Feminist Theory in Science: Working
Toward a Practical Transformation
DEBOLEENA ROY
Although a rich tradition of feminist critiques of science exists, it is often difficult for
feminists who are scientists to bridge these critiques with practical transformations
in scientifi c knowledge production. In this paper, I go beyond the general bases of
feminist critiques of science by using feminist theory in science to illustrate how a
practical transformation in methodology can change molecular biology based research
in the reproductive sciences.
Reflection
Having recently completed my Ph.D. in reproductive neuroendocrinology, I
have experienced first-hand the difficulties in keeping the words  feminist and
 scientist side by side. I spent my graduate years in a lab, working on a bench,
using the principles and techniques of molecular biology to create scientific
knowledge. My goal, however, was to become a feminist scientist. More easily
said than done. In the process of developing a career as a scientist trying to
be a feminist, I managed to create another career path for myself in a parallel
universe as a feminist trying to be a scientist. Following the completion of my
degree, I left the lab bench and have since found a new home in a Women s
Studies department as the resident feminist scientist. It s all very confusing
and exciting. But before the lab smells of LB broth and TEMED fade from my
memory, I think that sharing my experience will be useful for feminist scientists,
students, and others.
In my undergraduate years as a microbiology major, the biggest problem I
faced was the resistance on the part of my professors to make room for a femi-
nist perspective in the classroom. The underlying sentiment was that feminist
Hypatia vol. 19, no. 1 (Winter 2004) © by Deboleena Roy
256 Hypatia
thought and science were completely different areas of scholarship that would
not and should not ever meet. I used to joke about it, but now I think it was no
coincidence that the Women s Studies and the Medical Sciences departments
at my university were as far away from each other on campus as was physically
possible. I actually had one professor in a fourth-year Human Diseases course
tell me that if I wanted to spend class time talking about women s health issues,
I had better go to the  Female Studies department.
When I gathered the courage to continue studying biology at the graduate
level, the predicament I found myself in was very common among other femi-
nists who enter scientific fields. As is often the case,  in an effort to create a
successful career in science, unfortunately many scholars either leave their views
at the lab door or after years of struggling to find a place within the patricentric
ivory tower, they cannot sustain their critical feminist perspective (Christian-
sen-Ruffman 1993, 19). In my undergraduate years, at least I had the nerve to
raise my hand in class and push some buttons by trying to include a feminist
perspective in our class discussions. This was not so easy to do at the graduate
level as an increasing number of barriers appeared before me. As a graduate
student in the sciences, I quickly learned that  radical and  nonscientific ideas
would not be tolerated and that intellectual conformity seemed to be the key
to success. Feminists have repeatedly emphasized the need for more feminists
to become scientists and for women to keep informed of the technologies that
shape our lives (Hubbard 1995; Franklin 1990; Benston 1982). In my opinion,
the issue is not simply about feminists learning more about technology or more
feminists becoming scientists. In order for feminists to thrive in science and
develop careers in science they need immediate role models and supportive
mentors who are not afraid of including feminist thought in the creation of
scientific knowledge. In addition, they need to receive a science education that
is not based on the use of sexist, classist, and racist paradigms. I was encouraged
to pursue a doctoral degree in reproductive science by many feminists outside
of science whom I respected and admired, but the truth is the more I tried to
become a scientist, the harder it became for me to apply feminist critiques of
science to my daily practice.
As difficult as it all seemed, I realized that in order to do a Ph.D. in reproduc-
tive biology and use molecular biology techniques, it was no longer sufficient
for me to simply engage in feminist critiques of science. I needed to formulate
a concrete feminist model of scientific inquiry that spoke directly to my experi-
ences. I didn t have a name for it then, but what I was in pursuit of was feminist
theory in science. This emerging field of scholarship bridges feminist critiques of
science with practical transformations of science and is being developed mostly
by feminist scientists. With their first-hand experience, they have brought new
insights into how feminist approaches can influence the creation of scientific
knowledge. In the second year of my Ph.D. studies, when I was really starting
Deboleena Roy 257
to grapple with the defi nition of feminist scientist, I had two life-changing
experiences. The fi rst was that I picked up a book called the The Real World
of Technology (1990) written by experimental physicist Dr. Ursula Franklin.
When I realized that she was Professor Emeritus at my own university, I decided
I needed to speak to her. Perhaps she had already worked out a model for femi-
nist science in physics. I was looking for a recipe from her that I could tweak
for the biological sciences. When I posed my question to her, Dr. Franklin was
both brilliant and vague. She gave me one clue and told me that the rest would
come. That clue was an essay written by Margaret Benston called  Feminism
and the Critique of Scientific Method (1982).
In this essay, Benston was working toward a different science by formulating
her questions of scientific inquiry within a context of community (Christian-
sen-Ruffman 1993). Benston felt that what was needed in a new science was a
sense of the limits of appropriateness of reductionism, a consideration of the
connections between the knower and the known, and an understanding of
appropriate levels of discourse (Benston 1982, 64). After reading Benston s work
on developing a new science, I realized that in order to take my first steps toward
a feminist science, I would have to formulate my own questions of scientific
inquiry in a context relevant to me. And just as I was about to sail out into this
uncharted territory, the second life-changing event occurred.
I remember it so clearly. I had just spent twelve frustrating hours working
in the lab and fi nally decided to head home. On my way home, I was telling
myself that I was foolish to think that I could pull off this degree and lead this
secret life as a feminist spy, when there it was. Shining under the front window
display lights of the Women s Bookstore, I saw before me a reason to go on. It
was a copy of Bonnie Spanier s Im/partial Science (1995). I think I stood frozen
in front of that window wondering if my eyes were playing tricks on me. For
before me was the most obscure but relevant subtitle that I had ever read: Gender
Ideology in Molecular Biology. Although I am not mentioned in the dedication,
I am convinced that this book was written with me in mind. Now I not only
had a vision of formulating my own questions of scientific inquiry in a context
that was relevant to me but I also had a feminist framework in molecular biol-
ogy to follow.
Feminist Theory in Science: Where Can It Take Us?
Feminist critiques of science have focused on the ideologies, politics, epistemolo-
gies, economics, and metaphysics of traditional science and brought our atten-
tion to biases based on sex, race, class, sexual orientation, and other arbitrary
categories (Fausto-Sterling 1985; Tuana 1989; Martin 1987). Although a rich
tradition of feminist critiques of science exists for feminists who are scientists
working within scientific establishments, it is difficult to bridge the ideas of
258 Hypatia
these critiques with practical transformations in scientific knowledge produc-
tion. For example, how should a feminist scientist conduct experiments? The
actual transformations based on feminist critiques of science are left up to the
individual scientist.
In this paper, I go beyond the general bases of feminist critiques of sci-
ence. I will attempt to extend these critiques by drawing upon an emerging
field of scholarship referred to as feminist theory in science (Rosser 1989). I will
use feminist theory in science to illustrate how a practical transformation in
methodology can change scientific knowledge production. More specifically, I
will demonstrate how a feminist model of inquiry can change how we conduct
molecular biology research in the reproductive sciences. My work is based on
a feminist approach of inquiry proposed by Sandra Harding (1987) and later
described in the context of molecular biology research by Spanier (1995).
This model of feminist inquiry has some similarities to, but is also distinct
from, the model of inquiry traditionally used in science. In the lab and in the
classroom, young scientists are taught how to produce and report scientific
knowledge in a powerfully uniform way. This is one of the great strengths
of modern Western science. As early as grade six, I recall being taught that
scientists use Scientific Method with a capital  S and a capital  M as both
their guide for and their means of knowledge production. The framework of
Scientific Method consists of the hypothesis, materials and methods, results,
and discussion. This framework may seem very simplistic, but its power lies in its
simplicity. Those of us who know better realize that the production of scientific
knowledge cannot occur within the confines of these four components. Yet I do
not recall a single instance throughout my undergraduate or graduate science
training where a professor pulled me aside and told me that there was more
to Scientific Method than these four components. In fact, it is not likely that
most feminists starting their careers as scientists would be exposed to critiques
or in-depth analyses of the Scientific Method. They would have been taught,
as I was, that the scientist begins her journey by formulating a Hypothesis. In
order to prove or disprove this hypothesis, the scientist outlines an experimental
plan and calls this materials and methods. She then conducts experiments and
records the data. These are her results. Once the data has been collected, the
results are then placed into a discussion where supporting theories and para-
digms are used to bring relevance to her findings. According to the Scientific
Method, scientists must report their findings and discuss their work using these
four strict headings and most of the time in a specific order.
In the lab and classroom, scientific epistemology, scientific methodology, and
scientific method are all conflated into one entity and given the name Scientific
Method. The feminist scientist must therefore learn to take a step back from
this monolith called Scientific Method and appreciate the distinction between
epistemology, methodology, and method. To make this distinction, I would like
Deboleena Roy 259
to turn to some of the discussions that have evolved out of the  method debates
among feminist social scientists in the late 1980s as they raised issues very simi-
lar to those raised in the biological sciences. In these discussions, epistemology
is described as a theory of knowledge, methodology as the broad theoretical
basis that informs and shapes the character of various methods, and method
as a technique for gathering evidence or conducting research (Harding 1987;
Eichler 1997). Upon learning these distinctions, it becomes possible to imagine
how feminist epistemologies and feminist methodologies could be used to create
scientific knowledge. The problem arises for the feminist scientist in trying to
understand what a feminist method in science would look like.
Therefore, before I go any further, I would like to address the  feminist
method in science question. When it is said that feminist theory in science
will lead to practical transformations, what exactly do we mean? We can think
in terms of curriculum changes, integrating feminist perspectives into science
education, and continued sexist-paradigm busting. But can practical transfor-
mations of science occur, both at the metaphysical levels of epistemological
and methodological changes, and at the more mundane level of method? Can
feminist theory in science be used to create a feminist method in science? And
is this the same question as whether feminist theory in science can influence
how we  practice or  do science in the lab? Others before me have addressed
the feminist method in science question and come up with various answers. I
would like to address the issue of a feminist method in science and contribute
to this debate from the other side as a scientist, and up until recently, as a lab-
dweller.
However, I must make a comment before I proceed. I believe that when
asking the feminist method in science question, one must have already pre-
supposed the existence of a feminist science in the epistemological and meth-
odological senses and must also be careful not to equate the meaning of the
feminist method question with either of these.
In her essay  Can There Be a Feminist Science? Helen Longino argues for a
process-based approach and rejects a content-based approach to characterizing
feminist science. In her contribution to the method debates, Longino states,
 I want to suggest that we focus on science as practice rather than content, as
process rather than product; hence, not on feminist science, but on doing science
as a feminist ( 1989, 47). Her rejection of a content-based approach is based on
the idea that theories of feminist science conflate  feminist with  feminine.
She argues that such theories  encode a particular world view, characterized
by complexity, interaction and wholism, thus portraying feminist science as
 the expression and valorization of female sensitivity and cognitive tempera-
ment (1989, 46). She also claims that feminist science cannot emerge from a
 feminist standpoint, which she considers to be an essentialist notion. After
having made this distinction between a content-based  feminist science and a
260 Hypatia
process-based  doing science as a feminist, Longino arrives at the main point
of her argument. She poses the question:  [C]an there be a feminist science?
If this means: is it in principle possible to do science as a feminist?, the answer
must be: yes. If this means: can we in practice do science as a feminist?, the
answer must be: not until we change the social and political context in which
science is done (Longino 1989, 56).
These statements raise two issues for me as a feminist scientist. First of all,
what exactly does she mean when she says  to do science as a feminist? Does
this  do imply method? And if it does, does this mean that until one defines a
feminist method in science they cannot, in principle,  do science as a feminist?
Secondly, must this change that she speaks of occur at the level of the institu-
tion, or can the individual scientist act as an agent of change and bring a social
and political context into the science that they  do ?
In feminist critiques of science, terms such as  do and  practice are com-
monly used to describe the process of scientific knowledge production. They flow
freely among the different levels of epistemology, methodology, and method.
However, as a scientist I find it confusing when these words are used while the
level of the process to which they are meant to refer is not clearly defi ned. In
her essay, Longino also writes:  The doing of science involves many practices:
how one structures a laboratory (hierarchically or collectively), how one relates
to other scientists (competitively or cooperatively), how and whether one
engages in political struggles over affi rmative action. It extends also to intel-
lectual practices, to the activities of scientific inquiry, such as observation and
reasoning (Longino 1989, 47). It appears that the feminist  doing of science
and the  practices to which she refers here lie at the levels of epistemology and
methodology, but not method. Yet earlier in her essay, she dismisses theories of
feminist science, which presumably include feminist epistemology and meth-
odology, on the grounds that they are content-based. In an attempt to support
her process-based approach, Longino thus reconfigures the question Can there
be a feminist science? into Is it possible, in principle and in practice, to do science as
a feminist? In this way, her choice of terminology both includes and masks the
feminist method in science question. To  do science would seem to involve
the technical aspects of conducting scientific research belonging to the level
of method, such as conducting experiments and gathering evidence. However,
Longino neglects to address the relationship between  doing and scientific
knowledge production at this very level. Longino s process-based approach fails
to make a clear distinction between the different levels of scientific knowledge
production on which the  doing of science can occur.
Harding has dealt with the question of developing a feminist method for
the social sciences and biology, and suggests that the effort  is misguided and
furthermore should be abandoned (1989, 17). She is right. She argues against
a distinctive feminist method of research in the social sciences and biology and
Deboleena Roy 261
suggests that what distinguishes what feminist researchers  do from what non-
feminist researchers  do involves analyzing gender critically, taking women s
experiences into account and including them as valid scientific evidence, and
identifying the complex subjectivities in ourselves and what we observe.  Do
in this sense refers to the doing of research at the levels of epistemology and
methodology. So, is there a feminist method in science? I would have to agree
that the answer is no. Speaking from the perspective of a biologist, method has
a very specific meaning. It refers to lab work the nuts and bolts of experimenta-
tion. Now, if one was to ask whether there is a feminist way of  doing science,
the answer is yes and no. There is not a feminist way to pipette, centrifuge, or
run a statistical test. However, one can still be  doing feminist science if the
reason for pipetting, centrifuging, and running a statistical analysis originates
from a feminist epistemological and methodological basis.
For the feminist scientist, then, feminism can exist as an epistemology and
as a methodology, but not as a method. But for the benefit of the feminist
scientist, I have one further piece of advice. In the end, it does come down
to the method question and you must be armed with the correct answer in
order to explain yourself and what you do to both the scientists who are not
feminists and the feminists who are not scientists. Inasmuch as feminism can
exist as an epistemology and methodology in science, for the feminist scientist
the science that you do can exist only as a method. This method is not to be
confused with the capital  M Method. When you are practicing science as a
feminist, you are not engaging in science as a methodology or epistemology. So
after learning that the Method in Scientific Method really includes scientific
epistemology, methodology, and method, you have to stop doing what you did
not realize you were doing and start thinking of science as a method only, not
also as a methodology or an epistemology.
Let me return to an earlier question: Can feminist theory in science be used
to create a feminist method in science? Since there can be no feminist method
in science, the question no longer carries meaning. However, now we can
appreciate that this question is not the same as, can feminist theory in science
influence how we  practice or  do science in the lab? This question begs to
be rephrased. We must now ask, can feminist theory in science influence the
production of scientific knowledge at the level of epistemology and methodol-
ogy? The answer should be a resounding  Yes! But now let me consider the
caveat presented by Longino when she comments on whether or not there can
be a feminist science. She says that  if this question means can we in practice
do science as feminists?, the answer must be not until we change the social and
political context in which science is done (1989, 56). She also states:  Doing
science differently requires more than just the will to do so and it would be
disingenuous to pretend that our philosophies of science are the only barrier.
Scientific inquiry takes place in a social, political and economic context which
262 Hypatia
imposes a variety of institutional obstacles to innovation, let alone to the intel-
lectual working out of oppositional and political commitments (55).
It is true that scientific inquiry does not occur in isolation and that a scien-
tist, his or her supervisor, department, institution, and governmental granting
agency all have a great deal of influence over the scientific enterprise. But does
this mean that although we can now see that feminist theory in science may
be used to create a feminist science whose knowledge would be based on femi-
nist epistemology and methodology, we can not proceed any further until the
social and political context in which the science is  done changes? This raises
several issues. Is science  done by the individual scientist working in a lab, or
is it  done by the supervisor, the department, the institution, or the granting
agency that provides the funds? If the answer is that science is done by all of
the above, then whose social and political context has to be changed? The
individual scientist s context? The scientific institution s context? Everybody s
context? The real question is, is it all or nothing? Or can an individual try to do
feminist science even if the social and political context of the institution(s) in
which it is done is not completely changed to reflect a feminist vision?
For the scientist working away at her lab bench who also considers herself a
feminist, how I address this last question will determine the status of her cur-
rent existence. I think the answer is obvious. One has to try. The individual
has to try to do feminist science even if her context and the context of the
institution in which she works do not resonate with each other. This is where
feminist theory in science comes in, by bridging feminist critiques of science
with practical transformations of science. If we want the feminist scientist to
thrive, the least that feminist theory in science can do is to try to provide her
with concrete strategies on how to  do feminist science. This sets the stage for
my own attempt at realizing the potential of feminist theory in science.
Practical Transformation: Conducting Molecular
Biology Research in the Reproductive Sciences
For the feminist scientist, feminism may not be able to exist as a method, but
it can and does exist as a methodology and an epistemology. So how do we use
feminist methodology and epistemology for the production of scientific knowl-
edge? The answer to this question is not so simple. There appear to be several
different and sometimes contradictory ideas as to how feminist ethical theory
in science application would evolve. But the common element among these
different ideas is the pursuit of a science that recognizes the needs of, and treats
with respect, those who are oppressed and whose voices either cannot be heard
or cannot be understood (Birke 1994; Messing and Mergler 1995).
In my attempt to put feminist theory in science into practice, I have replaced
Scientific Method s methodology with a feminist methodology. For the femi-
Deboleena Roy 263
nist scientists out there this means that I want to stop thinking in terms of
hypothesis, materials and methods, results and discussion. As an alternative
methodology, I want to use a model of feminist inquiry proposed by Harding
(1987) for the social sciences. Spanier has taken up this model and applied it
to her research revealing the sexist paradigms used in molecular biology. The
components of this methodology include (i) locating the Origins of Problemat-
ics; (ii) uncovering the Purposes of Inquiry; (iii) interpreting the Hypothesis and
Evidence; and (iv) establishing a Relationship between the Inquirer and her/his
Subject of Inquiry (Spanier 1995, 41). I must point out that this is not the only
feminist model of inquiry available but I think that by using the framework
of this model I can illustrate realistically both the promises and perils of put-
ting feminist theory in science into practice. In order to demonstrate how this
feminist methodology can be used to change molecular biology-based research
in the reproductive sciences, I will use examples from current research in the
field as well as from my own Ph.D. work.
Origins of Problematics
Scientific Method does not recognize any events prior to the derivation of the
Hypothesis. This omission is purposeful. In order to obey the doctrine of  objec-
tivity in the Scientific Method, any form of influence, whether personal or
environmental, must be removed from the mind of the scientist.  Scientists, and
the information they collect are treated as though they are culture-free, class-
less, apolitical; as though the scientist s attempts at objectivity were routinely
successful (Namenwirth 1986, 34). Feminists argue that no scientific evidence
or interpretation is without influence by cultural and social biases (Hubbard
1989; Haraway 1986; Lewontin 1991; Fox Keller 1996). Envisioning scientific
knowledge that is valid despite this recognition is key in order for feminist
theory in science to be able to change how it is that we practice science.
The fi rst component of feminist inquiry, which asks where the idea of the
research to be conducted originates and what it is influenced by, is referred to
as the Origins of Problematics:
Ideally, feminist research originates in the material and political
concerns of women-centered efforts to improve the quality of life
for women, children and hence, the planet. [I would note that
improving the quality of life for men should not be excluded].
Women s concerns about what is wrong with society, such as vio-
lence, poverty, sexual abuse, and the misuse of power over people
and resources, are placed at the center of a feminist approach,
in contrast to conventional scientific motivations, such as the
accrual of knowledge for its own sake, the advancement of capi-
264 Hypatia
talism, or personal ambition. Explicitly stated feminist values
may reorder funding priorities for research, question metaphors
chosen and promoted for biological life, and re-vision who should
be recruited in to the profession (Spanier 1995, 41).
Therefore, in this feminist model of inquiry, in starting with the Origins of
Problematics, a scientist is forced to think not only about her hypothesis but
about what factors have influenced her to arrive at this particular hypothesis.
The factors that influence a scientist, in turn, depend on who they are. An
example of how the Origins of Problematics would change how and what
molecular biology-based research is conducted in reproductive science can be
demonstrated using the technology of embryonic genetic screening.
Once we recognize that scientists bring with them certain biases based on
their gender, race, and class, we must then acknowledge that the direction of
research in reproductive biology in North America largely depends on the
gender, race, and class perspectives of white, middle-to-upper-class men. The
predominance of white upper-class male doctors and scientists participating in
reproductive biology research over the last century has been associated with
increased medical intervention in the processes of pregnancy and female repro-
ductive health care (Corea 1986; Ehrenreich and English 1978). Societies, and
the scientists within these societies, have repeatedly used science to rational-
ize, justify, and naturalize dominant ideologies and to maintain the status quo
(Namenwirth 1986). In this way, research in reproductive biology has been used
by the institutions of science and medicine to justify the misuse of power over
women, regardless of their race and class, in the name of their  well-being.
Turning to the example of embryonic genetic screening, we must ask why
this molecular biology based technology has been granted such prominence. In
embryonic genetic screening, cells from a developing embryo are isolated from
maternal peripheral blood. The DNA in the nuclei of these cells is extracted
and analyzed for certain genes thought to be associated with diseases (see Steele
et al. 1996). What dominant ideologies are being rationalized in this research?
The promise of perfection and  well-being is now offered through techniques
such as genetic screening of embryos for people who can afford to pay for  per-
fect babies. In these cases, genetic screening would select against a fetus with
anything that is perceived as a physical or mental disability. What value does
that place on the lives of people who live with these challenges in our society
today? Who has the power and desire to formulate a hypothesis that leads to
more research on embryonic genetic screening?
As a Ph.D. student, the director of my department was an upper-class white
male. His (sub)?/conscious Origins of Problematics intimately influenced what
type of research was funded in our department, which scientists got to practice
that research, and ultimately, how women received reproductive health care.
Deboleena Roy 265
This observation is not made to suggest, however, that simply replacing male
scientists with female scientists would rectify the existing problem within
reproductive biology research. Feminist epistemologies must replace the exist-
ing epistemologies, and this can be done by either women or men. Before the
embryonic genetic screening experiments begin we have to ask, Why do we want
to screen genes? The intentions and motives of the scientist should be made
known. This process can begin when scientists start their scientific inquiry by
locating the Origins of Problematics in their research.
As I was doing my Ph.D. research and thesis writing, I faced the daily chal-
lenge of practicing feminist science. Had I not been aware of Spanier s work
and Harding s model of feminist inquiry, I know that I would not have been
able to finish my degree. Now, having completed my Ph.D., I thought it would
be interesting and only fair that I put my own research on the spot. In this
paper I claim to provide a practical transformation of how experiments can be
conducted in reproductive biology research, but can I show to both feminists
and scientists that my own research counts as feminist science?
My Ph.D. thesis examined the effect of a hormone called melatonin on
reproduction at the level of Gonadotropin-releasing hormone (GnRH) neurons
of the brain. Melatonin is a hormone that is naturally synthesized in humans
and other animals at nighttime by the pineal gland, which is located at the base
of the brain. Melatonin is best known for its regulation of circadian rhythmic-
ity, but has also been shown to have antioxidant properties and to play a role
in the reproductive control of seasonally breeding animals (Arendt 1995). In
humans, the sleep cycle effects of this hormone are better understood, but there
is also a great deal of interest in melatonin s possible role in the regulation of
reproduction. Clinical trials indicate that at high doses (levels that the body
would not normally encounter), melatonin can be used as a contraceptive
in women (Voordouw et al. 1992). GnRH, on the other hand, is a hormone
produced by less than 1000 neurons in the hypothalamus of all mammals and
which is known to play a crucial role in reproduction by regulating the levels
of other gonadal hormones such as estrogen and testosterone in both women
and men (Yen 1991). The neurons that produce GnRH are referred to as the
GnRH neurons. My research involved trying to connect melatonin s role in
reproduction with GnRH neurons of the hypothalamus. The real question,
however, is whether or not my research qualifies as feminist science. It is time
to put my own work to the test. A good place to start would be to locate the
Origin of Problematics in my research.
(i) Did my thesis originate in the material and political concerns of women-cen-
tered efforts to improve the quality of life for those who are oppressed?
It is possible that research on melatonin may help to improve the quality of
life for both women and men by addressing material health concerns involv-
ing sleep disorders and cancer prevention. But from a point of view of holistic
266 Hypatia
medicine, administration of melatonin would only help to treat symptoms. The
preferable option would be to create a healthy environment in which stress and
environmental toxins leading to these disorders and diseases would be removed.
But many would argue that the reality of that kind of healthy environment is
unattainable at present. So in the meantime, there are those who would wish
to treat their symptoms with the most nonintrusive, naturally based remedy as
possible. Melatonin-mediated therapy for sleep disorders and cancer treatments
may therefore represent a preferable alternative to other chemotherapies.
The material concern of women with regards to the access of melatonin
for oral contraception is more complicated. For those who wish to use oral
contraceptives, melatonin may be viewed as a possible  natural contraceptive,
but no more natural than estrogen and progesterone-based contraceptives. As
it stands, very little is understood regarding the totality of effects of melatonin
on reproduction. My thesis was based on a concern to better understand the
broader effects of melatonin on reproduction, apart from its ability to block
ovulation in women. By examining the neuroendocrinological effects of mela-
tonin, I demonstrated that melatonin may have farther-reaching systemic anti-
gonadotropic effects (Roy et al. 2001). In other words, melatonin inhibits many
other hormones involved in the positive control of reproduction and prolonged
overdosing may be detrimental to women s reproductive health.
In melatonin research, the bodies of animals and women have been used as
materials to test yet another type of contraceptive. In this field of science, the
political concern of whether or not oral contraceptives represent reproductive
freedom for women is not addressed. Why is it that science and medicine are
so fascinated with reproductive control over women s bodies? However, the
more immediate reality is that oral contraceptives are being used by millions
of women around the world. Therefore, the political concern becomes more
about whether or not there exists a need for yet another form of oral contracep-
tion for women. No doubt that pharmaceutical companies who will distribute
melatonin-based contraceptives will enjoy fi nancial gain. But in terms of the
political concerns from which my thesis originated, by studying the effects of
melatonin from the perspective that reproduction is comprised of a series of
hormonal feedback loops in the body, I showed that melatonin not only shuts
down ovulation at the level of the gonads but has antigonadotropic effects at
the level of the brain as well (Roy et al. 2001). I have tried to build a case that
as far as contraception is concerned, melatonin should not be used.
Purposes of Inquiry
In scientific discourse, the term  purpose is often used interchangeably with
the term hypothesis. As will become evident, the two words do not share the
same meaning in the context of a feminist inquiry. In a scientific experiment,
Deboleena Roy 267
the assumption is often made that a purpose for the research obviously exists,
even if it goes unsaid. At other times, the purpose is stated by way of refer-
encing a particular subject area, thus suggesting that the research conducted
contributes to knowledge in that field, and that the accrual of knowledge is
the sole purpose of the research. By not having to state a defi ned purpose for
the particular scientific experiment, researchers are not required to reveal the
social forces prompting their research, or the biases that may exist in their
reasoning for conducting the research in the first place. In terms of a feminist
model of inquiry, this is unacceptable. The second component of this feminist
inquiry states that:
An inquiry s origin and its purpose are closely intertwined.
Originating in concerns for women s quality of life, a central
purpose in feminist inquiry is to eliminate constraints based on
sex, race, class, sexual orientation, and other arbitrary categories,
in order to change society for the better. Identifying bias in lan-
guage, concepts, paradigms, applications, and personnel policies
of science acknowledges the harm done to science and to society
by scientific studies based on questionable assumptions about the
meaning of gender, race, and sexual orientation. If one purpose
of scientific inquiry is to gain more accurate understandings of
the world and another is to improve the quality of life for people,
then feminist inquiry, with its rigorous attention to eliminating
the consequences of gender ideology, can offer corrections that
expunge inaccuracies and distortions as well as encourage strict
scientific standards (Spanier 1995, 42).
Therefore, in this feminist methodology, the process of defining the Purposes
of Inquiry in a scientific experiment forces the scientist to consider the impact
of her research in a broader context. The scientist would then be required to
investigate what would be the totality of effects of a scientific intervention would
be, prior to its widespread application. The point here is that even if the totality
of effects cannot be fully realized, at least an attempt to consider all the effects,
whether desirable or not, should be made on the part of the researcher. This
requirement can only improve the current standard of scientific experimenta-
tion. An example of how the Purposes of Inquiry would change molecular
biology based research in the reproductive sciences can be demonstrated using
the technologies of in vitro fertilization (IVF).
Consider the vast amounts of funds and time being spent on the develop-
ment of IVF technologies based on molecular biology research. As feminist
inquirers, we must question the Purposes of these Inquiries. In a recent review
on IVF, the author states:
268 Hypatia
Genetic disorders are a major cause of miscarriage and fetal
death. Pre-implantation genetic diagnosis (PGD) can be used
to diagnose genetic defects before [emphasis added] pregnancy
has occurred by creating embryos by IVF, then removing single
cells which are genetically analyzed. . . . Newer techniques,
however, can rapidly diagnose multiple defects including chro-
mosomal aneuploidy, sex and single gene defects. Embryonic
cells can also be DNA fi ngerprinted. . . . As embryo screening
can increase IVF success rates and decrease miscarriage rates,
it will be increasingly offered in routine IVF. . . . These new,
low-cost techniques may ultimately allow PGD to be offered to
all IVF patients regardless of risk (Findlay 2000, 672).
Is the goal of this research to eliminate constraints based on sex, race, class,
sexual orientation, and other categories, in order to change society for the better?
Or will the newest molecular biology based IVF technologies be developed
in order to select for the participating scientist s interpretation of the perfect
human being? In terms of the accessibility issue, which classes of people will reap
the so-called benefits of these technologies? If desired, will everyone have equal
access to these technologies? How many subsidized  inner city IVF clinics will
we see? A feminist model of inquiry can expose the Purposes of Inquiry that
scientists either want to hide or are not even aware of. Having said this, does
my own research address this component of a feminist inquiry?
(ii) Was it a central purpose of my inquiry to eliminate constraints based on sex
in order to change society for the better?
Women have repeatedly been targets for contraceptive technologies. Male
contraception does not seem to receive the same amount of attention. The
Purpose of Inquiry of my thesis was to examine the effects of melatonin on
GnRH, which is a hormone involved in regulating both male and female repro-
ductive systems. Since I found that melatonin downregulates GnRH, I showed
that no scientific basis exists for why both male and female contraception by
melatonin cannot be envisioned. This would help to eliminate some of the
existing constraints based on sex that are blatantly apparent in contraceptive
technologies. However, since I found that melatonin may have antigonadotropic
effects at the level of the brain, and despite the health risks women have taken
for the sake of contraception, I did not advise the use of melatonin for male
contraception either. This is a case in point for the benefits of feminist science
for men as well as for women.
(iii) Did my inquiry improve the quality of life for people by expunging inaccura-
cies and distortions of biased paradigms?
In order to make my research qualify as feminist science, it was critical to
identify and avoid the biases in paradigms commonly used in reproductive
Deboleena Roy 269
neuroendocrinology research. This was by far the hardest task for me. For
example, research in this field has been deeply influenced by the paradigm of
biological reductionism. It is true that not all forms of reductionism are evil and
that sometimes biological reductionism is necessary in order to fully appreciate
the complexity of an organism. But to echo Benston s (1982) thoughts, a sense
of the limits of appropriateness of reductionism has to exist. Reductionism
becomes a problem when it leads to oversimplified models and simplistic causal
thinking, which is the tendency in biological research. While caught up in
the reductionism paradigm, it becomes very difficult to determine the limits of
appropriateness. But this is not the fault of reductionist thinking in itself. The
inability to keep sight of the broader consequences, connections, and implica-
tions of one s research stems from scientific isolationism and from the idea that
scientists should not have to think about the broader consequences of their
work. Therefore, in order for my research to pass as feminist science, I had to
critically evaluate whether or not studying melatonin-mediated regulation of
GnRH really answered any broader questions. The influences of reductionist
paradigms in my work were innumerable, and I realized early on that I would
be unable to justify or eliminate each and every one of them. I knew that I had
to choose my battles and not let the fact that I was not completely satisfying
this component of the feminist model of inquiry interfere with my attempt to
practice feminist science.
One of the main Purposes of my Inquiry was to examine the effect of mela-
tonin on GnRH neurons at the level of their gene expression. In other words,
my project constantly required me to work at a molecular level and deal with
the reductionist paradigm that leads us to believe that the gene is the master
molecule. To work my way through this, I had to realize that although discover-
ing melatonin-mediated effects on GnRH gene expression may have very little
meaning on its own, there could be broader impacts of my research in terms of
appreciating systemic reproductive influences of hormones traditionally thought
to have confined physiological targets. In this case, I would not have been able
to make this scientific claim had I not worked at the level of the isolated GnRH
neurons. I also forced my research to go in a certain direction. After fi nding
the result that melatonin regulates GnRH gene expression, I made it a point
to study the effects of melatonin on other cellular components such as energy
production by mitochondria, GnRH secretion, expression of some key proteins
involved in cellular activation, and the cellular signaling pathways in the GnRH
neurons (Roy and Belsham 2002). In the end, my fi ndings suggested that the
cooperativity of all these factors must be responsible for the cellular effects of
melatonin on GnRH neurons.
270 Hypatia
Hypothesis and Evidence
According to Scientific Method, we can see that it is here that the process of
experimentation is supposed to begin. Instead of searching for the Origins of
Problematics and the Purposes of Inquiry, the process of experimentation begins
with the derivation of a Hypothesis. By eliminating the need to recognize the
broader influences and reasons for conducting the experiment and the biases
in the paradigms to be used, the scientist can formulate a Hypothesis with
all ideological assumptions intact. In a feminist inquiry, the Hypothesis and
Evidence component would replace the hypothesis, results, and discussion
components of the traditional scientific inquiry. Furthermore, the derivation
of a Hypothesis, followed by the gathering of Evidence and interpretation of
this Evidence, would occur along a different line:
The discipline of biology turns to  biological explanations
fi rst, so the assumptions built into the meaning of  biology
shape what are considered plausible theories, explanations,
or legitimate evidence. Feminism turns to a broader and more
interdisciplinary range of knowledge and theories for explana-
tions and forms of evidence, taking into account cross-cultural
and intracultural evidence for the plasticity of human behavior
and physicality. Furthermore, the long history of erroneous and
harmful theories about sex, race and class differences creates a
justifiable skepticism about hypotheses and evidence that ignore
the dynamics of culture that shape both behavior and biology
(Spanier 1995, 42).
In the discipline of biology, certain ideological assumptions are built into the
meaning of biology itself. These assumptions intimately shape the derivation of a
Hypothesis and the interpretation of Results. A common ideological assumption,
for example, is that biology can be separated from influences such as the  envi-
ronment or  culture (Lewontin 1991; Shiva 1995; Hubbard 1988; Spanier 1995).
Another powerful ideological assumption is that the scientist can approach a
research question with  pure objectivity. It is thought that only pure objectivity
can produce accuracy in the collection and interpretation of Results.
In a feminist inquiry there would be no claims to pure objectivity. But at
the same time, we cannot dismiss objectivity all together. For when objectivity
implies quantitative research, statistics, and accuracy, there may still be some-
thing to gain from its practice. Of course, feminist science would also strive
for accuracy but would not assume that this could be achieved by pure objec-
tivity alone. Therefore, instead of dismissing objectivity completely, Margrit
Eichler argues that  [i]t seems useful to think of objectivity as an asymptoti-
cally approachable but unreachable goal (1991, 14). For the feminist scientist,
Deboleena Roy 271
however, clearly a tension arises between striving for accuracy and the desire
to avoid achieving this accuracy by forming Hypotheses laden with incorrect
ideological assumptions. This tension may be resolved if one were to approach
the scientific inquiry with what Harding has called  strong objectivity. She
states,  We can think of strong objectivity as extending the notion of scientific
research to include systematic examination of . . . powerful background beliefs.
It must do so in order to be competent at maximizing objectivity (1991, 149).
Therefore, by examining the ideological assumptions built into the actual
Hypothesis itself, the feminist scientist only increases the level of objectivity
in her inquiry, thereby increasing the accuracy in the interpretation of her Evi-
dence. An example of how a Hypothesis originating from this feminist model
of inquiry would alter how experiments are conducted and how Evidence is
interpreted in current reproductive biology research can be demonstrated using
the new technology of intracytoplasmic sperm injection (ICSI).
As in the fields of cognitive science (Fausto-Sterling 1985), neuroanatomy
(Bleier 1986; Hubbard 1988), and primatology (Haraway 1986), most research
in reproductive biology appears to be framed in order to echo incorrect assump-
tions of gender differences. In ICSI, the sperm head from immature spermato-
cytes are microinjected into the cytoplasm of an egg (see Van Steirteghem,
Devroey, and Liebaers 2002). This procedure is performed when the male
partner in a heterosexual couple cannot produce motile sperm. For now, let us
put aside the issue that the female partner in this arrangement may very well
be fertile, but for the sake of this procedure may have to undergo superovula-
tory drug treatments. Take, for example, a recently published paper in this
field, the abstract of which reads:  Degeneration of oocytes occurs even when
maximum care is exercised during ICSI, especially when the oolemma is very
fragile and/or the zona pellucida is resistant. In order to be able to minimize
the risk of degeneration associated with microinjection this study applied a new
method: a microhole on the zona pellucida of the oocyte was drilled by laser
beam just prior to ICSI to permit the penetration of the microneedle without
any trauma (Abdelmassih et al. 2002).
The hypothesis made by these traditional scientists, then, is that since fragile
eggs often do not survive microinjection during ICSI, maybe drilling a hole into
the outer membrane of the egg with a laser beam would allow easier penetra-
tion of the egg by the spermatocyte and lead to less degeneration. Ideological
assumptions of gender differences have driven the derivation of the Hypothesis
in this experiment whereby a scientist aggressively penetrates a fragile egg to
allow a sperm to enter. In comparison, the feminist Hypothesis would take into
account the fact that an egg is not usually fertilized by an immature sperm, and
that biological mechanisms are in place so that this does not occur naturally
in a woman s body. Instead, the feminist Hypothesis might ask why the eggs
are degenerating, why the zona pellucida is resistant, and determine whether
272 Hypatia
or not it is in the best interest of the patient undergoing the ICSI procedure to
have these eggs injected with immature spermatocytes.
The Results and Discussion presented in the same paper read:  After laser-
assisted ICSI compared with conventional ICSI, survival rates of oocytes were
99.6 and 84% (P<0.0001, n=32). . . . [Therefore] creating a microhole on the
zona pellucida of the oocyte by laser beam prior to ICSI provides a less trau-
matic penetration of the injection needle in to the ooplasm and results in lower
degeneration and higher embryo development rates than conventional ICSI in
patients with fragile oocytes (Abdelmassih et al. 2002). It is not completely
clear here if the  traumatic penetration referred to is felt by the egg, the sperm,
the needle, or the scientist doing the microinjection. In any case, as gender-
biased assumptions would dictate, scientists have spent inordinate amounts of
time and money to recreate a scenario of  aggressively inserting a sperm head
into a  fragile egg in a petri dish. These assumptions lead scientists to focus
on ways to increase the sperm s activation of the egg for successful fertilization
and downgrade the importance of the female contribution in fertility. Since
a Hypothesis derived from the feminist model of inquiry would never ask the
same question as above, obviously the Evidence gathered and then discussed by
the scientist would also be different. Instead, a feminist inquiry would produce
Evidence that would enhance our understanding of not only the male contribu-
tion but also the female contribution to fertility. Turning to my own work, was
I able to incorporate a broader range of knowledge into my research?
(iv)Did my Hypothesis and Evidence incorporate dynamics of culture that shape
both behavior and biology?
In recent years, melatonin has gained popularity as a cure for jet lag and sleep
disorders. Although the sale of melatonin is illegal in some countries such as
Canada, it is easily available in the United States. A few years ago, melatonin
was being marketed as a wonder drug that could improve sleeping habits, prevent
cancer, and even reverse the aging process. Whether or not all these benefits
are true remains to be seen. However, evidence showed that people felt great
after taking melatonin. It was due to this increase in public interest that some
scientists, including myself, became interested in studying melatonin.
Because melatonin has been shown to have effects on both human behavior
and physicality, I attempted to develop a better understanding of melatonin
through non-traditional forms of evidence. Yet whenever I tried to design a
Hypothesis that incorporated cultural dynamics, I was told that the question
I was asking was non-scientific. In hindsight, I realize that it was not necessar-
ily the cultural context itself but rather the language that I used to formulate
my Hypothesis that was considered to be  non-scientific. Despite this fact, for
a broader range of knowledge beyond the  scientific I did learn about some
herbal remedies that have been used for the treatment of both sleep disorders
and contraception for centuries. This information never made it into my thesis.
Deboleena Roy 273
I learned that in order to substantiate the use of crosscultural or intracultural
dynamics I had to present this information with a traditionally scientific spin.
For example, in some countries distinct patterns in the number of births are
observed among humans who live in regions with fewer hours of daylight year-
round. I tried to draw out the importance of these events by formulating a
Hypothesis that would allow me to examine the correlation between melatonin,
reproduction, and circadian rhythmicity in GnRH neurons.
Relationship between the Inquirer
and Her/His Subject of Inquiry
In Scientific Method, the materials and methods component describes what
animals, plants, cells, chemicals, and machines were used to conduct an experi-
ment and how the experiments were done. Often the descriptions are in great
detail, which is necessary for the replication of the same experiment by other
researchers. This is a commendable feature of the Scientific Method. However,
at the same time this is also one of the greatest limitations of the traditional
Scientific Method, as the materials and the methods used are never connected
directly to the user. In addition, when documenting this component of the
traditional scientific inquiry, it is written in the past tense, so as to further dis-
sociate the experimenter from any immediate relationship to the information
being produced. In a feminist inquiry, the Relationship between the Inquirer and
her/his Subject of Inquiry would replace the material and methods section. As
discussed previously, although the methods used in a feminist inquiry will not
be different than a traditional scientific inquiry, the relationship between the
scientist and the subject of examination must be recognized and articulated:
One of the tenets of feminist scholarship is that the researcher
should be in the same critical plane as the subject matter. By
making her conceptual framework clear, the researcher places
herself on a mutual footing with the material. This helps to make
visible the researcher s actual relationship to the information
and interpretations of the research and promotes a self-reflexive
search for researcher bias, something that is rarely considered
necessary in conventional research (Spanier 1995, 43).
In reproductive biology research, it is not only animals and cells that are used
as materials but women as well. A strong theme in feminist critiques of science
has been to see animals as  fellow sufferers (Birke 1994, 14). This sentiment
is nowhere truer than in the field of reproductive biology. An example of how
the Relationship between the Inquirer and her/his Subject of Inquiry would
change what research is conducted in reproductive biology can be demonstrated
by examining how lab animals are treated.
274 Hypatia
The parallel histories of violence toward animals and toward women in
reproductive biology have been justified in the name of taming  nature. Femi-
nists such as Vandana Shiva (1995) recognize that biology is not separate from
the environmental plane. To correct the standard assumption that the two are
separate, feminists have called for the  democratization and  (re)invention of
a biology that would create novel knowledge systems based on justified levels of
appropriateness by using sensitive, noninvasive techniques (Shiva 1995, 1997;
Birke 1994). Animals, particularly laboratory-bred animals such as mice and
rats, are constantly being used to study reproductive physiology on the grounds
that they provide models for human physiology. Yet scientists justify the use of
animals to the public by stating that animals are significantly different from
us so that they may be used for experimentation (Birke 1994). If required to
analyze the Relationship between the Inquirer and his/her Subject of Inquiry,
a scientist conducting experiments on animals would have to recognize that
the real  difference between animals and humans is that a lower ethical value
has been placed on the lives of animals. Does my research meet this criterion
of a feminist inquiry?
(v) Did I as the researcher make my conceptual framework clear and place myself
on a mutual footing with the material I used?
When I was interviewing for my Ph.D. position, I made it a point to let my
supervisor know that I would not do animal work. This was almost unheard
of in my area of research, but I knew that if I did not make this clear from the
beginning I would not be able to take the position. In a field where my options
were restricted to whole animal studies or in vitro cell line studies, I chose to work
in vitro. This was the level of appropriateness that I felt justified in using in order
to create scientific knowledge. But these neurons originally came from mice
whose lives were sacrificed to create the neuronal cells that I used. I know that
I was indebted to those mice, but faced with the choice of having to kill more
animals or kill cells to do my research, I chose to kill cells. Honestly, I found it
very difficult to try to place myself on a mutual footing with these neurons. How
could I when I knew that I was still going to kill them for their DNA, RNA,
and proteins? In this respect, I failed to incorporate this element of feminist
inquiry into my own research. But while the cells were alive, I acknowledged
them as life forms, not simply as materials in my study.
As for making my conceptual framework clear, I tried to do this at every
turn. An interesting case in point deals with the issue of the use of neuronal
cells in vitro for my research. By working at the level of the cell and not with the
whole animal, my research could have easily been influenced by the reduction-
ist paradigm that holds that we can understand the biology of an organism as
a whole from the information we gather about that organism at the level of its
cells. In using an in vitro cell line for my study, I knew that I had to be aware
Deboleena Roy 275
of this when I interpreted my data and be careful not to assume that the same
effects would occur in the whole animal. I had to remind myself of the broader
picture. Curiously though, it was the nonfeminist scientists who warned me
over and over again of the biases involved in doing in vitro research and the
inaccuracies that could result. They urged me to back up my findings by doing
whole animal studies. One might think that this was a step in the right direction
on the part of traditional science, but let me here give a beautiful illustration
of how the feminist scientist is caught between the drive for accuracy and the
desire to avoid paradigms laden with biased ideology. The traditional scientists
criticized my in vitro research because in a typical laboratory where drugs or
hormones are being examined for their effects on reproductive functions, the
most common models used for testing are rats, mice, or sheep. However, the
normal reproductive systems of these animals are not trusted enough to guar-
antee normalized or uniform results. For this reason, animals whose ovaries
have been removed (and which thus have no endogenous source of estrogen)
are administered uniform doses of estrogen and then tested with an unknown
drug or hormone. Scientists do not want variability in their raw material. The
ideological assumption here is that animal physiology needs to be standard-
ized in order to achieve accuracy in the results. At least I acknowledged the
limitations of my in vitro research and still achieved accuracy. Most traditional
scientists have convinced themselves that studies with whole animals are more
accurate in developing our understanding of reproductive biology, but they do
not question the ideological assumptions built into their own work.
Conclusion
I would like to return again to the question, can feminist theory in science
influence the production of scientific knowledge at the level of epistemology
and methodology? It appears to me that it can. But perhaps the real question
is, Are we ready for feminist theory in science to influence the production of
scientific knowledge? If the social and political context in which science is
done is not compatible with the vision of feminist science, is it fair to say to
the feminist scientist that she must still try to do feminist science? Feminist
scientist Evelyn Fox Keller writes:
Is there a conflict between our commitment to feminism and
our commitment to science? As both a feminist and a scientist,
I am more familiar than I might wish with the nervousness and
defensiveness that such a potential conflict evokes. As scientists,
we have very real difficulties in thinking about the kinds of issues
that, as feminists, we have been raising. These difficulties may,
276 Hypatia
however, ultimately be productive. . . . those elements of feminist
criticism that seem to conflict most with at least conventional
conceptions of science may, in fact carry a liberating potential
for science (1996, 28).
My experience as a Ph.D. student was extremely rewarding for me. Not so
much for the science, but instead for the challenge of conducting scientific
research and still calling myself a feminist. Having compared the components
of this feminist inquiry to the components of the Scientific Method, I would not
say that they are mutually exclusive. In fact, all the components of the Scientific
Method are included within the feminist inquiry. What the feminist inquiry
does, however, is to ask the scientist to uncover the social and political forces
driving their research questions as well as to establish a relationship with their
research subject(s). Perhaps the real problem that traditional scientists have with
feminism is that they are not up to the intellectual challenge presented by the
feminist inquiry. Until feminist epistemology and methodology influence those
who hold positions of power in the current scientific establishments, perhaps the
feminist science inquiry can be thought to exist like the curve of objectivity, as
an  asymptotically approachable but unreachable goal (Eichler 1991, 14).
I know that in order to complete my degree, I had to make a lot of compro-
mises. According to the feminist model of inquiry that I have outlined as the
practical transformation in this paper, I do not think that my own research
completely met the criteria of this inquiry. My supervisors never criticized my
research, or the data that I produced, only how I interpreted my work. This was
due to a difference of opinion between what they and I considered important
and worth mentioning. I located the Origins of Problematics in my work. They
said this was irrelevant. I stated the Purposes of my Inquiry. They said this too
was irrelevant. However, they were most annoyed with my efforts to record the
Relationship between myself and my Subject of Inquiry. If I tried to draw out
any research biases, or even to write my methods sections in the fi rst person,
they found this unacceptable. I was told to make the appropriate changes if I
wanted to be taken seriously. The chapters of my thesis were written as papers
that were submitted for publication in peer-reviewed scientific journals. In order
to graduate and fi nish my Ph.D. successfully, I had to write and rewrite these
papers so many times that there were hardly any traces of a feminist inquiry
left in them.
The reality of my situation was that as a graduate student, I worked with
scientists not in the least bit interested in or supportive of my feminist science
work. But just because my work was not supported, does this mean that I failed
to practice feminist science? I think that feminist science can be practiced on an
individual level, but with much difficulty. An individual can still ask  different
questions. Nobody can take that away from the feminist scientist. She can still
Deboleena Roy 277
try to analyze gender critically, to take women s experiences into account, and
to identify the complex subjectivities in herself and what she observes (Harding
1989). Of course it would be less difficult to do feminist science if it were seen
as something that should be a coordinated effort on the part of the student,
supervisor, department, university, and granting agency. However, it was this
very difficulty that was ultimately productive in my case. It forced me to search
for a practical transformation of traditional science. What should other femi-
nist scientists do when faced with this difficulty? Whatever the answer to this
question might be, there is still a need for feminist theory in science to provide
the practical transformations. It is up to the scientist whether or not she wants
to try to do feminist science.
So, are we ready? The answer is yes, if we are willing. If we are willing to
accept and recognize the limitations of our own work without letting these
limitations stop us from doing science, or for that matter from creating feminist
science. It is a strength of feminism to set high standards, but at the same time,
we cannot dismiss the efforts and small degrees of progress made by the indi-
vidual. And so to the feminist scientist working at the lab bench I say, READY.
. . . SET. . . . PROCEED WITH CAUTION!
Note
I am grateful to Margrit Eichler for encouraging me to write this essay, and to members
of the BAITWoRM (Biology As If The World Mattered) network for allowing me to
present a very early version of this paper at the May 2000 conference.
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