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Medieval Warfare
Warfare was a way of life in Medieval Europe. The nobility held their power by virtue of their status as professional
soldiers. Many commoner soldiers were also professionals, usually led by nobles. And all who wished to maintain their
safety and security had to be ready for a fight. It was, without too much exaggeration, a population in arms.
The form of warfare in Medieval Europe was that which developed out of the military traditions and practices of the
German tribes that overran the Roman empire in the 4th, 5th, and 6th centuries. The Romans had been fighting the
German tribes since the 2nd Century BC. The Romans had a professional, standing army and, as a result, they usually
won. The Germans were bigger and wilder, but not highly organized and not nearly as professional. This changed over
the centuries as technology improved and the Germans learned more about how the Romans did things, while the
Romans frittered away their time having civil wars and such. In short, the Germans got better and the Romans didn't. A
major innovation in the century before Rome fell was the widespread use of armored cavalry by the Germans. This
came about because of the introduction of the stirrup in the first centuries AD, as German tribes migrated to the vast
plains of Russia and adapted to mounted combat. There was also the German exposure to the Asiatic nomads coming in
from the east (the Huns). The wealthier (and usually more skilled) German warriors began to do most of their fighting
on horseback. Wearing a lot of armor and wielding a long sword, and even longer lance, the massed charge of these
mounted Germans became more and more effective. As a result, the Romans suffered a number of serious defeats, even
though the Romans also adopted the same mounted form of warfare. The Romans tried to adapt, but internal problems
kept getting in the way of a thorough reform of the military system, and things just went downhill throughout the 5th
century. The funny thing was, most of the German invaders were still infantry. But the availability of those heavy,
armored cavalry troops often made a decisive difference.
While the Germans ultimately proved themselves superior militarily, the Romans had the edge in all other respects. In
particular, the elaborate and efficient Roman form of government provided, century after century, a steady supply of tax
money and recruits with which to form a standing army. The Germans had nothing like this, and as they settled down in
the conquered Roman lands, they found their lack of administrative skills a major handicap. Fortunately, another aspect
of German tribal traditions came to the rescue. It was customary for the heads of tribes (from the wealthiest families,
not surprisingly, who now styled themselves kings) to reward their most powerful and successful warriors with a
portion of the goodies after a successful campaign. The invasions of Roman territory had provided enormous
opportunities in this department. Following a practice already common back in Germany, the new rulers gave their
mounted warriors large tracts of land (thousands of acres in some cases) to run as their own little balliwick in the king's
name, as well as a good chunk of the land for their personal use. The people on this land were under the control of the
warrior, who provided administrative and legal services for the population. And taxed "his" subjects any way he liked.
Some of the farmers, the poorest, were serfs (either before the Germans arrived, or due to the depradations of the
invading armies). These serfs owned no land, but were allowed to work a few acres for themselves while providing up
to half their time to work the new rulers lands. This was the feudal system. It was nothing radically new, and had
existed in much the same form earlier. Even the Romans had used a version of it in some places. The German kings
expected their warlords to use whatever profit they could wrest from their land (eventually known as a fief) to support
themselves. In return, they had to maintain their military skills and answer the king's call when armed forces were
needed. With this system, the new German kings put trusted men in charge of every village and town while maintaining
armed forces at the same time.
While the new military system wasn't as efficient as the Roman one, it was sufficient. Although the East Romans still
had their professional army, they were not much of a threat after the 7th century, when the Moslem Arabs drove their
armies right up to the walls of Constantinope several times. The East Romans (or Byzantines) had proven capable of
defeating the fedual German armies in the 6th and 7th centuries and one could say without much exaggeration that it
was the Arabs who saved the Germans by preoccupying the "Byzantines". In the century before the Moslims showed
up, the East Romans were well on their way to reconquering the western portion of the empire. Later the Turks came
along and not only kept the East Romans engaged, but eventually broke Byzantine military power.
The Arabs also invaded German lands, at least in Spain and thence into southern France, an by sea into portions of Italy.
But the Arabs, man for man, weren't any better than the Germans. In Spain, the Arabs were at the end of a long
campaign across North Africa and the Germans had superior numbers. The East Romans took the full brunt of the Arab
armies and it was only the superior quality of their army that managed to stop the more numerous Arabs.
As impressive as the mounted man-at-arms (whether knighted or not) appeared, he was a warrior, not a soldier. Roman
troops had been soldiers. Drilled, disciplined, and thoroughly professional, the Roman army failed only when it got
sloppy with recruiting, training, and politics. Medieval troops were not so much sloppy as highly variable and
individualistic. Medieval knights, like their Samurai counterparts in Japan, trained and fought as individuals. While
thousands of these warriors would frequently join together as an army, and make grand, massed charges at the enemy,
they always thought of themselves as fighting as individuals, not as part of a military unit.
Naturally, leading a Medieval army was a tricky proposition. Fortunately, winning battles with such armies was less of
a problem because, for a long time, all the armies were the same. Tactics were simplistic in the extreme. Both sides
lined up their masses of mounted troops, with foot troops in the front ranks. The infantry usually opened the battle.
When one or the other side's leader judged the moment appropriate, a mass charge of mounted men would be launched.
This usually decided the affair one way or another.
There were a lot of variations. Some nations still relied on a lot of infantry, if only because they were too poor to
support a lot of mounted troops. Examples were the Scots and the Swiss. The poverty stricken Scots, with a more
populous and wealthier England to the south, always faced their mounted foes with infantry, and had often managed to
hold their own. The Swiss threw off the rule of the Hapsburgs, and maintained their independence with nothing but
highly disciplined infantry. Even the Germans maintained elements of their ancient infantry tradition. Indeed, the
Germans continued to win victories with infantry armies up to the 11th century.
But, all things being equal, the mounted man-at-arms was superior. It wasn't just the horse, the knight was also better
armed and armored. Moreover, a knight devoted his life to training with his weapons and was usually quite good at it.
The downside was that the knight's believed their own propaganda. Foot soldiers were disdained and discipline was
seen as incompatible with a noble warriors honor. The basic problem was that every noble (knights and above) thought
he was above obeying orders. A duke or a count had some control over his knights (and each knight's small band of
armed followers), but each such noble was less impressed by the royal official, or king himself, in charge of the entire
army. Every noble thought he, and his troops, deserved the post of honor in the first rank. An army commander would
try and line up his various contingents in such a way that each would be used to best effect. Most knights (of whatever
rank) simply wanted to get at the enemy and fight it out man to man. This was the mentality of knights through most of
the Medieval period.
Moreover, unlike the Romans the feudal warriors did not train together as a unit. There were exceptions. The Swiss
fought on foot and basically reinvented the Greek Phalanx. The major Swiss innovation here was the use of less body
armor, even more discipline and organization in the spear formations, and greater speed and flexibility of movement.
This last element was neccessary because the Swiss often fought in broken, hilly terrain (that is, Switzerland) and had to
be flexible and swift to prevent the mounted knights from hitting them in their vulnerable flanks or rear. Indeed, these
were the tactics the highly disciplined and mobile Romans used to defeat the original Greek Phalanx spear formations.
The Swiss drilled endlessly, and fought with a ferocity that impressed even the armed nobles they faced. The Medieval
knights were never able to get organized sufficiently to defeat the Swiss.
The most effective infantry of the Medieval period were the English yeomen. These were English and Welch farmers
who owned their own land (hence the term "yeomen") and were paid by the king to train in peacetime, and answer his
call when he needed to raise an army. The typical English army of the period would be 80-90 percent yeomen, the
remainder being men-at-arms (knights and serjeants, commoners equipped as knights). The yeomen were basically light
infantry, who knew how to ride a horse. For hand-to-hand fighting they usually carried a sword, an axe, or a mallet
(quite effective against a dismounted knight in full armor). But their principal weapon was the longbow. Originally a
hunting weapon in Wales, it's major drawback was that it required years of practice to use effectively.
The king offered money, and other favors, to encourage the peacetime training, and good pay for when the yeomen
were called to action. The king also offered fines and other punishments if the yeomen didn't practice their archery in
peacetime. But the yeomen were skilled at more than just handling the bow. Their training concentrated on firing in
groups (they were organized into units of 20 and 100 men). Peacetime training consisted of individual archers learning
how to fire at a specific range. This took a lot of practice. The archers soon learned which angle to point their bows in
order to land their arrow on a white sheet (the common target, representing a group of enemy troops) at different ranges,
a practice called "clout shooting" (i.e, cloth shooting). In addition to individual practice, they also drilled with their
units. In a formation ten ranks deep, only the men in the first few ranks could even see the enemy, or hear the
commands of their "centenaur" (leader of a hundred.)
In battle, the centuries (each with a hundred archers) would line up in formations of up to ten ranks deep. In front of
each century would be an experienced (and very well paid) centenaur. A typical English army would have 50 or more
centuries of archers available. In overall command would be a Master of the Archers, an experienced knight who was
(unlike most knights) skilled with the longbow. The Master of the Archers would keep his eye on the enemy and judge
how many yards distant the foe was. When ordered to fire, the Master of the Archers would estimate the range to the
enemy and then bellow out "ready," quickly followed by his range estimate, to the Centenaurs, who would turn and
bellow it to their archers (especially the most experienced ones, placed in the first rank to provide an accurate guide for
the archers behind them). The Master of the Archers would then yell "loose," the Centenaurs would echo the command,
and thousands of arrows would fly skywrd, most of them to land where, and when, the Master of the Archers wanted
them.
The Master of the Archers might order only a few of his Centuries to fire, if enemy troops were only advancing on a
portion of the front. But in Medieval warfare it was generally all or nothing. An attack usually called for the knights to
advance on a broad front.
The yeomen could let loose a dozen arrows a minute, creating a steady stream of deadly missiles. Advancing horsemen
were doomed, as their unarmored (or even partially armored) mounts went down from arrow wounds. The riders went
down also, often with broken bones and other injuries in the process, not to mention exposing them to the possibility of
being trampled by their onrushing comrades.
When the French knights advanced on foot, the results weren't much different. The long range (up to 300 yards)
plunging fire would eventually cause some wounds. The sight and sound of all those arrows raining down was quite
demoralizing. As the enemy knights got closer to the yeomen, they would get hit by direct fire from the front row of
archers (the most experienced and accurate ones) and discover that at point blank range, the yard long arrows did indeed
have an armor piercing tip. For those knights that got to within ten yards of the yeomen would encounter several rows
of sharpened stakes, and perhaps even a ditch. Usually the English would post their own dismounted knights in a sort of
phalanx to support their archers, which only made matters worse for the attacking French. At this point, there were few
enough knights for the yeomen to successfully engage them in single combat. Well, it was more lopsided than that.
Supported by the English knights, the archers would put down their bows and come out from behind their defenses with
sword or axe or mallet once they saw they had a 2-to-1 or better advantage over the surviving knights. The yeomen
would then team up to capture knights alive, and reap the ransoms captured nobles always brought. One yeoman would
engage the knight from in front while another hit him from the side or rear with the flat end of an axe or a mallet. The
stunned knight, now on the ground, would invariably surrender. The yeomen rarely lost these combats and took few
casualties in them, even if they did not wear much armor. The ransoms thus obtained made many a yeoman family
wealthy. The news of these riches travelled far and fast, making it easier for the king to keep his yeoman at their
peacetime training and eager to answer the royal call when another campaign was afoot.
There were never that many yeomen, some 10,000-20,000 were raised for each campaign. While some of them became
full time professionals during the Hundred Years War, most remained basically farmers who fought on the side.
Typically, they would answer the king's call in the Spring. If they were lucky, they would go off to war after the Spring
planting was out of the way. With the approach of Winter, the king would allow many to return home. In practice, all
those that wanted to go home would do so. Campaigning was rarely done in the Winter and all the king needed then
were troops to man the fortifications in his French lands. Garrison soldiers could be obtained locally and cost less than
yeomen.
Families worked together in the period, so an family consisting of two generations, 20-30 people, and a half dozen or so
married couples (plus children of all ages) could send off two or three yeomen to war while those who stayed home
covered all the labor requirements needed to keep the farm going. When their yeomen returned from France, they would
have several thousand ducats in pay, not to mention that, if they had had a good campaign, thousands more in loot and
ransom money. After battles like Crecy, Poitiers, or Agincourt, many yeomen came home with 100,000 ducats, some
with or more. This was a fortune in Medieval terms. Land cost several thousand ducats an acre, and such large sums of
money made the yeomen even more prosperous farmers.
But in practice, through most of the period battles were rare, mainly because it took so long to line up all your troops in
order to have one. If the other fellow didn't want to fight, he could just keep marching away. Of course, an
exceptionally large, or better led, army could force an opponent to give battle. This was usually done by cutting your
opponent off from any easy escape route and, in effect, giving him an offer to do battle that he couldn't refuse. Most
armies were undisciplined masses of troops, straggling along on the primitive roads or cross country. Scouting was
primitive, if it was done at all. When a scout, or passing traveller, brought word of an enemy army in the vicinity, an
army leader would often want to hold a council of war with his leading nobles, lest some of them refuse to obey any
hastily conceived orders to move off in a different direction. Sometimes battles were by pre-arrangements, with the
Heralds working out the details of where and when the armies would meet. So battles didn't happen all that ofte. And
when they did, most frequently, a battle was forced when an army sought to break a siege.
Sieges were the most common for of large scale combat in the Middle Ages. Political control Medieval times depended
on who held the numerous castles and walled cities that dotted the countryside. These fortifications held reserve
supplies of food and large numbers of troops. From these bases, the nobility controlled the sountryside. If you wished to
"conquer" an area you had to take the fortified places away from whoever currently held them. Since these places were
built to resist being taken, a siege was the usual result. Sieges took time, some went on for months, and money, some
cost literally millions of ducats. The larger force outside often had more serious food problems than the besieged. The
surrounding countryside was often stripped bare of food at the approach of an enemy army. But the defender could not
always depend on the besieger giving up because he was hungry. The usual hope was that a friendly army would come
up and chase the besiegers away. This often resulted in a battle as a means to determine of the siege would continue or
not.
Sieges themselves were largely a matter of engineering work, with a little knightly combat thrown in to keep the
warriors from getting bored. It was not uncommon for an impromptu tournament, or series of duels, to be arranged
between the knights on both sides, just to enliven what was otherwise a very tedious process. The English had an
advantage in sieges for most of the war (until the French developed superior cannon) because their yeomen were more
effective at siege warfare. In addition to being able to sweep defenders from castle walls with their accurate and long
range archery, the yeomen were also more skilled at the more mundane aspects of siege work. Being well paid
mercenaries, the yeomen went about the digging and building that comprised most siege work in more professional
manner than their French counterparts.
Armies took siege technicians with them on campaign. These were usually carpenters and miners, plus master siege
artisans who had years of experience in the techniques of siege warfare. The typical siege consisted of throwing a
cordon of troops around the fortified place and then building rock (or fire) throwing catapults to attack the troops on the
walls, tunnels to collapse the walls, scaling ladders and movable towers to allow troops to go over the walls, and
battering rams to demolish walls or gateways. But the typical activity was the threat of an attack. The custom was that if
the city surrendered without a fight, it would not be pillaged by the enemy troops. Both sides preferred to end the matter
through negotiation and this was basically a war of nerves. The besieger didn't really want to attack, as this would get a
lot of his troops killed and it might not work, at least not the first time. Moreover, the besieger was usually after
permanent possession of the place and disn't want to be stuck with the damage his angry troops would inflict if, after
successfully storming the place, they pillaged it (thus wrecked everything in sight and killed off a fair percentage of the
population). The defender didn't want to risk an assault either, but for different reasons. In many cases, time was on the
side of the besieged. If careful preparations were made, the defenders might well have had a better supply of food and
water than the besiegers. Moreover, there might be a relief army on the way. The defender had to calculate whether he
could fight off enough assaults so that the attacker ran out of men or enthusiasm for the task.
If the attacker could make a breach in the wall with, say by tunneling which caused the wall to collapse, this might give
the defender sufficient reason to surrender without an assault. Catapults throwing fire balls into the city or castle might
start fires that would also encourage a surrender. Negotiations were usually underway from the very beginning (or even
before, as the advancing army sent forward Heralds to try and convince the commander of the castle or town that it was
never too early to surrender). Of course, the commander of the defenders had more than his honor at stake. His boss
might punish him quite severely (unto death, perhaps) if the fortified place was lost without every possible action being
taken to avoid such a loss.
There was also the question of cost. Your typical fortress or castle (the former had fewer towers and less comfotable
living accommodations) had a garrison of 100-300 men. These were usually locals, full or part time soldiers on the
regular payroll of the local lord. Say an army of 1,000 men approached, mercenaries, costing the attacker, on average,
170,000 ducats a week to maintain. It would take several weeks to invest the place, build siege engines (catapults, etc.),
and start digging tunnels. By this time the cost would already be up to half a million ducats, with less than a hundred
thousand gained from pillaging the surrounding countryside. That pillage would going to cost the local lord tens of
thousands of lost taxes in the future, and some of the damage would be to things the lord owned, such as flour mills or
buildings. Nevertheless, it would be costing the besieger a lot more than it would be costing the defender. If the place is
taken by negotiation, there would be loot inside the castle. In addition to at least several thousand ducats in cash, there
were no doubt many other valuable items. Everything from captured weapons and tools, and perhaps some gold or
silver objects. But the besieger had to decide when to stop throwing good money after bad. We may not think of
Medieval warlords as accountants, but they had to pay their bills, too. Unpaid troops tended to drift away, leaving you
defenseless in hostile territory. It wasn't all adventure and glory. A lot of Medieval warfare was the headaches delivered
via a clerk's report on your current cash position.
Medieval warfare was also very dependant on the quality of leadership. The troops didn't vary much from area to area
(except in the case of the yeomen or Swiss pikemen), nor did the methods. There were few books on "how to make
war," and most military leaders obtained their positions because of their social standing, not their military track records.
As a result, when good leaders were present, they would quickly reorganize their troops, redistribute what good
subordinate leaders there were more effectively, and run their army on a more efficient basis than their opposition.
Evolution of Medieval Warfare
Dispite the conventional wisdom, the techniques of warfare did evolve during the Medieval years. This was so, even
though the social order in Medieval Europe was unusually stable.
This social system developed in the Early Middle Ages (A.D. 700-1000) as a result of changes in prevailing military
practices. The barbarian kingdoms erected on the ruins of the Roman Empire had generally treated all free adult males
as equals before the law, with an equal obligation to render military service. This assumption of a universal male
military obligation remained in force over the centuries even as the barbarian kingdoms became increasingly settled and
civilized. The form which such service took was usually that of infantryman, with each man required to bring his own
arms when called. Armies were thus primarily militia forces, although the king might have a small band of full- time
"henchmen" in his service who may be considered professional soldiers. This adequately provided for defense in terms
of the types of threat which confronted the various Western European kingdoms in this period. Beginning in the Eighth
Century, however, threats of a different nature began to beset the West: the Vikings, the Arabs, and the Hungarians.
The nature of the threat posed by the Vikings, the Arabs, and the Hungarians was different from those experienced
previously. These peoples were raiders, intent upon plundering what they could, although not adverse to making a land
grab if the opportunity was offered. The Vikings raided Western Europe's Atlantic littoral from the sea, while the Arabs
did so along the Mediterranean coast, and the Hungarians rode rough-shod over much of Central Europe from the Great
Hungarian Plain. These peoples moved far too swiftly for the militia levies. Only forces of comparable mobility, that is
on horseback, could possibly muster in sufficient time and move with sufficient speed to catch the raiders before they
were off once more.
But mounted forces are difficult to sustain. Horses are expensive. Moreover, mastering the skills of mounted combat
was a full-time job. Ultimately, the feudal system was born out of the need to support a class of professional mounted
soldiers. A lord would endow a man with land and peasants so that he could procure suitable mounts and equipment,
and then prepare and maintain himself and his mount in perpetual readiness for military service.
The new military system proved quite successful. The Viking, Arab, and Hungarian threats were largely beaten off by
the end of the Tenth Century. The success of the innovative mounted armies naturally reduced the status of, and the
necessity for, the old freeborn militia infantry, so that it became increasingly rare for the commoner militia to be called
upon to render military service. The superior fighting qualities of the professional mounted warriors as opposed to the
increasingly amateurish militia further enhanced the status of the horsemen.
Eventually the levy of all able-bodied adult males virtually disappeared. The mounted soldier - the knight or man-at-
arms with armor and sword and lance - had become the undisputed master of the battlefield, able to sweep all before
him in one mighty charge. Now there was, at first, no inherent notion of hereditary claim by a mounted soldier to the
lands allocated for his support, but this began to evolve even as the new military system successfully beat off the
various threats. By the end of the 10th Century the feudal system was firmly established.
One unfortunate side-effect of the new system was that it decentralized government to such an extent that the title
"king" was, in most countries merely an honorific held by one of the greater nobles. Thus, there was no one to restrain
the lords from fighting with each other, and private war was fairly common, as different lords sought to wipe-out
alleged insults or, more practically, to steal from their neighbors. Efforts by the Church to curb such activities had some
effect, and by the 12th Century Western Europe was experiencing a degree of stability unknown since before the Fall of
Rome seven centuries earlier.
Meanwhile. there seemed to be no way to defeat the mounted knight with any degree on consistency. However,
fortifications could frustrate even the most capable knights. Strongholds, of course, were primordal factors in war. After
the Fall of Rome all manner of ancient Roman, but quite sturdy, structures, from castles to amphitheaters, and from
palaces to watchtowers, were pressed into service as fortifications. This enabled many people to survive the barbarian
storm, for the latter were inept at siegecraft.
The use of fortifications multiplied in the Dark Ages, particularly as siege techniques remained fairly rudimentary.
Fortified places were an inherent part of the new mounted defense system which developed to meet the Viking, Arab,
and Hungarian threats. In the event of a raid the local populace could flee to the nearest strongplace - perhaps a walled
town, a castle or fortified manor or a stoutly built church - where, under the direction of the local captain - a
professional mounted warrior holding his lands from the crown, or one of the crown's lesser lords - they could attempt
to hold out until the regional contingent of men-at-arms rode to their relief.
Initially such strongpoints were relatively simple, sometimes no more than a mound of earth with a moat and palisade
and perhaps a tower of heavy timbers, construction in stone having fallen out of fashion with the demise of Rome. As
anyone attacking such a place usually had no notion of how to take it save by starvation or storm, one was generally
fairly safe in such a "motte-and-bailey" castle, for raiders usually had little time to starve such a place out, and might
not be inclined to pay the price of taking it by storm. Gradually, however, siege techniques became more sophisticated.
After all, wooden palisades and towers can be burned, and devices can be improvised for hurling fire and rock over
them. Stone therefore once again began to become common in fortification.
By the height of the Feudal Age (A.D. 1000-1300) Europe was dotted with fortified places. By way of example we may
note that in the 14th Century there were, in an area of approximately 1050 square kilometers just south of the forest of
Fontainebleau in France, twelve forts, 28 fortified churches, five towers, four fortified manor houses, and six full-
fledged castles, for a total of 55 fortified places, or roughly one for every 19 square kilometers. Few people were more
than a 15-20 minute walk from a place of refuge. This was, of course, after several centuries of development of the
prevailing military system.
Thus, at the height of the Feudal Age military activities were characterized and defined by two basic factors: the heavily
armed, professional mounted soldier and the fortified place. Both of these were relatively unbeatable, but did possess
some serious disadvantages. One of these was expense. The full panoply of a knight, including armor, weapons, and a
couple of horses, plus equipment for a squire, a page, and perhaps one or two additional retainers, could cost more than
180,000 ducats at a time when 2,500 ducats a year was a fairly good income. The annual cost to maintain this crew was
15,000-20,000 ducats. Since a knight's daily honorarium was usually about 50 ducats, active service could not bring in
enough money to cover expenses. If he served a full year he might earn 10,000 ducats, less room and board (and
another 10,000 ducats for his retainers). Moreover it was rare for a knight to serve for an entire year. Normally they
rendered only their obligatory 40-days or so, plus a few months here or there as the martial spirit moved him. Even a
cut-rate outfit could come to perhaps 60,000 ducats, though the kit and nag one might get for that sort of investment
might appreciably affect one's life expectancy in battle. Little wonder, then, that the military system of the Feudal Era
required landed wealth to support the knights. And fortifications were far more expensive than knights. (see Sieges.)
The combination of mounted knight and fortified place was the dominant military pattern throughout Western Europe
during the Feudal Age. To be sure, it sometimes failed, as when some North Italian urban (city) militia spearmen
defeated the mailed men-at-arms of the Holy Roman Emperor at Legnano in 1176, or as at Chateau-Gaillard, a great
fortress on the Seine between Paris and Rouenf, but such reverses were exceptions, and could be explained away. The
relative invincibility of the military system contributed to the enormous stability of the social system. Nevertheless, by
the 14th Century the knight was beginning to encounter some more serious resistance to his domination of the
battlefield, in the form of distinctly lower class Swiss pikemen, who several times diced up Habsburg knightly armies
by means of a solid phalanx of pikepoints and lots of determination. And equally low class Englishmen were learning to
use a new weapon Edward I had coopted as a result of his conquest of Wales, the longbow. Meanwhile, society was
becoming increasingly complex, commerce was booming, towns were growing rapidly, and there was a trend towards
the reassertion of royal domination in most countries, while the middle level lords had pretty much eclipsed the lower
ranking ones in influence. And something else was beginning to appear on the scene which would eclipse both knight
and castle, and ultimately help overturn the entire social and political order of Feudal Europe, gunpowder, and cannon.
During the Hundred Years War England was trying to assert the claim of its kings to the throne of France. The war was
characterized by long periods of inactivity punctuated by occassional battles engendered by raids or sieges. The English
military system, based on the long bow, proved virtually unbeatable on the battlefield by the French, who relied heavily
on the traditional man-at-arms. Put simply, on the battlefield the English normally adopted the tactical defensive.
Carefully selecting sites with well-protected flanks, they dismounted their men-at-arms to form a defensive line of
spearmen, and interspersed large blocks of longbowmen among them. The French would invariably attack, or could be
provoked into attacking by long-range arrow strikes. When they came on, whether horsed or dismounted, they would be
plastered with tens of thousands of arrows.
Not until the latter portion of the 14th Century did the French finally develop a strategy with which the English could
not cope. This was the work of Bernard Du Guesclin (1320?- 1380), Constable of France under the able King Charles V
(reigned 1364-1380). Du Guesclin recognized that the English were unbeatable tactically. But, while they could win
battles using their longbows and thus gain territory, they had to rely on fortifications in order to hold it. So he adopted a
strategy of attrition which avoided open battles with the fearsome longbowmen and relied upon ambushes, night
attacks, guerrilla raids, feints, calculated withdrawals, and sieges, for which he used an effective, if modestly sized,
artillery train.
The strategy worked well. In a series of campaigns between 1368 and 1380 the English were driven out of virtually all
of France. Du Guesclin's artillery helped get him into many of the lesser fortified places, which was a big help, but it
was too light to batter a way into the more stoutly built castles and cities, which had to be reduced by more conventional
sieges. The English proved incapable of coping with this strategy. Because Du Guesclin consistently, and intelligently,
refused battle under any circumstances, there was not a single pitched battle in the traditional style (i.e., with the
English longbowmen shooting down the French men-at-arms) during the entire dozen years of fighting.
Du Guesclin's highly unorthodox techniques caused his enemies --who included many high-born Frenchmen desireous
of stabbing the low-born Constable in the back-- to accuse him of "unchivalrous" and "cowardly" conduct. The fact that
English longbows were not one whit more chivalrous than French guile and artillery was overlooked, of course, as was
the fact that Du Guesclin's tactics worked.
In 1380, on the verge of total victory, Du Guesclin and his able master both died. By this time the English were
confined to a few cities along the coast of southwestern France, in the ancient province of Aquitaine, and were neither
able nor inclined to resume hostilities. The war thus entered another long period of inactivity. Surprisingly, despite the
evidence of the increasing inability of fortified places to cope with artillery, little attention was paid to improving
fortifications to make them better able to resist gunfire. After all, even Du Guesclin's artillery train was unable to reduce
the more extensively fortified places. Progress in gunnery continued in the decades after Du Guesclin's death.
The Du Guesclin period of the Hundred Years War, and the years immediately following it, had a considerable
influence on the growth of artillery.Nor was this influence confined to France and England, for the innovations spread
rapidly. Moreover, guns were beginning to appear on the battlefield with some regularity.
Early evidence for the use of cannon in the field is poor. Indeed, after a brief, somewhat suspect, mention of their use at
Crecy in 1346, we have no certain information for over forty years, until the famed Italian condottiero Giovanni Acuto -
-originally a low-born Englishman named John Hawkwood-- encountered some at the Battle of Castagnaro (11 March
1387). Hawkwood's outnumbered Paduans do not seem to have had any cannon, but their Veronese foemen had 20
bombards and three 144-barrel ribaults. Despite an inferiority in firepower, Hawkwood came away with an
overwhelming victory, the result of a brilliantly conducted flank attack. Gunpowder had been of but slight influence on
the course the battle. The cannon of the age had virtually no tactical mobility, were extremely slow firing, and had little
accuracy. While these disadvantages did not seriously impede their use in sieges, it made them virtually useless in
pitched battles. Hawkwood, among others, could not help but notice that this new innovation would most likely grow in
importance over time.
Although cannon would be present at many battles over the next half-century, their outcomes were not influenced by
that fact. Thus, at the Battle of Agincourt (25 October 1415) - during yet another round in the Hundred Years War - the
presence of a considerable contingent of artillery with the French did not prevent yet another generation of English
longbowmen from mowing down the French men-at-arms, this time deployed as a dismounted phalanx of pikemen.
Indeed, the artillery managed to get off only a few rounds before it was masked by the advance of the men-at-arms, and
thus managed to inflict but one fatality on the English.
During this period, only the Hussites demonstrated how effective gunpower weapons could be during the early 15th
century. But they were basically a bunch of religious heretics who were eventually brought down by sheer wait of
numbers, and their own internal disputes. Meanwhile, significant developments were taking place elsewhere in Europe
during the same period.
In 1415 King Henry V of England (reigned 1413-1422) resumed the interminable Hundred Years War with an invasion
of Normandy. His brilliance as a strategist and politician soon made him master of much of France. Militarily, the
English continued to rely on their time-tested longbows, which contributed to yet another victory over men-at-arms at
Agincourt. In addition they had a considerable train of artillery, which proved useful in taking French fortresses. French
resistance was inept, due to both military and political weakness. So succesful was Henry that France's Charles VI
(reigned 1380-1422), surnamed "the Foolish", renounced his own son in favor of Henry's son, giving him a daughter to
wed to seal the bargain, and produce the heir. Feeble resistance continued on the part of the disinherited Dauphin
Charles, but it looked like the war had ended in an English victory.
The deaths of both King Henry and King Charles within weeks of each other in 1422 had no noticeable effect on the
course of the war, for Henry's able brothers managed to hold things together for their infant nephew, Henry VI (reigned
1422-1461 & 1470-1471). In the period 1422-1428 English control was gradually extended to all of France north of the
Loire, save for Orleans. The siege of Orleans (September 1428 - 8 May 1429) proved to be the turning point in the war.
The numerous but demoralized defenders benefited from some excellent fortifications, as well as some 70 pieces of
artillery of all types brought to the city before the siege. This was probably the greatest concentration of guns in the
world at the time. These kept the English out.
Cannon were not yet powerful enough to batter down such stout walls, though they could be very effective at smashing
gates and outworks. They were also quite useful in creating fires and could inflict casualties. But techniques had been
developed to bolster the defenses of gates and outworks, and neither fires nor casualties were unanticipated events in a
siege. The fact that the French were able to respond to English firepower with their own also helped. Nevertheless,
given sufficient time Orleans would have fallen. That it did not was due to Joan of Arc (1412-1431). Joan inspired the
defenders to renewed efforts and the English were forced to abandon the siege. Joan went on to lead a counteroffensive
over the next few weeks which yielded the first French victories since Du Guesclin, culminating in the coronation of the
Dauphin as Charles VII (reigned 1422-1461) in newly liberated Rheims. France now had two kings, one the infant son
of Henry V, the other the newly crowned son of the last French king.
The war soon entered a new phase, as Frenchmen of all classes began to feel the stirrings of nationalism. This was
strengthened when the English foolishly burned the "Maid of Orleans" as a witch on 30 May 1431. As a martyr Joan
was even more valuable to France than as a maid-at-arms. Over the next dozen years the French gradually drove the
English back, clearing most of Northern France. In 1444 a truce was arranged, leaving the English with Normandy and
Aquitaine.
The French used the truce to totally reorganize their army. Charles VII may have been a relatively dim bulb, but he had
several able advisors, among them the Duke of Alencon, a good general, who had provided the military smarts for Joan;
the Constable de Richemont, a capable commander and administrator; and the Brothers Bureau, who were first class
military managers and organizers as well as being fine generals. These men thoroughly reorganized the French state and
army. Administration of government was centralized, local autonomy curbed in the interests of the great national
struggle. The national finances were reorganized and put on a rational basis, with a resulting windfall to the treasury.
This money was used to finance extensive military reforms. A new army was created. The troops were organized into
well-disciplined formations --even the men-at-arms-- with clearly defined ranks, a standardized tactical doctrine was
introduced, proper rationing allowances and regular pay were established, and a formal chain of command instituted.
Enormous sums were expended on the artillery, which was completely revamped. Now it was considered an integral
part of the army, with a well-defined role in cooperation with the horse and foot.
The equipment was modernized and standardized, and the pieces were properly mounted on mobile carriages. This was
made possible because improvements in metallurgy, and particularly in cannon founding, made it practical to reduce the
weight of metal in guns without affecting their capabilities. In addition, trunnions .may have been introduced at this
time, axle-like appendages emerging from the underside of the barrel at the piece's center of gravity, which permitted
more efficient elevation and training, to the great improvement of accuracy. Cheaper and more effective iron cannon
balls definitively replaced stone, which was as likely to shatter on masonry as to shatter it. The crews were
professionally organized and paid, formally trained, and subject to proper discipline.
One of the most important elements in the technical reform of the French army came in the form of a significant
advance in the making of gunpowder. Early forms of gunpowder were essentially just carefully blended mixtures of
saltpeter, sulphur, and charcoal in the prescribed proportions. By the early 15th Century efforts were being made to
insure more efficient mixing. Everything was reduced to fine powders, blended together, and sieved to insure a
consistent, but relatively loose mixture. Unfortunately each of the three ingredients has a different specific gravity, with
the result that they settle out when in storage, so that it was common for early artillerymen to mix their powder on the
spot.
The new French army quickly proved itself a superb instrument. Within weeks of the renewal of the war, the English
were on the defensive on all fronts. The French invaded Normandy and systematicly set about reducing strongholds. So
good had their artillery become that great fortresses easily succumbed to the pounding of the French guns. Castle after
castle fell. More importantly, the new cannon enabled the French to defeat the traditional English longbow tactics in a
pitched battle for the first time in over a century. At the Battle of Formigny on 15 April 1450 the English deployed as
had their ancestors at Crecy and Poitiers and Agincourt, with dismounted men-at-arms covering their front supported by
their longbowmen in the center and on the flanks. The French deployed in similar fashion, with their spearmen covering
a broad front supported by crossbowmen. But they also positioned two cannon on their flanks, six- or eight-pounder
culverins, long-barreled pieces firing upwards of 1,000 yards, greatly outranging the English bows. These wrought
terrible execution in the English ranks, provoking them into a charge. The English were cut to pieces by the combined
attentions of the French spears, crossbows, and cannon. Nearly 4,000 of them fell at a cost of perhaps 100 French lives.
It was a victory such as France had never experienced and it was due, in large measure, to France's modern artillery.
Within five months of Formigny, the first pitched battle in which artillery played a decisive role, all Normandy was in
French hands. Some 60 castles, cities, and fortresses had been taken in the space of a year, the average siege lasting but
six days. So effective were the new cannon that many places surrendered on terms as soon as the French emplaced their
guns. The French pressed on, and over the next few years secured repeated success in both sieges and battles until the
English were completely driven from France in 1453, after yet another disastrous tactical defeat at Castillon (17 July
1453). It was a stunning recovery and a remarkable victory, and it was largely attributable to French superiority in
firearms.
So in 1453 gunpowder brought an end not only to the Hundred Years's War, but also to the last remnant of the Roman
Empire, making that year a the principal milestone marking the end of the Middle Ages.
Recruiting, Organization, Tactics
The experience of war must inevltably change the practice of war. And in a war lasting more than a century, the practice
of war hanged enormously. Of course, from the perspective of the 20th Century - when the ways of war undergo almost
daily change - the evolution of the military art during the Hundred Years' War seems minor. Yet there were changes,
and they were both significant and of far reaching implications.
Recruiting
At the start of the wars, ln 1337, the theoretical basis for military service in both France and England was still feudal
obligation: a person owed service as a consequence of holding lands from the King, or from someone who held lands
from the King. A particularly prosperous individual might owe a great many men-at-arms and infantrymen. A relatively
impoverished person might be obliged to club together with several others of his ilk to supply but one man-at-arms or
infantryman. However, if this remained the theoretical basls of military service it was by no means practical under most
circumstances, such as foreign conquest. As a result it had been virtually abandoned in England.
For generations England had been involved in wars of conquest against Ireland, Scotland, Wales and, of course, France.
In these wars the traditional obligation of 40 days, which worked fine for home defense, proved impractical. A
campaign would barely begln before the troops' obligation had expired. So a practice called scutage had been invented.
A person owing militiary service paid a small fee to the King and was rid of his - or her - obligations for that year. Since
some people did not find military service particularly onerous, the king could then contract - "indent" - with them for
regular long-term service on the royal payroll, using the proceeds from scutage to pay them. Thus England developed
something of a regular army, consisting of hundreds of private contractors willing to provide service anywhere and
anytime at the King' s pleasure and expense. It was these men who formed the backbone of the English armies through
the Hundred Years' War.
Now scutage existed under French law as well, but France was so large - as was the military class - that even by relying
upon feudal obligation it was usually never difficult to collect a large army. The King could always find some money to
keep some men active if he really needed them beyond the traditional obligation. So the armies which met the English
at Crecy, Poitiers, Agincourt and on many another occasion essentially consisted of feudal levies; masses of reservists
with a small leavening of professionals. Many of these people were not particularly skilfull, nor experienced, and many
had their heads full or chivalrous nonesense. And since they were not necessarily on the royal payroll, they were not
necessarily going to obey orders.
Gradually the French improved, though not without painful disasters. The success of DuGuesclin later in the 14th
century was partially due to the establishment of something akin to the English indent system. Of course the
introduction of irregular warfare and gunpowder helped a great deal, but - aside from an increasingly favorable political
situation - the real breakthrough for the French came in 1445 with the organizatinn of the Compagnies de l'Ordonnance,
the first organized, full-time, salaried standing army in Europe since the fall of Rome. This gave the French a technical
superiority over the Engllsh, proving a significant factor in French successes during the final phase of the war, in 1449-
1453.
Organization
There were surprisingly little organizational differences between the two armies. Indeed, there was little variation af any
sort through the wars as a whole. Field forces were composed essentially of cavalry and infantry.
The cavalry was mostly heavy cavalry-men-at-arms (knights and "serjeants") with a small contingent of light horse.
These were formed into "lances," basic combat teams comprising two or three armored men (normally a knight or
serjeant, one or two squires) and usually one or two lightly equipped mounted troops (pages or bowmen). Several lances
formed a "post" under the senior man-at-arms, and several posts made a "banner" frequently under a veteran knight
called a "banneret." Even the French compagnies de l'ordonnance were organized on this basis, each company really
comprising a single banner.
The foot soldiery usually consisted of archers and several types of melee infantry. As time went by the archers -
whether longbowmen, shortbowmen, or crossbowmen - increased in numbers at the expense of the other types of foot
(spearmen, javelinmen, daggermen, axemen). In the English service, and probably also in the French, the foot was
formed into platoons of 20 men under a double-pay man (a "ventenar," or "twentier.") Five such platoons would
comprise the command of a"centenar" ("hundreder"), usually a squire, who received even more pay. Several of those
went to form a battalion, and we hear of specific commands of a thousand men during the 13th century. These were
often commanded by experienced knights, who received a knights pay, and usually a little more, for the responsibility
required to lead so many troops.
Finally, of course, there was the artillery. Both the English and the French had mechanical artillery, various types of
catapults and trebuchets which could be surprisingly effective. But chemical artillery - gunpowder artillery - was just
coming into existence during the Hundred Years War: There is some slight evidence that there may have been some
primitive cannon at Crecy, while the French certainly had several at Agincourt, albeit they accounted for only one
Englishman killed. The French took the lead in the development of artillery, if only because they spent most of the war
on the losing side. Much of their success under DuGuesclin and in the closing years of the war were due to their
possession of superior artillery: Certainly the French cannon were the decisive factor in their victory at Formigny.
Tactics
Through most of the Hundred Year's War the English were the tactical masters. Their Welch, Scottish, and Irish wars
had given then a lot of unique combat experience which served them well in France. Their basic tactic was quite simple.
The always tried to fight on the defensive, using dismounted men-at-arms to form a phalanx, behind and to the flanks of
which were formed masses of archers, all covered in front by wolf pits or sharpened stakes, and with their flanks resting
on secure natural obstacles. Such a defensive posture would force an attacking foe - whether ahorse or afoot - to come
at them from the front. In the process, the attackers would suffer greatly from the enormous volume of arrow fire.
Robin Hood to the contrary notwithstanding, it was the volume - not the accuracy - of the arrow barrage which would
cause the attackers problems. Consider that 6,000 archers carried a quarter of a million arrows and could easily
discharge them in a fairly leisurely fashion in a hour or so. In a hurry they could theoretically get them off in a couple of
minutes, with devastaging effect on any attacker. Thus, by the time the attackers were able to come to trade blows with
the dismounted English men-at-arms they were already pretty cut up, and possibly very disorganized. Of course, in
order for this system to work properly the enemy had to do the attacking. Usually this was no problem, as the French
tended to be overly agressive. On those occassions when they were less so, a few flights of arrows at long range usually
stung their honor sufficiently to force the issue.
The French ought to have been able to cope with the English tactics with relative ease. They had, in fact, some
experience combating steady infantry, having been thoroughly waxed by Flemish citizen-infantry at Coutrai in 1302.
But they had attributed their defeat to the boggy nature of the ground, which was only partially correct. Moreover, they
had several times over the following 20 years inflicted severe reverses on the sturdy Flemish burgers, and failed to
understand the reasons for their victories, which were just as easily explainable by citing unique circumstances as had
their reverse in 1302. Worse still, there was little of what has come to be called "institutional memory" among French
military leaders, who were themselves little more than reservists as well.
So the French continued to believe that a head-on clash was the key to victory, even when one was unnecessary. At
Crecy they tried it mounted. Blaming their failure there on the English trick of dismounting their men-at-arms, the
French tried dismounted combat at Poitiers and again at Agincourt. They never caught on to the idea that the English
technique worked only in defense. Never, that is, until Formigny, when their two cannon gave them the chance to force
the English into making an attack, which was essentially what the English had been doing to them for over a century.
Stratecy
It is sometimes difficult to discern whether some leaders during the Hundred Year's War had a strategic vision. For
some it is probably true that strategy was little more than pointing an army in a particular direction and turning it loose.
But clearly men like Edward III, the Black Prince, Bertrand DuGuesclin, and Henry V, had a clearer notion of strategy.
Operations were often undertaken with their political implications in mind, such as Henry V's campaign in Normandy,
which would simultaneously reclaim a province historically in the possession of the Kings of England and threaten
Paris itself. And Henry's enforcement of rigid --even draconian-- discipline with regard to the behavior of his troops
strongly suggests that he had a clear idea that winning ultmiately meant securing the "minds and hearts" of the
Normans.
But in the end, the English could never figure out how to win the war, although Henry V came close through dividing
the French. The French, of course, could see that the way to win was to clear the English out of France. But it took them
a long time to learn how to win the battles which would permit them to do this. Ultimately, of course, France was
transformed on the anvil of the war from a collection of petty feudatories into a nation. Once that happened the English
cause was doomed.
Pay for the troops
By the early 14th century, the most effective armies were those consisting of professional, paid troops. At this point,
these warriors were largely mercenaries, kings and magnates not yet being wealthy enough to maintain armies
permanently. The ancient system of raising troops through feudal obligation had, in the meantime, fallen apart. This
system, in its most common form, obligated each land holder to render 40 days of armed service a year to his overlord.
In practice, the obligation also depended on how much land was held and the fine print in the original arrangement,
Since the king was the "overlord of all overlords," he could, in theory, raise an enormous number of troops. In practice,
the feudal armies were often quite ineffective. For one thing, the feudal obligation had an escape clause whereby the
knights could pay money ("scutage") instead of showing up when called. Moreover, many knights promised to pay and
somehow never got around to it. Even the troops that did show up were usually quite eager to go home as soon as the 40
day obligation was up, or even earlier if they could get away with it. Since a campaign generally lasted longer than 40
days, this time limit could prove very inconvenient for the leader of the feudal host. The English had, by this time, done
away with the traditional feudal system and replaced it by one where the feudal lords were still obliged to supply troops,
but they would be paid and would stay in service for as long as the king could meet the payroll. The French were
moving towards a similar system, although they were not as well organized as the English, and would not be until the
end of the war.
Going into the 14th century, the idea of mercenary military service had caught on in a big way in Europe. Knights and
commoners under arms were all eager to take the gold of anyone looking to raise an army. The table below shows the
rates of pay that had become common during the period.
Translated into pay for 90 days in ducats for the various types of troops, the price list for troops would look something
like this;
Ducates Soldier Type
1.200 English Yeoman Archer (longbow)
1.500 Italian Crossbowman
1.000 Common (professional) infantry
1.000 Archer (short bow)
1.500 Light cavalry (common in Spain, where it was native, and Italy, where
it was often hired from Albania.)
2.400 Mounted Man at Arms (squire or  sergeant at arms )
5.000 Fief Holder (knight leading 20-50 troops)
40.000  100.000 for the above group
12.000 Noble (lesser noble leading 100-500 troops)
200.000  1.000.000 for the above group
25.000 Magnate (leading 1.000-5.000 troops)
2.000.000  10.000.000 for the group plus siege train, etc.
This comes to about 2,000 ducats per man on average, although in practice the employers could get off with paying
about half that by passing out IOUs that were never honored. This was a game in itself, and was one of the reasons
kings, and other magnates who hired troops regularly, surrounded themselves with loyal, well paid and permanently
employed bodyguards. There were threats and assassination attempts by unpaid soldiers, especially higher ranking ones
owned hundreds of thousands of ducats.
Other military specialists drew higher rates of pay for 90 days service.
For example: 10,000-Siegeworks Master. This would be an individual, often a commoner, who had a knack for running
sieges. Nobles often had one or more of these fellows in their household, and had to pay them handsomely lest these
talented fellows move on. When there wasn't a war going on, these specialists were often employed to build things, as
sieges were, more than anything else, construction (or "destruction") projects.
1,000-Siegeworks Artisan. These were commoners who were skilled at actually building siege machines or digging
specialized trenches and tunnels.
Pillage, Plunder and Ransom
Even if the agreed upon pay were not forthcoming on a regular basis, the troops could be kept loyal with sufficient
opportunities to pillage the countryside and plunder particularly rich places (like towns.) There was a lottery aspect to
this, because rich opportunities did not always present themselves during a campaign. But a share of the plunder could
make even a common soldier rich beyond his fondest dreams. Even without hitting the jackpot, just traveling around
with a large bunch of armed men presented new opportunities to enrich oneself. In most Medieval armies, it was
expected that the troops would "live off the land." Living off the land did not mean that they would go hunting and live
off nuts and berries from the forest. A more accurate term would be "live off any unarmed locals." It meant that any
food or other valuables encountered as the troops moved along was free for the taking. The nobles leading the army
would discourage the troops from pillaging while in friendly territory, which was why everyone was eager to "take the
war to the enemy." Once on the lands of the enemy, pillage was encouraged. This not only demoralized the enemies
population, but it made your troops happy and gave you the opportunity to skip a pay day and get away with it.
Plunder was another matter. This was organized pillage, undertaken when there was a lot of wealth concentrated in one
place and the nobles wanted to make sure they got their cut. Towns and castles were the most likely places to find
plunder, as anyone with wealth would look to such heavily fortified places as a safe location to park their money and
valuables. Taking walled towns or castles was no easy task, as it usually involved a long and costly siege. What kept
troop morale up during this dreary and dangerous process was the prospect of looting the town or castle. Any big
treasures had to be shared with the head of the army, but the common soldiers were customarily allowed to grab
anything else and, in general, enjoy themselves for a few days. If the town surrendered before an actual assault took
place, the terms usually included the payment of a large sum of money. While the troops would not be allowed to loot
the place, they would get a portion of this payment. Sometimes the besieging general would refuse to accept a surrender
unless his troops were allowed to do some looting anyway. It all depended on what shape his soldiers morale was in.
Not being allowed to plunder a town was a big disappointment to the troops. This attitude was known by those within
and without the walls and often led to a rapid surrender of a town or castle. The alternative was grim if the defender
guessed wrong about his chances of keeping the besiegers out. Towns and castles often yielded tens of millions of
ducats worth of coin and treasure. For an army of a few thousand men, and with the nobles taking at least half of this,
there was still enough left for each soldier to pick up a few thousand ducats. In an age when the average working stiff
was living well on an annual income of 3,000 ducats, this was good money indeed. And then there was all that
opportunity to abuse the local women. Armies were never friendly, cuddly creatures, and the people in the towns and
castles well knew it.
Ransom was a little harder, and riskier, to come by. The custom of the period was to take nobles and knights (anyone in
a good set of armor) alive, if possible. The captives family would willingly pay a ransom to get their man back. The
amount of the ransom depended on the wealth of the family and was, to a certain extent, negotiable. The captives were
not that difficult to take alive. All that armor protected the wearer from a lot of battlefield damage and often all you had
to do was knock him down, pile on, and disarm him. The fellow was usually quick to surrender at that point. The
problem was, to take a captive, you had to fight, win and survive a battle. Not an easy task when everyone was armed in
the same fashion and fought the same way. Moreover, only a small portion of most medieval armies consisted of
knights and nobles. Anywhere from 50 to 90 percent of a Medieval army consisted of commoners. These folks didn't
rate a ransom, and were usually found easier to kill than take prisoner. Commoner soldiers, knowing their probable fate
if their side lost, would usually run for cover at the first opportunity. English armies of the 14th century had ample
opportunities to defeat French armies. For the English yeomen infantry, who were often 70 percent or more of these
armies, there were splendid opportunities to take French nobles captive and many a yeoman family became rich in the
process. Ransoms of over 100,000 ducats were not uncommon. For a particularly high ranking noble, the yeoman might
bring in one of his own nobles to help with the negotiations. In any event, the commoner soldier would have indeed hit
the jackpot.
Logistics
Logistics, the art and science of supplying troops, was a lost art and an inexact science during the Medieval period. The
Romans had truly mastered the art of military logistics, but these lessons were among the many things the barbarian
successors to the Romans did not adopt for themselves.
The Roman system wasn't perfect. Money problems, enemy action, or communications foul ups would sometimes leave
the troops lacking key items. But when compared to their opponents, the Romans were much better off. Roman
opponents were either barbarians, who stole what they could find in the areas they passed through, or ill organized kings
who at best made haphazard arrangements.
Assurred of regular supply, Roman troops could more easily survive being under siege, or reduce enemy fortifications
themselves without worrying about starving. Well supplied Roman armies could march hither and yon for months at a
time while their ill-organized foes would see their troops getting hungry, and shortly thereafterwards deciding to go
home (with or without permission). Few of the armies Rome faced over the centuries had efficient logistics and were
thus under a lot more time pressure to reach a decision before their troops starved or, more likely, quit the field.
Unless you had a logistical system comparable to the Romans, and few Medieval armies did, you had to live off the
land. This could have dire consequences. Each man needed at least three pounds of food a day, and each horse twenty
pounds of feed. If these requirements were not met, the troops would first go hungry and then most of them would
either desert or, if you were far from friendly territory, starve to death or be picked off by enemy troops..
The horses could be grazed, but then there would not be much time left to travel far. This might not be a problem if the
troops were spending a lot of time wandering afield looking for food, a practice armies call foraging, but peasants
usually termed plundering. As this was often the case, it meant that armies moved along at a rate of only 5-10 miles a
day. Armies could not forage more than sixty miles from their line of march. The mounted forage parties (a dozen to
some hundreds of men and pack horses) had to be able to range outward to steal food and then get back in a reasonable
time, thus the sixty mile rule of thumb,. A large army, numbering over 20,000 men and even more horses, would
advance at that 5-10 mile a day speed and literally strip an area ten or more miles wide of all food and fodder (grass and
hay). Anyone coming into that area a few days later would find a wasteland. The local peasants would have fled, or be
starving in their hovels. This was a wasteful process. Usually as much, if not more, food was wasted by such methods as
was collected for the use of the army. It was for such situations that all those castles and walled towns were built. When
an army approached, even if it was just passing through, the peasants tended to flee to the fortified areas, taking any
food they could carry with them. Anything they couldn't take would be gone once the army passed. These troops would
usually not be able to get into the fortified places, thus the peasants could later emerge with what food they had saved
and try to pick up the pieces of their lives. If they had crops growing, whatever the army's horses hadn't eaten could
later be harvested. Even with that, it was a disaster for the locals, with many destined to die over the coming Winter
from malnutrition. Armies on the move killed far more civilians than soldiers, and the troops did just that by moving
about and eating up all the food they could lay their hands on.
Medieval armies could support themselves, and move twenty or more miles a day, if they were near a coast or river and
had ships to carry the supplies. But moving overland, any transport would be pulled by animals that also had to be fed,
either with grain they carried or by grazing the animals most of the day. It wasn't until railroads were introduced in the
1800s that this changed.
Medieval troops could carry about a weeks' worth of food with them, but only for the troops, not for the animals. The
animals would still have to be allowed to munch on grass and hay for at least four to six hours each day.
Some Medieval generals were up to the task of managing logistics, but there were few. One of the outstanding examples
was Richard the Lionhearted, king of England in the laye 12th century. Richard led a large army on Crusade to the Holy
Land. Previous Crusader armies had suffered greatly from a lack of logistical planning. Moving through hostile, and
often barren, country, several Crusader armies had literally fallen apart from lack of food. Richard arranged for supplies
to be accummulated and ships used to deliver them to his troops as they marched along the coast. He thus managed to
defeat Saladin, the great Moslem general. Unfortunately, Saladin also understood logistics. When Richard finally had to
march inland to besiege Jerusalem, he found that Saladin had stripped the country-side bare of food and fodder. The
wells had been poisoned and Richard realized that his army would fall apart from starvation if he tried to besiege
Jerusalem. The Crusaders had to settle for a treaty with Saladin that guaranteed Christian pilgrims access to the Holy
Places. This was also a classic example of two able, and well matched, generals checkmating each other and then
negotiating an agreement that left both able to claim a victory. This sort of solution was also quite rare, given the
shortage of competant military leaders in the period.
Many Medieval generals looked after logistical arrangements, but this was considered exceptional, if not a bit eccentric.
Each soldier was expected to tend to his own supply needs. This was sometimes done by purchasing food from the
locals, but soldiers on campaign habitually took what they wanted. This was especially true when they were in enemy
territory, where the thefts were considered part of the damage they were inflicting on their foes. An army was
considered well organized if it set up regular foraging parties from each major contingent, rather than simply allowing
the troops to wander all over the place for a meal, often getting into disputes with other members of their army over
who was to have what.
While this do-it-yourself supply system saved the army leaders a lot of money and administrative headaches, there were
numerous drawbacks as well. For one thing, foraging (as this looting and pillaging was called) for your food was time
consuming, not always successful and sometimes dangerous. Many of the locals were armed and if they were feisty and
determined, your foraging parties would either have to be quite large or risk getting chopped up. The main purpose of
setting up organized foraging parties was to reduce your own casualties from irate, and organized, locals. A Medieval
general also had to ensure that the primary business of war, moving towards the enemy and being ready for battle, was
not subordinated to the need to find food.
Experienced, or simply wise, generals sought to keep the peace in areas their armies were passing through by doing the
foraging on an organized basis. The local officials were contacted before the army arrived and told that if they supplied
certain amounts of food, at specificed times and places, the troops would be kept under control. This last statement, in
Medieval terms, meant that the army leader had a proclamation read to all the troops warning that anyone caught
abusing the locals would be summarily dealt with. The penalties were harsh, and some hangings were the usual result.
The miscreants were strung up in a public place, so the locals knew that they were getting "value" for the supplies being
extracted from them.
Troops pillaging was a problem even, or particularly, in your own territory. While your troops might owe allegience to
you, the only civilians they felt a kinship with were those from their own village. So if they were marching through
another one of your villages many miles from their own, the troops felt they were still moving through "alien" territory
and tended to act accordingly. This attitude persisted until quite recently, and well into the last century there were areas
of Europe were the peasantry used the word foreign" to describe people from the next village. Again, control could be
maintained if supplies were forthcoming and the soldiers were read the warning "do not abuse the population." In your
own territory, supplies would be obtained either by outright purchase (arranged by your officials governing the area.) or
by resorting to the obligations an area had under feudalism to provide supplies to its overlord and his servants whenever
he came to visit. If the lord came by with several thousand troops, the locals could do little but mutter and comply.
Usually, since the overlord did not want a dangerous drop in loyalty in the area, a portion of the supplies would be paid
for and great care taken to insure that the troops did not get out of hand. While this reduced the amount of food in the
area, it left a lot more than foraging would have. Indeed, with proper management a given area can usually feed an army
equal to its own population for a week or two without undue hardship to the local folks.
Then, as now, men tend to change their attittudes towards property rights once they are armed and organized into
groups. In Medieval times, there were no police departments or media to report atrocities. A few dozen soldiers could
come apon a village of a hundred or so people, thoroughly trash the place, abuse the women, steal everything portable,
and kill a few of the inhabitants, and no one would know about it except the surviving villagers and, eventually, other
villages in the vicinity. The soldiers, if they kept going, would literally get away with murder (not to mention theft,
rape, arson, and assault). The Medieval soldiers knew this, as did the civilians. Unless the leader of the army the troops
belonged to was keen on protecting civilians, nothing would be done to discipline the marauding soldiers. The prospect
for "plunder" was used to attract men to military service. If a general had a hard time meeting his payroll, and many did,
the troops could be kept in service by providing ample opportunity for plunder. This solved the payroll problem, as well
as the logistical one.
The Medieval approach to logistics continued into the 17th century. But the 30 Years War (1618-1648) so devastated
central Europe and the Rhineland that "foraging" was abandonded for good (with some lapses during the Napoleonic
Wars of the late 18tth and early 19th centuries). Even before the 30 Years War completely discredited foraging, the
practice fell into disuse in France and England as a result of the rampant campaigning and free lance brigandage during
the Hundred Years War.
One could say that one of the darker aspects of the Dark Ages and the Medieval period was the loss of the Roman
logistical system which led to a dependence on foraging to supply armies. It's probably no coincidence that the
beginning of modern times, "the Age of Englightenment" (late 17th century to late 18th century), included among its
many accomplishments the abandonment of foraging as an official government policy.
Just War
Medieval thinking on war, including that of Thomas Aquinas, was based on St Augustine's theory of the just war as laid
out in On the City of God (5th century AD).
St. Augustine saw war as a means to deal with sin. War was a judicial action in which the people fighting were, in one
way or another, righting a wrong. As Agustine put it originally, "justa bella ulciscuntur injurias" (just wars avenge
injuries) also means that the those who who wages wage war play the role of God's scourge and that this action, inspired
by love, is beneficial even for him against whom it is directed. The Augustinian attitude was that you have to show your
love any way you can and war was simply a large scale application of the death penalty to people who had earned it.
In more practical terms, a king might say to another that "your dynasty is wicked and I will invade you and wipe you
out to save your people from your wickedness." What they are really saying is that "your lands are in disarray and I'm
going to attack you because you're not strong enough to defend yourself."
According to Augustine, you can only take up the sword if you are the injured party, or if you perceive an injustice that
needs redressing (such as the occupation of the Holy Land by the infidels). Thus, to this day, an aggressor almost
always tries to come up with some injury to himself to justify his own invasion.
In the fourteenth century, Christian writers like John Gower and Philippe de Mezieres were not impressed by the
dynastic justifications for war offered by England and France. The warring parties even tried to recast their actions as a
crusade, so that they could be morally certain of waging a proper war. They were not concerned with how the war was
practised but whether it was in fact ever right in the first place. This is why the moral legitimacy of the sovereign who
declares war was so important to the theorists in the Middle Ages and later. Shakespeare in his play Henry V still had
this attitude.
Medieval war extended beyond the battlefield. Assassination was widely practiced and this was not felt to be a dastardly
act. As St Augustine put it, "all homicide is not murder."
There were certain exceptions to the law against killing, made by the authority of God himself. There were some whose
killing God orders, either by a law, or by an express command to a particular person at a particular time who speaks
with Gods authority. The pope, for example. One who owes a duty of obedience to the giver of the command does not
himself "kill," he is an instrument, a sword in Gods hand. For this reason the commandment forbidding killing was not
broken by those who have waged war on the authority of God. This standard also applied for those who have imposed
the death-penalty on criminals when representing the authority of the state, recognized by the church as the just and
most reasonable source of power. The Old Testament offered many examples of this use of Gods authority. When
Abraham was ready to kill his own son, so far from being blamed for cruelty, he was praised for his devotion. It was not
a criminal act, but one of obedience. In an other example, one is justified in asking whether Jeptha is to be regarded as
obeying a command of God in killing his daughter, when he had vowed to sacrifice to God the first thing he met when
returning victorious from battle (Judges 11 29ff). And when Samson destroyed himself, with his enemies, by the
bringing down the building, this can only be excused on the ground that the Spirit, which performed miracles through
him, secretly ordered him to do so. With the exception of these killings prescribed generally by a just law, or specially
commanded by God himself (the source of justice) anyone who kills a human being, whether by himself or anyone else,
is involved in a charge of murder. That was how St Agustine put it, and this interpretation was widely accepted
throughout the Medieval period.
St. Thomas Aquinas, the 13th century authority on theology, gave several criteria for a Just War:
1. The war must be to "right a wrong"
2. The war must be winnable. Fighting hopelessly, even against an evil despot, is not justified. Of course, which
struggle is winnable and which is not is something best judged with hindsight.
3. The suffering caused, or thought likely to be caused, by the war is going to be less than the suffering caused by
leaving whatever evil you are trying to correct, like a despot on the throne, in place. You want to wage the war
"efficiently" in terms of human suffering.
The third point was oft quoted to justify assassination. In the 14th century, the king was the state. Kill the evil noble and
you eliminate his evil rule. If the king or duke was an eveil fellow, "killing the tyrant" by any means neccessary was
considered spiritually superior to waging war and killing thousands of soldiers and civilians. But this ran up against the
establishment of class consciousness within the nobility. Seeing themselves as a better sort of people, the nobles found
it convenient to treat each other charitably in combat. Thus there was the prevalence of offering quarter and taking
ransom instead of the opponents life. Assassination was not unknown, but it was frowned apon. While the theologians
might condone one noble killing another, the aristocrats were content to pay ransom and fight again another day.
The nobles fighting in the Hundred Years War did so with little regard to the damage they caused. This was particularly
true with the English. Depopulation of towns and villages in France was noted in a lot of the sources. Petrarch visited
Paris in the 1360s and reported wolves running in the streets and whole surrounding villages empty. That probably was
caused in part by the plague, plus the medieval tendency to exaggerate and blame all earthly misfortune on human sin
and God's displeasure (God does things in a big way). Yet the war between the English and French king was fought in
such a way that everyone suffered except the two kings who started. According to Medieval thinking, one of these two
kings was "wicked" (each accused the other of being the bad guy), but neither of them suffered much for it.
During most of the Medieval period, war between the international nobility was insulated from the brutalising effects of
total war. It was something between a game and a career path, where people went to war for reasons of personal profit
and social advancement, rather than abstract devotion to king and country. In 1421, for example, two English squires,
John Winter and Nicholas Molyneux, entered into a solemn agreement to fight together in France and to pool their
winnings (ie, ransoms) and invest them at home. These fellows were definitly not going off to do Gods work.
Dispite the theological admonitions against it, the middle ages had an enormous propensity to accept cruelty and
barbarity as a fact of life. Thus you see figures like Sir John Hawkwood, who probably would be at home in Bosnia or
Somalia today as a warlord, being praised in the 15th century as a chivalrous and noble knight who deserved to be
remembered alongside Edward III, the Black Prince, and Sir John Knollys (another mercenary commander and self-
made man). Du Guesclin, who served with mercenary captains in Spain before going on to become Constable of France,
was praised as a pious and gallant knight.
There was a chivalrous side to all this, but not in terms of sparing the innocents. For example, Poton de Xaintrailles, a
professional soldier and mercenary, thought nothing amiss when he took a break from combat to participate in a great
tournament/pageant staged by Rene of Anjou in 1446. This was not hypocrisy, but chivalry as it was actually practiced
and an essential part of a military career. Attending tournaments with your enemies added social acceptability and class
solidarity to the profession of arms.
There were exceptions. The Wars of the Roses was pretty cruel, but it was an internal dynastic war. Those types of wars
are always cruel and very hard on participants with royal blood or royal aspirations. The French/Burgundian wars of the
same period were similar in tone.
What has come down to us via the most literate and persuasive Medieval writers is not entirely accurate. Froissart, for
example, genuinely believed in chivalry and all the pretty stuff that went along with it. So he tended to gloss over the
unpleasant stuff. Like massacres of peasants, rape and pillage, torturing of priests so's they'd reveal where the silver was
hidden, etc.
Ransom for Those Captured in Battle
In pre-modern times it was common to make war pay for itself. One way was to exact ransom from prisoners-of-war.
Because Medieval nobles fought in expensive, and pretty effective, armor, it was common for the nobles and knights to
survive defeat in battle. Since nobles saw themselves as a class that transcended nationality and language, it was
considered good manners, and good business, to take enemy nobles alive and hold them for ransom. This money was
eagerly, if not happily, paid. For the alternative was death, or a lifetime in captivity. The ransom for King Jean II of
France, captured at Poitiers, was so enormous (up in the hundreds of millions of ducats by our reckoning), that the
French never actually paid it. The king died of natural causes, in regal captivity in England, before the sum could be
collected.
Other French troops captured at Agincourt were ransommed for much less, and the list below shows the ransoms that
were paid for various prisoners.
Captive Ducats Captor
M. de Corpe 220.000 Two men-at-arms and an archer
Man-at-arms 8.000 Sir Robert Laurence
Man-at-arms 8.000 Sir Robert Laurence
Man-at-arms 16.000 Unknown
Man-at-arms 3.000 A man-at-arms
Man-at-arms 650 An archer
Unknown 360 An archer
In terms of Hundred Years War game, the players are at the level of the Seigneur de Corpe or higher. Family members
would presumably be at rather less than what the Player would have to pay. Most NPCs would be at the level of the
men-at-arms, the precise amount presumably varying with the status and skills of the NPC.
Amounts apparently varied according to the rank of the captor as well.
Although these figures are for a great many years later than 1337, there was little inflation during the period.
Siege Warfare
The siege was the most common form of battle in the Middle Ages. In most cases a siege consisted of little more than a
larger army cornering a smaller force inside fortifications. The besieger could try and attack the fortifications, but this
would often be risky (the assault would fail) and expensive (in terms of dead attackers). The most common tactic was to
try and starve the besieged force out. This took time, and given the expense of maintaining a large besieging force over
many weeks or months, the siege was often lifted because the besieging commander ran out of food to feed or money to
pay his troops.
The besiegers faced a formidable task, as they had to take on places that were expertly built to keep people out. But a
good reason to persevere was that there weren't that many fortified places. And the reason for that was the huge expense
of building these places.
Even a simple stone tower could be incredibly expensive. A plain tower erected at Dover between 1180 and 1190 cost
some 2.4 milliion ducats, at a time when crown income in England was probably no more than 12 million ducats a year.
As stone was fairly cheap (one or two ducats per hundredweight), the principal element in the cost was labor, which is
why construction was stretched over ten years.
If one wanted a more elaborate castle, and one wanted it in a hurry, costs would escalate rapidly. Thus, Chateau-
Gaillard, the great bastion erected by England's Richard the Lionhearted (reigned 1189-1199) on the Seine above
Rouen, was put up in a single year, 1197-1198, at a cost of 12,721,800 ducats, of which some 75% went for labor,
representing some 2,544,436 man-days, the equivelent of over 6,000 men for a year. Materials, on the other hand, ran
only about 2.4 million ducats, and transportation for such only about a million ducats more. When Edward I of England
(reigned 1272-1307) bound Wales between 1277 and 1302 with a chain of ten of the greatest castles ever built, his total
investment ran to something approaching 90 million ducats. Of course money expended on castles was money well
spent, for they were long-term investments in military security. Castles were pretty much invinceable, for the art of
siegecraft had not kept pace with that of fortification.
The best method of taking a castle was to use one's wits, to get inside by making a reasonable deal, or by means of a
clever ruse, or a judicious bit of treachery. Failing that, one had no choice but to attempt a siege. A siege was neither a
pleasant nor a cheap enterprise. One's army had to sit down outside the castle, blocking all entry and exit, and pound
away at its defenses. Moats and ditches could be filled in with bundles of wood or earth; walls could be smashed with
battering rams, undermined by tunnels, or bombarded by great catapult stones; the defenders could be picked off by
archery, flames, plague, or hunger. The variety of machines available for such work was remarkable, some hold-overs
from Roman times and some newly invented. Taking a castle this way required time and was costly in both money and
men, for the enemy would not remain passive in the face of such threats. Moreover, an enemy army might march up and
force one to give up the entire enterprise, with nothing to show for one's considerable investment in men, money, and
time. Of course if one were in a hurry, one could attempt to storm a fortification.
Taking a place by storm could take a variety of forms. If tunnels or battering rams and catapults were successful in
bringing down a portion of the wall, one could send one's troops up over the rubble in an assault. Or one could try the
same thing by going over the walls using scaling ladders and mobile siege towers called "belfries". Then it all was a
matter of desperate hand-to-hand sword and axe work, with a huge butcher's bill regardless of victor. In a storm, the
quality of one's manpower mattered little, for knights had to fight on foot, clammering over rubble or up scaling ladders.
This gave the defense a distinct advantage. Thus, a storm could be even more costly than a protracted siege.
There was another way to take a castle, one certain to work unless a relieving army came up, and one which was very
economical of manpower, the blockade. To blockade a place meant literally to prevent all exit or entry. Doing this long
enough would cause any castle to yield, for it would eventually run out of provisions. This could be done at little cost in
lives. But starving a place out was expensive in time and money, for one might have to wait months, and one's own
army had to be paid and fed whilst waiting.
Nevertheless, blockade did work. Chateau-Gaillard, virtually impregnable to conventional attack, succumbed on 6
March 1204, after an unusual winter blockade which had begun the previous September. To be sure, King Philip
Augustus II of France (reigned 1180-1223) conducted something more than a passive blockade, for he erected siege
works and successfully stormed the outer walls, but by the time of the final French assault the combined effects of
combat, hunger, and disease had reduced the defenders to no more than 140 able-bodied men. Taking Chateau-Gaillard
cost Philip Augustus a pretty penny, precisely how much no one knows, but it was easily several million ducats. This
was money well spent, for not only did the castle control traffic on the Seine, it also covered Rouen, the capital of
Normandy, then in English hands. Three months after Chateau-Gaillard fell, Rouen was French again, and the rest of
Normandy soon followed. Obviously no one could afford such an enormous investment on a objective of lesser
importance, so the castle was still a reasonable investment for anyone looking for a little security.
In the late 14th century cannon technology had matured to the point where effective cannon for sieges were available.
Early cannon were cast by bell makers using much the same technology applied to casting bells. However the soft
bronze used wore out quiclkly and reduced the force of the explosion. In 1375 the French built one of the early
successful cannon. Four ironsmiths, eight assistants and one laborer built three forges in Caen and worked 2,300 pounds
of iron. The gun was made from longitudinal strips of iron welded together and bound with 90 pounds of rope. It was
reported that during the siege of Odruik in 1377, 200 pound stone balls were fired. Also in 1377, a canon was ordered
that was capable of huring a 450 pound shot. At the Siege of Odruik, the Duke of Burgundy fielded 140 canon. It was
reported by Froissart that earlier that year at the siege of Ardes, the French canon pierced the walls. This was the first
record of a wall being pierced by cannon shot. Eventually the cannon helped bring about the downfall of smaller nobles
who could not afford to construct "cannon resistant" fortifications.
Chivalry
Chivalry was a peculiarity of the practice of war in medieval Europe. It can be likened to the Code of Bushido produced
in very similar feudal Japanese society. The feudal knight was supposed to be devout, honest, selfless, just, brave,
honorable, obedient, kind, charitable, generous, and kind to women. Sort of a heavily armed Boy Scout. His life was to
some extent governed by complex rituals and rules, and he belonged to a quasi-religious international brotherhood.
There were numerous examples of truly chivalrous conduct during the Hundred Years' War. Thus, the Black Prince
accorded Jean II of France all the deference due him as a king, even though Jean was a prisoner of war. And Jean,
having been released from captivity in England to help negotiate his ransom, voluntarily returned when one of his sons,
who had been standing surety for his return, escaped from England. These were deeds celebrated throughout Europe.
There was, however, another side to chivalry. Many French --and several English-- defeats in the war can be traced to a
bit too much concern for knightly honor, such as Crecy and Agincourt. And, of course, chivalry extended only to certain
classes of society. The code did not restrain a person of rank in his dealings with the lower orders.
Operations in which an army treated the local inhabitants with any degree of respect were rare. Henry V was kind to the
French commoners as a matter of policy, not chivalry. Henry wanted to win the loyalty of the French people and he was
often successful at it. But he was in many ways unusual. More often the march of an army through an area --whether
friendly or not-- was marked by looting, arson, rape, torture, murder, and all the other usual atrocities, while hunger and
disease brought up the rear. Thus, the Black Prince (Henry Vs great uncle) caused thousands of women and children to
be put to the sword during the sack of Limoges. And perhaps 12,000 commoners starved to death between the lines
during Henry V's siege of Rouen in 1418-1419, the garrison having driven all the "useless mouths" in the town outside
the walls, while the besiegers refused to let them pass their lines of investment.
Much of what has passed down to us regarding chivalry has to do with that aspect of it involving noble men pursuing
other mens wives. The "rules" for this game are roughly as follows:
1. Worship of the chosen lady
2. Declaration of passionate devotion
3. Virtuous rejection by the lady
4. Renewed wooing with oaths of eternal fealty
5. Moans of approaching death from unsatisfied desire
6. Heroic deeds of valor which win the lady's heart
7. Consummation of the secret love
8. Endless adventures and subterfuges
9. Tragic denouement
Item 6 was often played out at tournaments, where the lady in question could watch her lover roar through the lists and
make his mark jousting. Item 7 often took place the evening after the brave kinght won the tournament. Item 8 involved
trying to keep the lady's husband in the dark and item 9 was the result of the husband discovering he was a cuckold.
Like the Code Bushndo, the Code of Chivalry seems to have been honored mostly in the breach.
Orders of Chivalry
During the 14th century, it became quite fashionable for kings and magnates to establish "Orders of Chivalry." Some of
these still survive in England. These were not merely high honors. The members of the order were normally expected to
stand with the master in battle, as did Sir Thomas Erpingham, chief of the archers at Agincourt.
- Order of the Garter (1348) founded by King Edward III of England.
The ribbon around the shield signifies the status of Order of the Garter. The words Honi soit qui mal y
pense mean "Ashamed be he who thinks ill of it."
- Order of the Star (1351), King John II of France founded it in response to Edward's creation of the Garter.
- The Breton Order of Ermine (1382), founded by Duke Jean IV.
- The Golden Apple (1394), Knights of Auvergne and Bourbonnais.
- The Orleanist Porcupine (1396)
- The Golden Shield (1414), The Duke of Bourbon.
- The Dragon (c.1414), The Count of Foix.
- The Prisoner's Chain (1415), The Duke of Bourbon.
- Order of the Golden Fleece (1430), founded by Philip the Good of Burgundy, "From the great
love we bear to the noble order of chivalry, whose honour and prosperity are our only concern...
and for the furtherance of virtue and good manners." The Dukes of Burgundy placed at the
Order's disposal the resources of their enormous wealth. In their view, the order was to serve not
only as a symbol of their power; it could also be used to tie together the scattered dominions of
the Burgundian state.
The lamb at the bottom represents membership in the Order of the Golden Fleece. This order
technically still exists within the gift of the King of Spain (who inherits it through a very complex
series of marriages in the early 16th Century), but it has not been awarded in some time.
- The Crescent (1448), Rene of Anjou.
- The Green Shield of the White Lady (?), The 2nd Marshal of Bouccicaut.