Ethnic Migration in Central

and Eastern Europe: Its

Historical Background and

Contemporary Flows

Roel Jennissen*

Research and Documentation Centre, Dutch Ministry of Security and Justice

Abstract

This article aims to describe the historical background of international ethnic
migration in Central and Eastern Europe. The rise and fall of the Habsburg Empire
in Central Europe and the Ottoman Empire in Southeastern Europe has been the
underlying cause of many ethnic migration flows in Central and Eastern Europe in
the post-communist era. Moreover, the German Ostkolonisation, border changes
after the two World Wars, and interstate migration in the former Soviet Union
caused a large pool of potential ethnic migrants. In addition to the description of
this historical background, this article contains a description of important contem-
porary ethnic migration flows that originate from the aforementioned historical
developments, and a discussion of future developments of ethnic migration in
Central and Eastern Europe.

I. Introduction

International migration figures were traditionally low in communist Europe from
the 1960s.

1

Since the second half of the 1980s, however, international migration

figures in the former communist countries (the countries in transition) significantly
increased (Okólski 1998). Given the turbulent history of Eastern Europe, the
potential number of migrants in Eastern Europe was very large (Van de Kaa 1996).
After the collapse of communism, ethnic minorities in Eastern Europe were able
(or forced) to migrate to their country of origin, and as a result ethnic migration has

* Roel Jennissen is researcher at the Research and Documentation Centre (WODC) of the
Dutch Ministry of Security and Justice. He also worked at the Netherlands Interdisciplinary
Demographic Institute (NIDI), where he conducted most of the research for this article. He
obtained a Ph.D. in demography from the University of Groningen on the basis of the book
Macro-Economic Determinants of International Migration in Europe (2004). Currently, his
main research interests are the integration of non-Western minorities in the Netherlands,
international migration, and historical demography.

Roel Jennissen: Ethnic Migration in Central and Eastern Europe

252

once again become significant. Both ethnic migration within Central and Eastern
Europe and ethnic migration from Central and Eastern Europe to Germany (and to
a lesser extent to Finland, Greece, and Israel) reached a high level in the 1990s. The
aim of this article is to describe the historical developments and events that
eventually ended in the ethnic mosaic of Central and Eastern Europe when
communism fell. Moreover, this article describes important contemporary migra-
tion flows that originate from these historical developments. This article also deals
with the contemporary factors that have had an impact on these migration flows,
which are often labelled ‘ethnic migration’.

In Central and Eastern Europe, many population groups have lived outside their

own nation-states – if they have had one at all. Three specific historical develop-
ments were largely responsible for this situation. Firstly, the rise and fall of two
large multi-ethnic states, i.e. the Habsburg Empire and the Ottoman Empire,
played an important part. Secondly, many ethnic Germans have lived outside the
united Germany because of ancient migration to the east and border changes after
the World Wars. Thirdly, many people have lived outside their home country in the
former Soviet Union because of interstate migration within the Soviet Union
before its disintegration. The following three sections describe these historical
developments and examples of important ethnic migration flows that have origi-
nated from these developments. The topic of the fifth section is future develop-
ments of ethnic migration in Central and Eastern Europe. This article ends with
some concluding remarks.

II. The Habsburg and the Ottoman Empires

At the dawn of the First World War the Habsburg Empire (Austria-Hungary)
comprised

contemporary

Austria,

Hungary,

Slovenia,

Croatia,

Bosnia-

Herzegovina, the contemporary Czech and Slovak Republics, Vojvodina, Transyl-
vania, Trentino-Alto Adige, and parts of contemporary southern Poland and
western Ukraine (see Figure 1). In contrast to the Western European states, the
Habsburg Empire was a multiethnic state, in which people of different ethnic
descent (Germans, Hungarians, Czechs, Slovaks, Croats, Serbs, Bosnians, Roma-
nians, Poles, Ruthenians, Slovenes, and Italians) lived together (Sked 1989).

The disintegration of the Habsburg Empire, which occurred after the First World

War, appeared to be the root cause of many small ethnic migration flows. Hungary,
for instance, lost large parts of its historical territory, as a consequence of the treaty
of Trianon, which came into effect in 1920. Hence, many ethnic Hungarians have
lived in Romania (Transylvania), Czechoslovakia (southern Slovakia), and Yugo-
slavia (Vojvodina) (Courbage 1998). Many ethnic Hungarians harboured the wish
to migrate to Hungary, and the end of communism offered the chance for many of
them to do so. Yugoslavia was a multiethnic state, as it was established out of the
southern Slavic provinces of Austria-Hungary, Serbia,

2

and Montenegro. In turn,

after the disintegration of Yugoslavia in the 1990s, many people from ethnic
minorities were forced to migrate out of the area where they and their ancestors
had lived for centuries. Often they migrated to the successor state that was
inhabited by a majority of the people of their own ethnic group.

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253

Similar to the Habsburg Empire, the Ottoman Empire was also a multiethnic

state. It dominated (parts of) the contemporary Southeastern European states of
Bulgaria, Greece, Serbia, Montenegro, Bosnia-Herzegovina, the Former Yugosla-
vian Republic of Macedonia (FYROM), Kosovo, Albania, and Romania for more
than 200 years (Quataert 2000; see also Figure 2).

Examples of ethnic migration flows in the post-communist era that can be

attributed to the multiethnic character of the Ottoman Empire are the Turks, who
emigrated from Bulgaria, and the Greeks, who emigrated from Albania. The
Ottoman domination of Southeastern Europe brought Islam to this region.
However, the sultans also tolerated the continued existence of the various forms of
Christianity to which the original population adhered (Kinross 1977). This reli-
gious tolerance often originated out of necessity and was often accompanied with
several discriminating measures towards non-Muslims. Albanians, Bosniaks, and
the Pomaks in Bulgaria are examples of population groups who voluntarily

3

converted to Islam during Ottoman rule. The different coexisting religions in the
former Yugoslavia led to a sense of nationhood among Orthodox Serbs, Catholic
Croats, and Bosnian Muslims, although these groups have a common Slavic
ancestry (Ingrao 1996). Conflicts between these groups caused large ethnic migra-
tion flows in the post-communist era.

The changing frontier between the Ottoman and Habsburg Empires and other

border changes were also the root cause of many ethnic migration flows in the
post-communist era. Examples include the Serbs who emigrated from Krajina
(Croatia), the Albanians who emigrated from Kosovo (Serbia and Montenegro),

Figure 1. Europe in 1914

Dual Kingdom of
Austria-Hungary

Roel Jennissen: Ethnic Migration in Central and Eastern Europe

254

and the Hungarians who emigrated from Transylvania (Romania). According to
Ingrao (1996:3), the Habsburgs resettled 600,000 Serbs near their southern mili-
tary border (the so-called Vojne Krajina). Many Serbs had to flee from this area
after the Croatian army conquered this area in 1995. Ingrao also states that the
Ottomans replaced Serbs, who fled en masse from Kosovo at the end of the
fourteenth century, with loyal Albanian Muslims. Many Albanians were forced to
flee from Kosovo in 1999. Hungarians, who settled in Transylvania at the end of the
ninth century, claim that Slavonic tribes were the only inhabitants of the Danube
basin when they conquered it. However, according to Romanian historiography,
Romanians, who are seen as Romanised Dacians, had lived in Transylvania for
centuries before the Hungarians arrived (Deletant 1992). Hence, both Hungarians
and Romanians consider Transylvania as part of their historical homeland. Many
Romanians (Vlachs) migrated to Transylvania after the Ottomans were driven
away from this area, because of heavy burdens on Romanian peasants in Wallachia
and Moldavia, which were still under Ottoman rule. Eventually, Romanians con-
stituted the majority in Transylvania in the eighteenth century (Péter 1992).
Transylvania became Romanian territory when the treaty of Trianon was signed in
1920. About 1.6 million ethnic Hungarians lived in Transylvania in 1992. The
Hungarian population in Romania can be divided into two groups: Magyars and
Szekels (Cushing 1992). The latter, who live in the southeastern part of Transyl-
vania, developed their own social structure and often consider themselves as
separate from the other Hungarians. Many ethnic Hungarians emigrated from
Transylvania after the fall of communism.

Figure 2. The northern part of the Ottoman Empire in 1740

Bosnia

Wallachia

Moldavia

Ottoman Empire

Vassal states

Anatolia

Black Sea

Rumelia

Transylvania

Studies in Ethnicity and Nationalism: Vol. 11, No. 2, 2011

255

III. Ethnic Germans in Central and Eastern Europe

Overpopulation in the German states and labour shortages in several Central and
Eastern European areas induced many Germans to migrate eastwards. This
so-called Ostkolonisation started in the twelfth century and continued up to the
nineteenth century. Large groups of Germans settled in the Baltic area, the Sudeten
area, Bohemia-Moravia, Poland, and Hungary in the first three centuries of the
Ostkolonisation. Wars and turmoil in Central and Eastern Europe caused a decline
in the number of Germans who migrated eastwards in the fifteenth century.
Subsequently, the Turkish expansion in Southeastern Europe virtually ended the
southeastern migration until the Turkish siege of Vienna in 1683. After withstand-
ing this siege, the Habsburg emperors sponsored Germans to settle near the
frontier as a buffer against the Ottomans. In this period many Germans migrated to
Transylvania,

4

Vojvodina, and Slavonia. During the seventeenth and eighteenth

centuries, Russia conquered expansive yet sparsely populated fertile territories
around the Black and Caspian Seas. From 1763, Catherine II and her successors
encouraged German farmers to inhabit these areas. Hence, many ethnic Germans
lived in the Volga steppes, the Ukraine, the Crimea, and in the Caucasian provinces
(Schoenberg 1970). During the 1930s, many ethnic Germans were deported to
Siberia and Central Asia as part of the collectivisation of agriculture. The Nazi
attack on the Soviet Union provided Stalin a charter to abolish the Autonomous
Socialistic Republic of the Volga Germans and to deport ethnic Germans, who
were considered as Hitler’s fifth column, to the Asiatic part of the Soviet Union
(Long 1988; Sinner 2000). After the Second World War, many ethnic Germans
from Romania were deported to labour camps in the Soviet Union (Groenendijk
1997).

In addition to the 8.3 million Germans who lived outside Germany because of

historical migration to the east, millions of Germans lived outside the territory of
the contemporary reunited Germany because of border changes after the First and
Second World Wars. Germany lost large parts of the provinces of West Prussia and
Posen and the eastern part of Upper Silesia to Poland, the Memel region to
Lithuania, and the Hultschin region (an area in the south of Upper Silesia) to
Czechoslovakia

5

as stipulated by the Treaty of Versailles in 1919. Moreover, the

city of Danzig became a ‘free city’ governed by the League of Nations (Schoen-
berg 1970; Tooley 1997). Germany reoccupied these territories in the first years of
the Second World War, but lost them again to the advancing Red Army at the end
of this war. The loss of the Second World War had even more far-reaching
territorial consequences for the eastern part of Germany: the provinces of East
Pomerania, East Brandenburg, Silesia, and the southern part of East Prussia were
allocated to Poland (see Figure 5), while the northern part of East Prussia was
placed under Soviet administration. About 9.5 million Germans lived in the
German provinces that lay east of the Oder-Neisse line

6

at the start of the Second

World War. Many Germans from the lost eastern provinces and ethnic Germans
from central and eastern European states fled or were expelled to the four military
occupation zones after the war. Almost two million ethnic Germans and Germans
from the eastern provinces were killed during the last months of the war. In 1950,

Roel Jennissen: Ethnic Migration in Central and Eastern Europe

256

about 11 million German expellees lived in the two German states (about 8 million
in West Germany and about 3 million in East Germany). Furthermore, Austria and
other Western countries received about 500,000 German expellees. At this time it
was estimated that about 4.2 million ethnic Germans still lived in other central and
eastern European states: 1.7 million in Poland, 1.4 million in the Soviet Union,
300,000 in Czechoslovakia, and 750,000 in southeastern European countries
(Fleischer and Proebsting 1989; Münz and Ohliger 2001; Schoenberg 1970).

Table 1 presents the number of Aussiedler in the period 1950–2005 and their

country of origin. Aussiedler are ethnic Germans who did not use to live in one of
the two German states but in other central or eastern European countries and that
migrated to the Federal Republic of Germany after the Second World War.

7

In the period 1950–1984, more than 1.25 million Aussiedler arrived in West

Germany. In this period the most represented country of origin was Poland
(59.5%), followed by Romania (13.0%), Czechoslovakia (7.6%), the Soviet Union
(7.5%), and Yugoslavia (6.8%). Ethnic migration to East Germany was very small
after 1950, because the East German authorities did not want to upset the relation-
ships with the other East Bloc states (Bade 2000). Despite the more than 1.25
million ethnic Germans who migrated to West Germany in the period 1950–1984,
the number of ethnic Germans in Central and Eastern Europe and in Central Asia
was still very large in 1985.

Most Aussiedler came from the (former) Soviet Union (73.3%), followed by

Poland (22.7%), and Romania (8.7%) in the period 1985–2005. The number of
Aussiedler from the remaining countries was quite small, as the number of ethnic
Germans in these countries had already significantly decreased in the former
decades. For instance, the borders of Yugoslavia were relatively open after the
Second World War. Therefore, the number of ethnic Germans in Yugoslavia was
already quite small after the 1950s. The number of ethnic Germans in Czechoslo-
vakia was also already small towards the end of the 1960s, since large numbers of
ethnic Germans emigrated from Czechoslovakia in the 1960s (Fleischer and
Proebsting 1989). Many of them emigrated at the end of the 1960s in the years
around the ‘Prague Spring’. The figures in Table 1 show that the number of
Aussiedler from the countries which had relatively closed borders (Poland,
Romania, and the Soviet Union) was much larger in the 1970s compared to the
1960s. The Ostpolitik of the Brandt/Scheel Administration, which was inaugurated
in October 1969, improved the relationship between West Germany and the
communist countries in Central and Eastern Europe. This enabled more ethnic
Germans who lived in this area to emigrate to West Germany (Banchoff 1999;
Bucher 2000). West Germany often granted credit to Poland, Romania, and the
Soviet Union in exchange for the exit visas of ethnic Germans. Poland received, for
instance, a credit of 2.3 billion Deutschmarks for the promise that 125,000 people
of German origin were allowed to leave the country within a year (Mak 2004).

Another remarkable fact that emerges from Table 1 is that the number of

Aussiedler from the former Soviet Union is considerably larger than the estimated
number of ethnic Germans in the Soviet Union in 1950 (2.3 million versus 1.4
million). Moreover, hundreds of thousands of ethnic Germans still lived in the
former Soviet Union in the middle of the first decade of the new millennium.

8

A

Studies in Ethnicity and Nationalism: Vol. 11, No. 2, 2011

257

T

a

b

le

1

.

The

n

umber

of

A

ussiedler

b

y

country

of

origin,

1950–2005

1950–59

1960–69

1970–79

1980–89

1990–99

2000–05

Total

(former)

Soviet

Union

13,580

8,571

56,585

176,565

1,630,041

448,992

2,334,334

Poland

292,183

110,618

202,712

632,803

204,069

2,462

1,444,847

Romania

3,454

16,294

71,417

151,161

186,340

1,435

430,101

(former)

Czechoslovakia

20,361

55,733

12,775

12,727

3,437

51

105,084

(former)

Yugoslavia

57,512

21,108

6,205

3,282

2,234

37

90,378

Remaining

countries

51,132

9,192

6,172

7,549

3,055

38

77,138

Total

438,222

221,516

355,866

984,087

2,029,176

453,015

4,481,882

Sources:

Bundesambt

für

die

Anerk

ennung

ausländischer

Flüchtlinge

(2002)

and

Bundesambt

für

Mig

ration

und

Flüchtlinge

(2006).

Roel Jennissen: Ethnic Migration in Central and Eastern Europe

258

part of the natural growth of the German population in the former Soviet Union
may explain the aforementioned discrepancy. Moreover, the population able to
apply for Aussiedler status had increased because of mixed marriages. The share of
mixed marriages was very high among the German population in the Soviet Union.
According to Dietz (1995), nearly half of the married ethnic Germans lived in
mixed marriages in the Russian Federation and Kazakhstan at the end of the 1970s.
However, there are also indications that many Aussiedler who arrived after the
1980s had only weak cultural ties to the German motherland (see, e.g., Dietz
1999). Thus, economic motives probably contributed considerably to this migra-
tion flow, which is labelled ‘ethnic migration’, after the 1980s.

As is shown in Figure 3, the number of Aussiedler from the (former) Soviet

Union exceeds the number of Aussiedler from Poland since 1990. Before 1990 the
number of Aussiedler from Poland, which peaked in 1989, was by far the largest.
Figure 3 also shows a large number of Aussiedler from countries other than Poland
and the Soviet Union in 1990. About 111,000 ethnic Germans from Romania
migrated to Germany in this year after the fall of the Ceaus¸escu regime (Bunde-
sambt für die Anerkennung ausländischer Flüchtlinge 2002). This was more than
half of the total ethnic German population in Romania in 1990. Since July 1990,
Aussiedler intending to migrate to Germany had to complete a fifty-page applica-
tion form in German in their country of residence (Heinelt and Lohmann 1992,
cited in Groenendijk 1997; Thränhardt 1995, cited in Groenendijk 1997). This
might be a reason why the number of Aussiedler decreased after 1990. Since
December 1992, Aussiedler had to prove that their wish to migrate to Germany was
based on ill treatment related to the Second World War, with the exception of those

Figure 3. The number of Aussiedler (in thousands) from Poland, the
(former) Soviet Union, and other countries, 1985–2005

0

50

100

150

200

250

300

350

400

450

1985

1987

1989

1991

1993

1995

1997

1999

2001

2003

2005

Poland

(former) USSR

other countries

Sources: Bundesambt für die Anerkennung ausländischer Flüchtlinge (2002) and Bundesambt für Migration
und Flüchtlinge (2006).

Studies in Ethnicity and Nationalism: Vol. 11, No. 2, 2011

259

who live in the former Soviet Union (Groenendijk 1997).

9

This has meant in

practice that hardly any ethnic Germans from countries outside the former Soviet
Union qualified for Aussiedler status.

Kazakhstan and the Siberian part of the Russian Federation were the most

represented departure countries of Aussiedler from the former Soviet Union: in
1998, for instance, 50.4% of all Aussiedler from the former Soviet Union came
from Kazakhstan, 40.4% from the Russian Federation, 3.2% from Kyrgyzstan,
2.8% from Ukraine, 1.5% from Uzbekistan, and 1.6% from the remaining succes-
sor states of the Soviet Union (Waffenschmidt 1999). As we can see in Figure 3, the
number of Aussiedler from the former Soviet Union decreased after 1996. The
introduction of a German language test in July 1996 was an important cause of this
decrease. Furthermore, the German authorities reduced the yearly quota of Aussie-
dler from 225,000 to 100,000 in 2000 (Dietz 2002). Ethnic migration from the
former communist European and Central Asian countries to Germany is bound to
end, as people born after 1992 cannot apply for Aussiedler status (Groenendijk
1997). After 2005 there were only a few thousand Aussiedler annually (Bundesa-
mbt für Migration und Flüchlinge 2011).

IV. The Soviet Union

International migration occurred on a very modest scale in the former Soviet
Union until the end of the 1980s. However, within the Soviet Union many people
were involved in interstate migration. Labour shortages and Sovietisation politics
(accompanied by Russification) induced many Slavs to migrate to other non-Slavic
regions of the Soviet Union. Öberg and Boubnova (1993) provide a comprehensive
description of these migration flows. After the Second World War many Russians,
Ukrainians, and Belarussians migrated to the newly acquired territories in the west
of the Soviet Union (the Baltic states, Kaliningrad, and parts of Poland). Another
very large group of migrants was the group of forced migrants during the Stalin
era. Many of these migrants were involved in intrastate migration (mainly from
Western Russia to Siberia). On the other hand, many inhabitants of mainly Russia,
Ukraine, and Belarus, but also of other republics, were forced to migrate to other
states.

10

After Stalin’s death in 1953, the ‘spring period’ set in. Substantial restruc-

turing activities characterised this period. Vast amounts of resources were invested
to develop new land, mainly in Central Asia. Again many people migrated to other
states, especially from the Slavic states to Central Asia. This time migration had a
less coercive character. Most emigrants from Russia, who went to Central Asia,
were relatively higher educated labour migrants, who were attracted to the rapidly
industrialising and modernising urban areas (Lewis and Rowland 1977).

After the disintegration of the Soviet Union many Slavs were induced to return

to their homeland. Therefore, Russia, Ukraine, and Belarus experienced net
immigration from other non-Slavic former Soviet states. Figure 4 plots the trend of
migration to the Slavic former Soviet states from the non-Slavic former Soviet
states from the dissolution of the Soviet Union to 1998. This figure provides a good
indication of the volume and trend of Slavic return migration in the post-
communist era, although not all migrants are necessarily Russians, Ukrainians, or

Roel Jennissen: Ethnic Migration in Central and Eastern Europe

260

Belarussians. Hence, Figure 4 may overestimate Slavic return migration. On the
other hand, Figure 4 does not capture Slavic return migration from the autonomous
areas of the Russian Federation.

Migration from non-Slavic to Slavic former Soviet states was very large in the

1990s (see Figure 4). Many Slavs left because they were unsatisfied with the
changes in the independent non-Slavic successor states of the Soviet Union.
Furthermore, the withdrawal of troops of the former Red Army, of whom many had
a Russian, Ukrainian, or Belarussian nationality, caused this large emigration flow.
In 1994, a record number of more than 900,000 emigrants from non-Slavic former
Soviet republics entered the Russian Federation, Ukraine, and Belarus. After 1994,
migration from non-Slavic to Slavic republics decreased as the pool of Slavs who
were exposed to considerable pressure to return had shrunk.

Although return migration of Slavs reached enormous proportions after the

dissolution of the Soviet Union, it started earlier. Much south to north migration
also occurred in the Soviet Union in the 1980s. About 300,000 immigrants from
Central Asia entered Russia yearly (Goskomstat 1997). This migration was a result
of the emerging labour surpluses among the rapidly growing (due to high fertility)
Muslim population groups in the less developed southern regions and of chronic
labour shortages in low-fertility, more developed Russia. Most migrants were
probably Russian nationals (Rowland 1993). Additionally, the educational level of
the indigenous population in the south of the Soviet Union had increased signifi-
cantly in the post-war period (Lewis and Rowland 1977). According to Lewis and
Rowland, this educational expansion would reduce the need for high-skilled
Russians in the modern sector in southern regions. Thus, pressure to return may be

Figure 4. Migration (in thousands) to the Russian Federation, Ukraine, and
Belarus from non-Slavic former Soviet Republics in the 1990s

0

100

200

300

400

500

600

700

800

900

1000

1992

1993

1994

1995

1996

1997

1998

Source: United Nations (2001).

Studies in Ethnicity and Nationalism: Vol. 11, No. 2, 2011

261

not the only cause of the Slavic return migration in the former Soviet Union. The
changing supply on the labour market in both the southern (Central Asian and
Transcaucasian) and the Slavic Soviet states may also have played an important
role.

The Poles were another Slavic population group that not only had to face

interstate migration within the Soviet Union on a large scale but also international
migration because of relocations of the Soviet Union’s western border. Millions of
Poles lived in Russia when the Russian Revolution started in 1917. Although
Poland became an independent country in 1918 after World War I, many Poles
continued to live in territories that were part of the Soviet Union after independ-
ence. Similar to ethnic Germans who lived in the Soviet Union, many Poles were
deported to Kazakhstan as part of the collectivisation of agriculture in the 1930s.
At least 250,000 Poles had to make this involuntary journey. An estimated 40% of
this group did not survive the first winter in Central Asia. After the Soviet invasion
of the so-called Kresy region in eastern Poland in 1939, the Soviets also sent
hundreds of thousands of people from this region to Kazakhstan and other Asiatic
parts of the Soviet Union. However, these people were allowed to repatriate to
Poland after the war (Iglicka 1998).

The definitive relocation of Poland’s eastern and the Soviet Union’s western

border after World War II (see Figure 5) was an incentive for 2.2 million Poles to
leave those parts of Poland that became part of the Soviet Union and to settle
themselves west of the Curzon line

11

(Alexander 2003). On the other hand,

hundreds of thousands ethnic Ukrainians, Belarussians, and Lithuanians moved in
the opposite direction (Praz˙mowska 2004). Officially 1.3 million Poles stayed in
the Kresy region after the war (Eberhardt 2006). Moreover, probably some hun-
dreds of thousands of ethnic Poles lived in other parts of the Soviet Union at the
end of the 1940s. In the period 1955–1959, about 250,000 ethnic Poles migrated
from the Soviet Union to their motherland (Korys´ 2003). The official number of
Poles in the Soviet Union in 1989 was still 1.1 million (Korcelli 1992). However,
this might be an underestimation, as many Poles did not register their true ethnicity
in their official documentation (see, e.g., Iglicka 1998). After the fall of commu-
nism, thousands of ethnic Poles repatriated from successor states of the Soviet
Union to Poland (see, e.g., Leven 2008).

V. A Tentative Look into the Future Based on Future

Economic Developments

There are many indications that economic developments have an impact on
migration flows (see, e.g., Hatton and Williamson 2003; Martin, Martin, and Cross
2007; Vogler and Rotte 2000). Both welfare differences between a potential
receiving and a potential sending country and the situation in the labour market in
receiving countries may influence migration flows. The theoretical underpinning
of the impact of welfare differences is based on neo-classical and Keynesian
economic theory while the theoretical underpinning of the impact of the latter is
based on the dual labour market theory (Massey et al. 1993). This theory argues
that the demand for (unskilled) labour in receiving countries often determines the

Roel Jennissen: Ethnic Migration in Central and Eastern Europe

262

entry requirements of these countries. In times of labour shortages, receiving
countries may lower their entry criteria, which enables more potential immigrants
to enter these countries, while in times of large unemployment the opposite may
occur. The aforementioned theories are mostly used to explain labour migration
flows. However, migration driven by other motives may also be partly determined
by economic factors (Jennissen 2003). Two figures will be presented to illustrate
the impact of the two aforementioned economic developments (trends in welfare
differences between the receiving and sending country and unemployment in the
receiving country) on ethnic migration in Central and Eastern Europe in this
section. Figure 6 shows the trends of Russian migration from Latvia to the Russian
Federation

12

and the difference in GDP per capita between the Russian Federation

and Latvia

13

in the 1990s.

Figure 6 illustrates that the difference in real GDP per capita and ethnic migra-

tion from Latvia to the Russian Federation have a common pattern in the 1990s.
Not surprisingly, welfare differences appear to be the most important economic
determinants of this ethnic international migration flow, which is insensitive to
immigration policies. On the other hand, ethnic migration flows may be largely
affected by immigration policies. The equilibrium recovering function of interna-
tional migration, which removes, according to neo-classical economic thinking,

Figure 5. The relocation of Poland’s borders after World War II

Studies in Ethnicity and Nationalism: Vol. 11, No. 2, 2011

263

differences in real wages, does not exist for migration flows that are sensitive to
immigration policies. Here, the argument is made that unemployment in the
receiving country is the most important determinant of international migration
flows that are sensitive to immigration policies. An example of an ethnic migration
flow that is sensitive to immigration policies is presented in Figure 7. This Figure
plots the trends of Aussiedler from Romania

14

and unemployment in Germany

15

in

the 1990s.

Figure 7 shows that the unemployment level in Germany has probably a nega-

tive impact on ethnic migration to Germany. This is an indication that the assumed
negative relation between unemployment in a receiving country and ethnic migra-
tion that is sensitive to immigration policies actually exists.

The deliberate statements about future developments of ethnic migration in

Central and Eastern Europe, which are formulated below, are for a large part based
on expectations about future economic developments. Ethnic migration from
Eastern to Western Europe in the post-communist era has consisted for the
overwhelming part of ethnic Germans who have migrated to Germany. As men-
tioned above, this ethnic migration flow is bound to end in the near future.
However, this does not mean that ethnic migration from Eastern to Western Europe
will completely disappear from the scene at that point in time. The enlargement of
the European Union (EU) in 2004 will probably have moved the border between
prosperous and less prosperous Europe further to the east with the lapse of time, if
the (economic) integration of the new former communist member states is suc-
cessful. This implies that ethnic migration from Romania,

16

Ukraine, and Serbia to

Hungary and ethnic migration from Belarus, Ukraine, and Kazakhstan to Poland
will become comparable to what we currently call ethnic migration from Eastern

Figure 6. Migration from Latvia to the Russian Federation (divided by the
midyear Russian population in Latvia) and the difference in GDP per
capita between the Russian Federation and Latvia

0

5

10

15

20

25

30

35

1991

1992

1993

1994

1995

1996

1997

1998

1999

(mi

g

ran

ts / p

o

p

u

latio

n) x 1000

-2500

-2000

-1500

-1000

-500

0

500

1000

1990 in

terna

tio

n

al $

migration

GDP Russia - GDP Latvia

Roel Jennissen: Ethnic Migration in Central and Eastern Europe

264

to Western Europe. Of course, some differences will still exist; the most significant
one is that, unlike Germany, Hungary and Poland did not bind themselves to
guarantee immigration and citizenship rights to ethnic Hungarians and Poles who
live in other Central and Eastern European states (Brubaker 1998). However, this
situation has been subject to change. For instance, from 2011 ethnic Hungarians
who live permanently in another country than Hungary may apply for a Hungarian
passport through a simplified procedure (Szymanowska and Groszkowski 2011).

Migration from non-Slavic to Slavic former Soviet states was very large in

the 1990s. Many Slavs left because they were unsatisfied with the changes in the
independent non-Slavic successor states of the Soviet Union. Nevertheless, the
size of the Slavic population in non-Slavic former Soviet states is still very large,
despite much return migration. About 6.5 million ethnic Russians, for instance,
still lived in Central Asia in 1999 (Zhalimbetova and Gleason 2001). The number
of Russians, Ukrainians, and Belarussians in the Baltic states was about 1.5
million at the beginning of the twenty-first century (Euromosaic 2004). Develop-
ments in the non-Slavic republics will have a large impact on the extent of future
return migration to Russia, Ukraine, and Belarus. The Transcaucasian and Central
Asian republics and Moldova are politically unstable. Moreover, some autono-
mous regions in the Russian Federation (e.g., Chechnya) are politically very
unstable as well. Explosions of (ethnic) violence in these states and autonomous
regions, which are difficult to predict, may lead to large Slavic return flows in the
former Soviet Union. Economic developments in both Slavic and non-Slavic
former Soviet states may also influence this return migration. Slavic return migra-
tion from the Baltic states will decrease further, in view of the expectation that the

Figure 7. Migration of ethnic Germans from Romania (divided by the
midyear ethnic German population in Romania) and unemployment in
Germany

0

50

100

150

200

250

1991

1992

1993

1994

1995

1996

1997

1998

1999

(mi

g

ran

ts / p

o

p

u

latio

n) x 1000

0.0

2.0

4.0

6.0

8.0

10.0

12.0

per

centage

migration

unemployment in Germany

Studies in Ethnicity and Nationalism: Vol. 11, No. 2, 2011

265

EU membership of these states will have a positive effect on their economic
development and political stability.

VI. Conclusions

The aim of this article was to describe the historical background of international
ethnic migration in Central and Eastern Europe. The rise and fall of the Habsburg
Empire in Central Europe and the Ottoman Empire in Southeastern Europe was the
underlying cause of many ethnic migration flows in Central and Eastern Europe in
the post-communist era. Moreover, the German Ostkolonisation, border changes
after the two World Wars, and interstate migration in the former Soviet Union
caused a large pool of potential ethnic migrants. In addition, this article discussed
future developments of ethnic migration in Europe based largely on expectations
about future economic developments. Ethnic migration from the countries in
Europe with a communist past to Western Europe will probably end in the near
future, simply because the pool of potential ethnic migrants has become very small.
The border between prosperous and less prosperous Europe probably moves in
gradual stages further to the east with the lapse of time because of the phased and
selective enlargement of the EU. This may cause new cases of large-scale ethnic
migration, which are partly triggered by welfare differences between the sending
and the receiving area. Future ethnic migration for instance from Transylvania and
Vojvodina to Hungary may be comparable to ethnic migration to Germany in the
1990s with regard to the determination of the potential ethnic migrants to move to
the motherland. In all likelihood economic developments will also have an impact
on ethnic migration in the former Soviet Union; however, ethnic migration in this
area is hard to predict as it may be highly influenced by explosions of (ethnic)
violence in the politically unstable regions of the former Soviet Union.

Notes

1

Most Central and Eastern European countries experienced low net emigration in the

period 1960–1988, albeit with some exceptions: East Germany, for instance, experienced
mass emigration before the construction of the Berlin Wall (1961); many Czechoslovakians
left their country in the years around the Prague Spring (1967–1968); and many Poles
migrated from their country at the beginning of the 1980s. The only communist country that
experienced considerable labour emigration was Yugoslavia. Yugoslavia did not maintain
the communist ‘rule’ of full employment. In response to unemployment, the Yugoslav
authorities allowed Yugoslav workers to work abroad.

2

The territory of the former Yugoslavian Republic of Macedonia was part of Serbia at the

start of the First World War.

3

In addition to voluntary conversion to Islam, forced conversion also existed. However,

forced conversion was not the typical way inhabitants of the Ottoman Empire were adopted
to Islam (Sarieva 1995).

4

The presence of ethnic Germans in Romania (Transylvania) has a long history. The first

German settlers (Siebenbürger Sachsen), who were invited by the Hungarian king Geysa II
to protect the borders against Mongol and Tartar incursions and to cultivate the land, arrived
as early as the twelfth century (Gabanyi 2000).

Roel Jennissen: Ethnic Migration in Central and Eastern Europe

266

5

We have to keep in mind that although these areas were officially German at that time, the

German population in these areas often constituted only a minority.

6

The contemporary border between the reunified Germany and Poland.

7

Inhabitants of the German Democratic Republic who migrated to the Federal Republic of

Germany were called Übersiedler.

8

For instance, in 2006 about 480,000 ethnic Germans lived in the Russian Federation

(author’s estimation based on the Russian census of 2002, the number of Aussiedler from
the Russian Federation, and the natural population growth in Russia) and about 200
thousand ethnic Germans lived in Kazakhstan (Auswärtiges Amt 2007).

9

Ethnic Germans who migrated to Germany after 1992 are called Spätaussiedler.

10

See Polian (2004) for an overview of forced migrations in the Soviet Union during the

Stalin era.

11

The Curzon line was a proposed demarcation line between Poland and the Soviet Union

during the Polish-Soviet War (1919–1921). In 1945, the Allied leaders agreed that the
Curzon line should be used to determine the eastern border between Poland and the Soviet
Union at the Yalta Conference. The current eastern border of Poland follows the Curzon line
with minor modifications.

12

Source for 1991–1998: United Nations (2001); for 1999 and 2000: Council of Europe

(2000; 2001). I used the immigration tables of the Russian Federation. The number of
migrants is divided by the mid-year Russian population in Latvia (Central Statistical Bureau
of Latvia 2001). Only the number of Russians in Latvia in the beginning of 2000 was
available. The data 1991–1999 have been estimated with the natural increase of Russians in
Latvia (Central Statistical Bureau of Latvia 2001) and emigration from Latvia to the
Russian Federation. The natural increase of Russians in Latvia has been estimated as
‘natural increase of the total population of Latvia’ multiplied by (‘natural increase of
Russians in Latvia in 1995’ divided by ‘natural increase of the total population of Latvia in
1995’) for the years before 1995.

13

Source: Maddison (2001). The difference in GDP per capita is expressed in 1990

international dollars. The data for 1999 have been estimated as the data for 1998 times the
quotient of GDP per capita expressed in constant national currencies (International Mon-
etary Fund 2000) in 1999 and 1998.

14

Source for 1991–1996: Mammey and Schiener (1998); for 1997–1999: Bundesambt für

die Anerkennung ausländischer Flüchtlinge (2002). The number of migrants is divided by
the mid-year ethnic German population in Romania (Romanian National Commission for
Statistics 1992, cited in Mures¸an and Rotariu 2000). Only the number of ethnic Germans in
Romania in the beginning of 1992 was available. Data for the other years have been
estimated with the natural increase in Romania (Council of Europe 2001) and emigration of
ethnic Germans to Germany. The assumption has been made that the natural rate of
population growth for ethnic Germans was the same as for the total Romanian population.

15

Source: Gärtner (2000).

16

In the period between Hungary’s and Romania’s successful economic integration in the

EU.

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