, at best, unlikely, given
the diversity of interests that each of the last two have always had), it is doubtful
that the trio would have carried sufﬁ cient international weight to counterbalance
the US. Further, the defeat of the referendum on the EU constitution in France and
the November 2005 riots in Paris and other cities have tremendously weakened the
political power and credibility of President Chirac. In addition, the election of a
strongly pro-American president, Nicolas Sarkozy, in 2007 promises to re-balance
relations between Paris and the anti-American elites and Washington.

As well, the 2005 elections in Germany resulted in the defeat of Schroeder’s

Social Democrats and brought to power a Chancellor, Angela Merkel, who places
less emphasis on relations with Paris and Moscow, and wants to improve ties with
the US. Although she leads a coalition government with the Social Democrats, and
this might limit her options, Chancellor Merkel has made it clear that she views
Europe as a partner, not a counterweight, to the US.

Therefore, at the very least,

the vaunted moteur franco-allemand, which supposedly led Europe, and which
Russia tried so hard to inﬂ uence, is, if not dead, rapidly running out of gas.

Putin, of course, has never given up on inﬂ uencing the US directly, despite his

various efforts at containment, but his success here has also been limited. There
has been productive cooperation in the ﬁ ght against terrorism between Russia and
the US, and Putin has good personal relations with George W. Bush. Even after the
friction over the American proposal for the deployment of components of an anti-
ballistic missile system (ABM) in Poland and the Czech Republic, Bush invited
the Russian leader to his family’s vacation compound in Kennebunkport, Maine
in 2007, in an attempt to warm up relations.

Despite this honour, Putin refused to

support an East European ABM deployment, instead offering a joint development
with NATO that would be deployed on the territory of the former Soviet Union

and Moscow did not reverse its decision to pull out of the Conventional Forces in
Europe (CFE) treaty (which it had made in retaliation for the American proposed
deployment.

Such personal relations moreover, have not prevented the US from pushing

strongly for the continued enlargement of the Alliance, from harshly criticizing
Russian relations with Iran,

from continuing its military actions in Iraq, or from

trying to ensure its primacy in NATO. Further, despite professions of friendship,
US discursive practices in dealing with Russia show considerable insensitivity, and
Putin’s counterattacks have not made matters better. Following the February 2005
meeting with Putin in Bratislava, President Bush was bluntly patronizing when he
demanded that “the Russian government must renew a commitment to democracy
and the rule of law.”

In June 2007 Bush, just prior to meeting Putin in Germany,

62 A.

Braun

asserted that promised Russian domestic reforms “have been derailed.”

Little

wonder that Russia has emphasized its other efforts at containment.

Eastern European attempts at containment

Russia, though, is not the only state that is trying its hand at containment. It
would be hard for any group of countries to just easily transcend several decades
of history, but given the legacy of Soviet rule and hegemony in Eastern Europe,
it would be especially difﬁ cult for the latter to overcome old fears and lingering
bitterness. Matters have not been made easier by the fact that, as noted, Russia
has not only refused to atone for Soviet misdeeds, but all too often, has failed to
even acknowledge them. Combine this with a slow and often uncertain transition
to democracy in Russia, and it is little wonder that the former communist states in
Eastern Europe have been eager to join NATO and gain its protection.

The Alliance, however, has evolved. It has increasingly emphasized its political

dimensions, it has created a larger area of ambiguity between collective defence
and collective security, and, as an organization, has stressed that it no longer views
Russia as a threat. Consequently, the Cold War idea of containment, speciﬁ cally
directed at the Soviet Union/Russia seems anachronistic, particularly in Paris and
Berlin. The latter, though, is not necessarily the view in Warsaw, Riga or Vilnius.
True, the new members of NATO have ofﬁ cially and frequently proclaimed that
they do not see Russia as a threat. Yet, even though there is not a homogeneity of
views among the ten post-Cold War members in Eastern Europe, there is persistent
concern in most quarters with certain elements of Russian behaviour or Russian
domestic political and economic developments that they ﬁ nd especially worrisome.
Moreover, as democracy is increasingly successfully consolidated in Eastern
Europe, the democratic deﬁ cit in Russia appears in a starker and more threatening
light to the former members of the Soviet bloc. Further, the absence or scarcity
of productive direct talks between Eastern European states on the one hand and
Russia on the other (due in part to Russia’s attempts to outﬂ ank the former) also
increases mistrust between seeming solitudes.

Protestations to the contrary then, Eastern European states have sought to contain

Russia and have viewed enlargement as part of this process. Until Russia changes
fundamentally in their eyes, they do not feel entirely safe. This is why the Baltic
States, for example, have attached such importance to the symbolic deployment of
a few NATO F-16 ﬁ ghter aircraft to guard their skies. Poland remains concerned
about a Russian return to imperialism or even a transmogriﬁ cation to a form
of “liberal imperialism.”

Latvia’s minister of foreign affairs, Artis Pabriks,

compared Russia to the Weimar Republic and suggested that it is a country that
suffers from an identity crisis where individual liberalism does not quite ﬁ t.

Therefore, the Eastern Europeans have sought to make certain that NATO could
help them contain the threats that might arise from Russian instability or possible
attempts by Moscow to undermine their security. Consequently, they are also
looking for collective defence rather than collective security, and in particular, they
want to have “hard security guarantees.”

Enlargement and the perils of containment 63

Eastern European states, though, have had to work hard to convince West

European states, such as France and Germany, about hard security guarantees. This
was made doubly difﬁ cult by the fact that for the Eastern Europeans only the US
can provide such hard security guarantees. In turn, this means that they have had to
push for a different vision of the transatlantic relationship within the Alliance from
that of some of the key West European players. Enlargement that brings in more
Eastern European states, then, would have among other beneﬁ ts, the strengthening
of the weight of those Alliance members who insist on hard security guarantees.

If all this, in a sense, were purely an Eastern European quest for some form of

“insurance” where containment was used subtly, and where it was presented as
temporary and precautionary, then this would probably be seen, at worst, as mar-
ginally threatening by Russia. The Eastern European states, however, have deﬁ ned
the potential dangers that they face from Russia, at times in rather confrontational
terms, and have pressed for developments that Russia has viewed as alarming.
In Poland, for example, there have been claims that the Russian secret services
have been involved in the energy sector and that Russia has used spies within oil
companies to try to damage Polish interests.

Latvian leaders have spoken darkly

about Russians coming in by bus and rail with “large suitcases.”

Eastern European states, moreover, have added new dimensions to contain ment,

just as they have pushed for an Easternization of NATO’s security policy

(some-

thing they assume will give them a greater say in the Alliance), and have offered
military bases to the US at a time when the Americans are drawing down their
forces in Western Europe.

Some of these states have pushed for a buffer zone.

The Poles, for instance, have made it clear that they do not wish to be squeezed
between Russia and Germany, and that a Ukraine in NATO would essentially
provide an important buffer.

Not surprisingly, Poland in particular, has pressed

very hard for the quick integration of Ukraine into NATO and the EU. Despite the
fact that there is a widespread consensus in the Alliance (and the EU) that Ukraine
is a considerable way from fulﬁ lling entrance requirements, in August 2005,
Kwasniewski declared that Ukraine was ready and that he believed that it would
be “soon in our common European home, in the EU and in NATO.”

Further, he

did not mince words in warning Russia that it must not ignore individual countries
or try to isolate them in Europe.

The new president of Poland, Lech Kaczynski,

has similarly indicated that he intends to take a tough line with Russia.

In July

2007 he also reached an agreement with President Bush on the placement of part
of the US missile defense system in Poland.

At the same time, Defense Minister

Aleksander Szczyglo labelled Russia “unpredictable.”

Poland, in particular, seems to be deeply inﬂ uenced by former US national

security adviser, Zbigniew Brzezinski’s arguments that Russia suffers from imperial
nostalgia, that it has alienated all its neighbours, and that the independence of
Ukraine is essential in preventing Russia from becoming an empire.

Brzezinski’s

approach to Russia though dangerously combines contempt and fear. An enlarge-
ment of NATO to the Ukraine, Georgia, or eventually to Belarus that is guided by
such views would build walls and buffer zones that would segregate Russia.

Such a “segregating” approach is both risky and counter-productive. First,

64 A.

Braun

although Ukraine, for instance, may have good reasons why it would wish to
join NATO, it is highly unlikely that they would want to become a buffer zone
for Poland or any East European NATO members. Second, by looking at further
NATO enlargement as an opportunity for the creation of buffer zones against an
“irredeemable” Russia, one that could not possibly become democratic, and then
incorporating this into a policy has, ironically, the element of a self-fulﬁ lling
prophecy. By isolating and making more insecure a troubled Russia, it could
encourage the nationalistic, xenophobic, and anti-democratic forces in that state,
leading to the creation of precisely the kind of political order that the new NATO
members fear. It is an approach that is tone-deaf to the possibilities of democratic
developments in Russia and of integrating it into larger security architecture that
could bring together democratic states from Vancouver to Vladivostok. Over the
long term too strong a focus on Russia and relentless emphasis on a Russian threat
could also encourage nationalist and populist forces in Eastern Europe and damage
their democracies.

If the Eastern European attempt at containment then is more

than just a short-term tactic (and even then there are risks), it poses a danger that in
turn could defeat the strategy of building sustainable security. NATO enlargement
eastward in that case will certainly not deliver the security beneﬁ ts that the ten new
members have hoped to attain.

West European maneuvers

West European states such as France and Germany, as noted, have differed sig niﬁ -
cantly in their perception of Russia from their fellow NATO members beyond the
Oder River. For Paris and Berlin, Russia is a state to be engaged rather than deterred
and the Cold War containment is part of the rapidly receding past. European
politicians such as Friedbert Pﬂ uger, Foreign Policy Spokesman for the CDU/CSU
Parliamentary Group in Germany, have also tried to make it very clear that NATO
enlargement is not a threat to Russia.

French ofﬁ cials, in particular, have worked

hard to be sensitive to Russian concerns about enlargement, and though they have
suggested that Moscow has to accept the growth of the Alliance to Eastern Europe
and the Baltic States, they have also insisted that the new members must learn to
live with and accept the reality of Russia.

They have also suggested a careful

approach to Russia, stating for instance that, as a key player, Russia must be treated
differently from smaller states such as Romania.

For such West European states, the expansion of NATO was and remains part

of a goal of enlarging the zone of democracy and of responding positively to the
very strong and persistent requests of the Eastern European states to join. There
were even suspicions in some quarters in the earlier post-Cold War enlargement
that Alliance membership was offered as a compensation for withholding the more
difﬁ cult and expensive EU membership.

West European states, such as France,

therefore, emphasized early on that NATO enlargement was not meant to separate
Russia from Europe, and that they rejected the notion that Europe stopped at the
borders of Russia.

They strongly emphasized that a Europe without Russia was

not a genuine Europe – France even set up a joint France–Russia Council.

Enlargement and the perils of containment 65

Nonetheless, it would be a mistake to overstate West European inclusiveness.

True, there are limits to how far Russia itself would like to integrate into European
institutions. Though Vladimir Putin has emphasized the European nature of Russia
and the powerful links to European culture and history,

he has been coy, at best,

about the possibility of joining NATO. Russian ofﬁ cials, in fact, have indicated
that they do not envision Russian membership in NATO in the near future.

For

their part though, the West European states such as France and Germany that have
pushed most enthusiastically for stronger relations with Russia have not suggested
even the possibility of NATO membership for it, in the future.

French ofﬁ cials and diplomats may have spoken so readily about the European-

ness, the great importance of Russia and have pressed for negotiations on the
“four Common Spaces,” but they do not seem any more eager to integrate Russia
into the Alliance than their new Eastern European NATO partners. The French
Ambassador to NATO, for instance, has contended that Russia’s natural place is
in the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS).

Other French ofﬁ cials have

also expressed the view that they could not envision Russia in NATO, as this
would make the Alliance a very different kind of organization.

Further, German

ofﬁ cials have been no more keen about any possibility of Russian membership.

Thus, although these West European allies reject Eastern European notions of
containing Russia as anachronistic, the former still appear intent on keeping
Russia substantively separate from the most important military (and economic)
organizations on the continent. Since Germany and France seem in favour of
limiting NATO enlargement to Russia’s borders, this raises questions as to just
what role they see for Moscow in terms of a broader regional and international
security strategy.

Still, it is fairly clear that West European states such as France and Germany,

have been disconcerted by the extent of US dominance in the post Cold War
period and by the clumsy way in which the current Bush administration has used
America’s overwhelming power. Further, these European countries have also
been irritated by the new NATO members’ insistence on hard security guarantees
and strong ties to the US. Faced with a unipolar world, France and Germany very
much want to move to multipolarity.

They and others in Western Europe have

been unhappy about what they see as a diminished ability to inﬂ uence American
behaviour in international relations. Among the key beneﬁ ts that West European
states had received from NATO in its ﬁ rst four decades was an ability to “socialize”
the US to the European way of thinking

and to develop dense shared experiences

that aided Alliance cohesion.

As the Bush administration was moving toward military action in Iraq, though

it became quite evident that West European states such as France and Germany
had little inﬂ uence on the US. Chirac and Schroeder looked for counterweights.
For Chirac especially, Russia seemed to provide opportunities for containing the
US. The problem was that both Chirac and Putin had an exaggerated sense of what
could be achieved jointly. It is as if they concluded that in combining the myths
of France’s grandeur and Russia’s indispensability, they could create a reality of
global power that would be an effective counterweight to America. Cultivating

66 A.

Braun

Russia, however, did not achieve this goal, nor did it have the side beneﬁ t of
keeping the Eastern European members “in their place.” On the contrary, it may
have raised unattainable Russian expectations, further alarmed the new Eastern
European members (who were also annoyed by Chirac’s contemptuous directive
to Poland to keep silent) and irritated the US.

Further, in engaging Russia in terms of building counterweights, France and

Germany sought to have the best of all worlds. They would remain free to criticize
Russian domestic policies; keep Russia out of full membership in the key military
and economic organizations in Europe, as noted; remain committed to further
enlargements of NATO; and yet hope to basically have Russia “on call” to support
French and German policy initiatives. It is noteworthy that even formal institutional
links such as the France–Russia Council have been more about atmospherics than
substance.

In important ways, Western European states have been taking Russia

for granted under the belief that Moscow, faced with growing Chinese power, had
little choice anyway but to turn to Europe.

It would not be surprising then, if

sooner or later the Russians begin to ask some hard questions as to just how much
beneﬁ t they are really getting out of such a relationship, as well as query certain
West European intentions and expectations.

Conclusion

It is not uncommon of course, in international relations, to witness multiple quests
for power, intensive manipulation, or the pursuit of seemingly contradictory
policies. It is also possible that even in very difﬁ cult circumstances, countries
and international organizations will somehow muddle through. Further, it should
be recognized that NATO enlargement did not necessarily create the problems
that members, aspirants, and Russia face, but rather, highlighted and ampliﬁ ed
them. Yet, the attempts at a solution through the creation of intricate, multiple,
overlapping containments are too complex, overly ambitious, and too dependent
on an extraordinarily elaborate choreography that neither realpolitik nor discursive
practices suggest will succeed.

Russia buoyed by its success as an oil/gas-based economy and needed partner

in the ﬁ ght against terrorism, risks over-reaching. Its short-term gains domestically
and in international relations may extract a heavy long-term price. It is unlikely
to realize the Primakovian fantasies of containing, manipulating, and isolating
smaller neighbours and susceptible larger states (or organizations) while it rebuilds
domestic strength and moves to regain global power. Russian/Soviet history
shows that there is no long-term substitute for building democracy, a viable
market system, balanced economic growth and integrating into the community of
democratic states. In the case of the Eastern European states, they are not likely
to succeed in building walls, segregating Russia, and constructing buffer zones.
They will also need to recognize the irony of self-fulﬁ lling prophecies and how
their actions can damage the prospects for stability and democracy in Russia. For
certain key West European states, they need to come to the realization that they
may well be better off by working on an equitable and sustainable partnership with

Enlargement and the perils of containment 67

Washington rather than cynically seeking to use Russia to create a counterweight to
the US to contain it. These West European states would also help both the Alliance
and the prospects for a wider security architecture if they treated the new members
with greater sensitivity and more reassurance.

The above, however, would require considerably greater patience, sensitivity

and modesty from all parties. It would involve recognizing not only the risks but
also the opportunities created by enlargement and accepting that seemingly clever
solutions do not change reality. Failure would not just involve certain opportunity
costs. It could lead to segregation, suspicion and hostility, a further stiﬂ ing of
the movement to democracy, and the creation of insurmountable obstacles to the
building of what should be possible – a stable Vancouver to Vladivostok security
architecture.

Notes

1 Michael Mandelbaum, “Preserving the New Peace: The Case Against NATO Expansion,”

Foreign Affairs, Vol. 74, No. 3, May–June 1995, p. 9.

2 Mark Joyce, “Taking the Transformation Agenda Forward,” NATO Review, Spring

2005, http://www.nato.int/docu/review/2005/issue1/english/art5_pr.html

3 Ivo Daalder and James Goldgeier, “Global NATO,” Foreign Affairs, September–

October 2006, http://www.foreignaffairs.org/20060901faessay85509/ivo-daalder-
james-goldgeier/global-nato.html.

4 Yuliya Tymoshenko, “Containing Russia,” Foreign Affairs, May–June 2007, http://

www.foreignaffairs.org/20070501faessay86307/yuliya-tymoshenko/containing-russia.
html.

5 Dov Lynch, “Russia’s Strategic Partnership with Europe,” The Washington Quarterly,

Vol. 27, No. 2, Spring 2004, p. 100.

6 S. Neil MacFarlane, “NATO in Russia’s Relations with the West,” Security Dialogue,

Vol. 32, No. 3, September 2001, pp. 281–96.

7 A survey by the All-Russia Center for the Study of Public Opinion found that a plurality

of 44% of the respondents perceived enlargement as a threat to Russia. Jeremy Page,
“Expanded NATO Turns Cold War into Cold Peace,” The Times (UK), 13 April 2004;
RFE/RL, Newsline 8:63. Part I, 5 April 2004.

8 Boston Globe, “Putin Questions NATO Enlargement,” 7 May 2005.
9 Andrew E. Kramer, “Putin Is Said to Compare U.S. Policies to Third Reich,” New York

Times, 10 May 2007, http://www.nytimes.com/2007/05/10/world/europe/10russia.
html.

10 Yevgeny Primakov, “Russia in World Politics: A Lecture in Honor of Chancellor

Gorchakov,” International Affairs (Moscow) 44, No. 3, 1998, pp. 7–13.

11 Ibid., pp. 10–12.
12 C. J. Chivers, “Russia Will Pursue Democracy, but in Its Own Way, Putin Says,” New

York Times, 26 April 2005.

13 Steven Lee Myers, “From Moscow, a New Chill,” New York Times, 27 May 2007, http://

www.nytimes.com/2007/05/27/weekinreview/27myers.html.

68 A.

Braun

14 Adam Przeworski, “Problems in the Study of Transition to Democracy,” in Guillermo

O’Donnell, ed., et al., Transitions from Authoritarian Rule: Prospects for Democracy
(Baltimore and London: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1986) pp. 50–1.

15 Ibid.
16 Steven Lee Myers, “Putin Defends Russia’s Right to Regulate Private Groups,” New

York Times, 24 November 2005.

17 Matthew Chance, “Eye on Russia: Russia’s Resurgence,” CNN, 29 June 2007, http://

www.cnn.com/2007/WORLD/europe/06/18/chance.intro/index.html.

18 Jeremy Bransten, “NATO: Secretary-General in Moscow as Two Sides Work Out Evolving

Relationship,” RFE/RL, 8 April 2004, http://www.rferl.org/featuresarticleprint/2004/04/
d7068b60-39fc-4a20-b2d3-d743f07ed6a7.html.

19 Chivers, Supra, note 12.
20 RFE/RL, “Ukrainian President Reafﬁ rms Euro-Atlantic Aspirations,” 20 October 2005,

http://www.rferl.org/newsline/2005/10/201005.asp; RFE/RL, “Georgia Speaker Upbeat
on Chances of Joining NATO,” 14 April 2005, http://www.rferl.org/features/features_
Article.aspx?m=04&y=2005&id=2CE0A2BF-A54E-4578-8B66-A88909729C76.

21 Robert Parsons, “Russia–Poland: Assaults Add New Sour Note to Rivalry,” RFE/

RL, 12 August 2005, http://www.rferl.org/features/features_Article.aspx?m=08&y
=2005&id=AEC0C4B0-A11B-4C52-AF35-40342813EF45.

22 Andrew Tully, “Yushchenko, Bush Proclaim Shared Values in Talks,” RFE/RL, 4 April

2005, http://www.rferl.org/featuresarticleprint/2005/04/4f5fb885-88ae-469b-a2be-
4d94b6c9004c.html.

23  New York Times, 5 July 1997.
24  MacFarlane, Supra, note 6.
25  NATO Fact Sheets, “NATO–Russia Relations,” 11 June 2002, Declaration by Heads of

State and Government of NATO Member States and the Russian Federation, “NATO-
Russia Relations: A New Quality,” 28 May 2002, http://www.nato.int/docu/basictxt/
b020528e.htm.

26 Ahto Lobjakas, “NATO–Russia: Past Rifts Resurface as Both Sides Struggle to Build

Ties,” RFE/RL, 29 June 2004, http://www.rferl.org/featuresarticleprint/2004/06/
dc713d58-aaf2-4632-9df4-90252ce7d8d0.html.

27 Personal interview with Victor Kochukov, Senior Counselor, Embassy of Russia,

Brussels, Belgium, 30 December 2004.

28 Ibid.
29 Keith Smith, Russian Energy Politics in the Baltics, Poland and Ukraine: A New Stealth

Imperialism (Washington, D.C.: CSIS, December 2004), pp. 41–2.

30 Richard Bernstein, “After Centuries of Enmity, Relations Between Poland and Russia

Are as Bad as Ever,” New York Times, 3 July 2005.

31  Ibid.
32  Ibid.
33  Pavel Felgenhauer, “Russia Still Has Not Atoned,” Moscow Times, 3 August 2004.
34  RFE/RL Newsline, “Russia,” 25 April 2005, http://www.rferl.org/newsline/2005/

04/250405.asp.

35 Reuters, “Clashes over Red Army monument continue in Estonia,” International Herald

Tribune, 28 April 2007, http://www.iht.com/articles/2007/04/28/europe/web0428-

Enlargement and the perils of containment 69

estonia-41376.php; Associated Press, “Estonians Lay Flowers at WWII Monument,”
The Washington Post, 8 May 2007, http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/
article/2007/05/08/AR2007050800288.htmlhttp://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/
content/article/2007/05/08/AR2007050800288.html.

36 Chivers, Supra, note 12.
37 Personal interview with Dr Jerzy Nowak, Ambassador of Poland to NATO, Brussels,

Belgium, 16 December 2004.

38 Robert Legvold, “Russian Foreign Policy Ten Years After the Fall,” Congressional

Program, Aspen Institute, Vol. 16, No. 4, August 2001, pp. 7–8.

39 Lynch, Supra, note 5, p. 101.
40 Pravda, “Referendum in France to Aggravate Russia’s Relations with EU,” 31 May

2005, http://english.pravda.ru/russia/politics/31-05-2005/8337-europe-0.

41 Ibid.
42 Iraq Watch, “Interview with Vladimir Putin,” 11 February 2003, http://www.iraqwatch.

org/government/Russia/russia-mfa-putin-021103.htm.

43 Nowak, Supra, note 37; personal interview with SE Benoit d’Aboville, Ambassador of

France to NATO, Brussels, Belgium, 16 December 2004.

44 Gateway to Russia, “’Evident” Crisis in EU–Russia Relations,” 22 July 2005, http://

www.gateway2russia.com/st/art_275177.php.

45 Ibid.
46 Viktor Kuvaldin, “Does Growing Anti-Americanism in Russia Pose a More Serious

Threat to the U.S. or to Us?” Nezavisimaya gazeta, 12 May 2001.

47 Associated Press, “Economy Big Challenge for Germany’s New Leader,” USA Today,

22 November 2005, http://www.usatoday.com/news/world/2005-11-22-german-
chancellor_x.htm.

48 Heather Maher, “U.S.–Russia: Hopes High, Expectations Low For Bush–Putin

Summit,” RFE/RL, 29 June 2007, http://www.rferl.org/features/features_Article.
aspx?m=06&y=2007&id=1F7002CB-A961-4BAE-BB9E-1DA689F4F663.

49 Jim Rutenberg, “Putin Expands on His Missile Defense Plan,” New York Times, 3 July

2007, http://nytimes.com/2007/07/03/us/03putin.html.

50 Reuters, “Russia Says Has Not ‘Slammed the Door’ on Arms Pact,” New York Times,

20 July 2007, http://www.nytimes.com/reuters/world/international-russia-nato-cfe

51 New York Times, “Bush Warms to Putin Plan on Iran,” 18 November 2005.
52 RFE/RL, Features, “Russia–U.S.: With Bush–Putin Summit Over, Reaction Mixed Over

What Was Achieved,” 25 February 2005, http://www.rferl.org/features/features_Article.
aspx?m=02&y=2005&id=414E34DD-E8E2-48AC-B3D0-B12B32FE2FD8.

53 Sheryl Gay Stolberg, “Chastising Putin, Bush Says Russia Derails Reform,” New

York Times, 6 June 2007, http://www.nytimes.com/2007/06/06/world/europe/06prexy.
html.

54 Nowak, Supra, note 37.
55 Personal interview with Artis Pabriks, Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of

Latvia, Riga, Latvia, 1 August 2005.

56 Daniel Braun, NATO Enlargement and the Politics of Identity, 2007 (Martello Paper

#31, Kingston, ON: Queen’s Centre for International Relations) pp. 43–9.

57 Nowak, Supra, note 37.

70 A.

Braun

58 Artis Pabriks, Supra, note 55.
59 Don Hill, “Europe: Scholar Says Europe’s Security Policy Becoming ‘Easternized’,”

RFE/RL, 15 November 2004, http://www.rferl.org/featuresarticleprint/2004/11/800e4
609-c37c-4524-8297-5eb8ad5dd438.html.

60 RFE/RL, “Romania Says Agreement Near on U.S. Military Base,” 24 October 2005,

http://www.rferl.org/features/features_Article.aspx?m=02&y=2005&id=414E34DD-
E8E2-48AC-B3D0-B12B32FE2FD8.

61 Nowak, Supra, note 37.
62 Aleksander Kwasniewski, Keynote Address, “Europe – Our Common Home,” Opening

Ceremony of the VII ICEES World Congress, 25 July 2005.

63 Ibid.
64 Judy Dempsey, “Warsaw Mayor Is Poised to Win Runoff in Poland,” New York Times,

24 October 2005, http://www.nytimes.com/2005/10/24/international/europe/24poland.
html; Judy Dempsey, “Kaczynski is Elected Presidentin Poland,” International Herald
Tribune, 24 October 2004, http://www.iht.com/articles/2005/10/23/news/poland.php.

65 Kommersant (Moscow), “U.S. Base Construction in Poland to Begin on Eve of Russian

Elections,” 19 July 2007, http://www.kommersant.com/p783639/missile_defense/.

66 Ibid.
67 RFE/RL Features, “U.S.–Russia: Zbigniew Brzezinski Assesses U.S.–Russia Relations,”

11 May 2005, http://www.rferl.org/features/features_Article.aspx?m=05&y=
2005&id=B62307E1-832C-4FBC-AB91-BA8FA7A0EB24.

68 Stephen Larrabee, “Danger and Opportunity in Eastern Europe,” Foreign Affairs,

November–December 2006, http://www.foreignaffairs.org/20061101faessay85610/f-
stephen-larrabee/danger-and-opportunity-in-eastern-europe.html.

69 Friedberg Pﬂ uger, Address, “Europe – Our Common Home,” Opening Ceremony of

the VII ICEES World Congress, 25 July 2005.

70 Personal interview with Bertrand Besancenot, Diplomatic Councillor, Ministry of

Defense of France, Paris, France, 5 August 2005.

71 Personal interview with Evelyn Mathey, Associate Director of NATO Bureau for

Europe and the Atlantic Alliance, Ministry of Defense of France, Paris, France, 9 August
2005.

72 Michael Mandelbaum, The Case for Goliath: How America Acts as the World’s

Government in the Twenty-first Century (New York: Public Affairs, 2005)
pp. 203–12.

73  Personal communication with Thomas Gomart, Paris, France, 9 August 2005.
74  Ibid.
75  Lynch, Supra, note 5, p. 99.
76  Kochukov, Supra, note 27.
77  Benoit d’Aboville, Supra, note 43.
78  Besancenot, Supra, note 70; personal interview with Serge Smessow, Assistant Director

for Continental Europe, Ministry of Foreign Affairs of France, Paris, France, 8 August
2005.

79 Personal interview with Dr Rudiger Reyels, Ambassador of Germany to NATO,

Brussels, Belgium, 15 December 2004.

80 Smesnow, Supra, note 78.

NATO beyond Russia

Stanley R. Sloan

The impact of enlargement and transformation

As a result of NATO’s post-Cold War enlargement and the evolving transformation
of the missions and methods of the Alliance, NATO could be said to have moved
beyond Russia. Russia is no longer the primary security concern for the Alliance,
even though Russia’s evolution remains an important variable in Europe’s future.
This process of change began in the early 1990s as the NATO allies reacted to
the emerging reality that the Soviet Union and the Warsaw Pact no longer existed
as threats to their security. The process moved an important step down the road
during the debate on the ﬁ rst phase of NATO enlargement. That debate foreshad-
owed some of the challenges facing the Alliance today as controversy continues
about whether or not NATO’s enlargement and the simultaneous expansion of its
responsibilities have ensured or threatened its future.

This analysis begins by recalling brieﬂ y some of the arguments put forward

in the 1998 US Senate debate concerning the impact of enlargement on NATO’s
relations with Russia and on the ability of the Alliance to take decisions that
respond to the security requirements of its members. This leads to an assessment of
the current health of and future outlook for the Alliance, as it moves beyond Russia,
and even Europe, on the way to becoming an alliance with global missions.

The bottom line in analysis of the NATO–Russia relationship is that enlarge-

ment has troubled but not destroyed a cooperative relationship between the
Alliance and Russia – it did not lead to a “new Cold War.” Political developments
in Russia – with no connection to NATO’s enlargement process – have turned out
to be far more important to the relationship than the addition of former Warsaw
Pact allies and the Baltic Republics to the Alliance.

Russia’s future nonetheless remains critically important to the NATO allies.

Neither the United States nor any European ally wishes to see Russia re-emerge as
a challenge to Europe’s peace and stability. NATO policies therefore have for the
most part been designed to invite Russia’s constructive involvement in European
and global security affairs while at the same time critiquing Moscow’s recent
tendencies to reverse the process of democratization and liberalization that began
after the Soviet Union was dissolved.

Moreover, this essay argues that NATO has not been brought down by the

process of enlargement and can still function as a framework for coordinating

NATO beyond Russia 73

responses to the security needs of its members. This will remain true as long as
the allies – individually and collectively, and most importantly the United States –
continue to believe that such cooperation is in their interest. The biggest challenge
to the Alliance, therefore, is not Russia, nor even terrorism, Iraq, Iran or the Middle
East more generally, but rather that of maintaining sufﬁ cient transatlantic cohesion
to deal with these and other issues most effectively.

The enlargement step

In September 1995, after several years of telling East European aspirants to NATO
membership that they should be “patient,” the allies released the Study on NATO
Enlargement which explained why enlargement was warranted.

It also drew out a

road map for countries seeking membership to follow on their way to the open door.
The report said that enlargement would support NATO’s broader goal of enhancing
security and extending stability throughout the Euro-Atlantic area. It would support
the process of democratization and establishment of market economic systems in
candidate countries. The allies asserted that enlargement would threaten no one,
because NATO would remain a defensive alliance whose fundamental purpose is
to preserve peace and provide security to its members.

With regard to the “how” of enlargement, the allies established a framework

of principles to follow, including: new members should assume all the rights and
respon sibilities of current members, and accept the policies and procedures in
effect at the time of their entry; no country should enter with the goal of closing
the door behind it, using its vote as a member to block other candidates; countries
should resolve ethnic disputes or external territorial disputes before joining NATO;
candidates should be able to contribute to the missions of the Alliance; and no
country outside the Alliance – Russia, for example – would have the right to
interfere with the process. The allies, at a summit meeting in Madrid in July 1997,
invited the Czech Republic, Hungary and Poland to join the Alliance.

The US Senate debate on NATO’s future

As the Clinton administration began preparing to shepherd the resolution of rati ﬁ -
cation through the US Senate, it faced the challenge of holding together a coalition
of Senate supporters and potential supporters who were motivated by substantially
different assumptions and objectives.

Supporters ranged from conservative

Republicans to liberal Democrats. The arguments raised by both supporters and
opponents identiﬁ ed the most critical issues ahead of the Alliance.

Senator Helms and a few other conservative Republican Senators saw NATO

enlargement ﬁ rst and foremost as an insurance policy against a resurgent Russia
laying claim once again to the sovereignty of central and eastern European
states. Senator Helms was particularly interested in how the administration saw
the future of NATO–Russia relations. In the process of introducing Secretary of
State Madeleine Albright at the committee’s opening enlargement hearing, Helms
cautioned “… NATO’s relations with Russia must be restrained by the reality that

74 S.R.

Sloan

Russia’s future commitment to peace and democracy, as of this date, is far from
certain. In fact, I confess a fear that the United States’ overture toward Russia may
have already gone a bit far.”

In addition, many Senators had not signed off on “the new NATO” (in which

members cooperated to deal with new security challenges, including peace opera-
tions in the Balkans) and believed that the “old NATO” (focused primarily on
Article 5, the commitment to assist a fellow member that has come under attack)
was what was still needed. On the other hand, some Senators found the “old
NATO” to be of decreasing relevance, and were more interested in the idea of
expanding the number of democratic states that could help deal with new security
challenges in and beyond Europe.

The Senate opponents of enlargement were also all over the map politically

and philosophically. Senator John Warner (R – Virginia) became one of the most
severe critics of enlargement. He believed that too many members would make the
Alliance impossible to manage and would doom it to future irrelevance because
it would be unable to make timely consensual decision with 19-plus members (an
argument that some analysts now say was on target

The most strongly committed enlargement opponent, Senator John Ashcroft

(R – Missouri), simply believed that the United States was already overburdened
and that NATO enlargement would perpetuate a responsibility that had long ago
outlived its utility. Among the opponents, Ashcroft’s position came closest to
representing a neo-isolationist perspective.

The other main school of thought motivating opponents of enlargement was

concern about the impact on relations with Russia. George Kennan, the highly
respected Russia expert who played a major role in developing the US containment
strategy toward the Soviet Union, had opined

that NATO enlargement would be

a disaster for US–Russian relations, and some members, including Senators Paul
Wellstone (D – Minnesota) and Patrick Leahy (D – Vermont) cast their votes
against enlargement largely based on Kennan’s warning.

In the end, the politically-diverse coalition of enlargement supporters rode to an

80 to 19 victory in the Senate, giving the Senate’s advice and consent to ratiﬁ cation
of the protocol to the North Atlantic Treaty that would bring the Czech Republic,
Hungary and Poland into the Alliance.

NATO’s evolving relationship with Russia

When the Soviet Union imploded at the end of the Cold War, the United States
and its European allies concluded that even though this founding threat was also
disappearing, the cooperation that had developed over the years was not only
based on solid common values and interests, but also had continuing utility in a
post-Soviet world.

Nevertheless, Russia remained a major factor in allied calculations. In spite of

Russia’s devastated economy and military forces, so weakened as to be incapable
of putting down rebellion in the former Soviet Republic of Chechnya, Russia
remained a world-class nuclear power with a natural resource base that could serve

NATO beyond Russia 75

as the foundation for future economic growth and renewed strategic signiﬁ cance.
The development of a liberal democratic system in Russia would constitute a
dramatic gain for international peace and stability. An autocratic, deprived and
dissatisﬁ ed Russia would constitute a major source of instability for the indeﬁ nite
future. As a consequence, the transatlantic allies moved carefully throughout the
1990s trying to assess how steps that they were taking to adapt their alliance would
affect and be affected by Russia.

NATO reached out to Russia as it moved toward including the Soviet Union’s

former Central and East European “allies” in the Western security system. Russia
was offered participation in NATO’s partnership program. Then, in the context
of the ﬁ rst round of NATO enlargement, was given a special relationship to
the Alliance with the negotiation of “The Founding Act on Mutual Relations,
Cooperation and Security between NATO and the Russia Federation,” establishing
a Permanent Joint Council (PJC) – NATO nations plus Russia – as a framework
for continuing consultations.

Russia’s acceptance of the PJC was always grudging. Russian leaders wanted

something more – something that would more directly acknowledge Russia’s
importance in European security. The NATO countries, on the other hand, did not
want to give Russia a direct say in NATO deliberations and certainly not a veto
over NATO actions – a concern directly expressed by American conservatives
during the 1990s debate on NATO enlargement.

However, Vladimir Putin has, over time, led Russia toward a pragmatic and

even constructive relationship with NATO. The most important stimulus was
provided by the September 11 terrorist attacks and Putin’s offer of assistance in
the US-declared war against terrorism. Putin’s position clearly helped strengthen
his relationship with President Bush, and facilitated work toward agreements on
dramatic cuts in strategic nuclear weapons arsenals and possible agreements on
missile defenses. Putin also hinted at new Russian perspectives on its relationship
to NATO and Russia’s attitude toward NATO enlargement.

In November 2001, it was Bush’s political ally, Prime Minister Tony Blair,

who started the ball rolling toward a new Russia–NATO relationship by proposing
creation of an updated forum for Russia–NATO cooperation. Blair, in a letter to
NATO Secretary General George Robertson, suggested creation of a “Russia–
North Atlantic Council” which would take decisions by consensus on certain
issues affecting both NATO and Russia including, for example, terrorism, arms
proliferation and peacekeeping. According to press reports, British officials
suggested privately that post-9/11 events could lead to a new world order, ending
old enmities and building new bridges. “The prime minister believes the fact that
the world is such a different place since September 11 does give us opportunities
as well as threats,” one ofﬁ cial said.

Apparently with the blessing of the Bush administration, Secretary General

Robertson put the idea forward during an ofﬁ cial visit to Moscow. Headlines
shouted “Russia Could Get Veto Power in New NATO.”

Russian conservatives

worried that Putin was about to give away the store, while other Russian analysts
speculated that the move would give Russia associate membership in the Alliance.

76 S.R.

Sloan

American conservatives remained concerned that the move might end NATO’s
useful existence. Polish observers fretted that this might be the ﬁ rst step toward
Russian membership in NATO. French observers wondered if events were moving
too fast for rational consideration of their consequences.

Two former officials responsible for Clinton NATO enlargement policy,

Jeremy D. Rosner and Ronald D. Asmus, argued for simply revitalizing current
NATO–Russia relations: “Mr Putin has complained that the existing NATO–
Russia relationship is moribund. He is right. But the reason why it is moribund is
that Russia walked away from the table in protest over NATO’s air campaign in
Kosovo and has since pursued an obstructionist policy. That fact alone should give
us pause. There is nothing wrong with the NATO–Russia Permanent Joint Council
that a dose of good will and hard work could not ﬁ x.”

On 6 December 2001, in spite of such arguments, the allies agreed to establish

a new NATO–Russia council to identify and pursue opportunities for joint action
between Russia and the NATO allies. The ministers made it clear that the new
council would not give Russia a veto over NATO decisions.

Agreement on the new arrangements was conﬁ rmed at a NATO–Russia summit

outside Rome, Italy on 28 May 2002. The Permanent Joint Council was replaced
by a new Russia–NATO Council. The new council was intended to meet more
regularly, and to make decisions on some subjects. However, the regular agenda of
the North Atlantic Council would not be shifted to the new framework. The NAC
would decide when issues should be submitted to decision by the NATO–Russia
Council and when they should be kept within usual NATO decision-making
channels. Unlike the PJC, however, the allies would not bring “pre-cooked”
NATO positions to the table with Russia. If the new council became deadlocked
on an issue because of Russian disagreement, this would not bloc the NATO
members from acting in the NAC without Russian agreement or participation.
Lord Robertson argued that the real differences between the former arrangement
and the new forum was a matter of “chemistry rather than arithmetic, as even the
best format and seating arrangements can be no substitute for genuine political will
and open mind on both sides.”

In spite of the new consultative arrangements, resentment of NATO’s enlarge-

ment to include the three former Soviet republics of Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania
persisted in some Russian quarters. In March 2004, Russia’s lower house of
parliament adopted a resolution denouncing NATO enlargement and the deployment
of four Belgian F-16 ﬁ ghter jets to a Lithuanian air base to patrol the air space of
the new Baltic members of NATO. This, however, did not stop President Putin
just one week later from signing agreements with NATO Secretary General Jaap
de Hoop Scheffer establishing Russian military liaison ofﬁ ces at NATO’s top
military headquarters.

Just as creation of the Permanent Joint Council with Russia accompanied and

facilitated the ﬁ rst round of NATO enlargement, development of the new NATO–
Russia Council paralleled implementation of NATO’s most recent enlargement
round. The step did not presage imminent Russian membership in the Alliance.
Militarily, Russia obviously could make major contributions to the Alliance.

NATO beyond Russia 77

However, Russia’s size and importance suggested that geopolitical factors would
play a large role in deciding when Russia might be acceptable as a member.

Politically, Russia remains a long way from meeting the guidelines for mem-

bership laid out in NATO’s 1995 Study on Enlargement. Russia falls far short
particularly in terms of the internal development of liberal democratic institutions,
including a free press and a Western-style human rights regime. If Russia some day
meets these guidelines, there truly will be a “new world order” and Russia should
then be considered a legitimate candidate for membership. Recent developments,
however, have not been encouraging. President Putin has increasingly adopted an
autocratic approach to governance in Moscow. Using the struggle against Chechyn
separatists as the rationale, Putin has begun re-centralizing power. In 2004, he
involved himself actively in the presidential election campaign in Ukraine, support-
ing the pro-Moscow candidate against the more Western-oriented opposition.

In July 2006, as Putin continued consolidating power, Russia hosted the G8

economic summit – the annual gathering of the leaders of the world’s industrial
powers. Russia became a full participant in the G8 in 1998, having been invited
partly to encourage and facilitate Russia’s democratization and modernization
process as well as to acknowledge Russia’s natural resource base and nuclear
weapons capabilities (at the time, Russia was just the 17th leading industrial
power). In Moscow, the G8 leaders sought and accomplished a non-controversial
meeting, generally regarded as a success for the host government.

Taken together, these developments suggest that Russia’s internal and foreign

policies may occasionally move Moscow toward closer relations with the NATO
allies while at other times causing problems in the relationship. On balance, the
Russia–NATO relationship is likely to experience many ups and downs in the years
ahead, and will challenge the NATO allies to try to prevent the lows from leading
toward anything that could be considered a “new Cold War” with their important
Russian “partner.”

NATO beyond Russia …

At the opening of the twenty-ﬁ rst century, in spite of the mixed outlook for future
NATO–Russia relations, NATO had moved well beyond its former Russian
preoccupation. The allies were already focusing on security challenges that did not
pose existential threats in the near term but which were much more complex both
in interpretation and response than the Soviet threat had been. As NATO was still
trying to reorganize itself to deal with this new environment, the combination of
the 9/11 terrorist attacks and the Iraq crisis in Euro-Atlantic relations came as close
to breaking the transatlantic bargain as any set of developments since the Treaty
of Washington was signed in 1949. The events and subsequent developments in
the Alliance brought one NATO analyst to suggest, “… NATO has become an
obstacle and not a solution to contemporary security problems.”

The fact that the

Alliance remains in business nonetheless testiﬁ es to the fundamental necessities
of US–European cooperation.

Before looking toward the future, it may be helpful to establish where the

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Alliance stands today with regard to the three important areas of adaptation that
Alliance leaders identiﬁ ed in 1991 – cooperation and dialogue, responding to the
new security environment, and strengthening Europe’s role in the Alliance.

Dialogue, cooperation and partnership

NATO has remained true to its pledge to continue to expand its membership
to qualiﬁ ed European states and develop cooperation with other European and
Mediterranean countries. The addition of seven new members, celebrated at the
June 2004 summit in Istanbul, will not be the end of the enlargement process.
At least a few other European countries probably will join in the years ahead.
The continued process of stabilizing the Balkans could lead to membership for
Macedonia, Croatia, Montenegro and Albania during this decade and, at some
point, even Serbia. As for EU members Austria, Finland, Sweden and Ireland,
the US–European and internal European divisions over Iraq may have provided
additional reasons for these countries not to apply for NATO membership in the
near future. In the meantime, partnerships with NATO provide a way for countries
to participate in NATO programs at a time when membership might not be an
option as well as helping those who seek membership to get prepared to apply.

Now that NATO has taken on a more demanding mission in Afghanistan,

pressures are developing for expanding the partnership concept well beyond any
geographic limits to include any and all democratic nations. Some analysts have
even suggested this process should go beyond partnership to include possible
membership for countries like Australia, Brazil, Japan, India, New Zealand, South
Africa and South Korea.

With regard to Russia and Ukraine, neither is likely to join the Alliance in

the near future, but NATO’s approach to partnership and cooperation with these
impor tant European states and other former Soviet republics guarantees a con-
tinuing dialogue and cooperation on a wide range of issues. The dark cloud on the
horizon is the apparent drift of Russia back toward an authoritarian regime with
the trappings of democracy. Such tendencies are most alarming to NATO countries
around Russia’s borders. The Poles, for example, remain particularly concerned
that Russia will use its role as a key energy supplier to Europe as a way of holding
Poland, Ukraine and other states hostage to Russian interests. Many West European
states, also concerned about how Russia intends to use the leverage gained from
its energy supplier position, have been reluctant to criticize Russia too strongly or
publicly, perhaps judging that quiet diplomacy will work best with Putin or, seen
less generously, reluctant to offend an important energy supplier at a time when
other sources are potentially in jeopardy.

Nonetheless, the new German government led by Angela Merkel has not been

reluc tant to express Berlin’s concerns about internal Russian developments and
Moscow’s use of energy as a less-than-benign source of inﬂ uence in European
politics.

Ukraine, on the other hand, could pose additional challenges for the Russia–

NATO relationship by reforming itself sufﬁ ciently to be considered a viable

NATO beyond Russia 79

candidate for NATO membership toward the end of this decade. The Ukrainian
population and political parties remain divided between those who wish to continue
a close rela tionship with Russia and those who hope that political, institutional and
economic ties with the West will ensure Ukraine’s independence from Russian
inﬂ uence. At this point, such political divisions and recent political instability in
Ukraine have greatly diminished the chances that Ukraine will be invited to join
NATO at a planned NATO summit in 2008, as pro-Western forces in Kiev had
hoped.

NATO’s outreach to the Mediterranean will become increasingly important as

the Alliance is considered for possible peace operation roles in the broader Middle
East. NATO’s Mediterranean dialogue is already making important contributions
to building up the credibility of the Alliance as a potential contributor to peace and
stability in that region, and complements European Union outreach in the region.

Responding to the new security environment

The most important change in NATO in recent years has been the post-9/11
acknowl edg ment that NATO’s role cannot be limited to Europe. Most of the threats
to the interests of NATO countries now arise beyond Europe, and the European
allies have accepted that NATO must be prepared to deal with those challenges if
it is to remain relevant. Moreover, NATO’s military organization looks little like
it did during the Cold War. The creation of a “transformation” command should
help the Alliance keep up with the rapid pace of technological and doctrinal
developments that ﬂ ow in particular from the US military establishment. NATO’s
new military structures should facilitate adaptation to new missions, including
very demanding ones beyond Europe in Afghanistan, Iraq, and perhaps elsewhere
in the broader Middle East.

The allies have created a NATO Response Force (NRF) intended to bring

together highly capable air, sea and land units, largely from the European allies, to
respond quickly and effectively to future military challenges, no matter where they
may arise. The political signiﬁ cance of the force is huge. It is a clear statement that
NATO is prepared to act anywhere in the world in support of Alliance interests.
In addition, such a force could help stimulate European efforts to bring at least
some portions of their forces up to the level to be able to operate effectively with
hi-tech US forces. The most likely arena for such a force would be the Middle and
Near East regions, but this need not exclude Africa, the Caucasus or another region
should the need arise and the UN Security Council grant a mandate. The NRF is
being designed to respond to a military crisis, and any intervention would have to
be accompanied by a post-conﬂ ict plan for transition to a peacekeeping presence,
freeing up the NRF for other more demanding situations.

Prior to the emergence of a contingency, the allies need to conduct realistic

and detailed contingency planning at the political and military levels. Only by so
doing will they be able to anticipate the issues and obstacles they might encounter
in a real-world scenario. Beyond preparing the forces for such contingencies, the
most important step for the allies is to hold constant and substantive consultations

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on emerging security challenges to help prepare for decisions on whether or not to
use the force when they are required.

The question now is whether the allies will provide sufﬁ cient forces for NATO’s

new missions. According to Supreme Allied Commander General David Jones,
the NATO mission in Afghanistan has not received sufﬁ cient numbers of troops
from allied nations.

Both Russia and Ukraine, if they so choose, could be helpful partners for NATO

in its new missions, even if they do not seek or qualify for membership in the near
future. Both countries have already worked with NATO forces in the Balkans, and
they have the military potential to make important focused contributions to future
NATO operations. That Ukraine will volunteer future contributions seems assured.
Similar cooperation between NATO and Russia could help mitigate Moscow’s
inbred mistrust of NATO’s purposes and intentions, contributing further to moving
beyond Cold War perceptions and attitudes. On the other hand, Moscow will
undoubtedly remain suspicious of any steps – for example, military action against
Iran – that could bring US military power closer to its borders.

Strengthening Europe’s role

Europe is no longer part of the problem with which NATO must grapple; it now
has to ﬁ gure how to become an effective part of the solution. This is true for Russia
as well as for the European allies of the United States.

There has been progress on both the organizational and the capabilities fronts.

The members of the European Union have created the potential for the EU
members to enhance their military cooperation in every area of defense endeavors,
from strategic planning to weapons systems development to training and exercising
to deployment of forces in combined and joint operations. The major European
powers know what needs to be done to improve their military forces to be able to
work and ﬁ ght effectively alongside their American ally. The question remains
whether political leaders will provide sufﬁ cient resources for this to happen.

There will always be room, of course, for US–European and intra-European

differences about the correct balance in relations between NATO and the European
Union. The challenge for leaders on both sides of the Atlantic will be to ensure
that petty bickering and inﬂ ated institutional or national egos do not get in the way
of practical cooperation. However, US–European differences over how to work
toward peace in the Middle East and how best to reduce the terrorist threat over
time will raise serious policy issues that will have to be compromised in order for
NATO–EU institutional arrangements in principle to work well in practice.

NATO after Iraq

Where do the Euro-Atlantic allies go now, having suffered through a period of deep
political divisions while at the same time mandating dramatic changes in NATO’s
mission and improving NATO–EU working relationships?

NATO beyond Russia 81

Tackle terrorism together

In spite of the differences over Iraq, few would question how important it will be to
ensure that the members of the Atlantic Community stay united and strong against
the sources of international terrorism. NATO’s initial response to the September
11 attacks on the United States was impressive and appropriate, but also reﬂ ects
some limitations on the Alliance that will inﬂ uence its future role.

Most observers of transatlantic security issues remember the debates in the

1990s, particularly those leading up to NATO’s 1999 strategic concept, in which
the United States sought a NATO mandate without artiﬁ cial geographic limitations
while many European countries wanted to prevent the appearance of an “open-
ended” role for the Alliance in dealing with future security challenges. The
September 11 events demonstrated that the United States was right concerning the
nature of future threats to transatlantic security – most of them have roots outside
Europe and must be dealt with well beyond NATO’s borders.

However, the differing perspectives among NATO members, and between

NATO and Russia, concerning the best instruments to employ against disparate
threats have not disappeared. They are based on fundamentally different historical
experiences, political and military traditions, and available power and military
capabilities. Britain and France have force projection philosophies and global
strategic perspectives. But Germany’s concepts and perspectives will continue
to inhibit the Federal Republic’s military role beyond its borders, in spite of the
dramatic progress Berlin has made in breaking out of outdated constraints on the
use of its forces since the end of the Cold War.

Russia is engaged in a struggle

with Chechen rebels, seen by Moscow as terrorists but by some in the West as
“freedom ﬁ ghters,” responding to Russian oppression. Such differing perceptions
will, on occasion, make consensus and cooperation difﬁ cult to ﬁ nd, in NATO and
between NATO countries and Russia. The challenge will be to keep the Alliance
and NATO–Russia partnership on track in spite of the inevitable disagreements on
military tactics and political strategies.

If, however, the war against international terrorism remains for some years

the main focus of US security policy, NATO’s ability to be part of the solution
could exert a major inﬂ uence on US perceptions of the Alliance’s utility. It seems
likely that the United States, in spite of unilateralist temptations in Washington,
will want to ensure that the response to the terrorist attacks strengthens America’s
most important alliance instead of undermining it. Europeans, in spite of their
skepticism about the US approach to the war on terrorism, will not want to risk
diminished US support for the Alliance speciﬁ cally and transatlantic cooperation
more generally.

Maintaining Alliance cohesion will require sophisticated political management

on both sides of the Atlantic. The United States will have to be careful to ask allies
to do things that they are capable of doing. At the same time, the NATO allies
must avoid at all cost the perception that they do not support the United States
in responding to the terrorist threat. For NATO’s European members, not doing
enough risks losing US interest in the Alliance. For the United States, trying to push
the Alliance beyond the political consensus concerning NATO’s mission could

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create splits among the allies and even domestic unrest in some allied countries. In
any case, the struggle against international terrorism could for many years remain
the most important part of the strategic environment in which the NATO allies deal
with every issue they face as allies.

Make NATO a useful alliance toolbox

Some European observers have objected to what they see as the US desire to
turn NATO into a toolbox from which the United States would draw resources to
complement its own in future military operations. This perception grows reasonably
enough out of the George W. Bush administration’s articulated view that, in dealing
with future security challenges, “the mission determines the coalition,” implying
that a standing alliance like NATO has become of secondary importance. During
the Iraq crisis, the United States appeared to follow this doctrine, “cherry-picking”
allies and capabilities for an ad hoc coalition rather than making a serious effort to
bring the entire NATO Alliance on board.

If the United States were regularly to follow such an approach, NATO would

soon be out of business even if it has gone “out of area.” As Klaus Naumann
has observed, “… to believe that NATO could survive if it were used by the US
as a toolbox which will allow the US to select and pick allies on a case by case
basis is highly questionable in a situation in which the US allies are no longer
confronted with an existential threat.”

Perhaps reacting to such arguments made

by good friends of the United States like General Naumann, even the multilaterally
challenged Bush administration seemed to have discovered that working with allies
through an alliance like NATO can have advantages.

The practical reality is that NATO should be a toolbox in the sense that the habits

of cooperation and common programs that have been built up in NATO should
produce advantages for all the allies in dealing with future security challenges.
Moreover, NATO’s toolbox is not just available to the United States: the Berlin
Plus arrangements have set NATO up as a potential toolbox for the European Union
to use. Ad hoc coalitions, led by the United States or by France or Great Britain, can
beneﬁ t from the capabilities that have developed through NATO cooperation. The
point is that the ﬁ rst resort for the United States and the members of the European
Union should be to act as an alliance to take maximum advantage of the tools in
NATO’s box. Such tools will only be developed and preserved if there is a shared
sense that they are to the advantage of the entire Alliance.

Be wary of proposals to change NATO’s decision-making process

The divisive debate early in 2002 over whether or not NATO would commit itself
to helping Turkey if that ally were attacked in the course of hostilities with Iraq left
deep scars on the Alliance. In response, the US Senate by a vote of 96 to 0 passed
a “Sense of the Senate” resolution in May 2003 suggesting the United States look
for ways to enable NATO to act without a full consensus and to suspend difﬁ cult
members from Alliance decision making.

Proponents argued that, the Turkish

NATO beyond Russia 83

debate aside, a NATO that now has 26 members and is likely to have more in the
future may have an increasingly difﬁ cult time reaching a meaningful consensus.
Sean Kay has argued that “… the key to making NATO more relevant is to reform
its decision-making procedures so that one or two dissenting countries cannot block
the entire institution from acting when its capacities are needed.”

Kay laments the

fact that such reforms will not be possible, and that NATO is therefore destined
to become irrelevant. However, NATO has always been an alliance of sovereign
states based on cooperation, not supranational integration. It has always been a
challenge to get all the members behind any one idea or operation. The “good old
days” of the Cold War certainly helped the allies compromise, but the process
often required good diplomacy not only by the Alliance leader but by other powers
as well.

Moreover, the consensus “rule” has been constructively bent in the past. For

example, when the Dutch took footnotes to language about NATO nuclear policy
in the 1980s; Greece abstained constructively (not supporting but not blocking) on
NATO’s attack on Serbian forces in Kosovo; and when, in the 2003 Turkish case,
the decision was moved to the Defense Planning Committee, with German and
Belgian acquiescence, to avoid a French veto in the North Atlantic Council.

As Leo Michel has concluded in his excellent study of the issue, “The

[consensus] rule, as practised thus far, has not paralyzed the Alliance in the Balkans
or Afghanistan. With some relatively straightforward adjustments – for example,
according greater contingency operational planning authority to the SACEUR or
Secretary General … – the rule, like NATO itself, can continue to adapt to the 21st
century security environment.”

As Michel suggests, one important “ﬂ exing” of NATO’s consensus procedure

could be to ensure that NATO commanders are delegated sufﬁ cient authority to
run a military operation without frequent resort to the North Atlantic Council for
detailed guidance, as was the case in the air war against Serbia over Kosovo. If
there is a compelling case for NATO to act, effective diplomacy and leadership
on both sides of the Atlantic in most cases will produce a consensus or at least a
situation in which no country will veto. Perhaps a good “ﬁ rst case” in this regard
came when six allies allowed NATO training of Iraqi security personnel to go
ahead even though they were unwilling to provide military ofﬁ cers to staff NATO’s
training facility in Iraq.

Moreover, it seems quite unlikely that NATO members – least of all the

United States – will want the Alliance to become a supranational body rather than
a cooperative framework among sovereign states. In such a case, the consensus
procedure clearly will need to be ﬂ exed from time to time, as it has been in the
past, but it seems unlikely to be “ﬁ xed.”

On the question of suspending troublesome members, any attempt to give

formal consideration to such a procedure would be divisive in the extreme and
not worth the trouble. If NATO is not able to function in the future because of the
obstinance of one or more members then the Alliance will slip toward irrelevance.
Chances are, if the United States and the European allies continue to see NATO
cooperation as in their interest, they will ﬁ nd ways to compromise difﬁ cult issues

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and to move ahead, using ad hoc coalition approaches when absolutely necessary
to get around opposition to making an operation a formal NATO mission.

Avoid a formal transatlantic division of labor

A division of labor approach to Alliance missions might also appear superﬁ cially
attractive, given the current disparities between US and European military capabili-
ties. In fact, however, any formal division of responsibilities in the Alliance (hard
power tasks for the US, soft power jobs for the Europeans) would be disastrous
for US–European security cooperation.

It does make sense for individual nations, or groups of nations, to take on

speciﬁ c tasks within the overall framework of Alliance cooperation. In fact, the
special capacities that European allies have for managing stabilization and recon-
struction activities could be usefully combined with the potent US ability for
war ﬁ ghting to develop a full spectrum of pre-conﬂ ict, conﬂ ict, and post-conﬂ ict
coalition activities. Such a division of tasks between the United States and Europe
could have produced a much more effective approach to the defeat of Saddam
Hussein and the rehabilitation of Iraq had it been possible to agree on a common
trans atlantic strategy.

But a formal transatlantic division of responsibilities would create even bigger

gaps between the United States and Europe concerning how best to respond
to inter na tional security challenges. Such an approach would only encourage
US tendencies toward the unilateral use of military force as well as European
tendencies to believe that all problems can be solved without military force backing
up diplomacy. The response to every future security challenge would have to over-
come a growing transatlantic divergence in appreciation of the problem before
cooperation could be arranged.

The bottom line is that there should be a practical division of tasks among the

transatlantic partners, but not a formal division of labor across the Atlantic. Ideally,
both American and European forces should be engaged in the high intensity and
lower intensity ends of future conﬂ icts, sharing responsibility for the strategies
required for the entire continuum.

Even though it was logical for the European Union to take over responsibili-

ties for stability in the Balkans, the continuing security issues there, particularly
in Kosovo, made it clear that NATO’s involvement in some form will remain
critical to the long-term process of stabilization. Even before the European Union
took command of the stabilization effort in Bosnia and Herzegovina, European
nations provided the bulk of military forces there and in Kosovo. But the principle
and wisdom of burden sharing, not dividing, suggests the United States should
continue to contribute some troops to the international presence in this region
just as Europeans must contribute troops to international stability efforts in Iraq,
Afghanistan and elsewhere beyond Europe’s borders.

NATO beyond Russia 85

Rebuild a constructive transatlantic dialogue

The most immediate challenge to allies on both sides of the Atlantic is to rebuild a
constructive dialogue to replace the destructive interactions that have characterized
handling of the Iraq issue. This will require the United States to “speak more softly.”
Everyone knows that the United States already carries the “biggest stick.”

Future

US administrations will be required to be more constructive and creative in the use
of international institutions and multilateral cooperation than George W. Bush was
in his ﬁ rst term. The United Nations, with all its shortcomings, remains a critical
forum for legitimizing international security efforts. As has been demonstrated by
Iraq, US interests beneﬁ t when it can gain the international support and assistance
that political legitimization through the United Nations brings. In this context,
Russia must also be factored into Washington’s calculations, given its permanent
seat on the UN Security Council.

For their part, Europeans will have to bring more resources and capabilities

to the transatlantic security table. The US–European relationship needs a better
balance in terms of both authority and capability. However, it is not up to the
United States to “give” Europe more authority. European nations and the European
Union will wield greater inﬂ uence in Washington and internationally based on their
will and ability to contribute to solutions of international security problems. The
decision by European nations to take the lead responsibility for the international
peacekeeping force for Lebanon is an important step toward Europe assuming more
responsibility for security in this critically important region.

One of the most difﬁ cult tasks will be rebuilding the US relationship with

France, which was severely damaged by the Iraq debate. Not only did relations at
the top levels of government suffer, but public opinion in the two countries moved
decisively against the other. Both governments began moving toward reconciliation
early in 2004,

but it has been a slow and difﬁ cult process.

The US–French relationship has never been and may never be the most

comfortable that either country has in its ties with other nations. However, the
fact is that US and French interests in the world overlap more than they conﬂ ict.
As Guillaume Parmentier and Michael Brenner have observed, “France and the
United States have been a quarrelsome pair, yet their mutual interests force them
to work out the terms of a revived and thriving alliance.”

Moreover, the United

States knows that France not only can make serious trouble for its foreign and
defense policy goals from its position on the UN Security Council and as a leading
member of the European Union, but also can be a very helpful partner in dealing
with future security challenges. For its part, France knows it cannot achieve its
foreign and defense policy goals in permanent opposition to the United States, and
that its interests are best served when the two countries cooperate. Both countries
therefore have a strong mutual interest in moving beyond the Iraq crisis.

Build a new Euro-Atlantic front on Iraq, Iran and Middle East peace

One of the ways the allies can move beyond the divisive debate over Iraq is
to establish new foundations of cooperation on issues of direct and immediate

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concern to their interests. Fighting terrorism has already been recognized as one
of these areas. Even at the height of differences over Iraq, the United States and its
European allies cooperated closely at many formal and informal levels to disrupt
and destroy Al Qaeda cells, communication networks and ﬁ nancial connections.
There is no doubt that such cooperation will continue, even if the United States
calls it a “war” and the Europeans view it as a “struggle.”

However, the ﬁ ght against terrorism cannot succeed unless the allies also deal

effectively with the stabilization in Iraq, containment of Iran’s nuclear weapons
capabilities, and, perhaps most importantly, resolution of the Israeli–Palestinian
dispute. The chances for effective collaboration appear to have been enhanced by
a number of factors.

The European countries that opposed the war in Iraq know that a destabilized

Iraq, which serves as a refuge and breeding ground for international terrorism, is
contrary to their interests. The United States seems to have recognized that it will
need help from the other major international players and from the United Nations
to shepherd the process of Iraqi stabilization.

In Iran, European diplomatic efforts, backed up by the implicit threat that the

United States and/or Israel could use force to try to prevent Iran from going nuclear,
appeared to have made some progress in convincing Iran’s leadership to reconsider
the costs and beneﬁ ts of becoming a nuclear power. However, all bets came off in
October 2005 when Iran’s president called for wiping Israel off the map, forcing
the United States and the European powers to rethink the strategy in which the
Europeans played the “good cop” while the United States stayed in the background
holding the “bad cop” threat of military options. The Bush administration clearly
believes Iran has decided to become a nuclear weapons state. Whether or not that
conclusion is shared by the European countries, Russia and China will largely
determine whether the international community will take effective, uniﬁ ed action
against Teheran. As long as there are questions about this issue, it will be difﬁ cult to
keep the UN Security Council together. Deciding how to respond to Iran’s deﬁ ant
attitude will undoubtedly create tensions between the United States, which is
determined to impose “consequences” on Iran for the decision, the Europeans, who
undoubtedly will be less enthusiastic than the United States about sanctions against
Iran, and Russia, which may well oppose any serious sanctions altogether.

With regard to the Israeli–Palestinian conﬂ ict, Yasir Arafat’s passing created a

possible opening for a political settlement. Even though the success or failure of
peace efforts will rest primarily on the shoulders of the new Palestinian leaders and
the Israeli government, the United States, Europe and Russia, working together,
could help facilitate the process.

Continue to manage the transitions in Europe

At a time when most of the threats to allied security emanate well beyond Europe,
the United States and the European allies should not lose track of important proc-
esses of transition still underway in Europe that could affect their future security.
First and foremost, the NATO countries need to manage their relationship with

NATO beyond Russia 87

Russia in ways that encourage the development of a democratic country that one
day could be considered for NATO membership. There is much work left to be
done, and undoubtedly many bumps in the road. In the meantime, the cooperation
NATO has developed with Russia should be expanded in every way consistent
with NATO’s value base and current missions.

As Dmitri Trenin has suggested, the West will have to count on economic

forces rather than lectures about democracy to bend Russia back in more positive
directions. Trenin advises caution and patience: “Today’s Russia may not be pro-
Western, but neither is it anti-Western … the West needs to calm down and take
Russia for what it is: a major outside player that is neither an eternal foe nor an
automatic friend.”

An associated challenge is facilitating Ukraine’s progression from a former

Soviet republic to a position inside Europe’s institutions, including NATO. The
allies also will have continuing responsibilities in the Balkans, ensuring some
peaceful, stable framework for its future and membership in European institutions
for former Yugoslav republics who seek them.

Looking ahead

It is impossible to predict conﬁ dently which path the Alliance will follow in the
years ahead. History suggests that the Alliance has incredible staying power. It
has survived “crises” over the development of Soviet strategic nuclear weapons
(1950s), the advent of détente (1960s), France’s departure from the NATO inte-
grated military command (1967), the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan (1979), the
deployment of intermediate range nuclear missiles in Europe (1980s), the end of
the Cold War, the Warsaw Pact and the Soviet Union (1989–91), and the recent
differences over Iraq. Against this backdrop, it seems safe to suggest that the
Alliance will survive its recent crisis and persist as a viable organization for the
foreseeable future.

However, each crisis has left the Alliance somewhat different than it was before.

Today, the skeptics say the end of the Cold War removed the glue that had held the
Alliance together, and that the Iraq dispute is the most recent case in point. If the
Alliance continues, they argue, it will be an empty shell. More optimistic observers
note that while European and American member governments were ﬁ ghting over
what to do about Iraq, they were agreeing to dramatic changes in NATO’s missions
and capabilities, perhaps giving the Alliance key roles in the global struggle against
terrorism, conﬂ ict and instability.

The most important characteristic of the new international system remains the

emergence of the United States as the only true global power – not omnipotent,
but more powerful than any other nation or organized group of nations on this
earth. Having been subjected to a brutal terrorist attack on innocent civilians at this
critical point in its national history left the United States a more intense and less
predictable international actor. How the United States decides to use its power and
inﬂ uence will have a major impact on the future of the Alliance that it still leads.
Will it continue to act with a degree of unilateralism and paranoia that irritates and

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alienates even its best allies, or will it ﬁ nd a way to be a conﬁ dent and effective
benign hegemon? The bottom line is that, for the Alliance to recover from its
recent crisis, the United States will have to ﬁ nd ways to balance the advantages of
multilateral cooperation and burden sharing against the temptations and attractions
of unilateralism.

How the hegemon’s allies react to US leadership is also important. Most

European nations appear prepared to follow a benign US hegemon on most major
issues. Will the incredible power and capabilities of the United States convince the
allies to follow, even when the United States leads with a clumsy hand? Or will the
allies revolt, periodically, individually or as a group, in response to heavy-handed
US unilateralism? In terms of capabilities, will the allies respond to US leadership
by creating the capabilities required to make serious military contributions to global
military operations? Will they decide to take the “easy road” of concentrating on
their soft-power resources and allow the United States to take most responsibility
for military capabilities? Or will they build up signiﬁ cant European military
capabilities intended to give Europe more leverage over US decisions? If the EU’s
European Security and Defense Policy is to be taken seriously in Washington,
the EU members will have to demonstrate that the new aspect of the uniﬁ cation
process adds capabilities to the transatlantic inventory of security tools, not just
institutions and acronyms.

At the national level, for Europe to play its part in reconstructing a positive

transatlantic dynamic, Germany will be required to ﬁ nd a new balance in its policies
that serves two old masters – Europeanism and Atlanticism – while responding
to its rediscovered, redeﬁ ned and reenergized sense of national interests. France
will have to give more weight to the transatlantic dimension of its interests. Great
Britain will be required to be a “good European” while remaining Washington’s
trusted partner.

Finally, the fall 2005 rioting in France has illustrated that the problems of

ethnic peace and justice are not just international, but exist inside many allied
nations. It would be easy for the United States to respond to persistent French
criticism of social and economic injustice in the United States by thumbing its
nose at the challenges to French society and government. The better approach, of
course, will be for all the allies – the United States, Canada and the Europeans –
to work together to ﬁ nd ways to ensure that the external threats posed by Islamic
fundamentalism are not internalized because of the shortcomings of our socio-
economic systems.

The attitudes and capabilities the United States and Europe bring to the NATO

table in the years immediately ahead will determine whether the Alliance will
become part of the answer to problems of global stability. If NATO – meaning,
of course, the NATO nations – successfully manages the stabilization effort in
Afghanistan, it will establish its credentials as a serious and constructive device
for multilateral security cooperation for the international community. Of course,
failure in any mission the members assign to the Alliance could have disastrous
consequences for NATO’s credibility and future utility.

At the end of the day, there are two basic requirements for NATO to be perceived

NATO beyond Russia 89

as important enough for the member states to ensure its survival. Put most simply,
the United States must be convinced that political and military cooperation with
the European allies makes an important net contribution to US interests. On the
other side of the coin, the Europeans must believe that contributing to international
security efforts alongside the United States will produce inﬂ uence for Europe over
US decisions that affect their security. These are the fundamental self-interested
terms for continuation of a vital, productive transatlantic bargain that has moved
beyond Russia.

Notes

1 NATO, Study on NATO Enlargement (Brussels: September 1995).
2 This discussion draws on the author’s role as a consultant to the Senate NATO Observer

Group throughout the enlargement process, including presence on the ﬂ oor of the Senate
during the debate on the resolution of ratiﬁ cation. A more detailed version appears
in: Stanley R. Sloan, NATO, the European Union and the Atlantic Community: The
Transatlantic Bargain Challenged (Lanham, MD: Rowman and Littleﬁ eld, 2005),
156–66.

3 US Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, The Debate on NATO Enlargement, 105th

Congress, 1st session, 7, 9, 22, 28 and 30 October and 5 November 1997, S. Hrg.
105–285, 2.

4 Sean Kay, “What Went Wrong with NATO?”, Cambridge Review of International

Affairs, Vol. 18, No. 1, April 2005.

5 George F. Kennan, “A Fateful Error,” New York Times, 5 February 1997, A23.
6 Following one Senate NATO Observer Group session in the weeks before the Senate

vote, the late Paul Wellstone engaged me in a discussion of the Russia issue. I attempted
to provide a balanced perspective, but suggested that Kennan’s prediction was probably
exaggerated. It was clear from that discussion, however, that Wellstone’s vote probably
would be with the treaty opponents.

7 Mike Peacock, “Blair Pushes for a New NATO/Russia Relationship,” Reuters, 16

November 2001.

8 Michael Wines, “Russia Could Get Veto Power in New NATO,” International Herald

Tribune, 23 November 2001, 1.

9 Ronald D. Asmus and Jeremy D. Rosner, “Don’t Give Russia a Veto,” Washington

Times, 5 December 2001, A19.

10 Lord Robertson, “NATO in the 21st Century,” Speech at Charles University, Prague,

21 March 2002 (full text on NATO web site at http://www.nato.int/).

11 Claire Bigg, “Russia: Putin ‘Satisﬁ ed’ as G-8 Summit Winds to a Close,” RFE/RL

report, 17 July 2006.

12 Kay, 86.
13 Ivo Daalder and James Goldgeier, “Global NATO,” Foreign Affairs, September–

October 2006, p. 109.

14 Christopher Marquis, “General Urges NATO to Send Afghanistan More Troops”(New

York Times, 28 January 2004).

90 S.R.

Sloan

15 Mary Elise Sarotte, German Military Reform and European Security, Adelphi Paper

340, The International Institute for Strategic Studies (Oxford: Oxford University Press,
2001), pp. 9–12.

16 Klaus Naumann, “Assessing NATO’s Chances to Succeed” (World Security Network,

30 January 2004).

17  US Congress, Congressional Record – Senate, 8 May 2003, S5882.
18  Kay,  84.
19  Leo G. Michel, “NATO Decisionmaking: Au Revoir to Consensus?” (National Defense

University, US National Defense University Strategic Forum, No. 202, August 2003).
http://www.ndu.edu/inss/strforum/SF202/SF202.pdf [Accessed 11 November 2005].

20 Discussions of the division of labor issue with Robert P. Grant greatly contributed to the

development of this analysis. Division of tasks makes sense in terms of the most effective
use of US and European capabilities, but the danger that divided responsibilities will
lead to divergent perspectives is real. Something like a shared continuum approach to
future conﬂ icts, with the United States and the European allies involved along the full
spectrum but with roles attuned to speciﬁ c capabilities and resources, will be necessary
to overcome the dilemma posed by the division of labor issue.

21 The 26th President of the United States, Theodore (“Teddy”) Roosevelt, adopted the

adage “Speak softly and carry a big stick. You will go far” as the best way to deal with
other nations.

22 Andrew Borowiec, “France Eases Rift with United States,” (Washington Times, 22

January 2004).

23 Michael Brenner and Guillaume Parmentier, Reconcilable Differences, U.S.–French

Relations in the New Era (Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution Press, 2002),
p. 116.

24 Dmitri Trenin, “Russia Leaves the West,” Foreign Affairs, July–August 2006, p. 95.

NATO enlargement and Russia

Jeffrey Simon

This paper argues that NATO has undergone three distinct stages in its evolution,
during which it has responded to threats, built capabilities, enlarged and engaged
in response to challenges differently. During the same period, the European
security environment had undergone substantial change. During the post-Cold
War period of 1991–2001, NATO’s collective defense functions shifted towards
out-of-area expeditionary operations, and in the post-9/11 period NATO needs to
shift its focus toward building barriers against the human trafﬁ cking, drugs and
weapons (from small arms to weapons of mass destruction) threats to Europe’s
core, and to building bridges to ensure that vital energy supplies freely ﬂ ow from
and across the Caspian and Black Seas to Europe. In order to accomplish this task
of building barriers and bridges, NATO needs to build a wider regional and broader
functional security cooperation that entails the reaching out of its 26 members
and implementing a strategic vision with its 23 Partnership for Peace Partners in
Europe and beyond.

Cold War NATO, 1949–91

During the Cold War when there was a consensus on the threat that NATO faced
and the capabilities that it needed, the Alliance passed many defense tests. During
its ﬁ rst four decades, NATO never invoked Article 5 nor engaged in any Out-of-
Area military operations, and when it enlarged, it was for defense.

During the Cold War there was a consensus on the USSR–Warsaw Pact threat

that NATO faced as deﬁ ned in its Military Committee 161 threat assessments.
While we knew our opponent’s capabilities, we did not know his intent. Defense
of Europe remained a central US/NATO priority as embedded in NATO’s MC14/3
“ﬂ exible response.” The US and NATO shared consensus on the need to defend the
Greenland, Iceland, and United Kingdom (GIUK) and Fulda Gaps and, in 1978,
agreed to maintain sufﬁ cient capabilities in the Long Term Defense Plan (LTDP)
by committing three percent of GDP to defense.

* The opinions expressed in this paper are solely my personal views and do not necessarily reﬂ ect the

views of INSS, National Defense University, or any other governmental agency.

92 J.

Simon

When NATO enlarged during the Cold War it was for the purpose of improving

defenses. In the midst of the Korean War, Greece and Turkey were added in
1952 to contain the USSR, the Federal Republic of Germany with its newly
created Bundeswehr in 1955, and Spain in 1982 for strategic depth. The Alliance
passed many defense challenges; these included crises in Berlin in 1961 and
Czechoslovakia in 1968. Perhaps NATO’s greatest Cold War test, though, came
with the dual track decision invoked during 1978–84. This was a long-term effort
to hold the Alliance together. Maintaining Alliance cohesion was ultimately
successful, but proved quite challenging despite the presence of a clear threat.
During the Cold War the Alliance never engaged in Article 4 operations; and
though it never invoked Article 5, the Soviet–Warsaw Pact forward deployed
forces remained an omnipresent reminder of the need for it.

Post-Cold War NATO, 1991–2001

NATO’s fifth decade, the post-Cold War period, was marked by increasing
disagreements over the nature of the threats and capabilities necessary to deal
with them. The Alliance had to engage in Article 4 peace support operations and
extended bombing campaigns. When the Alliance enlarged during this period it
was for security and stability.

The post-Cold War period was marked by the 1991 dissolution of the Warsaw

Pact and Soviet Union and with their eclipse, NATO’s perception of common
threat. Differing perceptions on the challenges emerging from the dissolution
of Yugoslavia became apparent among allies during the Bosnia-Herzegovina
and Kosovo crises. NATO began redefining its mission with the November
1991 Rome Summit’s issuance of a New (now old) Strategic Concept, and
reorienting its capabilities at the January 1994 Brussels Summit which established
the groundwork for post-Cold War NATO by adopting the Combined Joint Task
Forces (CJTF) as support for European Security and Defense Identity (ESDI), now
displaced by the “autonomous” Common European Security and Defense Policy
(CESDP). Although the evolving transatlantic capabilities gap during the 1990s
resulted in the April 1999 Washington Summit’s adoption of yet another Strategic
Concept along with a Defense Capabilities Initiative (DCI), these efforts obviously
failed resulting from, and further contributing to, what Robert Kagan has described
as a psychological divide between US power and European “weakness.”

In sum,

while the United States continued to see NATO as an instrument for defense, many
Europeans increasingly saw the Alliance as an instrument in providing reassurance
of European “stability.”

Since the revolutions of 1989–90 and the fall of the Berlin Wall, NATO had

emerged as the backbone of Europe’s security architecture. In response to the
demands of outsiders for collaboration, NATO has consistently adhered to a
strategy of inclusion – to create a Europe whole and undivided. This was NATO’s
conscious effort at the July 1990 London Summit when it invited the then existing
Soviet Union and non-Soviet Warsaw Pact members “to establish regular dip-
lomatic liaison with NATO”

and at the November 1991 Rome Summit when it

NATO enlargement and Russia 93

launched the North Atlantic Cooperation Council (NACC) to include them.

Then

when the USSR disintegrated, NATO decided in January 1992 to include former
Soviet republics in the NACC thus attempting to ensure a Europe free and whole.
The same strategy prevailed at the Brussels Summit in January 1994 when NATO
reiterated the Alliance’s openness to enlarge and launched Partnership for Peace
(PFP) that included NACC members and other CSCE (now OSCE) countries able
and willing to contribute.

When invitations were extended to Poland, Hungary,

and the Czech Republic at the Madrid Summit in July 1997, NATO portrayed
enlargement in terms of inclusion and justiﬁ ed it as incorporating “producers”
of (political, economic, social, and military) security as deﬁ ned in the September
1995 Study on NATO Enlargement. The Alliance reafﬁ rmed that it remained open
to new members under Article 10 adding, “[N]o European democratic country …
would be excluded from consideration.”

After they joined on 12 March 1999, NATO’s Washington Summit in April

1999 launched the Membership Action Plan (MAP) that furthered incentives of
possible membership based upon the principles outlined in the 1995 NATO study.
NATO’s next Summit scheduled for 2002 would have enlargement on its agenda
not just because the April 1999 Washington Summit stated that the next Summit
would focus on it, but also because the (then) nine MAP foreign ministers launched
a political initiative on 18–19 May 2000 in Vilnius to remind the member states of
NATO “to fulﬁ ll the promise of the Washington Summit to build a Europe whole
and free … [and] at the next NATO Summit in 2002 to invite our democracies to
join NATO.”

This political initiative was to be followed by another gathering of

the nine MAP NATO aspirant defense ministers in Soﬁ a and foreign ministers in
Bucharest in October 2000.

After the signing of the Dayton Accords, starting in December 1995 NATO

deployed forces in Out-of-Area military operations for the ﬁ rst time. As these
deployments occurred, many began to think that the post-Cold War NATO
would be increasingly an Article 4 Alliance; that Implementation Force (IFOR)/
Stabilization Force (SFOR) and Kosovo Force (KFOR) deployments in Bosnia and
Kosovo would be the “bread and butter” of NATO’s post-Cold War defense efforts,
with the 78-day Kosovo bombing campaign representing the high end of NATO’s
conﬂ ict spectrum. Indeed, NATO’s Article 4 Balkan deployments would severely
test the sufﬁ ciency of common values for binding the Alliance in the absence
of a Soviet–Warsaw Pact threat. This was evident in the North Atlantic Council
(NAC)’s difﬁ culty (now at 19 members) in generating consensus to implement
the bombing and in utilizing the integrated military command during the 78-day
campaign. The April 1999 Washington Summit’s “Statement on Kosovo,” which
guaranteed territorial protection in the context of a limited temporal and spatial
Article 5, and MAP launch contributed to non-member partner support. In sum,
during the post-Cold War period, NATO engaged in stabilizing the East through
partnership and enlargement and Out-of-Area Article 4 defense deployments, while
Article 5 remained credible providing an incentive for those who wanted to identify
with and adhere to the Alliance.

94 J.

Simon

Post-11 September challenges

On 12 September 2001 NATO re-emerged as an Article 5 as well as Article 4
post-Cold War alliance and ended the Out-of-Area debate. But NATO faces
increased problems in developing consensus on threat and preventing diverging
risk assessments from developing among allies, providing the requisite capabilities,
in determining when and for how long to participate in coalition operations, and in
agreeing on what conditions are necessary for further enlargement.

Although the 1994 Brussels Summit also issued a declaration “to intensify our

efforts against the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and their means
of delivery” and the 1999 Strategic Concept referred to terrorism in an Article 4
context, these issues remained in the background during the post-Cold War period.
But when NATO invoked Article 5 on 12 September 2001, the issue of diverging
transatlantic risk assessments was raised to the forefront of NATO’s agenda.

Clearly the United States perception of risk had changed, and increasing defense

expenditures by $48 billion in 2002 reﬂ ected this. Although European NATO allies
invoked Article 5 and some have provided defense assistance in the war against
terrorism in Afghanistan, the war’s long-term impact on their risk assessments
was different, especially when searching for any substantial increases in defense
expenditures.

The breach, though, in threat perceptions became most evident in 2003 and

2004 over the war in Iraq. The US is at war with terrorism, with all that term
implies, while Europe is not, at least to the same degree. In a total reversal from
the Cold War when we knew our opponent’s capabilities but not his intent, in the
war on terrorism we know our opponent’s intent, but not his capabilities. While
NATO nominally remains a “defensive” alliance, intended to respond to an adver-
sary’s attack, the United States has concluded that the war on terrorism requires
“offensive” operations (e.g. pre-emption) often far beyond the territories of NATO
members. This mentality shift strains the transatlantic relationship, par ticu larly
for those European allies who had come to see NATO’s main role as pro viding
reassurance and stability (e.g. France and Germany), rather than in defending
Europe.

As already noted, in recognition of a capabilities problem and in an effort to rec-

tify it, NATO’s April 1999 Washington Summit launched the Defense Capabilities
Initiative (DCI) along with yet a “new” Strategic Concept. If we were to assess the
initiative’s progress since the accession of NATO’s three new members, Poland,
Hungary, and the Czech Republic, on 12 March 1999 and after the events of
11 September 2001, we would have to conclude, unfortunately, that the capabili-
ties gap in 2007 is wider than ever. While the US substantially increased defense
expenditures, most NATO allies’ budgets have remained unchanged. The gap also
increased after the accession of NATO’s seven new allies in 2004. In recognition
of the fact that the capabilities gap cannot be closed, but must be “ﬁ lled,” the
November 2002 NATO Prague Summit launched a NATO Response Force (NRF)
and “Capabilities Commitment,” while the June 2004 Istanbul Summit focused on
getting more NATO commitments to ﬁ ll Provincial Reconstruction Teams (PRT)
in Afghanistan.

NATO enlargement and Russia 95

While NATO has proved to be a good military instrument to deal with European

security challenges during the Cold War and post-Cold War, counter-terrorism
efforts require the application of wider set of tools than traditional military
actions, many of which are already available in the European Union. In other
words, as former Polish Minister of Defense, Janusz Onyszkiewicz said, while
“NATO is a good hammer, not all European security problems are nails.” In
addition, some Europeans feel that NATO’s invoking Article 5 on 12 September
had been a “mistake” in that like Pandora’s Box, once opened, the mystery had
been lifted. In sum, the post-9/11 period’s wider regional and broader func-
tional security requirements oblige NATO to coordinate its capabilities with
the EU.

The Prague Summit invited seven MAP partners from the Baltic to the Black Sea

to join the Alliance. Enlarging the NAC to include 26 members sharing common
values will test whether NATO’s political institutions will be sufﬁ cient to solve
these challenges or only make them worse. On the one hand, the seven invited MAP
partners’ institutional capacities are substantially weaker than Poland, Hungary
and the Czech Republic, whose performance has been less than ideal. On the
other hand, the Membership Action Plan introduced at the April 1999 Washington
Summit has witnessed the evolution of a defense reform process among MAP
partners that prepared them for NATO membership far more effectively than
the original January 1994 Partnership for Peace program or July 1997 enhanced
Partnership for Peace prepared Poland, Hungary, or the Czech Republic. While
the MAP experience would ease some post-accession challenges for invitees, it
remains to be seen if their commitment to common values is sufﬁ cient to moderate
their national interests.

Article 4 operations continue in the Balkans after nine years with NATO’s

IFOR/SFOR and follow-on EU Operation Althea since January 2005 and KFOR
since 1999. On 12 September 2001 NATO re-emerged as an Article 5 as well
as Article 4 post-Cold War alliance. Article 5 was not an empty gesture. NATO
AWACS protected the continental United States and NATO naval forces began
to patrol the eastern Mediterranean (Operation Active Endeavor) on 26 October
2001, widening its area of responsibility to the Strait of Gibraltar on 10 March
2003 and continues operating today. The NAC “planned” operations in and around
Afghanistan, provided support to the Polish-led multinational division in Iraq, and
Partnership for Peace (PFP) has played a role in the Caucasus and Central Asia.
On the one hand, Article 5 was symbolically signiﬁ cant representing transatlantic
solidarity; on the other hand, like the 1978 “dual-track” decision NATO now faces
its most serious test, because the counter-terrorism campaign will be long term and
will severely test the transatlantic relationship.

But the war on terrorism has had another signiﬁ cant impact on the US and

NATO in that Europe is no longer at center of US interest as its attention has shifted
across the Black Sea to the Caucasus and Central Asia. After Article 5’s invoca-
tion, the veil of mystery has lifted and many on both sides of the Atlantic remain
uncomfortable with its implications and obligations. In sum, the post-12 September
security environment necessitates a transatlantic dialogue to “clarify” our under-

96 J.

Simon

standing about what constitutes common risks and obligations under NATO’s
“new” Article 5. The November 2002 Prague Summit did not do this, nor did the
June 2004 Istanbul Summit! Postponing this transatlantic discussion because it is
either too difﬁ cult or might demonstrate the “weakness” of common values in the
face of increasingly divergent national interests, demonstrates the present state of
Alliance affairs. Bur even if we postpone the discussion, as the US, with its new
post-11 September risk assessment, continues to press for European support that
is likely to incur greater dangers and obligations for allies, a more full measure of
the Alliance’s future role in European security will emerge.

Changing security environment: bridges and barriers

Before the Dayton Accords the Balkans had been “Out-of-Area” for NATO;
ever since deployments in Bosnia, Kosovo, and Macedonia, the Balkans have
become part of its area of responsibility. The US has used Balkan bases to
support operations (International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) and Operation
Enduring Freedom (OEF)) in Afghanistan and the Polish-led multinational division
in Iraq (Operation Enduring Freedom (OIF)), and remains in Kosovo KFOR,
which remains a difﬁ cult problem in the Balkans.

Maintaining Balkan stability and

further integration of the West Balkans remains a NATO challenge, particularly
with Montenegro’s recent independence in May 2006 and forthcoming changes in
Kosovo’s future status. The 2004 accession of Slovenia, Romania, and Bulgaria
to NATO has served to stabilize the region by demonstrating to aspirants that
integration is possible, and it strengthens the new members’ ability to shape the
environment by advocating the interests of the Adriatic Charter (MAP members
Albania, Macedonia, and Croatia) as well as Bosnia-Herzegovina, Montenegro,
and Serbia within NATO. The three new southeast European NATO members also
have been willing and able to transfer their experiences to the three MAP Partners,
thereby producing more security inside the Alliance and “transferring” security to
the West Balkans. That, in any case, is the hope.

While the West Balkans now exports less insecurity to its neighbors, unfortunately

the Black Sea region tends to import instability into Europe. These instabilities
come in various forms: organized crime, and trafﬁ cking in humans, drugs, and
arms. Since NATO deploys in the Mediterranean (Operation Active Endeavor),
engages in Afghanistan, and provides support in Iraq, Black Sea bases provide
NATO not only with a bridge, but also, in theory, with a barrier to close this road to
Europe. While the NATO Istanbul Summit communiqué acknowledged the Black
Sea’s importance

(in effect moving it from an “Out-of-Area” concern to NATO

area of responsibility), it was met with French reluctance.

With Romania and Bulgaria now in the Alliance, Ukraine working on an

Action Plan since the Prague Summit,

and Georgia aspiring to join NATO, the

Black Sea is being gradually transformed geo-politically from a former Soviet to
a NATO “lake.” Though the Istanbul Summit communiqué also acknowledged
this new reality by now “putting a special focus on PFP partners in the Caucasus
and Central Asia,”

whether the Black Sea actually becomes a bridge or barrier

NATO enlargement and Russia 97

will largely depend upon Russia (for example, whether it will support or work to
prevent Ukraine’s and Georgia’s outreach to NATO). Optimists note that Russia’s
ﬁ rm opposition to Baltic accession to NATO in 1996 turned to tacit acceptance by
November 2002. Pessimists argue that most Russians still see the world as a zero-
sum game, particularly in this region where several so-called “frozen conﬂ icts”
remain; in Moldova’s Transdniestria, in Georgia’s South Ossetia and Abkhazia,

and Nagorno-Karabakh in Armenia-Azerbaijan.

Russia’s tendency to compete with the Euro-Atlantic community may have been

blunted during the decade of the 1990s when it was economically strapped, but
recent increases in global energy prices may have emboldened Russia to pursue
its interests, such as cutting off energy supplies to Ukraine and Lithuania, even
if it means risking cooperation with the West. If Dmitri Trenin is correct in his
conclusion that “Russia’s leaders have given up on becoming part of the West
and have started creating their own Moscow-centered system,”

then building

“bridges” and “barriers” will become a more difﬁ cult undertaking.

In sum, in the greater Black Sea region PFP needs to provide necessary “barriers”

and “bridges” to the South Caucasus and Caspian energy supplies, while Romania
now in NATO (along with Poland in the North) can play an important partner role
not only by anchoring Ukraine, but also by forming a “bridge” to Moldova. Recent
shifts in Russia’s behavior coupled with political developments in Ukraine since
the March 2006 elections suggest that building Black Sea regional bridges and
barriers may become even more difﬁ cult.

Partnership for peace in the post-Cold War period

After the collapse of the Soviet Union and Warsaw Pact, NATO faced a strategic
challenge: how to shape the post-communist reform process in Central and Eastern
Europe in ways that would foster stability and nurture cooperation on common
security problems. NATO created the North Atlantic Cooperation Council (NACC)
in December 1991 to promote dialogue on common security concerns with these
countries and the USSR. The NACC dialogue bridged the former East–West divide
and illuminated opportunities for practical cooperation. NACC also helped Central
and East European politicians understand that defense requirements are best rooted
in democratic politics and that national security encompassed civil emergency
planning and a broader range of concerns, not just the military.

Partnership for Peace, which built on NACC, has undergone enormous change

since it was launched in January of 1994. The program was designed to allow
for practical cooperation between NATO and non-members on a bilateral and
multilateral basis and to prepare aspirants for entry into the Alliance, which was
not yet ready to accept new members. Though many aspirants initially saw PFP
as a “policy for postponement,” it did address some of their security concerns and
established the norm that partners should also make contributions to common
security.

Continued partner pressure for membership and political shifts in the

West led NATO to initiate a Study on NATO Enlargement that made clear to all
that PFP was the best path to NATO membership.

98 J.

Simon

Within six months of launching PFP, there were roughly two-dozen partners

in the program, to include most of the newly independent states of the former
Soviet Union. PFP architects wrestled to identify the most useful forms of
cooperation and found military exercises and training generated great interest.
Initially, roughly a dozen partners participated in the Partnership Coordination
Cell (PCC) at Mons, Belgium, to coordinate and plan military exercises for search
and rescue, humanitarian assistance, and peacekeeping operations. The PCC’s
terms of reference expanded to include “peace enforcement operations” after the
December 1995 Dayton Accords and NATO’s decision to allow partners to deploy
peacekeepers in the Bosnia IFOR

and follow-on SFOR.

Another focal point

was internal defense reform – that is the so-called Planning and Review Process
(PARP).

The July 1997 Madrid Summit issued invitations to Poland, Hungary, and the

Czech Republic to join the Alliance. It also “enhanced” PFP to be more relevant
and operational.

The Madrid Summit also marked the introduction of the EAPC

that replaced the NACC, and the creation of the NATO–Russia Permanent Joint
Council (PJC) and NATO–Ukraine Commission to enhance consultation and
cooperation with Russia and Ukraine.

By the April 1999 Washington Summit, Poland, Hungary, and the Czech

Republic had just become the ﬁ rst PFP partners to join the Alliance, which was
then heavily engaged in a bombing campaign of Serbia. In the KFOR, sixteen PFP
partners contributed to the operation,

in addition to NATO’s three new allies. The

Summit also approved the new Alliance Strategic Concept, which underscored
the importance of partnerships, launched a Defense Capabilities Initiative (DCI)
to improve operability among Alliance forces and, where applicable, between
Alliance and partner forces in non-Article 5 operations. It also approved a third
PARP cycle that further enhanced partner force planning procedures to make
them more closely resemble the NATO Defense Planning Questionnaire (DPQ).

The 1999 Summit also introduced the MAP as a visible manifestation of NATO’s
“Open Door” (Article 10) policy with a clear set of Allied expectations from
prospective members.

The MAP Annual National Plans (ANPs) generated by

the nine

aspirant partners would allow each to set its own objectives and targets

on preparations for possible future membership. This framework and experience
prepared PFP well for the challenges of the war on terrorism.

Building a cooperative security climate after 11 September

Since 11 September 2001, NATO and many partner governments have struggled,
with varying degrees of success, to reshape their defense capabilities to deal with
the new risks posed by global terrorism. While the defense budgets of most other
long-time NATO allies have remained unchanged and the overall capabilities gap
between the US and other allies has widened, NATO committed itself to a broader
functional and wider geographic area of engagement.

Still, as NATO began to “plan” operations in and around Afghanistan, PFP

demonstrated its utility in bolstering and facilitating NATO operations in the

NATO enlargement and Russia 99

Caucasus and Central Asia. Moreover, at their ﬁ rst meeting after the 9/11 attacks,
EAPC defense ministers reafﬁ rmed their determination to exploit PFP to increase
cooperation and capabilities against terrorism. Consistent with NATO’s realization
that it must place greater emphasis on meeting the challenges of asymmetric
warfare, the EAPC approved new PARP ministerial guidance

and adopted an

Action Plan 2002–04 and the Civil Emergency Action Plan regarding possible
chemical, biological, or radiological attacks.

To better address these challenges, the November 2002 Prague Summit approved

the Prague Capabilities Commitment (PCC), NATO Response Force (NRF), and
new NATO command structure. The small NATO Response Force with high tech
capabilities for expeditionary missions was its centerpiece. If implemented, these
initiatives would provide a more constructive burden-sharing arrangement for
NATO in the post-9/11 risk environment.

The Prague Summit also endorsed the military Concept for Defense against

Terrorism that calls for “improved intelligence sharing and crisis response
arrangements [and commitment with partners] to fully implement the Civil
Emergency Planning (CEP) Action Plan … against possible attacks by …
chemical, biological or radiological (CBR) agents.”

So too, the EAPC adopted

the Partnership Action Plan against Terrorism (PAP-T) on 22 November 2002
that commits partners to take a number of steps to combat terrorism at home and
share information and experience.

The PAP-T does establish a framework upon

which NATO allies and partners are likely to be engaged in these areas for years
to come.

Although the International Security Assistance Force operations in Afghanistan

(ISAF) commenced in January 2002 with participation of several allies and PFP
partners, NATO did not assume command until 11 August 2003.

In addition,

in US Central Command’s (CENTCOM) Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF)
in Afghanistan, many NATO allies (to include two new ones – Poland and the
Czech Republic) and six PFP partners

rendered substantial assistance. Finally,

after Saddam Hussein had been toppled in Iraq, NATO provided intelligence and
logistical support to the Polish-led multinational division,

comprising many allies

and eleven partners, which engaged in stabilization efforts as part of Operation
Iraqi Freedom (OIF).

When NATO assumed command of ISAF, this marked the ﬁ rst mission in its

history outside the Euro-Atlantic area. Initially ISAF’s mandate was restricted to
security in and around Kabul. In December 2003, the NAC authorized expanding
ISAF to take over command of the German-led Provincial Reconstruction Team
(PRT) in Kunduz, leaving eight other PRTs under the US-led OEF military opera-
tion against terrorists in Afghanistan. During 2004, NATO assumed command
of four other PRTs in the north, and in 2005 expanded to two other PRTs in the
west. In December 2005, NATO decided to further expand to the south. As of
31 July 2006 the expanded ISAF comprises 18,500 troops from 37 NATO and
non-NATO countries and covers 13 PRTs accounting for approximately 75 percent
of Afghanistan’s territory, while the US-led OEF coalition retains responsibility
for counter-terrorist missions in the east.

100 J.

Simon

A way ahead: a strategic vision for PFP’s revival

To keep PFP relevant and effective over the next decade, partners need to focus on
developing capabilities to combat terrorism and other transnational threats. New
programs could focus on making interior ministries, police, and border guards
more effective. A revived partnership also now needs to improve its intelligence
cooperation to include sharing of interior (police and border control) and ﬁ nance
(banking) information. Finally, PFP’s budget and functions need to be reexamined
and updated to support future counter terrorist operations to include the counter-
proliferation efforts and missile defense systems outlined in the PAP-T.

Added to these broader functional and wider geographic challenges facing the

Alliance, the relationship between NATO members and PFP partners is changing
dramatically. With seven MAP partners acceding to membership in 2004, there are
more NATO allies (26) than partners (23 – leaving Russia and Ukraine, who, while
also members of PFP, have special bilateral relationships with NATO). Allies will
be struggling with the transformation of their own armed forces and security sector
institutions, and with completing the integration of the 10 newest members. The 23
remaining partners have diverse security interests and the majority of them have
much weaker defense establishments and governmental institutions

than those

now joining the Alliance.

Making Black Sea regional cooperation a reality

The greater Black Sea region has acquired increased strategic importance to
NATO in recent years, particularly since the Alliance assumed command of ISAF
in Afghanistan and provided support to the Polish-led division in Iraq. However,
regional security dialogue and cooperation in this region has been complicated by
lingering disputes, weak governance, and other problems. While there has been
dialogue on economic cooperation in the region, Black Sea regional security
cooperation remains embryonic. It is time to apply the successful lessons of
regional security cooperation in Central and Southeast European to the greater
Black Sea region. The ﬁ rst step to stabilize the region is to build understanding
through discussion of security risks, and then to build greater regional cooperation
through implementation of military activities in support of a transparent agenda.
What options should the participants consider?

The successful Balkan cooperation initiatives – Southeast European Defense

Ministerial (SEDM), Southeast European Cooperation Initiative (SECI), and
Southeast European Brigade (SEEBRIG) – could both serve as models for the
Caucasus and extend their beneﬁ ts throughout the greater Black Sea littoral.

The Central and East European experience since the late 1980s also provides

several successful examples of using military cooperation to build conﬁ dence and
regional security among wary neighbors that could be applied to improve inter-
state relations in the greater Black Sea region. These include: Romania–Hungary
military contacts to improve otherwise cool political relations in the early 1990s,
the continued deployment of the Czech–Slovak battalion in UNPROFOR and
UNCHRO during and after the January 1993 “Velvet divorce,” the Polish–Ukraine

NATO enlargement and Russia 101

Battalion in Kosovo (and Iraq), and the formation of the Baltic Battalion
(BALTBAT) and SEEBRIG to foster regional cooperation in the Baltic and the
Balkan regions respectively. Adapting some of these experiences as models for
application within the Caucasus and with NATO’s three Black Sea allies (two new
in 2004) and partners and other willing NATO allies, under a revived PFP could go
a long way in advancing greater Black Sea cooperation and stability, and advance
NATO’s cooperative security interests.

There are some existing foundations upon which to build security cooperation

in this region:

1 Organization of the Black Sea Economic Cooperation (BSEC) BSEC was
formed in 1992 to promote regional cooperation on economic, transportation,
energy, and environmental issues. BSEC is an organization comprising all six
littoral states among its 12-state membership roster.

In 1998 it composed a

Working Group to combat crime and deal with natural disasters. In 2002 BSEC
established Working Groups to deal with border controls, crisis management, and
counter-terrorism, and in early December 2004 its ministers of interior agreed to
create a network of liaison ofﬁ ces. BSEC also provides a forum for the 12 Black
Sea foreign ministers to discuss security issues.

2 Blackseafor This Black Sea naval task force comprising the six maritime Black
Sea states was formally established in April 2001 with tasks of search and rescue
operations, humanitarian assistance, mine counter measures, environmental pro-
tection, and goodwill visits. Starting in August 2001, Blackseafor has convened
annual 30-day maritime activation exercises under changing national command
starting with Turkey, then Ukraine, Bulgaria, Georgia and Romania. In January
2004 the Turks began to transform the Blackseafor into a more dynamic instrument
to deal with new maritime risks. Rather than convening for exercises for one month
(usually in August) each year, Blackseafor has decided to establish a permanent
operation control center, draft a multilateral memorandum of understanding for
information exchange among its members, and carry out unscheduled activations
to shadow and trail suspicious ships. (Maritime control of the Black Sea is easier
than the Mediterranean with the transit of only 300 compared to 4,000 ships per
day respectively.) Finally, Blackseafor on 31 March 2005 agreed to broaden its
mandate to ﬁ ght terrorism as well as WMD proliferation by adopting a document
entitled “Maritime Risk Assessment in the Black Sea.”

3 Black Sea Harmony In March 2004, the Turkish navy initiated a new security
initiative Black Sea Harmony with the same objectives as NATO’s Operation Ac-
tive Endeavor in the Mediterranean (i.e. to assist in establishing a maritime picture
along the sea lines of communication and to shadow suspect ships). Covering
roughly 40 percent (the southern portion) of the Black Sea, after 16 months of oper-
ation Turkish naval assets have conducted 12,000 hailings and have conducted 195
port visits by coast guard and other law enforcement agencies. Recently, Turkey
extended an invitation to other littoral states to join Black Sea Harmony. Ukraine

102 J.

Simon

and Russia have declared their intention to join the operation. Multilateralizing
Black Sea Harmony could become not only a model for Blackseafor, but also might
be subordinated to it after it completes its transformation. NATO’s new allies,
Bulgaria and Romania,

though, remain unenthusiastic about these efforts, seeing

them as forms of Turkish and Russian domination respectively. Hence, Turkey’s
preferred approach appears to be to maintain its dominance by preventing NATO
from extending Operation Active Endeavor into the Black Sea. Turkey claims the
enduring utility and immutability of the 1936 Montreux Convention, giving Turkey
control over the Bosporus and the Dardanelles, while expressing willingness to
share information from Black Sea Harmony and Blackseafor with NATO.

One can envision the creation of real Black Sea regional cooperation to deal not

only with civil emergency contingencies, such as the earthquakes that perennially
strike the region or potential chemical, biological or radiological (CBR) incidents,
but also to interdict the trafﬁ cking of drugs, weapons, and humans across, particu-
larly if Ukraine and Russia participated. In addition to inter-state cooperation, US
policy can also help improve Black Sea cooperation and stability. The likely new
US presence in Bulgaria and Romania can be leveraged to improve interoperability
through development of joint training and joint logistics facilities and in working
with SECI to improve Black Sea barriers. Coupled with Romania, Bulgaria and
Turkey – now NATO’s three Black Sea allies with a rich experience in SEDM
and SEEBRIG – the US presence could be beneﬁ cial in fostering wider Black Sea
cooperation under a revived PFP program.

Since the continued engagement of Ukraine in PFP is important, the US and

NATO were considering commencing intensified dialogues with Ukraine as
a prerequisite to joining the MAP, if Ukraine’s 26 March 2006 parliamentary
elections were held in accordance with OSCE standards and adhered to Ukrainian
constitutional procedures (and if Ukraine really wants to join). At the same time,
Ukraine’s relations with Russia have always had to be balanced with its desires
for a Euro-Atlantic orientation.

Despite improvement in relations with Russia after the disintegration for the

former Soviet Union, Ukraine commenced cooperation with Georgia, Azerbaijan,
and Moldova on 10 October 1997 by establishing a consultative forum called
GUAM as a potential counterweight, which Uzbekistan joined in April 1999,
changing the name of the group to GUUAM. Though a 6–7 June 2001 summit in
Yalta formalized the organization by signing a Charter that recognized sovereignty
of members and stressed economic cooperation, developing transport links, and
strengthening regional security,

the organization initially stagnated. This changed

with the so-called “color revolutions” in Georgia in 2003 and Ukraine in 2004–
05

and a pro-Western and anti-Russian shift in the Moldovan political agenda,

coupled with the emergence of increased cooperation and coordination among the
three countries. This shift became evident during the 21 April 2005 CIS foreign
ministers session in Moscow, when the three countries not only lodged complaints
against Russian restrictions on some of their products, but also proposed to discuss
the “frozen conﬂ icts,” and supported Ukraine’s proposal to condemn the 1930s
famine (Holodomor) as genocide. The shift in shared views toward Euro-Atlantic

NATO enlargement and Russia 103

integration was evident at the 22 April 2005 GUUAM summit in Moldova,
which Uzbekistan did not attend, giving ofﬁ cial notice on 5 May 2005 that it was
withdrawing from the organization, leading to the organization’s name changing
back to GUAM.

On 22–23 May 2006 the four GUAM presidents announced plans to institu-

tionalize the organization by establishing headquarters in Kyiv, rename the
organization to GUAM Organization for Democracy and Economic Development,
and invite Romania and Bulgaria to join. The summit’s declaration reafﬁ rmed
the members goals to create a “regional space of democracy, security, and stable
economic and social development,” a determination to pursue their common
European choice, and to pursue policies to strengthen relations with the EU and
NATO.

At the ﬁ nal press conference President Yushchenko noted, “The name

itself indi cates that our key goals are Euro-Atlantic integration. The next stage
will be cooperation on organizing the work of our border guards and customs
services.”

President Ilkham Aliev of Azerbaijan supported Yushchenko adding

that they had discussed transporting new hydrocarbon sources from the Caspian
adding that oil from Azerbaijan would ﬁ ll Ukraine’s Odessa–Brody pipeline.

Georgian president Mikhail Saakashvili and Moldovan president Vladimir Voronin
criticized Russia’s ban on their wine imports noting that they were debating the
value of remaining in the CIS adding that it was important to develop a free trade
regime among GUAM members and to expand the organization to Bulgaria and
Romania who will soon be in the European Union.

In sum, while some of Ukraine’s political leaders professed a desire to pursue

Euro-Atlantic integration objectives, their failure to build domestic support since
the Orange Revolution has increasingly endangered the fulﬁ llment of that goal in
light of Russia’s opposition, hardening intransigence, and increasing political and
economic inﬂ uence in Ukraine. Ukraine’s struggle against herself manifest during
the December 2004 presidential elections remained unresolved after the March
2006 parliamentary elections and resulting government formation. The impact of
a Ukrainian government led by Prime Minister Viktor Yanukovych (Party of the
Regions (PRU)) in co-habitation with President Viktor Yuschenko’s “orange”
Our Ukraine bloc on Ukraine’s policy toward either Russia and/or a Euro-Atlantic
orientation remains to be seen.

Although all three South Caucasus partners were 1994 signatories of PFP, their

participation has varied considerably, and only recently become more prominent.
This has been particularly evident with PARP, which remains the core of transparent
defense planning, accountability, and democratic oversight of the military and
provides the foundation to enhance sub-regional cooperation. After 9/11, all three
South Caucasus partners joined the PARP.

Though Armenia participates in PFP, cooperation with NATO remains con-

tro versial because of unresolved problems with Turkey and Azerbaijan. Armenia
has good relations with Greece, Romania, and Bulgaria and remains very close to
Russia. An original signatory of the 15 May 1992 Tashkent CIS Collective Security
Treaty with Russia, Armenia was the only Caucasus state to renew its commitment
for another ﬁ ve years on 2 April 1999.

104 J.

Simon

While Azerbaijan and Georgia signed the CIS treaty in 1993, they withdrew

from it in April 1999. Azerbaijan’s principal security concerns are its conﬂ ict with
Armenia over Nagorno-Karabakh and problems with terrorism, drugs, crime, and
human trafﬁ cking. Georgia participates in Black Sea regional organizations, wants
NATO to play a role in solving the Abkhazian and South Ossetian conﬂ icts on
Georgian soil, and in September 2002 its parliament adopted a resolution endorsing
the goal of NATO membership. The US has assisted the Georgian armed forces
through the Train and Equip Program and in establishing control over the Pankisi
Gorge near the border with Russia. In response to the Istanbul Communique call
for further “efforts to build upon existing forms of regional [South Caucasus]
cooperation,”

Georgia and Azerbaijan have stressed their participation in PFP’s

Individual Partnership Action Plan (IPAP), in Kosovo’s KFOR, in Operation Iraqi
Freedom (and Operation Enduring Freedom in Afghanistan), and profess they want
to join NATO. South Caucasus regional cooperation exercises have been held in
Tbilisi in 2002 and Yerevan in 2003; though the September 2004 cancellation of a
planned PFP exercise in Baku was a setback. NATO will present special PAP-DIB
action plans on democratization to Georgia and Azerbaijan.

As a PFP Partner, Russia prefers maintaining its autonomy, rather than feel-

ing the need to “belong” and is not seriously interested in defense reform. While
NATO is no longer the bogeyman that it once was, and some Russians see it is a
cooperation partner, they do not regard it as an integration partner. Russia is no
longer imperialistic but is increasingly nationalistic. While the US realignment
of forces reﬂ ects a new US geo-Eurasian perspective with a clear Middle Eastern
focus, it does not necessarily imply across-the-board competition.

From the Russian perspective, while the inclusion of the Baltic States in NATO

is not a tragedy, real problems could result if it leads to a permanent military pres-
ence. If Ukraine, Georgia, and Azerbaijan move closer to NATO, greater tension
also will result. After Russia’s experience with Mikhail Saakashvili in Georgia’s
Adjaria, South Ossetia and Abkhazia remain unstable and likely to become more
problematic. Nagorno-Karabakh continues to fester between Azerbaijan and
Armenia. With a new greater Black Sea political geography in the making there is a
danger that Russia and NATO can misread each other. From a Russian perspective,
the Black Sea is being transformed from a former Soviet lake, to a NATO lake;
hence the need for Russia and Turkey to communicate with NATO as to what each
expects regarding stability.

Turkey has the largest coastline on the Black Sea and is concerned about US

intentions in the area. Turkey has also signed an Action Plan with Russia in 2002
that has brought about signiﬁ cant reconciliation between the two large Black Sea
states. Turkish perceptions of Black Sea security have been inﬂ uenced in part
by the increase in the shipping volumes of dangerous cargoes such as petroleum
products crossing the Straits every day. In 2004, 150 million tons of mostly Russian
oil crossed the Straits. Though these tankers pose a major security risk, Turkey
expects a decrease after September 2005 when the Baku–Tbilisi–Ceyhan pipeline
will ease the Black Sea oil ﬂ ow. Increased Turkish–Russian cooperation is reﬂ ected
in the fact that 60 percent of Turkey’s natural gas comes from Russia, which is

NATO enlargement and Russia 105

now its second largest trading partner. Both want stability in the South Caucasus
and Central Asia and share concerns about US efforts to promote democracy there
as contributing to instability.

This is particularly important because “frozen conﬂ icts” remain, particularly in

Transdniestria (which will be affected when Romania joins the EU), South Ossetia
and Abkhazia (where US and Russian cooperation is needed), and Nagorno-
Karabakh (which requires cooperation among the US, Russia and Turkey), but
also to deal with rising ethnic tensions among Crimean Tartars. Russia’s most
important threat is Chechnya and North Ossetia, which Black Sea regional activi-
ties and organizations will not address, while the frozen conﬂ icts, in which Black
Sea organizations can play a role, remain Turkey’s most important threat. In sum,
the challenge of how to incorporate the Blackseafor/Black Sea Harmony into a
“greater” Black Sea regional security process will depend in large part on Russia
and Turkey. NATO’s approval at the Istanbul Summit to improve arrangements
with the region by adding two liaison ofﬁ cers and creating a new special repre-
sentative for the Caucasus and Central Asia on the International Staff has sparked
hope for positive NATO engagement.

NATO and European security

The US has greater inﬂ uence among South Caucasus (and Central Asian) partners
than NATO (and EU) structures per se because NATO has been more hampered by
what it can offer in terms of assistance.

But this can change if the NATO Security

Investment Program (NSIP) was more directly focused on the region and the PFP
Trust Fund was made more robust.

The Istanbul Summit communiqué recognized the importance of the Black Sea

region for Euro-Atlantic security. While the Black Sea serves as a barrier against
potential threats for NATO/EU and as an important security bridge connecting the
Mediterranean to the Caucasus and Caspian, there is no geo-political unity to the
greater Black Sea region. Rather than a spirit of cooperation (that is only now slowly
emerging in the Balkans after multiple wars and nine years of peacekeeping), the
Black Sea region is home to nations with competitive agendas viewing the world in
zero-sum terms. The limitations to building regional cooperation have been evident
in earlier Black Sea regional efforts that have not lived up to expectations.

The EU’s “good neighborhood” policy also has put the South Caucasus on its

radar screen, but its willingness to commit resources remains very unclear. The EU
committed itself to the region when it invited Turkey to begin accession negotiations
in December 2004. Hence, there is a need for a dual-track Black Sea approach;
ﬁ rst, strengthen NATO/EU cooperation to play a leading role in the region, and
second, use PFP to enhance Black Sea regional security cooperation led by Turkey,
Romania and Bulgaria, particularly with Russia (and Ukraine). Promoting Black
Sea regional cooperation has particular relevance for NATO in that all the greater
Black Sea Partners have signed the Partnership Action Plan Against Terrorism.

NATO’s new members Romania and Bulgaria strongly support developing

Black Sea regional cooperation building on the lessons from SEDM. But Black Sea

106 J.

Simon

regional organizations will be more difﬁ cult to build because of the predominance
of competitive national agendas, and because of the difﬁ culty of creating an
institution before the outbreak of conﬂ ict. (SEDM was built after Balkan wars.)
Also important factors in the potential success of the Black Sea process will be
how or whether Russia (inﬂ uencing Ukraine) will participate; and how Turkey’s
EU integration agenda evolves.

In summary, NATO’s role in European security has changed substantially, not

only since the post-Cold War era arose in 1991, but also since the post-9/11 era
opened, as has the European security environment. In order to meet the post-9/11
chal lenges, NATO has assumed wider regional and broader functional security
cooperation obligations requiring it to cooperate and coordinate its efforts with
the EU. If NATO and the EU fail to build the necessary cooperation, each alone
does not have the sufﬁ cient functional tools to effectively meet the wider regional
challenges. If the two succeed in building the necessary cooperation, the basis of
a new transatlantic relationship can be established and European security will be
enhanced.

Notes

1 Robert Kagan, Of Paradise and Power: America and Europe in the New World Order

(New York: Vintage Books, 2004), pp. 12–27.

2 “London Declaration on a Transformed North Atlantic Alliance,” issued by the Heads

of State and Government participating in the meeting of the North Atlantic Council in
London, para. 7, 6 July 1990.

3 “Rome Declaration on Peace and Cooperation,” issued by the Heads of State and

Government participating in the meeting of the North Atlantic Council in Rome, para.
11. Press Release S-1 (91) 86, 8 November 1991.

4 “Declaration of the Heads of State and Government Participating in the Meeting of

the North Atlantic Council in Brussels,” para. 13. Press Communiqué M-1 (94) 3, 11
January 1994.

5 “Madrid Declaration on Euro-Atlantic Security and Cooperation,” issued by the Heads

of State and Government participating in the meeting of the North Atlantic Council in
Madrid, para. 8 (8 July 1997).

6 Vilnius Statement, 19 May 2000, issued at Vilnius Conference on “NATO’s Role in

Changing Security Environment in Europe.”

7 See Jeffrey Simon, NATO Expeditionary Operations: Impacts Upon New Members

and Partners, Occasional Paper No. 1 (Washington, D.C.: National Defense University
Press, March 2005).

8 Istanbul Summit Communiqué issued by the Heads of State and Government Participating

in the Meeting of the North Atlantic Council, 28 June 2004, para. 41. (NATO Press
Release (2004) 096, 28 June 2004.

9 On 15 July 2004 President Leonid Kuchma issued a decree removing Ukraine’s prepara-

tions for NATO membership from Ukraine’s ofﬁ cial military doctrine. RFE/RL Newsline,
Vol. 8, No. 141, 27 July 2004. As Sergei Karaganov has noted, this could only be a

NATO enlargement and Russia 107

temporary measure. “The next president could change the doctrine and restore it.”; Valeria
Korchagina “Putin Tells the West Not To Meddle in Ukraine,” The Moscow Times.com
(27 July 2004). In fact, this is exactly what President Viktor Yuschenko did.

10 Istanbul Communiqué, para. 31.
11 While Saakashvili quickly dealt with Adjaria, it remains to be seen how long-lasting

this resolution will be.

12 Dmitri Trenin, “Russia Leaves the West,” Foreign Affairs, Vol. 85, No. 4 (July–August

2006), p. 87.

13 These occurred in the form of Individual Partnership Programs (IPPs) and self-

differentiation. It marked the establishment of a wide environment of cooperation
to include Participation in the Planning and Review Process (PARP), peace support
operations in the Partnership Coordination Cell (PCC), transparency, and democratic
oversight of the military.

14 The Study on NATO Enlargement, briefed to Partners in September 1995, incorporated

the principles of political democracy, economic free enterprise, equitable treatment of
ethnic minorities, good neighbor relations, and democratic oversight of the military, as
essential elements of being a “producer” of security into NATO “acquis.”

15 The following 14 (of 26) PFP partners participated in IFOR: Austria, Finland and

Sweden; the Czech Republic, Hungary and Poland; Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Albania,
Bulgaria and Romania; and Russia and Ukraine.

16 Later Ireland, Slovakia, and Slovenia also joined SFOR.
17 The ﬁ rst PARP cycle launched in 1995 had 14 participants: Hungary, Poland, Czech

Republic, Latvia, Lithuania, Estonia, Slovakia, Slovenia, Romania, Bulgaria, Finland,
Sweden, Albania and Ukraine. Anthony Cragg, “The Partnership For Peace and Review
Process,” NATO Review, Vol. 43, No. 6 (November 1995), pp. 23–5.

18 The second PARP cycle launched in October 1996, which introduced interoperability

objectives to permit partners’ forces to operate with allies, had 18 partners sign up.

19 The 16 partners participating in KFOR included: Austria, Finland, Ireland, Sweden and

Switzerland; Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Slovakia, Slovenia, Romania and Bulgaria;
Russia and Ukraine; and Georgia and Azerbaijan from the Caucasus.

20 In essence, Partnership Goals (PGs) for Interoperability and for Forces and Capabilities

would replace the old interoperability objectives in 2000. The new PGs aimed to develop
speciﬁ c armed forces and capabilities that partners could offer in support of NATO
operations and to permit partners in the EAPC greater participation in deliberations
involving exercise planning.

21 The MAP identiﬁ ed ﬁ ve partner areas (political/economic, defense/military, resources,

security, and legal) that were necessary to develop the capabilities needed for
membership.

22 Croatia only joined PFP after the Washington Summit on 25 May 2000; later in May

2002 it joined the MAP.

23 The EAPC met 19 December 2001. Now 19 partners participated in PARP as Uzbekistan

and Kazakhstan followed Azerbaijan, Georgia and Armenia.

24 Prague Summit Declaration Issued by the Heads of State and Government of the

Atlantic Council in Prague on 21 November 2002. NATO Press Release (2002) 127,
21 November 2002.

108 J.

Simon

25 See Partnership Action Plan Against Terrorism, 22 November 2002, paras 16.1–16.5.

This initiative called on partners to: intensify political consultations and information
sharing on armaments and civil emergency planning; enhance preparedness for
combating terrorism by security sector reforms and force planning, air defense and
air trafﬁ c management, and armaments and logistics cooperation; impede support for
terrorist groups by enhancing exchange of banking information and improving border
controls of arms ranging from Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD) to small arms
and light weapons; enhance capabilities to contribute to consequence management
of WMD-related terrorism and civil emergency planning; and provide assistance to
partners’ efforts against terrorism through the Political Military Steering Committee
(PMSC) Clearing House mechanism and the creation of a PFP Trust Fund.

26 Participants in ISAF were: PFP partners Finland, Sweden and Austria; MAP member

Albania; and NATO invitees Romania and Bulgaria.

27 Participants in OEF were: Central Asian partners Kyrgyzstan and Uzbekistan; Black

Sea partners Romania, Bulgaria and Ukraine; and MAP invitee Slovakia; with new
members Poland and the Czech Republic.

28 SHAPE assisted Warsaw’s orientation and force generation conferences, the NATO

School at Oberammergau helped train the multinational staff, AFSOUTH supported
the Warsaw planning staff on logistics planning, NATO assisted the Poles to establish a
secure satellite communications link and provided intelligence sharing and information
management. NATO Press Release (2003) 93, 3 September 2002.

29 Participants in OIF were: MAP member Macedonia; MAP invitees Slovakia, Latvia,

Lithuania and Estonia; Ukraine, Romania and Bulgaria on the Black Sea; Azerbaijan
and Georgia in the Caucasus; and Kazakhstan in Central Asia.

30 The ﬁ ve exceptions are the “advanced” partners: Sweden, Finland, Austria, Switzerland

and Ireland.

31 In addition to the six littoral states – Turkey, Bulgaria, Romania, Ukraine, Russia and

Georgia – BSEC’s original members included: Greece, Albania, Moldova, Armenia and
Azerbaijan. In June 2002, BSEC enlarged to include Serbia-Montenegro. For further
background on BSEC, see http://www.bsec-organization.org/.

32 In fact, on separate occasions responsible Bulgarians and Romanians have gone so far

as to suggest privately that US ships could operate on the Black Sea under their ﬂ ag to
circumvent Montreux restrictions.

33 Liz Fuller, “GUUAM: Ukraine Aspires to Leadership Role in Revitalized Organization,”

Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty, 27 April 2005. Also see Yalta GUUAM Charter,
http://www.ukrainaemb.lv/guuam.htm.

34  Askar Akayev was also overthrown in Kyrgyzstan.
35  Eurasia Daily Monitor, Vol. 3, Issue 102, The Jamestown Foundation, 25 May 2006.
36  Richard  Beeston,  The Times (UK), 24 May 2006.
37  President Aliev reiterated this theme at the 5 June 2006 Black Sea Forum in Bucharest,

Romania, in the presence of Romanian president Basescu and Ukrainian president
Yushchenko.

38 Ibid., para. 41.
39 The US, for over a decade, has been working closely with Georgia (and Uzbekistan in

Central Asia) on training forces to deal with their internal requirements.

NATO, the European Union,
Russia and the ﬁ ght against
terrorism

Peter R. Neumann

Introduction

The notion of September 11, 2001, as “a day that changed the world” has become
a truism. Al Qaeda’s dramatic attacks on Washington, D.C., and New York have
led to two wars, a realignment of international alliances and coalitions, as well
as – more generally – a distinct and almost instantaneous sense that a new chapter
of international relations is about to be written. Indeed, according to John Lewis
Gaddis, if the fall of the Berlin Wall signiﬁ ed the end of the Cold War, the fall of
the Twin Towers marked the end of the post-Cold War era.

It seems almost natural,

therefore, that intellectuals and policymakers have engaged in a sustained, though
not always systematic, effort to reassess the continued relevance of major actors,
relationships and institutions. The EU and Russia are two particularly interesting
cases in point. Whereas Russia signiﬁ ed the antagonism of the Cold War era, the
European Union came to symbolize the hopes and aspirations in the immediate
aftermath of the East–West confrontation – a period in which many believed that
democracy and cooperation had eventually won the day.

While it will be impossible to examine all the complex and sometimes diffuse

changes that have occurred in the relationship between Russia and the EU, as
well as their respective positions in the wider international system generally, the
purpose of this paper is provide a snapshot of some of the issues and dynamics at
the heart of this process. First, as terrorism appears to be one of the most signiﬁ cant
drivers of Western security policy in the post-9/11 era, I will assess whether
Russia has a signiﬁ cant role to play in the ﬁ ght against it. Second, I will focus on
whether the EU can be effective as an institutional mechanism through which to
conduct a partnership with Russia on this issue. The argument presented here is
that Russia’s role in the ﬁ ght against terrorism is critical, but that the European
Union – for political as well as institutional reasons – is not the channel through
which this partnership should be pursued. I will conclude that, though the European
Union may have a role to play in facilitating and coordinating assistance, bilateral
relationships between EU member states and Russia will remain the predominant
mode of cooperation. Indeed, given the EU’s inherent and structural limitations,
European countries would be well-advised to look beyond Europe and consider
the idea of a pragmatic “division of labor” that would allow for collaboration and

112 P.R.

Neumann

partnership with others – principally, of course, Europe’s North American partners
– in order to perform tasks that they cannot carry out themselves.

Russia’s role in the ﬁ ght against terrorism

At ﬁ rst sight, Russia appears to be at the margins of the international campaign
against terrorism. Most of the terrorism we are currently faced with is of Middle
Eastern origin. And while Russia has a substantial Muslim minority (about
20 million people), it is not generally perceived as a major source of recruits, fund-
ing of logistical support for the global Salaﬁ jihad – especially when compared to
states like Saudi Arabia, Egypt, or even some Western European countries. This
impres sion, however, is almost entirely wrong. Indeed, I would argue that Russia’s
role in the global ﬁ ght against terrorism is pivotal, and that much of our success in
thwarting the terrorist threat depends on whether we can help (or persuade) Russia
to play a constructive role.

In order to appreciate Russia’s signiﬁ cance, it is essential to develop a strategic

under standing of the threat. Terrorism is not a deﬁ nable enemy. It is a tactic, some-
times a strategy, and most experts agree that it is virtually impossible to eliminate
it altogether.

Furthermore, hardly anyone would argue that conventional terrorist

attacks like those in Madrid or London represent an existential threat to our way
of life, however unnecessary and tragic the loss of life in each of these instances
may have been. From a strategic point of view, therefore, the threat is “manage-
able,” and it will eventually be brought under control by a combination of good
police work, increased intelligence capacities, effective risk communication, and
a more systematic way of engaging vulnerable communities. The one exception,
of course, is the possibility of terrorists acquiring weapons of mass destruction
(WMD), especially nuclear weapons. Armed with a nuclear device, terrorists could
kill not hundreds or thousands, but hundreds of thousands. They could threaten and
coerce even the most powerful states, forcing them to reorder their national priori-
ties and give up on vital interests. Jonathan Schell recently remarked that the use of
a nuclear device by terrorists would alter the dynamics of international politics as
profoundly as the end of the Cold War, and that – however small the probability –
our grand strategy should be geared towards preventing terrorists from obtaining a
nuclear weapon.

In fact, there now seems to be a relatively broad consensus among

Western scholars and policymakers that stopping the proliferation of WMD tops
the list of strategic priorities in the ﬁ ght against terrorism.

Most of the proposals aimed at curbing the spread of WMD consist of two main

elements, both of which underline Russia’s central role. The ﬁ rst is the need to
secure loose nuclear materials. Before its collapse in 1991, the Soviet Union had
more than 35,000 nuclear weapons as well as sufﬁ cient weapons-grade plutonium
and enriched uranium to produce another 50,000.

With the Ukraine, Belarus and

Kazakhstan agreeing to end their nuclear power status, the main responsibility for
dealing with this legacy now lies with Russia. While there have been no conﬁ rmed
reports of stolen or missing nuclear weapons, experts believe that substantial
numbers are unaccounted for. Also, there is ample evidence of a signiﬁ cant black

The European Union, Russia, and the fight against terrorism 113

market in nuclear materials, with almost two hundred reported smuggling incidents
in the 1990s alone.

Although numerous “threat reduction” initiatives have been

undertaken in order to help Russia establish full control of its nuclear stockpiles, the
country continues to be seen as the most likely source for terrorist WMD. In early
2004, Graham Allison estimated that half of the Soviet nuclear arsenal “remains
inadequately secured.”

The second main strand of most anti-proliferation strategies aims at limiting the

number of nuclear powers. In this respect, Russia’s position is almost as signiﬁ cant
as in relation to the ﬁ rst. As one of a very small number of states with the know-
how, the technology and the necessary materials to construct WMD, it is critically
important that Russia continues to observe the Non-Proliferation Treaty. More
speciﬁ cally, it is not only in the Western interest that Moscow refrains from selling
its expertise to the highest bidder, but also that it prevents aspiring nuclear powers
from recruiting Russian scientists or inﬁ ltrating Russian nuclear installations.

Not least, given its position as a permanent member of the United Nations

Security Council, Russia could play a vital part in making global anti-proliferation
policies effective. Only with the full support of Russia will it be possible to present
aspiring nuclear powers – especially, of course, Iran – with a united political front
(including the possibility of sanctions under the relevant Chapters of the United
Nations Charter), as well as pursue a coordinated and internationally legitimate
approach vis-à-vis anti-proliferation and anti-terrorism generally. Unfortunately,
Russia’s attitude towards Iran’s nuclear programme is highly ambiguous: whilst
condemning Iran’s breaches of the Non-Proliferation Treaty, Russian companies
continue to supply the regime in Tehran with the expertise and technology to make
it work.

Russia’s strategic signiﬁ cance in the global ﬁ ght against terrorism extends

beyond the nuclear issue. Among experts in terrorism and insurgency, it is almost
universally agreed that terrorist groups and movements are more persistent and
dangerous if they have a sanctuary or safe haven at their disposal. If based in a
hostile environment, terrorist operations, recruitment, relations with the public,
as well as the acquisition of arms and funds all need to be carried out in strict
secrecy. Individual members are forced to lead double lives or cease their ordinary
existences altogether. This has a signiﬁ cant bearing on the terrorists’ effectiveness:
the need to conceal one’s activities consumes much of the terrorists’ resources
and is generally considered a distraction from their principal objective, namely to
ﬁ ght the perceived enemy. With a safe haven – usually in a jurisdiction different
from that of the enemy – the terrorists can train and operate freely; there is no
need to hide one’s identity or set up safe houses; the terrorists group may even
hold press conferences and maintain open relations with the public. Arguably,
the twenty-ﬁ ve-year-long campaign of the Irish Republican Army could not have
been sustained had the organisation not had the possibility of retreating from
Northern Ireland to a less hostile environment in the Irish Republic. The same is
true for Basque Homeland and Liberty (ETA), which maintained strategic bases
in southwest of France, and the Palestinian Liberation Organisation (PLO), which
found an operational safe haven in Jordan and – following its forceful expulsion

114 P.R.

Neumann

in September 1970 – Lebanon. From a counter-terrorist perspective, therefore,
eliminating such sanctuaries is a strategic priority to which considerable military
and diplomatic efforts need to be dedicated.

Russia, of course, has no intention of offering sanctuary to a terrorist group.

Yet parts of its territory have been at risk of becoming lawless zones in which
jihadist groups could set up operational bases. This has been true, in particular,
for Chechnya and – more recently – neighbouring territories, which militant
Islamists have considered not only as a potential safe haven but also as a jihadist
battlefront in its own right. Like the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan in 1979, they
have interpreted Moscow’s attempts to put down the separatist uprising as an
effort to encroach upon Muslim lands.

In early 1995, a small group of “Afghan

Arabs,” who had sided with the Afghani mujahideen in the 1980s, arrived in
Chechnya to lend their support to the Chechen insurgent movement. Led by a
Saudi national, Amir Khattab, the International Islamic Battalion consisted of
around 300 men, which fought alongside the rebels and took part in some of the
most daring operations during the First Chechen War (1994–96).

While relatively

small in numbers, their participation had a profound impact on the dynamics of
the conﬂ ict. It added a group of experienced and highly committed ﬁ ghters to the
Chechen cause; it radicalized and brutalized the Chechen insurgency as a whole;
and it facilitated access to the immense ﬁ nancial resources of the global jihadist
movement, including signiﬁ cant contributions from Islamic charities and wealthy
individuals in the Arab Gulf states.

Most importantly perhaps, it introduced an

Islamist agenda into an otherwise local conﬂ ict. For Khattab, the issue was not
Chechen independence, but the creation of an Islamic republic on the territory of
the former Soviet Union. Consequently, when Russia withdrew from Chechnya
in 1996, Khattab set up training camps for young Muslims from across the
Caucasus, preparing them “for a never-ending jihad that was far greater in scope
than the micro-republic envisioned by Chechnya’s nationalist leadership.”

The

destabilizing inﬂ uence of this presence was demonstrated in September 1999, when
the incursions of Islamist militants into the neighbouring Republic of Dagestan
ignited the Second Chechen War.

The Caucasus assumed even greater signiﬁ cance following the removal of

the Taleban regime in Afghanistan. In the years prior to 2001, Afghanistan had
been the principal operational sanctuary for the Salaﬁ jihadis. When it ceased to
exist, the Al Qaeda leadership and hundreds of foreign jihadis from across the
world needed to ﬁ nd a new home. While, for most, the most obvious choice were
the tribal areas of Pakistan, others concluded that this could not be a permanent
solu tion, especially given President Pervez Musharraf’s support for the Western
coalition. The Caucasus was an attractive alternative. It was ideologically sound, as
there was an ongoing jihad in which one could participate. At the same time, there
existed a jihadi infrastructure with training camps and practically no functioning
state authority that would interfere with their operations. As a result, Chechnya
and the neighbouring territories – especially the Chechen-inhabited Pankisi Gorge
in Georgia and, more recently, the Russian Republic of Dagestan

– came to be

seen as “the next Afghanistan.” Indeed, there is some evidence that these places

The European Union, Russia, and the fight against terrorism 115

developed into a major base not only for the ﬁ ght against the Russian presence
in Chechnya, but the global jihad generally. For instance, Interpol and Western
intelligence agencies believe that Al Qaeda’s “mad scientist,” Abu Khabab, moved
his operations from Afghanistan to the Caucasus, with sightings of him reported
across the region. Furthermore, in August 2002, Georgian security forces arrested
a member of Al Qaeda’s leading council, Saif al-Islam el Masry, in Pankisi. And
following the arrest of six North Africans, who were accused of producing ricin in
a North London ﬂ at, it transpired that they had been trained at the Pankisi Gorge
camps.

Although much of the terrorist infrastructure in the southeast of Chechnya and

Pankisi Gorge has now been disabled, the ongoing presence of Salaﬁ jihadis in
the region continues to be a major concern. The conditions of virtual state collapse
and widespread lawlessness have not only attracted terrorists, but also allowed
private militias and organized crime to ﬂ ourish. The region is at the centre of the
two major drug-trading routes from Central Asia to Europe; it is awash with small
arms; and there has been a steady rise in the reported cases of nuclear smuggling.

From a Western perspective, this raises the worrying prospect of tactical coalitions
between warlords, organized criminals, and terrorist groups, which could perpetuate
the conﬂ icts in the region as well as sustain the jihadis’ global terrorist campaign.
Hence, even if the Caucasus does not turn into a fully-ﬂ edged operational base for
terrorist operations, it may serve as a more or less permanent source for terrorist
funding and weapons. Indeed, Western ofﬁ cials believe that the easiest way for
terrorists to obtain a nuclear device would be by enlisting the help of a Chechen
criminal gang.

From a strategic perspective, therefore, Russia is a crucial regional hub in the

global campaign against terrorism. Its effectiveness in combating nuclear prolifera-
tion and denying the emergence of terrorist safe havens may turn out to be critical.
A failure to accomplish the latter – but especially the former – would have poten-
tially disastrous consequences for Russia and Western countries alike.

The role of the European Union

Terrorism constitutes a major threat to the citizens of the EU. Several of its
members states – most prominently, of course, Spain and the United Kingdom
– have seen mass-casualty attacks by Islamist groups in recent years. In others –
France and Germany, for example – terrorist plots have been prevented. And in a
recent war-gaming exercise organized by the EU and NATO, experts concluded
that the detonation of a crude nuclear device in Brussels would result in 40,000
dead, 300,000 injured, and a prolonged downturn in the continent’s economy.

Given such dire predictions, one would expect the EU to be at the forefront of
counter-terrorist cooperation with Russia. In reality, though, the EU has turned
out to be a largely ineffective mechanism.

Russia’s support for the United States and its allies in the global campaign

against terrorism after the September 11 attacks provided Russia and the EU with
an opportunity to enhance their relationship, especially in the security ﬁ eld. At the

116 P.R.

Neumann

EU–Russia Summit in early October 2001, the two sides released a robust joint
statement that described terrorist attacks as “acts of savagery,” and noted that “there
can be no justiﬁ cation for international, whatever its motives and origins.” It also
contained a ﬁ rm commitment to increased anti-terrorist cooperation, especially in
international bodies such as the UN, as well as with regards to terrorist ﬁ nancing,
judicial and police cooperation, and the exchange of information.

The results have

been mixed. Diplomatic cooperation between Russia and EU member states, for
example, in relation to the draft International Convention on the Suppression of
Acts of Nuclear Terrorism, has been effective, though it is unclear what role the
EU has played in this respect.

Regarding terrorist ﬁ nancing, no speciﬁ c mechanism for bilateral cooperation to

address this issue was established. Both sides eventually agreed to rely on existing
institutions, more speciﬁ cally the G8-sponsored Financial Action Task Force. The
commitment to improve the exchange of intelligence about terrorist individuals,
groups, weapons and activities translated into an agreement between Russia and
the EU to facilitate cooperation between Russian agencies and the European police
agency Europol. At the same time, the EU’s powers in this area are very limited.
(Indeed, one of the greatest difﬁ culties has been to persuade EU member states to
share their intelligence with Europol.) Regarding police and judicial cooperation,
the EU managed to set up a number of informal forums. Also, the work of its
technical assistance facility TACIS, which aims to bring Russia’s judicial system
closer to European standards, is widely judged as successful. More substantial
cooperation, however, has been made difﬁ cult by European concerns about data
protection, human rights and the lack of fair trials in Russia.

Why hasn’t the EU managed to go further? In my view, there are two main

reasons. The ﬁ rst relates to the EU’s overall approach towards ﬁ ghting terrorism.
In contrast to the United States, where terrorism has come to be seen as a strategic
threat of the highest order, most European countries – and especially the European
Union – continue to perceive of terrorism as one priority amongst many others.
Unlike many Americans, Europeans never found the idea of a “war on terrorism”
appealing, nor indeed did they think the term was an appropriate description of the
situation.

This may have prevented European governments from over-reacting,

but it has also encouraged a sense of complacency. As a result, terrorism has topped
the European agenda only in the wake of dramatic attacks. Very soon afterwards, it
was back to “business as usual,” with many of the agreed measures getting stuck in
the bureaucratic fog of ministerial meetings, roundtables and committee hearings.
Edwin E. Bakker observes “only terrorist attacks are able to force Europeans to
overcome their difference and move EU anti-terrorism policy into higher gear
… The speed and direction of our anti-terrorism efforts seems to depend on the
terrorists rather than our politicians.”

Another – albeit related – facet of the EU’s

approach at ﬁ ghting terrorism is the notion of terrorism as a symptom, which can
only be resolved by removing its political and economic root causes. Rather than
ﬁ ghting terrorism per se, European statements about terrorism always highlight
the need to look at its underlying factors, as well as the grievances and “drivers”
that compel people to join terrorist groups. Given the European experience with

The European Union, Russia, and the fight against terrorism 117

terrorism, there is also a tendency to view terrorism as geographically conﬁ ned and
rooted in particular regional conﬂ icts.

This may be laudable, yet – in combination

with the comparatively low priority accorded to the issue generally – it means that
the development of any meaningful cooperation between Russia and the EU in the
area of counter-terrorism has been all but impossible.

It is not an exaggeration to say that the entire Russia–EU relationship has been

overshadowed by controversies about the Russian policy towards Chechnya. While
Russia has defended the application of harsh security measures against the province
as part of the global campaign against Islamist terrorism and criticized European
governments for giving asylum to rebel leaders,

European lawmakers and ofﬁ cials

have described Moscow’s actions as one of the primary causes for the persistence
of the conﬂ ict. Numerous statements by the European Parliament and – to a lesser
extent – the European Commission have called on Russia to improve the political
and human rights situation in Chechnya, implying – sometimes rather openly – that
this was a pre-condition for achieving a more effective relationship with the EU. A
report of the European Parliament’s Committee on Foreign Affairs stated:

An effective partnership in combating terrorism … presupposes a reasonable
degree of common understanding of the deﬁ nition and causes of terrorism.
The key to ﬁ ght terrorism in Russia is to resolve the conﬂ ict in Chechnya.
Unquestionably, Chechen armed groups commit atrocities … But federal and
local government armed forces continue to commit grave breaches of human
rights and international humanitarian laws.

An earlier resolution, adopted by the European Parliament as a whole, went even
further, declaring that “the ongoing conﬂ ict in Chechnya and the massive human
rights violation taking place there are an insurmountable [sic] obstacle to the
development of a genuine partnership between the EU and Russia.”

Indeed, this

was echoed by the EU’s then External Relations Commissioner, Chris Patten, who
– when referring to Chechnya – pointed out that “the fact that you are trying to sort
out problems with another country should not ever in my view stop you raising
questions which that country may ﬁ nd difﬁ cult or sensitive.”

Again, the European Union’s principled stance on the thorny issue of Chechnya

may be praiseworthy. It is undoubtedly true that Moscow’s heavy-handed approach
towards the province has made the conﬂ ict worse. The use of heavy artillery
against civilian targets as well as the de facto suspension of political rights has
helped radicalize the Chechen population, blurring the public’s distinction between
perpetrator and victim and providing the rebels with a seemingly never-ending
stream of recruits. At the same time, as even the most fervent supporters of the EU
would admit, the EU’s public shaming of Moscow’s Chechnya policy has never
been likely to achieve any shift in Russian policy. Public condemnation aside, the
EU has never employed any other means of exerting pressure in this respect, nor
would the member states have allowed it to do so. In relation to, say, Romania or
Turkey, voicing public concern about the functioning of the judicial system or the
treatment of minorities may indeed have been effective as a way of bringing about

118 P.R.

Neumann

political change. In contrast to both Romania and Turkey, however, Russia is not
an EU accession country, and the “carrot” of EU membership could therefore not
be part of the bilateral equation. As a consequence, the EU’s stance on Chechnya
has amounted to little more than an exercise at public grandstanding, aimed at the
European public’s liberal conscience rather than hoping to effecting any signiﬁ cant
change of behaviour. The most unfortunate consequence of this has been to make
the development of any form of meaningful relationship with Russia on counter-
terrorism issues impossible.

The second reason for the EU’s failure to extend its anti-terrorism cooperation

with Russia relates to the nature of the EU as an international organisation. The
EU is not a national government. It cannot arrest or prosecute terrorists, nor can
it deploy intelligence ofﬁ cers or satellites in order to track them. Most counter-
terrorism work is done by policemen and national intelligence agencies. Even
during cross-border investigations, security agencies tend to favour bilateral
rather than multilateral interactions. After all, secret intelligence information is
considered by most governments a national asset, which was obtained at great
expense and will be shared only if tangible beneﬁ ts can be gained through such
cooperation.

In practical terms, therefore, it will be hard to convince governments

that there is need or justiﬁ cation for Estonia or Malta to be involved when France
and Spain carry out a joint operation aimed at uncovering an ETA cell.

The EU’s difﬁ culties in this area are compounded by the fact that counter-

terrorism is not in itself a clearly deﬁ ned area of policymaking. At the national
level, it involves a long list of departments and government agencies, including
law enforcement and intelligence, immigration and border control, foreign and
defence, ﬁ nance, as well as even health. In federally structured political systems
(for example, Germany or Belgium), the bureaucratic nightmare of coordinating
counter-terrorism policy across government departments extends to the vertical
level, with core competencies in the ﬁ ght against terrorism, such as law enforcement
and intelligence collection, residing with local or state authorities rather than
national government.

As a consequence, trying to coordinate the collective efforts

of twenty-ﬁ ve governments at the EU level is considered neither feasible nor even
desirable by many observers.

The underlying political reason for this institutional problem, however, is not

merely technical. In political terms, EU member states have proved unwilling to
give the Union the responsibilities and resources it would need to be truly effective.
Counter-terrorism goes to the core of national sovereignty, and governments are
– perhaps understandably – reluctant to give the EU powers that would dilute, or
interfere with, the authority to protect their nations from physical attack. This, of
course, is true not only in the area of counter-terrorism. While EU cooperation
on issues like agriculture, trade and even monetary policy has exceeded that of
any other multi-governmental institution anywhere in the world, all attempts to
extend supranational governance to the area of foreign policy have met with only
limited success. When the notion of a “common foreign and security policy”
was introduced as one of the three pillars of the Maastricht Treaty in 1992, there
were high hopes that European nations would come to speak with one voice on

The European Union, Russia, and the fight against terrorism 119

matters of international concern. (Some even believed that France and the United
Kingdom would one day give up their permanent representations on the UN
Security Council in favour of a joint European seat.) In practice, a truly common
foreign and security policy has emerged only in the very small number of areas
in which no vital national interests were believed to be at stake. Yet, whenever
issues of foreign policy were thought to involve fundamental choices about how
one’s country would be perceived by the rest of the world, member states have
happily sacriﬁ ced the aspiration of a joint approach.

This, of course, was amply

demonstrated during the Iraq crisis in the years 2002–03, but it is probably true
for member states’ relations with big powers – principally Russia, China and the
United States – generally.

In the case of EU relations with Russia, the challenge of developing a meaningful

approach has therefore not only been the technocratic one of coordinating a number
of different policy areas and responsibilities, but also – more substantially – one
of competing political agendas. Indeed, it would be naïve to assume that the EU
could develop a relationship with a country as signiﬁ cant as Russia in a political
vacuum. The Union’s new members – most of which Eastern European – have been
more cautious in their approach towards Russia, insisting on ﬁ rm commitments
to human rights, democratic freedoms and the rule of law before an extension
of the partnership to areas like trade should be considered. Moreover, countries
like Poland – for good historical reasons – are highly suspicious of too intimate a
relationship between Russia and the larger European powers, especially Germany.

Even the older member states – in particular the “big three” (the United Kingdom,
Germany and France) – have all pursued their own independent foreign policies
towards Russia, sometimes in competition with each other as well as with the
EU. For instance, while the EU expressed deep concern about President Putin’s
commitment to the rule of law following the arrest of Michail Khodorkowsky,
a number of EU member states discreetly supplied the Russian government
with information about Khodorkowsky’s ﬁ nancial transactions. According to a
widely respected investigative journalist, German Chancellor Gerhard Schroeder
personally gave Putin an intelligence dossier, which had been put together by
German intelligence with the explicit purpose of helping the Russian authorities to
make a better case against the oligarch.

Arguably, Russia is fully aware of such

divisions and competing interests among European countries, and has become
exceedingly skilful at exploiting them.

The attempt to develop a meaningful relationship between Russia and the EU

on the issue of counter-terrorism has therefore been marred with difﬁ culties. While
some of these relate, more narrowly, to different perceptions of the terrorism issue,
others concern the nature of the EU as a supra-national institution with limited
competencies in the policy areas that would be most relevant to developing a
successful partnership with Russia, namely security and defence. In combination,
they tend to reinforce the idea that the EU cannot – indeed, must not – become the
main institutional channel through which to assist Russia in addressing the threat
from terrorism.

120 P.R.

Neumann

Conclusion

This paper aimed to address the relationship between the EU and Russia in the
ﬁ ght against terrorism. From a strategic perspective, Russia’s role in this global
campaign is pivotal. As the main source of loose nuclear materials, as well as
given the country’s potentially signiﬁ cant inﬂ uence in anti-proliferation policy
generally, Russia is a critical player in the global effort to ensure that terrorists
will not obtain WMD, which would turn terrorism a major strategic threat.
Furthermore, Russia’s inﬂ uence in – and, to some extent, direct political control
of – the Caucasus region has an important bearing on whether it will be possible
to prevent the emergence of ﬁ xed operational bases in which Salaﬁ jihadist can
ﬁ nd sanctuary. Of particular relevance are the Russian Republics of Dagestan and
Chechnya, but also neighbouring territories in other states, such as Pankisi Gorge in
Georgia. Helping Russia to play a positive role, in particular by settling separatist
conﬂ icts and end the general state of virtual state collapse and lawlessness in the
North Caucasus, is not merely a regional issue, but will be of direct consequence
to the global campaign against terrorism.

Since the events of September 11 the EU has attempted to play a leading role in

facilitating a partnership with Russia in the area of counter-terrorism, albeit with
limited success. It is important to examine the reasons for this failure, because the
nature of the explanation will determine whether the EU can and should continue
to pursue its efforts in the future. In my view, the EU’s lack of success has been
caused by differences in outlook as well as the substantial limitations of its institu-
tional structure. Regarding the former, it seems obvious that the EU and European
countries generally not only perceive of terrorism as less than a strategic threat,
it also has a fundamentally different conception from Russia of what is needed in
order to address that threat. As a result, the relationship has been made difﬁ cult by
disagreements and empty rhetoric, especially regarding the situation in Chechnya,
which have hindered the development of a successful partnership. Regarding
the latter, the main problem lies in the fact that the EU is not a sovereign actor.
Furthermore, notwithstanding the fact that the EU does not have the competen-
cies to effect a full bilateral relationship on counter-terrorism issues, I have shown
that the EU is competing with – and sometimes contradicting – its member states’
national political agenda.

My main conclusion is that the EU is not in a position to develop a full partnership

with Russia in the area of counter-terrorism. Considering how important it would
be to constructively involve Russia in addressing this threat, one may even say that
it would be detrimental to national and – ultimately – global security if the EU was
given wider responsibilities in this area. In practice, responsibility for international
cooperation in the ﬁ eld of counter-terrorism will continue to lie with individual
nation states. The EU may play a useful role in facilitating such cooperation, in
technical capacity building or as an ad hoc forum for wider discussions, but it
cannot replace the nation state. European policymakers – especially those hoping to
advance the European project – must recognize the EU’s limitations in this area.

Indeed, the area of counter-terrorism cooperation is one in which a compelling

case could be made for strengthening the transatlantic partnership. Clearly, as we

The European Union, Russia, and the fight against terrorism 121

have seen, there are areas in which European states will not have the capacity to
act either individually or collectively. Conversely, when it comes to “softer” issues
such as economic aid, reconstruction, broad political engagement and the reaching
out to “rogue” regimes, Europe may well have political assets that could be of value
to the United States. In my view, therefore, European countries would be well
advised to consider the idea of a pragmatic “division of labor” between themselves
and their transatlantic partners. In the case of Russia and counter-terrorism, such an
approach would make it possible for the EU to continue (and expand) its activities
in some of the areas in which it has been successful – such as technical assistance
– whilst relieving the institution from tasks in which it can only fail. This would
be more honest than the current approach as well as genuinely pro-European, not
least because it will make global counter-terrorism cooperation more effective and
thus help protect the continent from further terrorist atrocities.

Notes

1 John Lewis Gaddis, interviewed on “The End of the Post Cold War Era,” National

Public Radio, 18 October 2001.

2 Most prominently, these ideas were embodied in, and symbolized by, Francis Fukuyama’s

idea of the “end of history.” See Francis Fukuyama, The End of History and the Last
Man (New York: Free Press, 1992).

3 See Peter R. Neumann and M. L. R. Smith, The Strategy of Terrorism (London:

Routledge, 2007).

4 Jonathan Schell, remarks at the International Summit on Democracy, Terrorism and

Security, Madrid, 10 March 2005. See http://www.safe-democracy.org.

5 See Stephen M. Walt, “A New Grand Strategy for the War on Terrorism,” paper

delivered at the National Policy Forum on Terrorism, Security and America’s Purpose,
6–7 September 2005, Washington, D.C. See http://www.americaspurpose.org.

6 See Marco de Andreis and Francesco Calogero, The Soviet Nuclear Weapon Legacy

(Stockholm: SIPRI Research Report, 1995).

7 Most of these incidents involved “nuclear junk,” which cannot be used in nuclear

devices. At the same time, it is reported that on at least 15 occasions, weapons-grade
material was seized. Oleg Bukharin, Renewing the Partnership: Recommendations for
Accelerated Action to Secure Nuclear Material in the Former Soviet Union (Princeton,
NJ: Russian American Security Advisory Council, 2000), p. 5.

8 See Graham T. Allinson, Nuclear Terrorism: The Ultimate Preventable Catastrophe

(New York: Henry Holt, 2004).

9 See Louise Richardson, “Global Rebels: Terrorist Organizations as Trans-National

Actors,” Harvard International Review, 20 (4) (1998).

10 Gilles Kepel, Jihad: The Trail of Political Islam (London: I.B. Tauris, 2003), p. 222.
11 Rohan Gunaratna, Inside Al Qaeda: Global Network of Terror, 2nd edn (London: Hurst,

2002), pp. 134–5.

122 P.R.

Neumann

12 On the role of charities in funding regional conﬂ icts such as Chechnya, see Evan

Kohlman, Al-Qaida’s Jihad in Europe (Oxford and New York: 2004), chap. 3 (“The
Role of the Islamic Charities”).

13 Brian Glyn Williams, “The ‘Chechen Arabs’: An Introduction to the Real al-Qaeda

Terrorists from Chechnya,” Jamestown Terrorism Monitor, 2 (1) (2004).

14  Domitilla Sagramoso, interview with author, 28 November 2005.
15  Williams, see note 13.
16  Svante E. Cornell, “The Growing Threat of Transnational Crime,” Chaillot Paper 65

(2003), pp. 35–7.

17  Alex P. Schmid, interview with author, March 2005.
18  Ian Black, “EU Faces Nuclear Terror Threat,” Guardian, 5 May 2004.
19  “EU Russia Summit: Statement on International Terrorism,” 3 October 2001. http://

ec.europa.eu/external_relations/russia/summit_10_01/dc_en.htm.

20 Domitilla Sagramoso, Russia’s Western Orientation after 11th September: Russia’s

Enhanced Co-operation with NATO and the European Union (Rome: Centro Militare
di Studi Strategici, 2004), pp. 27–41.

21 See Ronald D. Crelinsten, “The EU–US Partnership in the Area of Counterterrorism:

A Multicentric View,” in Dan Hansen and Magnus Ranstorp, eds, Cooperating Against
Terrorism: EU–US Relations Post September 11 (Stockholm: Swedish National
Defence College, 2007), pp. 53–98.

22 Edwin E. Bakker, “The Cracks in EU Anti-terrorism Co-operation that Invite Attack,”

Europe’s World, 1 (1) (2005), p. 133.

23  Crelinsten, “The EU–US Partnership,” pp. 71–2.
24  Dimitri Trenin, “Russia and Anti-terrorism,” Chaillot Paper 74 (2005), p. 106.
25  “Report on EU–Russian Relations,” European Parliament, A6-0135/2005, 4 May

2005.

26 Quoted in Jo Leinen, “EU and Russia Draw Closer, but Political Concerns Remain,”

European Integration, Winter 2005.

27 “Declaration by The Rt Hon. Chris Patten at the European Parliament Development

Committee,” European Parliament, IP/02/1655, 12 November 2002.

28 William Rosenau, “Liaisons Dangereuses? Transatlantic Intelligence Cooperation and

the Global War on Terrorism,” in Hansen and Ranstorp, see note 21, pp. 31–40.

29 See, for example, Tessa Szyszkowitz, “Germany,” in Karin von Hippel, ed., Europe

Confronts Terrorism (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2005), pp. 43–58.

30 Daniel Keohane, “The EU and Counter-terrorism,” Working Paper of the Centre for

European Reform, May 2005, pp. 17–22.

31 See Dov Lynch, “Struggling With an Indispensable Partner,” Chaillot Paper 74 (2005),

pp. 117–18.

32 Sandra Kalniete, “EU Relations With Russia Must Focus on Values, Not Trade,”

Europe’s World, 1 (1) (2005), pp. 24–9.

33 Erich Schmidt-Eenboom, quoted in „Die angebliche deutsche Mitschuld am Irak-

Krieg“, Saar-Echo, 22 November 2005.

34 Trenin, see note 24, p. 110.

Can Russia be a partner for
NATO in the Middle East?

Robert O. Freedman

Introduction

In working to answer the question of whether Russia could be a partner for NATO
in the Middle East, one must begin with a more fundamental question. As Russia
moves increasingly away from democracy under Putin, it is necessary to ask
whether a country that does not share basic values such as democracy with the
NATO countries can be a genuine partner for the organization. I don’t plan to
answer that question in this essay, only to point out that before NATO leaders plan
major cooperative activities with Russia, they should keep in mind the question of
the increasing lack of Russian democracy.

My task in this paper, after describing Russian leader Vladimir Putin’s domestic

and foreign policies, is to present four case studies of Russian behavior in Middle
East conﬂ ict areas, and to abstract from the case studies some general comments on
Russian policy behavior in order to determine whether Russia could be a genuine
partner for NATO. The four case studies are: 1 The war on terrorism; 2 Russia’s
relations with Iraq; 3 Russia’s relations with Iran; and, more brieﬂ y, 4 Russia’s
relations with Syria. Before beginning the analysis it is, of course, necessary to
deﬁ ne what partnership means in the international community. I deﬁ ne a partner
to mean a country which, while following its own interests, as all states do in the
international system, nonetheless, on matters of major importance, is willing to
subordinate its own interests to the greater good. As will be shown, it is a very
open question as to whether Russia meets this deﬁ nition.

Putin’s domestic and foreign policies

One of the most striking aspects of the Putin presidency has been his ability
to bring the quasi-independent players in Russian domestic and foreign policy
of the Yeltsin era under much tighter centralized control. Thus Putin has all
but eliminated the political inﬂ uence of oligarchs Boris Berezovsky, Vladimir
Gusinsky and Mikhail Khodorkovsky and taken over their media outlets. He has
replaced Yevgeny Adamov, head of the Ministry of Atomic Energy (Minatom, now
Rosatom), who had a habit of trying to make nuclear deals with Iran not approved
of by the Kremlin, with Alexander Rumyantsev, who in November 2005 was, in
turn, replaced by Sergei Kiriyenko.

124 R.O.

Freedman

The powerful gas monopoly, Gazprom, heavily involved in Turkey and Central

Asia, had its director, Rem Vekhirev replaced by Alexei Miller, while the Defense
Ministry had its leader, Defense Minister Igor Sergeev, replaced by the Secretary
of the National Security Council, Sergei Ivanov. Two other holdovers from the
Yeltsin era were also removed. Prime Minister Mikhail Khazyanov has been
replaced by Mikhail Fradkov and Foreign Minister Igor Ivanov was replaced by
Sergei Lavrov.

Putin also changed interior ministers, set up plenipotentiaries to oversee Russia’s

89 regions, and consolidated Russia’s arms sales agencies into Rosoboronoexport,
in an effort to gain greater control over a major source of foreign exchange. Putin
also put a great deal of emphasis on improving Russia’s economy, not only through
the sale of arms, oil and natural gas (the Russian economy has been blessed with
high oil and natural gas prices during most of his years in ofﬁ ce) but also by sell-
ing high tech goods such as nuclear reactors and by expanding Russia’s business
ties abroad. Indeed, business interests have played an increasingly signiﬁ cant role
in Putin’s foreign policy.

Making Putin’s task easier was the support he received from the Duma, espe-

cially from his Edinstvo [Unity] party – now the enlarged United Russian Party
– in contrast to the hostile relations Yeltsin had with the Duma from 1993 until
his resignation as Russia’s president in December 1999. Indeed, in the Duma
elections of December 2003, Putin greatly increased his support, weakening both
the communist and liberal parties that were his main opponents, and he scored an
over whelm ing victory in the 2004 presidential elections.

Overall, Putin’s central foreign policy aim has been to strengthen the Russian

economy in the hope that, in the not too distant future, Russian might regain its
status as a great power. In the interim he has sought to create an “arc of stability”
on Russia’s frontiers so that economic development can proceed as rapidly as
possible. This was one of the reasons Putin embraced an improved relationship with
Turkey and ended Russian opposition to the Baku–Ceyhan pipeline. In theory, at
least, Putin’s goal would appear to require a policy of increased cooperation with
the members of NATO.

At the same time, however, mindful of voices in the Duma – now represented

most strongly by the Rodina [Motherland] party that had been created by the
Kremlin to weaken the Russian Communist party – as well as in the security
apparatus and the Russian foreign ministry unhappy at Moscow’s appearing to
play “second ﬁ ddle” to the US post-9/11 even as NATO was moving closer to the
borders of Russia, Putin has from time to time asserted an independent position for
Russia, as Moscow’s behavior during the recent war in Iraq and the more assertive
Russian policy in 2005 and 2006 indicated. Indeed, increasingly Russian foreign
policy looks like it is seeking to create the “multipolar world” advocated by former
Russian foreign minister and prime minister Yevgeny Primakov, who is now a
Putin adviser. As will be shown, the tension between these two alternative thrusts of
Russian foreign policy, cooperating with NATO but also competing with it, clearly
impacts the possibility of Russia’s becoming a genuine partner for NATO.

This tension became increasingly evident following a series of reversals

Can Russia be a partner for NATO in the Middle East? 125

encountered by Putin in 2004. Following the replacement of Edouard Shevardnadze
in December 2003 by the much more pro-Western Mikhail Saakashivili, Putin suf-
fered an embarrassing failure in the Ukraine in November and December 2004
when, following the mass demonstrations of the Orange Revolution the pro-Western
Viktor Yushchenko defeated the pro-Russian candidate Victor Yanukovich in a
presidential re-election that Putin had publicly opposed. Making matters worse for
Putin was the debacle at Beslan in September 2004 when a Chechen rebel attack on
a school led to the loss of 332 Russian lives following a bungled rescue mission.
While Putin sought to capitalize on the incident by tightening control over Russia’s
governors (he would now appoint them) and political parties and even more sharply
limiting the vestiges of Russian democracy, as well as by blaming outside powers
for wanting to dismantle Russia, the Beslan incident underlined Putin’s major
failure – his inability to bring the Chechen rebellion under control. Domestically,
Putin also had problems in 2004. His efforts to transform “payments in kind” to
cash payments stirred up opposition from Russian pensioners, while his heavy
handed prosecution of oligarch Mikhail Khodorkovsky led to renewed capital ﬂ ight
from Russia and a chilling of the atmosphere for foreign investment.

As we shall see, these events which put Putin on the defensive and challenged

his image of a strong leader of a strong state, were to play a major role in Putin’s de-
cision to go ahead with the supply of nuclear fuel to the Bushehr reactor in February
2005, despite serious American objections, as well as with the provision of arms to
Syria, which was under heavy international pressure for its purported involve ment
in the assassination of former Lebanese prime minister, Raﬁ k Hariri.

The war on terrorism

While much has been made of Russian cooperation with NATO post-9/11, par-
ticu larly its acquiescence in US bases in Central Asia and its sharing of military
intelligence,

it should be pointed out that Russia itself beneﬁ ted greatly from the

destruction of the Taliban regime in Afghanistan and the severe damage caused
to the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan (IMU) which together posed a serious
threat not only to Central Asia, the soft underbelly of Russia, but also to Russia
itself through the threat of the radicalization of Russia’s 20 million person Muslim
population.

Putin also took advantage of 9/11 to try to rally international support for his war

against the Chechen rebels, whom he labeled as terrorists. While he received more
support for this effort in the United States than in the European states of NATO,
he also made a major effort to cultivate the Muslim world to limit their aid to the
Chechen rebels who, in the Second Chechen War with Russia, had exploited Islam
as a rallying point against Russia.

Unsuccessful in putting down the increasingly Islamist rebellion during his

ﬁ rst three years in ofﬁ ce, and embarrassed by the Chechen seizure of a Moscow
theater in October 2002, in the Spring of 2003 Putin embarked on a new policy.
This involved a referendum and new elections in Chechnya – both of which were
seen as bogus by Western and even Russian observers – which brought into power

126 R.O.

Freedman

in Chechnya a one-time Chechen opponent of Moscow, Akhmad Kadyrov, whom
Putin sought to legitimize in the Muslim world, along with Russian policy toward
Chechnya. Putin’s policy which was aimed at neutralizing Islamic support for
the Chechen terrorists, had two elements: ﬁ rst, a warming of relations with Saudi
Arabia, the most inﬂ uential Islamic state, and second, a quest for membership in
the Islamic Conference of States (OIC).

Prior to the visit of Saudi Crown Prince Abdullah to Moscow in September

2003, Russian–Saudi relations were, at best, mixed.

While both countries had an

interest in keeping oil prices stable (and high), although from time to time there
were tactical disputes on pricing and Russia was reluctant to limit its oil production
which provided one-third of its state revenues, Chechnya soured the relationship.
Moscow accused Riyadh of funding not only the Chechen rebels, but post-9/11
of funding other terrorist groups as well. Still, when Saudi Arabia itself suffered a
major terrorist attack in May 2003, Putin seized on the opportunity and spoke out
on the similarity of that attack to the ones in Moscow by Chechen rebels, stating,
“the hand writing is absolutely identical in both places. And the effect is absolutely
comparable.”

Putin’s speech set the tone for the September 2003 Moscow visit of Crown Prince

Abdullah. Putin, while also seeking (and getting) deals for Russian companies
during the visit, had as his major goal the gaining of Saudi legitimization for
Russian policy in Chechnya. Consequently, a meeting was arranged between
Crown Prince Abdullah, then the de facto ruler of Saudi Arabia, and Chechen
leader Kadyrov, who stated following the meeting that the Saudis had condemned
what was happening in Chechnya and said that it had nothing to do with Islam.

Kadyrov also was given an invitation to visit Saudi Arabia, which he did four
months later in January 2004, reportedly extracting from the Saudis promises that
their charitable foundations would stop funding the Chechen rebels, and would
now fund the new Chechen government instead.

The other element of Putin’s policy of securing Islamic legitimization for

Russia’s policy in Chechnya involved courting other key Islamic leaders, and, if
at all possible, gaining membership for Russia in the OIC. This effort accelerated
during a Putin visit to Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia in August 2003. Malaysia was a
key country in Putin’s strategy because it was to host the next Islamic summit in
October 2003 and would be the OIC leader until 2006. Besides securing deals for
the sale of 18 SU-30 ﬁ ghter bombers, Putin obtained the support of the outspoken
Malaysian leader Mahathir Mohamed for Russian membership in the OIC.

At the OIC meeting in Malaysia in October 2003 Putin made the Russian case

for observer status (something Russia was to achieve in 2005), noting that the
number of Russian mosques had grown from 870 in 1991 to 7000 in 2003 and
that the 20 million Muslims “peacefully and productively” living in Russia dis-
proved the theory of the clash of civilizations.

Putin also brought a number of

Russian Muslim leaders to the OIC meeting including, of course, Chechen leader
Kadyrov. As far as Chechnya was concerned, Putin noted that the situation there
was “returning to normal” and in not-so-veiled criticism of the US, stated, “some
are involved in practising terrorism. Others are using this situation for their own

Can Russia be a partner for NATO in the Middle East? 127

mercenary ends, as a tool of political pressure to achieve their own goals, which
have nothing in common with the interests of Islam, with protecting human rights,
or with international law in general.”

Unfortunately for Putin, the ﬁ rst track of his policy, building legitimacy for the

Chechen regime of Akhmed Kadyrov in order to quiet the turmoil in Chechnya,
soon became untracked. On 13 February 2004, one week after a Chechen terrorist
bombing of a Moscow subway that killed 42 people and wounded more than 250,

Russian agents in Qatar assassinated the former Chechen president, Zelimikhan
Yandarbiyev. Yandarbiyev had been blamed by the Russian leadership for aiding
the Chechen terrorists who seized the Moscow theater in October 2002. Initially,
Moscow took a tough line with Qatar over the incident, with Foreign Minister
Sergei Lavrov stating, “In Qatar, unfortunately, both now and in the past, founda-
tions and charitable organizations, in the guise of charitable and other activities,
have in fact been gathering information for the ﬁ nancing of terrorist and extremist
organizations.”

Nonetheless, the Qatari regime held tough as well, at least initially, and by the

end of June following their trial, a Qatari court sentenced two of the suspected
Russians (the third had diplomatic immunity) to life imprisonment. Fortunately for
the two Russians, however, by December the Qatari regime had relented and the
two were returned to Russia.

However, the assassination could not have helped

Russia’s position in the Gulf Emirates, or Moscow’s efforts to cut down on their
dona tions to the Chechens in the short run at least, as Putin was to visit Qatar in
2007.

An even worse blow to Moscow came on 11 May 2004 when Putin’s hand-

picked Chechen leader, Akhmed Kadyrov, was assassinated in Grozny, and his
murder was followed by a series of Chechen attacks in Chechnya, Ingushetia,
Moscow (another suicide bombing in a subway), the suicide bombings on two
Russians airliners which killed 93 people, and worst of all, the seizure of a school
in Beslan, Northern Ossetia, which led to the deaths of an estimated 332 hostages
and security personnel, more than half of whom were school children.

As the Chechen attacks mounted, Putin took a number of steps to counter them,

although the moves did give Putin an international umbrella of support, at least
initially, they did little to solve the Chechen terrorist problem. Thus after opposing
Bush’s plan on non-proliferation in late January 2004, which involved the seizing
of ships, trucks, cars and aircraft on the grounds that they might be carrying
WMD,

soon after Kadyrov’s assassination Russia signed on to the proposal.

Later, in June 2004, in what would be a precursor of a major international effort
after Beslan, Putin rallied the Shanghai Cooperation Organization into supporting
his anti-terrorist position, with the statement issued after the meeting in Tashkent
asserting, “The global threat of terrorism must be countered by a global system
of opposition with the UN at its central core, this system must be supported by
regional, sub-regional and national structures.”

Then following the Beslan school seizure in September 2004, Putin embarked

on a major campaign to get international assistance against Chechen terrorism.
This involved getting pledges of support from such disparate countries as the US,

128 R.O.

Freedman

Spain, India, Turkey, Iran and Israel with which an anti-terrorism cooperation
agree ment was signed.

Putin also went to the United Nations and obtained a unanimous UN Security

Council declaration denouncing the school seizure which asserted, “The Council
condemns in the strongest terms the taking of hostages at a Russian school, as
well as other terrorist acts committed against civilians in Moscow and aboard the
two airliners.” The statement also asserted that “acts of terrorism are criminal and
unjustiﬁ able regardless of their motivation.”

The Russian leader, however, had less success with the Europeans. At a meet ing

of the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe (PACE) in Stroudsberg,
Moscow got a discussion of terrorism placed on the agenda and used the opportu-
nity to introduce to the Europeans and hopefully legitimize, Kadyrov’s successor as
Chechen president, Alu Alkhanov. Unfortunately for Moscow, however, when the
Russian delegations proposed an amendment that Chechnya now had a legitimately
and lawfully elected president (Alkhanov) the motion was rejected, with the Swiss
delegate, Andreas Gross, declaring that there had been so many irregularities in
the Chechen presidential election that Alkhanov could not be recognized as being
lawfully elected.

Besides criticizing PACE Putin has been critical of a number of NATO countries

and especially Britain for harboring Chechen “terrorists” with some Russian
commentators blaming the subway attacks in London in July 2005 on Britain’s
permissive attitude toward terrorists.

However, Moscow has pursued, especially since 2003, a very self-centered,

if not hypocritical policy on terrorism. Thus despite signing an anti-terrorist
agreement with Israel in September 2004, it continues to refuse to put the Palestinian
terrorist organization Hamas on its terrorist list

– and Hamas is seen as a terrorist

organization by the US and almost all NATO countries. Indeed, Moscow voted in
the UN in October 2004 one month after its anti-terrorism agreement with Israel,
to condemn an Israeli attack on Hamas operatives in Gaza.

Similarly, despite

pressuring Turkey to crack down on Chechen terrorists, it has failed to put the
anti-Turkish PKK terrorist organization on its ofﬁ cial terrorist list.

Finally the

Russian effort in July 2005, as part of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization,
to have the US expelled from its bases in Central Asia, even as the Taliban were
stepping up their attacks in Afghanistan cannot be considered the act of a genuine
partner in the anti-terrorist effort.

The height of Russian hypocrisy over terrorism, however, was to come in

2006. Following the Palestinian Legislative Council elections in January 2006
which were to result in a victory for Hamas – a development which Putin called a
“very serious blow” to American diplomacy in the Middle East – the diplomatic
Quartet (the US, UN, EU and Russia) met to deal with the new situation. The
Quartet decided not to provide any assistance to a Hamas government unless it
renounced terrorism, recognized Israel’s right to exist, and respected international
agreements for an Arab–Israel peace settlement, such as the Oslo Accords and
the Quartet’s Road Map. Almost immediately thereafter, however, Putin invited
a Hamas delegation to Moscow, proclaiming that Hamas was not on the Russian

Can Russia be a partner for NATO in the Middle East? 129

terrorist list, and hence not considered a terrorist organization – a clear change
from Russian policy in 2000 when Sergei Ivanov, then head of Russia’s Security
Council, had stated to a visiting Israeli delegation that what they were facing in
Gaza and the West Bank (the Hamas-led Al-Aksa Intifada) was exactly what
Russia was battling in Chechnya.

When the Hamas delegation came to Moscow in early March, Putin had a

number of objectives. First, by inviting Hamas, he associated Russia with the
Arab consensus which was to give Hamas time to change its policies, but in
the meanwhile to work with a Hamas government and not to sanction it. Such a
position not only enabled Russia to pursue an independent position in the Middle
East, it also enabled the Arab world to play Moscow against Washington and
Europe, and Russia was widely praised in the Arab world for the invitation.
Another goal of Putin was to get Hamas to downplay the Chechen issue, and the
Hamas delegation complied, with delegation leader Khaled Mashal stating after
meeting with Lavrov, that the Checken separatists were “an internal problem of
Russia.”

This drew a bitter reaction from the Chechen rebels, who called Hamas’

decision to visit Putin’s Russia, which had killed so many Chechen Muslims, not
only regrettable but also “un-Islamic.”

For its part, the Hamas delegation, which refused while in Moscow to compromise

over its refusal to recognize Israel, was coming to Russia primarily in search of
international legitimacy. Indeed, Hamas spokesman Sami Abu Zuhri said, on the
eve of the visit, “Now Hamas is on the threshold of international legitimacy, thanks
to the visit by Hamas leaders to Moscow.”

Further legitimizing Hamas during the

visit was its visit with the Russian Mufti Council chairman (besides discussions,
they also prayed together) and the Russian Patriarch. It was clear that Putin used
the Hamas visit to Moscow to improve the position of Russia in the Middle East
at the expense of the United States. He also used the visit of an avowedly Islamic
organization to de-legitimize the Islamic nature of the Chechen rebellion, even as
he was legitimizing Hamas’ role in Middle East diplomacy.

In sum, given Putin’s speech at the OIC in 2003, his policy toward Hamas and

the PKK, and his efforts to terminate US bases in Central Asia, Moscow cannot be
seen as a genuine partner in the war on terrorism.

Russia’s relations with Iraq

Prior to the Anglo-American attack on March 2003, which overthrew the regime
of Saddam Hussein, Putin had two central goals in Iraq. The ﬁ rst was to obtain the
more than $8 billion dollars owed to Russia by Iraq. The second was to support
the development of major Russian business ties with Iraq, especially Moscow’s
oil companies. Such deals, however (other than oil-for-food purchases which were
quite proﬁ table for Moscow), could only take place when UN sanctions against Iraq
were lifted. Consequently Moscow energetically pushed for the lifting of sanctions
until the war broke out.

Nonetheless as the US moved inexorably closer to war in 2002, Putin faced a

clear dilemma – how to maintain good relations with the US while at the same

130 R.O.

Freedman

time protecting Russia’s extensive business interests in Iraq and its hopes for future
contracts there. As the crisis deepened, however, Putin saw some beneﬁ ts ﬂ owing
to Russia. Oil prices, on which Russia depended for more than one-third of its tax
revenues, shot up from $25 per barrel to an average $38 per barrel, giving Russia
an economic windfall. Under the circumstances, the Russian leader adopted a dual
strategy. First, he sought to prevent the war by calling for the UN Security Council
to legitimize any decision to go to war. Second, he sought to prolong the crisis as
long as possible so as to keep the extra income ﬂ owing to the Russian economy.
This, in turn, would keep Russian growth rates high, would enable Moscow to
pay off some of its international debts (thus enhancing its international investment
climate), and would provide enough extra spending power to get Putin not only
through the Duma elections in December 2003 but also through the presidential
election in the Spring of 2004.

At the same time Moscow sought to maintain contact with the United States, as

well as with both the Saddam Hussein regime (his advisor Yevgeny Primakov was
sent to Baghdad) and, discretely, with the Iraqi opposition so that no matter who
emerged on top in Iraq, Russia would continue to have access to Iraqi oil. Saddam
Hussein, however, was less than happy with Moscow’s policy and, in December
2002, canceled the lucrative contract Lukoil had received to develop the West
Qurna oil ﬁ eld, although he left the contracts with Machinoimport and Zarubezhneft
in place. Nonetheless, by also ﬂ oating the possibility of up to $40 billion in new
trade deals, he sought to entice Putin to give him greater support.

Interestingly enough, as the war approached, US–Russian relations did not

immediately suffer. In part this was due to the fact that the leading forces opposing
a US–British attack on Iraq were the French and Germans, and this provided
diplomatic cover for Moscow, and in part it was due to the fact that the US kept
hoping for Russian support, or at least neutrality, during the war, hinting that it
would in return respect Russia’s economic interests in Iraq. Nonetheless, once
Putin publicly sided with French leader Jacques Chirac, US–Russian ties began to
deteriorate.

The situation was to worsen once the war broke out in late March.

Putin, while not being forced to veto a resolution calling for UN Security Council
support of the war, because the US decided not to seek such a UN resolution,
nonetheless spoke out sharply against the British–US attack, calling it the most
serious crisis since the end of the cold war, and asserting that it was “a direct
violation of international law, and a major political mistake that could cause the
International Security system to collapse.”

Russian–American relations were

further hurt by credible reports that Russia had secretly sold military equipment
to Iraq, including night-vision goggles, anti-tank missiles, and devices to interfere
with US GPS positioning systems.

In addition, the Russian ambassador to Iraq

accused US forces of shooting at a Russian convoy exiting Baghdad; the Kremlin
protested a US military spy plane ﬂ ying over Georgia; and the Duma postponed
action on an arms control treaty.

Putin also, perhaps hoping to further prolong

the crisis, demanded a cease-ﬁ re during the ﬁ rst week of the war, as US forces
encountered unexpected resistance.

In seeking to explain Putin’s apparent hardening of policy during the war, there

Can Russia be a partner for NATO in the Middle East? 131

are several possible explanations. First, with the Duma elections drawing closer,
and the Russian public strongly against the war,

Putin did not wish to leave the

issue solely in the hands of the opposition communist party, especially since his
own party, United Russia, was at the time running into problems.

Second, with

most of the Muslim world opposing the war, Putin may have felt that a strong
anti-war position could both win Moscow friends in the Muslim world which, as
noted above, Putin was cultivating and also assuage Russia’s 20 million Muslims,
many of whom are unhappy with his policy in Chechnya. Indeed, Putin asserted,
“Russia has a community of 20 million Muslims and we cannot but take their
opinion into account, I fully share their concerns.”

Finally, with Germany and

France also strongly opposing the war, Putin may have felt that the newly created
Franco-German-Russian bloc of states could serve as a check on US unilater-
alism, and Russian opposition to the war would strengthen the prospects of a
multi polar world.

In any case, Russian behavior during the war was clearly not that of a partner,

at least for the United States. This was to change in the post-war period, albeit only
at the margins, and primarily for Russian, not NATO reasons. Thus immediately
after the war Moscow supported the US-sponsored Security Council Resolution
1483, which, while leaving the US fully in control of Iraq, did provide a role, albeit
an unclear one, for the United Nations in the form of special representative, and
both lifted sanctions on Iraq (except for arms) and noted the goal of the resolution
was for the Iraqis to manage their own national resources

– thus holding out

the hope for Moscow that its oil companies and business interests could obtain
lucrative contracts.

In the aftermath of the fall of Saddam Hussein’s regime in Baghdad in April

2003, Putin set two goals for Russia in Iraq. The ﬁ rst goal was to maximize the
number of trade deals with the post-Saddam Iraqi government to bolster the Russian
economy, a primary goal of Putin. Second, Moscow sought to internationalize the
situation in Iraq so that the US would not continue to dominate the one-time ally
of Russia.

As 2004 dawned, Iraq was beset by increasing instability, a development which

posed both opportunities and problems for Moscow. The instability weakened the
US position and offered opportunities for Moscow to project its inﬂ uence. On the
other hand the growing insurgency also threatened Russian business prospects in
Iraq as well as Russian personnel.

By the end of 2003, despite US efforts to prevent countries, like Russia, who

had not supported the war, from getting reconstruction contracts, Moscow seemed
to be rebuilding its economic position in Iraq. This was, in part, due to the growing
insurgency which led the US to call for all countries holding Iraqi debt to waive
all or part of it so the country could get back on its feet. A now petro-rich Moscow
responded by offering to waive part of the debt, but on the understanding that
Russian companies would have access to the Iraqi market, despite Moscow’s
previous strong support for Saddam Hussein. This goal appeared to be achieved
during a late December 2003 visit to Moscow by Abdul Aziz al-Hakim, head of
Iraq’s governing council, who noted after discussions with Putin, “We received a

132 R.O.

Freedman

generous promise to write off the debt, or at least part of it.” In return, he noted,
“We will be open to all Russian companies.”

Immediately thereafter, the Iraqis

began negotiations with the Russian oil company Lukoil on the West Qurna oil
ﬁ eld concession initially promised to Lukoil in 1997, but taken away by Saddam
Hussein on the eve of the 2003 war with the US.

In observing Russian behavior

in Iraq, a senior US State Department ofﬁ cials commented, “At least so far they’re
taking a positive approach in the Iraqi debt, although they obviously have broader
commercial interests – which they are articulating openly – that they hope will be
satisﬁ ed at the same time.”

Meanwhile Russia was already selling to Iraq locomotives, taxis and motorcycles,

and in February 2004 signed a $10 million deal to send Iraq air-conditioned buses.

Thus, from Moscow’s perspective, one of its goals – increased business dealings
with Iraq – was being achieved, with the promise of more contracts to come – and
all this was being done despite Moscow’s being banned by the US from the ﬁ rst
round of Iraqi reconstruction contracts.

Unfortunately for Moscow, however, the growing insurgency in Iraq, which

while undermining the US position in the country, was to hurt Russia’s own
workers and contracts as well. Thus in April 2004, ﬁ ve Russian workers were
kidnapped. Although they were subsequently released, the hostage-taking incident
was enough to prompt Moscow to begin to evacuate the 553 Russian citizens
working in Iraq, most but not all of whom had left for Russia by 17 April.

However, possibly seeking to politically exploit the deteriorating situation in Iraq,
newly appointed Russian foreign minister, Sergei Lavrov, called for a much larger
role for the United Nations in the rebuilding of that country. Speaking in Dublin,
Lavrov contended that only “with the assistance of the UN will it be possible to
unite all of the opposing forces in Iraq … this is the only way to get the Iraqis to
agree among themselves, with the participation of their neighbors, on how they
want to rebuild their country.” Lavrov then added, seeking to forge a greater role
for the UN (and, by implication, a lesser role for the US) “If the idea is to use the
UN in this way, then we will support any proposals.”

Meanwhile, however, the situation in Iraq worsened for Russians as well as

other foreigners. On 10 May 2004, one Russian was killed, and two more died on
26 May, leading to a further evacuation of Russian citizens

and striking a further

blow at Russian business interests in Iraq. The deteriorating security situation,
along with a reported willingness on the part of the US and Britain to compromise
further on Iraq, may have prompted Moscow to go along with an amended UN
Security Council draft resolution (No. 1546) which was unanimously approved
on 8 June 2004. The resolution formally ended the period of military occupation
on 30 June and transferred power to an interim government that would rule until
elections were held for a national assembly in January 2005. Resolution 1546
incorporated a number of Russian ideas including the holding of an international
conference on Iraq to assist the political process. Perhaps most important for
Moscow, the resolution stated that after 30 June 2004 the Iraqis would exercise
full sovereignty and would have control over their natural resources – a potential
boon for Russian companies – and that the Iraqis would control security issues,

Can Russia be a partner for NATO in the Middle East? 133

with the US-dominated multinational force remaining in Iraq at the request
of Iraq’s interim government and also being accountable to the UN Security
Council.

In theory at least, these were major achievements for Moscow. Iraq had been

“internationalized” thus weakening US control, and the US would no longer
dominate the reconstruction and development of Iraq, thus offering increased
opportunities for Russian companies. There would also be limits – at least in
theory – on the activities of US forces in Iraq. Perhaps for this reason Putin hailed
the resolution as a “big step forward,” while a “high-ranking Kremlin source”
asserted “all our wishes were taken into account, up to and including a point on
holding an international conference.”

To be sure the interim government, faced

by a rising insurgency, would depend on US troops to stay in power (as the attack
on Fallujah demonstrated), and the subsequent, post-election Iraqi government
would most probably need US aid as well. Still, in principle, it was clear that the
US position in Iraq was weakening, and this was seen as a positive development
for Moscow.

Perhaps as a result of Moscow’s improved position in Iraq – or because fol low-

ing the assassination of Ahmed Kadyrov in Chechnya, he felt he needed more US
support – several weeks after the passing of UN Security Council Resolution1546
Putin came out with his surprising statement that Russia had evidence that Iraqi
intelligence agencies during the Saddam period, had been preparing terrorist
attacks against US interests.

Given the lack of evidence on that point by the US

9/11 Commission and other investigatory bodies, Putin’s statement seemed aimed
at enhancing Bush’s credibility at a time when the US presidential campaign had
heated up and Bush’s Democratic party opponent, John Kerry, was neck and neck
with Bush in the polls.

In addition to helping Bush, Putin also moved to enhance Russian inﬂ uence in

the new Iraqi interim government. While unwilling to provide the peacekeeping
forces which the Iraqis had reportedly requested,

Foreign Minister Lavrov,

during a Moscow visit in late July 2004 by Iraqi foreign minister, Hoshyar Zebari,
stated “we are supporting the rebuilding of Iraq by other methods … We take a
positive view of Iraq’s proposal to send Iraqi citizens to study in Russia.”

Iraq

also expressed its willingness to renegotiate contracts which Russian companies
had signed with the Saddam Hussein regime, with Zebari stating, “An agreement
was reached during the visit to appoint representatives from the Iraqi and Russian
governments to carefully review all Russian contracts concluded under the former
Iraqi regime, including the oil for food program.

This agreement appeared to be a

signiﬁ cant concession by the Iraqi interim government, given the erupting scandal
over the pay-offs to and by Saddam Hussein in the oil-for-food program, with
Russian companies and individuals leading the list of those involved.

Perhaps

for this reason, Zebari added “the Iraqi government will honor and carry out all
contracts that this review deems to be legal.”

The Iraqi foreign minister, however,

did not go along with another of Moscow’s goals – the rapid convening of a major
international conference on Iraq.

As the Iraqi election of January 2005 drew near, Moscow took a contradictory

134 R.O.

Freedman

position. On the one hand it promised to reduce the Iraqi debt by 90 percent, which
led interim government President Ayad Allawi, who was visiting Moscow in early
December 2004, to state, “Russia’s writing off of Iraqi debts will contribute to
Russia’s playing a leading role in the regeneration of Iraqi industry and the Iraqi
economy.

While Moscow may have made this move not only to curry favor in

Iraq, but also with the hope of possibly getting Russia’s own foreign debt reduced
by European creditors, the primary motivation seems to have been to induce Iraq
to honor Russian contracts with the former regime, above all the Lukoil contract
for the West Qurna oil ﬁ eld. Indeed, Lukoil President Vagit Alekperov stated
that he felt the prospect for his oil company’s operations in Iraq had improved
following the Allawi visit to Moscow.

Still, the most Allawi could do – at least

before the Iraqi election – was to agree to hold a Russian–Iraqi intergovernmental
commission in February 2005 to “verify the Russian contracts concluded with the
former Iraqi leadership,” with all “fair” contracts remaining in force and “unfair”
ones being cancelled.

On the other hand, the Russian leadership continued to raise questions about

the elections, saying they could not be held fairly given the rising insurgency
and the continuing occupation by the multilateral force.

Consequently, unlike

the situation in Gaza and the West Bank, Moscow did not appear willing to
send observers to monitor the Iraqi election. Putin also stated that due to the
lack of security, it was not yet safe enough for Russian companies to return
to Iraq.

Following the January 2005 elections, where the large turnout surprised much

of the world, Russia warmed its ties with the new government. Offers of Russian
military assistance to Iraq were ﬂ oated,

and Russian Foreign Ministry spokesman

Alexander Yakovenko stated that Russia “positively trusts the formation of the
transitional government of Iraq and is ready to develop all-round cooperation”
with it “in the interests of that country’s post-war development, its economy, [and]
restoration and strengthening of its national sovereignty.”

For his part Putin also praised the elections, stating, “this will be a good platform

for [an] Iraq settlement” and said Russian specialists will soon be returning to Iraq.
He also repeated his call for the pull out of foreign troops from Iraq.

Nonetheless

Russian citizens continued to be in danger in Iraq – two embassy vehicles were
ﬁ red on on 3 July

– and reluctantly Putin appeared to come around to the idea that

the foreign troops, while hopefully leaving within one or two years would have to
stay until security was assured, “We agree with our partners that this (the foreign
troop withdrawal) should not happen before Iraq’s army and policy have become
capable of ensuring security.”

Thus by the Fall of 2005 Putin seems to have become resigned to the fact

that US and British troops would have to stay in the country to provide security,
if Russian businessmen were to have the opportunity to develop their ties with
Iraq and thereby both help the Russian economy and position Russia for a return
to a position of inﬂ uence in Iraq. Thus in the period from 2003 to 2005 Russian
policy changed from trying to exploit differences within NATO to prevent the
US invasion of Iraq to becoming a de facto partner of NATO in Iraq in an effort

Can Russia be a partner for NATO in the Middle East? 135

to prevent the country from sliding further into chaos, an eventuality that would
not only weaken the US position in Iraq, but also make impossible any recovery
of Russian business interests in Iraq. Thus Russia has become a de facto NATO
partner in Iraq, more for its own parochial interests than out of a desire to be a
responsible member of the international community.

Russia’s relations with Iran

As far as NATO is concerned, the central problem in the Russian–Iranian rela-
tion ship has been Iran’s purported efforts to develop nuclear weapons, and the
questionable Russian response to it both in terms of its construction of a nuclear
reactor at Bushehr and its efforts to protect Iran from UN Security Council
sanctions because of its nuclear activities.

To be sure, Iran is a very important country as far as Moscow is concerned, the

most important in the Middle East. The two countries cooperate in Central Asia and
the Caucasus, and to a lesser degree in the Caspian. Russia also sells sophisticated
arms to Iran including ﬁ ghter jets and submarines, and as mentioned above, is
building a nuclear reactor for Iran at Bushehr, now scheduled for operation in
2008.

While Russia increasingly grew close to Iran, divisions over Iran have long

plagued NATO, with the US imposing economic sanctions on Iran (the US also
berated Iran for supporting Hezbollah and Islamic Jihad), France opposing them
and other NATO states leaning to the French position. Nonetheless after revelations
in late 2002 that Tehran had been concealing large parts of its purportedly peaceful
nuclear program, NATO differences began to narrow and Moscow, which had
been able to exploit the NATO ﬁ ssures, came under increasing pressure to curb its
nuclear assistance to Iran.

The problem became especially serious for Russia in December 2002 when it

was revealed in a series of satellite photographs that, in addition to Bushehr, Iran
was building two new nuclear facilities, one a centrifuge plant near the city of
Natanz and the other a heavy water plant near the city of Arak.

Initially Russia

downplayed the development, with the then Director of Minatom, Alexander
Rumyantsev, stating that the photos taken of the plants were not sufﬁ cient to
determine their nature, and, in any case, the Russians had nothing to do with the
two plants. Other representatives of Minatom said Russia was ready to supply the
long-awaited nuclear fuel to Tehran – but only if the Iranians guaranteed the return
of the spent fuel to Moscow. Rumyantsev, however, said Russia was ready without
conditions to supply nuclear fuel to Iran.

By February 2003, however, Rumyantsev was hedging his position, noting, “at

this moment in time Iran did not have the capability to build nuclear weapons.”

March 2003 with an International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) team visiting the
two plants, Rumyantsev had further changed his position and asserted that Russia
could not tell whether Iran was secretly developing nuclear weapons, “While
Russia is helping Iran build its nuclear plant (at Bushehr) it is not being informed
by Iran on all the other projects currently underway.”

Following its initial successes in the Iraq war, the US stepped up its pressure

136 R.O.

Freedman

on Russia to halt the Iranian nuclear weapons program. In response, Igor Ivanov
noted in an Interfax interview at the end of May 2003 that Russia wanted all Iranian
nuclear programs to be under the supervision of the IAEA.

Then, following the Bush–Putin talks in Saint Petersburg in early June 2003,

when Bush was at the height of his international inﬂ uence following the fall of
Baghdad, Putin asserted that the positions of Russia and the US on Iran were closer
than people thought. However, he added that “the pretext of an Iranian nuclear
weapons program [could be used] as an instrument of unfair competition against
Russian companies.”

By early June 2003 it appeared that the US was making two demands on Russia,

vis-à-vis the Bushehr reactor. First, while the US wanted Russia to end all support
for Bushehr, at the minimum, the US argued that Moscow should not supply any
nuclear fuel to the Bushehr reactor unless Iran agreed to send all used fuel back to
Moscow. Second, Moscow should also withhold the nuclear fuel until Iran signed
an additional protocol with the IAEA permitting the agency unannounced visits to
all Iranian nuclear facilities. On the latter issue, both the G8 (of which Russia is a
member) and the EU also pressured Iran. Indeed, the G8 statement issued in early
June noted, “We urge Iran to sign and implement the IAEA Additional Protocol
without delay or conditions. We offer our strongest support to comprehensive
IAEA examination of this country’s nuclear program.”

The question, of course, was not only how far Iran would go to comply, but

how far Russia would go to pressure Iran. In this there appeared to be some
initial confusion in Moscow. While Tony Blair asserted that Moscow had agreed
not to deliver nuclear fuel until Iran signed the IAEA protocol, Russian Foreign
Ministry spokesman, Alexander Yakovenko, stated that Moscow would only freeze
construction on the Bushehr plant if Iran refused to agree to return all spent nuclear
fuel to Russia, and that Iran was not required to sign the protocol, because “the
protocol is an agreement that is signed on a voluntary basis.”

Meanwhile, perhaps to deﬂ ect some of the US pressure, Minatom Minister

Alexander Rumyantsev announced on 3 June 2003 that the Bushehr reactor would
be completed in 2005, not 2004 as originally planned. While he blamed the delay
on the need to replace the reactor’s original German parts, it could well be that this
was an important gesture to the US.

Then, on 12 September 2003, the IAEA, of which Russia is a member, gave

Tehran a deadline of 31 October to provide full information about its nuclear
program to show that it was not secretly building nuclear weapons, and furthermore
urged Iran to freeze its uranium enrichment program. While the tough wording
of the message prompted the walkout of the Iranian delegation from the Vienna
IAEA meeting, the question now became how Russia would react to the situation.
Interestingly enough, at the time, Russia’s Deputy Foreign Minister Sergei Kislyak
tried to soft pedal the IAEA report by saying Iran should not see the 31 October
deadline as “an ultimatum.”

However, in September a dispute between Russia

and Iran had broken out over who would pay for the return of the spent fuel from
the reactor, with Iran demanding that Russia pay for it and Moscow refusing.
Complicating matters further for Putin on the eve of his visit to the US in late

Can Russia be a partner for NATO in the Middle East? 137

September, was the US sanctioning of a Russian arms ﬁ rm (The Tula Instrument
Design Bureau) for selling laser-guided artillery shells to Iran.

Fortunately for Putin, Bush’s position at the time of the summit was weaker than

it had been when the two leaders last met in June. Guerrilla warfare had erupted in
Iraq and the US was beginning to have trouble dealing with it. Indeed, Washington
had turned to the UN in an effort to get additional troops, along with monetary
aid to rebuild Iraq. Along with a sputtering American economy, Iraq had become
a major issue in US politics, as Bush’s standing in US polls had begun to drop.
Consequently, while Bush raised the issue of Iran with Putin, the most he could
extract from the Russian leader was the somewhat vague statement that “It is our
conviction that we shall give a clear but respectful signal to Iran about the necessity
to continue and expand its cooperation with the IAEA.”

In addition, Bush proved

unable to get Putin to agree to cease construction on the Bushehr reactor.

The ball, however, was taken out of Moscow’s hands by the EU, which sent a

delegation to Tehran in late October 2003. The delegation succeeded in extracting
from Iran (which at the time may have still feared a US attack), in return for a
promise of high-tech cooperation, an agreement to temporarily stop enriching
uranium and to sign the additional protocol as well as to inform the IAEA of its past
nuclear activities. Moscow hailed the Iranian action, and the head of the Iranian
Security Council, Hassan Rowhani, came to Moscow on 11 November to formally
announce that Tehran was temporarily suspending the enrichment of uranium and
was sending that day a letter to the IAEA agreeing to the additional protocol.

Moscow exploited the visit saying that Iran was now in full compliance with
the IAEA, and Putin said that now Russia and Iran would continue their nuclear
cooperation.

Indeed, Foreign Ministry spokesman Alexander Yakovenko, eyeing

the possibility of the sale of additional reactors to Tehran, something discussed
during the Iranian delegation’s visit, said Russia would now “do its utmost to
expedite the completion of Bushehr.”

In part because of Russian (and EU) pressure, the Board of Governors of the

IAEA in November 2003 decided not to refer Iran’s nuclear program to the UN
Security Council. Nonetheless it did warn Iran against developing nuclear weapons
and threatened to consider “all options available” if Iran continued to conceal
information about its nuclear facilities.

The US took a tougher stance, with John

Bolton, then Undersecretary of State for Arms Control and International Security,
warning that the US was ready to use all options against rogue states believed to
be developing WMD. Bolton also voiced skepticism that Iran would abide by its
commitments to the IAEA.

Bolton’s skepticism soon proved to be well taken because less than two months

later revelations about Pakistan’s nuclear proliferation policies, including to Iran,
led IAEA Chief Mohammed ElBaradei to warn about the collapse of the non-
proliferation system. The US then called for closing a loophole in the nuclear
non-proliferation treaty to prevent countries, such as Iran, from acquiring materials
for their national atomic energy programs that could be used to build nuclear
weapons.

In addition, IAEA inspectors found that Iran had hidden (and not told

the IAEA about), among other things, an advanced P-2 centrifuge system that could

138 R.O.

Freedman

be used for enriching uranium, along with a program for producing polonium-210
which could be use as a neutron initiator for nuclear weapons.

Meanwhile, as these revelations emerged, Moscow seemed confused about

how to react. Minatom’s Deputy Minister Valery Govorukhin played down
ElBaradei’s warning of the possible collapse of the international nuclear non-
proliferation system and hailed Iran’s cooperation with the IAEA.

By contrast,

however, his superior Alexander Rumyantsev supported ElBaradei, calling the
situation “extremely unpleasant,” and went so far as to say that Russia, along
with other countries, was going to give “active consideration as to whether work
on the establishment of national fuel cycles should be terminated in non-nuclear
countries”

– something that would strike a serious blow against Iran’s nuclear

aspirations.

Consequently the central factor in Russian–Iranian relations in 2004 was the

question as to when Russia would complete the Bushehr nuclear reactor. While
there was progress on coordinating electricity grids via Azerbaijan, trade increased
to the level of $2 billion per year, and Tehran and Moscow negotiated on further
arms and civilian plane sales as well as on the Russian launch of an Iranian
satellite,

Bushehr dominated the discourse as Iran increasingly clashed with the

IAEA. Even the division of the Caspian Sea, the other “hot button” issue in the
Russian–Iranian relationship seemed to be put on hold during this period with
Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov noting in October 2004 that the Caspian Sea littoral
states had only agreed on parts of 8 of the 33 articles of the proposed Caspian Sea
Legal Regime.

Moscow’s dilemma was basically two-fold. Throughout 2004 either the IAEA

continued to ﬁ nd that Iran was hiding information about its nuclear activities, or
Iran was reneging on agreements it had already made with the IAEA and/or the
EU3 (Germany, France and England). This, in turn, brought heavy US pressure
on Russia to hold off supplying nuclear fuel to the Bushehr reactor project it was
constructing in Iran, lest Iranian efforts to develop a nuclear bomb be enhanced.
Increasingly, as 2004 wore on, the Russian leaders appeared to be at least somewhat
persuaded by the US argument and their criticism of Tehran mounted.

In April Iran informed the IAEA that it intended to begin testing at its uranium

conversion facility at Isfahan, after which it began to convert small amounts of
natural uranium into uranium hexaﬂ uoride, the feed material used in centrifuges
– an action that was a clear violation of the agreement signed with the EU3 in
October 2003.

Despite being criticized for this at the IAEA June 2004 Board

of Governors meeting, Iran then notiﬁ ed the IAEA that it intended to resume
manufacture of centrifuge components as well as to test and assemble centrifuges.
This led the IAEA in September to threaten to refer Iran to the UN Security Council
if Tehran did not restore full suspension of its enrichment programs, as well as
grant IAEA inspectors access to Iranian nuclear facilities, and explain to the IAEA
the extent and nature of Iran’s uranium enrichment processing, speciﬁ cally the
role of P-2 centrifuges. What happened next was almost a repeat of the events
in the Fall of 2003 when the IAEA urged Iran to freeze its enrichment program
and allow IAEA inspections, and the EU3 followed up with negotiations that led

Can Russia be a partner for NATO in the Middle East? 139

to an apparent agreement with Tehran to promise to temporarily stop enriching
uranium in return for a promise of trade cooperation. Thus on 15 November 2004 a
preliminary agreement was reached to this effect, only to have Iran attempt to back
off from it by asserting its right to keep 20 centrifuges for research. At the end of
November, however, Iran dropped this demand and signed an agreement with the
EU3 to suspend all enrichment related and reprocessing activities “on a voluntary
basis,” which included: the manufacture and import of gas centrifuges and their
components; the assembly, installation, testing or operation of gas centrifuges;
and undertaking any plutonium separation, or the construction or operation of any
plutonium separation installation as well as all tests or production at any conversion
installation. According to the agreement, Iran’s suspension “will be sustained
while negotiations (with the EU3) proceed on a mutually acceptable agreement
on long-term arrangements.” In return the EU set up working groups with Iran
on political and security issues; technology and cooperation; and nuclear issues,
with all working groups to report by 15 March 2005. The goal of the EU3 was to
have Iran permanently suspend its enrichment activities and end its nuclear fuel
cycle program, and the EU was prepared to offer Iran guarantees of fuel supply
and management for Iran’s nuclear power program and also to help Iran acquire
a light water research reactor if Iran cancelled its plans to build a heavy water
research reactor.

Almost immediately, however, Iran seemed to back off from

the agreement with Hassan Rowhani, Iran’s chief negotiator, saying at a news
conference that “The length of the suspension will only be for the length of the
negotiations with the Europeans and … must be rational and not too long. We’re
talking about months, not years.”

As these events unfolded, Russia was presented with a dilemma. On the one

hand, as in 2003, the EU3 deﬂ ected pressure from Russia and helped prevent not
only a referral of Iran’s nuclear program to the UN Security Council, but also
possible US and/or Israeli military action against Iran’s nuclear installations.
Indeed Moscow could only welcome UK Foreign Minister Jack Straw’s comments
that force should not be used against Iran under any circumstances.

On the other

hand Moscow faced the possibility that, despite Iran’s constant backsliding, the
EU3 – Iran agreement of 30 November 2004 might actually take hold and, if so,
the EU states could become competitors in Iran’s nuclear market.

In any case, what was clear was that as Iran throughout 2004 was seeking to

wriggle out from its commitments to the IAEA and EU3, Moscow appeared to take
an increasingly tough tone with Tehran on nuclear issues. Thus Putin, in June 2004
threatened that “Russia will halt its work at Bushehr if Iran refuses to behave in
an open manner and fails to comply with the IAEA’s demands.”

Similarly, when

meeting with French leader Jacques Chirac and German leader Gerhard Schroeder
in September, Putin stated Russia’s opposition to an “expansion of the club of
nuclear powers, notably through the addition of Iran.”

Then in commenting on the

tough September IAEA resolution, Rumyantsev stated, “It is balanced and serves
the interests of all parties.”

While Russia proved supportive of the EU3 negotiations with Iran, it reportedly

opposed Iranian efforts to get the 20 centrifuges excluded from the agreement,

140 R.O.

Freedman

something that was negatively commented on by the Iranian news agency Mehr.

Putin himself, as the ﬁ nal negotiations with the EU3 wound down, made a not-
so-veiled warning to Iran, stating, “We are engaged in bilateral negotiations with
Iran. We are helping it use nuclear power for peaceful purposes. If ﬁ nal agreements
are achieved, we will continue this cooperation.”

Then, when the agreement

was reached at the end of November, and the subsequent IAEA report took a
relatively tough stand against Iran, Deputy Foreign Minister Sergei Kislyak told
Interfax that not only did Russia praise the IAEA resolution as “well balanced,”
but “we also welcome Iran’s decision to freeze all uranium enrichment programs.
This is a voluntary, trust building measure. We hope this decision will be reliably
fulﬁ lled.”

100

The Russian Foreign Ministry, in a statement issued after the IAEA

resolution, reinforced Kislyak’s words, noting “a full and sustained fulﬁ llment of
this voluntary undertaking, with due monitoring on the part of the IAEA is essential
for the settlement of remaining issues regarding Iran’s nuclear program.”

101

Moscow’s sharp rhetoric vis-à-vis Tehran began to fade in 2005. As mentioned

above, in the latter part of 2004 Putin had suffered a number of embarrassing
failures both internally and externally with the debacle in Beslan demonstrating
just how far Putin was from “normalizing” the situation in Chechnya, and the pro-
Western Orange Revolution in the Ukraine apparently indicating the defection of
Russia’s most important CIS neighbor. Consequently, Putin seems to have decided
that he had to demonstrate both his own, and Russia’s, continuing importance in
world affairs, and reinforcing his alliance with Iran was one way to do this.

102

The process included inviting Iran to join the Shanghai Cooperation Organization
as an observer, and also inviting Iran to join the planned Caspian Sea security
organization. (Iran, under heavy pressure both from the United States and the
European Union, eagerly accepted both invitations.) The two countries also stepped
up their planning for a north–south transportation corridor through Azerbaijan. In
addition, Moscow launched a satellite for Iran and discussed the possibility of the
sale of submarine-launched missiles with a range of 300 kilometers to be ﬁ tted
on the submarines Russia had sold to Iran.

103

Should the sale go through, it would

greatly complicate the activities of the US ﬂ eet in the Persian Gulf–Indian Ocean
region, and be a major blow to US–Russian relations.

While all these developments demonstrated a reinforced tie between Russia and

Iran, the nuclear issue continued to occupy ﬁ rst place in the relationship. In early
2005, however, Iran was becoming increasingly critical of the delay in Russia’s
ﬁ nalizing completion of the reactor. Indeed, a Kehyan commentary by Mehdi
Mohammadi in early January 2005 went so far as to assert that “the breaches of
promise, subterfuge and mischief-making of the Russians in the ﬁ eld of peaceful
nuclear cooperation with the Islamic Republic of Iran is now a repeated saga.”

104

Whether or not the Iranian criticism was an important factor in Putin’s decision

making is not yet known. However, Putin did realize that in order to cement the
relationship with Iran, which he saw as a foreign policy priority, for reasons
mentioned above, he had to ﬁ nalize the nuclear fuel agreement. Consequently in
late February 2005, Russia signed the ﬁ nal agreement for the supply of nuclear fuel
to the Bushehr reactor.

105

Under the agreement all spent fuel was to be returned to

Can Russia be a partner for NATO in the Middle East? 141

Russia, thus, in theory at least, preventing its diversion into atomic weapons. The
agreement came after a Bush–Putin summit in which the US and Russia pledged
to work together against nuclear proliferation,

106

and, as might be expected, the US

took a dim view of the Russian–Iranian agreement.

Perhaps emboldened by the agreement with Russia, Iran’s then chief nuclear

negotiator, Hassan Rowhani warned that Iran would never permanently cease
enriching uranium, and if the US sought sanctions at the UN Security Council,
“The security and stability of the region would become a problem.” Rowhani also
stated that Iran was not happy with the pace of negotiations with the EU3, and
threatened to end the negotiations if there were no progress.

107

Meanwhile, as the US became increasingly bogged down in Iraq, it appeared to

somewhat back off from its confrontation with Iran over the nuclear issue. Thus
in mid-March 2005 the US agreed to join the EU in offering economic incentives
to Iran if it gave up its nuclear program.

108

At the same time, however, an Iranian

presidential campaign was now underway. While both the US and the EU3 hoped
that the victor would be former Iranian president Hashemi Rafsanjani, whom they
felt they could make a deal with, to their surprise an Islamic hardliner, Mahmud
Ahmadinezhad, the Mayor of Tehran was elected president. Consequently when
the EU3 presented its proposal to Ahmadinezhad’s government on 5 August 2005,
it was contemptuously rejected as a “joke.”

109

The proposal called for a long-

term EU–Iranian relationship which combined security and economic incentives,
including giving Iran access to international technologies for light water reactors,
in return for Iran agreeing not to withdraw from the nuclear non-proliferation treaty
and keeping all Iranian nuclear facilities under IAEA safeguards.

110

The Iranian

rejection may have been encouraged by a leaked US intelligence report in the
Washington Post on 2 August 2005 which asserted the Iran was ﬁ ve to ten years
away from acquiring a nuclear weapon.

111

The Iranians may well have seen the leak

as an effort by the Bush Administration to deﬂ ect public pressure to take action
against Iran by demonstrating that Iran would not have the bomb for a decade. In
any case an emboldened Iran, led by its hardline president who appeared to have
the support of Iran’s supreme religious leader, the Ayatollah Khamenei, not only
rejected the EU proposal but also announced it was resuming work at the uranium
conversion plant at Isfahan, where it would transform uranium into nuclear fuel.

112

An angered EU3 then cancelled further talks with Iran, and the issue was referred
to the IAEA.

113

As these events were transpiring, Russia sought to defuse the crisis, with the

Russian Foreign Ministry issuing a statement of 9 August 2005 which asserted that
“it would be a wise decision on the part of Iran to stop enriching uranium and renew
cooperation with the IAEA.”

114

Iran did not heed the Russian request, however,

and international pressure on Iran grew at the end of August with French president
Jacques Chirac warning that Iran would face censure by the UN Security Council if
it did not reinstate a freeze on sensitive nuclear activities.

115

Russia, however, was

now in a protective mode vis-à-vis Iran and chose not to go beyond its verbal call
for Iran to stop enriching uranium. Thus on 5 September 2005 the Russian Foreign
Ministry stated it was opposed to reporting Iran to the UN Security Council.

116

142 R.O.

Freedman

However, Russia was discomﬁ ted by the speech Ahmadinezhad gave at the UN

in mid-September. Instead of diplomatically trying to assuage the opponents of
Iran’s nuclear program, he delivered a ﬁ ery attack on the US and Israel, going so far
as to claim that the US was poisoning its own troops in Iraq, while at the same time
asserting that Iran would never give up its plans to enrich uranium.

117

This speech

placed Iran on the defensive as the members of the IAEA met in late September to
decide what to do about its nuclear program. At the beginning of the meeting Russia
again asserted its opposition to referring Iran’s nuclear program to the UNSC,
with the Russian Foreign Ministry issuing a statement that it considered proposals
that Iran’s nuclear programs be referred to the UNSC to be “counterproductive
and non-conducive to the search for a solution to the problem by political and
diplomatic methods.”

118

Nonetheless, following a heated debate, Russia (along

with 11 other countries) chose to abstain on an IAEA resolution which passed 22
to 1 that found that Iran’s “failures and breaches … constitute non-compliance
with Iran’s agreement to let the international body verify that its nuclear program
is purely peaceful.” The resolution went on to state that the “absence of conﬁ dence
that Iran’s nuclear program is exclusively for peaceful purposes has given rise to
questions that are within the competence of the Security Council.” The resolution
further called on Iran to re-suspend conversion of uranium at its Isfahan plant and
asked Tehran to return to negotiations with the EU3.

119

Russian behavior at the IAEA meeting illustrated Moscow’s ongoing dilemma

in dealing with Iran. While Moscow did not want Iran to acquire nuclear weapons,
it also did not want sanctions brought against one of its closest allies, who was
also a very good customer, buying not only the Bushehr nuclear reactor (and
possibly more in the future) but military equipment as well. Consequently since
the IAEA resolution did not explicitly call for sanctions, Moscow could perhaps
claim a victory, while at the same time it did not alienate the EU3, with which it
was seeking increased economic and political cooperation, or the United States.
Nonetheless, by this time the US was again seeking action against Iran and US
Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice traveled to Russia in mid-October 2005
to try to gain Russian support for sanctions. However, Foreign Minister Sergei
Lavrov stated that Russia wanted to pursue negotiations in the IAEA rather
than go to the UN Security Council, noting, “We think that the current situation
permits us to develop this issue and do everything possible within the means of
this organization [the IAEA] without referring this issue to other organizations,
so far.”

120

Putin echoed Lavrov’s position in a telephone call to Ahmadinezhad in

which he reportedly stated, “The need was stressed for decision on all relevant
issues to be made using political methods within the legal framework of the IAEA.
In connection to this, the Russian president advocated the further development
of Iran’s cooperation with the IAEA, including with the aim of renewing the
negotiations process.”

121

With these statements Russia had come down strongly on the side of Iran in

its conﬂ ict with the EU3 and the US; because without the threat of sanctions,
there would be little incentive for Iran to change its policy. Nonetheless, Iran
was to prove a difﬁ cult ally for Russia. With Foreign Minister Lavrov on a visit

Can Russia be a partner for NATO in the Middle East? 143

to Israel as part of his post-Israeli Gaza disengagement trip to the Middle East,
Ahmadinezhad, in a speech to Iranian students, on 26 October at a program called
“A World Without Zionism,” stated not only that Israel “must be wiped off the
map” but also that any country which recognizes Israel (presumably including
Russia) “will burn in the ﬁ re of the Islamic nation’s fury.”

122

A discomﬁ ted Lavrov

stated, “What I saw on CNN is unacceptable. We will convey our standpoint to
the Iranian side. We’re inviting the Iranian ambassador to the Ministry of Foreign
Affairs and will ask him to explain the motives behind this kind of statement.” He
also noted that these kinds of statements “do not facilitate the efforts of those who
want to normalize the situation surrounding Iran.”

123

Two days later, however, while in Jordan, Lavrov changed his tone, stating, “our

position on Iran remains unchanged. We favor cooperation through the IAEA in
dealing with problems related to the Iranian nuclear program.”

124

In the period between the two IAEA conferences, the Iranian record of com-

pli ance with IAEA directives was mixed. On the one hand Iran, in addition to
offering to resume negotiations with the EU3, made a gesture to the IAEA by
giving it access to a building at Parchin that the IAEA inspectors had wanted
to enter. In addition the IAEA was allowed to interview Iranian specialists, and
Iran also handed over additional documents to the IAEA.

125

However, in one

of the documents it was revealed that rogue Pakistani nuclear scientist, Abdul
Khan, had provided Iran technical data to enable it to cast “enriched, natural and
depleted uranium metal into hemispheric forms” that would help Iran ﬁ t a nuclear
warhead onto its missiles. In commenting on this development former nuclear
inspector David Albright said the design is “part of what you need … to build a
nuclear weapon. Although it’s not a ‘smoking gun’ proving Iran was developing
nuclear weapons, the ﬁ nd cast doubts on previous Iranian assertions that it had no
documents on making such arms.”

126

Further complicating Iran’s position as the IAEA meeting neared was Tehran’s

decision to reprocess another batch of uranium at its Isfahan nuclear facility. This
brought a negative reaction from the French Foreign Ministry whose spokesman
stated, “We consider that this is a decision which does not go in the right direction.
It does not contribute to creating a climate of conﬁ dence between Iran and the
international community.”

127

The Iranian Parliament then escalated the tension

by voting 183 to 14 to stop IAEA inspection of its nuclear facilities if Iran were
referred to the UN Security Council by the IAEA.

128

As this situation developed Moscow continued to oppose referring Iran to the

UN Security Council, although holding out the possibility it could happen. Three
days before the start of the IAEA meeting, Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov stated,
“I do not rule out the possibility that the Iranian question might be sent to the
Security Council if a real threat of the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction
above all nuclear weapons arises. At the moment we do not see such a threat.

129

Moscow also sought to defuse the crisis by working out a proposal with the EU3
that would enable Iran to domestically convert uranium into uranium hexaﬂ uoride
gas that is the precursor to making enriched uranium. The enrichment itself,
however, would be done in Russia.

130

While the compromise defused the situation

144 R.O.

Freedman

so that 24 November IAEA meeting did not refer Iran to the UN Security Council,
how long Iran would enjoy its respite was an open question. First, at the time
of the IAEA meeting Iran not only did not accept the EU3–Russia compromise
agreement, but many Iranian ofﬁ cials continued to demand the right to develop
a full fuel cycle.

131

Second, members of the EU warned Iran that its time was not

unlimited to accept the compromise as Peter Jenkins, Britain’s IAEA delegate
stated, “Iran should not conclude that this window of opportunity will remain
open in all circumstances. It won’t be open for a great deal longer.”

132

Finally, in

his report to the IAEA, Director General Mohamed ElBaradei, who had just been
awarded a Nobel prize, urged Iran to:

… respond positively and without delay to the Agency’s remaining questions
related to uranium enrichment, and to the additional transparency measures
we have requested. As I have stated before, these transparency measures are
indispensable for the Agency to be able to clarify remaining outstanding is-
sues – in particular, the scope and chronology of Iran’s centrifuge enrichment
programs. Clariﬁ cation of these issues is overdue after three years of intensive
veriﬁ cation efforts.

133

Following the IAEA meeting Russian moved much closer to Iran by signing a one
billion dollar arms deal with it, which included $700 million for surface-to-air
missiles that could be deployed to protect Iran’s nuclear installations.

134

Such an

air defense system, once installed, could seriously inhibit a possible US or Israeli
attack. By moving to help Iran to protect its nuclear installations, Moscow sent a
clear signal that it would stand by Iran, whatever its nuclear policies.

In the aftermath of the Russian arms deal, which clearly strengthened Iran’s

position, and, as noted above, appeared to reinforce the Russian commitment to
Iran, Iran prepared for renewed talks with the EU3. Prior to the meeting, however,
Ahmadinezhad once again made a highly provocative statement, especially
for the Europeans, by asserting that the Holocaust was a “myth.” Not only the
Europeans but also Moscow repudiated the Ahmadinezhad statement.

135

To what

degree the Iranian president’s comments on the Holocaust negatively inﬂ uenced
Iran’s negotiations with the EU3 is an open question. However, it is clear that
Iran’s announcement that it would enrich additional uranium in mid-January 2006
effectively ended the talks, and the EU3, drawing increasingly close to the United
States, called on the Security Council to take action against Iran.

136

As tensions between Iran and NATO rose, the IAEA met in early February

2006, and, noting Iran’s unwillingness to provide inspectors with the necessary
information about its nuclear program, voted 27 to 3 (with 5 abstentions) to
refer Iran to the UN Security Council in March if Tehran failed to “restore the
international community’s conﬁ dence in its nuclear program.”

137

While Russia

voted for the resolution, the additional month before referral to the Security Council
was aimed at giving Moscow time to win Iran over to its plan to enrich Iranian
uranium in Russia. Meanwhile, Putin, seeking to build up Russia’s technological
base, and perhaps also to persuade Iran that it was not being singled out for special

Can Russia be a partner for NATO in the Middle East? 145

treatment by the Russian proposal, announced a program to make Russia a world
center for uranium enrichment.

138

While Russia was seeking to entice Iran to agree to its nuclear enrichment plan,

Iran was taking a hard line. In response to the IAEA decision to refer Tehran to the
UN Security Council, Ahmadinezhad ordered industrial level nuclear enrichment,
halted surprise visits by the IAEA to its nuclear installations and ordered the
IAEA to remove seals and surveillance equipment on some of the Iranian nuclear
facilities.

139

In this chilly atmosphere, Russian–Iranian talks began in mid-February. Putin

himself noted on 22 February that “the talks are not going easily”,

140

but expressed

optimism that they would be successful. Unfortunately, Putin’s optimism proved
unfounded as the talks collapsed in early March, primarily because Iran continued
to demand the right to enrich uranium domestically.

141

The failure of the talks

placed Iran in further diplomatic isolation, and perhaps for this reason Iran tried
once again to negotiate with the EU3. These negotiations, however, like the
previous ones, failed again because Iran refused to stop enriching uranium.

142

Under these circumstances, it appeared that following the March meeting the

UN Security Council would take up Iran’s nuclear program. While ElBaradei’s
report to the IAEA did not state conclusively that Iran was pursuing a nuclear
weapons program, he did state, “Regrettably, however, after three years of intensive
veriﬁ cation, there remain uncertainties with regard to both the scope and the nature
of Iran’s nuclear program … For conﬁ dence to be built in the peaceful nature of
Iran’s program, Iran should do its utmost to provide maximum transparency and
build conﬁ dence.”

143

As the time for UN Security Council deliberations on Iran neared, Foreign

Minister Lavrov ﬂ oated the idea of letting Iran do a limited amount of nuclear
enrichment domestically while the bulk of the enrichment would be done in Russia.
While this idea appeared to have the endorsement of IAEA Chief ElBaradei, US
opposition killed it.

144

As the issue began to be discussed in the UN Security Council, Iran, seeing

itself in deepening international isolation, tried yet another ploy. This was to offer
to engage the United States in talks on the rapidly deteriorating security situation
in Iraq.

145

It is possible that, by demonstrating ﬂ exibility in this area, Iran hoped it

could delay action against it in the Security Council, and give Russia diplomatic
ammunition to use to postpone any sanctions.

Meanwhile, Russia reverted to its traditional policy of being willing to publicly

criticize Iran for its actions, but also being unwilling to support serious action
against Tehran. Thus on the eve of the UN Security Council debate, Lavrov was
sharply critical of Iranian behavior during its talks with Russia: “We are extremely
disappointed with Tehran’s conduct during these talks. Iran is absolutely failing
to help those [parties] who are seeking peaceful ways to resolve this problem.
Contradictory signals are coming from Tehran. One day they reject it, the next
day they don’t.”

146

Despite the criticism, Russia took a strong stand against the possible imposition

of sanctions against Iran during the Security Council talks. The end result was

146 R.O.

Freedman

a non-binding resolution which, while frequently expressing “serious concern”
about Iran’s actions, such as its resumption of nuclear enrichment activities,
did not contain any threats of sanctions and only asked for ElBaradei to report
back on Iranian compliance in thirty days.

147

Indeed, in a follow-up meeting in

Berlin, Lavrov reiterated the Russian position, stating that sanctions could not
be used “to solve” the Iranian nuclear dispute, and asserting that the IAEA had
yet to provide “decisive evidence” that Iran was developing nuclear weapons
programs.

148

So matters stood until the surprise announcement by Ahmadinezhad, on the

eve of a visit by ElBaradei to Iran to ascertain Iran’s compliance with the Security
Council resolution, that Iran had succeeded in enriching uranium, and “joined the
club of nuclear countries,” by putting into successful operation a cascade of 164
centrifuges.

149

While this number was insufﬁ cient to provide enough enriched

uranium for a nuclear weapon, Iran’s Atomic Energy Organization’s Deputy
Director, Mohamed Saeedi said that within a year the number of centrifuges in
operation would be 3000 – in the opinion of most observers, enough for a nuclear
weapon, if the centrifuges were competently managed – and in the future Iran would
bring 54,000 centrifuges on line.

150

Iran also contemptuously rejected ElBaradei’s

call for Iran to stop its enrichment efforts, with Ahmadinezhad asserting that
Iran would not retreat “one iota” on nuclear enrichment, and Iran’s chief nuclear
negotiator, Ali Larijani, asserting that the UN Security Council proposals were
“not very important ones.”

151

Then, as if to make the situation even tenser, Iran

announced it was testing the sophisticated P-2 centrifuge.

152

If successful, the use

of P-2 centrifuges would signiﬁ cantly enhance Iran’s enrichment capability.

These developments once again put pressure on Russia to react. While a number

of Russian ofﬁ cials, such as Russia’s Atomic Energy head Sergei Kiriyenko,
downplayed Iran’s ability to create a nuclear bomb,

153

and Foreign Minister Lavrov

called Iran’s announcement “a step in the wrong direction.”

154

Moscow continued

to promote a diplomatic solution and oppose sanctions, with Lavrov asserting, “We
are convinced that neither sanctions nor the use of force will lead to a solution of
this problem.”

155

The United States’ patience with Russian policy on Iran, however, now appeared

to be running out. On 21 April US Deputy Secretary of State Nicholas Burns called
for Russia to stop providing weapons to Iran and to end assistance to the Bushehr
nuclear project. These demands were immediately rejected by Russian ofﬁ cials
who stated the projects would go on unless the UN Security Council imposed
sanctions – an unlikely possibility given Russian opposition to sanctions.

156

When the IAEA report came out on 28 April 2006, it was highly critical of Iran.

The report made ﬁ ve central points:

During the 30-day period after the UN Security Council asked Iran to suspend
enrichment, Iran built a cascade of 164 centrifuges with an enrichment
capability of 3.6 percent.

Iran was building two additional cascades of 164 centrifuges each.

Iran refused to provide documents about the nuclear black market run by

Can Russia be a partner for NATO in the Middle East? 147

A.Q. Khan as they related to centrifuges and the building of the core of a
nuclear weapon.

Iran refused to answer questions about the experiments it was doing with
small amounts of plutonium.

Iran refused to explain the research it was doing on P-2 centrifuges.

The IAEA report concluded that because of these gaps in information “including
the role of the military in Iran’s nuclear program, the agency is unable to make
progress in its efforts to provide assurance about the absence of undeclared nuclear
material and activities in Iran.”

157

Following the report, the US, and its European allies, pushed for sanctions

against Iran. And, as in the past, while calling for Iran to provide the necessary
information to the IAEA, Russia continued to resist sanctions while also opposing
any kind of military action against Iran. Russia’s new UN representative, Vitaly
Churkin, made this point clearly following a debate on policy toward Iran at the UN
Security Council several days after the IAEA report, stating, “We are convinced
that there is no military solution to the problem. However, complicated and difﬁ cult
it may be, a political and diplomatic solution of the problem needs to be sought.”

158

Meanwhile, in an effort to persuade Russia not to support the sanctions resolution,
Iran dangled a major economic incentive – the chance to be the preferred bidder on
two additional nuclear reactors,

159

a development that would not only earn Russia

valuable hard currency, but would also ﬁ t nicely into Putin’s high-tech economic
program.

In any case, the IAEA report of 28 April 2006 and the Russian reaction to it,

demonstrates that Moscow has deﬁ nitely chosen to preserve its ties with Iran at
the expense of its relationship with the United States and its NATO allies. Such
behavior makes a genuine partnership with NATO appear to be impossible.

Russia’s relations with Syria

After a long period of coolness dating back to the closing years of the Soviet
Union, Russian–Syrian relations sharply improved in 2005. This happened just as
Syria was growing increasingly isolated ﬁ rst because of its heavy-handed policies
in Lebanon – Syria had forced a 2004 change in the Lebanese constitution to
allow a three-year extension to the term of Lebanon’s pro-Syrian president, Emile
Lahoud – and then because of Syria’s purported involvement in the February 2005
assassination of former Lebanese prime minister, Raﬁ k Hariri.

On 2 September 2004, when the UN Security Council approved UN Resolution

1559 which called for the withdrawal of “all remaining foreign forces” from
Lebanon and for “the disbanding and disarmament of all Lebanese and non-
Lebanese militias,” Russia abstained choosing not to veto the resolution even
though it was clearly aimed at Syria and its ally in Lebanon, the Hezbollah
militia.

160

However, following the passage of Resolution 1559, Russian policy

changed. As mentioned above, in late 2004 Putin suffered a series of reversals
because of the Orange Revolution in Ukraine and the Chechen terrorist attack on

148 R.O.

Freedman

the school in Beslan, which demonstrated the incompetence of Putin’s security
forces. Putin sought to compensate for these events by playing a more active role
in the Middle East so as to demonstrate Russia was still a great power. Thus, as
noted above, he ﬁ nally signed the nuclear fuel agreement with Iran in February
2005 and moved to sharply improve relations with Syria.

Syria was a target of opportunity for Russia as it sought to rebuild its position

in the Middle East. By the beginning of 2005 Syria was under heavy pressure
on two fronts. Not only had the UN Security Council condemned its activities
in Lebanon but the US was complaining that Syria had become a conduit for
foreign Jihadists ﬁ ghting in Iraq. Consequently, when Moscow, during Bashar
Assad’s visit to Moscow in January 2005, agreed to write off 73 percent of Syria’s
$13.4 billion debt to Russia, Putin demonstrated strong support for an increasingly
isolated Syrian government.

161

Then, in March 2005 Russia and Syria signed an

agreement for Russia to develop new oil and gas deposits in Syria

162

and in April,

just before Putin arrived in Israel, Russia signed an agreement to provide surface-
to-air missiles to Syria

163

– a further sign of support for Syria which was under

increasing pressure because of the assassination of Raﬁ k Hariri. Indeed under
heavy international pressure, spearheaded by France and the United States, Syria
was compelled to pull its troops out of Lebanon by the end of April, with Russia
choosing once again not to interfere in the face of NATO solidarity on the issue.

164

Then, the special commission investigating the assassination of Hariri, under the
leadership of the German police ofﬁ cer Detlev Mehlis, issued an interim report in
October 2005 implicating high-ranking members of the Syrian government, and
noting that the Syrian regime had obstructed cooperation with the commission.
At the same time, a committee under Terje Rød-Larsen issued a report to the UN
that stated that Syria, despite pulling its forces out of Lebanon, had continued to
supply Lebanese and Palestinian militias in Lebanon with weaponry.

165

Upon the

release of the two reports, the US, Britain and France, acting jointly, called for
UN sanctions against Syria. As in the case of Iran, Moscow sought to prevent the
sanctions and succeeded in somewhat watering down the UN Security Council
Resolution criticizing Syria. Nonetheless, UN Security Council Resolution 1636
did condemn Syria for trying to mislead the Mehlis Commission by following a
policy of “cooperating in form but not in substance,” and demanded Syria expand
its cooperation with the investigation or face “further action.”

166

While Foreign

Minister Sergei Lavrov praised UN Security Council Resolution 1636 for taking
Russia’s views into account,

167

and did manage to prevent an immediate referral of

Syria to the UN Security Council, as in the case of Iran, Moscow may face some
difﬁ cult choices once the ﬁ nal report on the Hariri assassination is issued.

In addition, the Russian supply of weapons to Syria raised further questions

about Moscow’s intentions. Russia, at best, looked the other way as its sophisticated
anti-tank weapons were transferred to Hezbollah, Syria’s primary ally in Lebanon,
from Syria (and from Iran via Syria).

168

By directly or indirectly providing weapons

to an organization on the US terrorist list, weapons that were used during the
summer 2006 Israel–Hezbollah war, Moscow showed once again that it could not
be depended on to be a genuine ally for NATO.

Can Russia be a partner for NATO in the Middle East? 149

In sum, in the case of Syria, it appears that while responding to a united effort

by key NATO states to pressure Syria by weakening a UN resolution calling
Damascus to account for its behavior as well as providing weapons to Syria which
were then transferred to Hezbollah, Russia is acting against NATO interests. This
is not the behavior one would expect from a partner. Indeed, as in the case of Iran,
Putin appears to have chosen Syria over NATO.

Conclusions

In examining Russian behavior in four crisis areas of the Middle East – the war on
terror, Iraq, Iran, and Syria – it does not appear as if Russia has met the criteria for
becoming a genuine partner for NATO in the Middle East. In every case Russia
has preferred to follow its own interests rather than seriously working with NATO
states on the problem, and this has been especially true since January 2005.

In the war on terrorism, while blaming NATO countries for not imprisoning or

extraditing Chechens deemed by Moscow to be terrorists, Putin has refused to put
acknowledged terrorist organizations like Hamas and the PKK on its own terrorist
list and even invited Hamas to visit Moscow. Similarly, while Russia has carefully
cultivated the Arab and Muslim worlds in an effort to reduce their support for the
Chechen rebellion, in 2005 Moscow joined with the ﬁ ve Central Asian states and
China in the Shanghai Cooperation Organization to demand the US leave its bases
in Central Asia – just as the Taliban, linked to the terrorist organization Al Qaeda
were going on the offensive. These are not the actions of a country that could be a
partner for NATO in the war on terrorism.

In the case of Iraq, serious divisions within NATO in the rundown to the

war, which Russia exploited, prevented NATO unity, let alone NATO–Russian
cooperation on Iraq. After the war, however, there was increasing cooperation
among most of the leaders of the NATO states as the Iraqi insurgency grew (Spain
was a notable exception), and the defeat of German Chancellor Gerhard Schroeder
in the 2005 elections further increased cooperation. Meanwhile, for its part, Russia
became what might be termed a de facto partner of the quest for stability in Iraq, as
it agreed to waive 90 percent of Iraq’s debts and appeared to become resigned to the
need to maintain the multinational force in that country until the Iraqi army could
be trained to provide security. The reason for the transformation of the Russian
position, however, was not to cooperate with NATO per se, but rather to create
an atmosphere in Iraq wherein Russian business interests in that country, as well
as Russian inﬂ uence, could be rebuilt. Under these circumstances it is doubtful
whether Russia could be considered a real partner for NATO in Iraq.

In the case of Iran, the positions of the leading NATO states, the EU3, and the

US became increasingly congruent between 2003 and 2006 as revelations that
Iran was hiding information from the IAEA emerged, and Iran repeatedly violated
agreements it had made both with the IAEA and the EU3. In the face of the growing
NATO unity, and initially, in 2003, in fear that the US might follow up its ouster
of the Saddam Hussein regime in Iraq with an attack on Iran, Moscow supported
IAEA inspection of all Iranian nuclear facilities and the additional protocol

150 R.O.

Freedman

which allowed the IAEA to make unannounced inspections of these facilities.
In addition, while constructing a nuclear reactor for Iran at Bushehr, Russia also
came to agree with the EU3 and US position to get Iran to sign an agreement to
send all the spent fuel back to Moscow so it could not be used in nuclear weapons.
Russia also appears to have delayed completion of the reactor until Iran met these
requirements.

On the other hand, there is no clear guarantee that once the reactor is operating,

Iran will not be able to secretly divert some of the spent fuel, and this is the reason
the United States so strongly opposed completion of the reactor. In addition, in
the face of frequent Iranian violations of its agreements with the EU3, Moscow
repeatedly sought to prevent the Iranian violations from being reported to the UN
Security Council, where Russia would have to be forced to vote on sanctions. To
make matters worse, while Iran was continuing its violations in the Fall of 2005,
Moscow chose to sign a $1 billion arms deal with it, including $700 million in
surface-to-air missiles that could be used to protect Iranian nuclear installations
from a NATO (or Israeli) attack. Under these circumstances, it is doubtful whether
Russia could be considered a genuine partner for NATO on Iran, even with the
US–EU3–Russian offer to Iran to allow it some low level uranium enrichment – an
offer the Iranians still have not accepted as of November 2007.

Finally, in the case of Syria, one can see another example of Russia trying to

protect a client from UN sanctions. With Syria under strong pressure from a united
NATO because of its heavy-handed policies in Lebanon (UN Security Council
Resolution 1559) Russia chose to waive 90 percent of Syria’s debt. Then, when
Syria stood accused of masterminding the assassination of former Lebanese prime
minister, Raﬁ k Hariri, Russia agreed to sell it surface-to-air missiles. Then, when
Syria was accused not only with failure to cooperate with the UN team investigating
the assassination, but also with smuggling weapons back into Lebanon after its
troops had pulled out, and again a united NATO demanded sanctions, Russia
managed to water down a UN resolution so that it did not immediately call for
sanctions. At the same time, it provided Syria with weapons that it transferred to
Hezbollah for use in the Summer 2006 Israel–Hezbollah war. Thus in reviewing
Russia’s behavior toward Syria, once again Russia cannot be deemed a partner
for NATO.

In sum, a review of the four cases indicates that Russia has been primarily

following its own interests in the war on terrorism, Iraq, Iran and Syria and cannot
be deemed a real partner for NATO in these crises. Under these circumstances
as well as because of Russia’s retreat from democracy, NATO leaders should
seriously consider how much Putin’s Russia can be trusted to play a positive role
in the international community, let alone whether it can qualify to be a partner for
NATO.

Can Russia be a partner for NATO in the Middle East? 151

Notes

1 Anatoly Medetsky, “Kiriyenko Tapped To Run Rosatom,” Moscow News, 16 November

2005.

2 For a more sympathetic view of Putin and his policies, see Richard Sawka, Putin:

Russia’s Choice (London: Routledge, 2004.).

3 Interviews with US State Department ofﬁ cials, Washington, D.C., January 2002.
4 For a view of Russia’s problems in this area, see Dmitri Trenin, The End of Eurasia:

Russia on the Border Between Geopolitics and Globalization (Washington: Carnegie
Endowment for Peace, 2004), chap. 3.

5 See Matthew Evangelista, The Chechen Wars (Washington: Brookings Institution,

2002.).

6 See Mark Katz, “Saudi–Russian Relations in the Putin Era,” Middle East Journal, Vol.

55, No. 4 (August 2001).

7 Cited in article by Aleksandr Samokhotin, Vremya Novostei, 14 May 2003 (translated

in Current Digest of the Post Soviet Press [hereafter CDSP], Vol. 55, No. 19, 2003,
p. 20).

8 Cited in AP Worldstream via Comtex, “Head of Moscow-backed Administration in

Chechnya Invited to Saudi Arabia,” Zawya, Arab business and ﬁ nance online report,
4 September 2003.

9 Itar Tass, 19 January 2004, “Chechen President Says Saudi Funds for Rebels to Dry

Up,” Foreign Broadcast Information Service Daily Report: Russia [hereafter FBIS:
Russia], 19 January 2004.

10 Arkady Dubnov, “Relations Between Russia and Malaysia Reach Cosmic Heights,”

Vremya Novostei, 6 August 2003 (CDSP, Vol. 55, No. 31, p. 18).

11 Cited in Caroline McGregor, “President Speaks to Muslim World,” Moscow Times,

20 October 2003.

12 Cited in Maksim Glikin, “Protocols of the Elder of Malaysia,” Nezavisimaya Gazetza,

17 October 2003 (CDSP, Vol. 55, No. 41, p. 17).

13 Aleksandr Shvaryov, “Prosecutor’s Ofﬁ ce Identiﬁ es Perpetrators of Terrorist Attacks

in Subway and at National Hotel,” Vremya Novostei, 29 September 2004 (CDSP, Vol.
56, No. 39, p. 11).

14 Cited in Yelena Suponina, “Arab Monarch Arrests Russian Security Ofﬁ cers,” Vremya

Novostei, 27 February 2004 (CDSP, Vol. 56, No. 8, p. 18).

15 “Qatar Hands Over Jailed Russian Agents,” Moscow Times, 24 December 2004.

Reportedly, the two are to continue to serve their prison sentences in Russia. Whether
this actually happens is highly doubtful.

16 See Steven Lee Myers, “Investigation Says Russians Acted Ineptly in School Raid,”

New York Times, 30 November 2005.

17 Marina Kalashnikova, “Russia Rejects Bush’s Pet Project,” Russky Kuryer, 2 February

2004 (CDSP, Vol. 56, No. 5, p. 19).

18 Natalya Ratiani, “Moscow Finally Supports Bush Initiative,” Izvestia, 1 June 2004

(CDSP, Vol. 56, No. 22, p. 20).

19 Cited in Yelena Lashkina, “Shanghai Cooperation Organization Goes on Offensive

Against Terrorism,” Rossiskaya Gazeta, 18 June 2004 (CDSP, Vol. 56, No. 25, p. 17).

152 R.O.

Freedman

20 Gregory Asmolov, “Israel’s Intelligence Community Will Support Russia’s,”

Kommersant, 7 September 2004 (CDSP, Vol. 56, No. 36, p. 23). See also Pavel
Felgenauer, “Israel as the Promised Land of Russian Generals,” Moscow Times,
11 November 2004.

21 Cited in Sergei Strokan, “UN Security Council Gives Vladimir Putin Carte Blanche,”

Kommersant, 3 September 2004 (CDSP, Vol. 56, No. 35, p. 6).

22 Mikhail Zygar, “PACE Refuses To Recognize Him as a Legitimate President,”

Kommersant, 8 October 2004 (CDSP, Vol. 56, Nos 40–1, p. 25). In April 2003, PACE
had voted to recommend the establishment of an international tribunal to try both
Chechens and Russians who were accused of war crimes (Sawka, op. cit., p. 180).

23 See Sergei Strokan, “Battle of Britain Is Not Over,” Kommersant, 9 July 2005 (CDSP,

Vol. 57, No. 27, pp. 15–16).

24 Voice of Israel external service: “Israel: Shalom, Saltanov Discuss Terror List, Iran’s

Nuclear Build-up,” 14 April 2005 (FBIS: Russia, 16 April 2005). See also Ekaterina
Stepanova, “Russia’s Approach to the Fight Against Terrorism,” in Jacob Hedenskog,
ed., Russia as a Great Power (London: Routledge, 2005).

25 See Grigory Asmolov, “Israel’s Intelligence Community Will Assist Russia’s,”

Kommersant, 7 September 2004 (CDSP, Vol. 36, No. 26, p. 23); and Yula Petrovskaya,
“Russia Is a Collateral Victim of Terror in the Middle East,” Nezavisimaya Gazeta,
11 October 2004 (CDSP, Vol. 56, Nos 40–1, p. 23).

26 Cf Turkish Press.com, “Aksu Conveys Turkey’s Expectation from Russia Regarding

PKK,” 22 October 2005.

27 See Andrei Kolesnikov, “Russia Prods Asia To Give America an Ultimatum,”

Kommersant, 6 July 2005 (CDSP, Vol. 57, No. 27, p. 3).

28 See Robert O. Freedman, Russian Policy Toward the Middle East Since the Collapse

of the Soviet Union: The Yeltsin Legacy and the Challenge for Putin (Seattle: Henry
Jackson School of International Studies, University of Washington, Donald Treadgold
Paper #23, 2001), p. 55.

29 Itar Tass, “Hamas’ Mishal Says Chechen Separatists Russian Internal Problem,”

3 March 2006 (FBIS: Russia, 3 March 2006).

30 Kavkaz Tsentr News Agency, “Chechen Rebel Ofﬁ cial Criticizing Hamas Decision To

Visit Moscow,” 4 March 2006 (FBIS: Russia, 5 March 2006).

31 Cited in Reuters report, “Hamas Heads to Moscow in Bid for Legitimacy,” Turkish

Daily News (online edition), 2 March 2006.

32 Less than a week after canceling the Lukoil project, Iraq ordered 5000 taxis from the

Russian ﬁ rm GAZ, in a $25 million dollar deal (Simon Ostrovsky, “Baghdad Orders
5,000 Volga Taxis from GAZ,” Moscow Times, 20 December 2002).

33 See Craig S. Smith, “3 NATO Members and Russia Resist U.S. on Iraq Plans,” New

York Times, 11 February 2003. Two weeks later, Russian Foreign Minister Igor Ivanov,
in a news conference in Beijing, threatened to use the Russian veto against a proposed
US–British resolution in the UN Security Council authorizing the use of force against
Iraq (AP report, “Russia Warns of Iraq War Resolution Veto,” Washington Post,
28 February 2003). Putin himself, in Paris on 12 February, had hinted that Russia might
use its veto (John Leicester, “Putin: Russia Could Use Its Veto at UN,” Moscow Times,
12 February 2003).

Can Russia be a partner for NATO in the Middle East? 153

34 For the complete text of Putin’s speech, see Rossiskaya Gazeta, 21 March 2003 (CDSP,

Vol. 55, No. 11, p. 5).

35 See Peter Slevin, “Three Russian Firms’ Deals Anger U.S.: Iraq Purchased Jamming

Gear, Missiles, Night Vision Goggles,” Washington Post, 23 March 2003. See also Bob
Drogin, “Banned Arms Flowed into Iraq through Syrian ﬁ rms,” Los Angeles Times, 30
December 2003.

36 Steve Gutterman, “Russia’s Ambassador Accuses U.S. for Firing on Convoy,” Moscow

Times, 8 April 2003; AP report, “Russia Deploys Fighters To Track U.S. Spy Plane,”
The [Baltimore] Sun, 23 March 2003.

37 Nicholas Kralev, “U.S. Rebuffs Russian Call for Cease-ﬁ re,” Washington Times,

27 March 2003.

38 Anti-American feelings in Russia preceded the war. One poll, taken in early March

2003, revealed that 75 percent of the respondents saw the US as an “aggressor that
wants to gain control of every country in the world.” See Georgy Ilyichov, “Russians’
and Americans’ Attitudes Toward Iraq Differ Fundamentally,” Izvestia, 15 March
2003 (CDSP, Vol. 55, No. 11, p. 6). For a perceptive article on Russian public opinion
during the war, see Leonid Radzikovsky, Rossiskaya Gazeta, 29 March 2003 (CDSP,
Vol. 55, No. 13, p. 13). See also Andrew Jack, “Russians Demonstrate Against U.S.
Intervention,” Financial Times, 10 April 2003.

39 Michael Wines, “Rival Russian Parties Try To Recast Their Images,” New York Times,

2 May 2003.

40 Cited in Sharon LaFraniere, “Russia’s Putin Calls Iraq War a Mistake,” Washington

Post, 18 March 2003.

41 For the text of United Nations Security Council Resolution #1483, see the UN website,

UN Resolution 1483, adopted 22 May 2003.

42 Cited in “For Oil Contracts Russia Will Waive Most of Iraq’s $8 billion Debt,” New

York Times, 23 December 2003.

43 For details on the ups and downs of the Lukoil experience in Iraq, see Robert O.

Freedman, “Russian Policy Toward the Middle East Under Putin,” in Bulent Aras, ed.,
War in the Gardens of Babylon: The Middle East After the Iraqi War (Istanbul: Tasam,
2004, pp. 66–7).

44 Cited in Christopher Marquis, “Russia Sees Iraqi Debt Relief as Link to Oil, U.S. Aides

Say,” New York Times, 17 January 2004.

45 Simon Ostrovsky, “Kamaz Links Iraqi Bus Deal,” Moscow Times, 26 February 2004.
46 Yuri Spirin, “Emergency Situations Ministry To Start Evacuating Russian Citizens from

Iraq,” Izvestia, 15 April 2004 (CDSP, Vol. 56, No. 15, pp. 2–3).

47 Cited in Andrei Zlobin, “Point of Return,” Vremya Novostei, 15 April 2004 (CDSP,

Vol. 56, No. 15, p. 5).

48 Olga Shevel, “Second Blood,” Russky Kuryer, 27 May 2004 (CDSP, Vol. 56, No. 21, p. 22).
49 For a Russian perspective on UNSC Resolution #1546, see Sergei Mironov, “No One

Wanted To Object,” Rossiskaya Gazeta, 10 June 2004 (CDSP, Vol. 56, No. 23, p. 1).

50 Cited in Andrei Denisov, “Good-luck Island,” Vremya Novostei, 10 June 2004 (CDSP,

Vol. 56, No. 23, pp. 1–2).

51 Mikhail Zygar, “A Little Intelligence Among Friends,” Kommersant, 21 2004 (CDSP,

Vol. 56, No. 25, p. 6).

154 R.O.

Freedman

52 Alexander Reutov, “Probe Concerning Peacekeeping Forces,” Kommersant, 26 July

2004 (CDSP, Vol. 56, No. 30, p. 18).

53 Ibid. However, from time to time the Russian Defense Ministry stated it was interested

in selling weapons to, and even providing peacekeeping forces for, Iraq (see Moscow
Times, “Hot News,” 16 November 2004).

54 Ibid.
55 See Yuri Kovalenko, “Who Took Bribes from Saddam,” Russky Kuryer, 12 October

2004 (CDSP, Vol. 56, Nos 40–1, p. 24). See also Itar Tass, “Russia for Holding Iraqi
Elections on Schedule,” 19 November 2004 (FBIS: Russia, 19 November 2004); and
Greg Walters, “Reports: Moscow Thwarting Oil-for-Food Probe,” Moscow Times,
10 December 2004. See also the CIA report on Iraq’s WMD by Charles Duelfeer,
Vol. 1; and Greg Walters, “Russia Was Hussein’s Top Oil Agent: UN,” Moscow
Times, 25 October 2004. Russian ﬁ rms bought $19.2 billion of Iraqi oil and exported
$3.3 billion of UN-approved goods to Iraq.

56 Reutov, see note 52.
57 Ilona Vinogradova, “Iraq Promises to ‘Verify’ Contracts with Russian Oil Sector,”

Izvestia, 8 December 2004 (Foreign Broadcast Information Service Daily Report: The
Middle East and South Asia [hereafter FBIS: MESA], 8 December 2004).

58 Interfax, “Lukoil Chief Says Talks with Iraqi Premier Improve Company’s Prospects in

Iraq,” 7 December 2004 (FBIS: Russia, 7 December 2004). Alekperov may also have
felt Lukoil’s chances in Iraq had improved because, in September, a 7.6 percent Russian
government stake in Lukoil was sold to the US oil company Conoco Phillips.

59 Vinogradova, see note 57.
60 Ivan Groshkov, “Interim Premier Received in Kremlin. Vladimir Putin and Iyad

Allawi Leave Speciﬁ c Decisions to Later,” Nezavisimaya Gazeta, 8 December 2004
(FBIS: MESA, 8 December 2004). See also Novosty, “Russia Says Not Considering
Sending Observers to Iraq Election,” 29 December 2004 (FBIS: Russia, 29 December
2004.)

61 Interfax, “Putin Says Situation in Iraq Too Unsafe for Russian Companies To Return,”

10 December 2004 (FBIS: Russia, 10 December 2004).

62 Itar Tass, “Russian Ofﬁ cial Says Training of Iraqi Security Forces Possible,” 9 February

2005 (FBIS: Russia, 10 February 2005).

63 Itar Tass, “Spokesman Says Russia Ready To Develop All-round Cooperation with

Iraq” (FBIS: Russia, 29 April 2005).

64 Itar Tass, “Putin Says Russia To Expand Efforts To Support Iraqi People,” 27 April

2005 (FBIS: Russia, 28 April 2005).

65 Interfax, “Russian Foreign Ministry Conﬁ rms Attack on its Vehicles in Iraq,” 5 July

2005 (FBIS: Russia, 6 July 2005).

66 Cited in Interfax, “Russian Diplomatic Panorama,” 19 September 2005 (FBIS: Russia,

21 September 2005).

67 For a review of the relations between Russia and Iran in the Yeltsin era, and the ﬁ rst

years of Putin, see Robert O. Freedman, Russian Policy Toward the Middle East Since
the Collapse of the Soviet Union: The Yeltsin Legacy and the Challenge for Putin
(Seattle: Henry Jackson School of International Studies, University of Washington,
2001).

Can Russia be a partner for NATO in the Middle East? 155

68 For a useful survey of the Iranian nuclear installations, see Joseph Cirincione et al.,

Deadly Arsenals, Nuclear, Biological and Chemical Threats, 2nd edn (Washington:
Carnegie Endowment, 2005), chap. 15. See also William Broad and David Sanger,
“Relying on Computer, U.S. Seeks To Prove Iran’s Nuclear Arms,” New York Times,
13 November 2005.

69 See Guy Dinmore, “Russia Ready To Supply N-fuel to Iran,” Financial Times,

24 December 2002.

70 Guy Dinmore, “U.S. Raises Fears Over Iran’s Nuclear Policy,” Financial Times,

24 February 2003.

71 Cited in Ali Akbar Dareini, “Iran’s First Nuclear Power Plant 70 percent Constructed,”

AP report, Washington Times, 12 March 2003.

72 Interfax, 28 May 2003, “Moscow–Tehran Cooperation Gives No Grounds for Criticism

– Russian Foreign Minister” (FBIS: Russia, Diplomatic Panorama, 28 May 2003).

73 Simon Saradzhyan, “Russia Needs Iran Proof or Incentives,” Moscow Times, 3 June

2003.

74 Cited in New York Times, 3 June 2003, “Primary Points from the Statements of the

Group of 8.” See also Judy Dempsey, “EU Presses Iran on Nuclear Arms,” Financial
Times, 27 May 2003.

75 Cited in Vladimir Isachenko, “Russia Will Ship Nuclear Fuel to Iran,” Washington Post,

5 June 2003.

76  Cited in Ibid.
77  Cited in “World Scene,” Washington Times, 14 September 2003.
78  Cited in Dana Milbank, “Putin Agrees in Spirit but Little Else,” Washington Post,

28 September 2003.

79 Seth Mydans, “Russia Ready To Help Iran with A-plant,” New York Times, 11 November

2003.

80 Ibid.
81 Cited in Tehran IRNA, 13 November 2003, “Russian Spokesman Calls Meetings with

Rowhani ‘Constructive’” (FBIS: MESA, 13 November 2003).

82 Cited in Judy Dempsey and Guy Dinmore, “Nuclear Monitor Compromises on Iran,”

Financial Times, 27 November 2003.

83 Cited in Guy Dinmore, “All Options Are Open, U.S. Warns Five ‘Rogue’ Countries,”

Financial Times, 3 December 2003.

84 “Stronger Non-proliferation Treaty Sought by U.S.,” Financial Times, 26 January 2004.
85 See Scott Peterson, “Evidence of Possible Work on Nukes Tests Iran’s Credibility,”

Christian Science Monitor, 26 February 2004; and Carla Anne Robbins, “U.N. Report
Ties Nuclear Program to Iran’s Military,” Wall Street Journal, 25 February 2004.

86 Cited in Itar Tass report, 27 January 2004, “Russian Minister Plays Down IAEA’s

Nuclear Security Fears” (FBIS: Russia, 27 January 2004).

87 Cited in Itar Tass report, 5 February 2004, “Atomic Energy Minister Fears Non-

proliferation Safeguards May Fail” (FBIS: Russia, 5 February 2004).

88 See Andrey Kioloskov, “Who Is Lighting Up Iran: Energy Systems Expand in Synch,”

Rossiskaya Gazeta, 17 December 2004 (FBIS: Russia, 17 December 2004) and Tehran
IRNA, “Iran To Purchase Russian Topolev Passenger Planes,” 26 November 2004
(FBIS: MESA, 26 November 2004).

156 R.O.

Freedman

89 Cited on Tehran TV, Vision of the Islamic Republic Report, 26 October 2004 (FBIS:

MESA, 26 October 2004).

90 For an excellent review of Iran’s violations, see International Institute for Strategic

Studies, IISS Strategic Comments, “Iran’s Nuclear Program Suspended Animation,”
Vol. 10, No. 9 (November 2004).

91 Ibid.
92 Cited in Paul Hughes, “Iran Says Nuclear Freeze Won’t Last Long,” Reuters,

30 November 2004.

93 Straw’s reported comments were: “The prospect of it (war against Iran) is inconceivable.

I don’t see any circumstances in which military action would be justiﬁ ed against Iran,
full stop” (Cited in “Sigh of Relief,” Jordan Times, 7 November 2004).

94 For a Russian view of this possibility, see Arthur Blinov and Andrey Vaganov, “Iran–

Iraq Slap in Moscow’s Face: Russia Sidelined When Questions of Freezing Tehran’s
Nuclear Program and Writing Off Baghdad’s Debt Are Tackled,” Nezavizimaya
Gazeta, 23 November 2004 (FBIS: Russia, 24 November 2004).

95 Cited in Dmitry Suslov, “Iranian Draw,” Russky Kuryer, 13 June 2004 (CDSP, Vol.

56, No. 24, p. 15).

96 Cited in Alexei Andreyev, “Sochi Three,” Russky Kuryer, 1 September 2004 (CDSP,

Vol. 56, No. 35, p. 19).

97 Cited in Andrei Zlobin, “Iran Could Face Sanctions,” Vremya Novostei, 20 September

2004 (CDSP, Vol. 56, No. 38, p. 22).

98 Mehr News Agency (Tehran), “Russia’s ‘Secret’ Moves Against Iran at IAEA

Revealed,” 29 November 2004 (FBIS: MESA, 29 November 2004).

99 Interfax, “Putin Says [He] Applauds Iran’s Decision To Suspend Uranium Enrichment

Program,” 25 November 2004 (FBIS: Russia, 25 November 2004).

100 Interfax, “Russian Foreign Ministry Welcomes [Well-balanced] IAEA Resolution on

Iran,” 20 November 2004 (FBIS: Russia, 30 November 2004).

101 Itar Tass, “Russia Hopes Iran To Continue Cooperation with IAEA,” 30 November

2004 (FBIS: Russia, 30 November 2004).

102 During the early part of 2005, Putin decided to sell surface-to-air missiles to Syria,

and he also visited Egypt, Israel and the Palestinian Authority in April.

103 Kommersant, “Russia Will Equip Iranian Subs with Missiles,” 5 July 2005. Cited

in Habalar report, 6 July 2005. See also Agenstvo Voyennykh Novostey, “Russian
Shipyard Plans To Upgrade Iranian Submarines with 200 km Club-5 Missile” (FBIS:
Russia, 6 July 2005).

104 Mehdi Mohammadi, “Gone with the Wind,” Keyhan, January 2005 (FBIS: MESA,

9 January 2005).

105 Scott Peterson, “Russia Fuels Iran’s Atomic Bid, Christian Science Monitor,

28 February 2005.

106 Peter Baker, “U.S.–Russian Pact Aimed at Nuclear Terrorism,” Washington Post,

24 February 2005.

107 Cited in Nazila Fathi, “Iran Says It Won’t Give Up Program To Enrich Uranium,”

New York Times, 6 March 2005.

108 David Sanger, “U.S. and European Allies Agree on Steps in Iranian Dispute,” New

York Times, 11 March 2005.

Can Russia be a partner for NATO in the Middle East? 157

109 Vision of Islamic Republic of Iran (Tehran), “Iran Foreign Ministry Spokesman

Dismisses EU Proposal as a ‘Joke’, Notes Three ‘Flaws’,” 7 August 2005 (FBIS:
MESA, 8 August 2005).

110 For the text of the EU proposals, see Mehr News Agency, “Full Text of EU Nuclear

Proposal,” 5 August 2005 (FBIS: MESA, 6 August 2005).

111 Cited in Dafna Linzer, “Iran Is Judged 10 Years from Bomb,” Washington Post,

2 August 2005.

112 Cited in Dafna Linzer, “Iran Resumes Uranium Work, Ignores Warning,” Washington

Post, 9 August 2005.

113 Kathrin Benhold, “Europeans Call Off Talks as Iran Balks on Nuclear Issue,” New

York Times, 24 August 2005.

114 RIA, “Russian Foreign Ministry Urges Iran To Stop Uranium Conversion Without

Delay,” Moscow Times, 10 August 2005.

115 Elaine Sciolino, “Chirac Warns Iran of Penalty If It Continues Nuclear Work,” New

York Times, 30 August 2005.

116 “Russia Opposes Reporting Iran to UNSC,” New York Times, 5 September 2005.
117 Cited in Dafna Linzer, “Iran’s President Does What U.S. Diplomacy Could Not,”

Washington Post, 19 September 2005.

118 Itar Tass, “Russia Opposes Referral of Iran to UN Security Council,” 22 September

2005 (FBIS: Russia, 23 September 2005).

119 For the full text of the IAEA resolution, see IAEA website, “Implementation of the

NPT Safeguards Agreement in the Islamic Republic of Iran.” Resolution adopted on
24 September 2005.

120 Robin Wright, “Rice Is Rebuffed by Russia on Iran,” Washington Post, 16 October 2005.
121 Interfax, “Russia: Putin Advocates Iran Developing Cooperation with the IAEA,

Renewing Talks,” 25 October 2005 (FBIS: Russia, 26 October 2005).

122 Cited in Nazila Fathi, “Iran’s New President Says Israel Must Be Wiped Off the Map,”

New York Times, 27 October 2005.

123 Cited in Ivan Groshkov, “Iranian President’s Anti-Israeli Remarks Viewed, Deemed

Dirty Trick on Lavrov,” Nezavisimaya Gazeta, 30 October 2005 (FBIS: Russia,
1November 2005).

124 Cited in Interfax, “Moscow’s Position on Iran Not Inﬂ uenced by Tehran’s Statement,”

27 October 2005 (FBIS: Russia, 28 October 2005).

125 Statement to the Board of Directors by IAEA Director General, Dr Mohamed

ElBaradei, 24 November 2005 (IAEA website), and IRNA, “Full Text of Iranian
Representative’s Address to the IAEA Board,” 25 November 2005 (FBIS: MESA,
27 November 2005).

126 Cited in AP report, “Iran Got Black Market Warhead Design – IAEA,” Jordan Times,

20 November 2005. See also Dafna Linzer, “U.S. Backs Russian Plan To Resolve Iran
Crisis,” Washington Post, 19 November 2005.

127 Cited in Parisa Hafezi, “Iran Signals Deﬁ ance Ahead of IAEA Meeting,” Reuters,

15 November 2005. See also Richard Bernstein, “Iran Has Resumed Reprocessing
Uranium, Diplomat Said,” New York Times, 17 November 2005.

128 AP, “Parliament Approves Bill To Block UN Nuclear Agency Inspections,” Jordan

Times, 20 November 2005.

158 R.O.

Freedman

129 Itar Tass, “Russia Sees ‘No Reason’ To Refer Iran to UN Security Council,”

21 November 2005 (FBIS: Russia, 22 November 2005).

130 Rohan Sullivan, “Bush Backs Putin’s Uranium Plan,” AP Report, Moscow Times,

21 November 2005. See also Roula Khalaf, “EU-3 Willing To Explore New Iran
Nuclear Talks,” Financial Times, 23 November 2005.

131 Fars News Agency, “Iran MP Says Country Must Reject Production of Nuclear Fuel

in Russia,” 25 November 2005 (FBIS: MESA, 26 November 2005).

132 Cited in George Jahn, “EU Accuses Iran, Warns of Sanctions,” AP report, Washington

Times, 25 November 2005.

133 Cited in statement to the Board of Governors by IAEA Director General, Dr Mohamed

ElBaradei, November 2005 (IAEA website).

134 See Andrew Kramer, “Russia To Sell Anti-aircraft Missiles to Iran in Billion Dollar

Deal,” New York Times, 3 December 2005. See also Lyuba Pronina, “Moscow Inks
Arms Deal with Tehran,” Moscow Times, 5 December 2005; and Ria-Novosti, “Russian
Ofﬁ cial Says Sales of Tor-MI Missile Systems to Iran Continue,” 15 December 2005
(FBIS: Russia, 16 December 2005).

135 Itar Tass, “Russia: Foreign Ministry Says Iran’s Attempts To Revise Holocaust Facts

Unacceptable,” 15 December 2005 (FBIS: Russia, 16 December 2004). In denouncing
the Admadinezhad statement, the President of the EU’s Administrative Council,
Jose Manuel Barrosco, stated that Iranians “do not have the president, or the regime,
they deserve. It calls our attention to the real danger of that regime having an atomic
bomb” (Cited in Ali Akbar Dareini, “Iranian President Calls Holocaust a ‘Myth’,” AP/
Washington Post, 14 December 2005).

136 Elaine Sciolino, “Iran Proposes New Talks with Europeans Who Are Mostly

Dismissive,” New York Times, 18 January 2006.

137 Cited in Artur Blinov, “Tehran Agrees to Talks with Moscow,” Nezavisimaya Gazeta,

6 February 2006 (CDSP, Vol. 58, No. 6, p. 18). See also Michael Adler, “Iran Nuclear
Issue To Be Reported to UN Security Council,” AFP, 5 February 2006 (FBIS: MESA,
6 February 2006).

138 Itar Tass, “Russian Atomic Chief Hopes Iran To Be First To Join Enrichment Center,”

8 February 2006 (FBIS: Russia, 9 February 2006).

139 Blinov, see note 137. See also Ali Akbar Dareini, “Nuclear Inspections Are Curbed

by Iran,” AP/Washington Post, 6 February 2006; and Alissa Rubin, “Rejecting
Cooperation, Iran Asks IAEA To Remove Seals, Cameras,” Los Angeles Times (online
edition), 7 February 2006.

140 Cited in AP report, “Russia’s Nuke Talks with Iran ‘Not Easy’,” Jordan Times (online

edition), 23 February 2006.

141 Oliver Bullough, “No Nuclear Breakthrough as Iran Stands Fast,” (AP/Moscow Times,

2 March 2006).

142 Elaine Sciolino, “Iran Softens Tone, but Talks with Europeans on Nuclear Program

End in Bitterness,” New York Times, 4 March 2006.

143 “Introductory Statement to the Board of Governors by IAEA Director General,

Mohamed ElBaradei,” 6 March 2006 (IAEA website).

144 Elaine Sciolino, “Russia and West Split on Iran Nuclear Issue,” New York Times,

7 March 2006; and AFP North European Service, “IAEA’s ElBaradei Favors Iran

Can Russia be a partner for NATO in the Middle East? 159

‘Small-scale’ Nuclear Program,” 16 February 2006 (FBIS: Russia, 18 February
2006).

145 Michael Slackman and David Sanger, “U.S. and Iranians Agree To Discuss Violence

in Iraq,” New York Times, 17 March 2006. Ahmadinezhad’s letter to Bush in early
May 2006 may have had the same goal.

146 Cited in Neil Buckley et al., “Moscow May Be Losing Patience with Tehran Stance

in Nuclear Stand-off,” Financial Times, 14 March 2006.

147 The text of the 29 March 2006 statement was published in the Washington Post (online

edition), 30 March 2006.

148 Cited in “Big Powers Fail To Agree [on] Iran Strategy,” Financial Times, 31 March

2006.

149 Cited in Moscow Times, 12 April 2006.
150 Cited in Mehr News Agency, “Ofﬁ cial Says Iran Informed IAEA of Plan To Complete

Natanz Site, 3,000 Centrifuges,” 12 April 2006 (FBIS: MESA, 13 April 2006). See also
Henry Mayer, “Iran Vows To Boost Uranium Program,” AP/Moscow Times, 13 April
2006.

151 Cited in AP report, “Iran Rejects UN Request To Halt Its Nuclear Activity,” Los

Angeles Times (online edition), 14 April 2006. Ahmadinezhad reportedly said, “Our
answer to those who are angry about Iran achieving the full nuclear cycle is just one
phrase. We say ‘Be angry at us and die of this anger’.”

152 Cited in Mehr News Agency, “Iran President Ahmadinezhad Reveals P-2 Testing by

Iranian Scientists,” 18 April 2006 (FBIS: MESA, 19 April 2006).

153 Itar Tass, “Russian Atomic Head Says Iran Nuclear Problem May Have Diplomatic

Solution,” 14 April 2006 (FBIS: Russia, 15 April 2006).

154 Cited in AFP/Reuters report, “World United in Alarm Over Iran Nuclear Advance,”

Turkish Times (online edition), 13 April 2006.

155 Cited in Simon Saradzhyan, “Russia Seeks Iran Diplomacy,” Moscow Times, 19 April

2006.

156 Paul Richter and Kim Murphy, “U.S. Wants Embargo on Arms to Iran,” Los Angeles

Times (online edition), 22 April 2006.

157 Cited in Maggie Farly and Alissa J. Rubin, “UN Nuclear Agency Takes Steps Toward

Sanctions on Iran,” Los Angeles Times (online edition), 29 April 2006. See also
Elaine Sciolino, “UN Agency Says Iran Falls Short on Nuclear Data: Enrichment Is
Conﬁ rmed,” New York Times, 29 April 2006.

158 Cited in Itar Tass, “Russia’s UN Envoy Rules Out Threat of Force in Iran Resolution,”

3 May 2006 (FBIS: Russia, 4 May 2006).

159 Itar Tass, “Russia Ready To Bid for New Iranian Nuclear Contracts,” 2 May 2006

(FBIS: Russia, 4 May 2006). See also Interfax, “Iranian Envoy Says Russian Bid for
New Nuclear Contracts To Be Viewed Favorably,” (FBIS: Russia, 23 April 2006).

160 For the text of UN Security Council Resolution #1559, see United Nations website,

2 September 2004.

161 Nabi Abdullaev, “Assad Praises Russia, Wins Debt Deal,” Moscow Times, 25 January

2005.

162 RIA, “Russian Company Signs Oil, Gas Exploration Deal with Syria,” 21 March 2005

(FBIS: Russia, 22 March 2005).

160 R.O.

Freedman

163 Steve Gutterman, “Putin Defends Missile Sale to Syria,” AP report, Moscow Times,

29 April 2005.

164 Interfax – Agenstvo Voyennykh Novostoy, “Russian Foreign Minister: Syria Should

Withdraw Security Forces from Lebanon,” 11 March 2005 (FBIS: Russia, 13 March
2005).

165 The two reports are found on the United Nations website.
166 Cited in Resolution #1636 (2005), 31 October 2005, United Nations website, Security

Council, 31 October 2005.

167 Interfax, “Lavrov Voted for Syria Resolution Because Her [Russia’s] Views [Were]

Taken into Account,” 31 October 2005 (FBIS: Russia, 31 October 2005).

168 Cf Interfax, “Russian FM: Facts Needed Before Conclusions on Hezbollah’s Use

of Russian Arms,” 8 September 2006 (FBIS: Russia, 9 September 2006); and Igor
Plugatarev, “Israeli Tanks Ran Up Against Russian Weapons,” Nezavisimaya Gazeta,
15 August 2006 (FBIS: Russia, 16 August 2006).

Is East–West integration
possible?

Stephen J. Blank

In 2002 Russian, American, and European elites claimed to have agreed upon
the goal of reuniting Russia with the West.

They also understood that realizing

that goal would oblige the West to make Russia a full partner within the Euro-
Atlantic world and duly take its interests into account.

Yet today that concord

has been dashed and trends point in the other direction. Partnership is as far away
as ever. Neither is this merely a matter of Russian estrangement from America.
In fact, mutual EU–Russian skepticism and tension on economic, political and
military issues is pervasive and probably growing.

Russia has visibly renounced

the strategic course towards integration proclaimed by President Vladimir Putin
and Foreign Minister Igor Ivanov in 2001–02. And it long ago deviated from an
evolution toward democracy that was hoped for ﬁ fteen years ago.

Neither are the six goals for Russia laid out by the Bush Administration

anywhere near realization. Although the term “integration” is not present in the
six goals of the Bush Administration listed here. The goals are:

Russia integrated into, and linking the Euro-Atlantic and Northeast Asian
zones;

Russia as a key partner against terrorism and proliferation, particularly in
the Middle East, Caucasus and Central Asia;

Russia contributing to international coalitions for regional stability and
humanitarian assistance;

Russia as a reliable supplier of energy on commercial terms to global
markets;

Russian–US partnership in space and in advancing high-technology
frontiers;

Russia as a consolidated free-market democracy.

Thus both sides seem to be trapped in a spiral of mutual estrangement. As Dmitry
Trenin recently wrote,

* The views expressed here do not represent those of the US Army, Defense Department, or the US

Government.

162 S.J.

Blank

Western relations with Russia can no longer be described in terms of integra-
tion, as it is traditionally understood, that is gradually drawing Russia into the
Western institutional orbit. For that there is neither particular demand on the
part of Russia nor sufﬁ cient supply on the part of the United States or NATO
and the EU.

Consequently these are trying times for those who want Russia fully to reclaim
what Putin called its European vocation and Europe’s consequent reuniﬁ cation.
Indeed, as Trenin observes, Russia does not want to belong to a larger institutional
grouping so to a very large degree this estrangement is a direct result of Russia’s
domestic and foreign policy behavior.

This is not to deny that Western, including US, policies have much to answer

for. American unilateralism, particularly in Iraq, clearly undid the rapprochement
of 2001–03. Western disunity concerning approaches to Russia and apathy or
disinterest in Russian developments, such as the EU’s visible ambivalence about
pushing Russia too hard on its anti-democratic and neo-imperial tendencies, for
example Chechnya and the spread of violence to engulf the entire North Caucasus
where 250,000 Russian security personnel are now stationed and where, despite
the killing of Chechen leader Shamil Basayev, more troops are being sent, have
all contributed to this situation.

America’s and the EU’s reluctance to chal-

lenge Russia’s anti-democratic policies (it is noteworthy that democracy was
the last of the six aforementioned goals of the Administration) its ﬁ xation upon
the Middle East and terrorism, if not China, plus its inability or refusal to seri-
ously address the many issues eroding transatlantic unity are also major causes
for the lack of any coherent Western policy towards Russia or of any apparent
interest in devising one.

Indeed, in May 2005, Andrew Card, President Bush’s

Chief of Staff said on nationwide television that “President Putin was building
democracy!”

Washington, as is often the case, prefers to seek Russian cooperation on

outstanding security issues rather than push it on human rights issues, fearing that
Russia will then cease cooperation with it on those seemingly more important
or more urgent issues. In May 2005 Newsweek reported that the White House
had decided not to pressure Russia over its own and the CIS’s democracy deﬁ cit
because America needed Russian support against Iranian and North Korean nuclear
proliferation.

Although there are now more divisions within US policy toward

Russia, that view still appears to prevail in policy discussions.

Newsweek’s

report also reinforced widespread beliefs that pursuing purely strategic goals
fundamentally contradicts a policy based on the invocation of values and second,
that the only realistic policy towards Russia mandates that the pursuit of strategic
goals should override the pursuit of Russian democratization. Defenders of this
policy like Anatol Lieven of the Center for American Progress and John Hulsman
of the Heritage Foundation call it realism.

Ironically, this alleged realism towards Russia directly contradicts the

Administration’s own stated policy to campaign for democratization throughout
the world and formulate policies towards other states on the basis of their adherence

Is East–West integration possible? 163

to or deviation from a universal, even theologically ordained, norm of democratic
governance.

It also clashes with the EU’s stated goals in its Strategy for Russia

of fostering the integration of a democratic Russia.

While US policy clearly

acknowledges and should acknowledge overall power realities as well as Russia’s
power and importance, it also strikes many observers as a hypocritical double
standard that undermines the entire democratization project. And despite rhetoric
to the contrary, Russian and American observers know that America looks the other
way.

Worse yet, that policy also tolerates Russia’s violation of many international

accords that it has signed since the Helsinki Treaty of 1975. If the doctrine that
treaties must be obeyed is a cornerstone of international order, undermining it to
gain short-term expedient interests, is deeply misguided as a policy precept and
certainly against vital Western interests.

Certainly we cannot call this policy realism if it based on the deeply unrealistic

notion that Russian domestic behavior is separate from its foreign policy behavior.
For, “Whether the agenda is thick or thin, internal developments cannot be divorced
for long from external behavior. What happens inside Russia impacts on the nature
of Russia as a partner for the EU and the US.”

Perhaps worst of all this supposed realism is visibly unrealistic as we have

long known that East–West cooperation will be limited at best and that Russia
opposes more than it supports US and European international goals. So silence in
the face of democratization deﬁ cits merely gains complicity in Russia’s regression,
not the attainment of genuinely strategic goals. This fact calls into question the
utility of a policy of silence concerning violation of the democratization agenda
to which Russia has committed itself in international treaties and accords. In fact
Russian policies are as much to blame if not more for the current estrangement
as are Western ones. Russian analysts actually admit that Russia remains “a risk
factor” in world politics, not a reliable or autonomous pole of world politics.

This admission reﬂ ects Moscow’s ongoing failure to build a stable, democratic,
legitimate, and non-revisionist state.

Many recent Russian initiatives: arms sales to Syria, Iran, Venezuela, and

China, providing nuclear reactors to Iran, supporting North Korea, attempts to
undermine European security institutions, efforts to subvert Central and East
European governments, and attacking Western military presence and support for
democracy throughout the CIS signify a basically anti-American and anti-Western
policy orientation.

Russia’s participation in the war on terrorism is also rather

less substantive than might otherwise be imagined. In 2001 FBI investigators
alleged that Russian spy Robert Hanssen had sold or transmitted electronic
software programs and equipment to Russia who then sold them to Bin Laden.
This equipment let him monitor US efforts to track him down.

Similarly, recent

assessments have made a plausible case that Moscow has a direct link to Bin
Laden’s number two man, Ayman Zawahiri, giving it a source of leverage at the
very top of Al-Qaeda.

Moscow has also frequently promised Central Asian states

all kinds of military assistance against various terrorist groups like the Islamic
Movement of Uzbekistan only to renege in practice and send little or nothing.

Certainly it is not Russian troops who have fought against the Taliban. And there

164 S.J.

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are more than occasional reports of Russian gun running to the Taliban or of
ex-KGB ofﬁ cers training terrorists in Iraq.

Certainly the provision of weapons to

Iran and Syria that then go to Hezbollah suggests a cynical willingness to exploit
terrorism indirectly in pursuit of Russian ambitions.

We also know that throughout the war in Chechnya the Russian intelligence

services have long collaborated with Chechen leaders accused of being terrorists.
Elizabeth Fuller has argued compellingly that Russian intelligence agencies are
controlling the war to the extent of frustrating the army in its search for Chechen
leaders like Shamil Basayev who have committed acts of outright terrorism.

Indeed Basayev, Russian claims to the contrary notwithstanding, was killed in
2006 by accident, not by Russian forces. Therefore those services have ulterior or
at least mixed motives in waging this war. We also know from Fuller that this war
has proven to be extremely lucrative for many members of the Russian bureaucracy
and armed forces who possess carte blanche to rob the country blind and to
appropriate for themselves funds earmarked in Moscow for Chechnya’s intended
reconstruction or who are supported by bribes from Moscow’s puppet in Chechnya,
Razman Kadyrov.

In any case, since this war began largely as part of an internal

coup d’état by the ruling party and Silovye Struktury (power structures) in Russia
in 1999 to consolidate Putin’s rise to power as Boris Yeltsin’s heir, there is good
reason to argue that Moscow’s war on terrorism has mainly been an instrument to
serve larger or more private interests.

Finally, in its foreign policies Moscow opposes labeling Syria and Iran as sponsors

of terrorism and Hamas and Hizbollah as terrorists despite the overwhelming
evidence to support those facts.

In other cases, for example arms sales to China,

Russia opposes European interests. Moscow beneﬁ ts from the EU’s continuing
sanctions on arms sales to China because otherwise European competition might
ultimately erode Russia’s leverage on China’s defense capability. Thus Russia has
tangible material reasons for looking to balance with China against Washington
even though in fact integration with Europe, if not America, offers Russia more
possibilities over time for genuine leverage upon China.

Russian policies and East–West estrangement

Washington’s failings aside, the more powerful cause of this growing East–West
estrangement is that Russia’s retreat from democracy towards neo-Tsarism parallels
or even drives its neo-imperial aspirations throughout the CIS.

The conjuncture

of these two trends represents a major and actual, not potential, threat to European
security and not just because this regression to autocracy re-divides Europe along
political and ideological lines that leads Russia to view current issues of world
politics through the archaic or archaizing lens and retrogressive agenda of zero-sum
games or spheres of inﬂ uence, etcetera. In the Russian context, autocracy’s intrinsic
logic and implications is itself at fault. Autocracy logically entails empire and a
patrimonial concept of the state that is owned by the Tsar and can only survive
by expansion and predation.

But beyond that, just as autocracy means that the

autocrat is not bound by or answerable to any institution or principle at home, in

Is East–West integration possible? 165

foreign policy, just as often happened under the Tsars, Russia feels free not to be
bound by its own prior treaties and agreements, for example its agreements to
vacate its forces from Moldova and Georgia. This craving for unfettered power and
status as a great, for even super power also manifests itself in incessant demands
for a free hand and an exclusive sphere of inﬂ uence in the CIS.

Russia’s professed doctrine of multipolarity, postulating it as one of the great

powers that demands in fact a status equal to both Washington and the EU as a
whole in bilateral negotiations while also seeking to exploit its status as a state is
fundamentally opposed to any concept of European security. Demanding an equal
status with Washington and the EU, Russia refuses to be bound by its agreements
with them. Its pursuit of wholly unconstrained foreign policies, particularly in the
CIS, is not just a recipe for imperial expansion but is also dangerous. As Chechnya
and the North Caucasus show us, this mentality, aligned to a lack of democratic
control over the power structures, generates an endless institutional temptation for
imperialism and military adventurism that quickly devolves into protracted war.
Indeed, quite quickly after the collapse of the USSR Moscow has re-established
foreign lodgments for its forces in every post-Soviet state except for the Baltic
states. Concurrently across Eastern Europe, the Caucasus and Central Asia, Russia
has used energy companies, intelligence penetration, organized crime, and military
threats to undermine the stability and integrity of local regimes.

In innumerable ways Russia also continues to wage an undeclared political

and economic war against the Baltic states that shows its refusal to integrate into
Europe.

Russian politicians still refuse to admit that the USSR occupied the

independent Baltic states after 1940.

Moscow also seeks to compel its neighbors

to institute pro-Russian cultural and educational policies based on its professed
solicitude for the Russian diaspora. This concern for that diaspora has been invoked
steadily over the last decade to undermine the security and legitimacy of the Baltic
states even as it wages an economic war against them. Thus in 2002 Putin actually
compared them to Macedonia and demanded that Europe supervise their minority
policies, an explicit derogation of their sovereignty.

After urging partnership with

NATO and saying that he did not oppose the Baltic states’ membership in NATO,
Putin publicly urged Russia’s residents to agitate against Baltic governments.

response Estonian Parliamentarian Marko Mihkelson, Deputy Chairman of the
Parliament’s Foreign Affairs Committee observes that “If Moscow thinks that the
occupation of the Baltic states did not exist there is no reason to believe that Russia
belongs to the [Baltic] cultural space.”

Indeed, that observation also holds true

for the European political space. Neither is the Baltic a unique case. In Moldova
too Russia has also played the diaspora card and subjected the region to what
Moldova’s foreign and prime minister call a military occupation and humiliation
that violates every European treaty Moscow has signed since 1975.

Russian policies thus erode European security. Not only did Russia try to subvert

Ukraine’s sovereignty and elections in 2004, it has clearly used both Ukraine and
Belarus as middlemen for arms shipments to dubious end-users like, Iraq, Iran, and
China. Kaliningrad and Russia’s proto-state in Moldova, Transnistria, are notorious
havens of every kind of racket, including weapons and other smuggling. Belarus,

166 S.J.

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too, has long been a conduit of dual-use and purely military technologies and
weapons to states like Iraq and Iran. Ofﬁ cial statistics say that Belarussian–Iraqi
trade turnover in 1999 came to $6 million. According to Kommersant in 2000, the
real ﬁ gure was closer to $60 million.

Similarly there has also occurred a complete fusion of crime and government

reaching up to the highest levels of the regime and acknowledged by Putin.

This corruption lies at the heart of much of Russian domestic and foreign policy
and fuels the Chechen war as well as the vibrant drug and Kalashnikov culture
in Central Asia, the Caucasus, and Black Sea. Indeed, in Russia corruption has
become the system.

In regard to energy deals abroad, the regime’s key strategic

asset, we ﬁ nd a total fusion of networks of former KGB, intelligence, and other
Siloviki types, energy ﬁ rms controlled, if not owned by the state, and outright
gangsters and criminals.

Understandably, these enmeshed networks of crime,

governance, police, military, and business now strive to ensure that their policies
and candidate/s prevail in 2008 and to preserve and entrench this system under
the guise of a normal state. Nor is it likely this elite cannot solve its constitutional
issues by means of some negotiated pact. Rather the threat if not the reality of
violence and of repression is always present. Thus Russian policies threaten the
progress of democracy in Eurasia and the security of European governments,
includ ing its own, paradoxically making Russia’s own regime the main threat to
internal security and stability. For example, due to its endemic misrule, Russian
policy has now stimulated what can only be a protracted war in the North Caucasus,
which could engulf even more of Russia for a long time.

Empire and autocracy

As Russian political scientist Egor Kholmogorov has observed, “‘Empire’ is
the main category of any strategic political analysis in the Russian language.
Whenever we start to ponder a full-scale, long-term construction of the Russian
state, we begin to think of empire and in terms of empire. Russians are inherently
imperialists.”

Similarly, John Loewenhardt reported in 2000 that despite the fact

that Russia’s alleged status as a leading pole in global affairs was then understood
to be increasingly more rhetorical than real, “In one of our interviews a former
member of the Presidential Administration said that the perception of Russia as
a great power ‘is a basic element of the self-perception of high bureaucrats.’ If
a political leader were to behave as if Russia was no longer a great power, there
would be ‘a deeply rooted emotional reaction in the population.’”

This outlook stimulates Russia’s refusal to integrate into Europe and subordinate

itself to any rules or institutions. As Trenin stated above, Russia does not want to
belong to a larger institutional grouping.

As has often happened Russian reform

foundered on the rock of empire and the demand of elites for the role of a great
power, for example empire in Eurasia. “Much of the general rejection of the MFA’s
(Ministry of Foreign Affairs-author) foreign policy direction on the former Soviet
Union was caused by the general difﬁ culty in accepting the collapse of empire by
the Imperialists and even some liberal-democrats.”

Is East–West integration possible? 167

Indeed, the stability of Russia’s political and economic structure depends quite

literally on its continuing ability to exploit Central Asia and perpetuate its back-
wardness through neo-colonial economic policies. From Russia’s standpoint it is
essential to penetrate Central Asia’s energy economy because the latter’s oil is
cheaper to extract than is Russia’s. Therefore Russia must capture those products
for use in its domestic market at subsidized prices so that Moscow can compel
Central Asia to sell to it at less than world market prices. Meanwhile, Russia can
use its production for sale on the world market at global prices. The ensuing price
manipulation is the source of enormous revenues that sustain the government and
overall economy.

Andrei Grozin, Head of the Department on Central Asia and Kazakhstan at

Russia’s Institute for CIS countries, has frankly outlined Russia’s approach to
energy issues with Central Asian states. In 2005 he told the Rosbalt news agency
that:

For successful economic cooperation with Russia ‘in the nearest future Uz-
bekistan will need to give up the system of state capitalism, in particular,
by “shaking” servicing of expensive ore mining and energy industries off
state shoulders.’ [Grozin] believes that if Gazprom obtains control over Uz-
bekistan’s gas transporting system, Lukoil is granted free access to explora-
tion and extraction of oil and Russia’s expansion into the nutrition and light
industry sectors of the Uzbek market takes place, then one can say that the
Russian state has received what it expected from the [Russo-Uzbek treaty of
November, 2005] alliance treaty.

Elsewhere Grozin admits that Russia’s neo-imperial policies are in many respects
against economic logic although they make excellent geopolitical sense from an
imperial perspective. Thus he writes:

The changes on the world market might force the Russian Federation to start
importing uranium instead of exporting it. This may happen in the relatively
near future. For this reason, the uranium of Kazakhstan and its products
are of special interest for Russia, while bilateral cooperation in the atomic,
space research, and other high tech applied spheres might pull all the other
branches along with them. Russia does not proﬁ t ﬁ nancially from its relations
with Kazakhstan, which have nothing to do with altruism: ﬁ nancial input is
accepted as payment for Russia’s geopolitical interests and national security.
This is a long-term strategy that allows the Republic of Kazakhstan to adjust
its nearly entire scientiﬁ c and technical potential to Russia: Kazakhstan and
Uzbekistan are two key Central Asian states. This strategy also applies to the
military-technical sphere – Moscow sells its resources for “allied” prices not
only to strengthen military and foreign policy contacts with Kazakhstan, but
also tie it, for many years to come, to Russia’s military-industrial complex
and standards.

168 S.J.

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If Russia could not control Central Asian energy exports and production, it would
have to use its own production for its domestic market and this would all but ensure
failure to meet its overly large commitments to both Europe and Asia as well as
an end to subsidized inefﬁ ciencies at home. And without those subsidies domestic
industry would crash. As Mikhail Khodorkovsky, Yukos’ Chairman and CEO told
the Carnegie Endowment in 2002, a key reason why Russian oil has a high cost
is transportation costs and its most pressing needs are for liberalization and new
markets. But the state will not let go of its control of pipelines and this will maintain
the excessively high costs of Russian oil and deprive Russia of markets even as
Russia has to “push aide” other producers by expanding its pipeline network to
take their oil through its pipelines. Khodorkovsky also conceded that Caspian
oil is indeed competition for Russian oil so if that energy goes onto markets
before Russian energy capabilities are developed, the latter will not have room to
compete. And given the importance of oil companies to Russia’s economics, it is
urgent for them to restrict Central Asian production and infrastructure to mainly or
even exclusively Russian channels lest their oil and gas become less competitive
due to its own high cost and wasteful monopolistic structure and dilapidated
infrastructure.

This is by no means an isolated view. Vladimir Paramonov and

Aleksey Strogov have observed that, “should energy prices in the domestic market
reach the world level, it will spell the end for virtually all Russian enterprises.
Even if world fuel prices remain high, fuel production will become uneconomic
in Russia.”

Central Asia’s abundant gas deposits, if marketed abroad, could restrict Russia’s

ability to compete in world markets, in particular the surging Asian markets of
India, Japan, China, and South Korea, for fossil fuels. Given the centrality of oil
and gas to Russia’s economy, that would be a catastrophe. Thus, for Moscow it is
essential that Putin’s proposals for an OPEC-like cartel over natural gas dominated
by Moscow be realized and that Central Asia’s efforts to build infrastructure is
limited to projects that are compatible only with Russia.

Multipolarity and empire

Russia’s policy of multipolarity and anti-American balancing aims to secure
Russia’s integrity and its role as undisputed hegemon of the CIS.

Indeed, Russian

elites profess to believe that Russia will fall apart otherwise.

Several corollaries

ﬂ ow from this posture and they all negate cooperative solutions in the CIS and
possibilities for cooperative security elsewhere in favor of openly hegemonic
spheres of inﬂ uence and zero-sum games, all within a context of traditional
Realpolitik. Since 1996, if not earlier, many Russian scholars and ofﬁ cials have
proposed endless variations upon the theme of a binary structure where NATO
and the CIS, led by Washington and Moscow respectively, would constitute two
equal pillars of Eurasian security.

While Russia wants European bipolarity, it

also insists upon a free hand in the CIS and a suspension of Western pressure for
both democratization and European integration. This is a recipe for deadlock and
conﬂ ict not peace. For both China and Russia,

Is East–West integration possible? 169

The emphasis on the United Nations Security Council, as well as statements
such as ‘mutual respect, equality, and mutual beneﬁ t’ and ‘the establishment
of mutual understanding’, imply the desire for both states to have a veto over
US unilateralism – something which would be unnecessary if power was more
evenly distributed in the international system. In fact, the entire concept of
multipolarity implies a virtual veto over the unilateralist impulses of any great
power: other powers align against any aggressive power in an effort to pre-
serve the status quo and to ensure that any major changes in the international
system require consensus.

Logically this should entail support for multipolarity in the CIS too but that is
anathema to Russian rulers and elites. Thus the rhetoric of multipolarity conceals
a disposition for empire and even coercive military interventions by Russia in the
CIS. In other words, it betokens a return to frozen conﬂ icts in world politics for as
Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice has said:

Multipolarity was never a unifying idea. It represented a necessary evil and
supported a condition without war, but it never contributed to the victory of
peace. Multipolarity is a theory of competition, a theory of competing interests
– and worse still – competing values.

Moscow’s preferred foreign policy posture condemns Eurasia to the status of being
Russia’s neo-colonial sphere of inﬂ uence. Yet Russia cannot effectively police
that sphere and even if it could do so the conditions necessary for accepting that
outcome undermine any hope of stabilizing Europe or Eurasia. Russia deﬁ nes its
security as requiring its neighbors’ perpetual insecurity and unending vulnerability
to failed state symptoms. But this also means their ongoing vulnerability to too
many of the pathologies associated with terrorism, crime, proliferation, and ethnic
war. Since peace does not protect itself, excessive complacency about European
security is unwarranted. In fact, at least some governments and militaries reject this
complacency even if they defend against their anxieties sotto voce.

Although never voiced publicly by elected European ofﬁ cials, there is concern
about Russia. It is rarely announced as policy, but the force structure of the
Bundeswehr – still, all these years after the end of the Cold War, organized to
defend the homeland against tanks coming from the east – makes it obvious.
In a way that frustrates and confounds its NATO partners, Germany still de
facto prioritizes conventional territorial defense even if pledges allegiance to
the Petersberg tasks which presume force projection capabilities.

These apprehensions are well founded because the logic of Russian policy also
requires the erosion of the capabilities of European security institutions and
suspension of their pressure upon Russia to observe the many international
agreements and conventions it has previously signed. Russia can only maintain a
free hand in the CIS if Europe’s main security agencies are deterred from fulﬁ lling

170 S.J.

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their missions and from ensuring that numerous international accords are fulﬁ lled.
That is hardly an auspicious way to build the new Europe. Thus we can say that
only if Russia is allowed to be an empire can autocracy succeed. Russian empire
and European security are contradictions in terms. If the West wants to reintegrate
a democratic Russia into itself and thereby restore Russia’s European vocation it
must preclude the restoration of any form of Russian empire. The survival and/or
restoration of autocracy and empire necessarily entails the insecurity and instability
of great swathes of Europe and Asia. “The main reason why the West cannot
remain complacent about Russia’s actions is the fact that Russia’s ‘near abroad’
is, in many cases, also democratic Europe’s near abroad.”

Undoubtedly Russian goals entail empire, that is, the diminished sovereignty of

neighboring CIS states. This strategic aim is inherently incompatible with genuinely
improved EU–Russian or Russian–NATO relationships. Russian spokesmen
argue that the West has no business or interest there, without its permission, or
alternatively that America and Europe, in their own interest, should give Russia
a sphere of inﬂ uence there.

In 2005 Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov threatened

supposedly “disloyal” CIS governments with the use of “every conceivable
economic pressure tactics.”

At the same time, Defense Minister Sergei Ivanov

explicitly updated the Brezhnev doctrine’s concept of diminished sovereignty
for Central Asian states. Thus, “The countries of the region are members of the
Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO). And [if the countries of the
region are] making a decision about hosting new bases on their territory, they
should take into account the interests of Russia and coordinate this decision with
our country.”

Ivanov also said that these states should also take preliminary consultations with

other members of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO). This represents
an effort to include China as a power with rights of veto over these states’ defense
policies and to tie up each local government by obliging it to seek collective
permission to conduct an independent defense policy.

On 15 September 2005 Ivanov further stated that if Georgia and/or Ukraine join

NATO, Moscow will reassess its relations with them “and not just in the defense
and security realm.”

Numerous threatening statements to the same effect by him,

Lavrov, and others have followed since then in an attempt to maintain the CIS,
and particularly Ukraine, as an exclusive sphere of Russian inﬂ uence. But worse
yet, these threats have been followed up by actins, what high-ranking Ukrainian
ofﬁ cials call “punishments,” to the extent that they believe Russia is waging a cold
war against Ukraine.

This belligerence marks a new tone for earlier he had he

reiterated Moscow’s position that it viewed NATO bases in the Baltic as a threat
(another sign of its unwillingness to accept Baltic freedom of action in defense and
foreign policy) and that concern for Middle Eastern security did not justify a new
US or NATO base in Georgia. But he then added that he accepted that some CIS
countries might become NATO members by 2015 and that there is nothing we can
do to stop Ukraine or Georgia from joining NATO “and perhaps there is no need
for that,” because what they really want is to leverage membership in NATO in
order to join the EU.

Is East–West integration possible? 171

Similarly Russian diplomats still cannot fully accept former Soviet republics

as genuine states, for example diplomats at an Organization for Security and Co-
operation in Europe (OSCE) meeting calling Georgia “some province.”

Neither

was this an accidental one-time affair. Instead it represents deeply held views in
the Ministry of Foreign Affairs.

Therefore other parties’ acceptance of Russia’s

demands for multipolarity and recognition as a pole in a new world order means
conceding its right to deﬁ ne an exclusive neo-imperial sphere of interest in the CIS
even if that precludes genuine multipolarity with Europe. Furthermore, they must
also understand that Russia is not a European power and will not abide by European
“Acquis” as a participant in this multipolarity. Former Deputy Foreign Minister
Ivan Ivanov told an American-European-Russian forum in 2002 that:

At the same time, Russia is a global and Eurasian power and obviously can-
not concentrate its attention exclusively on Europe. Therefore, while stressing
our European identify we prefer to have a free hand in our policy towards and
cooperation with all regions, including Asia, the United States, and, above
all the CIS. Thus our relations with the EU can be expected to be only con-
tractual, and not institutional, i.e. involving membership or association. This
is not a limitation, however, as a recent treaty such as the PCA (Partnership
Cooperation Agreement-Author) still offers many untapped opportunities for
cooperation – at least 64 of its norms still await implementation.

Yuri Borko’s analysis of the clash between demands for a free hand in the CIS and
for cooperation with Europe is even starker:

It is widely believed among Russia’s political, business, and intellectual circles
that a policy toward integration with other members of the Commonwealth
of Independent States (CIS) is incompatible with a policy toward a strategic
partnership with the EU, toward integration into the Common European Eco-
nomic Space and close coordination of foreign-policy and security activities.
These circles will hardly cause the Russian president to give up his European
policy, yet their efforts may prove enough for sinking the idea of concluding
a new PCA (Partnership and cooperation Agreement).

Indeed, many examples show that Russian foreign policy elites do not believe that
Russia is either part of or thought of as part of Europe. Secretary of the Security
Council, Igor Ivanov, calls Kaliningrad a bridge to Europe for Russia, implying
that Russia is on the non-European side of the bridge and that Immanuel Kant’s
hometown is also somehow not Europe.

Arguably, the centrality of the CIS in

Russian calculations overrides even the geopolitical and geo-economic neces-
sity of Russia’s speediest possible reintegration into Europe. Indeed, it is now
clear that “making a European choice” must ratify Europe’s (and Washington’s)
ever-growing involvement in Russia’s internal affairs and an end to Russia’s
neo-imperial designs on the CIS.

Russian elites have therefore retreated from that

choice even if doing so impedes creation of genuine multipolarity with Russia as

172 S.J.

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a leading pole. And their policies in the borderlands show that instead they prefer
to dominate the CIS even if that puts Eurasian stability as a whole at risk.

Thus

Moscow opposes any true stabilization of the European security system beyond the
CIS while seeking to limit the losses to its imperial objectives. As Sergei Medvedev
observed in 1999:

Damage limitation is a strategy that postpones Russia’s European engage-
ment. Underlying this argument is a long-term strategic consideration aimed
at the new European balance of the twenty-ﬁ rst century. Russia, currently in
a phase of geopolitical and economic decline, must prevent the ﬁ xation of this
unfavorable status quo by any treaty, agreement or security system. Russia is
objectively interested in maintaining the current uncertain and unstructured
security arrangement that took shape in Europe in the wake of the Cold
War as long as possible – preferably until the economic upsurge in Russia
expected by the middle of the next decade. Russia is therefore instinctively
opposed to any institutional upgrade of European security, NATO enlarge-
ment included; it would prefer to see European security not as an institution,
but as an open-ended process (much like the former CSCE; hence the current
impact of Moscow on the OSCE) and would like to dissolve it in various pan-
European collective security proposals, reminiscent of old Soviet designs of
the 1930s.

Thus Russia’s goals remain consistent with its 1999 ofﬁ cial submission of its
strategy for relations with the EU, made by then prime minister, Vladimir Putin,
who stated that:

As a world power situated on two continents, Russia should retain its freedom
to determine and implement its foreign and domestic policies, its status and
advantages of a Euro-Asian state and largest country of the CIS. The ‘develop-
ment of partnership with the EU should contribute to consolidating Russia’s
role as the leading power in shaping a new system of interstate political and
economic relations in the CIS area’ and thus, Russia would ‘oppose any at-
tempts to hamper economic integration in the CIS’ [that may be made by the
EU], including through “special relations” with individual CIS member states
to the detriment of Russia’s interests.

Therefore it is hardly surprising that there is so much tension and frustration in the
high hopes for genuine integration in EU–Russian relations.

The large literature on EU–Russian relations also shows that Russia refuses

to integrate with the EU but rather to stand beside it while denying the EU
opportunities to inﬂ uence trends in the CIS.

Russia also uses its energy assets

and diplomacy to bypass the EU and gain better relations with individual European
states that surpass its relations with the EU and NATO. These efforts to secure such
bilateral ties, especially with Germany, and use them plus energy leverage to erode
European support for Ukraine or democratization in the CIS undermine the EU’s

Is East–West integration possible? 173

unity of purpose and policy toward Russia and arouse great resentment in Eastern
Europe.

Moscow’s current attacks on the OSCE, which actually began in 2000

once it became clear that the OSCE had become interested in democratic deﬁ cits and
Russian neo-imperialism in the CIS, also speak for themselves.

Neither is Russia’s

cooperation with NATO all that it seems.

Indeed, it is often more rhetorical and

tactical than strategic and real and certainly stops at the Russian border, another
example of Russia seeking a free hand and spheres of inﬂ uence.

Therefore both NATO and the EU have taken a more active interest in these

“borderlands” or what is now called Eastern Europe. They cannot do otherwise if
they hope to realize the imperatives of their own security mission within Europe
or to achieve their stated aim of a democratic Russia. Likewise, Moldova, Georgia,
and Ukraine increasingly resent Russian efforts to dominate them and are pressing
Western security institutions to settle these so called frozen conﬂ icts, pressure
Russia to cease its tactics, help reform their economies and polities so they can
move toward the West, and create alternatives to Russian domination. Georgia has
advanced its own peace plan for South Ossetia, and Ukraine has advanced its own
peace plan for Moldova, won the support of the government in Chisinau in a clear
effort to block Russian ambitions there, and taken major initiatives with Georgia
to establish counter-blocs in the CIS to blunt Russia’s imperial drive. Moldova has
appealed to the OSCE and other Western security organizations for an end to what
even its pro-Moscow government has called Russian military occupation.

Even

if Russia prevents progress here this issue is becoming ever more urgent.

Given

the Black Sea’s rising importance in world politics, the pressure to move forward
on conﬂ ict resolution in these conﬂ icts can only grow. Responding to this pressure
and shaping a framework for conﬂ ict resolution here is therefore most timely for
Europe, America, and Russia.

Unblocking Eurasia’s frozen conﬂ icts and prospects for cooperation

Nonetheless, there are opportunities for cooperation that could foster integration,
but only over the middle to long term and on the basis of a uniﬁ ed Western approach
to Russia. But for success in this endeavor not only must Washington overcome the
breakdown of its policy process, which has afﬂ icted policy-making on Iraq, Korea,
and myriad other issues besides Russia–Central Asian policy, for example – it
must also adopt a uniﬁ ed agenda for East–West relations with its European allies
and the EU.

And this uniﬁ ed agenda must be comprehensive in scope – that is, it

must apply to issues of defense, democratization, energy, etcetera. Time is of the
essence because further inaction and disunity only strengthens Russia’s drift to
autocracy and neo-imperial posturing which can only end in frustration and con-
ﬂ ict. Worse yet it allows for potential crises like those in Georgia’s relations with
South Ossetia and Abkhazia and Ukraine’s difﬁ cult domestic situation to spin out
of control.

Certain guidelines should illuminate what can and must be done to meet loom-

ing security challenges and deal with urgent problems in a concrete way that
beneﬁ ts all parties. Given the overriding strategic dictum that frustrating Russian

174 S.J.

Blank

imperialism must inevitably generate pressure for domestic reform – the fundamen-
tal strategic rationale of George Kennan’s containment strategy – Western regimes
should unite behind proposals for assisting Westernizing states like Georgia, and
Ukraine, and for simultaneously unblocking existing conﬂ icts in the Black Sea
and Caucasus by utilizing those trends that favor sound proposals for conﬂ ict
resolution there.

Resolving any or all of these frozen conﬂ icts is an essential prerequisite for

peace and stability but also for democratizing the Caucasus and in Russia too.
There are four reasons for regarding this as a Western priority. First, America and
its European allies are formally and actually united as both the EU and NATO,
as well as the OSCE, have already taken stands on them.

Member governments

and Western security organizations have enormous experience from a decade of
immersion in Balkan issues in confronting the issues of reconstruction, ensuring
minority rights, assisting democratization and promoting the transformation
of irregular and uncontrolled militaries and paramilitaries into responsible
democratically controlled forces. Since the Balkan situation has demonstrably
improved, even if full resolution of its conﬂ icts is still incomplete, the lessons of
that experience, provided that local governments genuinely wish to integrate into
NATO and the EU, show that meaningful progress towards the goals of peace,
stability, democratization, and integration is possible.

Second, such an initiative offers Western security organizations a chance to

actively participate in extending security to the increasingly vital Black Sea–
Caucasus area, Europe’s new security frontier. NATO and/or the EU can lead the
peace support operation while NATO can upgrade and extend its programs under
the Partnership for Peace to develop stronger Membership Action Plans for local
states. Such actions stabilize the peace and also create a mechanism for eliminating
the scourge of paramilitaries and criminal gangs that dominate these conﬂ icts and
the territories surrounding them. Armies operating under more democratic and
legitimate political leadership could gradually assume the primary role in pacifying
formerly violent areas or areas at risk and in stabilizing a new status quo. The EU
can also institute programs like those now operating in the Balkans which help
participating states institute needed reforms and even draw closer to membership.
Previous examples show that the prospect of genuine membership is decisive in
inducing governments to cooperate in Westernizing reforms that extend security,
democracy, and prosperity.

Finally, the OSCE could supervise resolution of

contentious democratization and human rights issues in disputed territories.

The third reason relates to Russia’s integration as a democratic genuinely peace-

loving state into the Euro-Atlantic world, a process that also enhances Russian
security. Russia can only be a secure democratic state that is fully integrated into
Euro-Atlantic structures by repudiating the neo-imperial policies that have helped
freeze these conﬂ icts. Meanwhile, it is particularly important to create a military–
political mechanism that lets Russia participate in conﬂ ict resolution and protects its
legitimate interests in these zones. This mechanism now exists thanks to two critical
decisions in 2005 which show how obstacles to effective conﬂ ict resolution can be
overcome or at lest signiﬁ cantly reduced by Western military–political action.

Is East–West integration possible? 175

One such decision is Russia’s new readiness to form a brigade to work with

NATO and be interoperable with it on international peace missions. Here inter-
oper ability mainly means command of English, but it also provides an oppor tu nity
to implement the jointly elaborated generic concept of peacekeeping.

While this

brigade is supposedly being optimized for service in South Ossetia, Abkhazia,
and conﬂ icts in and around Russia, nothing precludes its deployment elsewhere if
suitable political and command arrangements can be negotiated.

Nor does the fact that Russia, on the basis of that generic concept, would

demand that in all operations led by the NRC that it and NATO co-decide issues
at every stage of the operation including participation in operational planning.

Such moves would also accept the implicit principle that partnership with Russia
entails mutual equality but also prevent anyone from acting unilaterally.

Since

Russian leaders consistently espouse military cooperation with NATO along these
and other lines, action based on this generic concept can advance that goal on the
basis of the equality they both profess to seek.

Ultimately, it can offer a uniﬁ ed

agenda for joint peace support missions with Russian forces and for pacifying these
areas so that existing security threats do not migrate into Russia. Then Moscow
might become more susceptible to Western persuasion.

Furthermore, the 2005 status of forces agreement between NATO and Russia

removes legal obstacles to such operations, and makes it easier to organize them
together.

The opportunity to conduct combined missions with the Russian

Army offers NATO an opportunity to inﬂ uence it toward greater integration with
Western armies, while also stimulating greater military professionalization and
democratization of Russian civil–military relationships. The future deployment
of this brigade also lets NATO alleviate Russian concerns for its interests in the
resolution of any of these conﬂ icts as Moscow could then legitimately participate
in that process. The NATO umbrella over these operations would also reassure
other parties to these conﬂ icts that their interests were also being safeguarded.
Formation and deployment of this interoperable force also represents a positive
precedent for future such operations involving NATO and Russia in missions of
interest to them both.

The second decision of 2005 was to combine US and NATO operations in

Afghanistan into a single mission and force.

By 2006, NATO had indeed taken

command of this operation. Thus counterterrorism and peacekeeping forces and
missions would be merged into a single command structure and provide a new
template for future operations that are intended to prevent terrorism and support
peaceful resolution of the war in Afghanistan. Obviously this decision also creates
possibilities for future missions along the same lines that can be deployed to resolve
hitherto frozen conﬂ icts.

Although some European governments still resist committing their forces to

what might become counter-terrorism operations and missions, creation of this US–
NATO force, and its accompanying command and mission structure, represents a
new departure in global peace support operations. It could create a new model for
designating and deploying forces that can pre-empt the potential for instability in
the CIS’s frozen conﬂ icts while helping integrate Russia into European agendas

176 S.J.

Blank

and values. This is inherently a task for US leadership since it is clear that, left to
its own devices, Europe cannot and will not act in a united fashion. Neither does it
have enough forces to spare given its current military organization.

Ultimately,

Europe must shoulder the responsibilities of defending its new security frontier
but it still cannot do so exclusively.

Because Russia’s current regime cannot and probably will not do this without

continuous external pressure, not only must Western pressure for liberalization
and democratization, on the basis of international standards and agreements
continue and intensify, foreign policy initiatives to advance Western interests in
the borderlands must also aim at rescuing Russia from itself. However, if Russia
declines to participate in unfreezing these conﬂ icts the West, led by the United
States, should not take “no” or Russian stonewalling for an answer. Instead, in their
own interests, Western states must keep up the pressure to terminate the prevailing
state of siege that in the Black Sea basin. They must proceed toward this objective
that enhances their security whether or not Russia wishes to join them and despite
Russian objections and obstacles.

Accordingly, and this is the fourth reason why progress toward resolving

these frozen conﬂ icts is vital to the causes of democratization and security in
Eurasia, nothing could be more false and misconceived than to argue that we
must place the stability of Russia’s government above calls for democracy, an
end to neo-imperialism abroad, and for an honest confrontation of all the former
Soviet peoples and governments with their history. Privileging Russian stabil-
ity above the prerequisites for Russian democratization ensures the instability
of all of Russia’s neighbors and allows Russia to continue manipulating these
conﬂ icts. Worse, privileging the stability of the autocratic Putin regime over
democratization perpetuates these conﬂ icts by supporting corrupt, authoritarian,
and sub-optimizing regimes in those zones and imperialism and autocracy in Russia.
Paradoxically a policy that emphasizies stabilizing Russia above other considera-
tions ensures the continuing instability of the entire post-Soviet periphery, including
Russia.

Indeed, the very idea that Russia can sustain an imperial posture throughout

the CIS by freezing local conﬂ icts is, at face value, preposterous. Although we
see ofﬁ cials openly calling for that policy, they simultaneously concede that
Moscow cannot afford it.

Fortunately, at least some insightful Russian analysts

increasingly recognize that Russia cannot cope with the Caucasus or Ukraine, or
Central Asia by itself and needs outside help to resolve these conﬂ icts.

Similarly, we must help Russia understand that it pays a steadily rising price for

pur suing an obstructionist but inherently futile policy of preserving this debased
status quo and that it gains much more by participating in regional reconstruc-
tion. Moscow cannot hunt with the hounds by supporting secessionism and ethnic
violence in Moldova and the Trans-Caucasus and run with the hares by insisting
upon its own inviolate sovereignty in Chechnya and the North Caucasus. More
practically, the instability that Moscow’s actions around the Black Sea and the
Caucasus have generated are decisive causes of Chechnya’s ongoing and spread-
ing nightmare.

Is East–West integration possible? 177

These two decisions provide many of the political and operational prerequisites

for successful conﬂ ict resolution within the CIS. If the political will to build
upon those decisions and to offer creative new initiatives that exploit these
achievements and carry them further is present, then the possibilities for successful
conﬂ ict resolution in the CIS could then grow by an order of magnitude. And if
Washington has not yet seen these problems and opportunities in the broader
context portrayed here, reconsideration of the trends cited here might yet allow
it to devise appropriate initiatives for a win-win solution for all the parties to any
or all of these frozen conﬂ icts. What we need now is both the political will to
recognize the opportunity that stands before us, and the ability to shape the existing
dimensions of that possibility into a concrete and mutually acceptable basis for
action. If we fail to realize this opportunity, it may be a long and bitter time before
we have another chance to create a durable system of security for resolving the
CIS’s wars and conﬂ icts.

Notes

1 Atlantic Council of the United States, The Twain Shall Meet (Washington, D.C., 2002),

p. 2.

2 Ibid., passim.
3 Oksana Antonenko and Katherine Pinnick, eds, Russia and the European Union

(London and New York: Routledge and the IISS, 2005); Dov Lynch, ed., What Russia
Sees, Chaillot Papers 74, (Paris: Institute for European Security Studies of the European
Union, 2005); Andrew Monaghan, “A Sea Change and Its Undercurrents: Russian
Perspectives of European Military Integration,” World Defence Systems, VIII, No. 1,
2005, pp. 67–8.

4 Conference remarks by Thomas Graham, of the National Security Council and Special

Assistant to the President and Senior Director for Russian Affairs, at the American
Enterprise Institute, 1 October 2005 (cited in Johnson’s Russia List, 17 October 2005,
available at: http://www.cdi.org).

5 Dmitry Trenin, Reading Russia Right, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace,

Policy Brief, No. 42, October 2005, p. 8.

6 Ibid. (italics in the original). This certainly is the line of nationalists like Alexei Pushkov,

already in 2000, “Russia and the New World Order,” International Affairs, No. 6, 2000,
p. 10.

7 Sarah E. Mendelson, Anatomy of Ambivalence: The International Community and

Human Rights Abuse in the North Caucasus (Washington D.C.: Center for Strategic
and International Studies, 2005); Maria Raquel Freire, “Matching Words with Actions:
Russia, Chechnya and the OSCE – A Relationship Shrouded in Ambiguity,” UNISCI
Discussion Papers, No. 9, October 2005; Tuomas Forsberg and Graeme P. Herd, “The
EU, Human Rights, and the Russo–Chechen Conﬂ ict,” Political Science Quarterly,
CXX, No. 3, Fall, 2005, pp. 472–8.

8 Ibid. Richard Wolffe and Eve Conant, “The Problem with Putin,” Newsweek, 9 May

2005, p. 49.

178 S.J.

Blank

9 “Transcript for Meet the Press,” 1 May 2005, available at: http://www.msnbc.msn.com/

id/7698687 [Accessed 13 August 2006].

10 Ibid.
11 Phillip Stephens, “The West Folds Before Putin’s Bluff,’ Financial Times, 18 July 2006,

retrieved from Lexis-Nexis; Jackson Diehl, “Crumbling Before Putin,” Washington
Post, 19 June 2006, p. 21; Tom Raum, “Bush Softens Criticisms of Putin’s Steps
To Curb Liberties,” AP, 11 July 2006; Pavel K. Baev, “Bush Downplays ‘Sovereign
Democracy’ at Putin’s Barbecue,” Eurasia Daily Monitor, 17 July 2006; Natalia
Melikova, “Making Them Respect Him,” Nezavisimaya Gazeta, 29 June 2006, retrieved
from Lexis-Nexis; John B. Dunlop and Rajan Menon, “Chaos in the North Caucasus and
Russia’s Future,” Survival, XLVIII, No. 2, Summer, 2006, p. 110; Vladimir Mukhin,
“Moscow Is Increasing Its Military Presence in Chechnya,” Nezavisimaya Gazeta,
5 June 2006, p. 3, cited in Current Digest of the Post-Soviet Press [henceforth CDPP],
LVIII. No. 23, 5 July 2006, p. 13.

12 John C. Hulsman and Anatol Lieven, “The Ethics of Realism,” The National Interest,

Summer, 2005, pp. 37–43.

13 “President Sworn-In to Second Term,” available at: http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/

releases/2005/01/20050120-1.html

14 “Common Strategy of the European Union on Russia, Conclusions of the Cologne

European Council,” 4 June 1999, available at: http://www.europa.int

15 Dmitri Sidorov, “Fuel Approval,” Kommersant, 17 October 2005, cited in Johnson’s

Russia List No. 9269, 17 October 2005; Fred Hiatt, “Silent on Putin’s Slide: Bush
Ignores Russia’s Fading Freedom,” Washington Post, 3 October 2005, available at:
http://www.washingtonpost.com; “Closed-type Democracy,” available at: http://www.
gazeta.ru, 6 October 2005, cited in Johnson’s Russia List, 6 October 2005, available at:
http://www.cdi.org; Natalya Gevorkyan, “The Bottom Line,” Moscow, Kommersant, 17
October 2005 (Foreign Broadcast Information Service Daily Report: Central Eurasia
[hereafter FBIS: Sov.], 17 October 2005); Moscow, Itar Tass, 21 November 2004 (FBIS:
Sov., 21 November 2004).

16 Dov Lynch, “Same View, Different Realities: EU and US Policy Toward Russia,”

Marcin Zaborowski, ed., Friends Again?: EU–US Relations After the Crisis (Paris:
European Union Institute for Security Studies, 2006), p. 170.

17 Timofei Bordachev, “Russia’s Europe Dilemma: Democratic Partner vs. Authoritarian

Satellite,” in Andrew Kuchins and Dmitri Trenin, eds, Russia: The Next Ten Years, A
Collection of Essays to Mark Ten Years of the Carnegie Moscow Center (Moscow:
Carnegie Center, 2004), p. 120.

18 Janusz Bugajski, Cold Peace: Russia’s New Imperialism (Washington, D.C.: Center for

Strategic and International Studies, Praeger, 2004), passim; Keith C. Smith, Russian
Energy Politics in the Baltics, Poland, and the Ukraine: A New Stealth Imperialism?
(Washington, D.C.: Center for Strategic and International Studies, 2004); Analysis:
“Russia Hints It Favors DPRK Talks Position: Blames US for Deadlock,” FBIS: Sov.,
29 July 2005; Stephen Blank, “Will Venezuela Send Russian Weapons to Terrorists,?”
Eurasia Daily Monitor, 17 February 2005; Stephen Blank, “Bashear Assad Comes to
Moscow, Seeking Gifts,” Eurasia Daily Monitor, 26 January 2005; Stephen Blank,
“Making Sense of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization’s Astana Summit,” Central

Is East–West integration possible? 179

Asia Caucasus analyst, 27 July 2005; Sergei Blagov, “Russia Eyes Stronger Clout in
Caspian Region,” Eurasia Insight, 15 July 2005; “Iran, Russia To Sign Nuclear Fuel
Deal Next Week for Bushehr Reactor, Iranian Ofﬁ cial Says,” accessible at: http://www.
nti.org, 18 February 2005; Richard J. Krickus, “The Presidential Crisis in Lithuania: Its
Roots and the Russian Factor,” remarks at the Woodrow Wilson Center, Washington,
D.C., 28 January 2004, provided by the kind consent of Dr Krickus. See also Richard
Krickus, Iron Troikas (Carlisle Barracks: Strategic Studies Institute of the US Army
War College, 2006).

19 Jerry Seper, “Software Likely in Hands of Terrorist; FBI’s Hanssen Seen as Provider,”

Washington Times, 14 June 2001.

20 Evgeni Novikov, “A Russian Agent at the Right Hand of Bin Laden,” Jamestown

Foundation Terrorism Monitor, I, No. 9, 16 January 2004.

21 Stephen Blank, “An Ambivalent War: Russia’s War on Terrorism,” in Thomas R.

Mockaitis and Paul B. Rich, eds, Grand Strategy in the War Against Terrorism (London:
Frank Cass Publishers, 2003), pp. 127–50.

22 Owais Tohid, “Taliban Fighters Inﬁ ltrating Back into Afghanistan from Pakistan,”

Eurasia Insight, accessible at: http://www.eurasianet.org, 5 May 2003; A. Gizabi,
“Sinking into the Afghan Swamp,” Jane's Terrorism and Security Monitor, 14 February
2003, accessible at: http://www4.janes.com/search97cgi/s97; Anthony Davis, “Afghan
Security Deteriorates as Taliban Regroup,” Jane's Intelligence Review, 1 May 2003,
accessible at: http://www4.janes.com/search97/cgis97; Scott Baladuf and Owais Tohid,
“Taliban Appears To Be Regrouped and Well-founded,” Christian Science Monitor, 8
May 2003, accessible at: http://www.csmonitor.com/2003/0508p01s02-wosc; Baghdad,
Al-Adalah, 22 July 2004 (FBIS: Sov., 22 July 2004).

23 Elizabeth Fuller, “What Lies Ahead in Chechnya,” In the National Interest, 14 January

2004.

24 Elizabeth Fuller, “Analysis: The Warlord and the Commissar,’ Eurasia Insight, 17

January 2005, accessible at: http://www.eurasianet.org.

25 Stephen Blank, “The 18th Brumaire of Vladimir Putin,” in Uri Ra’anan, ed., Flawed

Succession: Russia’s Power Transfer Crises, foreword by Robert Conquest (Lanham,
MD: Lexington Books for Rowman and Littleﬁ eld, 2006), pp. 133–70.

26 Moscow, Interfax, 23 April 2004 (FBIS: Sov., 23 April 2004); Steven Lee Myers and

Greg Myers, “Hamas Delegation Visits Moscow for a Crash Course in International
Diplomacy 101,” New York Times, 4 March 2006, p. A6.

27 Trenin, see note 5, pp. 2–3; Steven Roseﬁ elde, Russia in the 21st Century: The Prodigal

Superpower (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2004); Stefan Hedlund, Russian
Path Dependence (London; Routledge, 2005); Bugajski, see note 18, passim.

28 Ibid., Richard Pipes, Russia Under the Old Regime (New York: Scribner’s, 1975).
29 Henry Kissinger, Diplomacy (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1994), p. 152. More

recently we should take for example the 1999 agreement at the OSCE’s Istanbul
conference in 1999 to remove troops from Moldova and Georgia, or the international
accords it has signed relating to democratic practices in its domestic governance and
civil–military relations. See Stephen Blank, “The Code and Civil–Military Relations:
The Russian Case,” in Gert de Nooy, ed., Cooperative Security, the OSCE, and Its Code
of Conduct (The Hague: Kluwer Law International, 1996), pp. 93–112.

180 S.J.

Blank

30 Bugajski, see note 18, passim; Krickus, “The Presidential Crisis in Lithuania: Its Roots

and the Russian Factor” and Krickus, Iron Troikas, see note 18 for both.

31 Smith, see note 18, passim.
32 “Russian Politician Explains Refusal to Acknowledge Occupation of Estonia,” Postimees

website, Tallinn, 1 November 2005, BBC Monitoring, retrieved from Johnson’s Russia
List, 7 November 2005.

33 Federal News Service, National Public Radio Interview and Listener Call-in with

Russian President Vladimir Putin, National Public Radio, 15 November 2001, “Putin
Says Russia Had a Good Year in National Call-in,” 24 December 2001, retrieved from
Lexis-Nexis.

34  Ibid.
35  See note 32.
36  The Jamestown Monitor, 18 June 2000.
37  Kuwait,  Al-Qabas (online edition), 16 July 2000 (FBIS: Sov., 16 July 2000); Kuwait,

Al-Qabas (online edition), 18 July 2000 (FBIS: Sov., 18 July 2000).

38 Moscow, RTR Russia, TV, 13 September 2004 (FBIS: Sov., 13 September 2004);

Bugajski, see note 18, passim; Krickus, Iron Troikas, see note 18.

39 Robert Bruce Ware, “The Caucasian Vortex,” Radio Free Europe Radio Liberty,

Newsline, 26 August 2004; Svante Cornell, “The Growing Threat of Transnational
Crime,” in Dov Lynch, ed., The South Caucasus: A Challenge for the EU, Chaillot
Papers, No. 65, 2003, pp. 23–40; and Svante E. Cornell, Roger N. McDermott,
William O’Malley, Vladimir Socor and S. Frederick Starr, Regional Security in the
South Caucasus: The Role of NATO (Washington, D.C.: Central Asia Caucasus
Institute, Nitze School of Advanced International Studies, Johns Hopkins University,
2004), pp. 4–15; Dzhabrail Gakaev, “Chechnya in Russia and Russia in Chechnya,” in
Richard Sakwa, ed., Chechnya: From Past to Future (London: Anthem Press, 2005),
pp. 25–35.

40 Bugajski, see note 18; and Krickus, “The Presidential Crisis in Lithuania: Its Roots and

the Russian Factor” and Krickus, Iron Troikas, see note 18 for both.

41 Quoted in Boris Rumer, “Central Asia: At the End of the Transition,” in Boris Rumer,

ed., Central Asia At the End of Transition (Armonk, N.Y.: M. E. Sharpe & Co. Inc.,
2005), p. 47.

42 John Loewenhardt, “Russia and Europe: Growing Apart Together,” Brown Journal of

World Affairs, VII, No. 1, Winter–Spring, 2000, p. 171.

43 Trenin, see note 5, p. 8 (italics in the original). This certainly is the line of nationalists

like Alexei Pushkov, already in 2000, “Russia and the New World Order,” International
Affairs, No. 6, 2000, p. 10.

44 Thomas Ambrosio, Challenging America’s Global Preeminence: Russia’s Quest for

Multipolarity (Aldershot: Ashgate, 2005), p. 54.

45 Statement of Steven R. Mann, Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for South

and Central Asian Affairs Before the House Committee on International Relations,
Subcommittee on the Middle East and Central Asia, 25 July 2006 [henceforth Mann,
Testimony]; Zeyno Baran, “Assessing Energy and Security Issues in Central Asia,”
Statement to the House Committee on International Relations, Subcommittee on the
Middle East and Central Asia, 25 July 2006 [henceforth Baran, Testimony].

Is East–West integration possible? 181

46 Almaty, Delovaya Nedelya (ionline edition)25 November 2005 (FBIS: Sov., 25

November 2005).

47 Andrei Grozin, “Influence of World Centers of Power on Kazakhstan and New

Geopolitical Trends in Central Asia,” Central Asia and the Caucasus, No. 3 (39), 2006,
p. 45.

48 Mikhail Khodorkovsky, “Stabilizing World Oil Markets: Russia’s Role in Global

Recovery,” Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 28 February 2002, accessible
at: http://www.ceip.org/ﬁ les/events.

49 Vladimir Paramonov and Aleksey Strogov, New Russia’s Strategic Choice:

Regionalization Versus Globalization (Camberley, Surrey, UK: Conflict Studies
Research Centre, 2004), p. 7.

50 Stephen Blank, “Russia’s Energy Sector Hides Weaknesses Behind Powerful Façade,”

Eurasia Insight, 16 May 2006.

51 Robert Craig Nation, Beyond the Cold War: Change and Continuity in U.S.–Russian

Relations (Carlisle Barracks, PA: Strategic Studies Institute, US Army War College,
1997), pp. 17–25.

52 AP, “Russia at Risk of Collapsing, Putin Says,” 18 April 2005, retrieved from Lexis-

Nexis; “Interview with Chief of the Presidential Staff Dmitri Medvedev,” Ekspert
Weekly, 5 April 2005, retrieved from Lexis-Nexis; “Vladislav Surkov’s Secret Speech:
How Russia Should Fight International Conspiracy,” accessible at: http://www.mosnews.
com, 12 July 2005; “Interview with Vladislav Surkov,” Moscow, Ekho Moskvy (FBIS:
Sov., 29 September 2004).

53 This was the dominant theme of Russian presentations at the Biennial Conference of

European Security Institutions, 22–24 January 1996, in Moscow. See also Sergei Rogov
et al., Security Concerns of the New Russia, Vol. II (Alexandria VA: Center for Naval
Analysis, 1995), p. 34, where this demand is made explicitly; and Lena Jonson, “In
Search of a Doctrine: Russian Interventionism in Conﬂ icts in Its ‘Near Abroad’,” Low
Intensity Conﬂ ict & Law Enforcement, V, No. 3, Winter, 1996, p. 447.

54 Ambrosio, see note 44, p. 82.
55 Cited in Konstantin Syroezhkin, “Russia: On the Path to Empire?,” in Rumer, see note

41, p. 123.

56 Mary Elise Sarotte, “Transatlantic Tension and Threat Perception,” Naval War College

Review, LVIII, No. 4, Autumn, 2005, p. 32.

57 John Roper and Peter Van Ham, “Redeﬁ ning Russia’s Role in Europe,” in Vladimir

Baranovsky, ed., Russia and Europe: The Emerging Security Agenda (Oxford: Oxford
University Press for SIPRI, 1997), p. 517.

58 S. I. Chernyavsky, “Washington’s Caucasus Strategy,” Mezhdunarodnaya Zhizn',

January 1999, cited by Zbigniew Brzezinski, “Living with Russia,” The National
Interest, No. 61, Fall, 2000, p. 9.

59 “Russia to Pressure Disloyal CIS Countries,” Nezavisimaya Gazeta, 13 October 2005,

retrieved from Lexis-Nexis.

60 Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty, Newsline, from Radio Mayak, Moscow, 11 October

2005.

61 “Russian Minister’s Military Pact Comment Seen as Warning to Rice in Central Asia,”

NTV, Mir, 11 October 2005, retrieved from Lexis-Nexis.

182 S.J.

Blank

62 Anna Roze and Andrei Terekhov, “Sergei Ivanov Didn’t Say Anything Dramatic,”

Nezavisimaya Gazeta, 15 September 2005, p. 5, cited in CDPP, LVII, No. 37, 12 October
2005, p. 13.

63 Conversations with Ukrainian ofﬁ cials, June 2006; Igor Torbakov, “Russia and the West

Set to Clash over Ukraine,’ Eurasia Daily Monitor, 9 June 2006.

64 “Russia Will View NATO Bases in Baltics as a Threat – Defense Minister,” Interfax,

AVN Military News Agency, Moscow, 10 June 2005.

65 Moscow, NTV, 2 July 2005 (FBIS: Sov., 2 July 2005).
66 Charles Clover, “Ukraine Looks East,” FT.com, 21 January 2001, accessible at: http://

www.ft.com; Charles Clover, “Kiev Warned on Neutral Policy,” Financial Times,
12 July 2001, p. 2.

67 Ivan Ivanov, “The Twain Shall Meet,” p. 37. See note 1.
68 Yuri Borko, “Rethinking Russia–EU Relations,” Russia in Global Affairs, II, No. 3,

July–September 2004, p. 171.

69 Moscow, RIA Novosti, 30 June 2004 (FBIS: Sov., 30 June 2004).
70 James Sherr, “The Dual Enlargements and Ukraine,” in Anatol Lieven and Dmitri V.

Trenin, eds, Ambivalent Neighbors: The EU, NATO, and the Price of Membership
(Washington, D.C.: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 2002), p. 120.

71 Bugajski, see note 18, passim; Krickus, Iron Troikas, see note 18.
72 Sergei Medvedev, “Power, Space, and Russian Foreign Policy,” in Ted Hopf, ed.,

Understandings of Russian Foreign Policy (University Park, PA: Penn State University
Press, 1999), pp. 46–7.

73 Hannes Adomeit and Heidi Reisinger, Russia’s Role in Post-Soviet Territory: Decline

of Military Power and Political Inﬂ uence, Norwegian Institute for Defence Studies,
Forsvarstudier No. 4, 2002, p. 5.

74  Antonenko and Pinnick, eds, see note 3, passim; Lynch, ed., see note 3, passim.
75  Ibid.
76  Ibid., and also for example the discussion in the 129th Bergedorf Round Table, Frontiers

and Horizons of the EU: The New Neighbors Ukraine, Belarus, and Moldova, 15–17
October 2004, LVIV, pp. 80–8.

77 Moscow, Itar Tass, 19 July 2000 (FBIS: Sov., 19 July 2000); Dmitry Danilov, “Russia

and European Security,” in Dov Lynch, ed., What Russia Sees, Chaillot Paper, No. 74,
pp. 91–5; Moscow, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Transcript of Remarks and Replies to
Media Questions by Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov Following the Russia–
NATO Council Session, Brussels, 9 December 2004 (FBIS: Sov., 9 December 2004).

78 Stephen Blank, The NATO–Russia Relationship: Troubled Partnership or Marriage

of Convenience (Carlisle Barracks, PA: Strategic Studies Research Centre Carlisle
Barracks, 2006).

79 Danilov, see note 77, pp. 80–6; Centre for Eastern Studies (Warsaw), NATO’s New Role

in the NIS Area (Warsaw: Centre for Eastern Studies, 2005), pp. 34–43.

80 Vladimir Socor, “Moldova Decries ‘Russian Occupation,’ Draws Mixed Western

Response,” Eurasia Daily Monitor, 3 December 2004, and Idem, “Russia Proves OSCE’s
Irrelevance on Moldova at Year-end Meeting,” Eurasia Daily Monitor, 14 December 2004.

81 “NATO and EU to Discuss Transnistrian Conﬂ ict,” Russia Journal, 6 June 2005,

accessible at: http://www.russiajournal.ru/news/cnewswire.shtml?nw=48303;

Is East–West integration possible? 183

“Vladimir Voronin Had a Phone Conversation With Piotr Poroshenko, the author
of the Ukrainian Plan for Transnistrian Settlement,” Moldova Azi, 27 June 2005,
accessible at: http://www.azi.md/news?ID=34792; “Russia is Worried About Chisinau
Parliament Statement,” Moldova Azi, 13 June 2005, accessible at: http://www.azi.md/
news?ID=34610; Lyudmilla Feliksova, “Waiting for Miracle,” Moscow, Rossiyskaya
Gazeta, 15 June 2004 (FBIS: Sov., 15 June 2004).

82 Conversations with US ofﬁ cials in Washington, 2005–06. These conversations were with

members of the Department of Defense, Department of State and the National Security
Council; Ron Susskind, The One-Percent Solution: Deep Inside America’s Pursuit of
Its Enemies Since 9/11 (New York: Simon & Schuster, 2006), pp. 224–8, 307–8; Peter
Baker, “Russian Relations Under Scrutiny,” Washington Post, 26 February 2006, p. 1;
John Vinocur, “Putin’s Brazen Moves Force Bush to Recalibrate,” International Herald
Tribune, 27 February 2006, p. 2, retrieved from Lexis-Nexis; “Russia: Friend or Foe
of the USA,?,” Pravda.ru, 27 February 2006, from Johnson’s Russia List, 27 February
2006, available at: http:// www.cdi.org; on Korea, see C. Kenneth Quinones, “Dualism
in the Bush Administration’s North Korea Policy,” Asian Perspective, XXVII, No. 1,
2003, pp. 197–224; David Ignatius, “A CEO’s Weaknesses,” Washington Post Weekly,
12–18 September 2005, p. 27; Karin Lee and Adam Miles, “North Korea on Capitol
Hill,” Asian Perspective, XXVIII, No. 4, 2004, pp. 185–207; Robert M. Hathaway
and Jordan Tama, “The U.S. Congress and North Korea during the Clinton Years,”
Asian Survey, XLIV, No. 5, September–October 2004, pp. 711–33; David E. Sanger,
“Aftereffects: Nuclear Standoff, Administration Divided Over North Korea,” New
York Times, 21 April 2003, p. 15; David Ronnie, “Rumsfeld Calls for Regime Change
in North Korea,” Daily Telegraph, 22 April 2003; Gordon Furlough, “Talks Display
U.S. Rift on Pyongyang,” Wall Street Journal, 28 June 2004, p. 9; Bill Gertz, “USA
Considers Reactor Deal with North Korea,” Washington Times, 19 May 2004, cited by
Aidan Foster-Carter, “Pyongyang Watch: Six-Party Glacier: Did the US Melt,?,” Asia
Times (online edition), 28 June 2004, accessible at: http://www.atimes.com; and the
author can attest to those policy divisions on Central Asia from his conversations with
US ofﬁ cials from the Department of State, Defense, and the National Security Council
over the period from May 2005 to the present. See also “The Pentagon’s Mission
Creep,” Jane’s Foreign Report, 1 June 2006, accessible at: http://www.4janes.com/
subscribe frp/doc_view.jsp?K2 DocKey=/content1/janesdat/mags.

83 Stephen Blank, “A Framework for Unfreezing Eurasia’s Conﬂ icts,” RUSI Journal, CL,

No. 4, August 2005, pp. 50–5; and idem., “Security in and Around the Black Sea: Is a
Virtuous Circle Now Possible?,” Mediterranean Quarterly, XVI, No. 2, Summer, 2005,
pp. 44–66.

84 Michael Ruhle, “Quo Vadis NATO?,” NATO’s Sixteen Nations, No. 5, 2004, pp. 14–20;

Mustafa Aydin, Europe’s Next Shore: The Black Sea Region After EU Enlargement,
Occasional Paper of the European Union Institute for Security Studies and Defense,
No. 53, 2004, p. 15; Istanbul Summit Communiqué, issued by the Heads of State
and Government participating in the meeting of the North Atlantic Council, Istanbul,
28–29 June 2004, accessible at: http://www.Nato.int/docu/pr/2004/p04-096e.htm
[henceforth Istanbul Initiative]; “Georgia, Azerbaijan, and Armenia Included in the
European Neighborhood Policy,” accessible at: http://www.welcomeeurope.com/news,

184 S.J.

Blank

5 July 2004; Ahto Lobjaskas, “Azerbaijan: EU Keen To Get Involved in Nagorno-
Karabakh Peace Process,” Eurasia Insight, accessible at: http://www.eurasianet.org,
18 May 2004.

85 Stephen Blank,”Security and Democracy in the Black Sea Basin,” Insight Turkey, VII,

No. 1, January–March, 2005, pp. 108–17.

86 Centre for Eastern Studies (Warsaw), see note 79.
87 Ibid., Agentstvo Voyennykh Novostei, Internet, 26 April 2004 (FBIS: Sov., 26 April

2004); Sergei Ivanov, “Strong Russia” (FBIS: Sov., 27 November 2003); FBIS report,
“Russia: Proﬁ le of 15th Peacekeeping Brigade,” 17 February 2005; Moscow, “Russia
Prepares to Play Proactive Peacekeeping Role,” RIA Novosti, 26 April 2005, retrieved
from Lexis-Nexis; Interfax, AVN Military News Agency website, Moscow, in English,
10 October 2003, retrieved from Lexis-Nexis.

88  See note 79, p. 38.
89  See note 1, passim.
90  Ibid; “NATO–Russia Action Plan on Terrorism,” Brussels, NATO HQ, 9 December

2004, accessible at: http://www.nato.int/docu/basictxt/b041209a-e.htm; “Russia Eager
To Boost Partnership with NATO,’ Russia Journal, 24 June 2005, accessible at: http://
www.russiajournal.ru/news/cnews-article.shtml?nd=48408; “Beginning of Meeting
with NATO Secretary General, Jaap de Hoop Scheffer,” accessible at: http://www.
president.kremlin.ru/eng/text/speeches/2005, 24 June 2005.

91 “Agreement Among the States Parties to the North Atlantic Treaty and the Other States

Participating in the Partnership for Peace Regarding the Status of Their Forces,” 19 June
2005, accessible at: http://www.nato.int/docu/basictxt/b95016a.htm

92 “Press Conference by NATO Secretary General, Jaap de Hoop Scheffer, Following the

Informal Meeting of Defence Ministers,” Nice, 10 February 2005, accessible at: http://
www.nato.int/docu/speech/2005/s050210e.htm; Diego A. Ruiz Palmer, “Afghanistan’s
Transformational Challenge,” NATO Review, Summer, 2005, accessible at: http://www.
nato.int/docu/review/2005/issue2/english/art2_pr.html.

93 As the recent votes against a European constitution and the collapse of an EU meeting

on budget deﬁ cits in member countries strongly suggest, a common foreign and security
policy has yet to be devised.

94 Vladislav Inozemtsev and Sergei Karaganov, “Imperialism of the Fittest,” The National

Interest, No. 80, Summer, 2005, pp. 74–80; Alexander Y. Skakov, “Russia’s Role in
the South Caucasus,” Helsinki Monitor, No. 2, 2005, pp. 120–6.

95 Moscow, Rossiyskaya Gazeta, “Interview with Sergei Ivanov,” 4 May 2004 (FBIS: Sov.,

4 May 2005).

96 A. Iurin, “Pragmatism of the ‘Most Difﬁ cult Meeting,’” International Affairs (Moscow),

No. 3, 2005, p. 59, Moscow, Rossiyskaya Gazeta, “Interview with Sergei Ivanov,”
4 May 2005 (FBIS: Sov., 4 May 2005).

97 Igor Korolkov, “Russia Fears New Type of Ethnic Conﬂ ict in Chechnya,” www.mosnews.

com, 24 June 2005, accessible at: http://www.mosnews.com/commentary/2005/06/24/
borozdnikovka.shtml; Oliver Bullough, “Russian Reform Pushes Caucasus to the
Brink,” Reuters and www.mosnews.com, 23 June 2005, accessible at: http://www.
mosnews.com/feature/2005/06/23/caucasus.shtml.

Conclusion

Tendencies and prospects for security
and democracy

Aurel Braun

Considerable ﬂ uidity characterizes Russian domestic and foreign developments,
NATO–Russia relations, and NATO’s policy (and declared goal) of enlarging
the zone of democracy. There is no deﬁ ned path that can be projected forward
with conﬁ dence, the interaction of the multiple variables reinforces uncertainty,
and recent events point to growing difﬁ culties in NATO–Russia relations in the
twenty-ﬁ rst century. Though it is worthwhile, I believe, to highlight some crucial
tendencies, it would be considerably more important to suggest vital questions
that we should focus on rather than just try to discern short term answers. Such
questions should include the following. What are some of the key domestic
developments in Russia that may drive its current and future foreign policy? What
is the nature of the interaction of domestic and foreign variables in Russia? What
is the developing Russian world vision, particularly when it comes to its national
security that in turn would shape its relations with NATO? Are apparent Russian
attempts to divide NATO part of short-term tactical moves or do they represent a
long-term petro-diplomacy approach that points to a fundamental incompatibility
with the interests of the democratic NATO members? Are Russian policies in the
Middle East, for instance, a reﬂ ection of the latter? And ﬁ nally, is NATO as an
organization able to maintain a viable identity and create coherent policies that can
offer current and new members security as well as sufﬁ cient reassurance to Russia
so that the latter encourages domestic democratic progress and helps enhance trust
and security within the vast Vancouver to Vladivostok zone?

Russian domestic developments and an evolving worldvision

It would be difﬁ cult, it seems, to separate growing Russian assertiveness interna-
tionally from domestic changes. As Romania and Bulgaria became EU members in
January 2007 and democracy, with that additional external integrative mechanism,
is further enhanced and entrenched in these two states, Russia, domestically,
con tinues to move in the opposite direction. In fact, as Russia proceeds toward
legislative and presidential elections, we have witnessed a continuing centralization
of both politics and economics that not only point to a move away from democracy,
but appear to be part of a domestic mobilization effort designed to underpin grow-
ing Russian foreign policy ambitions.

186 A.

Braun

Several developments that would be hard to ignore, in fact, suggest a Russian

move away from democratization. Whether it is the brazen murder of inﬂ uential
journalist and relentless Kremlin critic, Anna Politkovskaya, in Moscow in October
2006, the suspension of numerous foreign private organizations concerned with
human rights under a new legislation law and the growing pressure on the vast
number of civil society organizations in Russia,

the complete control by President

Putin of the governors or presidents of Russia’s 88 regions as well as of the compliant
local legislative assemblies,

or the willingness if the Kremlin to coerce (success-

fully) some of the largest international companies, including Royal Dutch Shell, to
cede control of the world’s largest combined oil and natural gas project to Russian
state energy company, Gazprom,

these all should raise questions not only about

domestic authoritarian tendencies but also about linkages to foreign policy goals.

For advocates of democracy in Russia, developments and tendencies are indeed

ever more disturbing. For instance, the raising of the threshold to win seats in the
Duma from 5 to 7 percent will make it signiﬁ cantly more difﬁ cult for democratic
opposition parties to win seats in the next election for the Duma and will very
likely reinforce the domination of Kremlin’s ultra loyal United Russia, supported
by some faux opposition parties in the style of old “front” government of the early
communist era in Eastern Europe.

With the Kremlin’s almost complete control

of television, from which most Russians get their news, with President Putin
auditioning his potential successors, and with his promise that even after he leaves
the presidency in 2008 he would continue to “inﬂ uence the life in our country,”

is fairly clear that Russia is taking a different path from the post-communist states
(and now, NATO members) in Eastern Europe.

The Kremlin’s conﬁ dence in domestic political and economic control is congruent

with its new international assertiveness. It is not only that internationally Russia is
more vocal in protecting its national interest, or that buoyed by greatly increased
oil revenues, a rapidly growing economy, and vast foreign currency reserves, it
is more willing to voice its differences with its smaller neighbors, NATO, or the
US. Rather, what is increasingly more perceptible is a Russian belief that, to use
an old Soviet term, “the correlation of forces” is moving decisively in its favor. In
fact, Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov asserted in March 2007 that Washington’s
role in the world is “shrinking” as “new centers of power” are emerging

– with

Russia presumably being one of these new centers. A month earlier, it should be
noted, President Putin launched his strongest attack to date on the US when he
declared before a security forum in Munich, Germany that the US was making
“… an almost uncontained hyper use of force in international relations” and that
it had “… overstepped its national borders in every way.”

In the same speech,

Putin also expressed strong Russian concerns both about American plans to build
a missile defense system in Poland and the Czech Republic, and about further
expansion of NATO.

Moreover, his attempts to divert the US from deploying a missile defense system

in Poland and the Czech Republic through a series of alternate site proposals, all in
Commonwealth in Independent States or in Russia proper,

was much more likely

to annoy and alienate Washington than suade it.

Conclusion

187

These public declarations by President Putin, moreover, have not been mere

rhetoric directed at impressing a domestic audience. Though increased domestic
centralization and authoritarianism may well be linked with foreign policy
assertiveness, the Putin government is making strong efforts to provide real
power backing to Russia’s international goals. In February 2007 President Putin
laid out a vision for a greatly enhanced Russian international presence and in the
next month his outgoing defense minister and newly appointed ﬁ rst deputy prime
minister, Sergei Ivanov, outlined a vast Russian rearmament program for the next
decade.

Ivanov indicated that in 2007 the defense budget was scheduled to reach

$31.6 billion (US), a fourfold increase from 2002, and that together with security
and law-enforcement agencies, the total allocation would reach $58 billion.

further projected that by 2017 Russia will spend $200 billion on defense, with half
going for the procurement of advanced weapons.

In February 2007 he announced an eight-year plan to spend $189 billion on

defense that would include new intercontinental ballistic missiles, aircraft carriers
and early warning radar systems.

And in June, Ivanov declared that Russia

intended to rebuild the Soviet-era naval power and would set up a new state-run
corporation to construct civilian and naval vessels.

It is also noteworthy that in March 2007 the Russian Security Council

announced that Russia will be revising its military doctrine in order to address the
“strengthening of military blocs, especially NATO.”

Further, the Russian military

wants to incorporate a statement that American efforts, “to push Russia away from
the post-Soviet space poses a threat to Russia’s national security.”

This goes

speciﬁ cally to the fears that Russia has about continuing NATO enlargement, but
also may well be a reﬂ ection of Moscow’s intentions to dominate, if not control,
the former Soviet space and especially countries such as Ukraine and Georgia who
have expressed an interest in eventually joining the Alliance. Therefore, Moscow
wants to keep NATO out of this space and perhaps even weaken NATO itself,
as a way to guarantee a free hand for itself and to further shift the correlation of
forces in its favor.

Divide and weaken?

Moscow, in addition to NATO enlargement, is also strongly concerned about the
prospect of the possible deployment of American missile defense systems in two
NATO states, the Czech Republic and Poland. Although it is extremely difﬁ cult
to see how these “thin” missile defenses, intended to intercept potential attacks
from “rogue states” could possibly block the massive nuclear arsenal that Russia
has, and especially the advanced attack systems that it is developing, Moscow
may also be using the plans for such deployment as a means of intimidating some
NATO members, dividing the Alliance, and ultimately, also blocking further
enlargement.

Some of the Russian response has consisted of crude pressures and threats. For

instance, in February 2007, after the Czech Republic and Poland expressed their
willingness to host part of the American missile-defense system, General Nikolai

188 A.

Braun

Solovtsov, the commander of Russia’s Strategic Missile Forces, warned the two
NATO members that allowing the US deployment could make them targets of
a Russian missile strike.

In July 2007, Sergei Ivanov, speaking as ﬁ rst deputy

minister, basically threatened that if the US did not accept President Putin’s
alternate proposals to deploying an American anti-missile shield in Eastern Europe,
Moscow would deploy missiles in Kaliningrad, on the borders of Lithuania and
Poland.

Other Russian efforts have been more subtle. For instance, Sergei Lavrov

accused the US of being “disrespectful” to its NATO partners by engaging in
bilateral negotiations with Poland and the Czech Republic for the deployment of a
missile-defense system.

It would be difﬁ cult though, to miss the innuendo.

Russian attempts to separate or isolate East European allies from western

NATO members, in fact, seems to be bearing some fruit. By claiming American
unilateralism and disrespect, using petro-diplomacy as West European states, and
particularly Germany, become more dependent on Russian energy supplies, and
by stressing differences in perceived threats among European NATO members,
Moscow is seeing its arguments resonate even with governments that seek to
strengthen relations with the US, such as that of Angela Merkel. In March 2007,
for instance, she expressed her wish that the two NATO states planning to host the
anti-missile system should try to resolve matters within NATO and that she would
like to see open discussions about it with Russia.

The German government and

others in Western Europe have become particularly sensitive to Russian claims that
the deployment would create mistrust between NATO and Russia.

By contrast, fears among Eastern European and Baltic states about Russia’s

retrenchment from democratization, its increased militarization, and ever greater
use of petro-diplomacy pressure on neighbours, make these allies want to place
themselves closer to the US in terms of hard security guarantees, thereby widening
the rift within the Alliance. Estonia’s former ambassador to Russia, using Donald
Rumsfeld’s (former US Secretary of Defense) terms, in April 2007 identiﬁ ed a
division between “old Europe” and “new Europe” when it came to Russia, deplored
the lack of unity in confronting what he viewed as a threatening Russia, and urged
“new Europe” to forge closer strategic ties with the US.

Lech Kaczynski, in July

2007, not only characterized Russia’s withdrawal from the Conventional Armed
Forces in Europe (CFE) treaty as a “threat” to Europe but reached an agreement on
the placement of the US missile defense system in Poland.

It is therefore, again

worth asking whether Russia merely aims to block deployment of the anti-missile
shield in the Czech Republic and Poland, or whether its ambitions go further to
undermining the Alliance as a whole.

Petro-diplomacy and outﬂ anking NATO

There are certain indicators that suggest that Russia’s regional ambitions are
growing significantly and somewhat alarmingly. Perhaps these are part of a
strongly assertive Russian world vision that has important domestic and foreign
policy implications. Lilia Shevtsova from the Carnegie Moscow Center, for
instance, has argued rather persuasively that behind Russia’s “new national idea,”

Conclusion

189

there is something rather troubling.

She contends that “anti-Western ideology has

become an important factor that legitimizes the highly centralized state.”

Putin,

moreover, gave further voice to Russian international assertiveness in July 2007
when he not only endorsed the Russian deep seabed mission of a week earlier
(which had planted a Russian titanium ﬂ ag below the North Pole), but declared
that the mission should be central to Russia’s contested claim to an enormous
1.2 million square kilometres of potentially energy rich Arctic seabed.

Its use of petro-diplomacy, backed up with sanctions against Ukraine, Georgia,

and even against a client state like Belarus,

shows that Moscow has not hesitated

to use energy, and even the suspension of travel and postal services, as a way to
bring states within the former Soviet space to heel. Russia has also worked to
preserve the CIS, despite Georgian, Ukrainian and Moldovan questions about the
organization’s relevance. For instance, the Putin government held a meeting in
November 2006 to coincide with the NATO summit in Riga, Latvia. Then Russian
minister of defense, Sergei Ivanov, argued that in fact new areas of cooperation
were being developed.

Further, Moscow has moved to strengthen its position in organizations where

its vast energy resources give it an advantage, including the Organization for
Democracy and Economic Development, GUAM, and the Shanghai Cooperation
Organization (SCO).

The SCO, where China is the other major partner, has

proven especially useful in light of Russian energy supplies to its neighbour and
the desire by both states to undercut, or at least, to become counterweights to
American global power.

It is in the Middle East though that in certain respects Moscow has tried to

outﬂ ank NATO most assiduously. The Kremlin has gone beyond mere criticism
of American involvement in Iraq (and of NATO in Afghanistan). Moscow has
acted in certain ways as a key protector of Iran. The Putin government has
not only repeatedly undercut American and NATO efforts to impose sanctions
on Tehran, but has sold the latter vast quantities of some of the most modern
weapons, including TOR-M1 anti-aircraft batteries.

Moscow has also engaged in

intelligence cooperation with Tehran

and has expressed an interest in cooperating

with Iran in controlling the international trade in natural gas. Russia has also
supplied Syria with highly advanced weapons (some of which were then transferred
to Hezbollah) and it has an intelligence agreement with Damascus.

Moscow has

continued to sell very large quantities of advanced weapons to Syria (and Iran),
claiming that these are merely “defensive.”

True, Russian hesitation about completing the nuclear reactor that it has been

building in Iran at Bushehr creates some ambiguity as to Russian plans in the Middle
East,

but its overall efforts over the past few years bear a closer resemblance to

old Soviet goals in the Middle East than to the more restricted aims of creating
some counterbalance to the US and of achieving greater commercial gain. If in fact
the changes in Russian foreign policy are aimed at undermining both the US and
NATO, then the prospects for security cooperation could well be endangered, and
particularly so if NATO itself is divided and ceases to be resilient.

190 A.

Braun

Can NATO maintain its cohesion?

Despite the Alliance’s remarkable longevity and impressive ability to adapt there
are signs that NATO could be vulnerable to Russian pressures. Further, in light of
Alliance difﬁ culties, if Moscow is truly intent on undermining it, the Kremlin’s
prospects of doing so, may grow. First, efforts to build effective cooperation
between NATO and the EU that could make the former more resilient are faltering.
“Berlin Plus,” the 2003 agreement that was meant to define how and when
European countries could employ NATO assets for EU purposes, is not working
out well either in Kosovo or in Afghanistan – the two best testing grounds.

Some

NATO allies, moreover, such as France, view NATO as an American tool and do
not seem to mind working with Russia to undermine the Alliance though this may
change somewhat with the new pro-American president, Nicolas Sarkozy.

Second, there are signiﬁ cant differences in threat perception, as noted, where the

eastern Alliance members, geographically close to Russia, are deeply concerned
about Moscow’s intentions, would like to see Ukraine and Georgia in NATO as
soon as possible, and deﬁ nitely want to have hard security guarantees from the US
within the Alliance. By contrast, as the Western Europeans become increasingly
dependent on Russian energy supplies, as Moscow continues to bypass Eastern
Europe with undersea oil and natural gas pipelines, the divisions on how to best
cooperate with Russia and how to create region-wide security are only likely to
grow, unless there are drastic changes in West European perceptions and/or in
Russian domestic and foreign policies. It is true, though, that NATO as a whole
voiced its strong disapproval of Moscow’s decision to withdraw (nominally a
“moratorium”) from the CFE.

Third, even in areas where there is strong military cooperation among Alliance

members, as in Afghanistan, there are important differences in the levels of allied
member commitment that are creating signiﬁ cant strains.

For example, multiple

restrictions on what their forces are allowed to do in Afghanistan by several
European states have not only caused considerable Alliance friction but have
considerably imperiled the effectiveness of the mission. If Afghanistan was meant
to be the successful demonstration of NATO Out-of-Area operations, its possible
failure (never mind the grave consequences in Afghanistan itself and in the Middle
East of seeing Taliban prevail) would be a terrible blow to NATO’s credibility. It
would certainly embolden those elements within the Russian security services and
the military that harbor fantasies of a return to superpower status, and especially
at the expense of the Alliance.

Where do Russia and the Alliance go from here? The growing frictions between the
two and Russia’s authoritarian turn and international assertiveness do not negate
the fact that both sides can still gain tremendously from cooperation, whether in
the ﬁ ght against terrorism or in economic development. Nonetheless, the growing
divisions cannot be ignored and it would be imprudent to try to paper over
differences. Some cooperation, of course, is always possible, but the building of
lasting regional security requires the fostering a strong commonality of interests.

Russia’s increasing authoritarian turn, aggressive petro-diplomacy, and apparent

Conclusion

191

efforts to undermine, or at least, to render less effective a vulnerable alliance,
then, does not bode well. Still, it may be premature to claim that there are clear
or irreversible trends in Russian domestic or foreign policies. Russia’s oil-based
economy and energy-fueled foreign policy are themselves vulnerable and Moscow
could change direction and become far more comfortable with Alliance goals
of democratization and security. NATO could also conceivably become more
cohesive and resilient. So far though, the questions that I raised earlier continue to
nag or, at the very least, should continue to govern our assessment of developments
and prospects. Even if for the present we cannot ﬁ nd solutions, asking the right
questions would at least give the Alliance and Russia a better long-term chance
to address the key concerns and improve the prospects for creating a sustainable
zone of security.

Notes

1 C.J. Chivers, “Russia Suspends Scores of Foreign Groups,” New York Times, 19 October

2006 [Accessible at: http://www.nytimes.com/2006/10/19/world/europe/19cnd-russia.
ht].

2 Steven Lee Myers, “Post-Putin,” New York Times, 25 February 2007 [Accessible at:

http://www.nytimes.com/2007/02/25/magazine/25Russia.t.html?r].

3 Steven Lee Myers, “Putin’s Assertive Diplomacy Is Seldom Challenged,” New York

Times, 27 December 2006. [Accessible at: http://www.nytimes.com/2006/12/27/world/
europe/27russia.html].

4 “The Hollowing Out of Politics,” Economist, 22 February 2007. [Accessible at: http://

www.economist.com/PrinterFriendly.cfm?story_id=8744541].

5 Andrew E. Kramer, “Putin Promises To Remain Inﬂ uential,” New York Times, 26 October

2006. [Accessible at: http://www.nytimes.com/2006/10/26/world/europe/26russia.
html].

6 “Russian Minister Says U.S. Inﬂ uence in Decline,” Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty,

17 March 2007. [Accessible at: http://www.rferl.org/featuresarticleprint/2007/03/41f2
09b2-2341-4].

7 The Associated Press, “Putin Rebukes U.S. for Its Use of Force,” New York Times,

10 February 2007. [Accessible at: http://www.nytimes.com/aponline/world/AP-
Security-Conference.html].

8 Ibid.
9 Heather Maher, “U.S.–Russia: Hopes High, Expectations Low For Bush–Putin Summit,”

Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty, 29 June 2007. [Accessible at: http://www.rferl.org/
featuresarticleprint/2007/06/1f002cb-a961-4b…]. See also Jim Rutenberg, “Putin
Expands on His Missile Defense Plan,” New York Times, 3 July 2007. [Accessible at:
http://www.nytimes.com/2007/07/03/us/03putin.html].

10 Victor Yasmann, “Russia: Reviving the Army, Revising Military Doctrine,” Radio Free

Europe/Radio Liberty, 12 March 2007. [Accessible at: http://www.rferl.org/featuresar
ticleprint/2007/03/63173250-a8b3-4].

11 Ibid.

192 A.

Braun

12 Ibid.
13 Simon Saradzhyan, “Military To Get $189 Bln Overhaul,” Moscow Times, 8 February

2007. [Accessible at: http://www.themoscowtimes.com/stories/2007/02/08/001.html].

14 The Moscow Times, “Ivanov Plans To Rebuild the Country’s Naval Power,” 14 June

2007. [Accessible at: http://www.themoscowtimes.com/stories/2007/06/14/042.html].

15  Ibid.
16  Ibid.
17  Claire Bigg, “Russia Warns Czech Republic, Poland on Missile Defense,” Radio Free

Europe/Radio Liberty, 20 February 2007. [Accessible at: http://www.rferl.org/features
articleprint/2007/02/3a7c3f97-dbbf-44].

18 Kommersant (Moscow), “Sergei Ivanov Threatens U.S. but Frightens Europe,” 7 July 2007.

[Accessible at: http://www.kommersant.com/p780721/Ivanov_said_Russia_might].

19 “Russia Accuses U.S. of ‘Disrespecting’ European Allies,” Radio Free Europe/Radio

Liberty, 21 March 2007. [Accessible at: http://www.rferl.org/featuresarticleprint/2007
/03/080a52ac-a059-4a].

20 Agence France Presse, “NATO Rules Out Involvement in US Missile Shield Talks,”

14 March 2007. [Accessible at: http://ca.news.yahoo.com/s/afp/us_defence_missile
_nato&printer=1].

21 Martin Helme, “The Beginning of a New Cold War,” Brussels Journal (Brussels),

4 April 2007. [Accessible at: http://www.brusselsjournal.com/node/2028].

22 Kommersant, “U.S. Base Construction in Poland to Begin on Eve of Russian

Elections,” 19 July 2007. [Accessible at: http://www.kommersant.com/p783639/
missile_defense/].

23 Lilia Shevtsova, “Anti-Westernism Is the New National Idea,” Moscow Times, 7 August

2007. [Accessible at: http://www.themoscowtimes.com/stories/2007/08/07/005-print.
html].

24 Ibid.
25 RIA Novosti (Moscow), “Putin Says Recent N. Pole Mission To Back Russian Claim

to Arctic,” 7 August 2007. [Accessible at: http://en.rian.ru/russia/20070807/70535166.
html].

26 Moscow Times, “Gazprom To Halve Gas Supply to Belarus,” 2 August 2007. [Accessible

at: http://www.themoscowtimes.com/stories/2007/08/02/003.html]. See also Andrew E.
Kramer, “Russia Threatens Cut in Belarus Gas Supply,” New York Times, 2 August
2007. [Accessible at: http://www.nytimes.com/2007/08/02/world/europe/02russia.html].
Further, see Steven Lee Myers, “Russia Suspends Links to Georgia as Tensions Rise,”
New York Times, 2 October 2006. [Accessible at: http://www.nytimes.com/2006/10/02/
world/europe/03georgiacnd.html].

27 “CIS: Foreign Ministers, Heads of State Gather in Minsk For Summit,” Radio Free

Europe/Radio Liberty, 26 November 2006. [Accessible at: http://www.rferl.org/featur
esarticleprint/2006/11/6e49cd34-6c37-40].

28 Ibid.
29 Steven Lee Myers, “No Cold War, Perhaps, but Surely a Lukewarm Peace,” New

York Times, 18 February 2007. [Accessible at: http://www.nytimes.com/2007/02/18/
weekinreview/18myers.html].

Conclusion

193

30 Ze’ev Schiff, “Syria, Iran Intelligence Services Aided Hezbollah during War,” Haaretz,

10 October 2006. [Accessible at: http://www.haaretz.com/hasen/objects/pages/
PrintArticleEn.jhtml].

31 Ibid.
32 Andrei Piontkovsky, “Putin’s Plan for Conﬂ ict with Iran,” Jerusalem Post, 1 February 2006

[Accessible at: http://pqasb.pqarchiver.com/jpost/access/979349791.html?dids=97…];
Oliver Bullough, “Russia Goes Its Own Way in Selling Arms,” Moscow Times, 20 June
2006 [Accessible at: http://www.themoscowtimes.com/stories/2006/06/20/050.html];
Barry Rubin, “Getting Serious About Syria,” Jerusalem Post, 10 July 2007 [Accessible
at: http://pqasb/pqarchiver.com/jpost/access/1303211681.html?dids=1].

33 Victor Yasmann, “Russia: Why Is the Kremlin Retreating From Bushehr?,” Radio Free

Europe/Radio Liberty, 23 March 2007. [Accessible at: http://www.rferl.org/featuresar
ticleprint/2007/03/0e8a4121-0572-4]; It should be noted though that by January 2008
Russia sent a fourth substantial shipment of nuclear fuel to Iran for the Bushehr reactor.
Associated Press, “A fourth shipment of Russian nuclear fuel arrives in Iran Sunday”,
CBC News, 20 January 2008, http://www.cbc.ca/cp/world/080120/w012008A.html.

34 Charlemagne, “Berlin Minus,” Economist, 8 February 2007. [Accessible at: http://www.

economist.com/PrinterFriendly.cfm?story_id=8669193].

35 Reuters, “NATO ‘Very Concerned’ at Russia Treaty Pullout,” New York Times, 16 July

2007; Ron Synovitz, “Russia Suspends Participation in Key Arms Treaty,” Radio Free
Europe/Radio Liberty, 14 July 2007. [Accessible at: http://www.rferl.org/featuresartic
leprint/2007/072204d555-8bf1-4].

36 Thom Shanker, “NATO To Meet Amid Afghan Mission Strains,” New York Times,

27 November 2006. [Accessible at: http://www.nytimes.com/2006/11/27/world/
asia/27nato.html?page].

Index

Abkhazian region 18, 49, 97, 104, 105,

173, 175

Adamov, Yevgeny 123
Adjaria 104, 107 n.11
Adriatic Charter 96
Afghanistan: NATO activities 55, 78, 79,

80, 83, 84, 88, 94, 96, 98, 99, 100, 104,
175–6, 189, 190; and NATO–Russia
Council 58; North Atlantic Council
activities 95; Provincial Reconstruction
Teams 94, 99; Soviet invasion 87, 114;
Taliban regime 114, 125, 128, 149,
163–4, 190; and United States 45, 48,
96, 99, 175–6

Africa 50, 79
Agrarian League 14
Ahmadinezhad, Mahmud 141, 142, 143,

144, 145, 146

al-Hakim, Abdul Aziz 131–2
Al Qaeda 86, 111, 114, 115, 149, 163
Albania 17, 78, 96, 107 n.15
Albright, David 143
Albright, Madeleine 73
Alekperov, Vagit 134
Aliev, Ilkham 103
Alkhanov, Alu 128
Allawi, Ayad 134
Allison, Graham 113
Andijan 48
anti-ballistic missile deployment 61, 63,

87, 186, 187–8

Anti-ballistic Missile Treaty 45
Arafat, Yasir 86
Argentina 15
Armenia 11, 20, 97, 103, 104
“arc of stability” 124
arms control 31, 91, 130
arms trafﬁ cking 91, 96, 102, 108, 112–13,

115, 165, 166

Ashcroft, John 74
Asia, Central 25, 43, 45, 48–9, 95, 96, 99,

105, 125, 128, 135, 165, 166, 167–8,
170, 173, 176

Asia, East 56
Asmus, Ronald D. 76
Assad, Bashar 148
Australia 78
Austria 78, 107 n.15
autocratic regimes 20; break-up of 13–15
Ayub Khan, Mohammad 15
Azerbaijan 11, 20, 43, 97, 102, 103, 104,

138, 140

Bakker, Edwin E. 116
Baku–Tbilisi–Ceyhan pipeline 104, 124
Balkans: cooperation initiatives 100; peace

operations 74, 78, 80, 84, 87, 93, 94, 96

Baltic Battalion (BALTBAT) 101
Baltic Sea 58
Baltic States 25, 46, 47, 55, 58, 59, 62,

64, 72, 97, 104, 165, 170; “frozen
conﬂ icts” 7, 97, 102, 105, 169, 173–7

Barnier, Michel 60
Basayev, Shamil 162, 164
Belarus 26, 47, 50, 63, 112, 165–6, 189
Belgium 83, 115, 118
Berdymukhamedov, Gurbanguli 26
Berezovsky, Boris 123
Berlin 92, 111, 146
Berlin Plus arrangements 82, 190
Berlusconi, Silvio 60
Beslan hostages 29, 125, 127–8, 140
Bismarck, Otto von 14, 18
Black Sea Economic Cooperation (BSEC)

101, 108 n.31

Black Sea Harmony 101–2, 105
Black Sea region 91, 96–7, 166, 173, 174,

176; security cooperation 100–6

Index

195

Blackseafor 101, 105
Blair, Tony 75, 136
Bolton, John 137
Borko, Yuri 171
Bosnia-Herzegovina 44, 84, 92, 93, 96 see

also Dayton Accords; Implementation
Force; Stabilization Force

Bratislava 61
Brazil 78
Brenner, Michael 85
Britain: Europe, relations with 88; France,

relations with 14; Germany, relations
with 14; institutions for the old elite,
and mass suffrage 15; and Iraq 130,
132, 134; and NATO 82, 91; Russia,
relations with 75, 119; Syria, relations
with 148; and terrorism 81, 115, 128;
and United Nations Security Council
119; United States, relations with 88
see also EU3

BSEC see Black Sea Economic

Cooperation

Brzezinski, Zbigniew 63
Bulgaria 33, 96, 102, 103, 105, 107 n.15,

185; Blackseafor 101; GUAM 103

Burns, Nicholas 146
Burundi 12
Bush, George W. 58, 60, 61–2, 63, 65, 75,

82, 85, 86, 127, 133

Bush–Putin talks 136–7, 141
Bushehr nuclear reactor 125, 135, 136,

137, 138, 139, 140–1, 142, 146, 150,
189, 193 n.33

Canada 43, 88
Card, Andrew 162
Caspian Basin 46, 47, 91, 97, 103, 135,

138, 168

Caspian Sea Legal Regime 138, 140
Caucasus 46, 47, 49, 79, 95, 96, 99, 100,

101, 105, 120, 135, 166, 174, 176;
North 30, 37, 49, 120, 162, 165, 166,
176; South 97, 103, 104, 105; and
terrorism 114–15

CFE (Conventional Forces in Europe)

treaty 190

Chechen conﬂ icts 12, 18–19, 43, 44, 45,

46, 55, 60, 74, 81, 105, 164, 166, 176;
European Union stance on 117–18,
120, 162; International Islamic
Battalion 114; Putin’s policies 12,
15, 19, 29, 77, 125, 140, 148, 149;
rebranded as counter-terrorist operation
40; Russian public opinion on 27, 28–9,

30, 37 n.2, 131; and Saudi Arabia 126;
and terrorism 114, 115, 125–8, 129,
149, 164

Chechnya 49, 114, 125–6, 128
China 40, 42, 43, 44, 46, 48, 66, 86, 119,

162, 164, 165, 168, 170, 189

Chirac, Jacques 59, 60, 61, 65, 66, 130,

139, 141

Churkin, Vitaly 147
class interests 17
Clinton, Bill 76
Cold War 62, 64, 79, 80, 83, 87, 91–2,

111

Collective Security Treaty Organization

(CSTO) 170

Common European Security and Defense

Policy 92

Commonwealth of Independent States

(CIS) 65, 186, 189; democratic
status 162, 163; included in North
Atlantic Cooperation Council 93;
and Organization for Security and
Co-operation in Europe (OSCE) 48;
and Partnership for Peace program
98; Russian hegemony 46–7, 164,
165, 168–73, 176, 177, 187; TACIS
(Technical Aid to the Commonwealth
of Independent States) 116; Tashkent
CIS Collective Security Treaty 103,
104 see also “near abroad”; and speciﬁ c
states

communism 25, 32, 43–4
Communist Party, Russian 124, 131
Conference on Security and Co-operation

in Europe (CSCE) 93, 172 see also
Organization for Security and Co-
operation in Europe

Conventional Forces in Europe treaty 61
Council of Europe 39, 40, 128
Council on Foreign Relations 32
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights

crime, organized 96, 115, 166
Crimea 36, 44, 105
Croatia 17, 78, 96
Czech Republic 32, 61, 73, 74, 93, 94, 95,

107 n.15; United States missile defense
systems 99, 186–7, 188

Czechoslovakia 92; “Velvet divorce” 100

Dagestan 114, 120
Darfur 40
Dayton Accords 42, 93, 96, 98
Demirel, Suleyman 37 n.2

196 Index

democracies: bargaining ability 21;

government accountability to voters
19–21; illiberal 57; and impact of
NATO enlargement on Russia-NATO
relations 39–52; liberal, deﬁ nition
57; NATO expansion of “zone of
democracy” 1, 55, 64, 185; shared
norms and common liberal identity 20;
transparency of 20–1

democratization: and democratic peace

19–21; Eastern Europe 62, 97, 174;
Georgia 58; link between use of force
and 11; links between incomplete
transitions and war 12–13; Russian
Federation 25–6, 39–41, 57, 60–1, 62,
64, 66, 72, 75, 77, 87, 123, 161, 162–3,
164–5, 168, 173, 174, 176, 185–6, 188,
191; Ukraine 58; United States policy
162–3; wars of 11–12

democratization, incomplete: institutions in

15–16; and nationalism 16–18, 19, 20,
21, 22; nature of power and calculus of
interests in 13–15;

division of responsibilities, transatlantic

see transatlantic division of
responsibilities

drug trafﬁ cking 91, 96, 102, 115, 166
Duma: elections (2003) 124, 130, 131;

elections (2007) 27; and Iraq war 130;
neutralization of 39; Putin, support of
124; raising of threshold to win seats
186

East Timor 12
Ecuador 11–12
Egypt 112
ElBaradei, Mohammed 137, 138, 144, 145,

146

elites: and incomplete democratization

13–18, 19, 21; and nationalism 16–18,
19; role in shaping public preferences
30; Russia 26, 27–8, 30, 31

energy security 47, 49
Eritrea 12
Estonia 33, 45, 59, 76, 107 n.15, 118, 165,

188

Ethiopia 12
ethnic conﬂ ict 26
ethnic nationalism 11, 17
Eurasia 25, 41, 47, 166, 168, 169, 171,

172; frozen conﬂ icts 173–7

Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council (EAPC)

98, 99, 107 n.23; Action Plan 2002–04
99; Civil Emergency Action Plan

99; Partnership Action Plan against
Terrorism (PAP–T) 99, 100

Euro-Atlantic relations 25, 73, 77, 99,

102–3, 105, 161, 174

Europe: democracy, impact of NATO

enlargement on Russia-NATO relations
39–52; energy supplies from Russia
58, 59–60, 78; Russia, relations with
56, 59–61, 64–7, 72, 78, 115–21, 161,
162; security frameworks 37, 63–4, 65,
67, 74, 79, 84–7, 88, 91–5, 105–6, 164,
165–6, 169, 170, 171–2, 174, 176, 190;
transition processes in 86–7; United
States, relations with 65–7, 80, 84–6,
87–9, 119, 173 see also transatlantic
division of responsibilities

Europe, Central 32, 73, 75, 100–1, 163
Europe, Eastern: military cooperation in

100–1; and NATO 32, 33, 55, 56, 57,
58, 59, 60, 61, 64, 66, 75, 97, 186, 188;
Russia, attempts to contain 62–4, 66;
Russia, relations with 65, 73, 119, 163,
173, 188 see also speciﬁ c countries

European Security and Defense Identity

Europe, Southeast 100 see also Balkans
Europe, Western see Europe
European Commission 117
European Parliament 117
European Union: and Balkans stabilization

84, 174; creation of single normative
space 39; European Security and
Defense Policy 88; expansion 56; and
France 61; and GUAM 103; and Iran
136, 137, 141; Middle East, diplomacy
in 128; and NATO 78, 80, 82, 83–4,
95, 105, 106, 190; Operation Althea 95;
Partnership Cooperation Agreement-
Author 171; Romanian membership
105, 117–18; Russian admission 37,
64; Russia, relations with 40, 115–19,
161, 162, 163, 165, 170, 171, 172–3;
and Russia’s “near abroad” 32, 37, 43,
47, 50; TACIS (Technical Aid to the
Commonwealth of Independent States)
116; terrorism, ﬁ ght against 111–12,
115–21; Ukraine membership 37, 43,
47, 63; and Uzbekistan 26

EU3 138–40, 141, 142, 143, 144, 145, 149,

150

Europol 116

Falklands/Malvinas War 14
Finland 78, 107 n.15

Index

197

Founding Act. See NATO–Russia

Founding Act on Mutual Relations,
Cooperation and Security

Fradkov, Mikhail 124
France: Britain, relations with 14; French

Revolution 17; Iran, relations with
135; Iraq War, opposition to 45, 85,
130, 131; and NATO 55–6, 58, 76, 82,
83, 87, 94, 96, 190; Poland, relations
with 60; rioting, fall 2005 88; Russia,
relations with 14, 58, 59, 60, 61, 62,
64, 65–6, 76, 119; Syria, relations with
148; and terrorism 81, 115, 118; and
United Nations Security Council 119;
United States, relations with 61, 85, 88
see also EU3

France–Russia Council 64, 66
“frozen conﬂ icts” 7, 97, 102, 105, 169,

173–7

Freedom House 26
Fulda Gaps 91
Fuller, Elizabeth 164

G8 40, 77, 116, 136
Gaddis, John Lewis 111
Gaza 128, 129, 143
Gazprom 39, 124, 167, 186
Geneva Conventions 40, 51 n.4
Georgia: Abkhazia 18, 49, 97, 105,

173, 175, 104; and Black Sea region
cooperation 101, 174; and CIS 189;
democratization 58; Europe, relations
with 26; GUAM/GUUAM 102–3;
NATO membership 36, 43, 47, 55,
58, 63, 96, 104, 170, 187, 190; Rose
Revolution 37, 40, 41, 47, 102; Russian
energy supply to 49; Russian forces in
165; Russian sanctions against 49, 189;
South Ossetia 97, 104, 105, 173, 175;
and terrorism 114, 115, 120, 130

Germany: Bundeswehr 169; Europe,

relations with 61, 88, 119; incomplete
democratization, late nineteenth century
14–15, 18; Iraq War, opposition to 45,
130, 131; nationalism in 18; and NATO
55–6, 58, 83, 92, 94; oil supplies from
Russia 58, 60, 188; Russia, relations
with 14, 58, 59, 60, 61, 62, 64, 65, 66,
78, 119, 172, 173; and terrorism 81,
115, 118 see also EU3

Gibraltar, Strait of 95
Gorbachev, Mikhail 25, 26, 41, 44
Gorchakov, Aleksandr 56
government accountability to voters: for

adherence to international agreements
20–1; for war 19–20; Russia 26–7, 30

Govorukhin, Valery 138
Grant, Robert P. 90 n.30
Great Britain see Britain
Greece 83, 92, 103
Greenland 91
Gross, Andreas 128
Grozin, Andrei 167
Grozny 29, 127
GUAM/GUUAM 102–3, 189
Gulf states 114, 127
Gusinsky, Vladimir 123

Hale, Henry 27
Hamas 50, 128–9, 149, 164
Hanssen, Robert 163
Hariri, Raﬁ k 125, 148, 150
Helms, Jesse 73–4
Helsinki Treaty (1975) 163
Herzegovina 84
Hezbollah 135, 147, 148, 149, 150, 164,

164, 189

Hitler, Adolf 17
Holbrooke, Richard C. 32, 33
Hugenberg, Alfred 17
Hulsman, John 162
human rights 40, 41, 48, 57, 59, 77, 116,

119, 162, 174, 186

human-rights offenses 40; Uzbekistan 26
human trafﬁ cking 91, 96, 102
humanitarian assistance 98
Hungary 12, 32, 73, 74, 93, 94, 95, 98,

100, 107 n.15

Huntington, Samuel 13
Hussein, Saddam 84, 99, 129, 130, 131,

132, 133

Iceland 91
Implementation Force (IFOR) 93, 95, 98,

107 n.15

India 12, 15, 42, 168; NATO membership

78; and terrorism 128

Indonesia 12
International Atomic Energy Agency

(IAEA) 135, 136, 137–8, 139, 140, 141,
142, 143–4, 145, 146–7, 149–507

International Convention on the

Suppression of Acts of Nuclear
Terrorism 116

International Convention on Torture 51

n.4

International Security Assistance Force

(ISAF) 55, 96, 99, 100, 108 n.26

198 Index

Iran: building a new Euro-Atlantic front

86; Bushehr nuclear reactor 125, 135,
136, 137, 138, 139, 140–1, 142, 146,
150, 189, 193 n.33; nuclear weapons
86, 113, 123, 135–47, 149–50, 162,
189, 193 n.33; Russia, relations with
42, 45–6, 61, 123, 128, 135–47,
149–50, 162, 163, 164, 189, 193 n.33;
Russian arms and military equipment
sales to 135, 137, 138, 140, 144, 150,
164, 165, 189; and terrorism 128;
uranium enrichment program 136,
137–9, 141, 142, 143, 144, 145, 146,
150

Iraq: Belarus, trade with 166; Russia’s

relations with 129–35

Iraq war 30, 31, 61, 65, 73, 78, 84, 85,

99, 137, 145, 149, 173; building a new
Euro-Atlantic front 85–6; divisions
over 78, 80, 81, 82, 83, 85, 86, 87;
Joint Statement on Iraq (2003) 60; and
NATO 37 n.4, 77, 79, 82; Polish-led
multinational division 95, 96, 99, 100;
and Russia 42, 44, 45, 58, 59, 60, 124,
129–35, 149, 165, 189; and Syria 148

Ireland 78, 107 n.16, 113
Isfahan 138, 141, 142, 143
Islam, radicalized and politicized 26, 114
Islamic Conference of States (OIC) 126,

129

Islamic militants 112, 114, 115, 120, 125,

135, 141, 148; Al Qaeda 86, 111, 114,
115, 149, 163; International Islamic
Battalion 114; Russia, relations with
125–9, 131, 149, 163–4

Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan 125, 163
Israel 50, 86, 128–9, 139, 142, 143, 144
Israel–Hezbollah war 148, 150
Israeli–Palestine dispute 86, 113–14,

128–9

Italy 60
Ivanov, Igor 124, 152 n.33, 161, 171
Ivanov, Sergei 30, 124, 129, 170, 187, 188,

189

Japan 21, 78, 168
Jenkins, Peter 144
jihadist movement see Islamists, militant
Jones, David 80
Jordan 143

Kabul 99
Kaczynski, Lech 63, 188
Kadyrov, Akhmad 126, 126, 127, 133

Kadyrov, Razman 164
Kagan, Robert 92
Kaliningrad 47, 59, 165, 171, 188
Kant, Immanuel 20
Karaganov, Sergei 106–7 n.9
Kargil War 12
Karimov, Islam 26, 49
Kay, Sean 83
Kazakhstan 49, 112, 167
Kennan, George 74, 174
Kerry, John 133
Khabab, Abu 115
Khan, Abdul 143, 147
Khattab, Amir 114
Khazyanov, Mikhail 124
Khodorkovsky, Mikhail 27, 30, 40, 46, 60,

119, 123, 125, 168

Kholmogorov, Egor 166
Kiriyenko, Sergei 123, 146
Kislyak, Sergei 136, 140
Kissinger, Henry 58
Komsomol 59
Korea, North 162, 163
Korea, South 78, 168
Korean War 92
Kosovo 15, 17, 42, 44, 58, 76, 83, 84, 92,

93, 96, 190; Polish–Ukraine battalion
in 100–1

Kosovo Force (KFOR) 93, 95, 96, 98, 104,

107 n.19

Kosyrev, Andrei 31
Kremlin 27, 37, 123, 124, 130, 133, 186,

189, 190

Kuala Lumpur 126–7
Kuchma, Leonid 106 n.9
Kunduz 99
Kwasniewski, Aleksander 58, 59, 60, 63
Kyrgyzstan 37, 40, 43, 45

Lahoud, Emile 147
Larijani, Ali 146
Latvia 33, 45, 62, 63, 76, 107 n.15
Lavrov, Sergei 124, 126, 129, 132, 133,

138, 142–3, 145, 146, 148, 170, 186,
187

Leahy, Patrick 74
Lebanon 85, 114, 125, 147, 148, 150
liberal imperialism 62
liberal internationalism 41
liberalism 16–17
Lieven, Anatol 162
Lithuania 33, 45, 58, 62, 76, 97, 107 n.15,

188

Loewenhardt, John 166

Index

199

Lukashenko, Aleksandr 26, 50
Lukoil 130, 132, 134, 167

Maastricht Treaty 118–19
Macedonia 78, 96, 165
Malaysia 126–7
Mashal, Khaled 129
Mazeikiai oil reﬁ nery 58
McFaul, Michael 19, 27
media, control of 17–18, 26; Russia 39,

77, 186

Mediterranean 78, 79, 95, 96, 101
Medvedev, Dmitrii 27, 37
Medvedev, Sergei 172
Mehlis, Detlev 148
Merkel, Angela 61, 78, 188
Michel, Leo 83
Middle East 33, 50, 56, 73, 79, 80, 112,

123–60, 189; building a new Euro-
Atlantic front 86

Mihkelson, Marko 165
Miller, Alexei 124
Milosevic, Slobodan 15, 17
Minatom 123, 135, 136, 138 see also

Rosatom

Mohammadi, Mehdi 140
Moldova 43, 59, 97, 102, 103, 165, 173,

176, 189

Molotov–Ribbentrop Protocols 59
Montenegro 78, 96
Montreux Convention (1936) 102
Moscow 26, 50, 75, 127, 128, 129, 137
multipolarity 42, 44, 60, 65, 124, 165,

168–73

Musharraf, Pervez 114
Muslims see Islamists

Nagorno-Karabakh 11, 20, 97, 104, 105
nationalism, and incomplete

democratization 16–18, 19, 20, 21, 22.
see also ethnic nationalism

NATO: and Afghanistan 96, 98, 99,

100, 175–6, 189, 190; anti-ballistic
missile deployment 61; and Balkans
174; and Baltic States 62, 104; Berlin
Plus arrangements 82; and Britain 82,
91; beyond Russia 77–87; Bosnia,
intervention in 44; Cold War policies
(1949–91) 91–2; Combined Joint Task
Forces 92; Concept for Defense against
Terrorism 99; decision-making process
82–4; Defense Capabilities Initiative
92, 94, 98; dialogue, cooperation and
partnership 78–9; and Eastern Europe

32, 33, 55, 56, 57, 58, 59, 60, 61, 64,
66, 75, 97, 186, 188; and European
transitions 86–7; European Union,
relations with 78, 80, 82, 83–4, 95,
105, 106, 190; and France 55–6, 58, 76,
82, 83, 87, 94, 96, 190; and Germany
55–6, 58, 83, 92, 94; and GUAM 103;
and Iran 135, 144; and Iraq War 37
n.4, 81, 134–5; and Kosovo 42, 76,
83; nuclear policy 83; Out-of-Area
operations 4, 82, 91, 93, 94, 96, 190;
peace operations, Balkans 74, 80,
84, 87, 93, 96, 175; and Poland 33,
47, 60, 64, 66, 73, 74, 76, 93, 94, 95;
post-Cold War policies (1991–2001)
92–3; post-11 September challenges
94–6; Russia, relations with 25, 44, 46,
47, 74–7, 100, 104, 123, 124, 134–5,
149–50, 168, 170, 173, 175, 186,
187–91; Russian cooperation with,
attitudes towards 35, 36; Russian elite
attitudes towards 33–5; Russian mass
attitudes towards 33–6, 38 n.5; Russian
membership 75, 76–7, 78, 87; Russian
membership, attitudes towards 35, 65,
75; security policies 63, 74, 77, 79–80,
84–7, 91–6, 105–6; and Serbia 42, 44,
78, 96, 98; Strategic Concept (1991)
92; Strategic Concept (1999) 81, 92,
94, 98; toolbox, use as 82; transatlantic
capabilities gap 84, 92, 94; transatlantic
division of responsibilities 84–6, 87–9,
90 n.20; “transformation” command
79; and Ukraine 36, 38 n.6, 47, 55, 58,
63, 64, 78–9, 80, , 87, 96, 97, 98, 100,
106–7 n.9, 170, 187, 190; vulnerability
to Russian pressures 190–1 see also
Partnership for Peace program

NATO Defense Planning Questionnaire 98
NATO enlargement: and attempts to

contain Russia 32, 37, 62–4, 66; Baltic
states 165, 174; Cold War (1949–91)
91–2; continuing 78–9; framework
of principles for 73; impact of 72–3;
justiﬁ cation for 32, 73; Membership
Action Plan (MAP) 93, 95, 96, 98, 100,
102, 107 n.21, 174; post-Cold War
(1991–2001) 92–3; post-11 September
94–6; and Russian containment of
NATO 56–62, 66, 187, 188; Russian
views on 32–4, 36, 44, 45, 46, 55,
56, 57–8, 72, 76, 91–110, 170, 187,
188; and Russia’s “near abroad” 32,
43, 47, 50; strengthening of European

200 Index

democracy, impact on Russia–NATO
relations 39–52; Study on NATO
enlargement 73, 77, 93, 97, 107 n.14;
terrorism, ﬁ ght against 94–6, 115;
United States Senate debate on 73–4;
Western European responses to Russian
concerns 64–7

NATO Response Force (NRF) 79, 94, 99
NATO–Russia Council (NRC) 55, 58,

75–6, 81, 175

NATO–Russia Founding Act on Mutual

Relations, Cooperation and Security
(1997) 32, 58, 75

NATO–Russia Permanent Joint Council

(PJC) 58, 75, 76, 98

NATO Security Investment Program 105
NATO–Ukraine Commission 98
Naumann, Klauss 82
Navy League 14
Nazi–Soviet Pact 59
“near abroad” 40, 42, 43; anti-ballistic

missile deployment in 61; and
European Union 32, 37, 43, 47, 50;
and NATO enlargement 32, 43,
47, 50; potential for disagreement
between Russia and Europe 48, 50,
170, 173, 176; Russian commitment
to primacy in 46–8, 165, 187 see also
Commonwealth of Independent States
(CIS); NATO enlargement

Netherlands 83
New Zealand 78
norms: humanitarian and human rights 40;

liberal 20

North Atlantic Cooperation Council 93, 97
North Atlantic Council (NAC) 39, 76, 83,

93, 95, 99

“nuclear junk” 121 n.7
Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty 113,

137, 141

nuclear weapons 112–13, 120; anti-

ballistic missile deployment 61, 63,
87, 186, 187–8; Anti-ballistic Missile
Treaty 45; Iran 86, 113, 123, 135–47,
150, 162, 189, 193 n.33; North Korea
162; nuclear missiles 87; Soviet Union
87; Russian Federation 46, 74, 77;
smuggling 112–13, 115

OIC see Islamic Conference of States
oil and gas: Baku–Tbilisi–Ceyhan pipeline

104, 124; Odessa–Brody oil pipeline
103; Turkey 104–5, 124 see also Black
Sea region; Caspian Basin; Russian

Federation energy development and
trade

Onyszkiewicz, Janusz 95
Operation Active Endeavour 95, 96, 101,

102

Operation Althea 95
Operation Enduring Freedom 96, 99, 104,

108 n.27

Operation Iraqi Freedom 99, 104, 108 n.29
Organization for Democracy and

Economic Development 189

Organization for Security and Co-

operation in Europe (OSCE) 39,
40, 93, 171, 172, 173; and Balkans
174; border monitoring, Georgia 49;
ﬁ eld ofﬁ ces in CIS 48; Ofﬁ ce for
Democratic Institutions and Human
Rights (ODIHR) 48; and Ukraine 102
see also Conference on Security and
Co-operation in Europe

Oslo Accords 128
Oslon, Aleksandr 33
Ossetia, North 105
Ossetia, South 49, 97, 104, 173, 175

Pabriks, Artis 62
Pakistan 12, 15, 114, 137
Palestinian Legislative Council 128
Pankisi Gorge 104, 114, 115, 120
Paramonov, Vladimir 168
Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of

Europe 128

Parmentier, Guillaume 85
Partnership Action Plan against Terrorism

(PAP–T) 99, 100, 105, 108 n.25

Partnership Cooperation Agreement-

Author 171

Partnership for Peace program 91, 93, 94,

96, 97–8, 98–9, 174; and Black Sea
regional cooperation 101, 102, 103,
104, 105, 174; and Operation Enduring
Freedom 99; Individual Partnership
Programs 104, 107 n.13; Participation
in the Planning and Review Process
(PARP) 98, 99, 103, 107 nn.13, 17, 18;
Partnership Coordination Cell 98, 107
n.13; strategic vision for revival 100;
Ukraine in 102, 104

Patten, Chris 117
peace, democratic 19–21
peacekeeping 75, 79; Balkans 74, 78, 80,

84, 87, 93, 94, 96, 175; Lebanon 85;
Partnership Coordination Cell exercises
98; Russian forces 175

Index

201

perestroika 44
Peru 11–12
Pﬂ uger, Friedbert 64
PJC. See NATO–Russia Permanent Joint

Council

PKK 128, 129, 149
Poland: democratization 12; and Iraq war

95, 96, 99, 100; and NATO 33, 47,
60, 64, 66, 73, 74, 76, 93, 94, 95; and
Partnership for Peace program 98, 107
n.15; Russia, relations with 58, 59,
62, 63, 78, 119; United States missile
defense systems 61, 99, 186–7, 188

Politkovskaya, Anna 39, 186
power 66; nature of, and incomplete

democratization 13–15

“praetorian societies” 13
Prague Capabilities Commitment (PCC)

Primakov, Yevgeny 56, 57, 66, 124, 130
Pushkov, Aleksei 44
Putin, Vladimir: autocratic approach

77, 176, 186, 187; and Baltic states
165; Chechen policies 12, 15, 19, 29,
77, 125, 140, 148, 149; conscription
policy 30; control and consolidation
39, 57, 123–4; and deep seabed
mission 189; defense policy 186–7,
188; and democracy 57, 123, 176;
Duma, support from 124; Eastern
Europe, relations with 59; Europe,
relations with 65, 78, 172; economic
revival under 31, 124, 130, 131, 168;
foreign policy 44–50, 57, 123–5,
186–7; France, relations with 65–6;
Iran, relations with 136–7, 139–40,
141, 142, 144–5, 189; Iraq, relations
with 129–35; Israel visit 50; NATO
enlargement, views on 56, 75; NATO
relations 75, 75, 76; Poland, relations
with 59; popularity 27; President of
Russian Federation 26, 27, 36, 42;
Prime Minister of Russian Federation
37; and rule of law 61, 119; South
African visit 50; Syria, relations with
148; and terrorism 125–9, 164; Ukraine
elections (2004) 58; United States,
relations with 44, 56, 61–2, 65–6, 124,
186; West, policy on 29, 31, 44, 57,
59–60, 161, 162; Western Europe,
relations with 60

Quartet 128–9
Qatar 127

realism 162, 163
Realpolitik 168
Rice, Condoleezza 142, 169
Robertson, George 75
Robertson, Lord 76
Rød-Larsen, Terje 148
Rodina party 124
Romania 33, 64, 96, 97, 100, 102, 105,

107 n.15, 185; Blackseafor 101; and
European Union 105, 117–18; GUAM
103

Rosatom 123 see also Minatom
Rosneft 39
Rosner, Jeremy D. 76
Rosoboronoexport 124
Rowhani, Hassan 137, 139, 141
rule of law 2, 11, 15, 16, 17, 51 n.4, 57,

61, 119

Rumsfeld, Donald 188
Rumyantsev, Alexander 123, 135, 136,

138, 139

Russia–Iranian nuclear technology

relationship 46

Russian Federation: arms and military

equipment sales 124, 130, 135, 137,
138, 140, 142, 144, 148, 149, 150,
163–4, 165–6, 167, 189; autocracy
164–5, 166–8, 170, 173, 176, 190;
and Black Sea regional cooperation
101, 102; containment of, and NATO
enlargement 32, 37, 62–4, 66, 92;
corruption in 166, 176; decline of
power 42–4; “deep state” 26, 30, 37
n.1; defense policy 187–8; democratic
status 25–6, 39–41, 57, 60–1, 62, 64,
66, 72, 75, 77, 87, 123, 161, 162–3,
164–5, 168, 173, 174, 176, 185–6,
188, 191; demographic decline 26, 43;
economy 26, 27–8, 29, 30, 31, 37, 39,
41, 42–3, 44, 50, 55, 66, 74–5, 124;
elite in 26, 27–8, 30, 31, 33–5, 37, 166,
168, 171; and European security 63–4,
915, 164, 165–6, 169, 170, 171–2, 176,
186, 187–8, 190; European Union,
cooperation with 40, 115–19; Eurasian
identity 41; foreign policy 26, 27,
29, 30, 41–2, 44–51, 56, 57, 123–5,
161–84, 185, 186–7, 191; human
rights 116, 162, 186; identity crisis
56, 62; immigration from post-Soviet
countries 26; media control 39, 77,
186; military decline 43; multipolarity
42, 44, 60, 124, 165, 168–73; Muslim
population 112, 125, 131; natural

202 Index

resources 74–5, 77; neo-imperialism
162, 164, 167, 171, 173, 174, 176;
non-governmental organizations in 57;
nuclear capability 46, 74, 77, 112–13,
120, 135, 145, 187–8; oligarchy 26,
27–8, 29, 44, 119, 123, 125; and
Partnership for Peace program 104,
107 n.15; political isolation 37; post-
postcommunist 25–38; power 56, 58,
66, 77, 124, 148, 163, 165, 166, 171,
186, 190; public opinion on policy
issues 27–31, 153 n.38; regions,
control over 39, 168–73, 176, 177,
187, 188–9; security concerns 56, 185;
secret services 26; social assistance
payments, attempt to monetize 30; “soft
power’ 43–4; “sovereign democracy”
status 37; sovereignty, internal 40,
55; and terrorism 81, 111, 112–16,
120–1, 125–35, 147–9, 150, 161,
163–4; xenophobia 26, 64; world order,
understanding of 41–2, 50–1 see also
Chechen conﬂ icts; Commonwealth of
Independent States (CIS); NATO; “near
abroad”; Soviet Union; West, Russian
relations with; and under speciﬁ c
countries and regions for Russian
relations

Russian Federation energy development

and trade 55, 66, 74–5, 77, 124, 126,
186, 190; Central Asia 167–8; Europe
59–60, 78, 91; Europe, Eastern 63;
Germany 58, 60, 188; and Iraq war
129, 130, 131–2, 133, 134; Lithuania
97; nuclear fuel supply to Iran 125,
135, 136, 138, 139–41, 142, 189, 193
n.33; oil shipments through Straits
104; Poland 63; petro-diplomacy 185,
188–9, 190; Syria 148; Turkey 104–5,
124; Ukraine 40, 47, 49–50, 78, 97,
189; vulnerability of 191

Russian Mufti Council 129
Rwanda 12

Saakashvili, Mikhail 36, 103, 104, 107

n.11, 125

SACEUR 83
Saeedi, Mohamed 146
Sakhalin II 46
Salaﬁ jihad 112, 114, 115, 120
Sarkozy, Nicolas 61, 190
Saudi Arabia 112, 114, 126
Scheffer, Jaap de Hoop 57, 76
Schell, Jonathan 112

Schroeder, Gerhard 59, 60, 61, 65, 119,

139

search and rescue 98
SECI see Southeast European Cooperation

Initiative

security 74, 77, 79–80; after September

11 98–9, 111; Black Sea region 100–6;
changing environment 96–7; Cold War
91–2; contingency planning 79–80;
Europe 37, 63–4, 65, 67, 74, 79, 84–7,
88, 91–5, 105–6, 164, 165–6, 169, 170,
171–2, 174, 176, 190; NATO policies
63, 74, 77, 79–80, 84–7, 91–6, 105–6;
post-Cold War 92–3; Russian concerns
56, 185; Vancouver to Vladivostok 1,
55, 64, 67 see also nuclear weapons;
Partnership for Peace program;
terrorism

SEDM see Southeast European Defense

Ministerial

SEEBRIG see Southeast European Brigade
September 11 terrorist attacks 30, 33, 45,

75, 77, 79, 81, 111

Serbia 42; media jurisdiction 17;

nationalist wars 20; NATO attack on
44, 98; NATO membership 78, 96

Sergeev, Igor 124
SFOR see Stabilization Force
Shanghai Cooperation Organization 48–9,

127, 128, 140, 149, 170, 189

Sharif, Nawaz 15
Shell 46, 186
Shevardnadze, Eduard 47, 125
Shevtsova, Lilia 188–9
Slovakia 33, 35, 107 n.16; “Velvet

divorce” 100

Slovenia 33, 96, 107 n.16
Solana, Javier 60
Solovstsov, Nikolai 187–8
South Africa 50; institutions for the old

elite, and mass suffrage 15; NATO
membership 78

Southeast European Brigade (SEEBRIG)

100, 101, 102

Southeast European Cooperation Initiative

(SECI) 100, 102

Southeast European Defense Ministerial

(SEDM) 100, 102, 105, 106

sovereignty, and counter-terrorism 118,

120

Soviet Union 32; and Baltic states 165;

collapse of 11, 18, 25, 31, 72, 92,
97, 166; and Eastern Europe 62;
and NATO 87, 92; nuclear weapons

Index

203

87, 112; United States containment
strategy 74 see also Commonwealth
of Independent States; “near abroad”;
Russian Federation

Spain 92, 115, 118, 128, 149
Stabilization Force (SFOR) 93, 95, 98, 107

n.16

Straits 104
Straw, Jack 139
Strogov, Aleksey 168
Sudan 40, 50
suffrage, mass 15
Sweden 78, 107 n.15
Syria: Russia, relations with 50, 147–9,

150, 164; Russian supply of arms to
125, 164, 189

Szczyglo, Aleksander 63

TACIS (Technical Aid to the

Commonwealth of Independent States)
116

Taliban regime 114, 125, 128, 149, 163–4,

190

Tallinn 59
Tehran 135
terrorism 26, 73, 81–2, 94, 95, 98, 111–22;

and Britain 81, 115, 128; and European
Union 111–12, 115–22; and France
81, 115, 118; and Georgia 114, 115,
120, 130; and Germany 81, 115, 118;
NATO members’ differing perspectives
81–2, 87; Partnership Action Plan
against Terrorism (PAP–T) 99, 100,
105; and Partnership for Peace program
100; and Russian Federation 81, 111,
112–16, 120–1, 125–35, 147–9, 150,
161, 163–4; September 11 terrorist
attacks 30, 33, 45, 75, 77, 79, 81, 111;
and Turkey 128; United States–led war
on 45, 51 n.4, 61, 66, 75, 77, 81–2, 94,
116, 127, 162; Uzbekistan 48 see also
Iraq war; Islamic militants

transatlantic division of responsibilities;

European Union 111–12, 121; NATO
84–6, 87–9, 90 n.20

Transnistria 47, 97, 105, 165
Transparency International 57
Trenin, Dmitri 87, 97, 161–2, 166
Tudjman, Franjo 17
Tula Instrument Design Bureau 137
Turkey 82, 83, 92, 104, 105; Armenia,

relations with 103; and European Union
117–18; Black Sea Harmony 101, 102;
Blackseafor 101; oil and gas 104–5,

124; Russia, relations with 104–5; and
terrorism 128

Turkmenistan 26

Uganda 12
Ukraine: and Black Sea regional

cooperation 101, 102; and CIS 189;
democratization 58, 59, 87; elections
(2004) 58, 59, 77, 165; elections (2006)
102; Europe, integration with 26, 37,
43, 47, 63, 174; Holodomor famine
102; NATO cooperation 36, 38 n.6, 80,
98, 100; NATO membership 36, 47,
55, 58, 63, 64, 78–9, 87, 96, 97, 106–7
n.9, 170, 187, 190; nuclear capability
112; Orange Revolution 37, 40, 58, 60,
102, 103, 125, 140; and Partnership for
Peace program 102, 107 n.15; Poland,
relations with 63; Russian energy
supply to 40, 49–50, 78, 97, 189;
Russia, relations with 36, 102, 103,
165, 172, 173, 176

UNCHRO, Czech–Slovak battalion in 100
United Kingdom see Britain
United Nations: Middle East, diplomacy in

128; role in legitimizing security efforts
85; and United States 85

United Nations Charter 40, 113
United Nations Protection Force

(UNPROFOR), Czech–Slovak battalion
in 100

United Nations Security Council 86, 119,

169; and Beslan school seizure 128;
and France 85; and Iran 46, 135, 137,
138, 139, 141, 142, 143, 144, 145–6,
150; and Iraq war 45, 130, 131, 132–3,
152 n.33; mandate for NATO military
force 79; Russian Federation in 40, 42,
45, 46, 113; and Syrian activities in
Lebanon 147, 148, 150

United Russia party 27, 124, 131, 186
United States: and Afghanistan 96, 99,

175–6; anti-ballistic missile deployment
61, 63, 186, 187–8; and Balkans 84,
96, 174, 177; and Black Sea regional
cooperation 102, 104; and China 164;
Cold War defense policy 91; economy
42, 43, 137; Eastern Europe, relations
with 188; Europe, relations with 65–7,
80, 84–6, 87–9, 119, 173; and European
security frameworks 37, 63, 65, 67,
74, 84–6, 91, 186–7, 190; and Iran 86,
135–7, 140, 141, 142, 144, 145, 146,
147; Middle East, diplomacy in 128,

204 Index

129; military presence in Central Asia,
campaign against 48; and NATO 56,
57, 61, 65, 73–4, 76, 81–2, 83–6, 87–8,
92, 94–6; France, relations with 61, 85,
88; oil and steel embargo on Japan 21;
Poland, relations with 63; power 55–6,
60–1, 65, 87–8, 92; Soviet Union,
relations with 74; Syria, relations
with 148; and United Nations 85;
unilateralism 81, 84, 87–8, 131, 162,
169; Uzbekistan, withdrawal of forces
from 26, 48–9; war on terror 45, 51
n.4, 61, 66, 75, 77, 81–2, 94, 116, 127,
162 see also Iraq war; September 11
terrorist attacks; transatlantic division
of responsibilities

United States Central Command

(CENTCOM) 99

United States–Russian relations 31–2,

42, 45–6, 72, 73, 74, 75, 76, 186; and
American missile defense systems
187–8; and CIS 168; and Iran 86,
135–7, 140, 141, 142, 146, 147, 163;
Iraq war 129–35, 153 n.38, 189; Putin’s
policies 44, 56, 61–2, 65–6, 124, 186;
Russian attempts to contain US 60–2,
65–6; and Russian integration with
West 161, 162, 163, 165, 170, 171,
173, 176, 177; Russian rapprochement
following September 11 attacks 33; and
Russia’s “near abroad” 32, 47

UNPROFOR see United Nations

Protection Force

Uzbekistan 26, 40, 45, 48–9, 102, 103,

125, 163, 167

Vekhirev, Rem 124
Villepin, Dominique de 60
Voronin, Vladimir 103

war and democratization 11–13, 19–21
Warner, John 74

Warsaw Pact 72, 87, 91, 92, 97
Warsaw Pact countries, former 35, 43, 72,

Washington Treaty (North Atlantic Treaty)

weapons of mass destruction 91, 94, 108

n.25, 112–13, 120, 127, 137, 143 see
also nuclear weapons

weapons trafﬁ cking see arms trafﬁ cking
Wellstone, Paul 74, 89 n.6
West, Russian relations with: economic

relations 19; Putin’s policy 29, 31,
44, 57, 59–60, 161, 162; Russian
estrangement from West 161–84;
Russian leaders’ abandonment of
West for Moscow-centered system
97; Russian public opinion on 27,
28, 29, 30, 31; and Russia’s internal
sovereignty 55; and Russia’s “near
abroad” 47, 48, 50; Yeltsin’s policy 31,
42, 44

World Trade Organization 31
World War I 14, 15

Yakovenko, Alexander 134, 136
Yandarbiyev, Zelimikhan 127
Yanukovich, Viktor 58, 103, 125
Yeltsin, Boris: decline in Russian power

under 42–3; Duma, relations with 124;
First Chechen war 19; president of
the Russian Federation 25, 26, 27, 29;
West, policy on 31, 42, 59

Yugoslavia, dissolution of 92
Yugoslavia, former 11, 17
Yukos 27, 60, 168
Yushchenko, Viktor 36, 58, 60, 103,

125

Zawahiri, Ayman 163
Zebari, Hoshyar 133
zero-sum thinking 46, 97, 105, 164, 168
Zhirinovsky, Vladimir 19

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