I E D T

A S K

F

O RC E

N

E W S L E T T E R

I E D T a s k F o r c e F i e ld T e a m
B u i l d i n g 1 0 0 , C a m p V i c t o r y
B a g h d a d , I r a q
C o m m e r c i a l : 7 0 3 - 6 2 1 - 6 5 4 3
D N V T : 3 0 2 - 5 5 0 - 2 1 1 9
W e b s i t e : h t t p :/ / i e d t a s k fo r c e . a r m y . s m i l . m i l

EOD recently responded to a re-
port of two mutilated cows with
possible wires leading from the
carcasses to a drainage gate
placed in the middle of a road.
On arrival at the scene, EOD
cleared the area around the car-
casses and identified the point of
detonation and recovered compo-
nents of an improvised pressure
switch. Fragmentation recovered
from the scene was consistent
with a thin cased munition such
as a 80-120mm rocket warhead.
The point of detonation was lo-
cated on the edge of the road
near the pressure plate that was
initiated by one of the cows. The
incident is believed to be linked

to a rocket attack where the point
of origin (POO) was located ap-
proximately 300m away. The
road where the Victim Operated
IED (VOIED) was emplace is the
only route leading to the POO
which makes it highly probable
that the VOIED was emplaced to
ambush coalition forces during
their immediate response to the
rocket attack. Coalition Forces
must use extreme caution when
investigating the POO of a rocket
or mortar attack. To prevent from
becoming predictable, it is recom-
mended to avoid the obvious
routes, and to vary the routes if
the enemy continues to conduct
attacks from the same location.

V o l u m e 1 , I s s u e 1 3

L

E A D

S

T O R Y

H

E A D L I N E

1 6 A u g u s t 2 0 0 4

S

H A R IN G

S

O LD IE R

K

N OW LE D GE

I E D T

I C K E R

N

2 6 / 1 8

N C

6 7 / 5 9

W

5 1 / 3 4

B

A G H D A D

4 9 / 9 4

C S

2 / 5

S E

1 / 3

* Number of IED Events for Week Ending 7 Aug 04 / Week Ending 14 Aug 04.

VO I E D E

M P L A C E D

O N

R

OA D

L

E A D I N G

T O

P

O I N T

O F

O

R I G I N

POO

300m

VOIED

Don’t be

predictable

Avoid the

obvious routes

Vary your

routes

Pressure Switch

I E D T a s k F o r c e N e w s l e t t e r

A patrol recently investigated a
tire they spotted on their route
that they considered to be suspi-
cious and found two 100mm pro-
jectiles with a garage door opener
initiator. As they cordoned the
area, they discovered an impro-
vised rocket launcher (IRL) at-
tached to a tree pointed towards
the location of the primary device.
The IRL was 100m north in a

palm grove along a trail that ran
perpendicular to the patrolled
route. The device consisted of a
57mm High Explosive Anti-Tank
(HEAT) round in a steel pipe that
was affixed approximately 4 ft
high to a palm tree with a nylon
strap, and a pager initiator. This
incident highlights the importance

of sweeping 360 degrees around
suspected IEDs when cordoning
the area. If the security element
had not searched the area to the
north of the road, the IRL would
not have been found and may
have killed the EOD soldiers re-
sponding to clear the primary IED.

The Bait and Trap is an attempt by AIF to in-
flict casualties by drawing Coalition Forces
into a desired kill zone, while maintaining
maximum survivability with planned escape
routes. In past issues, IED TF Newsletters
have highlighted other Bait and Trap scenar-
ios that were recently seen but beware that
AIF will continue to refine this TTP.

The Bait and Trap TTP has been used by Anti-
Iraqi Forces (AIF) for quite some time but has
been a noticeable increase in the last few
weeks. The use of this TTP is a clear indicator
that AIF are observing and studying the TTPs
being used by our patrols, QRF, and EOD to
include routes being used, security and cordon
procedures, and IED disarming techniques.

P a g e 2

I

M P R O V I S E D

R

O C K E T

L

A U N C H E R

A S

A

S

E C O N DA RY

D

E V I C E

Scan for

secondary

devices

Sweep the area

360 degrees

Search high

and low

B

A I T

A N D

T

R A P

T T P

S

Initiator

IRL

Primary IED

in Tire

IRL 100m North