SEESP
European Studies Centre, University of Oxford
Balancing Disappointment and Enthusiasm:
Developments in EU-Balkan Relations during 2003
SEESP OPINION PIECE
Dimitar Bechev
SEESP Research Associate
Enter the Greeks
When taking over the EU presidency, Greece made it clear that the Balkans would be top priority.
As early as January 2003, Foreign Minister George Papandreou's team issued an ambitious
strategy paper on the Western Balkans, confident that neighbouring Greece could make a
difference whilst at the EU's helm (Greek Presidency Priorities for the Western Balkans, 13
January 2003). It aimed to upgrade the Stabilisation and Association Process (SAP), the EU's
policy tool in the Western Balkans, into an enlargement-oriented framework. The paper spoke of
a 'Balkan European Integration Process' and a high-level Western-Balkans-EU forum to discuss
issues of common interest. In addition, the Greek Presidency pushed for the inclusion of
economic and social cohesion as goals on the EU agenda for the Western Balkans. The idea was
to channel funds into local-level initiatives targeting structural problems such as unemployment,
de-industrialisation and the lack of foreign investment. The Greek paper identified the EU-Balkan
summit scheduled to take place in Thessaloniki in June 2003 as the forum at which the region's
integration into the Union could be speeded up.
A year down the road, the question is whether the events lived up to initial expectations. It seems
appropriate to look at the bigger picture and put the question in context.
The bigger picture: integration or division?
Greece s bold move was indeed timely in light of the developments occurring beyond the Western
Balkans. In the EU annals, 2003 is likely to be remembered for the conclusion of the accession
treaty with the ten new members in Athens on 16 June. The enlargement endgame was delivered
during the December 2002 Copenhagen Summit, which also backed the aim of the two "left-
outs", Bulgaria and Romania, joining the Union by 2007. The Council also made pledges to both
of these countries for substantially increased funds ahead of accession. The Western Balkan,
however, feared they were the losers in the game. Uncertainty over the future of the enlargement
project post-2004/2007 clouded their outlook.
These fears at least partly reflected important changes at the global level, with the Balkans
caught between the EU and US. With international attention shifting to the Middle East, the region
could not rely on special treatment from the West. What is more, the squabbles within the EU,
and between France, Germany and the US over the war in Iraq held South East Europe hostage.
Virtually all of the regional governments were faced with a tough choice over the International
Criminal Tribunal as the US insisted on signing bilateral treaties with them to exempt its own
citizens from the court's jurisdiction. What is more, to some EU members' profound dislike, most
Balkan states were quick to jump on the "New Europe" bandwagon and support the war in Iraq.
Nevertheless, the EU-US cooperation on a range of Western Balkan issues was preserved, and
even advanced, with the EU launching a police mission in Bosnia-Herzegovina in January 2003
and taking up peacekeeping duties in FYR Macedonia from NATO two months later. For its part,
the Greek Presidency did a good job in ensuring that the EU remained focused on the Western
Balkans despite Iraq. Luckily, the tectonic moves in world politics had little negative fallout on the
region and its progress towards the EU.
Western Balkans' progress towards the EU
The success of the SAP can be measured by what has been accomplished by the individual
Western Balkan states. In January 2003, Albania started formal negotiations for a Stabilisation
and Association Agreement (SAA), having been turned down three years earlier. Based on its
progress in implementing the SAA signed in 2001, Croatia submitted a membership application in
February and declared its readiness to open accession talks. In response, Zagreb was asked to
complete a 3,000-page questionnaire to assess its level of preparedness. The Commission
received the answers in October and is due to submit to the Council an avis on the Croatian
application in spring 2004. Serbia and Montenegro fared less well. The two republics could not
bridge their differences over external trade regimes, which is a key EU condition for the common
state to start SAA negotiations. Thus the tensions inherent in preserving the federal state, under
EU pressure, ultimately hindered progress on the SAP agenda. Scandals related to the
unauthorized re-export of sugar to the EU under the preferential terms extended to the Western
Balkans further marred Serbia's image, not to mention the political instability in Belgrade all
through the year culminating in yet another unsuccessful presidential election. Serbia and Croatia
faced comparable international pressure over the Hague-based International Criminal Tribunal for
former Yugoslavia (ICTY). In the case of Croatia this has important consequences for its EU bid.
The UK and Netherlands postponed the ratification of the SAA and made progress conditional on
Zagreb's cooperation in extraditing high-profile figures such as General Gotovina. Motivated by
Croatia's example, FYR Macedonia has been considering submitting a membership application
but no words of encouragement have come from Brussels or the Member States' capitals. On 18
November, the Commission adopted a feasibility study on Bosnia, paving the way for a SAA, but
made the start of negotiations conditional on further progress on issues like the reintegration of
Mostar and the fight against organised crime. Overall, the SAP moved forward but the progress
was thorny and uneven.
Thessaloniki and the enhanced SAP
The run-up to Thessaloniki saw increasing foreign policy activism in the Western Balkans. The
region's leaders used all possible diplomatic fora to flag up their ambitions. Gathered in Ohrid in
early June, they demanded that the EU should give the region a clear membership horizon.
Croatia insisted (and indeed is still insisting) on acceding alongside Bulgaria and Romania in
2007. President Svetozar Marovic was quick to announce that the same applied to Serbia and
Montenegro. Lofty rhetoric, often directed toward domestic audiences, was sometimes followed
by more down-to-earth suggestions. It was requested that, within the Commission, the
Enlargement Directorate should take over responsibility for the Western Balkans. The Western
Balkans also demanded that funds left from the 2004 enlargement be channeled into the CARDS
programme.
Given that the issues of candidacy and extra funding monopolised the headlines, it was no
surprise that the Thessaloniki Summit proved a disappointment for the Western Balkan politicians
and citizenry. Promotion to candidate status was not on the table, while CARDS was beefed up
with only 200 million euro for the period until 2006. The EU referred to the region's membership
perspective, but adhered to the 'potential candidates' formula introduced during the Feira
European Council in 2000, and was reluctant to transfer the SAP to Commissioner Verheugen.
Finally, social and economic cohesion for the region did not find a place on the agenda despite
Greece's support. As a result, many in the region interpreted Thessaloniki as a failed opportunity
(RFE/RL Newsline, 23 June; Patrick Moore, EU Membership for the Western Balkan States
Remains "Over There, Far Away", RFE/RL Balkan Report, 27 June 2003).
The post-Thessaloniki pessimism, however, was partly unjustified considering the outcome of the
summit. Although the level of political commitment remained unaltered, the SAP was clearly
enriched with a variety of instruments that brought it as close as possible to the enlargement
template. This was sanctioned by the Thessaloniki Agenda, a document put together by the
Commission and endorsed by the EU General Affairs Council (The Western Balkans and
European Integration Communication from the Commission to the Council and the European
Parliament COM (2003) 285 - 21/05/03; Thessaloniki Agenda for the Western Balkans: Moving
towards European Integration, Luxembourg, 16 June 2003). It introduced European Partnerships,
a mechanism for supporting each country's progress through identifying priorities across sectors.
Termed European Integration Partnerships in the Commission's original proposal, the mechanism
is clearly modeled on the Accession Partnerships in force for the candidates of Central and
Eastern Europe. To strengthen the SAP states' institutions, the EU also launched twinning
exchanges with administrative staff from the Member States, and made the region eligible for
technical assistance for harmonising national legislation with the acquis communautaire. Brussels
also opened its research and education programmes. In addition, the Thessaloniki Agenda
inaugurated a regular EU-Western Balkan forum for political dialogue at the ministerial level on a
number of common-interest issues, including Justice and Home Affairs. Its first meeting took
place on 9 December in Brussels.
It is fair to say that although the EU-Balkan Summit was not a breakthrough, it added much flesh
to the bone by transforming the SAP into a more coherent EU integration framework. What is
more, the Thessaloniki Agenda gives the Commission a greater role in the SAP, which is a long-
term guarantee that the Western Balkans will not slip from the agenda after the 2003 Greek and
Italian presidencies.
On the political side, the EU was economical in its promises, but this did not discourage
frontrunner Croatia from pursuing its membership bid. The Union has also been, nevertheless,
emphatic that the Western Balkans are not part of its Wider Europe agenda -- a way of stressing
that accession remains the strategic goal of its policy for the region. However, it is still not clear
how one graduates from the SAP to a more tangible membership perspective. The latter is not an
issue for Bulgaria and Romania. The Thessaloniki Council's conclusions backed 2004 as the date
for closing accession negotiations and decoupled progress on chapters like regional policy,
agriculture, and the budget from the adoption of a new financial framework for the period 2007-
2012. What remains to be seen is whether Sofia and Bucharest will manage to complete
membership talks by the end of 2004, and how Croatia's application will be received. In sum,
2004 promises to be far more important for South East Europe's integration into the EU than
2003.